Security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction

By constructing a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attacks, and a path selection probability parameter, the problem of neglecting the linkage effect of vulnerabilities in traditional assessments is solved, enabling a comprehensive and accurate assessment of information system security risks and dynamic optimization of defense resources.

CN121864343APending Publication Date: 2026-04-14ELECTRIC POWER RES INST OF GUANGXI POWER GRID CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202511575843.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-10-31
Publication Date
2026-04-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing technologies are insufficient to comprehensively and accurately assess the security risks of information systems, especially in diverse attack chain scenarios. Traditional assessment models lack a comprehensive consideration of the overall attack scenario and the impact of the relationships between assets, resulting in inaccurate assessment results and being time-consuming and labor-intensive.

Method used

By constructing a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack stages, a set of attack paths is generated, and the risk value and probability of being selected are calculated. By introducing a path selection probability parameter, the entire process of attack chain can be visualized and dynamically updated. Combined with asset changes and the discovery of new vulnerabilities, accurate basic data support is provided.

Benefits of technology

It enables more comprehensive risk assessment, accurately identifies high-risk combination vulnerabilities, supports dynamic deployment of defense resources, improves the accuracy and efficiency of assessment, and aligns with the decision-making logic of real attacks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction, relates to the technical field of network security, and solves the problem that security risks are difficult to comprehensively and accurately assess in the prior art. According to the embodiment of the invention, by establishing the asset-vulnerability-attack stage mapping relationship, the whole-process visual modeling of the attack chain from initial reconnaissance to target achievement is realized, the specific effect of the vulnerability in the attack chain is determined, and the problem that the vulnerability linkage effect is neglected in traditional assessment is solved, so that more comprehensive risk assessment is realized; in addition, the mapping relation can be updated in real time according to asset change and new vulnerability discovery, accurate basic data support is provided for attack path generation, and dynamic construction of an attack surface panoramic view is achieved. Besides, by introducing path selected probability parameters, subjective strategy preferences of the attacker are brought into quantitative evaluation of the risk, so that total risk evaluation better fits real attack decision logic, and a more accurate evaluation result is obtained.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, information systems based on networks and centered on information resources are continuously expanding in scale. At the same time, information warfare and cyberattacks are escalating, and the security risks and threats faced by information systems are becoming increasingly severe. Theoretically, security management is a dynamic process and cannot rely solely on a single security product to solve all security problems. In the security management process, security risk assessment is a crucial initial step. Only by conducting an assessment can we identify system vulnerabilities and areas of greatest risk, and then, through cost-benefit analysis, take necessary security measures. Currently, threat assessment models centered on attackers are common approaches. While asset / impact-centered models consider the motivation and capabilities of threat sources to determine asset value and impact, they are insufficient for analyzing complex attack chains during an attack. Vulnerability / architecture-centered models focus on analyzing system design or detecting attacks that each component or vulnerability may encounter, lacking a comprehensive consideration of the overall attack scenario and the interrelationships between assets. Furthermore, diverse attack chains under various threat scenarios can cause different losses and impacts. Manual threat assessment not only consumes a significant amount of time and energy for security personnel, but the assessment conclusions often contain a large amount of non-quantifiable information, making effective risk management difficult. Therefore, a security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction is needed. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To address the problem that existing technologies struggle to comprehensively and accurately assess security risks, this invention provides a security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction. This method can more comprehensively and accurately assess security risks, thereby more effectively protecting the security of information systems. The specific technical solution is as follows: In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a security risk assessment method based on attack chain deduction, including: Acquire asset information, vulnerability scan reports, and threat intelligence; based on the asset information, vulnerability scan reports, and attack phase framework, construct a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases; based on the characteristics of the attack phases in the three-dimensional mapping relationship, acquire attack behaviors; based on the attack behaviors and the attack phases, generate a set of attack paths; for each attack path in the set of attack paths, calculate a risk value and a probability of selection based on the threat intelligence; wherein, the probability of selection is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference; calculate the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of selection.

[0004] Preferably, the risk value is the product of the success probability of the attack chain corresponding to the attack path and the total loss of the path; the success probability of the attack chain is the product of the transition probabilities of the corresponding attack stages, and the transition probability is the probability of transitioning from the previous attack stage to the next attack stage in two adjacent attack stages, and the formula for calculating the transition probability includes: ; in, From the attack phase arrive The transition probability, for The success rate of exploiting vulnerabilities corresponding to each stage. for The degree of alignment between the target environment and the stage. For the defense mechanism to intercept the attack phase Leap to The probability of a stage; the success rate is based on the frequency with which attackers exploit the corresponding vulnerability in the threat intelligence.

