Redundant robotic power and communication architecture

Abstract

An electronic circuit for a surgical robotic system is provided, the electronic circuit comprising: a central power node; a first voltage bus electrically coupling a first power source to the node; a second voltage bus electrically coupling a second power source to the node; and a number of robotic arms, each arm electrically coupled to the node via an output breaker and arranged to draw power from the node. Each bus is arranged to provide power from the respective power source to the node, and each bus has an input breaker arranged to limit a first output current flow from the node and into the bus. Each breaker is arranged to limit a second output current flow from the node and into the respective arm. The breakers are arranged to open in response to a fault occurring within the respective arm, while the other breaker remains closed.

Description

[0001] Cross-references This application claims the benefit of the earlier filing date of U.S. non-provisional application No. 16 / 816,055, filed on March 11, 2020, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0002] The embodiments disclosed herein relate generally to surgical robotic systems, and more specifically to the power and communication architecture of such systems. Other embodiments are also described. Background Technology

[0003] Minimally invasive surgery (MIS), such as laparoscopic surgery, involves techniques designed to minimize tissue damage during surgical procedures. For example, a laparoscopic procedure typically involves making multiple small incisions inside the patient (e.g., in the abdomen) and introducing one or more instruments and at least one camera into the patient through these incisions. The surgical procedure can then be performed using the introduced surgical instruments, with visualization aids provided by the camera.

[0004] Generally speaking, medical intervention (MIS) offers multiple beneficial effects, such as reducing patient scarring, alleviating patient pain, shortening patient recovery time, and reducing medical costs associated with patient recovery. MIS can be performed using a surgical robotic system, which includes one or more robotic arms for manipulating surgical instruments based on commands from a remote operator. The robotic arms may, for example, support various devices at their distal ends, such as surgical end effectors, imaging devices, and cannulas for providing access to patient cavities and organs. Therefore, surgical robotic arms can assist in performing surgical procedures.

[0005] Controlling such robotic systems may require a user (e.g., a surgeon or other operator) to provide control input via one or more user interface devices that translate the user's manipulations or commands into control of the robotic system. For example, when a surgical instrument is positioned at a patient's surgical site, an instrument actuator with one or more motors can actuate one or more degrees of freedom of the surgical instrument in response to a user command. Summary of the Invention

[0006] In some cases, the surgical robotic arm of a surgical robotic system is heavy and cumbersome for the operator. For example, the arm may include components such as actuators and motors that enable several degrees of freedom and may be made of heavy, robust materials such as metal. Because the arm cannot be easily moved, it may be mounted on a surgical table, which itself is mounted on the operating room floor to support the arm. Along with the arm, the surgical table may include table-side electronics that power and control the arm and the surgical table. Specifically, the system may include a control computer (which may be located within the operating room) that receives commands from the operator (the host), translates these commands into robot control commands, and transmits these robot control commands to the table-side electronics, which then route the control commands to the arm to cause it to move according to the commands.

[0007] During surgery, a patient lies on an operating table, and a robotic arm may be suspended above the patient while an operator (e.g., a surgeon) manipulates surgical instruments supported or coupled to the distal end of the robotic arm. If a malfunction occurs within the system during surgery, the surgical arm may become immobile, potentially trapping the patient on the operating table. For example, a malfunction may occur due to a communication failure between the tableside electronics and the host computer. As another example, components of the tableside electronics enabling communication with the host computer (e.g., a communication controller) may fail unexpectedly. In the event of a communication interruption, the tableside electronics will not receive robot control commands, and therefore the actuators and motors enabling movement within the arm may become inoperable. To prevent a malfunctioning robotic arm from trapping the patient, conventional systems may include a mechanical emergency rescue device that, when in use, allows the arm to be removed from the operating table, thereby freeing the patient. However, physically removing the arm from the operating table is not preferred, as the user may accidentally drop the arm onto the patient, causing injury. Therefore, there is a need for a fail-safe redundant robot power and communication architecture that provides power and communication to the arm and operating table to prevent the patient from becoming trapped in the event of a malfunction, thereby reducing the need for mechanical emergency rescue devices.

[0008] This disclosure provides a fail-safe surgical robot system with table-side electronics, comprising a first communication controller, a second communication controller, and a monitoring controller. The monitoring controller provides communication redundancy to ensure that any single failure (or malfunction) within the (communication) system does not render the robotic arm and / or surgical table completely inoperable during surgical procedures. To achieve this, one of the communication controllers (e.g., the first controller) performs the communication operations, while the other communication controller (e.g., the second controller) is a redundant controller and is therefore only available in the event of a failure within the first controller. For example, both communication controllers may receive instructions from a host computer to drive the robotic arm to perform movement. Specifically, the instructions are received by the communication controllers from a control computer, which translates the instructions into robot control commands. However, the first controller may have primary responsibility, which includes communicating (via the control computer) with the robotic arm and the host computer. For example, the first controller may send (e.g., repackage and transmit) robot control commands as joint control signals to the robotic arm along a route. These joint control signals may cause actuators or motors within the arm to change position.

[0009] The communication architecture is redundant, enabling the second communication controller to perform at least some of the operations of the first communication controller and to take over primary responsibility in response to a detected fault. For example, the second controller can also repackage robot control commands into another joint control signal, but may not transmit that signal to the arm because the first controller has primary responsibility. During surgical procedures, a monitoring controller can detect faults within the system, or more specifically, faults within the first controller. To detect a fault, the monitoring controller can monitor the output data of the first controller to determine if the data is inconsistent with robot control commands (e.g., instructions contained therein). In response to a detected fault, the monitoring controller signals to the second controller that it will assume primary responsibility in place of the first controller. Thus, the second controller can begin transmitting data (e.g., joint control signals) along a route to the arm to facilitate arm movement. Therefore, even in the event of a fault within the system, the surgical robot system can continue to operate using the second redundant communication controller.

[0010] In one implementation, the surgical robot system may include a redundant power architecture that enables components of the surgical robot system (e.g., the robotic arm and surgical table) to operate in the event of a power failure, such as a short circuit. Specifically, the system may implement redundant power sources, such as an AC trunk power source and batteries, both arranged to provide power on separate power buses. The system may include several circuit breakers located at different positions along various power buses controlled by one or more power controllers. In the event of a failure, the controllers can activate the appropriate circuit breaker to isolate the fault, ensuring that the remainder of the system continues to receive power.

[0011] According to another embodiment, the surgical robot system allows a user (e.g., a medical professional) in the operating room to adjust the position of the robotic arm in the event of a failure (e.g., communication failure), such as when communication with the host suddenly ceases. Specifically, the system can operate in one of two modes at any given time. The first mode is a “remote operation” mode, in which table-side electronics (e.g., at least one of a first and a second controller) communicate with the host. For example, the table-side electronics can establish communication with the host via a control computer by receiving robot control commands translated from commands received by the control computer from the host (e.g., via a communication link). Each robot control command can be used to instruct one of the robotic arms to perform a movement. Each arm may have a user-actuated switch that, when actuated by the user, allows the robotic arm to be moved by the user (e.g., repositioning while still mounted on the surgical table). However, once communication is established, the user-actuated switch is overridden, preventing the switch from moving the robotic arm. The system prevents the switch from allowing the user to move the arm because the host or operator is controlling the arm. The system is able to determine when communication with the host has ceased. For example, the stage-side electronics can stop receiving commands from the host computer via the control computer. In response to determining that communication with the host (and / or control computer) has been lost or terminated, the system enters a second mode, or "local control" mode, which allows the user to actuate a switch to enable the robotic arm to move when actuated by the user. Therefore, in cases where communication is lost and the surgery to be performed on the patient may no longer be performed by the surgical robotic system, medical professionals in the operating room can move the robotic arm to move the patient to a more conventional operating room environment. Alternatively, instead of moving the patient, the robotic arm can be moved to allow a surgeon physically present in the operating room to approach the patient to complete the surgery.

[0012] The foregoing summary does not include an exhaustive list of all embodiments of this disclosure. It is contemplated that this disclosure encompasses all systems and methods that can be implemented by all suitable combinations of the various embodiments outlined above, as well as those disclosed in the detailed description below and specifically pointed out in the claims. Such combinations may have specific advantages not specifically described in the foregoing summary. Attached Figure Description

[0013] The embodiments are illustrated in the figures by way of example rather than limitation, wherein similar reference numerals indicate similar elements. It should be noted that references to "an" or "one" embodiment of this disclosure do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, and that they refer to at least one. Furthermore, for the sake of brevity and to reduce the total number of figures, a given figure may be used to illustrate features of more than one embodiment, and not all elements in the figures may be necessary for a given embodiment.

[0014] Figure 1 A drawing view of an exemplary surgical robotic system in an operating room is shown.

[0015] Figure 2 A redundant communication architecture for the stage-side electronics of a surgical robot system with at least two communication controllers according to one embodiment is shown.

[0016] Figure 3 The main control circuit of a platform-side electronic device according to one embodiment is shown, in which one of the two communication controllers has primary responsibility.

[0017] Figure 4 It is shown that, according to one embodiment, in response to the detection of a fault in the station-side electronic equipment, the primary responsibility of the communication controller has been assigned to another communication controller.

[0018] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of an implementation of a process for transferring primary responsibility from one communication controller to another in response to the detection of a fault, according to an implementation scheme.

[0019] Figure 6 A redundant power architecture for the stage-side electronics of a surgical robot system according to one embodiment is shown.

[0020] Figure 7 A redundant power architecture for the main control circuit of the stage-side electronics of a surgical robot system according to one embodiment is shown.

[0021] Figure 8 A power distribution circuit for a tableside electronic device having at least two power controllers is shown according to one embodiment.

[0022] Figure 9 A drawing view of an example of a surgical robot system with a component having a user-actuated switch, according to one embodiment, is shown.

[0023] Figure 10 The diagram illustrates several stages of a user moving a robotic arm when the corresponding user-actuated switch of the arm is actuated by the user, according to one embodiment.

[0024] Figure 11 This is a flowchart of an implementation of a process according to an implementation scheme, which allows a user-actuated switch to enable the robot arm to move when it is determined that communication between the stage-side electronic equipment and the host has stopped and is actuated by the user. Detailed Implementation

[0025] Several embodiments of this disclosure will now be explained with reference to the accompanying drawings. Where the shape, relative positions, and other embodiments of the parts described in a given embodiment are not explicitly defined, the scope of this disclosure is not limited to the parts shown, which are shown for illustrative purposes only. Furthermore, while numerous details are set forth, it should be understood that some embodiments may be practiced without these details. In other instances, well-known circuits, structures, and techniques have not been shown in detail so as not to obscure the understanding of this specification. Moreover, unless the meaning explicitly states otherwise, all scopes listed herein are to be considered to include the endpoints of each scope.

