Market-based power distribution system distributed resource security regulation incentive method

Abstract

This invention discloses a market-based incentive method for distributed resource safety regulation in distribution systems. The method includes: real-time safety monitoring using a safety domain; triggering safety warnings or alarms based on the safety distance of operating points; the distribution system operator (DSO) determining safety requirements; safety warnings or alarms driving the Distribution Safety Ancillary Services Market (DSSASM), i.e., a market where the DSO purchases safety regulation ancillary services from distributed resource providers (DERs) to address distribution network safety issues; the DSO broadcasts safety regulation guidance information and a safety premium, which is an additional incentive fee paid by the DSO to the DERs for addressing safety issues, in addition to compensating for regulation costs; DERs submitting their bidding regulation power and prices; and, taking into account the DER regulation effect, market clearing to obtain DER safety regulation solutions, minimizing the total cost for the DSO to solve safety issues. This invention achieves accurate identification of safety issues, differentiated incentives for DERs, and clearing considering the DER regulation effect, ultimately yielding DER safety regulation solutions to address safety issues.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of electricity markets and intelligent distribution system operation. In particular, it relates to a market-based incentive method for distributed resource security regulation in distribution systems. Background Technology

[0002] The integration of numerous distributed energy resources (DERs) is posing challenges to the safe operation of power distribution systems, with static safety issues such as feeder reverse overload and node voltage exceeding limits becoming increasingly prominent. Management models relying on traditional dispatch commands face challenges in addressing the real-time, decentralized control demands of massive DERs. At the same time, DERs possess enormous potential to provide safety services to power distribution systems. [1] Examples include distributed generation (DG) output regulation, energy storage system (ESS) charge and discharge control, and demand response (DR) load-changing electricity consumption patterns.

[0003] Based on the distribution system security region (DSSR) [2] Under the application of the power distribution safety monitoring system, the distribution system operator (DSO) can intuitively monitor the system safety boundary and operating point trajectory, accurately understand the safety margin and available power supply capacity in real time, and have advanced pre-emptive functions such as preventive control, providing better technical conditions for DERs to participate in the safety regulation of the power distribution network.

[0004] Existing research has utilized DERs to address distribution network security issues, but these studies have not addressed how to incentivize DERs to provide security services. [1] Unlike traditional grid-side resources, Distribution Providers (DERs) often belong to different, separate entities, making them inaccessible to Distribution Network Security Providers (DSOs). In this context, market-based transactions serve as an effective incentive. By using price signals to guide the interaction between numerous DERs and DSOs, DSOs can procure safety auxiliary services from relevant DERs, thereby precisely and efficiently resolving safety issues and transforming DERs from passive "troublemakers" into proactive "distribution network safety service providers." Therefore, the purpose of this invention is to construct a market-based method to incentivize DERs to address distribution network safety issues.

[0005] Existing research on the distribution system ancillary services market largely focuses on the electricity market, aiming to address power imbalances, congestion, and voltage exceedances arising during energy trading. These distribution network ancillary services markets cooperate with the energy market to facilitate smooth energy trading, rather than specifically addressing the identification, analysis, and incentives for distribution network safety issues to address them. [3] .

[0006] Another market for distribution system ancillary services is called the local flexibility market (LFM), which is typically defined as a platform for trading electricity flexibility within a limited geographic area. [4] Here, "local" refers to a limited geographical area. "Flexibility" refers to the power regulation initiated by certain specific nodes in the distribution system within a specified timeframe. Depending on the intended use of the traded flexibility, LFM research is divided into several branches: 1) power balancing and frequency regulation of the main grid; 2) power balancing and cost reduction / efficiency improvement of the distribution network; 3) congestion management and voltage control of the distribution network, etc. The last branch is very similar to the purpose of this invention.

[0007] Current LFM (Local Function Mechanism) is not perfect in incentivizing DERs (Distribution Controllers) to address distribution network security issues, primarily because existing LFMs need to improve network-awareness. Network awareness refers to sensing the distribution network structure and real-time operating status, promptly identifying security issues, analyzing the corresponding adjustment needs, and determining whether DER bidding can resolve the security issues. This is a crucial foundation for utilizing DERs to address security problems. Although the latest LFM research has explored network awareness in distribution networks, the following shortcomings still exist:

[0008] 1) The market triggering mechanism for accurate identification of safety issues still needs further research. Although LFMs are being rapidly adopted, existing research typically simplifies the triggering of the ancillary service market by assuming a feeder overload or a node voltage exceeding its limit to initiate the market process. However, in reality, the DSO should accurately identify potential risks before a safety issue occurs, issue early warning signals, and utilize DERs for preventative control; and issue alarm signals and utilize DERs for emergency control when a safety issue is occurring. In this process, the safety margin of the distribution network operating point and the DSO's safety requirements are key network perception information driving the market.

[0009] 2) How to incentivize DERs to bid in LFMs, and how these incentives vary according to the severity of security issues and the scarcity of ancillary services, remains to be studied. Existing LFM studies typically assume that DERs actively bid, without considering how market operators incentivize DERs to bid in response to security issues. However, in reality, if the expected benefits for DERs are too low, or the cost of participating in the market is too high, they may choose not to bid. A well-designed ancillary service market for addressing distribution network security issues should incentivize DERs to bid, and these incentives should vary according to the severity of security issues and the scarcity of ancillary services, rather than waiting for DERs to bid.

[0010] 3) The clearing process does not adequately consider the fact that "different DERs have different effects on the adjustment of a certain security issue." Existing studies usually clear DERs based on their marginal adjustment cost, that is, ranking the bidding DERs by their adjustment cost from low to high, and prioritizing the use of DERs with lower bids to reduce the total cost of the DSO. However, it is possible that DERs with lower bids are not effective in adjusting the security issue, leading to the need for more DERs for security adjustment, which in turn increases the total cost of the DSO.