[0005] Preferably, the probability of selection is calculated based on the complexity of the attack path, the public nature and ease of use of the vulnerability in the three-dimensional mapping relationship, the attacker type, and the success probability of the attack chain.

[0006] Preferably, the calculation of the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of being selected includes: calculating the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and summing the weighted risk values ​​for each attack path to obtain the total risk value.

[0007] Preferably, the calculation of the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of selection includes: calculating the product of the risk value and the probability of selection for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and selecting the largest weighted risk value as the total risk value.

[0008] Preferably, the process of generating an attack path set based on the attack behavior and the attack stage includes: constructing an attack graph with the attack stage as a node and the attack behavior as a directed edge; and generating the attack path set using an improved breadth-first search algorithm based on the asset network topology and the permission dependency relationship of the attack behavior.

[0009] Preferably, the attack phases in this attack phase framework include the reconnaissance phase, weaponization phase, delivery phase, utilization phase, installation phase, command and control phase, and target achievement phase.

[0010] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a security risk assessment system based on attack chain deduction, applied to the method described in the first aspect, the system comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire asset information, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence. The building module is used to construct a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases based on the asset information, the vulnerability scanning report, and the attack phase framework. The acquisition module is also used to acquire attack behavior based on the characteristics of the attack phase in the three-dimensional mapping relationship; The generation module is used to generate a set of attack paths based on the attack behavior and the attack stage; The calculation module is used to calculate the risk value and the probability of selection for each attack path in the set of attack paths, based on the threat intelligence; wherein the probability of selection is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference. The calculation module is also used to calculate the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of being selected.

[0011] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a computing device, including: a memory for storing a program; and a processor for loading the program to execute the method as described in the first aspect.

[0012] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium including a stored program, wherein, when the program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform the method described in the first aspect.

[0013] Compared with existing technologies, the beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: By establishing a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack stages, it not only achieves full-process visual modeling of the attack chain from initial reconnaissance to target achievement, but also determines the specific role of vulnerabilities in the attack chain, solving the problem of neglecting the linkage effect of vulnerabilities in traditional assessments, thus achieving a more comprehensive risk assessment; it can also update the mapping relationship in real time based on asset changes and the discovery of new vulnerabilities, providing accurate basic data support for attack path generation and realizing the dynamic construction of a panoramic view of the attack surface. Furthermore, by introducing a path selection probability parameter, it incorporates the attacker's subjective strategy preferences into the quantitative risk assessment, making the overall risk assessment more closely aligned with the logic of real attack decisions, thereby obtaining more accurate assessment results. Attached Figure Description

[0014] To more clearly illustrate the specific embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the specific embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. In all the drawings, similar elements or parts are generally identified by similar reference numerals. In the drawings, the elements or parts are not necessarily drawn to scale.

[0015] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a security risk assessment method based on attack chain deduction provided in this application embodiment; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a security risk assessment system based on attack chain deduction provided in this application embodiment; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computing device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0016] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0017] It should be understood that, when used in this specification and the appended claims, the terms "comprising" and "including" indicate the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or collections thereof.

[0018] It should also be understood that the terminology used in this specification is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the invention. As used in this specification and the appended claims, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0019] It should also be further understood that the term "and / or" as used in this specification and the appended claims refers to any combination of one or more of the associated listed items and all possible combinations, and includes such combinations.

[0020] To address the problem that traditional methods are insufficient for a comprehensive and accurate assessment of security risks, this invention provides a security risk assessment method and system based on attack chain deduction, which can more comprehensively and accurately assess security risks, thereby more effectively protecting the security of information systems.

[0021] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 This application provides a flowchart illustrating a security risk assessment method based on attack chain deduction, which is applied to a computing device; Figure 1 As shown, the method includes: Step 101: The computing device acquires asset information, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence.

[0022] The computing device can be a server or a terminal. Specifically, the computing device can be a server or terminal dedicated to risk assessment, or it can be a multi-functional server or terminal that carries both security and risk assessment functions.

[0023] For example, in large enterprises or security scenarios, one or more servers are deployed to centrally process asset information, vulnerability data, and threat intelligence through risk assessment software or functional modules, and to complete risk value calculation and assessment report generation.