[0026] Figure 1 A drawing view of an exemplary surgical robotic system 1 in a surgical setting is shown. The robotic system 1 includes a user console 2, a control computer (or tower) 3, and one or more surgical robotic arms 4 located at a surgical robotic operating table (or surgical table) 5. In one embodiment, the arms 4 may be mounted to, for example... Figure 1 The example shows the operating table or bed where the patient is located, or these arms can be mounted to a trolley separate from the operating table or bed. In one embodiment, at least some of the arms 4 may be configured differently. For example, at least some of the arms may be mounted on a ceiling, sidewall, or other suitable structural support. System 1 can be combined with any number of devices, tools, or accessories for performing surgery on patient 6. For example, system 1 may include one or more surgical tools 7 for performing surgical procedures. Surgical tool 7 may be an end effector attached to the distal end of the surgical arm 4 for performing surgical procedures.

[0027] Each surgical tool 7 can be manually manipulated, robotically manipulated, or both during surgery. For example, a surgical tool 7 can be a tool for accessing, viewing, or manipulating the internal anatomy of a patient 6. In one embodiment, the surgical tool 7 is a gripper capable of grasping the patient's tissues. The surgical tool 7 can be manually controlled by a bedside operator 8; or it can be robotically controlled via actuated movement of its attached surgical robotic arm 4.

[0028] Generally, a remote operator 9 (such as a surgeon or other operator) can use the user console 2 to remotely manipulate the arm 4 and / or attached surgical tools 7, for example, through remote operation. The user console 2 may be located in the same operating room as the rest of the system 1, such as... Figure 1 As shown. However, in other environments, the user console 2 may be located in an adjacent or nearby room, or it may be located in a remote location, such as in different buildings, cities, or countries. The user console 2 may include a seat 10, foot controls 13, one or more handheld user input devices (handheld UIDs) 14, and at least one user display 15 configured to display a view, for example, of a surgical site within a patient 6. In the exemplary user console 2, a remote operator 9 sits in the seat 10 and views the user display 15 while manipulating the foot controls 13 and the handheld UID 14 to remotely control the arm 4 and the surgical instrument 7 (which is mounted on the distal end of the arm 4).

[0029] In some variations, the bedside operator 8 can also operate the system 1 in a "bedside" mode, where the bedside operator 8 (the user) is now positioned to one side of the patient 6 and simultaneously manipulates robot-driven tools (end-effectors attached to arm 4), for example, holding a handheld UID 14 and a manual laparoscopic tool with one hand. For instance, the bedside operator's left hand can manipulate the handheld UID to control the robotic components, while the bedside operator's right hand can manipulate the manual laparoscopic tool. Therefore, in these variations, the bedside operator 8 can perform both robot-assisted minimally invasive surgery and manual laparoscopic surgery on the patient 6.

[0030] During the exemplary procedure (surgical operation), patient 6 is prepared for surgery and aseptically covered with a sterile drape to administer anesthesia. Initial access to the surgical site can be manually performed (to facilitate access to the surgical site) while the arms of robotic system 1 are in a retracted or withdrawn configuration. Once access is complete, initial positioning or preparation of robotic system 1, including its arms 4, can be performed. The surgery then continues, with remote operator 9 at user console 2 using foot controls 13 and UID 14 to manipulate various end effectors and, possibly, imaging systems to perform the surgery. Artificial assistance can also be provided at the operating table or surgical table by a bedside person (e.g., bedside operator 8) wearing sterile surgical gowns, who can perform tasks on one or more arms of robotic arms 4, such as tissue retraction, manual repositioning, and tool changes. Non-sterilized personnel may also be present to assist remote operator 9 at user console 2. When a procedure or surgical operation is completed, System 1 and User Console 2 can be configured or set to a certain state to facilitate the completion of postoperative procedures, such as cleaning or disinfection, and the input or printing of health records via User Console 2.

[0031] In one embodiment, the remote operator 9 holds and moves UID 14 to provide input commands, thereby moving the robotic arm actuator 17 (or drive mechanism) in the robot system 1. UID 14 may be communicatively coupled to the rest of the robot system 1, for example, via a console computer system 16 (or host). UID 14 may generate spatial state signals corresponding to the movement of UID 14, such as the position and orientation of the UID's handheld housing, and these spatial state signals may be input signals for controlling the movement of the robotic arm actuator 17. The robot system 1 may use control signals derived from the spatial state signals to control the proportional movement of the actuator 17. In one embodiment, the console processor of the console computer system 16 receives the spatial state signals and generates corresponding control signals. Based on these control signals controlling how the actuator 17 is energized to move a segment or connector of the arm 4, the movement of a corresponding surgical tool attached to the arm can simulate the movement of UID 14. Similarly, the interaction between the remote operator 9 and UID 14 can generate, for example, a clamping control signal that causes the jaws of the gripper of the surgical tool 7 to close and clamp the tissue of the patient 6.

[0032] The surgical robot system 1 may include a plurality of UIDs 14, wherein a corresponding control signal is generated for each UID that controls the actuators and surgical instruments (end-effectors) of the respective arm 4. For example, a remote operator 9 may move a first UID 14 to control the movement of an actuator 17 located in the left robotic arm, wherein the actuator responds by moving links, gears, etc. in the arm 4. Similarly, movement of a second UID 14 by the remote operator 9 controls the movement of another actuator 17, which in turn moves other links, gears, etc. of the robot system 1. The robot system 1 may include a right arm 4 fixed to a bed or table on the right side of the patient, and a left arm 4 located on the left side of the patient. The actuators 17 or drive mechanisms may include one or more actuators and / or one or more motors, controlling the one or more actuators and / or the one or more motors such that they drive the joints of the arm 4 to rotate, for example, to change the orientation of an endoscope or gripper of a surgical instrument 7 attached to the arm relative to the patient. The movement of a plurality of actuators 17 in the same arm 4 may be controlled by spatial state signals generated from a particular UID 14. UID 14 can also control the movement of the corresponding surgical tool gripper. For example, each UID 14 can generate a corresponding gripping signal to control the movement of an actuator (e.g., a linear actuator) that opens or closes the jaws of the gripper at the distal end of the surgical tool 7 to grip tissue in the patient 6.

[0033] In some implementations, communication between the surgical robotic operating table 5 and the user console 2 may be conducted via a control computer 3, which translates user commands received from the user console 2 (and more specifically from the console computer system 16) into robotic control commands transmitted to the arm 4 on the surgical table 5. The control computer 3 may also transmit status and feedback from the surgical table 5 back to the user console 2. The communication connection between the surgical table 5, the user console 2, and the control computer 3 may be via a wired link (e.g., fiber optic) and / or a wireless link, using any suitable data communication protocol among various data communication protocols, such as Bluetooth. Any wired connection may optionally be integrated into the floor and / or walls or ceiling of the operating room. The robotic system 1 may provide video output to one or more displays, including displays within the operating room and remote displays accessible via the Internet or other networks. Video output or feeds may also be encrypted to ensure privacy, and all or part of the video output may be stored on a server or electronic healthcare record system.

[0034] Figure 2A redundant communication architecture for stage-side electronics of a surgical robot system with at least two communication controllers according to one embodiment is illustrated. Specifically, the figure shows stage-side electronics (or electronic circuitry) 20 with a redundant communication architecture to ensure that the surgical robot system 1 is fail-safe against one or more possible failures within the system. Specifically, the electronics include a main control circuit 21 arranged to communicate with a host 16 via a connection to exchange data (e.g., receive robot control commands, etc.) and to communicate with components of the robot system (e.g., arms 4a-4n), and the main control circuit maintains communication between the host and the arms in the event of a failure within the system. The main control circuit includes two separate communication controllers, namely communication controller 1 (first communication controller or first controller) 23 and communication controller 2 (second communication controller or second controller) 24, which operate independently of each other. The electronics are redundant because one controller has the “primary responsibility” to facilitate communication between the host 16 and components within the system, such as one or more robotic arms 4a-4n, while the other controller is redundant (e.g., non-communicatively coupled to the robotic arms 4a-4n to instruct the arms to perform one or more operations). In the event of a failure (such as the failure of the controller with primary responsibility), the redundant controller is given the primary responsibility to facilitate communication, thus ensuring that communication between the host and the arms is not interrupted. As another example, the system may be fail-safe against multiple or dual failures that may occur within one or more components of system 1. Further details regarding the redundancy of the stage-side electronics are described herein.

[0035] In one embodiment, the main control circuit 21 enables communication (via control computer 3) between one or more of the robot arms 4a-4n and the host computer 16. Specifically, the main control circuit is configured to establish communication (via connection) with the host computer 16 via control computer 3 to exchange data. In one embodiment, the connection may be a wired communication line (e.g., via fiber optic cable or coaxial cable) or a wireless link using any wireless protocol (such as Bluetooth). In one embodiment, the main control circuit includes one or more electronic components, such as a circuit board, which includes components integrated thereon as described herein that enable communication. For example, the control circuit includes a monitoring controller 22, a first controller 23, a second controller 24, routing logic 25, and isolators 26a-26n, one isolator for each of the robot arms 4a-4n. In one embodiment, at least some of the elements of the control circuit (such as the three controllers) constitute a redundant communication system for the main control circuit 21.

[0036] In one embodiment, the monitoring controller 22, the first controller 23, the second controller 24, and / or the routing logic 25 may each be (or include) separate electronic devices, which include one or more processors configured to perform one or more computational operations. For example, the first controller 23 and the second controller 24 may each be separate Systems on Modules (SOMs). In another embodiment, the first controller and the second controller may be the same electronic device (e.g., each being the same SOM including similar components), configured to perform at least some of the same operations. Further information regarding the first controller and the second controller is described herein.

[0037] Communication controllers 23 and 24 are configured to route input data (e.g., robot control commands) from control computer 3 to specific arms 4a-4n, and to route data received from the arms (e.g., response signals) back to the host as output data (e.g., feedback signals). For example, a controller with primary responsibility may process robot control commands received from the host and route them to one or more robot arms, each robot control command including one or more instructions for driving at least one arm to perform movement. Specifically, the controller may package (or repackage) robot control commands into joint command signals, which are transmitted to the appropriate arm. In one embodiment, the joint command signals cause a specific robot arm (e.g., its actuator or motor) to perform movement according to the instructions of the packaged robot control commands. The same controller may transmit joint command signals to specific robot arms via routing logic 25. As described herein, the system can be redundant, allowing two controllers to perform similar operations on each other. For example, two controllers may process robot control commands to generate joint command signals. However, only the controller with primary responsibility is able to transmit the joint command signals. Further information regarding communication controllers and primary responsibility is described herein.

[0038] Monitoring controller 22 is communicatively coupled to host 16 via control computer 3 (e.g., via a communication connection) to exchange data as described herein. The monitoring controller is also coupled to two communication controllers 23 and 24. The monitoring controller is configured to monitor the data exchanged with host 16, as well as the data generated by the two communication controllers, to determine whether the controller with primary responsibility should maintain that responsibility or whether that responsibility should be transferred to another controller. For example, upon detecting a fault (e.g., a fault in communication with the host), the monitoring controller may signal that a redundant controller will assume that responsibility in place of the currently primary controller. Further information regarding the operation of the monitoring controller is described herein.

