A data processing method, a wearable device, a medium and a program product based on a secure communication chip

Abstract

This invention relates to a data processing method, wearable device, medium, and program product for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, and pertains to the fields of IoT communication and information security technology. After acquiring multimedia service data, the wearable device performs segmented hash calculations and constructs a local Merkle tree through an independent block node management unit. This compresses the large volume of multimedia service data into a compact root node hash value. Then, a physically non-cloning function derives the device's private key in real time to perform a digital signature on the root node hash value and combines a timestamp and digital identity identifier to generate evidence storage record data. Simultaneously, the communication baseband unit is only briefly activated during its predetermined sleep / wake cycle to sample signal quality parameters and remaining battery power parameters. Based on a dual-threshold joint evaluation result, it automatically switches between a direct on-chain path and a P2P relay path, improving the wearable device's continuous and reliable evidence storage capability under extreme physical constraints.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) communication and information security technology, and in particular to a data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, as well as wearable devices, media, and software products. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid popularization of the Internet of Things and smart wearable technology, smart wearable devices (such as law enforcement recorders and smart goggles) are widely used in high-frequency real-time interactive scenarios such as security patrols and emergency evidence collection.

[0003] In related technologies, to ensure the immutability of data collected on-site by wearable devices, a secure encryption chip and a wireless communication network baseband are typically deployed within the wearable device. During operation, the device uses a pre-installed security key to perform a cryptographic hash operation and digital signature on the original data to be authenticated. After signing, it activates the local cellular network communication component, packages the signed data packet into an authentication transaction, and sends it directly to a centralized authentication server or blockchain node in the cloud for on-chain storage via the public wireless mobile network.

[0004] However, for demanding business scenarios such as outdoor inspections or emergency rescues, wearable devices are vulnerable in terms of radio frequency communication and available power due to their size constraints and the fact that they may be located at the edge of wireless mobile network coverage or even in complex physical environments without public network signals. The mechanism in related technologies that uses high-power cellular networks to upload data based on predetermined business logic can trigger frequent retransmission attempts in weak network environments, rapidly depleting the limited battery power. Furthermore, wearable devices may lose their ability to directly communicate with the cloud due to accidental physical damage, making it difficult to achieve closed-loop data ownership verification for highly sensitive on-site data collected locally. This reduces the data survival rate and business execution efficiency of wearable devices in constrained environments. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a data processing method, wearable device, medium, and program product for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, which is used to ensure data security of wearable devices in limited environments such as weak network and low power by improving the reliability of the evidence chain and the closed loop of evidence storage and confirmation under extreme physical constraints.

[0006] Firstly, this application provides a data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, applicable to wearable devices with a built-in secure communication chip. The secure communication chip includes a communication baseband unit, a physical security unit, and an independent block node management unit. The method includes: after acquiring multimedia service data, performing segmented hash calculations on the multimedia service data through the independent block node management unit to obtain multiple data segment hash values, and constructing a local Merkle tree using these multiple data segment hash values ​​as leaf nodes; generating a device private key based on the physically unclonable function of the physical security unit, digitally signing the root node hash value of the local Merkle tree using the device private key, and then combining the digitally signed root node hash value, a timestamp, and the data of the wearable device... Digital identity identifiers are combined to generate evidence storage record data. During the sleep-wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, the signal quality parameters of the current wireless network and the remaining power parameters of the wearable device are obtained. If the signal quality parameter is greater than a preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than a preset power threshold, a network connection is established through the communication baseband unit, and the evidence storage record data containing the hash value of the root node is sent to the blockchain node. If the signal quality parameter is not greater than the preset signal threshold or the remaining power parameter is not greater than the preset power threshold, after obtaining the access request of the target wearable device, identity authentication is performed with the target wearable device based on the digital identity identifier, and the evidence storage record data and corresponding multimedia service data are sent to the target wearable device.

[0007] By adopting the above technical solution, after acquiring multimedia service data, the wearable device performs segmented hash calculations and constructs a local Merkle tree through an independent block node management unit. This compresses the large volume of multimedia service data into a compact root node hash value. Then, a physically non-cloning function derives the device's private key in real time to perform a digital signature on the root node hash value and combines a timestamp and digital identity identifier to generate a storage record data. This compresses the on-chain payload to a very small size containing only a cryptographic digest, reducing the communication power consumption exposure during network transmission. Simultaneously, the communication baseband unit is only briefly activated during its predetermined sleep / wake cycle to sample signal quality parameters and remaining battery power parameters. Based on the joint evaluation results of dual thresholds, the system automatically switches between the direct connection to the blockchain and the P2P relay path. This ensures that the activation timing of the high-power RF circuit is always constrained by both network availability and power safety margin, effectively avoiding the high energy consumption risk of retransmission storms caused by forcibly establishing a cellular connection in a weak network or low power critical state. When a direct connection to the blockchain is not possible, P2P relay evidence storage is completed through the target wearable device after identity authentication. Even in the limited environment without cellular network coverage, a closed loop of evidence storage and confirmation of rights is achieved, ensuring that the integrity of the evidence chain of multimedia service data is not interrupted due to network unavailability, and improving the continuous and reliable evidence storage capability of wearable devices under extreme physical constraints.

[0008] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the step of authenticating identity with the target wearable device based on the digital identity specifically includes: determining a first sub-identity identifier corresponding to the digital identity identifier based on a pre-set distributed master wallet identifier within the secure communication chip, wherein the distributed master wallet identifier is used to represent the global identity of the same user; in response to the access request, obtaining a second sub-identity identifier sent by the target wearable device; if it is determined that the first sub-identity identifier and the second sub-identity identifier are located under the same association level defined by the distributed master wallet identifier, then authenticating identity with the target wearable device based on the digital identity identifier; and if the identity authentication is successful, establishing a point-to-point communication channel with the target wearable device.

[0009] By adopting the above technical solution, wearable devices authenticate the target wearable device through a sub-identity hierarchy comparison mechanism based on the distributed master control wallet identifier under the P2P relay path. Only when the second sub-identity identifier of the target wearable device and the first sub-identity identifier of this device belong to the same legitimate association level defined by the master control wallet identifier, a point-to-point communication channel is established to transmit evidence record data and multimedia service data. Thus, without relying on centralized identity services, data transmission access control is restricted to legitimate wearable devices belonging to the same user through purely local cryptographic verification methods. This effectively prevents evidence data from being routed to unauthorized devices and ensures the security and reliability of data flow and the uniqueness of the evidence chain under the P2P relay path.

[0010] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the step of sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device specifically includes: if the identity authentication of the target wearable device is confirmed to be successful, determining, based on the physical attribute characteristics and absolute change difference of adjacent data frames in the multimedia service data, a target data frame whose absolute change difference is greater than a preset static standard threshold, and the target data segment hash value corresponding to the target data frame; locating the leaf node position of each target data segment hash value in the local Merkle tree, and extracting the hash value from each leaf node to the root node from the bottom up. The hash values ​​of all adjacent side nodes on the path are used to determine the independent Merkel operation proof path for each target data segment hash value. The target data frame is combined into a high-priority transmission sequence, and the remaining data frames are combined into a low-priority transmission sequence. The device's private key is used to digitally sign the hash values ​​of the multiple data segments and their corresponding independent Merkel operation proof paths. The digitally signed hash values ​​of the multiple data segments and their corresponding independent Merkel operation proof paths are then sent to the target wearable device through a point-to-point communication channel in the order of the high-priority transmission sequence and the low-priority transmission sequence.

[0011] By adopting the above technical solution, when a wearable device transmits multimedia service data to a target wearable device, it identifies target data frames with significant dynamic content based on the absolute change difference of the physical attribute characteristics of adjacent data frames. After locating the corresponding leaf node position in the local Merkle tree, it extracts independent Merkle operation proof paths from the bottom up, combines the target data frames into a high-priority transmission sequence, and transmits them with priority. At the same time, it performs device private key signing on all data segment hash values ​​and their independent Merkle operation proof paths before sending them along with the transmission. This design allows the target wearable device to independently verify the consistency between the data segment hash value and the root node hash value of the received high-priority frame based on the corresponding Merkle proof path. In scenarios where the P2P channel may be interrupted at any time due to device movement, even if the data transmission is not fully completed, the high-value dynamic frames received by the target wearable device still have complete credible evidence value, improving the effectiveness and anti-interruption capability of the evidence chain in the case of partial transmission completion.

[0012] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, after sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device, the method further includes: establishing a network connection through the communication baseband unit when the signal quality parameter re-acquired by the wearable device is greater than the preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than the preset power threshold; sending an evidence status query request to the blockchain node based on the digital identity identifier and the timestamp in the evidence record data, and receiving an on-chain evidence certificate returned by the blockchain node in response to the evidence status query request, wherein the on-chain evidence certificate is a record generated by the blockchain node after completing the on-chain operation submitted by the target wearable device; extracting the on-chain root node hash value from the on-chain evidence certificate, and comparing the on-chain root node hash value with the root node hash value of the locally stored local Merkle tree bit by bit; and deleting the multimedia service data corresponding to the local Merkle tree when it is determined that the on-chain root node hash value is consistent with the root node hash value of the local Merkle tree.

[0013] By adopting the above technical solution, after the wearable device meets the dual threshold conditions again, the wearable device actively queries the blockchain node for the evidence storage status through the communication baseband unit. It extracts the hash value of the on-chain root node from the returned on-chain evidence storage certificate and compares it bit-by-bit with the hash value of the local Merkle tree root node. Only when the two are completely consistent can it be confirmed that the multimedia service data of this batch has been successfully stored on-chain through the target wearable device, and then the corresponding original multimedia service data is deleted locally. Using the local Merkle tree root node hash value as the sole cryptographic verification anchor for data integrity and evidence storage ownership reduces the risk of irrecoverable evidence caused by prematurely deleting original data without verifying the on-chain hash value. It also avoids the situation where historical data that has already been stored occupies limited local storage resources for a long time, affecting subsequent data collection. This achieves a dynamic balance between the reliability of evidence storage and ownership confirmation and the efficient turnover of local storage resources.

[0014] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, after the step of sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device, the method further includes: starting a timeout timer associated with the hash values ​​of the multiple data segments from the moment the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected; if it is determined that the timeout timer's count reaches a preset timeout threshold and no successful on-chain receipt is received from the target wearable device, the wearable device that sent the access request is identified as a backup wearable device based on the access request received within the communication range; performing identity authentication with the backup wearable device based on the digital identity identifier; and after confirming that the identity authentication with the backup wearable device is successful, establishing a new point-to-point communication channel with the backup wearable device, and sending the multiple data segment hash values ​​to the backup wearable device through the corresponding point-to-point communication channel.

[0015] By adopting the above technical solution, the wearable device immediately starts a timeout timer associated with the data segment hash value when the P2P channel is disconnected. If no successful on-chain confirmation is received within the timeout period, the device automatically filters and determines a backup wearable device from the access requests received within the communication range. Subsequently, it performs identity authentication and establishes a new peer-to-peer communication channel to retransmit the data segment hash value. By binding the timeout timer with the data segment hash value of a specific batch, the wearable device can accurately and asynchronously track the relay on-chain status of each batch of data, avoiding confusion between the on-chain status of different batches of data. The automatic switching mechanism of the backup wearable device builds a second-layer relay fault-tolerant channel when the target wearable device fails unexpectedly and cannot complete the on-chain process. This ensures that the evidence storage and confirmation task will not completely deadlock in the event of a single relay node failure, effectively guaranteeing the end-to-end reliability of the evidence chain in multi-node collaborative evidence storage scenarios.

[0016] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the step of determining the wearable device that sends the access request as a backup wearable device based on the access request received within the communication range specifically includes: when multiple wearable devices send the access request, obtaining the number of data segment hash values ​​of each candidate wearable device that sent the access request that has not received the corresponding on-chain evidence certificate, and the time interval between the last time each candidate wearable device received the on-chain evidence certificate; and determining the candidate wearable device with the fewest number of candidate wearable devices whose time interval is less than a preset time interval threshold as the backup wearable device.