[0011] In summary, existing methods have not yet systematically achieved accurate identification of security issues, differentiated incentives for DERs, and clearing based on the adjustment effects of DERs, which limits their ability to solve distribution network security problems.

[0012] [References]

[0013] [1] Patent document with publication number CN119134517A, publication date 2024.12.13, entitled "Method for Unifying and Quantifying the Flexible Resource Security Adjustment Capability of Distribution Network".

[0014] [2] Patent document with publication number CN120562761A, publication date August 29, 2025, entitled "Security Analysis Method for Power Distribution System with Flexible Resources Based on Time-invariant Security Domain Model".

[0015] [3] Zhou Y, Wu J, Song G, et al. Framework design and optimal bidding strategy for ancillary service provision from a peer-to-peer energy tradingcommunity[J]. Applied Energy. 2020, 278: 115671.

[0016] [4] Jin X, Wu Q, Jia H. Local flexibility markets: Literature review on concepts, models and clearing methods[J]. Applied Energy. 2020, 261:114387. Summary of the Invention

[0017] The distributed resource security regulation (DERs) in power distribution systems holds immense potential for addressing security issues. Given the large volume of distributed resources and the diverse interests of different stakeholders, market-based mechanisms are advisable to incentivize their participation. Addressing existing technologies, this invention establishes a distribution system security ancillary service market (DSSASM) and proposes a market-based incentive method for distributed resource security regulation in power distribution systems. This method accurately identifies security issues, differentiates incentives for DERs, considers the clearing effect of DER regulation, and ultimately yields a DER security regulation scheme to address security problems.

[0018] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention proposes a market-based incentive method for distributed resource security regulation in power distribution systems, comprising the following steps:

[0019] Step 1: Construct the Distribution System Safety Domain DSSR, determine the safety boundary of the Distribution System Safety Domain DSSR, and use the Distribution System Safety Domain DSSR for real-time safety monitoring. Based on the safe distance of the operating point, trigger a safety warning or a safety alarm. The Distribution System Operator (DSO) determines and saves the following information: the safe distance of the operating point when a safety problem occurs; the safety boundary when approaching or exceeding the boundary; the component at risk of exceeding the boundary; the load rate or voltage of the component at risk of exceeding the boundary; and the level of power supply protection when a safety problem occurs.

[0020] Step 2: The Distribution System Operator (DSO) determines the security requirements, including the direction, timing, and quantity of the security requirements.

[0021] Step 3, Distribution System Operator (DSO) Broadcast Adjustment Guidelines and Safety Premiums, including:

[0022] The Distribution Safety Ancillary Services (DSSASM) market, driven by safety warnings or alarms, refers to the market where Distribution System Operators (DSOs) procure safety regulation ancillary services from Distributed Resource Providers (DERs) to address distribution network safety issues; this includes:

[0023] The Distribution System Operator (DSO) broadcasts to Distributed Resource Controllers (DERs) within a bidding area. The bidding area is a distribution network area designated by the DSO for procuring safety regulation ancillary services for specific safety issues, and the DERs within the bidding area are effective in addressing the safety issues that occur at this time.

[0024] The Distribution System Operator (DSO) broadcasts regulation instructions to Distributed Resources DERs (DERs) within the bidding area. The DSO also broadcasts safety regulation instructions to the DERs within the bidding area, including regulation direction, regulation duration, and total regulation amount.

[0025] Distribution system operators (DSOs) broadcast security premiums to distributed resource providers (DERs) within their bidding areas. These security premiums are additional unit incentive fees paid by the DSO to the DERs in the Distribution Security Ancillary Services Market (DSSASM) for addressing security issues, in addition to compensating for DER adjustment costs.

[0026] Step 4: Distributed resource DERs report the bid adjustment power and bid adjustment price, including:

[0027] In the Distribution Safety Ancillary Services (DSSASM) market, Distributed Resource Providers (DERs) are incentivized by Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to submit bids to DSOs based on their own safety regulation capabilities, and to report the power regulation volume and regulation cost they are committed to provide.

[0028] The bidding closing conditions can be either successful or forced. Successful closing means that the distributed resource DER bidding adjustment power is sufficient to solve the safety problem, which means that the Distribution Safety Ancillary Services Market (DSSASM) has successfully incentivized distributed resource DERs in the bidding area to provide sufficient ancillary services to solve the safety problem. Forced closing means that the incentive or bidding rounds of the distribution system operator (DSO) have reached the limit, forcing the bidding to close.

[0029] Step 5: Market clearing yields a distributed resource DER (DER) security adjustment scheme, taking into account the DER adjustment effect of distributed resources, and minimizing the total cost for the distribution system operator (DSO) to solve security problems.

[0030] Furthermore, in the market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems described in this invention, wherein:

[0031] In step one, the distribution system safety domain DSSR safety boundary includes a positive safety boundary and a reverse safety boundary. The types of safety problems include positive overload, reverse overload, voltage below the lower limit, and voltage above the upper limit: the positive safety boundary corresponds to positive overload and voltage below the lower limit, and the reverse safety boundary corresponds to reverse overload and voltage above the upper limit.

[0032] In step two, the safety requirement direction is the direction in which the distribution system operator (DSO) requires the power or voltage regulation of the over-limit risk component; the safety requirement time is the shortest time that the distribution system operator (DSO) requires the power or voltage regulation of the over-limit risk component to be maintained; and the safety requirement amount is the amount of power or voltage regulation required by the distribution system operator (DSO) for the over-limit risk component, which is the power regulation amount for capacity overload and the voltage regulation amount for voltage over-limit.