[0039] Routing logic 25 is coupled between each of the isolators 26a-26n and the two communication controllers 23 and 24, and is arranged to communicatively couple the communication controllers and monitoring controllers to the robot arms 4a-4n. In one embodiment, the routing logic is configured to route signals received from one or more robot arms to at least one controller in the controllers. In another embodiment, the logic is configured to route signals received only from one of the communication controllers (e.g., the primary responsible communication controller as described herein) to one or more robot arms. In one embodiment, routing logic 25 may include an IC, such as a transistor or switch, that selects which communication controller can communicate with arms 4a-4n via the corresponding isolator 26a-26n. The routing logic may also include one or more drivers arranged to transmit signals back to the communication controllers and / or monitoring controllers. In one embodiment, the logic may include a separate IC for each robot arm, such as routing logic 25a coupled between isolator 26a and the communication controllers (and monitoring controllers). In one implementation, routing logic 25 is configured to switch communication between two communication controllers based on control signals obtained from the monitoring controller. Further information regarding the routing logic is described herein.

[0040] Isolators 26a-26n can be any type of digital isolator configured to electrically isolate components of the main control circuitry (e.g., routing logic 25) from components of the robot arm (e.g., circuit boards and / or motors within the robot arm). Therefore, the isolators prevent any electrical noise from propagating between the main control circuitry 21 and the robot arm. In one embodiment, the isolator can be a low-voltage differential signaling (LVDS) isolator. In another embodiment, at least some of the isolators can be optical isolators that use light transmission to isolate the two components.

[0041] Figure 3 The diagram illustrates the main control circuitry of a platform-side electronic device according to one embodiment, where one of two communication controllers bears primary responsibility. Specifically, the diagram shows a first communication controller 23 having primary responsibility for facilitating communication between the host 16 and at least one robotic arm (e.g., robotic arm 14a). For example, a monitoring controller 22 receives input data from the host 16 via a control computer 3. In one embodiment, the input data may be robot control commands translated by the control computer 3 from user commands (or control signals). The monitoring controller forwards the input data to both communication controllers 23 and 24. In one embodiment, the monitoring controller may only forward (or route) data to the communication controllers relevant to the operation or movement of the robotic arm, such as when the data includes robot control commands.

[0042] Both communication controllers 23 and 24 are configured to receive robot control commands, including instructions for driving at least one robotic arm to perform movement, and are configured to process the robot control commands as joint command signals. For example, the controllers may process the robot control commands by packaging data based on a communication protocol used for communication between the controller and the robotic arm. For example, the robot control commands may be data generated using transmission protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP / IP). In one embodiment, communication between one or more components within the stage-side electronics may use different communication protocols. Therefore, the two controllers generate separate joint command signals (e.g., communication controller 23 generates joint command signal 1, and communication controller 24 generates joint signal 2) and transmit these signals to routing logic 25a of the robotic arm 1. In one embodiment, only the controller with primary responsibility generates the joint command signals, which, as described herein, are packaged robot control commands.

[0043] Routing logic 25a includes a switch 30 (S1) and several drivers 32 and 33. S1 is configured to receive joint command signals from two communication controllers 23 and 24, but is only configured to allow one of the signals to be routed to robot arm 1 4a. Specifically, S1 is configured to route joint command signal 1 to robot arm 1 4a via isolator 26a. Therefore, communication controller 23 has primary responsibility because the switch enables the communication controller to communicate with robot arm 4a. As described herein, S1 is communicatively coupled to a monitoring controller and can be configured to route signals from a second communication controller in response to receiving control signals from the monitoring controller. In other words, the position of S1 indicates which communication controller has primary responsibility. More information regarding the control of S1 is described herein.

[0044] As joint command signal 1 is routed to isolator 26a, routing logic 25a is configured to route joint command signal 1 to driver 32, which then routes the joint command signal back to at least one of the first communication controller 23, the second communication controller 24, and the monitoring controller 22. In one embodiment, driver 32 may be a drive circuit including electrical components (e.g., one or more transistors) configured to receive the joint command signal (joint command signal 1 in this example) passing through S1 and transmit the signal to the corresponding controller. In another embodiment, driver 32 may include a separate drive circuit for each controller to which the joint command signal is forwarded. Thus, driver 32 may include at least three drive circuits.

[0045] In one implementation, once a joint command signal based on instructions from a user or operator is transmitted to the robot arm 1 4a via isolator 26a, the robot arm 1 can perform an operation. For example, the instruction may include a one-inch vertical movement of arm 4a. The joint command signal may control the motor nodes of the robot arm 1 to activate the motors and raise the arm vertically by one inch.

[0046] In one embodiment, the robotic arm 14a may be configured to transmit a response signal back to the host to provide confirmation of movement. In one embodiment, the response signal may include other data or information, such as the current position of the robotic arm (relative to the surgical table) or the overall state of the robotic arm. In another embodiment, the response signal may be based on the completion (or inability to complete) of the last instruction received by the robotic arm. In some embodiments, the response signal may be a signal transmitted periodically (e.g., every second). The response signal is transmitted by the robotic arm via isolator 26a to the arm's routing logic 25a. Specifically, the response signal is received by driver 33, which then routes the response signal to at least one of the first communication controller 23, the second communication controller 24, and the monitoring controller 22. In one embodiment, driver 33 may be similar to driver 32. For example, driver 33 may include separate drive circuitry for each controller, and driver 33 routes data or signals to these controllers. In particular, driver 33 may include three drive circuitry, one for each of the first communication controller 23, the second communication controller 24, and the monitoring controller 22.

[0047] Both communication controllers receive response signals from the robot arm 4a (via routing logic 25a). For example, the response signal may include an indication of movement performed by the arm in response to receiving joint command signal 1. Once received, the controllers are configured to generate feedback signals based on the indications in the response signals and transmit them to the host 16. As shown, the first communication controller 23 generates feedback signal 1, and the second communication controller 24 generates feedback signal 2. As described herein, components within system 1 can communicate according to a communication protocol, and therefore the response signals can be within that protocol. However, when generating feedback signals, the communication controllers may process the data according to a protocol for receiving input data (e.g., a transmission protocol) in order to transmit the data back to the host. Therefore, both controllers process the response signals by packaging them according to the transmission protocol to generate feedback signals 1 and 2, which are received by the monitoring controller 22. Thus, the feedback signals are packaged versions of the response signals according to the transmission protocol.

[0048] The monitoring controller 22 includes a switch (S2) 31 and voting logic 35. S2 is configured to receive data (e.g., feedback signals) from two communication controllers 23 and 24, and is configured to route the feedback signal (e.g., feedback signal 1) from the primary communication controller as output data to the host 16. In this case, since the first communication controller 23 has primary responsibility, S2 is positioned to allow only the feedback signal from the first communication controller 23 to pass through.

[0049] Monitoring controller 22 is configured to determine whether a fault is detected within the communication architecture in order to determine whether the primary responsibility should be transferred to another communication controller. Specifically, voting logic 35 is configured to receive at least one of the following: 1) input data from control tower 3, 2) output data from S2 (e.g., feedback signal 1), 3) a response signal from driver 33, and 4) a joint command signal transmitted via S1 to robot arm 4a along a route, in this case, joint command signal 1. The voting logic is configured to determine whether the communication controller with primary responsibility (first communication controller 23) should maintain that responsibility or whether that responsibility should be assigned to another communication controller.

[0050] To determine this, the monitoring controller's (voting logic) determines whether a fault is detected within the first communication controller 23 based on signals generated by controller 23. For example, the voting logic determines whether the first communication controller 23 is correctly generating a feedback signal. For example, voting logic 35 generates an expected feedback signal based on response signals sent by driver 33 to each of the three controllers along a route. Voting logic 35 may perform the same operations performed by the communication controller (e.g., processing response signals to package them according to a transmission protocol to generate the expected feedback signal). The voting logic compares the expected feedback signal generated by the voting logic with feedback signal 1 received from S2 generated by the first communication controller. If these signals are the same, this may mean that the first communication controller is correctly generating a feedback signal and therefore no fault is detected within the controller. In one embodiment, no fault is detected when the similarity of the feedback signals reaches a threshold difference (e.g., 10%). However, if the signals are different (e.g., exceeding the threshold difference), the voting logic may determine that a fault is detected within the first communication controller.

[0051] As another example, the voting logic 35 of the monitoring controller 22 can determine whether a fault has been detected within the first communication controller 23 based on signals generated by the controller and transmitted to the robot arm (e.g., arm 4a). For example, the voting logic can use input data (e.g., robot control commands) to generate expected joint commands based on instructions (such as arm movement) within the robot control commands. Specifically, the voting logic 35 can package the robot control commands to generate the expected joint commands based on a communication protocol. The voting logic compares the expected joint command signal with a joint command signal 1 generated by the first communication controller 23 and transmitted along a route by the driver 32. If these signals are the same (or within a threshold difference), the voting logic may not detect a fault. However, if these signals are different, the voting logic can detect a fault in the first communication controller.

[0052] In one implementation, the routing logic 25 of at least some of the other robotic arms 4b-4n may include at least some of the components of the routing logic 25a for robotic arm 4a described herein. Therefore, the operations described herein can also be performed for any routing logic and corresponding robotic arm.

[0053] When no fault is detected, the monitoring controller maintains the configuration that allows the first communication controller to assume primary responsibility. However, if a fault is detected, the monitoring controller is configured to signal to the second communication controller 24 that it will assume primary responsibility in place of the first communication controller. Figure 4According to one embodiment, in response to the detection of a fault in the stage-side electronics, primary responsibility of the communication controller has been assigned (or transferred) to another communication controller. Specifically, monitoring controller 22 (with voting logic 35) signals that the second communication controller 24 will assume primary responsibility in place of the first communication controller 23. For example, to signal this change, the monitoring controller configures routing logic to prevent the first communication controller from transmitting future joint command signals to the robot arm and to allow the second communication controller to transmit future joint command signals, processed by future robot control commands, to the robot arm. The monitoring signal can also signal this change by preventing the first communication controller from transmitting future feedback signals to the host and allowing the second communication controller to process future response signals and transmit them to the host as future feedback signals. Specifically, voting logic 35 transmits control signals to two switches S1 and S2 to change the position of the two switches. The control signal sent to S1 causes the switch to allow the joint command signal 2 generated by the second communication controller 24 to pass; and the control signal sent to S2 causes the switch to allow the feedback signal 2 generated by the second communication controller 24 to pass. In one embodiment, the first communication controller 23 may remain operational (e.g., generating joint command signals and feedback signals) even if a fault has been detected. In another embodiment, the monitoring controller may signal the first communication controller to shut down.