[0017] By adopting the above technical solution, when selecting a backup wearable device from multiple candidate wearable devices, the first filtering condition is whether the time interval between the most recent receipt of on-chain evidence is less than a preset time interval threshold. Devices that have failed to successfully complete on-chain operations for an extended period of time in the recent past are excluded. Then, from the filtered candidate devices, the device with the fewest data segment hash values ​​that have not yet received the corresponding on-chain evidence is selected as the backup wearable device. The evaluation of the candidate node's "historical on-chain credibility" and "current task load" is decoupled: the first round of time interval filtering ensures that the selected backup node has verifiable successful on-chain records in the recent past, fundamentally eliminating the probability of network failures or system anomalies causing devices to be mistakenly selected as relay nodes; the second round of minimum quantity screening ensures that the selected backup node currently has the most sufficient processing capacity to prioritize the relay tasks delivered by the current wearable device, reducing the risk of on-chain delays caused by congestion in the backup node's task queue, so that the backup relay path can still efficiently advance the evidence storage and confirmation closed loop even in extremely limited scenarios.

[0018] In conjunction with some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the step of activating the timeout timer associated with the multiple data segment hash values ​​specifically includes: obtaining the remaining battery power parameter of the wearable device and the number of currently detectable surrounding wearable devices at the moment the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected; calculating the corresponding continuous working duration as a first estimated duration based on the remaining battery power parameter and the current power consumption rate of the wearable device; determining the target surrounding wearable devices whose signal strength change rate is not less than a preset negative threshold based on the signal strength change rate of each of the surrounding wearable devices within a preset time period; calculating the communication maintenance duration required for the signal strength of each target surrounding wearable device to decay to a preset disconnection threshold based on the current signal strength and signal strength change rate of each target surrounding wearable device, as a second estimated duration; and determining the second estimated duration... If the effective number of spare wearable devices around the target exceeds a preset threshold when the estimated duration is greater than the first estimated duration, the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer is configured as a first duration, which is less than the first estimated duration. If the effective number of spare devices is determined not to be greater than the preset threshold, the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer is configured as a second duration, which is greater than the first duration and not greater than the first estimated duration. The timeout timer is started based on the preset timeout threshold, and during the timeout timer's timing, a preset polling interval is used to determine whether a successful on-chain receipt returned by the target wearable device is received. If the successful on-chain receipt returned by the target wearable device is received, the timeout timer is stopped and the on-chain evidence certificate carried in the successful on-chain receipt is stored.

[0019] By adopting the above technical solution, when the P2P channel is disconnected, the wearable device calculates the first estimated duration based on the remaining power parameters and power consumption rate. At the same time, it determines the effective backup quantity by filtering the signal strength change rate of surrounding wearable devices. Based on the comparison result between the effective backup quantity and the preset quantity threshold, the timeout threshold is dynamically configured to a first duration that is less than the first estimated duration or a second duration that is greater than the first duration but not greater than the first estimated duration. During the timing process, the arrival of the on-chain receipt is detected in real time at a polling interval. The core value of this dynamic configuration mechanism lies in anchoring the timeout threshold configuration decision to two dimensions: the remaining working time boundary of the current wearable device and the abundance of available backup resources in the surrounding area. When backup resources are sufficient, a shorter first duration is selected, enabling the wearable device to complete node switching as early as possible and fully utilize the abundant backup node resources to increase the probability of successful on-chain operation. When backup resources are scarce, a longer second duration is selected, giving the current target wearable device as much opportunity as possible to complete on-chain operation and reducing the data duplication overhead caused by multiple node switching in resource-scarce conditions. At the same time, the first estimated duration is always used as the upper bound of the timeout threshold to ensure that the timeout mechanism is not triggered only after the wearable device's own battery is depleted. This achieves adaptive optimization of the timeout strategy under dynamically changing battery status and surrounding node resource environment.

[0020] In a second aspect, this application provides a wearable device comprising: one or more processors and a memory; the memory being coupled to the one or more processors, the memory being used to store computer program code including computer instructions, the one or more processors invoking the computer instructions to cause the wearable device to perform the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0021] Thirdly, this application provides a computer program product containing instructions that, when run on a wearable device, cause the wearable device to perform the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0022] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed on a wearable device, cause the wearable device to perform the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0023] One or more technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application have at least the following technical effects or advantages: 1. Due to the adoption of a fusion technology that involves performing segmented hash calculations and constructing a local Merkle tree for multimedia service data through an independent block node management unit, and then using a device private key derived in real time by a physically non-cloning function to perform digital signatures only on the root node hash value to generate a very small amount of evidence record data, and driving the dynamic switching between direct connection to the chain and P2P relay path by jointly evaluating signal quality parameters and remaining power parameters during the sleep-wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, the processing device can strictly limit the activation time of high-power cellular radio frequency circuits to the condition that both threshold conditions are met, with only a very small amount of evidence record data containing cryptographic digests. The large payload of evidence storage completes on-chain evidence storage, thereby minimizing the communication power consumption of a single on-chain operation. When the dual threshold conditions are not met, it automatically switches to a P2P relay path that does not require a cellular network, and uses the target wearable device after identity authentication to complete the evidence storage and confirmation. This effectively solves the technical problems in the existing technology where wearable devices frequently activate high-power communication basebands to perform on-chain operations under weak network and low power conditions, resulting in rapid power depletion, and the inability to complete the evidence storage and confirmation closed loop when the network is unavailable. This improves the integrity of the evidence chain for reliable evidence storage of multimedia service data by wearable devices in extreme physical constraints.

[0024] 2. Due to the adoption of a distributed master control wallet identifier pre-set within the secure communication chip to determine the first sub-identity of the current wearable device, to obtain the second sub-identity of the target wearable device when responding to an access request, and to complete identity authentication by comparing whether the two belong to the same association level defined by the master control wallet identifier, and to establish a point-to-point communication channel to transmit evidence record data and multimedia service data only when authentication is successful, the processing device can complete the local decentralized verification of the legitimacy of the target wearable device without relying on any centralized identity service or cloud authentication interface in P2P relay scenarios where no cellular network is available. It can do so solely by relying on the cryptographic operations within the secure communication chip. This strictly limits the transmission of evidence data to devices in the same group that belong to the same legally authorized association level as the current wearable device. This effectively solves the technical problems in the existing technology where the P2P data relay path lacks a decentralized identity verification mechanism, leading to the security risk of evidence data being routed to unauthorized devices and the risk of unclear evidence ownership. Thus, it realizes the security and reliability of data flow access control and the verifiability of the source of evidence chain in wearable devices in weak network collaborative evidence storage scenarios.

[0025] 3. By employing technical features such as proactively establishing a network connection via the communication baseband unit after the dual threshold conditions are met again, sending a query request for the evidence storage status to the blockchain node based on the digital identity identifier and timestamp in the evidence storage record data, extracting the hash value of the on-chain root node from the returned on-chain evidence storage certificate and comparing it bit by bit with the hash value of the local Merkle tree root node, and deleting the corresponding original multimedia business data locally only when the two are completely consistent, the processing device, after completing data delivery through the P2P relay on-chain path, proactively initiates an independent verification of the on-chain evidence storage status to the blockchain node within the next wake-up window that meets the dual threshold conditions. The bit-by-bit consistency between the hash value of the on-chain root node and the hash value of the local Merkle tree root node is used as the sole cryptographic confirmation basis. This shifts the trust anchor of evidence storage confirmation from the local receipt of the target wearable device to the immutable record of the blockchain ledger, reducing the risk of premature and erroneous deletion of local original data due to malicious forgery of the on-chain receipt by the target wearable device or failure of on-chain block writing. This achieves coordinated protection of the security of original evidence data retention and the turnover of local storage resources in multi-hop relay evidence storage scenarios for wearable devices. Attached Figure Description

[0026] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a data processing method for a wearable device based on a secure communication chip, as described in an embodiment of this application. Figure 2 This is another flowchart illustrating a data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, as described in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an exemplary hardware structure of a wearable device in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0027] The terminology used in the following embodiments of this application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of this application. As used in the specification and appended claims of this application, the singular expressions “a,” “an,” “the,” “the,” “the,” and “this” are intended to include the plural expressions as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used in this application refers to and includes any or all possible combinations of one or more of the listed items.

[0028] Hereinafter, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as implying or suggesting relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature, and in the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, "multiple" means two or more.

[0029] Please see Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, as described in an embodiment of this application.

[0030] S101. After obtaining the multimedia service data, the multimedia service data is segmented and hashed by the independent block node management unit to obtain multiple data segment hash values, and the multiple data segment hash values ​​are used as leaf nodes to construct a local Merkle tree.

[0031] Multimedia business data refers to the original media content captured in real time by wearable devices through built-in sensors or acquisition modules in actual business scenarios. It covers various forms such as audio streams, video frame sequences, image files and their associated metadata. Examples include first-person video streams continuously recorded by AI law enforcement glasses during patrols, original audio tracks collected by AI recording clips in meeting or interview scenarios, and call recordings generated by AI earphones during private calls. Independent block node management unit refers to a dedicated computing module integrated inside the secure communication chip, which operates independently from the communication baseband unit and physical security unit. It is used to carry out blockchain-related hash operations, Merkle tree construction and on-chain interaction logic. Its independent operating architecture design ensures that the blockchain node management logic is not affected by communication status or security authentication processes. Local Merkle tree refers to a complete binary hash tree structure in the independent block node management unit of the wearable device. The hash values ​​of all data segments are used as leaf nodes. The hash values ​​are aggregated upwards through pairwise hash operations layer by layer until a unique root node hash value is generated. This structure can efficiently represent the integrity status of the entire batch of multimedia business data with a single root node hash value and supports independent membership proof verification for any single data segment.

[0032] After the wearable device successfully collects a complete multimedia service data segment containing privacy data, the independent block node management unit receives the raw multimedia service data stream output from the wearable device's acquisition module and segments it according to a preset segmentation strategy. This segmentation strategy can perform equal-length segmentation based on a fixed byte length, or perform semantically aligned variable-length segmentation based on the frame boundaries or time windows of the multimedia data, ensuring that each data segment has independent integrity at the content level. After completing the data segmentation, the independent block node management unit performs cryptographic hash operations on each data segment sequentially. The hash algorithm used is consistent with the national cryptographic algorithm system supported by the secure communication chip, such as using the SM3 algorithm to operate on each data segment, obtaining a fixed-length hash digest corresponding to each segment, i.e., the data segment hash value. After all segment hash operations are completed, the independent block node management unit arranges the obtained multiple data segment hash values ​​according to their order in the original data, and uses them as a set of leaf nodes to start the Merkle tree construction process. During the tree construction process, the independent block node management unit starts from the leaf node level, concatenates the hash values ​​of two adjacent nodes, and performs another hash operation to obtain their common parent node hash value. This process is repeated layer by layer upwards, performing pairwise hash operations until all nodes converge to a unique root node hash value. If the number of nodes at a certain level is odd, the last node is copied and paired with itself to ensure the integrity of the tree structure. The independent block node management unit fully stores the complete node structure of the local Merkle tree, including the hash values ​​of intermediate nodes, leaf nodes, and the root node at each level, for use in subsequent steps such as signing, notarization, and data verification.