[0033] In step three, the adjustment direction refers to the direction of distributed resource DER power adjustment. The correspondence between the adjustment direction and the safety demand direction of the distribution system operator (DSO) is as follows: when the safety demand direction is to reduce forward power or increase voltage, the adjustment direction is to reduce outflow (OUT-) and increase injection (IN+); when the safety demand direction is to reduce reverse power or decrease voltage, the adjustment direction is to increase outflow (OUT+) and reduce injection (IN-). The adjustment duration refers to the duration for which the distributed resource DER power adjustment should continue, and the adjustment duration is equal to the safety demand time. The total adjustment amount refers to the reference value of the total power adjustment amount of distributed resource DERs within the bidding area, and the total adjustment amount is equal to the difference between the DSO's expected safety distance and the operating point safety distance when a safety problem occurs. The safety premium is determined by the safety problem risk and the incentive level of the distribution system operator (DSO).

[0034] In step four, the bidding adjustment power refers to the power adjustment amount committed by the distributed resource DER in the bidding; the bidding adjustment price refers to the cost per unit of electricity adjusted reported by the distributed resource DER in the bidding.

[0035] In step five, the winning bid adjustment power for the safety issue is ≥0. The total cost consists of adjustment costs and safety incentives. The more severe the safety issue and the scarcer the ancillary services, the higher the proportion of safety incentives. The coefficient of the winning bid adjustment power reflects the adjustment effect of the distributed resources on the safety issue. Keeping the winning bid adjustment power constant, the larger the coefficient of the winning bid adjustment power, the better the adjustment effect of the distributed resources on the safety issue. The market clearing result is related to the bidding adjustment price and the adjustment result, thereby ensuring that the total cost of the distribution system operator (DSO) to solve the safety issue is minimized.

[0036] Furthermore, the winning regulation power of each distributed resource DER is obtained. The distribution system operator (DSO) formulates a safety regulation plan for each distributed resource DER based on the winning regulation power of each DER and informs the corresponding distributed resource DERs. Each distributed resource DER performs safety regulation according to the plan. The distribution system operator (DSO) pays the regulation costs and safety incentives to the distributed resource DERs.

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0038] Distributed resource entities (DERs) have enormous potential to participate in the safety regulation of distribution systems. Given the large number of DERs and the diverse stakeholders involved, market-based mechanisms are appropriate to incentivize their participation. This invention proposes a market-based incentive method for DER safety regulation in distribution systems. This method accurately identifies safety issues, provides differentiated incentives for DERs, and considers the clearing effect of DER regulation, thus offering a market-based approach to incentivizing DER safety regulation in response to distribution network safety problems. Attached Figure Description

[0039] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the real-time security monitoring process using DSSR in the method of this invention;

[0040] Figure 2 This is the market framework for power distribution safety auxiliary services in this invention;

[0041] Figure 3 This refers to the bidding process and termination conditions in the method of this invention;

[0042] Figure 4 This is a modified IEEE 33-node example;

[0043] Figure 5 This is a visualization of the security domain and the 12:00 run point in the embodiment;

[0044] Figure 6 This is a visualization of the security domain and the 20:00 run point in the embodiment;

[0045] Figure 7 χ is an example of 12 Medium safety adjustment effect;

[0046] Figure 8 χ is an example of 20 Medium safety adjustment effect. Detailed Implementation

[0047] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, but the following embodiments are by no means intended to limit the present invention.

[0048] This invention proposes a market-based incentive method for distributed resource security regulation in power distribution systems. The entire process is divided into three stages: pre-market activation, market preparation and activation, and market operation. It includes the following steps:

[0049] (1) DSSR security monitoring and early warning / alarm

[0050] This section pertains to the pre-market launch phase and is used to identify distribution network security issues. See references [1] and [2].

[0051] This mainly includes constructing a Distribution System Safety Domain (DSSR), determining the safety boundaries of the DSSR, utilizing the DSSR for real-time safety monitoring, and triggering safety warnings or alarms based on the safe distance from the operating point. The Distribution System Operator (DSO) determines and stores the following information: the safe distance of the operating point when a safety issue occurs; the safety boundary when approaching or exceeding the boundary; the component at risk of exceeding the boundary; the load rate or voltage of the component at risk of exceeding the boundary; and the level of power supply protection when a safety issue occurs.

[0052] For a certain power distribution system, the safety domain DSSR is constructed using the method in reference [2]. The final DSSR safety boundary is divided into a positive safety boundary and a negative safety boundary. [2] , respectively, correspond to positive overload, voltage below the lower limit and reverse overload, voltage above the upper limit. The analytical expression of the safety boundary is shown in equation (1).

[0053] (1)

[0054] In equation (1): p is the safety boundary number; B p It is the p-th security boundary; c p It is a constant related to the feeder, main transformer capacity, or upper and lower voltage limits; l is the total number of safety boundaries; a p,i S is the p-th security boundary parsing expression. i The coefficient.

[0055] Real-time security monitoring using DSSR [1] ,like Figure 1 As shown. Figure 1 In this context, t0 is the initial time; SD[W(t)] is the safe distance of the running point at time t, defined as the distance from the running point to the safe boundary; ∆t is the sampling time interval of DSCADA; SD exp This is the expected safety distance, corresponding to the load factor (LR) expected by the distribution system operator (DSO). exp and desired voltage U exp Safe distance [1] Calculate according to formula (2).

[0056] (2)

[0057] In equation (2): c p It is safety boundary B p Constants related to feeders, main transformer capacity, or upper and lower voltage limits; a p,i S is the p-th security boundary expression i The coefficient is l; l is the total number of safety boundaries.

[0058] according to Figure 1If SD[W(t)] < 0, it means the operating point has crossed the N-0 safety boundary, and a safety problem χ is occurring in the distribution network, triggering an alarm; if SD[W(t)] ≥ 0 but SD[W(t)] < SD exp This means that although the operating point does not exceed the N-0 safety boundary, the safety margin is insufficient, and the distribution network may have a potential safety problem χ, triggering an early warning.

[0059] A security issue χ is detected during real-time security monitoring, triggering a security alert / alarm. The DSO determines and saves: 1) the operating point W(t) at the time the security issue occurred. χ ) safe distance SD[W(t) χ )]; 2) Approaching / crossing the boundary safety boundary B(χ); 3) Crossing risk element z B(χ) ;4)z B(χ) Load rate LR zB(χ) or voltage U zB(χ) ;5)t χ The power supply reliability level (PSRL) reflects the importance of ensuring power supply to the load and DG (distributed generation) absorption services.