[0054] In one embodiment, S1 and S2 can be any type of electronic switch having one or more input terminals and one or more output terminals. For example, the switch may include a switching component (e.g., a transistor) that can be controlled via an electrical signal.

[0055] In some embodiments, the main control circuit 21 (e.g., its monitoring controller 22) may output an alarm in response to the detection of a fault. For example, the monitoring controller may transmit an alarm signal as output data to the host 16 to alert the operator 9 to the detected fault. In one embodiment, the alarm signal may be an audio signal output through one or more speakers. In another embodiment, the alarm signal is a visual message displayed on the display screen 15. In one embodiment, the alarm may be output by the tableside electronics 20 (e.g., by the speakers of the electronics 20) to alert the user in the operating room.

[0056] In one implementation, the main control circuit 21 may be communicatively coupled to the surgical table 5 in a similar manner. Specifically, the surgical table may include one or more drive mechanisms (e.g., actuators and / or motors) to manipulate or adjust the position of the table. For example, the table may include actuators coupled to the tabletop to allow the tabletop to tilt upwards. Thus, one or more components of the surgical table may be communicatively coupled to at least one of the communication controllers 23 and 24. For example, the two communication controllers may be communicatively coupled to the surgical table via routing logic controlled by the monitoring controller 22 as described herein (e.g., specific logic for each component of the surgical table). The communication controller with primary responsibility may exchange data (e.g., joint command signals and response signals) with the surgical table in a manner similar to that of the robotic arms 4a-4n.

[0057] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of one embodiment of a process 50 in which primary responsibility is transferred from one communication controller to another in response to the detection of a fault, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, process 50 may be executed by the main control circuitry 21 of the stage-side electronics 20. Specifically, at least a portion of the process may be executed by any of the components of the main control circuitry (e.g., the first communication controller 23, the second communication controller 24, the monitoring controller 22, and the routing logic 25). Process 50 begins at the first communication controller 23 and receives robot control commands from the host 16, which include instructions for driving the robot arm (e.g., arm 4a) to perform movements, wherein the first communication controller has primary responsibility, which includes communicating with the robot arm and the host (at block 51). Process 50 processes the robot control commands through the first communication controller and transmits them as joint command signals to the robot arm (at block 52). Process 50 determines whether a fault has been detected by the monitoring controller (at decision block 53). If not, process 50 returns to block 51. However, if a fault is detected (e.g., by comparing the expected joint command signal with the joint command signal generated by the first communication controller), process 50 signals the second communication controller to assume primary responsibility for the first communication controller (at box 54).

[0058] Some implementation schemes may have variations of process 50. For example, specific operations of the process may not be performed in the exact order shown and described. Specific operations may not be performed in a series of consecutive operations, and different specific operations may be performed in different implementation schemes.

[0059] Figure 6A redundant power architecture for tableside electronics of a surgical robot system according to one embodiment is illustrated. Specifically, the figure shows tableside electronics 20 with a redundant power architecture to ensure that the surgical robot system 1 is fault-safe against one or more possible faults (such as short circuits) within the system. The electronics include an input power controller 60, a power distribution circuit 61, and a main control circuit 21. The electronics also include several buses, power lines, and control lines. Specifically, tableside electronics 20 includes a first set of voltage buses Vbus 1 and Vbus 2 (which electrically couple the input power controller to the power distribution circuit) and a second set of voltage buses Vbus 1' and Vbus 2' (which electrically couple the power distribution circuit to the main control circuit). Furthermore, several power lines and control lines couple the robot arms 4a-4n to the power distribution circuit and the main control circuit. For example, each robotic arm may include at least one power line and at least one control line, the power line electrically coupling the arm to a power distribution circuit 61 (e.g., providing input power from the power distribution circuit 61), and the control line communicatively coupling the arm to a main control circuit (routing logic 25) (e.g., for exchanging data, such as joint command signals and response signals). Specifically, the arm's electronics (e.g., processors, actuators, motors, etc.) are electrically coupled and communicatively coupled via the power line and control line, respectively. Furthermore, the surgical table 5 is electrically coupled to an input power controller 60 via at least one power line (e.g., to provide input power), and the table is communicatively coupled to the main control circuit via at least one control line (e.g., for exchanging data, such as joint command signals and response signals).

[0060] As shown herein, components of the platform-side electronic device 20 may be coupled to each other. In one embodiment, the components are coupled together via wires, which may be conductors that directly connect the components together. In another embodiment, these wires may be signal traces. In some embodiments, at least some of the components may be wirelessly connected (e.g., via Bluetooth protocol).

[0061] The tableside electronics 20 is configured to draw power from at least one of two input power sources: an AC trunk power source (AC power source) and a battery 70. In one embodiment, the battery can be any type of battery, such as a lithium-ion battery or a lithium iron phosphate battery. In another embodiment, the battery can be housed within the surgical table 5, or the battery can be stored externally to the surgical table 5 (e.g., as part of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) battery pack).

[0062] Input power controller 60 is configured to manage input power from at least one of an AC power source and a battery 70, and is configured to provide redundant input power to the remainder of the desk-side electronics 20 via two separate buses, Vbus 1 and Vbus 2. Specifically, input power controller 60 provides input power to power distribution circuitry 61 via (at least) one of Vbus 1 and Vbus 2. In one embodiment, desk-side electronics may include an AC / DC converter configured to receive AC power from an AC power source and convert the AC power into direct current (DC), which is then received by the input power controller. In one embodiment, the input power controller may provide AC power source power via Vbus 1 and redundant battery power from battery 70 via Vbus 2 when needed (e.g., when the AC power source is shut down due to a power outage). Thus, the buses may be dedicated buses for their respective input power sources. For example, as described herein, each bus may be coupled to the central power node 62 of power distribution circuitry 61 via a circuit breaker “Prot In”. Therefore, when Vbus 1 provides power, Prot In 65 can be closed and Prot In 66 can be opened, allowing Vbus 1 to supply power only. In another embodiment, the bus is not dedicated to a source, allowing input power from either source to be provided via either bus. In some embodiments, the input power controller provides input power simultaneously via both Vbus 1 and Vbus 2. For example, input power provided via Vbus 1 may be drawn from an AC power source, while input power provided via Vbus 2 may be drawn from battery 70.

[0063] In one embodiment, the input power controller 60 is configured to switch which input power source to draw input power from in response to a detected fault. Specifically, the input power controller 60 may be configured to detect faults within the controller and / or within buses Vbus 1 and Vbus 2. For example, the input power controller 60 may provide input power drawn from battery 70 via Vbus 2, while power drawn from an AC power source charges the battery, as described herein. The input power controller may measure the current flowing through Vbus 2 and determine whether that current exceeds a threshold indicating a short circuit. When the input power controller detects a short circuit, the controller may stop providing input power via Vbus 2 (e.g., by disconnecting Prot In 66) and begin providing input power via Vbus 1 (e.g., from an AC power source) (e.g., by closing Prot In 65). In one embodiment, the input power controller 60 may include one or more circuit breakers that may open or close based on whether a fault is detected. As another example, when input power is provided simultaneously by two input power sources on their respective buses, the input power controller can stop providing input power from one of the sources in response to a detected fault, while input power continues to be provided by the other source. Therefore, even in the event of a detected fault, the station-side electronics can continue to provide power.

[0064] As described herein, the input power controller 60 is electrically coupled to the surgical table (e.g., electrical components of the surgical table, such as actuators, motors, circuit components, etc.) via power lines. In one embodiment, the input power controller may provide the same input power to the surgical table 5 via power lines as the input power provided to the rest of the electronics 20. For example, when the input power controller provides battery power from the battery 70 to the power distribution circuit 61 via Vbus 2, the controller 60 may provide battery power to the surgical table 5 via power lines.

[0065] The power distribution circuit 61 includes a redundant power architecture that manages and distributes input power received from at least one of Vbus 1 and Vbus 2 to the robot arm 4n and the main control circuit 21. In one embodiment, the power distribution circuit may include one or more electronic components or devices (e.g., circuit boards) for implementing input power distribution. For example, the circuit includes several circuit breakers 65-69, a central power node 62, a first power controller 63, and a second power controller 64.

[0066] Central power node 62 is electrically coupled to the input power controller 60 via Vbus 1 and Vbus 2, electrically coupled to the main control circuit 21 via Vbus 1' and Vbus 2', and electrically coupled to each of the robot arms 4a-4n via at least one power line. In one embodiment, the central power node is an electronic component configured to distribute power between the bus and / or power lines. For example, the node may include at least one electrical conductor, such as copper, to distribute power from the input power controller to the main control circuit and / or the robot arm.

[0067] As shown in the figure, Vbus 1 electrically couples an AC power source to node 62, and Vbus 2 electrically couples a battery 70 to the node. The node includes several circuit breakers: an input circuit breaker (Prot In) and an output circuit breaker (Prot Out). The input circuit breaker protects node 62 along the path of receiving input power, and the output circuit breaker protects the node along the path of providing input power. Specifically, Prot In 65 is coupled between Vbus 1 and node 62, Prot In 66 is coupled between Vbus 2 and node 62, Prot Out 67 is coupled between Vbus 1' and node 62, and Prot Out 68 is coupled between Vbus 2' and node 62. Additionally, a power distribution circuit includes Prot Out 69, which couples each robot arm to node 62 via a corresponding power line. In one embodiment, each of these circuit breakers may include a unidirectional circuit breaker and at least one diode. Input circuit breakers isolate nodes from the bus to prevent short circuits or excessive return current draw from one of them, but do allow unrestricted current to flow from the bus into the node. Therefore, each input circuit breaker protects a node from excessive current (e.g., above a first threshold) flowing out of the node via the corresponding bus. Thus, the input circuit breakers limit the output current flow (first output current flow) from the node into the bus. Output circuit breakers are arranged to limit (second) output current (e.g., current flowing out of the circuit breaker and into each arm and / or the main control circuitry), but allow unrestricted current to flow back to the node (e.g., during regenerative current events).

[0068] In one implementation, each circuit breaker in the circuit breaker may be automatically switched (e.g., Prot Out 67 may trip, thus creating an open circuit in response to a high current above a threshold detected along Vbus 1'), or may be controlled to switch under certain conditions. Specifically, both the first power controller 63 and the second power controller 64 are communicatively coupled to each circuit breaker in the circuit breaker and are configured to independently control each circuit breaker in the circuit breaker. A circuit breaker may need to disconnect under certain conditions. For example, when the system is deactivated, the controller may disconnect each (or at least some) of the circuit breakers in the circuit breaker to deactivate the system. As another example and as previously described, the controller may control the circuit breakers to allow only one of Vbus 1 and Vbus 2 to provide power. In another implementation, the power controller may obtain sensor data used to determine which circuit breakers are disconnected. Therefore, the decision to open / close a specific circuit may be made solely by power controllers 63 and / or 64. In one implementation, each power controller in the power controller can receive commands from at least one of the communication controllers 23 and / or 24 to open / close a specific circuit breaker. Further information on how circuit breakers are controlled is described herein.