[0033] In some embodiments, the segmented hash calculation of multimedia service data and the construction of a local Merkle tree can be implemented in various ways: Optionally, the wearable device segments the multimedia service data using a fixed byte length as the segment unit, such as 512 bytes or 1024 bytes per data segment. The independent block node management unit calls the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm to perform the operation on each fixed-length segment, obtaining the corresponding 32-byte hash digest as the leaf node value. Then, according to the order index of the leaf nodes, pairwise concatenation hash operations are performed layer by layer to construct a complete binary Merkle tree, and the root node hash value and the node structure of each layer are persistently stored in a secure environment. The secure storage unit within the communication chip is used for subsequent steps. Optionally, the wearable device parses frame boundary information according to the media format of the multimedia service data, dividing each complete data frame or several consecutive frames into an independent data segment. The independent block node management unit performs hash operations on each data segment according to the frame boundaries, obtaining a sequence of data segment hash values ​​based on media frame semantic alignment. Then, using this sequence as the set of leaf nodes, a tree structure is constructed layer by layer according to the standard binary Merkle tree algorithm. At the same time, the corresponding frame index number is recorded in each leaf node to support subsequent local data verification and priority sorting operations based on frame position. It is understood that other segmentation granularity strategies or hash algorithm combinations can also be used to implement segmented hash calculation of multimedia service data and construction of the local Merkle tree, which is not limited here. It should be further explained that when the number of leaf nodes is odd, the independent block node management unit should perform a copying and padding process on the last leaf node to maintain the symmetrical structure of pairwise pairings at each level of the Merkle tree and ensure the determinism and consistency of the root node hash value calculation result. In addition, the entire node structure of the Merkle tree should be completely preserved in local secure storage, rather than just saving the root node hash value. This is because in S105, it is necessary to extract the hash values ​​of the side nodes on the path from each leaf node to the root node to construct an independent Merkle operation proof path. If the intermediate node structure is missing, the extraction of the proof path cannot be completed.

[0034] S102. After generating the device private key based on the physical non-cloning function of the physical security unit, the device private key is used to digitally sign the root node hash value of the local Merkle tree, and the digitally signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier of the wearable device are combined to generate evidence storage record data.

[0035] The physical security unit (PSU) refers to the hardware security module integrated within the secure communication chip. It carries core security functions such as key lifecycle management, cryptographic operations, and protection against physical attacks. Internally, it implements a strict hardware isolation mechanism to ensure that key materials remain within protected hardware boundaries during computation and are not exposed in plaintext. The physically unclonable function (PFC) is a hardware fingerprint generation mechanism that utilizes the unavoidable physical randomness introduced in semiconductor manufacturing processes—such as minute deviations in transistor threshold voltage and process variations in metal interconnect layers. Its core characteristic is that the response of the same PFC circuit to the same input stimulus is highly unique and stable, and cannot be reproduced through reverse engineering or physical cloning. Even two chips produced from the same wafer batch will inevitably have different response values ​​generated by their PFCs. Therefore, PFCs are used to generate globally unique and non-detachable device root keys for each secure communication chip. The device private key refers to the response based on the PFC. The private key component of the asymmetric key pair derived from the value is used to perform digital signature operations on the data digest. Its corresponding public key can be publicly disclosed for signature verification, while the private key itself never leaves the hardware isolation boundary of the physical security unit in plaintext form throughout its entire lifecycle. A digital signature is a cryptographic credential obtained by performing an asymmetric cryptographic signature operation on the root node hash value using the device's private key. Any verifier holding the corresponding public key can verify that the root node hash value was indeed issued by the wearable device holding the legitimate device private key and that the content has not been tampered with. A digital identity identifier is a globally unique decentralized identifier assigned to the wearable device based on a distributed identity technology system. It is used to represent the verifiable identity of the wearable device in blockchain networks and P2P communication between devices. It is usually bound to the device's public key and registered in an on-chain identity contract. The evidence storage record data refers to the structured data packet formed by combining and encapsulating the digitally signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier according to a predetermined format. It serves as the core payload for storing the multimedia business data on the chain.

[0036] After the S101 completes the construction of the local Merkle tree and obtains the root node hash value, the wearable device uses the hardware root trust capability of the physical security unit to sign and protect the root node hash value. The signature result is then combined with the device identity information and encapsulated into a storage record data that can be directly used for on-chain submission. Specifically, the wearable device first initiates a device private key generation request to the physical security unit. Upon responding to this request, the physical security unit activates its internal physically unclonable function circuit, applies a preset excitation vector, collects the unique response value generated by the physically unclonable function circuit under the current chip physical state, and inputs this response value as a key seed into the key derivation function. Following the preset key derivation path, the device private key is generated. After derivation, this device private key resides only in the registers or protected memory areas within the physical security unit and is not output via the external chip bus in any form, fundamentally eliminating the risk of side-channel attacks or physical probe extraction during transmission or storage. After generating the device private key, the physical security unit receives the local Merkle tree from the independent block node management unit. The root node hash value is used, and a digital signature operation is performed on this root node hash value within a hardware-isolated environment. The signature algorithm used is consistent with the cryptographic algorithm system supported by the secure communication chip, such as using the national cryptographic SM2 elliptic curve signature algorithm to sign the root node hash value, generating a digital signature value with a fixed format. After the digital signature is completed, the wearable device obtains the current timestamp from the system clock module and reads the wearable device digital identity identifier pre-written into the secure storage unit. The digitally signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier are concatenated and encapsulated according to a predetermined structured format to form evidence record data. This evidence record data structure completely includes the content digest (root node hash value), the identity of the issuing entity (digital identity identifier), the signature certificate (digital signature value), and the time anchor (timestamp) of the batch of multimedia business data. Any recipient or blockchain node can independently verify the legality of the data source and the integrity of the content based on this evidence record data without accessing the original multimedia business data ontology.

[0037] In some embodiments, the generation of device private keys and the encapsulation of evidence record data can be implemented in multiple ways: Optionally, each time a device private key needs to be generated, the physical security unit activates the physical non-cloning function circuit in real time and collects the current response value. After error correction encoding, the response value is used as a key seed and input into the key derivation function based on the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm. Real-time derivation of the private key is completed within the physical security unit. After performing SM2 signing on the root node hash value, the intermediate state values ​​generated during the private key derivation process are immediately cleared to ensure that the device private key does not reside in any storage unit within the chip after signing. Subsequently, the signature value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier are concatenated and serialized according to JSON or TLV structure to generate... The evidence storage record data includes, optionally, a physical security unit that generates a device root key once upon initial power-up using a physically non-cloning function and persistently stores it in encrypted form in a protected partition of the secure storage unit. Subsequently, each time a signature operation is required, the physical security unit decrypts and loads the device root key from the secure storage unit, derives the session-level device private key used for the current business signature using a key derivation function, performs a digital signature on the root node hash value, destroys the session-level private key, and serializes and encapsulates the signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier according to a predetermined binary encoding format to form fixed-length or variable-length evidence storage record data for efficient transmission to the blockchain node via the communication baseband unit. It is understood that other key generation mechanisms and signature encapsulation formats can also be used to generate the evidence storage record data; this is not limited here. It should be further noted that the reliability of timestamps is crucial to the judicial acceptance value of evidence record data. When conditions permit, wearable devices should prioritize time synchronization with authoritative network time protocol servers through the communication baseband unit to ensure the accuracy and tamper-proof nature of the timestamps. In the event that communication is unavailable, the local time maintained by the chip's built-in hardware secure clock module can be used as the timestamp source, and the time source type should be marked in the evidence record data so that the verifier can make differentiated assessments of time reliability when comparing on-chain.

[0038] In some embodiments, during the chip factory calibration phase, the physical security unit samples the response value of the physically non-cloning function circuit multiple times under standard environmental conditions, extracts a stable reference response value based on majority voting or error correction code algorithms, and stores the corresponding error correction auxiliary data in plaintext in a secure storage unit. Subsequently, each time the physically non-cloning function circuit is activated to generate a private key, the physical security unit reads the currently collected noise response value, combines it with the stored error correction auxiliary data, and performs error correction and recovery on the response value using a fuzzy extraction algorithm. This ensures that a stable key seed highly consistent with the factory reference value is always restored, and a deterministic device private key is derived from this seed. This ensures that the device private key and corresponding public key generated by the same secure communication chip remain consistent throughout its entire lifecycle, guaranteeing the stability and reliability of signature verification.

[0039] S103. During the sleep-wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, obtain the signal quality parameters of the current wireless network and the remaining power parameters of the wearable device.

[0040] The communication baseband unit refers to the functional module integrated within the secure communication chip, responsible for managing the radio frequency communication link between the wearable device and the external wireless network. In the wearable device scenario addressed in this application, this unit typically implements cellular mobile network access and data transmission based on the LTE Cat.1 standard, exhibiting relatively high radio frequency transmission power consumption. Therefore, the management of its operating state has a significant impact on the overall device energy consumption. The sleep-wake cycle refers to the intermittent working mechanism adopted by the communication baseband unit to reduce continuous standby power consumption. That is, the communication baseband unit is in a low-power sleep state most of the time, only automatically waking up and briefly activating the radio frequency transceiver circuit within a preset periodic time window to perform network status detection, signal quality sampling, or transmission of data to be transmitted. After completing the above operations or exceeding the wake-up window duration, it re-enters the sleep state. Through this periodic sleep-wake alternating working mode, basic communication capabilities are maintained while significantly reducing communication power consumption. The average power consumption of the baseband unit extends the continuous working time of wearable devices under power-constrained conditions; signal quality parameters refer to the metrics obtained by the wearable device through radio frequency signal measurement within the wake-up window of the communication baseband unit, which can quantify the availability and link quality of the current wireless network, such as reference signal reception quality, reference signal reception power, or signal-to-noise ratio, etc., and their values ​​directly reflect the wireless network coverage strength and link transmission reliability at the current location; remaining power parameters refer to the quantitative indicators of the remaining available power of the wearable device's battery, which is monitored in real time by the power management module. They are usually expressed as battery percentage or remaining voltage value and are a key basis for assessing whether the wearable device can support high-power communication operations.

[0041] After S102 completes the generation of the evidence record data, the wearable device needs to assess whether it has the network and power conditions to directly submit the evidence data to the blockchain node. This is triggered within the time window when the communication baseband unit automatically wakes up according to a predetermined sleep / wake cycle, completing the joint sampling of the current network and power status. Specifically, the communication baseband unit switches from a low-power sleep state to an active state according to a pre-configured sleep / wake cycle. Upon activation, it immediately initiates the radio frequency signal measurement process, receiving reference signals from the current serving cell or neighboring cells via the antenna. It then calls the baseband signal processing module to measure and calculate parameters such as the strength, quality, and signal-to-noise ratio of the received signal, normalizing the measurement results into signal quality parameter values ​​that can be directly compared with preset signal thresholds. Simultaneously, the wearable device reads the power status information reported by the current battery management chip through the interface between the secure communication chip and the wearable device's main controller, obtaining the remaining power parameter value representing the current remaining usable battery capacity. Within the same wake-up window, the wearable device independently compares the signal quality parameters and remaining power parameters with preset signal thresholds and preset power thresholds, respectively, to form a two-dimensional network-energy joint evaluation result. This evaluation result is then passed to the subsequent branch decision logic as the basis for determining whether to trigger the S104 direct network connection path or the S105 P2P relay path.

[0042] It should be noted that the entire sampling and evaluation process of S103 should be completed within the single wake-up window of the communication baseband unit to avoid unnecessary additional power consumption caused by timeout occupying the wake-up window. The wearable device should output the decision result immediately after completing parameter sampling and threshold judgment, and switch the communication baseband unit back to sleep state in a timely manner when no network connection is required.

[0043] In some embodiments, signal quality parameters and remaining power parameters can be obtained in multiple ways: Optionally, after the wearable device wakes up the communication baseband unit, it calls the measurement interface of the baseband driver layer to sample the reference signal reception quality and reference signal reception power of the current LTE serving cell, and takes the sliding weighted average of multiple consecutive measurements as the final signal quality parameter to smooth the interference of short-term signal jitter on the judgment result. At the same time, it reads the current power percentage value stored in the battery management chip register through the I2C bus as the remaining power parameter. After completing the synchronous acquisition of the two parameters, it immediately performs threshold comparison and outputs the joint evaluation result. Optionally, the wearable device maintains a network quality prediction model based on historical sampling records. In each wake-up window, the model predicts the expected signal quality of the next wake-up cycle based on the original value of the signal quality obtained by the current measurement and the historical signal quality sequence of several previous wake-up cycles through an exponential smoothing algorithm. The predicted value is used as the signal quality parameter for threshold comparison. At the same time, the remaining power is accurately estimated by combining the current battery voltage and discharge curve. The estimated result is used as the remaining power parameter, thereby improving the accuracy of the judgment of the two parameters in a dynamically changing environment. It is understandable that other signal quality quantification metrics or power estimation algorithms can also be combined to achieve the dual-parameter acquisition in S103, which is not limited here. It should be added that the configuration values ​​of the preset signal threshold and preset power threshold have a significant impact on the overall performance of the solution. If the threshold is too high, it will lead to excessive restriction on network uplink operations and increase the frequent triggering of P2P relay paths; if the threshold is too low, it may forcibly establish network connections under critical signal or power conditions, causing a high-power retransmission storm and accelerating power depletion. Therefore, wearable devices can dynamically configure or remotely update the above two thresholds according to the business needs and power budget of the specific deployment scenario.

