A lightweight secure communication processing method and industrial control system
By combining NTRU lattice cryptography and lightweight Vernam stream cipher, a lightweight secure communication method is proposed to solve the security and performance problems of SCADA systems on resource-constrained devices, and to achieve efficient and secure communication in a quantum computing environment.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611619530.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-10-20
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing SCADA system security communication protocols are insufficient in performance on resource-constrained devices, failing to meet real-time response requirements, and lack security in quantum computing environments, making them vulnerable to attacks.
A lightweight secure communication processing method is adopted, which combines NTRU lattice-based cipher, dynamic prime selection, multi-layer hash chain and lightweight Vernam stream cipher. Prime numbers are selected to generate session keys through a cyclic counter, and key exchange is performed using the Blake2b hash function and NTRU public key encryption algorithm. Message integrity is ensured through a hash chain manager.
It achieves high-performance secure communication on resource-constrained devices, reduces key exchange overhead and memory usage, resists quantum computing attacks, and meets the real-time requirements of industrial control systems.
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Figure CN123122832A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of industrial control security communication technology, and in particular to a lightweight secure communication processing method and an industrial control system. Background Technology
[0002] SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, as core control systems of critical infrastructure, suffer from serious security vulnerabilities due to insufficient consideration of security in their communication protocols, such as Modbus and MQTT, during the initial design phase. Current SCADA systems primarily employ the AGA-12 standard for security, which constructs a three-layer protection system based on traditional cryptography. 1. Key exchange layer: Uses the RSA algorithm (key length ≥ 1024 bits) and ensures security based on the large prime number factorization problem.
[0003] 2. Data encryption layer: AES algorithm (key length ≥ 128 bits) is used to ensure data confidentiality through symmetric encryption.
[0004] 3. Integrity Verification Layer: Uses the SHA-1-based ECDSA algorithm to provide digital signature and integrity verification.
[0005] The RSA-1024 key exchange recommended by the AGA-12 standard, according to NIST SP 800-57 "Key Management Recommendations," has a security strength of approximately 80 bits, which no longer meets current security requirements. Furthermore, Shor's algorithm can factor large integers in polynomial time under quantum computing models, rendering the RSA cryptosystem completely ineffective in quantum computing environments. The SHA-1 hash function has become unreliable in security since Google and CWI successfully conducted the first actual collision attack in 2017. In terms of performance, according to the applicant's comparative tests, RSA-1024 takes approximately 108 milliseconds to generate a key on an ARM Cortex-A53 processor and consumes approximately 62MB of memory, making it difficult to meet millisecond-level real-time response requirements on resource-constrained PLC and RTU devices.
[0006] While the traditional AGA-12 security standard offers some security in ordinary computing environments, it falls short in resource-constrained devices and quantum computing environments, failing to meet the security requirements of modern industrial control systems. Its shortcomings include: 1. Vulnerability of quantum computing: The RSA algorithm is vulnerable to Shor's quantum algorithm attack, AES faces the threat of Grover's algorithm, and traditional cryptographic systems are seriously insecure in quantum computing environments.
[0007] 2. Hash algorithm defects: The SHA-1 hash function has been proven to be vulnerable to collision attacks, and its integrity protection mechanism has fundamental vulnerabilities.
[0008] 3. Significant performance bottleneck: On resource-constrained industrial control equipment, RSA key generation takes up to 108 milliseconds and consumes more than 60MB of memory, which cannot meet the performance requirements of real-time control systems. Summary of the Invention
[0009] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a lightweight secure communication processing method and an industrial control system that addresses at least one of the above-mentioned deficiencies.
[0010] The technical solution adopted by this invention to solve its technical problem is: a lightweight secure communication processing method, which includes a secure session establishment phase and a secure message transmission phase. The secure session establishment phase includes the following steps: S11. The control terminal communication security layer selects prime numbers from the prime number set through a cyclic counter, and calculates the square root of the prime number fraction based on the prime numbers. S12. Generate a session key based on the square root of the prime fraction and the current timestamp; S13. Generate an initial random number, encrypt the session key using the NTRU public key encryption algorithm to obtain an encrypted random number, calculate the key salt based on the square root of the prime number fraction and the current timestamp, and package the encrypted random number, the key salt, the hash-based message authentication code and the current timestamp into a secure data packet and send it to the field device layer to complete the key exchange and establish a secure communication channel. The secure message transmission phase includes the following steps: S21. Generate a message key based on the session key, the prime fraction square root and the current business message sequence number, and use the message key to encrypt and transmit the business message Vernam stream cipher. S22. Update the hash chain state based on the business message, and verify the integrity of the hash chain through the hash chain manager to ensure that the communication data has not been tampered with or replayed.