[0024] For example, risk assessment functions can be integrated into the hardware of the security management center. These devices are themselves high-performance computing platforms that first collect security data from the entire network, then incorporate assessment algorithms to directly complete risk analysis, eliminating the need for additional separate equipment.

[0025] Among them, computing devices can collect multi-source data through asset mapping technology, which includes asset information, vulnerability scanning reports and threat intelligence.

[0026] Specifically, computing devices can obtain asset information from an asset information database, which includes information such as server model and application software version.

[0027] Specifically, computing devices can obtain vulnerability scanning reports output by security tools, which include vulnerability numbers, vulnerability types, vulnerability locations, and severity levels.

[0028] Specifically, computing devices can obtain external threat intelligence from professional security platforms, publicly available intelligence channels, and internal security system analysis reports. This threat intelligence includes the vulnerability exploitation preferences and latest attack methods of active attack groups.

[0029] Step 102: The computing device constructs a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases based on the asset information, the vulnerability scanning report, and the attack phase framework.

[0030] In order to systematically break down the complex attack process and lay the foundation for subsequent attack behavior analysis and path deduction, the computing device can pre-set the attack stage framework.

[0031] Specifically, computing devices can refer to authoritative attack models such as MITRE ATT&CK to divide the attack chain into seven core stages to set up an attack stage framework.

[0032] Preferably, the attack phases in this attack phase framework include the reconnaissance phase, weaponization phase, delivery phase, utilization phase, installation phase, command and control phase, and target achievement phase.

[0033] Each stage has distinct characteristics and boundaries, making it easy to accurately identify attack behaviors and vulnerability exploitation scenarios at each stage.

[0034] Specifically, the characteristics of each attack phase in this attack phase framework include: Reconnaissance phase: Attackers construct a profile of the target system by scanning open ports, probing service versions, and collecting network topology; assets involved include devices exposed on the network such as firewalls, routers, and web servers. Weaponization stage: Based on the information obtained through reconnaissance, attack tools adapted to the target are created, such as constructing malware containing exploit code, specially crafted data packets, etc. Delivery phase: The attack weapons are delivered to the target system through phishing emails, malicious webpage embedding, supply chain implantation, and other methods. Exploitation phase: By exploiting vulnerabilities in the target system, such as the Struts framework remote code execution vulnerability and the Structured Query Language (SQL) injection vulnerability, the attacker executes the payload to gain initial access.

[0035] Installation phase: Deploy backdoor programs and create persistent accounts on the target system to ensure long-term control. Command and Control Phase: Establish a stable communication channel between the attacker and the compromised system for issuing commands and transmitting data back.

[0036] Objective achievement phase: Complete the final attack objectives such as data theft, system destruction, and ransomware attacks. Based on the aforementioned attack phase framework, computing devices can establish a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases, serving as the core data foundation for attack path deduction. Specifically, computing devices can clearly identify the assets and their vulnerability distribution within the system, and then, by analyzing historical security data or pre-defined relationship data on how vulnerabilities might be exploited by attackers, deduce the attack phase to which a vulnerability belongs within the attack phase framework.

[0037] For example, the preset relationship data includes the correspondence between vulnerabilities and attack stages; when a vulnerability may be used in multiple attack stages, the preset relationship data also includes the matching conditions between vulnerabilities and different attack stages.

[0038] For example, a Struts 2 framework vulnerability on a web application server can directly enable remote code execution, and therefore can be clearly associated with the exploit phase; while a weak password vulnerability may be used for remote login during the exploit phase or for maintaining communication during the command and control phase.

[0039] This application's embodiments break through the limitations of traditional vulnerability list-based assessments, innovatively dividing the attack process into seven standardized stages. By establishing the aforementioned three-dimensional mapping relationship, it achieves visualized modeling of the entire attack chain from initial reconnaissance to target achievement. This model not only clarifies the typical attack behaviors at each stage but also accurately locates the specific role and scenario of the vulnerability in the attack chain, solving the problem of neglecting the interconnected effects of vulnerabilities in traditional assessments.

[0040] By integrating asset information databases, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence to build dynamic relationships, the mapping relationships can be updated in real time based on asset changes (such as software upgrades) and the discovery of new vulnerabilities (such as zero-day vulnerability disclosures). This mechanism breaks down the data silos in traditional asset mapping, provides accurate basic data support for attack path generation, and realizes the dynamic construction of a panoramic view of the attack surface.