[0069] Figure 7 A redundant power architecture for the main control circuitry of the tableside electronics of a surgical robotic system according to one embodiment is shown. Specifically, the figure illustrates how the main control circuitry 21 is powered by a power distribution circuitry 61 via a second set of buses, Vbus 1' and Vbus 2'. As shown, a first communication controller 23 is powered via Vbus 1', a second communication controller 24 is powered via Vbus 2', and a monitoring controller 22 and routing logic for each corresponding robotic arm 25a-25n are powered based on a combination of Vbus 1' and Vbus 2'. Coupled between each bus and the monitoring controller 22, and for each robotic arm, the routing logic is a diode 71 that allows current to flow only from the bus to the component. In one embodiment, instead of (or in addition to) diodes, the main control circuitry 21 may also include current limiting devices such that an output short circuit does not short-circuit the two input ports of the bus. Therefore, when one of the output circuit breakers (e.g., Prot Out 67) trips (e.g., due to a fault), Vbus 1' will stop supplying power; however, the main control circuit 21 will continue to supply power via Vbus 2' as long as Prot Out 68 remains closed. Specifically, when a single fault occurs along a particular bus, the communication controller that draws power only from that particular bus may be affected (e.g., disabled), while another component continues to draw power from other buses. Thus, even in the event of a fault, the main control circuit 21 will continue to operate.

[0070] In one implementation, the communication controller switches primary responsibility in response to a fault within the power architecture. For example, a first communication controller receives power via Vbus 1', and a second communication controller receives power from Vbus 2'. Upon fault occurrence, the power distribution circuit trips Prot Out 67. In one implementation, a monitoring controller 22 detects the fault and determines that the first communication controller is not receiving power from Vbus 1'. In response, the monitoring controller 22 may signal that the second communication controller 24 will assume primary responsibility as described herein.

[0071] In one embodiment, the main control circuit 21 may include additional electronic components to regulate the power supplied by the power distribution circuit 61. For example, each of the controllers 22-24 and the routing logics 25a-25n may include a power source that regulates the power allocated to the respective components.

[0072] Figure 8 A power distribution circuit for a benchtop electronics device with at least two power controllers according to one embodiment is shown. As described herein, circuit breakers (e.g., 65-69) can be independently controlled by two power controllers 63 and 64. Specifically, to prevent a failure within one of the controllers from causing one or more circuit breakers to trip unexpectedly, resulting in a power outage of the corresponding bus and / or power line, both controllers must agree to trip the circuit breakers. Thus, a circuit breaker can trip only in response to control signals transmitted by both power controllers instructing them to trip the circuit breaker. As shown in the figure, the output of each power controller in the power controllers enters a logic circuit 80, which includes an "OR" logic element for each circuit breaker 69a-69n of the corresponding robot arms 4a-4n. As an example, if power controller 63 malfunctions and transmits a control signal to the logic circuit to deactivate (or disconnect) ProtOut 69a (e.g., a low control signal) to de-energize robot arm 4a, ProtOut 69a will remain closed as long as the second power controller 64 does not transmit the same control signal. Specifically, ProtOut will remain closed as long as power controller 64 generates a high control signal. Therefore, the remaining portion of the circuit breaker (e.g., the output circuit breaker) will remain closed in response to at least one of the power controllers transmitting a control signal (high signal) including a command to close the remaining portion of the circuit breaker. In one embodiment, the circuit breaker will remain closed as long as neither power controllers 63 nor 64 transmits a control signal (e.g., both generate low control signals). In one embodiment, although not shown, each of power controllers 63 and 64 may be coupled to the input circuit breaker via logic circuitry.

[0073] In one embodiment, each of the first and second power controllers may receive a command signal instructing these controllers to open / close a specific circuit breaker. In one embodiment, the power controller may receive command signals from a main control circuit 21 (e.g., a communication controller that has primary responsibility for and / or monitors controller 22) and / or from an input power controller 60. For example, the input power controller 60 may transmit a command signal to de-energize one of the robot arms. As long as both power controllers 63 and 64 receive the same command signal, the arm's output circuit breaker will open. Therefore, in addition to protecting components from faults within one of the power controllers, the logic circuit 80 also provides protection against faulty command signals that could cause one of the power controllers to provide erroneous (or incorrect) control signals.

[0074] As described herein, the surgical robot system 1 allows a user in the operating room (e.g., a medical professional, such as a nurse or physician) to adjust the position of at least one of the robotic arms 4a-4n in the event that communication with the host 16 has failed or been terminated. For example, when a communication connection (or link) (e.g., wired or wireless) is established, the system can operate in a remote operation mode in which components of the system (e.g., robotic arms 4a-4n and the surgical table 5) can be controlled solely by the operator via the host 16 and the control computer 3. For example, the system may allow only the operator to control the robotic arms to prevent the arms from receiving comparative commands from different sources. However, if communication with the host is terminated or lost, the surgical robot system 1 may become inactive (e.g., suspending the position of the robotic arms to prevent the arms from collapsing onto the patient). To prevent the patient from becoming trapped between the surgical table and the robotic arms, this disclosure allows the system to enter a second mode or local mode that allows the user to move the robotic arms in response to a user-actuated switch. Thus, this disclosure allows the user to free the patient when communication with the host has been lost.

[0075] Figure 9 A drawing view of an example surgical robot system with components having a user-actuated switch according to one embodiment is shown. Specifically, the figure shows a surgical robot system 1, which includes a surgical robot operating table 5, a control tower 3, and a host (e.g., a console computer) 16. In one embodiment, system 1 may include, for example, Figure 1 The additional components described herein.

[0076] As shown in the figure, the surgical robotic operating table includes a tabletop 93, an adapter 94, and a support 95. The tabletop has an upper surface on which the patient 6 is placed during the surgical procedure, as shown. The tabletop is disposed on an adapter that is pivotally coupled to robotic arms 4a and 4b. The adapter is disposed on the support, which may be, for example, a base at a suitable height above the floor. In one embodiment, the operating table may also include more or fewer components. For example, the operating table may include a base (not shown) on which the support is disposed. As another example, the operating table may not include an adapter, so that the robotic arms may be coupled to the tabletop and / or the support. In one embodiment, the surgical robotic operating table may include more or fewer robotic arms, such as at least four robotic arms (e.g., 4a-4d). For example, two of the robotic arms may be located on a first side of the operating table, while the other two robotic arms may be located on a second side of the operating table opposite the first side. As another example, all robotic arms may be located on one side of the operating table to allow the user to access the patient from the other side of the operating table.

[0077] Each robotic arm may include one or more connectors (or components) and one or more joints for actuating the connectors relative to each other and / or relative to the surgical robotic table 5. Joints may include various types, such as pitch joints or roll joints, which can substantially constrain the movement of adjacent connectors about certain axes relative to other axes. In one embodiment, the arm may include at least one telescopic member configured to expand and contract relative to a joint at either end of the member to change its length. Each of the joint and the telescopic member may include at least one drive mechanism, such as an actuator or motor, configured to adjust the position of the joint (or telescopic member) according to a joint command signal received from table-side electronics (e.g., a communication controller with primary responsibility), as described herein. Each arm also includes a surgical tool 7 configured to be removably coupled to the distal end of the robotic arm. Thus, the joints of the robotic arm can be actuated to position and orient the tool of the arm to enable the operator of the surgical robotic system 1 to perform robotic surgery.

[0078] Both arms also include user-actuated switches 90 configured to allow the corresponding robotic arm to be moved by a user when actuated. In one embodiment, at least some of the arms may include one or more switches. When a switch is actuated or pressed by a user, a control signal is transmitted to a table-side electronics 20 (e.g., a communication controller with primary responsibility, such as a first communication controller 23) indicating a user request to manually move the robotic arm. In response, the communication controller may allow at least one joint of the robotic arm to be moved (manually) by the user. For example, the communication controller may generate and transmit joint command signals based on user commands received by a user attempting to move the robotic arm. In one embodiment, the user command may be based on a pulling / pushing force applied by the user to the robotic arm. For example, the robotic arm may include one or more force sensors (e.g., compression force sensors, tension sensors, etc.) configured to sense pushing and / or pulling forces applied by an external object (e.g., the user's hand). These sensors transmit electronic signals including sensor data (indicating the magnitude and direction of the force) to the communication controller, which then determines which joints of the robotic arm should be moved based on the data. The communication controller then transmits joint command signals to the joints to move the robot arm (its joints) based on the applied force. For example, the joint command signals cause drive mechanisms within the robot arm's joints to assist the robot arm in moving in the direction indicated by the signal. In one embodiment, the assisted movement may be based on the magnitude of the force applied to the robot arm. For example, the drive mechanisms may cause the robot arm to move slowly in response to a low (or below a threshold) force applied by the user. Once no force is applied (e.g., the user has stopped pushing or pulling the robot arm), the communication controller stops transmitting joint command signals. In another embodiment, the switch may include one or more controls (e.g., a joystick) that allow the user to guide the arm in which direction it moves. In some embodiments, the switch may not be physically coupled to the robot arm but may be communicatively coupled (e.g., wired or wireless) to a separate electronic device (e.g., a tablet computer) configured to receive user input instructing how to move the robot arm.

[0079] The figure also shows a surgical robotic operating table 5 including a user-actuated switch 91 that, when actuated by the user, allows the operating table to be adjusted by the user. Similar to a robotic arm, the operating table 5 may include actuators or motors configured to move at least a portion of the operating table. For example, the table surface may be arranged to be coupled to an adapter at a joint including the actuator, and may be arranged to pivot about the joint (e.g., the table surface can be pivotally coupled to the adapter at the joint). Once the switch 91 is pressed, the user can push one side of the table surface 93 to rotate the table surface about an axis extending vertically through the operating table. As another example, when the switch 91 is pressed, the user can tilt the table surface relative to the adapter.

[0080] In one embodiment, movement of the robotic arm and / or robotic operating table may occur only when the user actuates the corresponding switch. For example, the user may move the robotic arm 4a only while switch 90 is being pressed. Once the switch is no longer pressed, the robotic arm may cease to respond to the force applied to it. In another embodiment, the system's table-side electronics may allow movement for a period of time (e.g., thirty seconds) after the switch is actuated.