[0044] S104. If the signal quality parameter is greater than the preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than the preset power threshold, a network connection is established through the communication baseband unit, and the evidence record data containing the hash value of the root node is sent to the blockchain node.

[0045] In this context, network connectivity refers to the end-to-end usable communication link established between the wearable device and the target blockchain node after the wearable device activates its radio frequency transmission module via the communication baseband unit, completes the entire process of network attachment, IP address allocation, and transport layer connection establishment through the LTE Cat.1 cellular network. A blockchain node is an on-chain server node deployed in the cloud or consortium blockchain network, responsible for receiving notarized transactions submitted by external devices and writing them into the distributed ledger. After receiving the notarized data, it performs transaction verification, consensus confirmation, and on-chain block creation, and returns a block height and transaction details to the submitter. EasyHash's on-chain evidence storage certificate; the hash value of the root node refers to the unique top-level digest value generated after the local Merkle tree constructed in S101 completes the tree aggregation operation. As a compact cryptographic digest representing the integrity status of the entire batch of multimedia business data, it carries the credible representativeness of the entire batch of original data content with a very small data volume and is the core component of the evidence storage record data; the evidence storage record data refers to the complete structured data packet formed by encapsulating and combining the root node hash value after digital signature, timestamp and digital identity in S102. It is the business payload directly submitted to the blockchain node for on-chain storage.

[0046] After S103 completes the joint sampling and evaluation of signal quality parameters and remaining power parameters, if the wearable device determines that both the signal quality parameters and the remaining power parameters are greater than the preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameters are greater than the preset power threshold, meaning that the wearable device currently has sufficient network coverage quality and sufficient power reserves, meeting the dual conditions for performing network connection and blockchain operation, then the wearable device triggers the execution of S104, taking the priority path of direct connection to the blockchain. Specifically, the wearable device instructs the communication baseband unit to fully activate from the dormant state, initiate the LTE network attachment process, search and lock the operator's serving cell with the best signal quality at the current location through the multi-band radio frequency front end, complete network registration and IP address allocation, and establish a transport layer connection with the pre-configured blockchain node address; after the connection is established, the wearable device and the blockchain node perform two-way identity authentication and session key negotiation based on the national cryptographic SM2 or ECC algorithm, and establish an end-to-end encrypted communication channel after the handshake is completed to prevent the evidence record data from being eavesdropped or attacked by a man in the middle during transmission over the public network. After the encrypted channel is established, the wearable device encapsulates the evidence storage record data generated in S102—including the root node hash value after digital signature, timestamp, and digital identity identifier—into an evidence storage transaction message conforming to the blockchain node interface specification, and sends it to the blockchain node through the established encrypted channel. Upon receiving the evidence storage transaction message, the blockchain node first verifies the digital signature using the public key pre-registered on the chain by the wearable device, confirming the legality of the signature source and the integrity of the root node hash value. After successful verification, the evidence storage transaction is included in the consensus process. After consensus confirmation and on-chain block creation, the blockchain node returns an on-chain evidence storage certificate containing information such as block height and transaction hash to the wearable device. Upon receiving the on-chain evidence storage certificate, the wearable device persistently stores it in a secure storage unit and then switches its communication baseband unit back to sleep mode, completing the entire process of this direct connection to the blockchain. It is worth noting that S104 submits only the evidence record data containing the root node hash value to the blockchain node, rather than the original multimedia business data body. This design not only ensures the privacy and security of the original data by not transmitting it in plaintext over the public network, but also significantly reduces the transmission time and power consumption of LTE communication due to the extremely small size of the evidence payload, thereby improving the success rate of direct connection to the blockchain under the condition of limited remaining power.

[0047] In some embodiments, the sending of evidence record data to the blockchain node can be achieved in several ways: Optionally, after establishing an encrypted channel with the blockchain node, the wearable device sends a POST request containing evidence record data to the evidence storage interface provided by the blockchain node using the HTTP / HTTPS protocol. After receiving the HTTP 200 response and the on-chain evidence storage certificate carried in the response body from the blockchain node, the wearable device parses and stores the certificate content in a local secure storage unit, closes the HTTP connection, and notifies the communication baseband unit to enter a sleep state. Optionally, the wearable device establishes a persistent connection with the message broker service deployed on the blockchain node through lightweight IoT communication protocols such as MQTT or CoAP, publishes the evidence record data to a predetermined evidence storage topic, and after the blockchain node subscribes to the topic, receives and processes the evidence storage transaction. After completing the on-chain block, it sends the on-chain evidence storage certificate to the certificate receiving topic subscribed to by the wearable device through reverse message push. After receiving the pushed certificate, the wearable device completes the storage and closes the connection. It is understood that other transmission protocols such as WebSocket or gRPC can also be used to submit evidence record data to the blockchain node, which is not limited here. It should be noted that after sending the evidence record data, the wearable device should set a reasonable response waiting timeout period. If the on-chain evidence certificate is not received from the blockchain node within the timeout period, a limited number of retransmission attempts should be made within the time allowed by the current wake-up window. If the retransmission is still unsuccessful, the communication baseband unit should be switched back to sleep mode in a timely manner to avoid continuously occupying the high-power radio frequency circuit due to waiting for a response for a long time. In the next wake-up cycle, the network and power status should be reassessed to decide whether to try to connect directly to the chain again.

[0048] S105. If the signal quality parameter is not greater than the preset signal threshold, or the remaining power parameter is not greater than the preset power threshold, then after obtaining the access request from the target wearable device, the device will perform identity authentication based on the digital identity identifier and send the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device.

[0049] In this context, an access request refers to a point-to-point connection request message initiated by the target wearable device to the current wearable device via a short-range wireless communication protocol after the target wearable device discovers the wireless broadcast signal of the current wearable device locally. This message typically carries the target wearable device's sub-identity and communication capability parameters, used to request the establishment of a direct device-to-device communication channel with the current wearable device. The target wearable device refers to a similar wearable device that can receive the current wearable device's evidence storage records and original multimedia service data, and perform blockchain on-chain operations on its behalf, when the current wearable device cannot meet the conditions for direct connection to the blockchain. In actual deployment scenarios, the target wearable device is usually another smart wearable terminal belonging to the same user or law enforcement team as the current wearable device and having a legitimate identity association, such as in the same law enforcement scenario. AI-powered law enforcement glasses are worn by another law enforcement officer in collaborative operations, and are of the same model. Identity authentication refers to a security verification process that verifies whether the target wearable device has the legal qualification to receive the data of the current wearable device before establishing a P2P data transmission channel, based on the digital identity identifiers of both parties and the pre-set association hierarchy rules in the distributed identity system. Its purpose is to prevent evidence record data and original multimedia business data from being forwarded to unauthorized devices, thereby ensuring the security of access control for data on the P2P transmission path. Point-to-point communication channel refers to an encrypted bidirectional data transmission link established between the current wearable device and the target wearable device through direct wireless communication, bypassing basic network infrastructure. In the weak network scenario targeted by this application, this channel is usually implemented based on short-range wireless communication protocols such as Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth, or ultra-wideband, which has the significant advantage of not relying on cellular network coverage.

[0050] After completing the dual-parameter joint evaluation in S103, if the wearable device determines that the signal quality parameter is not greater than the preset signal threshold, or the remaining power parameter is not greater than the preset power threshold, meaning that the current wearable device has insufficient network coverage or insufficient power reserves and does not meet the conditions for safely performing direct connection to the blockchain, then the wearable device triggers the execution of S105, entering the P2P relay blockchain degradation and fault-tolerant path. Specifically, the wearable device keeps the communication baseband unit in a sleep or low-power listening state, while activating the short-range wireless communication module to begin scanning and broadcasting device discovery beacons, so that other wearable devices within the communication range can detect the presence of the current wearable device and initiate an access request. When a wearable device receives an access request from a target wearable device via a short-range wireless communication module, it extracts the target wearable device's sub-identity identifier carried in the access request message and matches it against the association hierarchy rules defined by the distributed master control wallet identifier preset in the secure communication chip. This verifies whether the target wearable device and the current wearable device belong to the same legally authorized associated identity range. If the identity authentication is successful, the wearable device negotiates and establishes an encrypted P2P communication channel with the target wearable device based on the short-range wireless communication protocol. Through this channel, it transmits the evidence storage record data and the corresponding original multimedia service data to the target wearable device. After receiving the complete data, the target wearable device, relying on its own network connectivity, performs the blockchain on-chain operation, submits the evidence storage record data to the blockchain node to complete the on-chain block creation, and returns the on-chain evidence storage certificate to the current wearable device through the same P2P channel or a subsequent available communication path, completing the complete closed loop of P2P relay on-chain.

[0051] In some embodiments, after receiving an access request from a target wearable device, the wearable device determines a first sub-identity identifier corresponding to its own digital identity identifier based on a distributed master wallet identifier preset within the secure communication chip. In response to the access request, it obtains a second sub-identity identifier sent by the target wearable device. If the first and second sub-identity identifiers are determined to be within the same association level defined by the same distributed master wallet identifier, identity authentication is considered successful, and a point-to-point communication channel is established between the wearable device and the target wearable device. Subsequently, the evidence record data and original multimedia service data are sent to the target wearable device through this channel according to the Merkel path priority transmission strategy. In other embodiments, the identity authentication process can further introduce a challenge-response based dynamic verification mechanism: after receiving an access request, the wearable device sends a random number challenge value to the target wearable device. The target wearable device signs the challenge value using its device private key and sends it back. The wearable device verifies the signature using the public key registered on-chain by the target wearable device, and completes dual identity verification in conjunction with association level rules. A P2P channel is established only after both verifications pass, further enhancing the security strength of the relay data transmission path; however, this is not limited to this.

[0052] In some embodiments, the transmission of evidence record data and multimedia service data to the target wearable device can be achieved in multiple ways: Optionally, after the P2P channel is established, the wearable device first identifies target data frames whose absolute change difference is greater than a preset static standard threshold based on the physical attribute characteristics and absolute change difference of adjacent data frames in the multimedia service data. It then locates the leaf node position of the target data segment hash value corresponding to each target data frame in the local Merkle tree, and extracts all adjacent side node hash values ​​on the path from each leaf node to the root node hash value from bottom to top. After reverse splicing according to the tree hierarchy, an independent Merkle operation proof path is formed for each target data segment hash value. The target data frames are combined into a high-priority transmission sequence, and the remaining data frames are combined into a low-priority transmission sequence. The device's private key is used to verify the hash values ​​of multiple data segments and their independent Merkle operations. The computational proof path is digitally signed and sent to the target wearable device via a P2P channel in a high-priority and low-priority sequence to ensure the priority and complete delivery of key dynamic frame content. Optionally, after the P2P channel is established, the wearable device first sends the evidence record data as the first batch of messages to the target wearable device through the channel. This allows the target wearable device to obtain the root node hash value in advance and establish an on-chain evidence anchor with the blockchain node. Subsequently, the original multimedia service data is transmitted in batches through the channel in segmented order. After each data segment is transmitted, the Merkel path proof corresponding to that segment is sent to the target wearable device. After receiving each data segment, the target wearable device can independently verify the hash value of that segment using the corresponding Merkel path proof to confirm its consistency with the hash value of the on-chain root node. The final on-chain submission operation is performed only after all segment transmission verifications are completed. It is understood that other transmission scheduling strategies and data distribution protocols can also be combined to realize the P2P transmission of evidence record data and multimedia service data, which is not limited here. It should be further noted that during the data transmission process from the wearable device to the target wearable device, the transmission quality of the P2P communication channel should be continuously monitored. If the channel signal quality drops significantly or the transmission rate falls below the preset lower limit, data transmission should be paused in time and the current transmission progress breakpoint should be saved. After the channel quality is restored, transmission should continue from the breakpoint to avoid the repeated full transmission of large amounts of multimedia service data due to channel interruption, thereby improving the transmission efficiency and reliability of the P2P relay path.