[0011] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, the secure session establishment phase, before step S11, further includes: Receive key exchange request.
[0012] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, step S11 includes: Pre-store a set of prime numbers P = {p1, p2, ..., p...} n}; where each prime number p i All greater than 21024 ; Upon receiving a key exchange request, a prime number p is selected from the set of prime numbers P based on the current count value k of the loop counter. k And calculate the square root of its prime fraction; for different key exchange requests, rely on the incremental logic of the loop counter to make the prime numbers selected each time different; k=1,……,n.
[0013] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method described in this invention, the update formula for the loop counter is: in, The index value used previously is n, where n is the size of the set of prime numbers, and mod n represents the modulo operation, causing the index to cycle in the range [0, n-1].
[0014] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, step S12 includes: The square root of a prime fraction is concatenated with the current timestamp and then fed into the Blake2b hash function to generate a session key with a binary bit length of 256 bits.
[0015] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, step S13 further includes: A hash-based message authentication code is calculated based on the session key, the current timestamp, the square root of the prime fraction, and the encrypted random number. The device-side communication security layer responds to the security data packet processing request by decrypting the security data packet, calculating the same session key, and completing key negotiation.
[0016] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method described in this invention, the NTRU public key encryption algorithm is based on a modular... The operation, and the modulus of each polynomial coefficient of the initial random number. After centering to the symmetric interval [- / 2, / 2] inside; The NTRU public key decryption algorithm is based on a modulo... The operation is performed to extract the initial random number from the secure data packet; wherein, For large modulus, It is a small module, and > .
[0017] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method described in this invention, the polynomial degree N of the NTRU public key encryption algorithm is 503. =256, =3, density parameter d=100.
[0018] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, step S21 includes: The message key generation algorithm is as follows: in, For message keys; For session key; It is the square root of a prime fraction; This is the sequence number of the current business message, used to ensure that a different key stream is used for each encryption; For connection operation; The plaintext of the current business message is encrypted using Vernam stream cipher to obtain the ciphertext; Generate a message authentication code based on the message key, the ciphertext, and the timestamp; The message key, the ciphertext, and the message authentication code are packaged into an encrypted data packet and sent to the field device layer.
[0019] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method of the present invention, step S22 includes: The device-side communication security layer calculates the expected hash value based on the current service message and the previous hash value; Determine whether the current hash value based on the current business message is equal to the expected hash value; If so, the message integrity verification passes, and the current hash value is stored; If not, the current business message is rejected and a security alert is triggered.
[0020] Furthermore, in the lightweight secure communication processing method described in this invention, the update formula for the hash chain is: in, Let be the hash value of the i-th business message. For the previous hash value, This is the complete data for the i-th business message.
[0021] In addition, the present invention also provides an industrial control system, comprising: The field device layer is used to perform industrial control tasks and data acquisition; The control center layer is used for overall monitoring, strategy formulation, and centralized management of the field equipment layer; The communication security layer includes a device-side communication security layer and a control-side communication security layer. The control center layer communicates with the field device layer through the control-side communication security layer and the device-side communication security layer. The communication security layer is used to execute the lightweight secure communication processing method described above.
[0022] Furthermore, in the industrial control system described in this invention, the industrial control system is a SCADA system or an Internet of Things (IoT) system.
[0023] The lightweight secure communication processing method and industrial control system of this invention have the following beneficial effects: This invention organically integrates NTRU lattice-based cryptography with dynamic prime number selection, multi-layer hash chains, and lightweight Vernam stream ciphers. It not only inherits the natural advantage of NTRU lattice-based cryptography in resisting Shor's algorithm attacks, but also reduces key exchange overhead through dynamic key management. Combined with lightweight Vernam stream ciphers, the overall encryption and decryption time is controlled within 1 millisecond, solving the technical problem that traditional quantum-resistant schemes cannot balance security and performance. This solution, through lightweight Vernam stream cipher design and dynamic key management mechanism, achieves high-performance secure communication on resource-constrained embedded devices, significantly reducing memory usage and expanding the deployment scope of SCADA / IoT systems, while solving the problem of excessive memory consumption in traditional RSA algorithms. Therefore, this invention can significantly improve communication performance while ensuring high security for real-time monitoring IoT systems of critical infrastructure such as power, water conservancy, and petroleum. Attached Figure Description
[0024] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. In the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the lightweight secure communication processing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a lightweight secure communication processing method according to some embodiments of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the hash chain verification process according to some embodiments of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the industrial control system provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0025] To provide a clearer understanding of the technical features, objectives, and effects of this invention, specific embodiments are now described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, it should be understood that the orientations or positional relationships indicated by terms such as "front," "rear," "upper," "lower," "left," "right," "longitudinal," "horizontal," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inner," "outer," "head," and "tail" are based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, and are constructed and operated in a specific orientation. They are only for the convenience of describing this technical solution and do not indicate that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation; therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on this invention.