[0060] (2) Determine security requirements

[0061] This section pertains to the market preparation and launch phase. The DSO identifies security requirements, including the direction, timing, and quantity of those requirements.

[0062] The safety requirement direction refers to the direction in which the DSO requires power or voltage regulation of components at risk of exceeding limits, denoted as D. d (χ), as shown in Table 1.

[0063] Table 1. Directions of Security Requirements

[0064]

[0065] Safety requirement time is the shortest time that the DSO requires the power or voltage regulation of the component at risk of exceeding the safety limits to maintain, denoted as ∆T. S (χ). ∆T for different security issues S (χ) may vary and is set by the DSO based on the cause of the safety issue and in combination with predictive information, operational experience, etc.

[0066] The safety requirement is the power or voltage regulation amount required by the DSO for components at risk of exceeding limits, denoted as ΔSecD(χ). For capacity overload, it is the power regulation amount; for voltage over-limit, it is the voltage regulation amount. The calculation method is shown in equation (3).

[0067] (3)

[0068] In equation (3): czB(χ) It refers to the capacity of components at risk of exceeding limits.

[0069] (3) DSO broadcasting regulation guidelines and safety premium

[0070] This section pertains to the market operation phase. The Distribution Safety Ancillary Services (DSSASM) market is driven by safety warnings / alarms, where Distribution Stations (DSOs) procure safety regulation ancillary services from Distribution Regulators (DERs) to address distribution network safety issues. The DSSASM framework is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, the DSSR (Distribution System Regulator) monitors the distribution network operation in real time. When a safety issue arises, a warning / alarm is issued. The DSO (Distribution System Operational State Regulator) determines the safety requirements and triggers the DSSASM (Distribution System Regulator ...

[0071] The DSO broadcasts to DERs within the bidding area. The bidding area is a distribution network area designated by the DSO for procuring security regulation ancillary services for a specific security issue. DERs within the area are valid for that security issue, while those outside the area are invalid. For security issue χ, the bidding area is denoted as BZ(χ), expressed as a set of nodes. BZ(χ) is determined using DSSR, as shown in equation (4).

[0072] (4)

[0073] In equation (4): a i (χ) is the S in the expression for the near-boundary / boundary safety boundary B(χ). i The coefficient.

[0074] The DSO broadcasts adjustment guidelines to DERs within the bidding area. These adjustment guidelines are safety adjustment instructions broadcast by the DSO to DERs within the bidding area, including the adjustment direction, duration, and total adjustment amount.

[0075] The adjustment direction is the direction of DER power adjustment, which depends on the safety requirements of the DSO, as shown in Table 2.

[0076] Table 2 Adjustment Directions in the Adjustment Guidelines

[0077]

[0078] The adjustment duration refers to the duration for which DER power adjustment should continue, which is equal to the safety requirement time.

[0079] The total regulation amount refers to the reference value of the total DERs power regulation amount within the bidding area, denoted as ΣΔS. RG (χ), as shown in equation (5).

[0080] (5)

[0081] The DSO broadcasts a safety premium to DERs within the bidding area. The safety premium is a unit incentive fee paid by the DSO to DERs in response to safety issues, in addition to compensating for DER adjustment costs, as part of the DSASM (Distributed Security and Safety Management System). It is denoted as π. SP (χ). The safety premium is determined by the safety risk and the DSO incentive level, and is calculated as shown in equation (6).

[0082] π SP (χ)=π BSP K RL (χ)K EI (6)

[0083] In equation (6): π BSP It is the basic security premium, that is, the security premium under the basic scenario where the security risk is minimized and the DSO incentive level is lowest. K RL (χ) is the safety issue risk level coefficient, which characterizes the severity of the safety issue. K RL (χ)≥1. K RL (χ) is related to the power grid supply guarantee level and safety distance, and the determination method is shown in Table 3.

[0084] Table 3 Risk Level Coefficient K RL

[0085]

[0086] As shown in Table 3, under the same supply guarantee level, the smaller the safety distance, the more serious the safety problem. RL The larger the value, the higher the safety premium; under the same safety distance, the higher the supply guarantee level, the more serious the safety issues. RL The larger the size, the higher the safety premium.

[0087] In equation (6), K EI It is to strengthen the incentive coefficient, K EI ≥1, characterizing the level of DSO incentives, depends on the scarcity of DER safety regulation ancillary services. K at market launch. EI =1, if the scarcity of DER security adjustment auxiliary services is insufficient to solve security problems, DSO will increase K. EI To strengthen incentives and guide DER to bid in multiple rounds.

[0088] (4) DERs submit bids for regulation power and regulation price.

[0089] This section pertains to the market operation phase. In DSSASM, DERs receive incentives from the DSO and adjust their security regulation capability (SRC) accordingly. [1] The bidder submits a tender to the DSO, outlining the committed power regulation and its cost. SRC is defined as the maximum feasible power regulation along the safety requirement direction at a given time that can sustain beyond the safety requirement for an duration exceeding that time. [1] The DER report is as follows:

[0090] 1) Tendered regulation power: The amount of power regulation committed by DER in the tender. The tendered regulation power for safety issue χ is denoted as ∆S. i,BR (χ).

[0091] ∆S i,BR (χ) must satisfy 0 ≤ ∆S i,BR (χ)≤SRC i (t χ ), that is, DERi bids within the current maximum feasible power regulation, which is to fully utilize its SRC.

[0092] Generally, as DSO increases its security premium and strengthens incentives, DER will increase its bid adjustment power in response to DSO's incentives.

[0093] 2) Adjusted Bid Price: The cost per unit of electricity adjusted by DER as reported in the bid. For DERi, denoted as π. i,BR This reflects the adjustment cost of DERi.