[0081] Figure 10 The diagram illustrates several stages of a user moving a robotic arm when a corresponding user-actuated switch of the arm is activated, according to one embodiment. Specifically, the diagram shows two stages, 1005 and 1010, in which user 100 moves robotic arm 4a from one position to another relative to operating table 5. Stage 1005 shows user 100 grasping robotic arm 4a with their hand and pressing (or actuating) user-actuated switch 90 downwards with their thumb. In response, the switch transmits a control signal to table-side electronics, which uses the signal to determine that the user-actuated switch of the robotic arm has been activated. Once activated, the table-side electronics can activate or begin receiving sensor data from one or more sensors, as described herein. Thus, the table-side electronics can receive signals from one or more sensors indicating the direction in which user 100 forces the robotic arm to move. In this case, the sensor data could indicate that the user is pulling robotic arm 4a away from robotic arm 4b and rotating the arm away from the table surface. Therefore, the stage-side electronics can generate one or more joint command signals, which cause the drive mechanisms of one or more joints of the robot arm to assist the robot arm in moving in the direction indicated by the signal. Stage 1010 shows the result of movement by the user. For example, arm 4a has rotated away from robot arm 4b about the vertical axis and is now located on one side of the stage.

[0082] Figure 11This is a flowchart of an implementation of a process according to one embodiment, which allows a user-actuated switch to enable movement of a robotic arm when it is actuated by the user in response to determining that communication between the stage-side electronics and the host has stopped or terminated. Specifically, the process describes two modes in which the surgical robot system 1 can operate. This figure will be referenced. Figure 2 and Figure 9 The description is as follows. For example, at least some of the operations described herein may be performed by the surgical robot system 1 (e.g., the main control circuit 21 of its tableside electronics 20). Specifically, as described herein, the operations may be performed by a communication controller with primary responsibility. In another embodiment, at least some of the operations may be performed by another processor (or controller) integrated within the system. For example, the robot arm 4a may include a processor configured to determine whether a corresponding user-actuated switch of the robot arm is actuated and to allow movement of the arm's drive mechanism (e.g., based on a force applied by the user).

[0083] Process 110 begins by establishing communication with the host via a connection through receiving robot control commands, each robot control command instructing one of the robotic arms to perform movement, wherein each robotic arm has a corresponding user-actuated switch that, when actuated by the user, enables the robotic arm to be moved by the user (at block 111). For example, communication can be conducted via any type of connection (e.g., wired or wireless) and any communication protocol. In one embodiment, communication can be established at the start of the surgical procedure. Thus, when communication is established, the surgical robot system can be in a remote operation mode, in which the surgical robot system (i.e., each robotic arm in robotic arms 4a-4n and the operating table 5) is under the complete control of the operator via host 16. Therefore, process 110 overridden (e.g., once communication is established) the corresponding user-actuated switch, thereby preventing the switch from enabling the robotic arm to move (at block 112). Specifically, when in remote operation mode, system 1 may not respond to the actuation of the user-actuated switch 90 of the robotic arm. For example, the main control circuit (the communication controller with primary responsibility) can override the switches when circuit 21 communicates with the host via a connection. In addition to overriding the user actuation switches 90 of each arm, the system can also overridden the operating table user actuation switches 91, thereby preventing the operating table user actuation switches from enabling adjustment of the surgical table once communication is established with the host.

[0084] In one embodiment, the main control circuit 21 can override the switch in at least one of several methods when in remote operation mode. In one embodiment, the main control circuit can override the switch by not supplying power to it, thereby preventing the switch from generating a control signal when actuated by the user. In another embodiment, the controller with primary responsibility can receive a control signal from the switch when actuated, but can ignore the signal when in remote operation mode. In one embodiment, when in remote operation mode, the communication controller can fail to respond by not transmitting joint command signals to the drive mechanism of the robot arm and / or operating table in response to sensing that a user (e.g., user 100) is applying a pushing and / or pulling force.

[0085] Process 110 determines whether the host is still communicating with the main control circuitry (at decision block 113). Specifically, the system determines whether the communication connection (or link) between the host and the main control circuitry has been terminated or lost. For example, this determination may be based on whether input data (e.g., robot command signals) has stopped being received from the host after a period of time (e.g., five minutes). As another example, this determination may be based on an explicit command from the host indicating that communication has been terminated (e.g., a communication link such as a Bluetooth link has been terminated). In another embodiment, any method can be used to determine whether communication with the host has been lost or terminated by the surgical robot system 1. If not, process 110 returns to block 112 to continue overriding the user-actuated switch.

[0086] However, in response to determining that communication with the host has ceased, process 110 allows the corresponding user-actuated switch to enable the robot arm to move when actuated by the user (at box 114). Specifically, once communication is determined to have ceased, the surgical robot system switches from remote operation mode to local mode to allow the user to manually move the robot arm and / or the operating table. Thus, as described herein, when the user-actuated switch 90 of the robot arm is actuated, the communication controller (with primary responsibility) can transmit joint command signals to the drive mechanism in response to receiving sensor data indicating the direction and / or speed at which the robot arm will move.

[0087] Some implementation schemes may perform variations of process 50. For example, specific operations of the process may not be performed in the exact order shown and described. Specific operations may not be performed within a series of consecutive operations, and different specific operations may be performed in different implementation schemes. For example, upon determining that communication has terminated, the surgical robot system may alert the user (and operator) in the operating room. For example, as described herein, the tableside electronics of the surgical robot system may include a speaker. In response to determining that communication with the host has terminated, the system may drive the speaker to issue an alarm message, alerting the user that communication between the host and the tableside electronics (the main control circuitry) has terminated.

[0088] In one implementation, at least some of the operations described herein may be optional (shown as dashed boxes) and thus can be omitted from the process. For example, process 110 may be performed when the surgical robot system 1 is already in a remote operation mode (e.g., when the host is communicating with the main control circuit 21). Thus, communication with the host has been established.

[0089] In one implementation, even if communication has ceased, the table-side electronics (e.g., its main control circuitry 21) may, under certain conditions, prevent the robotic arm from moving in response to a user-actuated switch and / or the operating table's user-actuated switch. For example, once the user-actuated switch 90 is actuated, the system 1 can determine whether the surgical tool 7 is coupled to the robotic arm. In one implementation, the main control circuitry may not allow the corresponding user-actuated switch to move the robotic arm unless it has been determined that the surgical tool is not coupled to the robotic arm. For example, the surgical tool 7 coupled to the robotic arm 4a may include a sharp object, such as a scalpel or cannula. If the tool moves while still coupled to the arm, it may inadvertently come into contact with the patient still on the operating table 5. Therefore, to avoid harming the patient, the system may wait for the permission switch to allow movement until the tool is removed. In one implementation, as soon as the surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm after it has been determined that communication with the host has ceased, the system may override the corresponding user-actuated switch of the robotic arm, thereby preventing the robotic arm from moving in response to user actuation. In another implementation, the system will not over-control the switch if communication is lost, regardless of whether the surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm.

[0090] In one implementation, system 1 (e.g., its main control circuit 21) may wait for a period of time (after switching from remote operation mode to local mode) to allow user-actuated switches to move the corresponding arm after communication has ceased. Specifically, in response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection (e.g., the communication link with the host has been unintentionally terminated), the system enables each robotic arm (and surgical table) in the robotic arm to maintain its current position to avoid any sudden movement (e.g., an arm collapsing onto the patient). Additionally, after determining that communication has ceased, the system may continue to override the corresponding user-actuated switches, thereby preventing the robotic arm from moving for a period of time (e.g., thirty seconds). For example, in cases where communication is intermittent (e.g., periodically terminated and re-established) or lasts only a short time (e.g., five seconds), the system will wait for a period of time to allow the connection to be re-established.

[0091] As described herein, the surgical robot system 1 may include several controllers, such as a monitoring controller 22, a first communication controller 23, a second communication controller 24, an input power controller 60, a first power controller 63, and a second power controller 64. In one embodiment, each of the controllers described herein may be a separate dedicated processor relative to each other. For example, each controller may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a general-purpose microprocessor, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a system-on-a-chip (SoC) with one or more processors, a system-on-module (SOM), a digital signal controller, or a set of hardware logic structures (e.g., filters, arithmetic logic units, and dedicated state machines). In one embodiment, the controllers may include other electronic components. For example, the monitoring controller 22 may include other electronic components such as integrated circuits (ICs, such as transistors (or switches)) and memory.

[0092] In one embodiment, several aspects of this disclosure may be described as follows. For example, the electronic circuitry (e.g., table-side electronics 20 as described herein) of a surgical robot system 1, including a surgical table (e.g., 5) and one or more robotic arms (e.g., 4a-4n), may include one or more components as described herein. In one embodiment, the electronic circuitry includes a main control circuit (e.g., 21) arranged to communicate with a host computer (e.g., 16) via a connection by receiving robot control commands, which are translated by a control computer (e.g., 3) from commands received from the host computer. Each robot control command instructs one of the robotic arms to perform a movement. Each arm has a corresponding user-actuated switch (e.g., 90) that, when actuated by a user, enables the robotic arm to be moved by the user. The main control circuit is configured to: 1) over-control switch, thereby preventing the robot arm from moving when the host is communicating (or in the process of communicating) with the main control circuit via connection; and 2) in response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via connection, allow the corresponding user-actuated switch to move the robot arm when actuated by the user.

[0093] In one embodiment, the surgical table includes a user-actuated switch (e.g., 91) that, when actuated by the user, enables the surgical table to be adjusted by the user. However, the main control circuit overridden the user-actuated switch while communicating with the host computer, thereby preventing the switch from enabling adjustment of the surgical table.

[0094] In another embodiment, the robotic arm has a surgical tool (e.g., 7) coupled thereto, and the main control circuit does not allow the corresponding user-actuated switch to enable the robotic arm to move unless the surgical tool is no longer coupled to the robotic arm.

[0095] In some implementations, once the surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm after determining that the host is no longer communicating with the main control circuit, the main control circuit overrides the corresponding user-actuated switch of the robotic arm, thereby preventing the arm from moving in response to user actuation.

[0096] In one embodiment, the main control circuitry allows a corresponding user-actuated switch to enable the robot arm to move by: 1) determining that the user-actuated switch of the robot arm has been actuated, 2) receiving a signal indicating the direction in which the robot arm is forced to move, and 3) causing the drive mechanism of the robot arm to assist the robot arm in moving in the direction indicated by the signal. In another embodiment, the main control circuitry includes a communication controller configured to route robot control commands received from the host to the robot arm, and the communication controller causes the drive mechanism of the robot arm to assist in movement by generating robot control commands based on the received signals and transmitting them to the drive mechanism.

[0097] In one implementation, the main control circuit is configured to, in response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection: 1) enable each robot arm in the robot arm to maintain its current position, and 2) continue to override the corresponding user-actuated switch so that the robot arm cannot move for a period of time after communication has stopped.

[0098] In another embodiment of this disclosure, the surgical robot system and method include at least some of the components described herein and perform at least some of the processes as described herein.

[0099] As previously explained, embodiments of this disclosure may be non-transitory machine-readable media (such as microelectronic memory) on which instructions are stored, programming one or more data processing units (generally referred to herein as a "processor") to perform network operations, signal processing operations, joint command operations, etc. In other embodiments, some of these operations may be performed by specific hardware components containing hard-wired logic. These operations may also be performed by any combination of programmed data processing units and fixed hard-wired circuit components.