[0041] By dynamically associating assets with vulnerabilities, asset information, vulnerability data, and threat intelligence scattered across different systems are integrated to form a complete attack surface view. Security teams can intuitively understand which assets have high-risk vulnerabilities and at which stage of the attack chain these vulnerabilities might be used, effectively supporting attack chain analysis and precise deployment of defense resources.

[0042] Step 103: The computing device obtains the attack behavior based on the characteristics of the attack phase in the three-dimensional mapping relationship.

[0043] The computing device can obtain specific attack behaviors and targets that may occur at each stage based on the characteristics of the attack phase and the correlation results of asset vulnerabilities. These attack behaviors can also be referred to as potential attack behaviors.

[0044] Specifically, computing devices can identify the technical actions that attackers might take against a specific vulnerability at each stage of an attack, providing data input for generating subsequent attack paths.

[0045] Specifically, computing devices can use this three-dimensional mapping relationship to analyze typical attack behaviors. For example, during the reconnaissance phase, attacks targeting network device vulnerabilities may include port scanning and service version probing; during the exploitation phase, attacks targeting Struts framework vulnerabilities may include constructing malicious HTTP requests and triggering OGNL expression injection; and during the command and control phase, attacks may involve using domain name generation algorithms to circumvent DNS interception and using encrypted channels to transmit data.

[0046] Then, the computing device can construct the correspondence between these typical attack behaviors and their corresponding attack stages.

[0047] Step 104: The computing device generates a set of attack paths based on the attack behavior and the attack stage.

[0048] The computing device can construct a set of attack paths from the initial attack to the achievement of the target based on the correspondence between the attack stages and attack behaviors obtained in step 103. Specifically, computing devices can enumerate all possible combinations of attack paths, providing analytical objects for subsequent risk quantification.

[0049] Preferably, the computing device can construct an attack graph with the attack stage as the node and the attack behavior as the directed edge; and use an improved breadth-first search algorithm to generate the attack path set based on the asset network topology and the permission dependency relationship of the attack behavior.

[0050] The attack diagram can visualize the originally abstract attack process into a concrete attack step diagram.

[0051] During the path search process, the computing device can combine the asset network topology and the permission dependencies of the attack behavior to exclude paths that are impossible from the perspective of network topology, as well as paths that do not conform to permission relationships and attack logic, and obtain a set of alternative attack paths.

[0052] Then, the computing device can remove duplicate paths (such as paths where different tools exploit the same vulnerability) and infeasible paths (such as paths where the vulnerability has been patched) from the set of alternative attack paths, retaining the set of valid paths, thus obtaining the set of attack paths.

[0053] In other possible implementations, the computing device may also use depth-first search or more complex path discovery algorithms for path searching.

[0054] By modeling the entire attack chain, we can identify the interconnected role of vulnerabilities in the attack chain, helping security teams discover high-risk combination vulnerabilities from the perspective of the overall attack path and avoid overlooking potential threats across stages. Step 105: The computing device calculates the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path in the attack path set based on the threat intelligence.

[0055] In the field of risk management, risk is usually defined as a measure of expected loss caused by a potential security risk event, i.e., risk (R) = probability of a potential threat event occurring (P) × loss caused by the event (C).

[0056] Therefore, after obtaining the set of attack paths, the computing device can calculate the success probability of the attack chain for each attack path, as well as the total loss of the path; and then calculate the risk value corresponding to the attack path based on these two factors.

[0057] Preferably, the risk value is the product of the success probability of the attack chain of the corresponding attack path and the total loss of the path.

[0058] Here, a transition from one attack phase to the next is defined as a phase jump. The success probability of this attack chain is the product of the transition probabilities of the corresponding attack phases. This transition probability is the probability of transitioning from one attack phase to the next in two adjacent attack phases. The formula for calculating this transition probability includes: ; in, From the attack phase arrive The transition probability, for The success rate of exploiting vulnerabilities corresponding to each stage. for The degree of alignment between the target environment and the stage. For the defense mechanism to intercept the attack phase Leap to The probability of a stage; the success rate is based on the frequency of attackers exploiting the corresponding vulnerability in the threat intelligence; the total loss of the path is the economic loss caused by the successful attack corresponding to the attack path.

[0059] The computing device can calculate the success rate of the vulnerability based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score, historical exploitation data, and the frequency of attackers' exploitation of the vulnerability, with a value range of [0,1].