[0026] In the following description, specific details such as particular system architectures and techniques are set forth for illustrative purposes and not for limitation, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. However, those skilled in the art will understand that the invention can be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, apparatuses, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the invention with unnecessary detail.
[0027] Combination Figure 1 The lightweight secure communication processing method in this solution is applied to the control-end communication security layer. It can be understood that the control-end communication security layer in this solution refers to the communication security components of the control center layer; the device-end communication security layer refers to the communication security components of the field device layer. The lightweight secure communication processing method in this embodiment includes a secure session establishment phase and a secure message transmission phase. The secure session establishment phase includes the following steps: S11. The control terminal communication security layer selects prime numbers from the prime number set through a cyclic counter and calculates the square root of the prime number fraction based on the prime numbers.
[0028] refer to Figure 2 Before step S11 in the secure session establishment phase, the process also includes receiving a key exchange request.
[0029] In some embodiments, step S11 includes: first, pre-storing a set of prime numbers P = {p1, p2, ..., p...} n}. Where each prime number p i All greater than 2 1024 This ensures sufficient security. Each time a key exchange request is received, a prime number p is selected from the set of prime numbers P based on the current count value k of the loop counter. k And calculate its prime fraction square root. For different key exchange requests, the selected prime number is different each time by relying on the incrementing logic of the loop counter. k=1,...,n. It can be understood that each prime fraction square root is a high-precision irrational number in the interval (0,1), which serves as a high-entropy random source.
[0030] Specifically, the formula for updating the loop counter is: in, This is the index value used previously, and n is the size of the set of prime numbers. Here, mod n represents the modulo operation, causing the index to cycle through the range [0, n-1].
[0031] The formula for calculating the square root of a prime number fraction is as follows: Wherein, FSRP is the square root of a prime fraction. This represents the floor operation. This calculation produces a high-precision irrational number within the interval (0,1), exhibiting excellent randomness.
[0032] S12. Based on the square root of the prime fraction generated in step S1 and the current timestamp, generate a session key. Since the prime number and timestamp selected for each session are different, the session key has forward security.
[0033] In some embodiments, step S12 includes: concatenating the square root of a prime fraction with the current timestamp and inputting it into the Blake2b hash function to generate a session key with a binary bit length of 256 bits.
[0034] Specifically, the formula for generating the session key is as follows: in, This is the Blake2b hash function. CDT is the current timestamp. This indicates a connection operation. FSRP and CDT are first converted into fixed-length byte sequences, then concatenated and hashed to ultimately generate a 256-bit session key.
[0035] S13. Generate an initial random number, encrypt the session key using the NTRU public key encryption algorithm to obtain an encrypted random number, calculate the key salt based on the square root of the prime fraction and the current timestamp, and package the encrypted random number, key salt, hash-based message authentication code and the current timestamp into a secure data packet and send it to the field device layer to complete the key exchange and establish a secure communication channel.
[0036] It is understood that the secure data packet is used to securely transmit the seed material of the session key from the control center layer to the field device layer. The secure data packet contains four fields: an encrypted random number, a key salt, a hash-based message authentication code, and a current timestamp. In this embodiment, the encrypted random number is used to protect the confidentiality of the initial random number. The key salt is used to securely transmit FSRP information during key exchange. The hash-based message authentication code is used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the secure data packet. The current timestamp is used to prevent replay attacks.
[0037] Specifically, the formula for calculating the key salt is as follows: in, This is the key salt. ⊕ indicates a bitwise XOR operation. Both FSRP and CDT treat 64-bit data for XOR operations to ensure the reversibility of the operation.
[0038] Specifically, as shown in the table below, the Sec_BUN security packet consists of the following four fields in order: The receiver first verifies the HMAC to confirm that Sec_BUN has not been tampered with; then it uses CDT and Sk to restore FSRP=S k ⊕CDT; Calculate independently at the end. =H(FSRP∥CDT), complete key negotiation.
[0039] In some embodiments, the NTRU public-key encryption algorithm is based on a modulo-3 model. The operation is performed, and the modulus of each polynomial coefficient of the initial random number is... Then center it to the symmetric interval [-q / 2, q / 2].
[0040] Then through the mold The operation restores the original message. That is, the NTRU public-key decryption algorithm is based on a modular... The operation is performed to extract an initial random number from the secure data packet. Among these, For large modulus, It is a small module, and > .
[0041] Preferably, in the NTRU algorithm, the polynomial degree N=503 of the NTRU public-key encryption algorithm is preferred. =256, =3, density parameter d=100. In this embodiment, the parameter design ensures that the coefficient amplitude of the intermediate polynomial is less than 3. / 2, therefore modulo It does not break the mathematical relationships required for decryption, thus ensuring correctness and providing a good balance between security and efficiency.