[0100] While certain embodiments have been described and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that such embodiments are merely illustrative and not limiting of this disclosure, and that this disclosure is not limited to the specific constructions and arrangements shown and described, as various other modifications will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Therefore, this specification should be considered illustrative rather than restrictive.

[0101] In some embodiments, this disclosure may include language such as, “at least one of [component A] and [component B]”. This language may refer to one or more of the components. For example, “at least one of A and B” may refer to “A”, “B”, or “A and B”. Specifically, “at least one of A and B” may refer to “at least one of A and at least one of B” or “at least one of A or B”. In some embodiments, this disclosure may include language such as, “[component A], [component B] and / or [component C]”. This language may refer to any one of these components or any combination thereof. For example, “A, B and / or C” may refer to “A”, “B”, “C”, “A and B”, “A and C”, “B and C”, or “A, B and C”.

Claims

1. An electronic circuit for a surgical robot system, comprising: A first communication controller has a primary responsibility, which includes communicating with the robotic arm of the surgical robot system and the host computer. When having the primary responsibility, the first communication controller is configured to process robot control commands received from the host computer, including instructions for driving the robotic arm to perform movement, and to transmit the robot control commands as joint command signals to the robotic arm. The second communication controller is a redundant controller. and A monitoring controller is configured to signal a second communication controller to assume the primary responsibility in place of the first communication controller in response to the detection of a fault.

2. The electronic circuit according to claim 1 further includes routing logic, said routing logic being arranged to communicatively couple the first communication controller, the second communication controller, and the monitoring controller to the robot arm, wherein, When having the aforementioned primary responsibility, the first communication controller is configured as follows: Receive a response signal from the robotic arm and via the routing logic, the response signal including an indication of movement performed by the robotic arm; and The response signal is processed and transmitted to the host as a feedback signal.

3. The electronic circuit of claim 2, wherein the monitoring controller is configured to detect faults by: A desired feedback signal is generated based on the indication from the response signal; and The expected feedback signal is compared with the feedback signal.

4. The electronic circuit according to claim 2, wherein the monitoring controller signals the second communication controller to assume the primary responsibility by configuring the routing logic to prevent the first communication controller from transmitting future joint command signals to the robot arm and to allow the second communication controller to transmit future joint command signals obtained by processing future robot control commands to the robot arm.

5. The electronic circuit of claim 4, wherein the monitoring controller is arranged to communicatively couple the first communication controller and the second communication controller to the host, wherein the monitoring controller signals the second communication controller to assume the primary responsibility in place of the first communication controller by preventing the first communication controller from transmitting future feedback signals to the host and allowing the second communication controller to process future response signals and transmit them to the host as future feedback signals.

6. The electronic circuit of claim 1, wherein the monitoring controller is configured to detect faults in the following manner: Generate expected joint command signals based on the instructions from the robot control commands; and The expected joint command signal is compared with the joint command signal.

7. The electronic circuit according to claim 1, wherein the joint command signal is a first joint command signal. The second communication controller receives the robot control commands and processes them into second joint command signals. When the first communication controller has the primary responsibility, the monitoring controller prevents the second communication controller from transmitting the second joint command signal to the robot arm.

8. The electronic circuit according to claim 1, further comprising: A first voltage bus, the first voltage bus being electrically connected to the first communication controller and being configured to provide power to the first communication controller; and A second voltage bus, electrically connected to the second communication controller and configured to provide the power to the second communication controller. The monitoring controller detects the fault by determining that the first communication controller is not receiving power through the first voltage bus.

9. The electronic circuit according to claim 1, further comprising: The routing logic is configured to communicatively couple the first communication controller, the second communication controller, and the monitoring controller to the robot arm. When the first communication controller has the primary responsibility, the routing logic sends the output data generated by the first communication controller to the robot arm according to a specified route, but does not send the output data generated by the second communication controller to the robot arm according to a specified route. The signal causes the routing logic not to send the output data generated by the first communication controller to the robot arm along a route, but instead sends the output data generated by the second communication controller to the robot arm along a route.

10. A method performed by a surgical robotic system, the method comprising: The robotic components of the surgical robot system receive user input to manipulate them. The user input is sent to a first controller and a second controller according to a route, wherein the first controller is responsible for controlling the robot components based on the user input, and the second controller is a backup controller; and In response to the detection of a fault within the surgical robot system, a signal is sent to notify the second controller to assume the responsibility in place of the first controller.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the first controller controls the robot component by transmitting control signals to the robot component based on the user input to manipulate the robot component, wherein the method further comprises receiving a feedback signal including a manipulation instruction from the first controller.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the fault is detected by: Receive the manipulation instructions from the robot component; Based on the manipulation instructions received by the robot component, a desired feedback signal is generated; and The expected feedback signal is compared with the feedback signal.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the robot component includes a robot arm, and the manipulation instruction includes a response signal generated by the robot arm, the response signal providing confirmation of movement of the robot arm.

14. The method of claim 11, wherein the user input is received from a host or directly from a user console, wherein signaling the second controller to assume the responsibility in place of the first controller includes: To prevent the first controller from transmitting future feedback signals to the host or to the user console; as well as Future feedback signals received from the second controller are allowed to be transmitted to the host or to the user console.

15. The method of claim 10, wherein signaling the second controller to assume the responsibility in place of the first controller comprises: To prevent the first controller from transmitting control signals to the robot component; as well as This allows the second controller to transmit control signals to the robot component.

16. The method of claim 10, wherein the first controller controls the robot component by transmitting control signals to the robot component based on the user input, wherein the fault is detected in the following manner: Generate the expected control signal based on the user input; and The expected control signal is compared with the control signal.

17. The method of claim 10, wherein the first controller is configured to generate a first control signal based on the user input, and the second controller is configured to generate a second control signal based on the user input, wherein the method further comprises: When the first controller has the aforementioned responsibility The first controller is allowed to transmit the first control signal to the robot component; as well as To prevent the second controller from transmitting the second control signal to the robot component.

18. A non-transitory machine-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by a processor of a surgical robotic system, cause the surgical robotic system to: The robotic components of the surgical robot system receive user input to manipulate them. The user input is sent to a first controller and a second controller according to a route, wherein the first controller is responsible for controlling the robot components based on the user input, and the second controller is a backup controller; and In response to the detection of a fault within the surgical robot system, a signal is sent to notify the second controller to assume the responsibility in place of the first controller.

19. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 18, wherein the first controller controls the robot component by transmitting control signals to the robot component based on the user input to manipulate the robot component, wherein the non-transitory machine-readable medium includes additional instructions for receiving feedback signals including manipulation instructions from the first controller.

20. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 19, wherein the fault is detected by means of: Receive the manipulation instructions from the robot component; Based on the manipulation instructions received by the robot component, a desired feedback signal is generated; and The expected feedback signal is compared with the feedback signal.

21. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 19, wherein the user input is received from a host or directly from a user console, wherein the instruction for signaling the second controller to assume the responsibility in place of the first controller includes instructions for the latter: Prevent the first controller from transmitting future feedback signals to the host or to the user console; and Future feedback signals received from the second controller are allowed to be transmitted to the host or to the user console.

22. A surgical robotic system, comprising: Robot components; and A redundant power architecture that manages and distributes power from a first power source and a second power source to the robot components, the redundant power architecture comprising: A circuit breaker, coupled to the first power source, the second power source, and the robot component. First controller and second controller, and A logic circuit that communicatively couples the circuit breaker to the first controller and the second controller, wherein the redundant power architecture is configured to, in response to a signal from one of the first controller and the second controller, instruct the logic circuit to keep the circuit breaker closed and distribute power from at least one of the first power source and the second power source to the robot component.

23. The surgical robot system of claim 22, wherein the redundant power architecture is further configured to stop distributing power from at least one of the first power source and the second power source to the robot component in response to both the first controller and the second controller signaling the logic circuit to open the circuit breaker.

24. The surgical robot system of claim 22, further comprising an input power controller electrically coupled between 1) the first power source and the second power source and 2) the redundant power architecture, and configured to select, in response to detecting a fault within the surgical robot system, which of the first power source or the second power source will provide the power to the redundant power architecture.

25. The surgical robot system of claim 22, wherein the redundant power architecture further comprises: A central power node, which is electrically coupled to the circuit breaker; and A first voltage bus and a second voltage bus, wherein the first voltage bus electrically couples the first power source to the central power node, and the second voltage bus electrically couples the second power source to the central power node.

26. The surgical robot system of claim 25, wherein the circuit breaker is an output circuit breaker, and wherein the redundant power architecture further includes a first input circuit breaker electrically coupled between the first voltage bus and the central power node and a second input circuit breaker electrically coupled between the second voltage bus and the central power node.

27. The surgical robot system of claim 25 further includes a main control circuit configured to control the robot components, wherein power is distributed by the redundant power architecture.

28. The surgical robot system of claim 27, wherein the circuit breaker is a first circuit breaker, and wherein the redundant power architecture further includes a second circuit breaker and a third circuit breaker, both of which are electrically coupled between the central power node and the main control circuit.

29. The surgical robot system of claim 22, further comprising a surgical table arranged to hold a patient, wherein the surgical table includes the redundant power architecture and the robot component, the robot component being a robotic arm mounted on the surgical table.

30. An electronic circuit for a surgical robot system, the surgical robot system comprising one or more robotic components, the electronic circuit comprising: A first voltage bus and a second voltage bus, the first voltage bus being arranged to electrically couple a first power source to a robot component of the surgical robot system, and the second voltage bus being arranged to electrically couple a second power source to the robot component. A circuit breaker, the circuit breaker being coupled to the first voltage bus, the second voltage bus and the robot component; First controller and second controller; and A logic circuit that communicatively couples the circuit breaker to the first controller and the second controller, wherein the circuit breaker is arranged to transmit a control signal to the logic circuit in response to each of the first controller and the second controller, causing the logic circuit to signal the circuit breaker to open while preventing current from being supplied by the first power source and the second power source to flow to the robot component.

31. The electronic circuit of claim 30, wherein the circuit breaker is arranged to supply current from at least one of the first power source and the second power source, wherein the control signal causes the logic circuit to signal the circuit breaker to close as soon as one of the first controller and the second controller transmits a control signal to the logic circuit.

32. The electronic circuit of claim 30 further includes an input power controller electrically coupled between 1) the first power source and the second power source and 2) the circuit breaker, and configured to select, in response to fault detection, which of the first power source or the second power source will provide the power to the robot component.

33. The electronic circuit of claim 30 further includes a central power node electrically coupled between the first voltage bus and the second voltage bus and the circuit breaker.

34. The electronic circuit of claim 33 further includes a first input circuit breaker electrically coupled between the first voltage bus and the central power node, and a second input circuit breaker electrically coupled between the second voltage bus and the central power node.