[0060] Specifically, the CVSS score is used to indicate the severity of the vulnerability itself, historical exploitation data is used to indicate whether it has been frequently exploited in the past, and the frequency of attackers' exploitation of the vulnerability in threat intelligence is used to indicate whether hackers are currently targeting this vulnerability.

[0061] Specifically, the CVSS score ranges from 0 to 10 and can be normalized to serve as the base probability. Historical exploitation data can be obtained by taking the number of times the publicly disclosed exploit tool corresponding to the vulnerability has been used within the last 30 days, dividing it by 100, and then normalizing the result.

[0062] Specifically, the computing device can perform a weighted calculation of the CVSS score, historical exploitation data, and the frequency of attackers' exploitation of the vulnerability to obtain the success rate of the vulnerability.

[0063] The computing device can set matching conditions based on known vulnerabilities and assess the degree of matching between the target asset environment and the vulnerability exploitation conditions based on these matching conditions. For example, whether the software version, system configuration, and privilege level required by the vulnerability match; the higher the matching degree, the closer the value is to 1.

[0064] The computing device can calculate the interception probability of the defense mechanism based on the effectiveness of the defense measures of the target system, such as the interception rate of firewall rules on attack ports and the recognition rate of intrusion detection system on attack behavior, with a value range of [0,1].

[0065] By integrating multiple data sources such as CVSS scores, threat intelligence activity, system configuration matching, and defense effectiveness to calculate vulnerability exploitation rates, this model achieves dynamic and objective probability calculations compared to the single vulnerability score reference of traditional models. It is more in line with the impact of defense measures on the attack chain in actual attack scenarios, significantly improves the accuracy of probability assessment, and solves the problem of subjectivity in probability calculations of traditional models.

[0066] After calculating the success probability of each attack chain along the attack path, the computing device can calculate the total loss for each path. The computing device can use a weighted approach to derive the specific value by considering factors such as asset value (e.g., the business value score of the core database), business interruption losses (hourly downtime loss amount × estimated downtime), and data breach losses (compliance fines + quantified reputational damage).

[0067] Then, the computing device can synthesize the risk values ​​of all attack paths to assess the overall security posture of the system. Specifically, the computing device can calculate the average risk level faced by the system, taking into account attacker path selection preferences.

[0068] Specifically, the computing device can calculate the probability of each attack path being selected, which is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference.

[0069] Specifically, computing devices can use multi-dimensional factors to assess the likelihood that each attack path will be chosen by an attacker.

[0070] Preferably, the selection probability is calculated based on the complexity of the attack path, the public nature and ease of use of the vulnerability in the three-dimensional mapping relationship, the attacker type, and the success probability of the attack chain.

[0071] Path complexity includes the number of hops and branches. The more steps involved, the higher the complexity and the lower the probability of selection. Specifically, the computing device can first calculate the number of hops and branches for each attack path using weighted averages to obtain a complexity index. Then, it can normalize the complexity index based on the maximum and minimum complexity indices in the attack path set to obtain the path complexity.

[0072] The higher the vulnerability's public disclosure and ease of use, the higher its probability of being selected. Specifically, the computing device can calculate the proportion of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities among all vulnerabilities in the path-corresponding vulnerability set, thus obtaining the public disclosure and ease of use parameters.

[0073] Among them, novice hackers prefer simple paths that can be exploited by automated tools, while advanced persistent threat (APT) organizations prefer highly concealed and complex paths. Computing devices can infer the attacker's identity based on the attack path and assign corresponding weights to different identities.

[0074] Among them, the path with the higher probability of success of the attack chain corresponding to the attack path is selected more frequently.

[0075] The computing device can use the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to weight the above factors and obtain the probability of each path being selected, and the sum of the probabilities of all attack paths being selected is 1.

[0076] By comprehensively calculating the path risk value and the probability of being selected, high-risk paths that are easily chosen by attackers can be identified, providing a quantitative basis for prioritizing vulnerability remediation. For example, for complex paths with high attack chain success rates, large losses, and favored by APT groups, defense resources can be allocated first, maximizing the cost-effectiveness of security investments and overcoming the shortcomings of traditional manual assessments, which are characterized by low efficiency and high subjectivity.

[0077] Step 106: The calculation device calculates the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of being selected.

[0078] After determining the risk value and probability of selection for each path, the computing device can calculate the total risk value for the current system situation.

[0079] Preferably, the computing device can calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and sum the weighted risk values ​​for each attack path to obtain the total risk value.