[0053] In other embodiments, after the wearable device completes the data transmission to the target wearable device, it also needs to perform asynchronous verification of the evidence storage status and local data cleanup operations: if the signal quality parameters re-acquired by the wearable device are greater than a preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameters are greater than a preset power threshold, the wearable device establishes a network connection through the communication baseband unit, sends an evidence storage status query request to the blockchain node based on the digital identity identifier and timestamp in the evidence storage record data, receives the on-chain evidence storage certificate returned by the blockchain node, extracts the hash value of the on-chain root node from it, and compares the hash value of the on-chain root node with the hash value of the root node of the local Merkle tree bit by bit; if it is confirmed that the two are completely consistent, the wearable device determines that the batch of multimedia service data has been successfully stored on-chain through the target wearable device, and then deletes the corresponding original multimedia service data stored locally, releasing storage space for subsequent data collection; this is not limited here.

[0054] Understandably, from the moment the P2P channel is disconnected, the wearable device starts a timeout timer associated with multiple data segment hash values. This timeout threshold is dynamically configured based on the current remaining battery power, power consumption rate, and the number of available wearable devices in the vicinity. If no on-chain success receipt is received from the target wearable device before the timeout threshold expires, the wearable device selects the device with the highest historical on-chain success rate and the lightest current pending data burden from the candidate wearable devices based on newly received access requests within the communication range. It then re-executes identity authentication and establishes a new P2P channel, resending the data segment hash values ​​to the backup wearable device. Through the fault tolerance mechanism of multi-hop relay, the evidence storage and rights confirmation closed loop can still be completed under extremely limited conditions.

[0055] In this embodiment, the wearable device employs a fusion technology that involves segmenting multimedia service data into hash values ​​and constructing a local Merkle tree, generating a device private key based on a physically non-cloning function to digitally sign the root node hash value, and jointly evaluating signal quality parameters and remaining battery power parameters during the sleep / wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, dynamically switching between direct uplink and P2P relay uplink paths based on the evaluation results. Therefore, the wearable device can continuously complete data integrity organization and signature / proof storage while the communication baseband unit is in a low-power sleep state, activating only when dual threshold conditions are met. The high-power radio frequency circuit performs the on-chain operation, and in weak network or low power scenarios, it automatically switches to a P2P relay path that does not rely on cellular networks. The evidence record data is stored on the chain through the target wearable device after identity authentication. This effectively solves the technical problems in the existing technology, such as the rapid depletion of power caused by the frequent activation of the high-power communication baseband to perform on-chain operation in weak network and low power environments, and the inability to complete the closed loop of evidence storage and confirmation due to the loss of network connectivity. Thus, it realizes the reliable evidence storage and confirmation of multimedia service data and the integrity of the evidence chain of wearable devices under extreme physical constraints.

[0056] In the above embodiments, wearable devices can achieve a closed loop of data storage and rights confirmation in weak network and low power scenarios through the above dual-path dynamic switching and P2P relay evidence storage mechanism. In practical applications, when the above method is executed, there is a defect that after the target wearable device receives the evidence record data and multimedia service data, the on-chain operation cannot be completed within the expected time due to unexpected power outages, physical damage or network failures. The current wearable device cannot perceive the on-chain result through the original P2P channel, and cannot directly connect to the network for verification due to insufficient signal or power, resulting in the closed loop of data storage and rights confirmation being suspended for a long time.

[0057] Please see Figure 2 This is another flowchart illustrating a data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, as described in this application.

[0058] S201. After obtaining the multimedia service data, the multimedia service data is segmented and hashed by the independent block node management unit to obtain multiple data segment hash values, and the multiple data segment hash values ​​are used as leaf nodes to construct a local Merkle tree.

[0059] S202. After generating the device private key based on the physical non-cloning function of the physical security unit, the device private key is used to digitally sign the root node hash value of the local Merkle tree, and the digitally signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier of the wearable device are combined to generate evidence storage record data.

[0060] S203. During the sleep-wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, obtain the signal quality parameters of the current wireless network and the remaining power parameters of the wearable device.

[0061] S204. If the signal quality parameter is greater than the preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than the preset power threshold, then a network connection is established through the communication baseband unit, and the evidence record data containing the hash value of the root node is sent to the blockchain node.

[0062] S205. If the signal quality parameter is not greater than the preset signal threshold, or the remaining power parameter is not greater than the preset power threshold, then after obtaining the access request from the target wearable device, the system performs identity authentication with the target wearable device based on the digital identity identifier, and sends the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device.

[0063] Steps S201~S205 and Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, steps S101 to S105 are similar, and can be found in the descriptions of steps S101 to S105, which will not be repeated here.

[0064] S206. Starting from the moment the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected, start a timeout timer associated with multiple data segment hash values.

[0065] The timeout timer is a software-timed mechanism activated by the wearable device after the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected. It continuously monitors whether a successful on-chain receipt is received from the target wearable device within a preset timeout threshold. The association of the timeout timer with multiple data segment hash values ​​means that the triggering condition of the timer is bound to the specific data batch transmitted, ensuring that the target of the timeout judgment is clearly defined. The successful on-chain receipt is a confirmation message returned by the target wearable device to the current wearable device through an available communication path after submitting the evidence record data to the blockchain node and obtaining on-chain block confirmation. This message typically carries on-chain evidence information, including block height, transaction hash, and other on-chain location identifiers. The first estimated duration is the time the wearable device estimates based on its current remaining battery power and real-time power consumption rate, representing the device's ability to operate under the current workload. The first estimated duration is the maximum remaining duration for continuous normal operation; the second estimated duration is the communication maintenance duration required for the signal strength of each wearable device around the target to decay to a preset disconnection threshold, calculated based on the current signal strength and signal strength change rate of each wearable device around the target. This is used to assess the remaining duration for which each wearable device around the target can maintain effective communication with the current wearable device under the current movement trend; the effective backup quantity refers to the number of devices among all detectable wearable devices whose second estimated duration is greater than the first estimated duration of the current wearable device, i.e., the number of wearable devices around the target that can still maintain effective communication before the current wearable device runs out of power; the first duration and the second duration refer to the timeout threshold duration configured in the two cases of sufficient and insufficient effective backup quantity, respectively, where the first duration is less than the first estimated duration, and the second duration is greater than the first duration but not greater than the first estimated duration.

[0066] After S205 completes the data transmission to the target wearable device and causes the point-to-point communication channel to be disconnected, the wearable device enters the asynchronous waiting stage for the result of the uplink operation on the target wearable device. S206 is immediately triggered to execute when the channel is disconnected. By dynamically configuring the timeout threshold and starting the timeout timer, time boundary constraints are provided for the subsequent possible backup node switching process.Specifically, after detecting a point-to-point communication channel disconnection event, the wearable device first collects the remaining battery power and the current battery consumption rate. Based on the ratio of these two parameters, it calculates a first estimated duration, which is the estimated duration required for the wearable device to continue operating until the battery is depleted while maintaining its current workload. Simultaneously, the wearable device activates the surrounding device scanning function of its short-range wireless communication module to detect all detectable surrounding wearable devices within the current communication range. It then samples and records the signal strength changes of each surrounding wearable device within a preset time period, calculating the signal strength change rate of each device. The wearable device subsequently filters out devices with a signal strength change rate not less than a predetermined value. A negative threshold is set for wearable devices around the target, excluding devices whose signal strength is rapidly attenuating and expected to soon exceed the communication range, retaining only devices with relatively stable or still increasing signal strength as valid candidates. For each wearable device around the target, the wearable device calculates the time required for its signal strength to attenuate from the current value to a preset disconnection threshold, i.e., the second estimated time, based on its current signal strength value and the corresponding rate of change of signal strength, through linear extrapolation or estimation methods based on physical propagation models. This quantifies the remaining window of time during which each wearable device around the target can maintain effective communication with the current wearable device under the current motion situation. The wearable device counts all targets whose second estimated time is greater than the first estimated time. The number of surrounding wearable devices is used to determine the effective backup quantity. If the effective backup quantity is greater than a preset threshold, the wearable device configures the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer to a first duration, which is shorter than a first estimated duration. This is intended to trigger the backup node switch as early as possible before the device's battery runs out, making full use of the abundant backup resources to complete the evidence storage relay as quickly as possible. If the effective backup quantity is not greater than the preset threshold, the wearable device configures the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer to a second duration, which is longer than the first duration but not greater than the first estimated duration. This is intended to give the target wearable device as much time as possible to complete the on-chain operation when backup resources are scarce, reducing unnecessary timeouts. The data retransmission overhead caused by point switching; after completing the timeout threshold configuration, the wearable device officially starts the timeout timer based on the preset timeout threshold, and continuously checks whether it receives the on-chain success receipt returned by the target wearable device at a preset polling interval during the timeout process; if the on-chain success receipt is received before the timeout timer expires, the wearable device immediately stops the timeout timer, extracts the on-chain evidence certificate carried in the receipt and persistently stores it in the secure storage unit, completing the closed loop of this P2P relay on-chain rights confirmation, and the subsequent process terminates; if the timeout timer reaches the preset timeout threshold and the on-chain success receipt is still not received, the wearable device triggers the execution of S207 and enters the selection and switching process of the backup wearable device.

[0067] In some embodiments, after the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected, the wearable device obtains the remaining power parameters and the number of currently detectable surrounding wearable devices at the time of channel disconnection. Based on the remaining power parameters and the current power consumption rate, it calculates a first estimated duration. It determines the signal strength change rate of each device by calculating the slope of the signal strength sampling sequence of each surrounding wearable device within a preset time period. It filters out target surrounding wearable devices whose signal strength change rate is not less than a preset negative threshold. It calculates a second estimated duration for each target surrounding wearable device based on the linear extrapolation of the current signal strength and the signal strength change rate. It counts the number of devices whose second estimated duration is greater than the first estimated duration as the effective reserve quantity. Based on the comparison result between the effective reserve quantity and the preset quantity threshold, it configures the timeout threshold as the first duration or the second duration. It starts a timeout timer and detects the successful on-chain receipt at a preset polling interval. After receiving the receipt, it stops the timer and stores the on-chain evidence. In other embodiments, the wearable device may adopt a simplified fixed timeout threshold strategy, that is, without performing the scanning of surrounding wearable devices and the calculation of the second estimated duration, the timeout timer is started directly with a pre-configured fixed duration as the timeout threshold, so as to reduce the consumption of computing resources at the moment of channel disconnection. This is suitable for scenarios where the number of surrounding wearable devices does not change frequently or the deployment environment is relatively fixed; no limitation is made here.