[0094] There are two conditions for closing the tender: 1) Successful closing: the DER tender adjustment power is sufficient to resolve the security issue, meaning that DSASSM has successfully incentivized DERs within the tender area to provide sufficient ancillary services to resolve the security issue; 2) Forced closing: the DSO's incentive or the number of tender rounds reaches the limit, forcing the tender to close, even if the DER tender adjustment power is insufficient to resolve the security issue at this time.

[0095] The bidding process and termination conditions are as follows: Figure 3 As shown. Let the number of bidding rounds be TIB, and the incentive coefficient K for the TIB round be... EI TIB The safety premium in the TIB round Accordingly, let the DERi TIB round bidding adjustment power be... (χ). The DSO sets a TIB upper limit, denoted as TIB. max DSO sets a safety premium cap, denoted as π. SP,maxThe number of bidding rounds at the end of the bidding process is denoted as TIB. end .

[0096] Depend on Figure 3 see:

[0097] 1) The adequacy criterion for the DER bidding adjustment power is shown in Equation (7). Simulate the operating point after the adjustment power is moved according to this round of bidding, and determine whether it has recovered a margin of not less than the expected safety distance.

[0098] (7)

[0099] In equation (7): W(t) χ ) Bid,TIB It is the operating point after the power adjustment movement according to the TIB round of bidding DER; P(χ) is a logical variable that depends on the type B(χ).

[0100] 2) To avoid excessively long market time due to too many TIB rounds of incentive bidding, when TIB reaches TIB... max The bidding process will be forced to end.

[0101] 3) To avoid the safety premium π SP Excessive π leads to excessively high payment costs. SP Reaching π SP,max The bidding process will be forced to end.

[0102] (5) Market clearing and DER safety adjustment plan

[0103] This section pertains to the market operation phase. A clearing method that takes into account the DER adjustment effect is proposed to minimize the total cost of DSO in resolving security issues, as shown in Equation (8).

[0104] (8)

[0105] In equation (8): ∆S i,CR (χ) is DER i For the standard adjustment power of χ, ∆S is specified. i,CR (χ)≥0;C TOTAL It is the total cost paid by the DSO to the DERs, which is composed of adjustment costs C. RC and safety incentives C SI It consists of two parts.

[0106] Equation (8-1) represents the adjustment cost, which is the cost by which the DSO compensates the DER for the adjustment cost. It depends on the bid adjustment price and the winning adjustment power of each DER.

[0107] Equation (8-2) represents the security incentive, which is the additional fee paid by the DSO to the DER for the security premium. It is an incentive for the DER to address security issues and depends on the security premium at the end of the bidding process and the adjustment power of each DER in the winning bid.

[0108] Equation (8-3) indicates that the adjustment power of each DER bid does not exceed the adjustment power at the end of its bid.

[0109] Equation (8-4) indicates that if the bidding adjustment power is sufficient to solve the safety problem, then the clearing result should solve the safety problem. Where W(t) χ ) CR It is the operating point after adjusting the power according to the bid.

[0110] Equation (8-5) is SD[W(t) χ ) CR The calculation formula for ].

[0111] Equation (8-6) indicates that if the bidding adjustment power is insufficient to solve the safety problem, the clearing result should make full use of the bidding adjustment power.

[0112] As can be seen from equation (8):

[0113] 1) The total cost is divided into two parts: adjustment costs and safety incentives. Safety incentives reflect the severity of safety issues and the scarcity of safety adjustment and support services. The more severe the safety issue and the scarcer the support services, the higher the proportion of safety incentives.

[0114] 2) In equation (8-5), ∆S i,CR The (χ) coefficient reflects the moderating effect of DERi on the safety issue χ. Keep ∆S i,CR With (χ) unchanged, the larger the coefficient, the easier it is to satisfy equation (8-4), and the more obvious the effect of DERi on χ.

[0115] 3) ∆S i,CR (χ) The clearing outcome depends not only on the bid adjustment price reported by DERi π i,BR It also depends on the adjustment effect of DER, which ensures that the total cost of DSO in resolving security issues is minimized. When clearing is only based on the marginal adjustment price of the bid, if the DERi bid adjustment price is low but ∆S i,CR If the (χ) coefficient is also small, the effect of χ adjustment will be poor, resulting in the need for more DERs to adjust safely, which will increase the total cost.

[0116] After handling the "if-otherwise" logic, equation (8) becomes a linear programming problem, and the winning adjustment power of each DER is obtained after solving it. The DSO formulates a DER safety adjustment plan based on the winning adjustment power of each DER and informs the corresponding DERs. Each DER performs safety adjustment according to the plan. The DSO pays the adjustment cost and safety incentives to the DERs.

[0117] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, but the following embodiments are by no means intended to limit the present invention.

[0118] The modified IEEE 33-node distribution network will be used as an example for further description, such as... Figure 4 As shown in the diagram, the demand response (DR) load can be increased or decreased, the intermittent DG participating in the DR can reduce the output, and the ESS charging and discharging are adjustable.

[0119] The static data for this example are as follows: Rated voltage is 10kV. Feeder outlet voltage is 10kV. The maximum and minimum limits for node voltage amplitude are 10.7kV and 9.3kV, respectively. Feeder parameters are shown in Table 4.

[0120] Table 4 Feeder Parameters

[0121]

[0122] Basic safety premium π BSP =10¥ / kWh. Incentive Bidding Rounds (TIB) max =3. Safety premium cap π SP,max =80¥ / kWh. The incentive coefficient K will be strengthened in the first, second, and third rounds of bidding. EI The values ​​are 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively. Additionally, the node power factor is 0.90. The network loss rate is 2%. The upper and lower limits of the ESS state of charge are 100% and 25%, respectively. The ESS charge / discharge efficiency is 95%. Other static data, such as the maximum load of each node, are shown in Table 5; the DG capacity is shown in Table 6; and the ESS power capacity and energy capacity are shown in Table 7.