[0080] By introducing the probability parameter of path selection, and taking into account factors such as path complexity, vulnerability usability, and attacker type, the total risk is calculated using the expected value formula: Total Risk = Σ (Path Risk Value × Path Selection Probability). This incorporates the attacker's subjective strategy preferences into the quantitative assessment, which solves the problem of traditional models that only focus on path success rate while ignoring the attacker's actual selection tendency. This makes the total risk assessment more in line with the logic of real attack decision-making.

[0081] Preferably, the computing device can calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and select the largest weighted risk value as the total risk value.

[0082] In cases where the focus is on ensuring the system can withstand the most severe potential attacks, computing devices can assume that attackers will choose the path that is most advantageous (highest risk) to them, in order to ensure that critical assets receive the highest level of protection.

[0083] By analyzing the correlation between assets, vulnerabilities, attack phases, and attack behaviors, it is possible to accurately reconstruct the attacker's technical route and predict the probability of attack success based on path probability. This enables security teams to proactively develop targeted defense strategies, transforming passive defense into active defense and improving the system's resilience against attacks.

[0084] In this embodiment, by establishing a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack stages, not only is a full-process visual modeling of the attack chain from initial reconnaissance to target achievement realized, and the specific role of vulnerabilities in the attack chain determined, thus solving the problem of neglecting the linkage effect of vulnerabilities in traditional assessments and achieving a more comprehensive risk assessment, but the mapping relationship can also be updated in real time based on asset changes and the discovery of new vulnerabilities, providing accurate basic data support for attack path generation and realizing the dynamic construction of a panoramic view of the attack surface. Furthermore, by introducing a path selection probability parameter, the attacker's subjective strategy preferences are incorporated into the quantitative risk assessment, making the overall risk assessment more closely aligned with the logic of real attack decisions, thereby obtaining more accurate assessment results.

[0085] Please see Figure 2 , Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a security risk assessment system based on attack chain deduction provided in this application embodiment is shown below. Figure 2 As shown, the system 20 includes: Module 201 is used to acquire asset information, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence. Module 202 is used to construct a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases based on the asset information, the vulnerability scanning report, and the attack phase framework. The acquisition module 201 is also used to acquire attack behavior based on the characteristics of the attack phase in the three-dimensional mapping relationship; The generation module 203 is used to generate a set of attack paths based on the attack behavior and the attack stage; The calculation module 204 is used to calculate the risk value and the probability of selection for each attack path in the set of attack paths based on the threat intelligence; wherein the probability of selection is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference. The calculation module 204 is also used to calculate the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of being selected.

[0086] Preferably, the risk value is the product of the success probability of the attack chain corresponding to the attack path and the total loss of the path; the success probability of the attack chain is the product of the transition probabilities of the corresponding attack stages, and the transition probability is the probability of transitioning from the previous attack stage to the next attack stage in two adjacent attack stages, and the formula for calculating the transition probability includes: ; in, From the attack phase arrive The transition probability, for The success rate of exploiting vulnerabilities corresponding to each stage. for The degree of alignment between the target environment and the stage. For the defense mechanism to intercept the attack phase Leap to The probability of a stage; the success rate is based on the frequency of attackers exploiting the corresponding vulnerability in the threat intelligence; the total loss of the path is the economic loss caused by the successful attack corresponding to the attack path.

[0087] Preferably, the selection probability is calculated based on the complexity of the attack path, the public nature and ease of use of the vulnerability in the three-dimensional mapping relationship, the attacker type, and the success probability of the attack chain.

[0088] Preferably, the calculation module 204 is specifically used to calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and to sum the weighted risk values ​​for each attack path to obtain the total risk value.

[0089] Preferably, the calculation module 204 is specifically used to calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; and select the largest weighted risk value as the total risk value.

[0090] Preferably, the generation module 203 is specifically used to construct an attack graph with the attack stage as the node and the attack behavior as the directed edge; and to generate the attack path set based on the asset network topology and the permission dependency relationship of the attack behavior using an improved breadth-first search algorithm.

[0091] Preferably, the attack phases in this attack phase framework include the reconnaissance phase, weaponization phase, delivery phase, utilization phase, installation phase, command and control phase, and target achievement phase.

[0092] The security risk assessment system based on attack chain deduction provided in this application can be understood by referring to the relevant content in the foregoing method embodiment section, and will not be repeated here.