[0068] In some embodiments, the activation of the timeout timer and the dynamic configuration of the timeout threshold can be achieved in various ways: Optionally, after detecting a point-to-point communication channel disconnection event, the wearable device immediately reads the current battery percentage and discharge current value through the battery management interface, converts the battery percentage into the remaining battery capacity, divides it by the discharge current value to obtain the first estimated duration, and simultaneously initiates active scanning of the short-range wireless communication module to collect the signal strength sequence of surrounding wearable devices. Least-squares linear fitting is performed on the signal strength sequence of each device to obtain the signal strength change rate. After filtering out devices with a change rate less than a preset negative threshold, a second estimated duration is obtained for the remaining target devices based on the current signal strength and change rate through linear extrapolation. The number of devices with a second estimated duration greater than the first estimated duration is compared with a preset number threshold, and the timeout threshold is set to either the first duration or the second duration based on the comparison result. The system timer interface is invoked to start a timeout timer with the threshold value, and a callback function triggered at a preset polling interval is registered to detect the arrival of a successful on-chain receipt. Optionally, the wearable device maintains a dynamically updated status table of surrounding wearable devices. During normal operation, it continuously collects the historical signal strength sequence of surrounding devices in a low-power scanning mode in the background. When a point-to-point communication channel disconnection event is triggered, the latest signal strength change rate and current signal strength of each surrounding wearable device are directly read from the status table, without needing to re-execute the scan sampling at the moment of channel disconnection. This reduces the latency of the timeout threshold configuration process after channel disconnection. Similarly, the effective backup quantity is counted based on the comparison between the second estimated duration and the first estimated duration. After completing the timeout threshold configuration based on the comparison result, the timeout timer is started, and asynchronous event listening is used instead of polling detection during the timeout process to reduce the processor resource consumption of continuous polling. It is understood that other power estimation methods and signal strength prediction models can also be combined to achieve dynamic configuration of the timeout threshold, which is not limited here. It should be further noted that the specific values ​​of the first and second durations should be determined based on the typical blockchain on-chain operation time of wearable devices in the actual deployment scenario. The first duration should not be less than the reasonable maximum time required for the target wearable device to complete a full on-chain operation, so as to avoid prematurely triggering the backup switch while the target wearable device is still performing the on-chain operation normally due to the timeout threshold being set too short, causing unnecessary data duplication. In addition, the configuration of the preset quantity threshold should also match the typical deployment density of wearable devices in the specific scenario. In the scenario of densely populated collaborative operation, the threshold can be appropriately increased to more fully screen high-quality backup nodes, while in the scenario of sparse deployment, the threshold should be appropriately decreased to avoid the timeout threshold always being configured as the second duration due to insufficient number of backup nodes.

[0069] In some embodiments, the signal strength change rate on which the wearable device calculates the second estimated duration at the moment of channel disconnection is obtained by linear fitting based on historical signal strength sequences over a period of time. However, the movement trajectory of the wearable device in actual use scenarios is often not a uniform linear motion. The trend of signal strength change may change drastically due to nonlinear factors such as the wearer suddenly changing direction, entering a building, or encountering obstacles, resulting in a large deviation between the linear extrapolation prediction based on the historical change rate and the actual communication duration. For example, if the signal strength of a wearable device in the vicinity is stable within the historical sampling window, but the device immediately enters an elevator or underground space after the channel is disconnected, causing a rapid signal interruption, the second estimated duration predicted by the wearable device based on that device is seriously overestimated, and it is incorrectly included in the effective backup candidate. Ultimately, the timeout threshold configuration is biased towards the first duration, while the actual available backup resources are insufficient. The wearable device can introduce a confidence weighting mechanism for the signal strength change rate to mitigate this: specifically, when calculating the fitted line and change rate of the signal strength of each wearable device in the vicinity of the target, the root mean square value (RMSE) of the residual between the discrete sampling points of the original historical signal strength sequence and the corresponding points of the linear fitted line is calculated simultaneously. The root mean square value of the residual statistically quantifies the dispersion of historical signal fluctuations. This residual value serves as an inverse indicator of the confidence level of the rate of change prediction: a larger residual value indicates more irregular and drastic historical changes in the signal strength of the device, a larger bias in the linear fitting error, and thus lower reliability of its linear extrapolation for future predictions. The processing device pre-defines a mapping algorithm based on a negative exponential decay function, and formulates the formula... Where C is the confidence discount factor (ranging from 0 to 1), and R is the root mean square value of the residuals calculated in real time. A pre-calibrated baseline fluctuation constant (used to characterize the acceptable amplitude of normal signal jitter in the scenario) is used. Based on this principle, the larger the residual value of a device, the smaller the confidence discount coefficient of its mapped output, forming a "penalty" mechanism for high-fluctuation signals. After this calculation, the initially calculated second estimated duration is multiplied by the corresponding confidence discount coefficient to complete the confidence discount correction for that duration. Finally, the processing device uses the discounted second estimated duration to perform a cross-dimensional comparison with the first estimated duration of the current wearable device. By using physical signal statistical algorithms other than cryptography, the weight of historically unstable devices is reduced, effectively eliminating interference caused by "false positive" overestimation. This makes the final number of effective backup devices closer to the actual resource situation that can support relay on-chain, improving the inference accuracy and system robustness of the dynamic configuration rule for timeout thresholds in non-uniform, nonlinear, and complex movement scenarios.

[0070] S207. If the timeout timer reaches the preset timeout threshold and no successful on-chain receipt is received from the target wearable device, the wearable device that sent the access request is identified as the backup wearable device based on the access request received within the communication range.

[0071] In this context, a backup wearable device refers to a wearable device selected from candidate wearable devices that have recently received access requests within the current communication range, following a preset screening strategy, to take over the task of relaying on-chain data storage records and data segment hash values ​​from the target wearable device when the timeout period expires and no successful on-chain confirmation is received from the target wearable device. A candidate wearable device refers to one or more wearable devices within the short-range wireless communication coverage area of ​​the wearable device that have sent access requests to it. Each candidate wearable device must meet the basic conditions for subsequent identity authentication before entering the backup device evaluation and screening process. The number of data segment hash values ​​for which no corresponding on-chain storage certificate has been received refers to the total number of data segment hash value entries in each candidate wearable device's local pending queue that have not yet received confirmation of the on-chain storage certificate from the blockchain node. This number directly reflects the current data processing load of the candidate wearable device. The fewer the number of on-chain tasks a device currently carries, the lighter its unfinished on-chain tasks are, and the more abundant its computing and communication resources are available to process newly received data. The time interval between the most recent receipt of on-chain evidence refers to the length of time since each candidate wearable device last successfully received a valid on-chain evidence from a blockchain node, tracing back from the current moment. This time interval is an important indicator for measuring the frequency of successful on-chain operations and network connectivity availability of candidate wearable devices in history. The smaller the time interval, the more active and successful the device's recent on-chain operations are, and the higher its trusted relay capability. The preset time interval threshold is a time reference upper limit pre-configured for screening candidate wearable devices. Only candidate wearable devices whose time interval between the most recent receipt of on-chain evidence is less than this threshold are considered qualified candidates with effective on-chain capabilities in the near future, thus entering the next stage of the optimal selection process based on the number of data segment hash values.

[0072] When the timeout timer in S206 reaches the preset timeout threshold and the wearable device still has not received the successful on-chain receipt from the target wearable device, the wearable device judges that the relay on-chain task of the target wearable device is likely to have failed to complete successfully, thereby triggering the execution of S207. From the candidate wearable devices available in the current communication range, a backup wearable device with the best on-chain capability is selected according to the comprehensive evaluation strategy to take over the subsequent evidence storage relay task from the target wearable device. Specifically, the wearable device first checks all access request messages received through the short-range wireless communication module during the S206 timeout timer's operation, extracting the identity information and communication capability parameters of each candidate wearable device that sent the access request, forming a candidate wearable device list for the current moment. If there is only one device in the candidate wearable device list, the wearable device directly lists that device as the sole candidate for subsequent identity authentication. If there are multiple devices in the candidate wearable device list, the wearable device initiates a multi-dimensional evaluation and screening process: the wearable device requests or reads two key status parameters from each candidate wearable device's access request message. The first is the number of data segment hash values ​​that the candidate device has not yet received for the corresponding on-chain evidence storage certificate, reflecting its current pending data load; the second is the time interval between the candidate device's most recent receipt of the on-chain evidence storage certificate and the current moment, reflecting the recent success frequency of its on-chain operations and network availability status. The wearable device then performs the first round of time interval filtering on all candidate wearable devices, removing candidate wearable devices whose most recent time interval for receiving the on-chain evidence storage certificate is greater than or equal to a preset time interval threshold from the candidate list. In addition, only candidate wearable devices with time intervals less than a preset time interval threshold are retained to exclude devices that have failed to complete on-chain operations for an extended period of time recently, or that may have network failures or system anomalies. After the first round of time interval filtering, the wearable device sorts the remaining candidate wearable devices in ascending order based on the number of data segment hash values ​​for which it has not received the corresponding on-chain evidence certificate. The candidate wearable device with the fewest hash values ​​is selected as the backup wearable device and serves as the target node for this relay task switchover. If, after the first round of filtering, there are still multiple candidate wearable devices with the same number of hash values, the wearable device can further prioritize them by referring to the signal strength or communication stability scores of each candidate device, and select the one with the best comprehensive score as the backup wearable device. If all candidate wearable devices are eliminated after the first round of time interval filtering, meaning no device meets the time interval requirement for recent successful on-chain operation, the wearable device directly selects the device with the fewest hash values ​​for which it has not received the corresponding on-chain evidence certificate from the original candidate list as the backup wearable device. This ensures that the backup relay task can still proceed in extreme resource-scarce scenarios without falling into a deadlock state where no node is available.

[0073] In some embodiments, when receiving access requests from multiple candidate wearable devices, the wearable device obtains the number of data segment hash values ​​for each candidate wearable device that has not received the corresponding on-chain evidence certificate, and the time interval between the last time each candidate wearable device received the on-chain evidence certificate. First, candidate wearable devices with time intervals less than a preset time interval threshold are filtered out. Then, the candidate wearable device with the fewest data segment hash values ​​is selected as the backup wearable device. This allows the device with the lightest current load to undertake the relay task from among the recently active on-chain devices. In other embodiments, the wearable device may further introduce the remaining battery power parameter of the candidate wearable devices as a third-dimensional screening indicator. After completing the time interval filtering and the minimum number filtering, if there are still tied optimal candidate devices, the device with the higher remaining battery power parameter is preferentially selected as the backup wearable device to reduce the probability of the backup wearable device failing again due to insufficient battery power during the relay on-chain operation; this is not limited here.

[0074] In some embodiments, the evaluation of candidate wearable devices and the determination of backup wearable devices can be achieved in multiple ways: Optionally, after receiving the access request messages from each candidate wearable device, the wearable device requires each candidate wearable device to attach its current status summary field to the access request message. This field contains the number of data segments with hash values ​​that have not been completed on the chain and the UTC timestamp of the most recent successful receipt of the on-chain evidence certificate. The wearable device parses the status summary field in each message, calculates the time interval value of each candidate device, performs time interval threshold filtering first, and then sorts the list of candidate devices that have passed the filtering in ascending order by the number field. The device identifier at the top of the list is taken as the backup wearable device identifier and passed into the subsequent identity authentication process. Optionally, after receiving the access requests from each candidate wearable device, the wearable device sends a status query command to each candidate device. After responding to the query command, the candidate wearable device returns a status response message containing the number of data segments that have not been completed on the chain and the most recent successful on-chain time via short-range wireless communication. After collecting all status responses, the wearable device performs time interval filtering and number sorting logic locally. After determining the backup wearable device, it continues to perform the subsequent authentication and channel establishment process. It is understandable that the selection of backup wearable devices can also be based on other candidate device status evaluation dimensions, and this is not limited here. It should be further noted that the number of incomplete on-chain data segment hash values ​​reported by candidate wearable devices and the time interval between their most recent successful on-chain submissions theoretically pose a security risk of being maliciously forged by candidate devices to gain priority access to data. Wearable devices should cross-verify the authenticity of the aforementioned status information when conditions permit, for example, by querying the historical evidence storage records of the candidate device's corresponding digital identity on the chain to verify the time of its most recent successful on-chain submission, in order to prevent false status information from causing the wearable device to route data to malicious nodes.

[0075] S208. Identity authentication based on digital identity and backup wearable devices.

[0076] Identity authentication refers to the verification process conducted by the wearable device after determining the device identifier of the backup wearable device and before formally establishing a new point-to-point communication channel. This process verifies whether the backup wearable device meets the identity legitimacy requirements for establishing a data transmission relationship with the current wearable device. The purpose of this process is to prevent the transmission of evidence record data and data segment hash values ​​to unidentified or unauthorized devices, thereby ensuring the access control security and the trustworthy integrity of the evidence chain for data flow under the backup relay path. The distributed master wallet identifier refers to the top-level identity identifier preset in the secure communication chip, used to uniformly represent the sub-identities of all wearable devices under the same user. The sub-identity identifiers of each wearable device are generated by the master wallet identifier through a hierarchical deterministic key derivation path, and there is a verifiable cryptographic association between them. Therefore, by comparing whether the sub-identity identifiers belong to the association level defined by the same master wallet identifier, decentralized identity legitimacy verification between devices can be completed without the participation of a centralized identity service.