35. The electronic circuit of claim 30, wherein the electronic circuit is part of the surgical table of the surgical robot system.

36. The electronic circuit of claim 35, wherein the one or more robotic components are robotic arms mounted to the surgical table.

37. The electronic circuit of claim 30, wherein the first power source is an alternating current (AC) trunk power source and the second power source is a battery.

38. An electronic circuit for a surgical robot system, comprising: Central power node; A first voltage bus and a second voltage bus, wherein the first voltage bus is arranged to provide power from a first power source and the second voltage bus is arranged to provide power from a second power source; A first input circuit breaker and a second input circuit breaker, wherein the first input circuit breaker is coupled between the first voltage bus and the central power node, and the second input circuit breaker is coupled between the second voltage bus and the central power node; A first output circuit breaker and a second output circuit breaker, the first output circuit breaker being coupled between the central power node and the main control circuit, the main control circuit being configured to control the robotic components of the surgical robot system, and the second output circuit breaker being coupled between the central power node and the main control circuit. and Multiple controllers are communicatively coupled to the first input circuit breaker and the second input circuit breaker, as well as the first output circuit breaker and the second output circuit breaker, and are configured to disconnect the input circuit breaker or the output circuit breaker in response to the detection of a disconnection condition.

39. The electronic circuit of claim 38 further includes a third output circuit coupled between the central power node and the robot component.

40. The electronic circuit of claim 38, wherein the input circuit breaker or the output circuit breaker disconnects in response to all of the plurality of controllers transmitting a low control signal to the input circuit breaker or the output circuit breaker.

41. The electronic circuit of claim 38 further includes a third voltage bus coupling the main control circuit to the first output circuit breaker and a fourth voltage bus coupling the main control circuit to the second output circuit breaker, wherein the disconnection condition includes a fault in at least one of the voltage bus or the main control circuit.

42. The electronic circuit of claim 38, wherein the electronic circuit is part of the surgical table of the surgical robot system.

43. The electronic circuit of claim 38, wherein the first power source is an alternating current (AC) trunk power source and the second power source is a battery.

44. A surgical robot system, comprising: A surgical operating table, the surgical operating table being arranged to hold the patient, including a main control circuit and a power distribution circuit; Multiple robotic arms, each of which is mounted on the surgical table; and A control computer communicatively coupled to the host computer and the main control circuit translates commands received from the host computer into robot control commands for transmission to the main control circuit. These robot control commands instruct the robot arm to perform movements. The main control circuit includes a redundant communication architecture that maintains communication between the multiple robotic arms and the host computer in the event of a system failure. The power distribution circuit includes a redundant power architecture that manages the input power received from a first power source or a second power source and distributes it to the plurality of robot arms and the main control circuit.

45. The surgical robot system of claim 44, wherein the main control circuit comprises: A first communication controller, having primary responsibility including communicating with the robot arms among the plurality of robot arms and the host computer, The second communication controller, which is a redundant controller, and A monitoring controller is configured to signal a second communication controller to assume the primary responsibility in place of the first communication controller in response to the detection of the fault.

46. ​​The surgical robot system of claim 45, wherein the main control circuit further includes routing logic, the routing logic being configured to: The signals received from the robotic arm are sent along a route to each controller in the controller, and Signals received only from the controller, which has the primary responsibility, are routed to the robotic arm.

47. The surgical robot system of claim 44, wherein the power distribution circuit comprises: Central power node, A first voltage bus and a second voltage bus, the first voltage bus electrically coupling the first power source to the central power node, and the second voltage bus electrically coupling the second power source to the central power node, each bus being arranged to supply power from the corresponding power source to the central power node, wherein each bus has an input circuit breaker arranged to limit the first output current flow from the node and into the bus. An output circuit breaker is used for each robot arm, which electrically couples the robot arm to the central power node, and the output circuit breaker is arranged to limit the flow of a second output current from the central power node into the corresponding robot arm.

48. The surgical robot system of claim 47, wherein the power distribution circuit further comprises a first power controller and a second power controller, both of which are communicatively coupled to each of the output circuit breakers, wherein the output circuit breakers are disconnected only in response to control signals transmitted by the two power controllers, including instructions to disconnect the circuit breakers.

49. An electronic circuit for a surgical robot system, the surgical robot system including a surgical table and a plurality of robotic arms, wherein the electronic circuit includes: A main control circuit is arranged to communicate with the host via a connection by receiving commands from the host computer. Each command instructs one of the plurality of robot arms to perform a movement. Each robot arm has a corresponding user-actuated switch that, when actuated by a user, enables the robot arm to be moved by the user. The main control circuit is configured as follows: When the host computer communicates with the main control circuit via the connection, it controls the corresponding user-actuated switch to prevent the robot arm from moving due to external force applied by the user. In response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection, the corresponding user-actuated switch is allowed to move the robot arm due to the applied external force when actuated by the user.

50. The electronic circuit of claim 49, wherein the surgical table includes a user-actuated switch, which, when actuated by the user, enables the surgical table to be adjusted by the user, wherein when the main control circuit is communicating with the host, the main control circuit overrides the user-actuated switch to prevent the user-actuated switch from enabling the surgical table to be adjusted.

51. The electronic circuit of claim 49, wherein the robotic arm includes a surgical tool coupled thereto, wherein the main control circuit prevents the corresponding user-actuated switch from enabling the robotic arm to move unless the surgical tool is no longer coupled to the robotic arm.

52. The electronic circuit according to claim 49, wherein, Once the host computer determines that it is no longer communicating with the main control circuit, the surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm, and the main control circuit overrides the corresponding user-actuated switch of the robotic arm, thereby preventing the robotic arm from moving in response to user actuation.

53. The electronic circuit according to claim 49, wherein, The main control circuit allows the corresponding user-actuated switch to enable the robot arm to move in the following manner: It has been confirmed that the user-activated switch of the robotic arm has been actuated; Receive a signal indicating the direction in which the robotic arm must move; and The drive mechanism of the robot arm assists the robot arm in moving in the direction indicated by the signal.

54. The electronic circuit according to claim 53, The main control circuit includes a communication controller configured to route commands received from the host computer to the robotic arm. The communication controller enables the drive mechanism of the robot arm to assist in movement by generating commands based on the received signals and transmitting them to the drive mechanism.

55. The electronic circuit of claim 49, wherein the main control circuit is configured to: in response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection, 1) enable each of the robot arms to maintain its current position, and 2) continue to override the corresponding user-actuated switch, thereby preventing the robot arm from moving for a period of time after the communication has stopped.

56. A surgical robotic system, comprising: A surgical operating table, which is arranged to hold the patient; Multiple robotic arms, each mounted on the surgical table and arranged to perform surgical tasks on the patient during surgery, each robotic arm including a user-actuated switch that, when actuated by a user, enables the robotic arm to be moved by the user. A control computer, communicatively coupled to a host and configured to translate commands from the host into robot control commands, each robot control command instructing one of the robot arms to perform a movement; and A main control circuit, connected to the control computer via a connection, and configured to communicate with the host computer via the connection by receiving robot control commands from the control computer. The main control circuit is configured as follows: When the host communicates with the main control circuit via the connection, it controls the corresponding user-actuated switch to prevent the switch from causing the robot arm to move. In response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection, the corresponding user-actuated switch is allowed to enable the robot arm to move when actuated by the user.

57. The surgical robot system of claim 56, wherein the surgical table includes a user-actuated switch, which, when actuated by the user, enables the surgical table to be adjusted by the user, wherein when the main control circuit is communicating with the host computer, the main control circuit overrides the user-actuated switch to prevent the user-actuated switch from enabling the surgical table to be adjusted.

58. The surgical robot system of claim 56, wherein the robotic arm includes a surgical tool coupled thereto, wherein the main control circuitry disallows the corresponding user-actuated switch from enabling the robotic arm to move unless the surgical tool is no longer coupled to the robotic arm.

59. The surgical robot system of claim 56, further comprising a speaker, wherein the main control circuitry is configured to drive the speaker using an alarm audio signal in response to determining that communication with the host has ceased, the alarm audio signal comprising an alarm message indicating that the host is no longer communicating with the main control circuitry.

60. The surgical robot system of claim 56, wherein the main control circuit is configured to: in response to determining that the host has stopped communicating with the main control circuit via the connection, 1) enable each of the robotic arms to maintain its current position, and 2) continue to override the corresponding user-actuated switch, thereby preventing the robotic arm from moving for a period of time after the communication has stopped.

61. A method executed by electronic circuitry of a surgical robot system, the surgical robot system comprising a surgical table and a plurality of robotic arms, the method comprising: Communication with the host is established via a connection by receiving robot control commands, which are translated by the control computer from commands received by the control computer from the host. Each robot control command is used to instruct one of the robot arms to perform a movement, wherein each of the robot arms has a corresponding user-actuated switch, which enables the robot arm to be moved by the user when actuated by the user. When establishing the communication via the connection, the corresponding user-actuated switch is controlled to prevent the switch from enabling the robot arm to move. It has been determined that the host has stopped communicating; as well as In response to determining that the host has stopped communicating, the corresponding user-actuated switch is allowed to enable the robot arm to move when actuated by the user.

62. The method of claim 61, wherein the surgical table includes a user-actuated switch, the user-actuated switch, when actuated by the user, enabling the surgical table to be adjusted by the user, wherein the method further comprises: Once communication with the host is established, the user-activated switch of the operating table is controlled to prevent the operating table from being adjusted by the user-activated switch.

63. The method of claim 61, further comprising determining whether a surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm, wherein the electronic circuitry prevents the corresponding user-actuated switch from enabling the robotic arm to move unless it has been determined that the surgical tool is not coupled to the robotic arm.

64. The method of claim 61, further comprising, once the surgical tool is coupled to the robotic arm, overriding the corresponding user-actuated switch of the robotic arm so that the robotic arm is unable to move in response to the user actuation, as soon as it is determined that communication with the host has ceased.

65. The method of claim 61, further comprising: It has been confirmed that the user-activated switch of the robotic arm has been actuated; Receive a signal indicating the direction in which the robotic arm must move; as well as The drive mechanism of the robot arm assists the robot arm in moving in the direction indicated by the signal.

66. The method according to claim 65, The electronic circuitry includes a communication controller configured to route commands received from the host computer to the robotic arm. The drive mechanism of the robot arm assists in movement by generating robot control commands based on the received signals through the communication controller and transmitting them to the drive mechanism.

67. The method of claim 61, wherein the surgical robot system includes a speaker, and wherein the method further includes activating the speaker with an alarm message in response to determining that communication with the host has ceased, the alarm message indicating that the communication has ceased.

68. The method of claim 61, further comprising: In response to determining that communication with the host has stopped, 1) each of the robotic arms is able to maintain its current position, and 2) continues to override the corresponding user-actuated switch, so that the robotic arm cannot move for a period of time after the communication has stopped.

Images