[0093] like Figure 3 As shown, Figure 3This is a schematic diagram of a possible logical structure of a computing device provided in an embodiment of this application. The computing device 30 includes a processor 301, a communication interface 302, a memory 303, and a bus 304. The processor 301, the communication interface 302, and the memory 303 are interconnected via the bus 304. In an embodiment of this application, the processor 301 is used to control and manage the operation of the computing device 30. For example, the processor 301 is used to execute... Figure 1 The steps in the embodiments and / or other processes used in the techniques described herein. Communication interface 302 is used to support communication by computing device 30. Memory 303 is used to store program code and data of computing device 30.

[0094] The processor 301 can be a central processing unit, a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It can implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor can also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, etc. The bus 304 can be a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus or an extended industry standard architecture (EISA) bus, etc. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 3 The bus is represented by a single thick line, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0095] In another embodiment of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, the computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the above-described... Figure 1 The method described in the embodiments.

[0096] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units of the various examples described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components of the various examples have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of the invention.

[0097] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0098] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the displayed or discussed mutual couplings, direct couplings, or communication connections may be through some interfaces; indirect couplings or communication connections between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0099] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0100] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present invention can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0101] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0102] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features therein. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and they should all be covered within the scope of the claims and specification of the present invention.

Claims

1. A security risk assessment method based on attack chain deduction, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain asset information, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence; Based on the asset information, the vulnerability scanning report, and the attack phase framework, a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases is constructed. Based on the characteristics of the attack phase in the aforementioned three-dimensional mapping relationship, the attack behavior is obtained; Based on the attack behavior and the attack stage, an attack path set is generated; For each attack path in the set of attack paths, a risk value and a selection probability are calculated based on the threat intelligence; wherein the selection probability is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference. The total risk value is calculated based on the risk value and the probability of being selected.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The risk value is the product of the success probability of the attack chain for the corresponding attack path and the total loss of the path; the success probability of the attack chain is the product of the transition probabilities of the corresponding attack stages, and the transition probability is the probability of transitioning from the previous attack stage to the next attack stage in two adjacent attack stages. The formula for calculating the transition probability includes: ; in, From the attack phase arrive The transition probability, for The success rate of exploiting vulnerabilities corresponding to each stage. for The degree of alignment between the target environment and the stage. For the defense mechanism to intercept the attack phase Leap to The probability of a stage; the success rate is based on the frequency with which attackers exploit the corresponding vulnerability in the threat intelligence; The total loss along the path is the economic loss incurred after a successful attack along the attack path.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The probability of being selected is calculated based on the complexity of the attack path, the public and easy-to-use nature of the vulnerability in the three-dimensional mapping relationship, the attacker type, and the success probability of the attack chain.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The calculation of the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of selection includes: Calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; The total risk value is obtained by summing the weighted risk values ​​of each attack path.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The calculation of the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of selection includes: Calculate the product of the risk value and the probability of being selected for each attack path to obtain the corresponding weighted risk value; The largest weighted risk value is selected as the total risk value.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The generation of an attack path set based on the attack behavior and the attack stage includes: An attack graph is constructed using the attack phase as nodes and the attack behavior as directed edges. An improved breadth-first search algorithm is used to generate the attack path set based on the asset network topology in the asset information and the permission dependency relationship of the attack behavior.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The attack phases in the attack phase framework include the reconnaissance phase, weaponization phase, delivery phase, exploitation phase, installation phase, command and control phase, and objective achievement phase.

8. A security risk assessment system based on attack chain deduction, characterized in that, The system, applied to the method of any one of claims 1-7, comprises: The acquisition module is used to acquire asset information, vulnerability scanning reports, and threat intelligence. The construction module is used to build a three-dimensional mapping relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and attack phases based on the asset information, the vulnerability scanning report, and the attack phase framework. The acquisition module is also used to acquire attack behavior based on the characteristics of the attack phase in the three-dimensional mapping relationship; A generation module is used to generate a set of attack paths based on the attack behavior and the attack stage; The calculation module is used to calculate a risk value and a selection probability for each attack path in the attack path set, based on the threat intelligence; wherein the selection probability is used to indicate the attacker's path selection preference. The calculation module is also used to calculate the total risk value based on the risk value and the probability of being selected.

9. A computing device, characterized in that, include: Memory, used to store programs; A processor for loading the program to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored program, wherein, when the program is executed, it controls the device on which the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform the method of any one of claims 1-7.