[0077] After selecting the backup wearable device in S207, the wearable device immediately triggers the execution of S208. Before formally establishing a new point-to-point communication channel with the backup wearable device, the identity and legitimacy of the backup wearable device are strictly verified to ensure the security of access control for the data relay path. Specifically, the wearable device first reads the pre-configured distributed master wallet identifier from the secure storage unit of the secure communication chip, and determines the first sub-identity identifier corresponding to the current wearable device based on the hierarchical derivation path relationship between the master wallet identifier and the digital identity identifier of the current wearable device. Subsequently, the wearable device responds to the access request from the backup wearable device by sending an identity information request instruction to the backup wearable device, requesting the backup wearable device to return its second sub-identity identifier held in the distributed identity system. After receiving the second sub-identity identifier returned by the backup wearable device, the wearable device verifies the relationship between the first sub-identity identifier and the second sub-identity identifier based on the association hierarchy rules defined by the distributed master wallet identifier. The authentication process involves verifying whether both sub-identities fall within the same legitimate sub-identity level associated with the same master wallet identifier, i.e., whether they can be traced back to the same distributed master wallet identifier. If the verification confirms that both belong to the same legitimate association level, the wearable device determines that the authentication of the backup wearable device has passed and continues to execute the channel establishment and data transmission process in S209. If the verification result indicates that the second sub-identity identifier does not belong to the association level defined by the current master wallet identifier, the wearable device rejects the access request, removes the corresponding candidate wearable device from the candidate list, and continues to wait for other candidate wearable devices that meet the authentication conditions to access, or triggers a new round of active broadcasting to attract legitimate candidate nodes to initiate access requests. Throughout the authentication process, the wearable device should encrypt and protect the authentication communication messages to prevent the second sub-identity identifier from being stolen or replayed during short-range wireless communication transmission, ensuring the security of the identity verification process itself.

[0078] In some embodiments, the wearable device determines a first sub-identity identifier corresponding to its own digital identity identifier based on a distributed master wallet identifier preset within the secure communication chip. In response to an access request, it obtains a second sub-identity identifier sent by a backup wearable device. If the first and second sub-identity identifiers are determined to be at the same association level defined by the same distributed master wallet identifier, authentication is deemed successful, and subsequent peer-to-peer communication channel establishment and data transmission processes are triggered. In other embodiments, the wearable device may further introduce dynamic signature verification based on a challenge-response mechanism on top of the sub-identity identifier hierarchical comparison: after confirming the legality of the second sub-identity identifier through hierarchical comparison, the wearable device sends a random challenge value to the backup wearable device. The backup wearable device signs the challenge value using its private key and sends it back. The wearable device verifies the signature using the public key registered on-chain by the backup wearable device. Authentication is only confirmed if both hierarchical comparison and signature verification pass, thus constructing a dual authentication mechanism to further enhance the security and reliability of data flow in the backup relay path; however, this is not limited to specific embodiments.

[0079] In some embodiments, authentication of the backup wearable device can be achieved in multiple ways: Optionally, after receiving an access request from the backup wearable device, the wearable device extracts the second sub-identity identifier declared by the backup wearable device from the access request message. Based on the pre-stored distributed master wallet identifier and sub-identity derivation rules, the secure communication chip locally verifies whether the derivation path of the second sub-identity identifier legally belongs to the association level defined by the same master wallet identifier. After successful verification, an authentication confirmation message is returned to the backup wearable device, and the point-to-point communication channel establishment process in S209 is triggered. Optionally, after receiving an access request from the backup wearable device, the wearable device queries the on-chain registered identity contract for the attribution association information of the backup wearable device's second sub-identity identifier. The on-chain contract returns a verification result indicating whether the sub-identity identifier belongs to a legally authorized association level. If the wearable device receives the on-chain verification result and the result is legal, it determines that the authentication is successful. After successful authentication, the subsequent point-to-point communication channel establishment process is triggered. This method is suitable for transitional scenarios where the current wearable device's communication baseband unit is in a brief wake-up state and has basic network connectivity capabilities. It is understandable that other verification mechanisms based on distributed identity systems can also be used to authenticate the identity of backup wearable devices, and no restrictions are imposed here.

[0080] It should be further explained that when the wearable device initiates the identity authentication process, it generates a challenge string containing a precise current timestamp and a random number. This challenge string is sent to the backup wearable device via short-range wireless communication, requiring the backup wearable device to sign the challenge string using its hardware-isolated device private key and return the signature result within a limited time window. After receiving the signature response, the wearable device first verifies whether the response time is within the limited window; if it exceeds the time limit, it directly rejects the response. After the time verification is successful, the wearable device verifies the signature using the public key bound to the backup wearable device's corresponding digital identity on the blockchain, confirming the legality of the signature and its consistency with the original challenge value. Only when the sub-identity level comparison, time window verification, and challenge-response signature verification are all successful does the wearable device finally confirm that the backup wearable device's identity authentication is successful. This effectively resists replay attacks on sub-identities and ensures the access control security of data transmission under the backup relay path.

[0081] S209. After confirming that the identity authentication with the backup wearable device is successful, a new point-to-point communication channel is established with the backup wearable device, and multiple data segment hash values ​​are sent to the backup wearable device through the corresponding point-to-point communication channel.

[0082] The new point-to-point communication channel refers to an independent encrypted direct data transmission link established through renegotiation based on a short-range wireless communication protocol between the wearable device and the backup wearable device after successful authentication. This channel is independent of the point-to-point communication channel established to the target wearable device in S205, and has its own session key and communication parameters. Its establishment does not depend on the availability of the cellular network infrastructure, making it suitable for limited scenarios where the current wearable device has insufficient wireless network signal coverage or its remaining battery power does not support high-power cellular communication. Multiple data segment hash values ​​refer to the hash digest values ​​of all leaf nodes obtained after performing segmented hash calculations on the multimedia service data in S201. Each data segment hash value corresponds to an independent data segment in the original multimedia service data. The ordered set of all data segment hash values ​​constitutes the leaf node layer of the local Merkle tree. Any third party holding all data segment hash values ​​and the root node hash value can independently reconstruct the Merkle tree and verify the consistency of the root node hash value. The corresponding peer-to-peer communication channel refers to the new channel established between the wearable device and the backup wearable device in this step. Multiple data segment hash values ​​are transmitted through this channel to ensure the orderly and reliable delivery of data between devices. The successful on-chain receipt refers to the confirmation message returned by the backup wearable device to the wearable device through the peer-to-peer communication channel or other available communication paths after submitting the evidence record data and data segment hash values ​​to the blockchain node and obtaining on-chain block confirmation. This message carries the on-chain evidence certificate generated by the blockchain node, including on-chain positioning information such as block height, transaction hash, and on-chain timestamp. It is the final basis for the wearable device to confirm that the multimedia business data of this batch has completed the on-chain evidence storage and rights confirmation closed loop.

[0083] After S208 confirms successful authentication with the backup wearable device, the wearable device immediately triggers S209, formally establishing a new peer-to-peer communication channel with the backup wearable device. Through this channel, multiple data segment hash values ​​are transmitted to the backup wearable device, entrusting it with subsequent blockchain on-chain notarization operations. Specifically, after successful authentication in S208, the wearable device and the backup wearable device perform a handshake process to establish a short-range wireless communication channel. Both parties negotiate and determine the communication protocol parameters, session encryption key, and channel transmission configuration, establishing an independent encrypted peer-to-peer communication channel. After the channel is established, the wearable device serializes and encapsulates the multiple data segment hash values ​​stored in the independent block node management unit according to their sequential index in the local Merkle tree, and sends them to the backup wearable device through the newly established peer-to-peer communication channel. Simultaneously, it sends the notarization record data and necessary Merkle tree structure information, enabling the backup wearable device to independently reconstruct its local Merkle tree structure and verify the root node after receiving the data. The correctness of the hash value is ensured. After receiving all data segment hash values ​​and evidence record data, the backup wearable device establishes a connection with the blockchain node using its network connectivity. It submits the evidence record data to the blockchain node for on-chain operation. After obtaining on-chain block confirmation, it returns a successful on-chain receipt containing the on-chain evidence certificate to the wearable device via a peer-to-peer communication channel or other available communication path. Upon receiving the successful on-chain receipt, the wearable device extracts the on-chain evidence certificate from the receipt and persistently stores it in a secure storage unit. Simultaneously, it stops the corresponding timeout timer and marks the evidence confirmation task as complete, thus completing the closed loop of evidence confirmation relayed by the backup wearable device. Throughout the transmission process, the wearable device should monitor the channel transmission quality. If data packet loss or transmission interruption occurs, a breakpoint resumption mechanism should be activated to continue transmission from the last successfully transmitted data segment hash value index position, avoiding full data retransmission due to local channel anomalies.

[0084] In some embodiments, after the wearable device and the backup wearable device complete identity authentication, an encrypted point-to-point communication channel is established based on the Wi-Fi Direct protocol. All data segment hash values ​​and evidence storage record data are encapsulated into structured data packets and sent to the backup wearable device through this channel. Upon receiving the data, the backup wearable device submits an on-chain request to the blockchain node via its LTE network connection. After obtaining on-chain block confirmation, it sends the on-chain evidence storage certificate back to the wearable device through the same Wi-Fi Direct channel. The wearable device stores the certificate and stops the timeout timer, completing the backup relay on-chain closed loop. In other embodiments, during the transmission of data segment hash values ​​to the backup wearable device, the wearable device may also include an independent Merkle operation proof path corresponding to each data segment hash value. This allows the backup wearable device to immediately verify the consistency of each data segment hash value with the root node hash value upon receiving it, without waiting for all data segment hash values ​​to be received before performing overall verification. This improves the real-time verifiability of segment data integrity in long-sequence data transmission scenarios and reduces the probability of retransmitting the entire batch of data due to later data corruption. This is not limited to specific embodiments.

[0085] In some embodiments, the transmission of multiple data segment hash values ​​to the backup wearable device and the receipt of successful on-chain confirmations can be achieved in various ways: Optionally, after the new peer-to-peer communication channel is established, the wearable device first sends a transmission metadata message containing the total number of data segment hash values, the root node hash value, and the evidence storage record data. After receiving the metadata message, the backup wearable device returns a ready confirmation. Upon receiving the confirmation, the wearable device encapsulates all data segment hash values ​​into data transmission messages in batches according to the leaf node index order and sends them one batch at a time. After each batch is sent, it waits for the backup wearable device to receive confirmations in batches. After all data segment hash values ​​have been confirmed and received, the backup wearable device initiates the on-chain process, encapsulates the on-chain evidence storage certificate into a confirmation message, and returns it through the channel. The wearable device receives the confirmation message. After execution, the on-chain evidence storage certificate is extracted and stored, the peer-to-peer communication channel is closed, and the timeout timer is stopped. Optionally, the wearable device packages all data segment hash values ​​and their corresponding independent Merkle operation proof paths into a complete ordered data set, and continuously sends it to the backup wearable device via a newly established peer-to-peer communication channel in a streaming manner. During the streaming reception, the backup wearable device performs immediate verification on each received data segment hash value using the corresponding Merkle operation proof path. For data segment hash values ​​that fail verification, a retransmission request is sent to the wearable device. After the streaming transmission ends and all hash values ​​are verified successfully, the backup wearable device submits the on-chain operation. After obtaining the on-chain evidence storage certificate, it sends it back to the wearable device through the channel. After the wearable device completes the certificate storage, it notifies the backup wearable device to close the channel. It is understood that other data distribution protocols and confirmation mechanisms can also be used to achieve reliable transmission of data segment hash values ​​and reception of on-chain receipts; this is not limited here. It should be further explained that when the wearable device sends the data segment hash value to the backup wearable device, it should also inform the backup wearable device of the remaining duration of the current timeout timer. This allows the backup wearable device to understand the time constraint of the current task and prioritize the processing of this batch of data when scheduling its own data processing and on-chain operations, thereby reducing the risk of on-chain response delays caused by congestion in the backup wearable device's task queue. If the wearable device's remaining battery power is close to the end of the first estimated duration after the new channel is established, it should also mark a high urgent priority in the transmission message, requesting the backup wearable device to place the on-chain operation of this batch of data segment hash values ​​in its task queue with the highest priority, ensuring that a successful on-chain receipt can be obtained and the evidence storage and confirmation loop can be completed before the wearable device's battery is exhausted.