[0123] Table 5 Maximum Node Load

[0124]

[0125] Table 6 DG Capacity

[0126]

[0127] Table 7 ESS Capacity

[0128]

[0129] Real-time data is as follows. Two scenarios are considered: a surge in renewable energy power generation at 12:00 noon leading to power flow reversal, and a peak load at 20:00 with low renewable energy output. The power supply guarantee level is II at 12:00 and I at 20:00. Based on similar weather patterns, the peak renewable energy power generation at 12:00 is predicted to last no more than 0.5 hours. Based on past load curves, the peak load at 20:00 is predicted to last no more than 1 hour. The expected voltage U at 12:00 is... exp=10.526 kV. The expected load factor at 20:00 is 89.8%. Other real-time data are as follows: real-time load of each node is shown in Table 8, load reduction ratio is shown in Table 9, load growth ratio is shown in Table 10, DG output is shown in Table 11, DG reduction ratio is shown in Table 12, ESS power is shown in Table 13, ESS state of charge is shown in Table 14, and bid adjustment price is shown in Table 15.

[0130] Table 8 Real-time Load (kVA)

[0131]

[0132] Table 9. Percentage of load that can be reduced by DR (%)

[0133]

[0134] Table 10. DR Upgrade Capacity Ratio (%)

[0135]

[0136] Table 11 Real-time output of DG (kVA)

[0137]

[0138] Table 12. DR can reduce the proportion of DG (%)

[0139]

[0140] Table 13 ESS Real-time Power (kVA)

[0141]

[0142] Table 14 ESS Real-time SOC (%)

[0143]

[0144] Table 15 Bidding Adjustment Price (¥ / kWh)

[0145]

[0146] In Table 15, "-" indicates that this node will not participate in the bidding at this time. For example, if feeder segment 6-7 is positively overloaded at 20:00, the intermittent DG cannot increase power generation, so it will not bid.

[0147] Implementation steps of the method of the present invention in the embodiments

[0148] 1) DSSR security monitoring and early warning / alarm

[0149] Before the market launch, DSSR real-time security monitoring is used to identify distribution network security issues.

[0150] Once the distribution network structure and parameters are determined, the DSSR is determined. [2] The DSSR safety boundary of the example distribution network is shown in Table 16.

[0151] Table 16 DSSR Safety Boundaries

[0152]

[0153] Conduct security monitoring.

[0154] 12:00, DSSR and run point W 12 like Figure 5 As shown. By Figure 5 It can be seen that W 12 Within the safety domain but close to the safety boundary B2, W is calculated using equation (2). 12 Safe distance SD (W) 12 =86kVA. The power distribution system faces safety issues. 12 The operating point safety margin is insufficient. The calculated voltage at node 31 corresponding to safety boundary B2 is 10.650kV, which is close to the upper limit of the voltage.

[0155] Overall, security issues χ 12 The severity is relatively low. The reasons are: ① Supply guarantee level II, not the highest level; ② W 12 Although it is close to the safety boundary, it has not yet crossed the line.

[0156] 20:00, DSSR and run point W 20 like Figure 6 As shown. By Figure 6 It can be seen that W 20 Outside the safety domain, beyond the safety boundary B1, W is calculated using equation (2). 20 Safe distance SD (W) 20 =-117kVA. The system faces security issues. 20 The operating point exceeds the safety boundary. The calculated load rate of feeder segment 6-7 corresponding to safety boundary B1 is 103.9%, which is a positive overload.

[0157] Overall, security issues χ 20 The severity is high. The reasons are: ① Supply guarantee level I, the highest level; ② The operating point has exceeded the safety boundary.

[0158] Based on the security monitoring results, the DSO issued security warnings / alarms as shown in Table 17.

[0159] Table 17 Security Warnings / Alarms

[0160]

[0161] 2) Determine security requirements

[0162] Preparing to launch the market.

[0163] The security requirements corresponding to the security warnings / alarms in Table 17 are shown in Table 18.

[0164] Table 18 Security Requirements

[0165]

[0166] 3) DSO broadcast adjustment guidelines and safety premium

[0167] The market has been launched.

[0168] First, determine the bidding area. Security issues χ 12 Approaching the boundary B(χ) 12 ) is B2. According to the expression for B2 in Table 16, the bidding area BZ(χ) is obtained. 12 ={2, 3, …, 33}. Similarly, we get 20:00 security issue χ. 20 Bidding area BZ(χ) 20 ={7, 8, …, 18}.

[0169] Secondly, determine the adjustment guidelines, including the direction of adjustment, the duration of adjustment, and the total amount of adjustment.

[0170] Adjust the direction. χ 12 The safety requirement is to reduce the voltage, guiding BZ(χ) 12 Within the DERs, increase outflow (OUT+) and decrease injection (IN-). χ 20 The safety requirements are aimed at reducing positive power and guiding BZ(χ) 20 )Inside DERs, reduce outflow (OUT-) and increase inflow (IN+).

[0171] Adjust the duration. χ 12 The safety requirement time is 0.5 hours, therefore, guide BZ(χ) 12 DERs regulation lasted for 0.5 hours. χ 20 The safety requirement time is 1 hour, therefore, guide BZ(χ) 20 Internal DER regulation lasts for 1 hour.

[0172] Adjust the total amount. Calculate χ according to formula (13). 12 and χ 20 The total amount of regulation is

[0173] ΣΔS RG (χ 12 )=SD exp-SD(W 12 ) = 300 - 86 = 214 kVA

[0174] ΣΔS RG (χ 20 )=SD exp -SD(W 20 ) = 300 - (-117) = 417 kVA

[0175] Next, determine the safety premium. According to equation (6), at market launch, the DSO's safety premium is χ. 12 The established safety premium is as follows:

[0176] π SP (χ 12 )=π BSP K RL (χ 12 )K EI =10×1.2×1=12￥ / kWh

[0177] In the formula: the safety problem risk level coefficient K is obtained from Table 3. RL (χ 12 = 1.2; Incentive coefficient K is strengthened during market launch. EI =1.0.