[0086] It is understandable that after the backup wearable device receives the data segment hash value transmitted by the wearable device, if its own network connectivity is also limited by the current scenario environment, such as the law enforcement team being located in an underground parking lot or a blind spot in a mountainous area with extremely sparse network coverage, the backup wearable device may also be unable to establish an effective cellular network connection to complete the on-chain operation in a short time. In this case, even if the wearable device successfully completes the P2P transmission of data to the backup wearable device, the entire data storage and confirmation chain cannot be closed within the effective time. After the wearable device waits for the successful on-chain receipt to time out, it may fall into an inefficient cycle of repeatedly switching backup nodes and data being circulated among multiple devices without ever being uploaded to the chain. Wearable devices can simultaneously transmit the complete structure of their local Merkle tree and the hash values ​​of each node when sending data segment hash values ​​to a backup wearable device. After transmission, a data holding certificate is agreed upon with the backup wearable device. The backup wearable device performs a local signature confirmation on the received full data segment hash values ​​and sends this signature confirmation certificate back to the wearable device as proof of data delivery. Upon receiving the data delivery certificate, the wearable device marks the corresponding local data as securely delivered. Even if subsequent on-chain operations are delayed due to network issues, the trusted holding and integrity of the data itself have been confirmed through cryptographic means. At the same time, the backup wearable device prioritizes the on-chain task of this batch of data segment hash values. Once sufficient network connectivity is available at any time, it immediately performs the on-chain submission and, after completing the on-chain submission, returns the on-chain proof certificate to the original wearable device through any available communication path (including but not limited to subsequently established P2P channels, cellular network SMS, or direct backhaul when the devices meet again). This achieves asynchronous delayed completion of the proof and ownership confirmation closed loop in extremely limited network environments, rather than permanent failure.

[0087] Because data must be relayed through target wearable devices not directly controlled by the current device in weak network conditions, the data faces the risk of being discarded or tampered with by malicious nodes during transmission. Therefore, the hardware root trust feature of PUF signatures ensures that the source of the evidence data is unforgeable, while the accompanying Merkle proof path allows the target wearable device to independently cryptographically verify the received portion even if it has only received part of the data.

[0088] Because it employs a technology that dynamically configures timeout thresholds and starts timeout timers based on current remaining battery power, power consumption rate, and signal strength change rate of surrounding available wearable devices when the P2P channel is disconnected; comprehensively evaluates the recent successful on-chain intervals of candidate wearable devices and the current uncompleted on-chain data load to select the optimal backup wearable device when no successful on-chain confirmation is received after timeout to select the optimal backup wearable device; and performs identity authentication based on distributed identifier association hierarchy on the backup wearable device to establish a new point-to-point communication channel for transmitting data segmented hash values, the wearable device can adaptively adjust its remaining working time and the number of available backup resources in the surrounding area after the relay on-chain task of the target wearable device fails. The strategy aims to complete node switching as early as possible when backup resources are sufficient, and to extend the waiting time window for the target node as much as possible when resources are scarce. At the same time, a multi-dimensional evaluation mechanism is used to prioritize the device with the most recent on-chain activity and the lightest current load from the candidate devices to undertake the relay task. A strict identity authentication mechanism is used to ensure that data only flows to legitimate associated devices. This effectively solves the technical problems in the existing technology of wearable device P2P relay path lacking an automatic fault-tolerant switching mechanism after the target node fails, resulting in the suspension of the evidence storage and confirmation task, and the fixed timeout strategy being unable to adapt to the dynamic changes in device power and surrounding node resource status. In this way, dynamic adaptive guarantee of the reliability of the evidence chain of wearable devices in multi-node collaborative evidence storage scenarios is achieved.

[0089] The following describes an exemplary wearable device 300 provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 This is an exemplary hardware structure diagram of the wearable device 300 provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0090] In some embodiments, the wearable device 300 is a computer device or includes a computer device. The computer device includes a processor, memory, and a network interface connected via a system bus. The processor of the computer device provides computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, computer programs, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device stores data. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with other external terminals or servers via a network connection. In some embodiments, the network interface can be a wired network interface; in some embodiments, the network interface can also be a wireless network interface. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the methods described in the embodiments of this application.

[0091] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 3The structure shown is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the present application is applied. Specific computer devices may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0092] The above-described embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit it. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application.

[0093] As used in the above embodiments, depending on the context, the term "when..." can be interpreted as meaning "if...", "after...", "in response to determining...", or "in response to detecting...". Similarly, depending on the context, the phrase "when determining..." or "if (the stated condition or event) is interpreted as meaning "if determining...", "in response to determining...", "when (the stated condition or event) is detected", or "in response to detecting (the stated condition or event)".

[0094] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved entirely or partially through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented entirely or partially in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., solid-state drive), etc.

[0095] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. This program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes described in the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as ROM or random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

Claims

1. A data processing method for wearable devices based on a secure communication chip, characterized in that, The method, applicable to wearable devices with a built-in secure communication chip, wherein the secure communication chip includes a communication baseband unit, a physical security unit, and an independent block node management unit, comprises: After obtaining the multimedia service data, the independent block node management unit performs segmented hash calculation on the multimedia service data to obtain multiple data segment hash values, and uses the multiple data segment hash values ​​as leaf nodes to construct a local Merkle tree; After generating a device private key based on the physical non-cloning function of the physical security unit, the device private key is used to digitally sign the root node hash value of the local Merkle tree, and the digitally signed root node hash value, timestamp, and digital identity identifier of the wearable device are combined to generate evidence storage record data. During the sleep-wake cycle of the communication baseband unit, the signal quality parameters of the current wireless network and the remaining power parameters of the wearable device are obtained; If the signal quality parameter is greater than a preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than a preset power threshold, then a network connection is established through the communication baseband unit, and the evidence record data containing the root node hash value is sent to the blockchain node. If the signal quality parameter is not greater than the preset signal threshold, or the remaining power parameter is not greater than the preset power threshold, then after obtaining the access request from the target wearable device, identity authentication is performed with the target wearable device based on the digital identity identifier, and the stored evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data are sent to the target wearable device.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of authenticating identity based on the digital identity and the target wearable device specifically includes: Based on the distributed master wallet identifier preset in the secure communication chip, a first sub-identity identifier corresponding to the digital identity identifier is determined. The distributed master wallet identifier is used to represent the global identity of the same user. In response to the access request, obtain the second sub-identity identifier sent by the target wearable device; If it is determined that the first sub-identity identifier and the second sub-identity identifier are located under the same association level defined by the distributed master wallet identifier, then identity authentication is performed based on the digital identity identifier and the target wearable device; Once the identity authentication is confirmed to be successful, a point-to-point communication channel is established between the device and the target wearable device.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device specifically includes: If the identity authentication of the target wearable device is confirmed to be successful, based on the physical attribute characteristics and absolute change difference of adjacent data frames in the multimedia service data, a target data frame whose absolute change difference is greater than a preset static standard threshold and the target data segment hash value corresponding to the target data frame are determined. Locate the leaf node position of each target data segment hash value in the local Merkle tree, and extract all adjacent branch node hash values ​​on the path from each leaf node to the root node hash value from bottom to top; The hash values ​​of all adjacent side nodes are concatenated in reverse according to the tree hierarchy to determine the independent Merkel operation proof path for the hash value of each target data segment; The target data frames are combined into a high-priority transmission sequence, and the remaining data frames are combined into a low-priority transmission sequence. The device's private key is used to digitally sign the hash values ​​of the multiple data segments and their corresponding independent Merkle operation proof paths. The digitally signed hash values ​​of the multiple data segments and their corresponding independent Merkle operation proof paths are then sent to the target wearable device via a point-to-point communication channel in the order of the high-priority sending sequence and the low-priority sending sequence.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After the step of sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device, the method further includes: If the signal quality parameter reacquired by the wearable device is greater than the preset signal threshold and the remaining power parameter is greater than the preset power threshold, a network connection is established through the communication baseband unit. Based on the digital identity identifier and the timestamp in the evidence storage record data, a request for evidence storage status query is sent to the blockchain node, and the blockchain node returns an on-chain evidence storage certificate in response to the request for evidence storage status query. The on-chain evidence storage certificate is a record generated by the blockchain node after completing the on-chain operation submitted by the target wearable device. Extract the hash value of the on-chain root node from the on-chain evidence certificate, and compare the hash value of the on-chain root node with the hash value of the root node of the locally stored Merkle tree bit by bit. If it is determined that the hash value of the root node on the chain is consistent with the hash value of the root node of the local Merkle tree, the multimedia service data corresponding to the local Merkle tree is deleted.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After the step of sending the evidence record data and the corresponding multimedia service data to the target wearable device, the method further includes: Start a timeout timer associated with the hash values ​​of the multiple data segments from the moment the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected; If the timeout timer reaches the preset timeout threshold and no successful on-chain receipt is received from the target wearable device, the wearable device that sent the access request is identified as the backup wearable device based on the access request received within the communication range. Identity authentication is performed based on the digital identity identifier and the backup wearable device; After confirming that the identity authentication with the backup wearable device is successful, a new point-to-point communication channel is established with the backup wearable device, and the multiple data segment hash values ​​are sent to the backup wearable device through the corresponding point-to-point communication channel.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of determining the wearable device that sends the access request as a backup wearable device based on the access request received within the communication range specifically includes: In the case of receiving access requests from multiple wearable devices, the number of data segment hash values ​​that each candidate wearable device that sent the access request did not receive the corresponding on-chain evidence certificate, and the time interval between the last time each candidate wearable device received the on-chain evidence certificate. The candidate wearable device with the smallest number among the candidate wearable devices whose time interval is less than a preset time interval threshold is determined as the backup wearable device.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of starting the timeout timer associated with the multiple data segment hash values ​​specifically includes: Obtain the remaining battery power of the wearable device and the number of currently detectable surrounding wearable devices at the moment when the point-to-point communication channel is disconnected; Based on the remaining power parameters and the current power consumption rate of the wearable device, the corresponding continuous working time is calculated as the first estimated time. Based on the signal strength change rate of each of the surrounding wearable devices within a preset time period, a target surrounding wearable device whose signal strength change rate is not less than a preset negative threshold is determined. Based on the current signal strength and signal strength change rate of wearable devices around each target, the communication maintenance time required for the signal strength of wearable devices around each target to decay to a preset disconnection threshold is calculated as the second estimated duration. If it is determined that the effective number of spare wearable devices around the target is greater than a preset number threshold when the second estimated duration is greater than the first estimated duration, the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer is configured as a first duration, the first duration being less than the first estimated duration. If it is determined that the effective reserve quantity is not greater than the preset quantity threshold, the preset timeout threshold of the timeout timer is configured to a second duration, wherein the second duration is greater than the first duration and not greater than the first estimated duration; The timeout timer is started based on the preset timeout threshold, and during the timeout timer's timing, a preset polling interval is used to determine whether a successful on-chain receipt is received from the target wearable device. If the on-chain success receipt is received from the target wearable device, the timeout timer is stopped and the on-chain evidence certificate carried in the on-chain success receipt is stored.

8. A wearable device, characterized in that, The wearable device includes: one or more processors and a memory; the memory is coupled to the one or more processors, the memory is used to store computer program code, the computer program code including computer instructions, and the one or more processors call the computer instructions to cause the wearable device to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

9. A computer program product containing instructions, characterized in that, When the computer program product is run on a wearable device, the wearable device performs the method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, characterized in that, When the instructions are executed on a wearable device, the wearable device performs the method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

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