[0178] DSO's impact on security issues χ 20 The established safety premium is as follows:

[0179] π SP (χ 20 )=π BSP K RL (χ 20 )K EI =10×3.0×1=30￥ / kWh

[0180] K RL (χ 20 The reason is that χ² is higher. 20 The security issues are even more serious.

[0181] The broadcast content is summarized in Table 19.

[0182] Table 19 DSO Broadcast Content

[0183]

[0184] 4) DERs submit their bids for regulation power and regulation price.

[0185] After receiving the DSO broadcast, DERs within the bidding area submit their bids based on their Security Regulation Capability (SRC) and regulation costs. The bid details include the regulation power and regulation price, as shown in Table 20.

[0186] Table 20 DER Bidding

[0187]

[0188] *: All tender DERs are listed in Tables 21 and 22.

[0189] Table 21 χ 12 DERs bidding regulation power (kWh)

[0190]

[0191] Table 22 χ 13 DERs bidding regulation power (kWh)

[0192]

[0193] As can be seen from Table 20, χ 12 DERs only bid in one round; χ 20 The bidding for DERs went through three rounds, with the bidding adjustment power gradually increasing.

[0194] DSO analyzes each round of bidding, based on Figure 3 The decision may be made to close the bidding process, or to increase the safety premium to strengthen incentives and encourage DERs to bid again. For χ... 12 After one round of bidding, the safe distance between the operating points exceeded the expected safe distance, and the bidding process concluded successfully. For χ... 20 After the first, second, and third rounds of bidding, the safe distance between the operating points did not exceed the expected safe distance, but the maximum number of rounds had been reached, and the bidding was passively stopped. A summary of the bidding end information is shown in Table 23.

[0195] Table 23 Bidding Completion Information

[0196]

[0197] As can be seen from Table 23: χ 20 The safety premium at the end of the bidding process was significantly higher than χ. 12 The reason is: on the one hand, when the market starts, χ 20 The safety premium is already higher than χ 12 High; on the other hand, χ 20 After three rounds of bidding, DSO gradually increased the safety premium to strengthen incentives.

[0198] 5) Market clearing and DER safety adjustment plan

[0199] The clearing results were obtained based on the lowest cost of resolving security issues by DSO, as shown in Table 24.

[0200] Table 24 Safety Adjustment Plan for Market Clearing

[0201]

[0202] In Table 24, the winning regulation power of all DERs constitutes the DER safety regulation scheme.

[0203] As can be seen from Table 24:

[0204] ① A lower bid adjustment price does not guarantee a successful DER bid.

[0205] χ in Table 20 12 Although the bid adjustment prices for L2, DG3, and L4 were significantly lower than those for ESS30, DG31, and L32, the first three DERs failed to win bids, while the latter three did.

[0206] The reason is that this invention does not completely follow the traditional DER adjustment cost, i.e., bid adjustment price and marginal clearing, but also considers the adjustment effect of DER. The adjustment effects of L2, DG3 and L4 are not good, and their ∆S in equation (17) is not good. i,CR The coefficients of (χ) are very small, at 0.0196, 0.0392, and 0.0588 respectively, indicating that the coefficients of χ for security issues are small. 12 The adjustment effect is not obvious. If L2, DG3 and L4 safety adjustment auxiliary services are purchased, more other DER safety adjustment auxiliary services will be needed, which will increase the total cost of DSO. On the contrary, although the bid adjustment prices of ESS30, DG31 and L32 are higher, they have a greater effect in Equation (17) ∆S i,CR The coefficients of (χ) are relatively large, all being 1.0, indicating that for χ... 12 The adjustment effect is better.

[0207] ② The clearing results can reflect the severity of security issues and the scarcity of security adjustment and support services.

[0208] χ 12 The proportion of safety incentives in total costs is significantly greater than χ². 20 . χ 12 The percentage was 16.2%, indicating that the safety value exceeding the basic value of power regulation was not high. On the one hand, χ² 12 The severity is not high; on the other hand, DER safety adjustment auxiliary services are not scarce at this time, and the DSO can easily procure sufficient adjustment capacity. And χ 20 The proportion was as high as 48.65%, precisely because of χ² 20 The severity of the disease was high, and DER safety adjustment auxiliary services were scarce and difficult to procure, resulting in multiple rounds of bidding.

[0209] χ 12 The safety adjustment effect according to the scheme in Table 24 is as follows: Figure 7 As shown. This is the adjusted operating point at 12:00. (By...) Figure 7 It can be seen that after safety adjustment, W 12 Moving away from the reverse safety boundary B2 and entering the safety domain, the calculated safety distance reaches the desired safety distance. The voltage at node 31 is calculated to have decreased from 10.650kV to 10.526kV, no longer approaching the upper voltage limit. Therefore, after implementing the safety adjustment scheme, safety issue χ is effectively addressed. 12 The problem has been resolved and the safety warning has been eliminated.

[0210] χ 20 The safety adjustment effect according to the scheme in Table 24 is as follows: Figure 8 As shown. This is the operating point at 20:00 after adjustment. (By...) Figure 8 It can be seen that after safety adjustment, W 20 Crossing the positive safety boundary B1 into the safety domain, the calculated safety distance is 287kVA < 300kVA, still not restoring the DSO's expected safety distance. The load rate of feeder segment 6-7 decreased from 103.9% to 90.2%. Although feeder segment 6-7 is no longer positively overloaded, it has not decreased to the DSO's expected load rate of 89.8%. The χ² problem has not been completely resolved. 20 .

[0211] Although the present invention has been described above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above. The specific embodiments described above are preferred application examples that demonstrate the core technical ideas of the present invention, and are merely illustrative and not restrictive. Those skilled in the art can make many improvements and changes under the guidance of the present invention without departing from the spirit of the present invention, and these all fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A market-based incentive method for distributed resource security regulation in power distribution systems, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Construct the Distribution System Security Domain (DSSR), determine the DSSR security boundary, and utilize the DSSR for real-time safety monitoring. Based on the safe distance of the operating point, trigger a safety warning or alarm. The Distribution System Operator (DSO) determines and saves the following information: the safe distance of the operating point when a safety issue occurs; the safety boundary when approaching or crossing the boundary; and the risky components crossing the boundary. The load rate or voltage of components at risk of exceeding limits; the level of protection in the event of a safety issue; Step 2: The Distribution System Operator (DSO) determines the security requirements, including the direction, timing, and quantity of the security requirements. Step 3, Distribution System Operator (DSO) Broadcast Adjustment Guidelines and Safety Premiums, including: The Distribution Safety Ancillary Services (DSSASM) market, driven by safety warnings or alarms, refers to the market where Distribution System Operators (DSOs) procure safety regulation ancillary services from Distributed Resource Providers (DERs) to address distribution network safety issues; this includes: The Distribution System Operator (DSO) broadcasts to Distributed Resource Controllers (DERs) within a bidding area. The bidding area is a distribution network area designated by the DSO for procuring safety regulation ancillary services for specific safety issues, and the DERs within the bidding area are effective in addressing the safety issues that occur at this time. The Distribution System Operator (DSO) broadcasts regulation instructions to Distributed Resources DERs (DERs) within the bidding area. The DSO also broadcasts safety regulation instructions to the DERs within the bidding area, including regulation direction, regulation duration, and total regulation amount. Distribution system operators (DSOs) broadcast security premiums to distributed resource providers (DERs) within their bidding areas. These security premiums are additional unit incentive fees paid by the DSO to the DERs in the Distribution Security Ancillary Services Market (DSSASM) for addressing security issues, in addition to compensating for DER adjustment costs. Step 4: Distributed resource DERs report the bid adjustment power and bid adjustment price, including: In the Distribution Safety Ancillary Services (DSSASM) market, Distributed Resource Providers (DERs) are incentivized by Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to submit bids to DSOs based on their own safety regulation capabilities, and to report the power regulation volume and regulation cost they are committed to provide. The bidding closing conditions can be either successful or forced. Successful closing means that the distributed resource DER bidding adjustment power is sufficient to solve the safety problem, which means that the Distribution Safety Ancillary Services Market (DSSASM) has successfully incentivized distributed resource DERs in the bidding area to provide sufficient ancillary services to solve the safety problem. Forced closing means that the incentive or bidding rounds of the distribution system operator (DSO) have reached the limit, forcing the bidding to close. Step 5: Market clearing yields a distributed resource DER (DER) security adjustment scheme, taking into account the DER adjustment effect of distributed resources, and minimizing the total cost for the distribution system operator (DSO) to solve security problems.

2. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step one, the distribution system safety domain DSSR safety boundary includes a positive safety boundary and a reverse safety boundary. The types of safety problems include positive overload, reverse overload, voltage below the lower limit, and voltage above the upper limit: the positive safety boundary corresponds to positive overload and voltage below the lower limit, and the reverse safety boundary corresponds to reverse overload and voltage above the upper limit.

3. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step two, The aforementioned safety requirements refer to the direction in which the power or voltage regulation of components at risk of exceeding limits is required by the distribution system operator (DSO). The aforementioned safety requirement time is the shortest time that the distribution system operator (DSO) requires to maintain power or voltage regulation of components at risk of exceeding limits. The aforementioned safety requirements refer to the power or voltage regulation amounts that the distribution system operator (DSO) requires for components at risk of exceeding limits. For capacity overload, it is the power regulation amount; for voltage exceeding limits, it is the voltage regulation amount.

4. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step three, The adjustment direction refers to the direction of distributed resource (DER) power adjustment. The correspondence between the adjustment direction and the safety demand direction of the distribution system operator (DSO) is as follows: when the safety demand direction is to reduce forward power or increase voltage, the adjustment direction is to reduce outflow (OUT-) and increase injection (IN+); when the safety demand direction is to reduce reverse power or decrease voltage, the adjustment direction is to increase outflow (OUT+) and reduce injection (IN-). The adjustment duration refers to the duration during which the power adjustment of the distributed resource DER should continue, and the adjustment duration is equal to the safety requirement time. The total adjustment amount refers to a reference value for the total power adjustment amount of distributed resources (DERs) within the bidding area. The total adjustment amount is equal to the difference between the expected safe distance of the DSO and the safe distance of the operating point when a safety problem occurs. The security premium is determined by the security risk and the incentive level of the distribution system operator (DSO).

5. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step four, The power adjustment mentioned above refers to the amount of power adjustment promised by the Distributed Resource DER in the bid. The adjusted price mentioned above refers to the cost per unit of electricity that the Distributed Resource DER (DER) reports in the bid.

6. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step five, The winning bid adjustment power of distributed resources for security issues is ≥0. The total cost consists of adjustment costs and security incentives. The more severe the security issue, the scarcer the auxiliary services, and the higher the proportion of security incentives. The coefficient of the winning bid adjustment power reflects the adjustment effect of distributed resources on security issues. Keeping the winning bid adjustment power constant, the larger the winning bid adjustment power coefficient, the better the adjustment effect of distributed resources on security issues. The market clearing outcome is related to the bid adjustment price and adjustment result, thereby ensuring that the total cost for the distribution system operator (DSO) to resolve security issues is minimized.

7. The market-based distributed resource security regulation incentive method for power distribution systems according to claim 6, characterized in that, In step five, the winning regulation power of each distributed resource DER is obtained. The distribution system operator (DSO) formulates a safety regulation plan for each distributed resource DER based on the winning regulation power of each DER and informs the corresponding distributed resource DERs. Each distributed resource DER performs safety regulation according to the plan. Distribution system operators (DSOs) pay regulation costs and security incentives to distributed resource providers (DERs).

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