[0042] It is understandable that in this solution, the module Operations and Modulus Operations perform different mathematical functions: mold The operation is performed on a large module. ( Modulo operation on the polynomial coefficients (=256) aims to constrain the result within a finite range and prevent coefficient inflation during polynomial multiplication. During encryption, since both the public key hh and the coefficients of the random polynomial rr are small, The maximum amplitude of the coefficient is approximately N·2d, and the modulus... Then, it is guaranteed that the ciphertext coefficient is within the symmetric interval [- / 2, Within / 2], it facilitates efficient transmission.
[0043] mold The operation is performed on a small module. ( =3) Taking the modulus of the polynomial coefficients is used to eliminate interference terms introduced by the public key during message decryption and recovery. The first step of decryption yields a= = ,because When the magnitude of each coefficient is less than q / 2, the modulo q operation degenerates into integer addition. Taking the modulo p of the result then eliminates the factor. The item = The original message m was accurately extracted.
[0044] Specifically, the encryption process uses polynomial operations: Where C represents the encrypted ciphertext polynomial, M is the message polynomial to be encrypted, h is the receiver's public key polynomial, and r is the random polynomial. and This is the modulus parameter. Decryption uses the private key polynomial f for calculation: Specifically, regarding the key generation algorithm: the private key f is a polynomial with small coefficients, derived from the set... The set is randomly selected from (d, d-1), containing exactly d polynomials with coefficients of 1, d-1 polynomials with coefficients of -1, and the rest with coefficients of 0. The public key h is calculated using the following formula: Where g is another from A polynomial randomly selected from (d, d) Is mold The reverse element below.
[0045] Regarding the encryption algorithm: For the message polynomial m, the encryption process first selects a random polynomial. ∈ (d,d), then compute the ciphertext: Polynomial operations in modulo The following steps are performed, and the resulting coefficients are centered within the interval [-q / 2, q / 2] (this centering step is added independently to ensure the correctness of subsequent decryption).
[0046] Regarding the decryption algorithm: The decryption process first calculates: Then, the coefficients of polynomial a are centered to the interval [-q / 2, q / 2], and finally the following calculations are performed: This will restore the original message polynomial m.
[0047] The correctness of the decryption is based on the following mathematical relationship: because They are all polynomials with small coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficient is less than q / 2, therefore the modulus... The calculation will not affect the result, and therefore it can be used through modulo. The operation accurately recovers message m.
[0048] The secure message transmission phase includes the following steps: S21. Generate a message key based on the session key, the square root of a prime fraction, and the current business message sequence number, and use the message key to encrypt and transmit the business message using Vernam stream cipher.
[0049] In some embodiments, step S21 includes: after generating a message key, performing Vernam stream cipher XOR encryption byte-by-byte on the plaintext of the current business message to obtain ciphertext. Generating a message authentication code based on the message key, ciphertext, and timestamp. The message authentication code ensures confidentiality and integrity. Packing the message key, ciphertext, and message authentication code into an encrypted data packet and sending it to the field device layer.
[0050] Specifically, regarding the message key generation algorithm: Message key It is generated by combining the session key, the square root of a prime fraction, and the current service message sequence number: Here, SEQ is the current business message sequence number, used to ensure that a different key stream is used for each encryption. When the required key length exceeds the hash function output length, a key expansion mechanism is employed. Where c is a counter, which continues until the length of the generated key stream meets the encryption requirements.
[0051] Specifically, regarding the Vernam stream cipher encryption algorithm: Let the plaintext message be Each of them It is one byte. This is the message length. The key stream is... The encryption process is accomplished through a byte-by-byte XOR operation: Cipher The decryption process uses the same operation: This symmetry allows encryption and decryption to be implemented using the same algorithm.
[0052] Specifically, regarding message authentication code generation: To ensure message integrity, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is generated for each encrypted message. in It is ciphertext. It's a timestamp. The receiver recalculates the MAC using the same parameters and verifies it to ensure the message hasn't been tampered with during transmission. Here, "the same parameters" specifically refers to... , , These three values, Generated independently by the recipient. and Obtain from the data packet.
[0053] In this embodiment, the plaintext encrypted with Vernam stream cipher is encrypted byte by byte using hardware-level XOR instructions.
[0054] S22. Update the hash chain state based on the business message, and verify the integrity of the hash chain through the hash chain manager to ensure that the communication data has not been tampered with or replayed.
[0055] Figure 3 A flowchart of hash chain verification is shown for some embodiments. In this embodiment, step S22 includes: The device-side communication security layer calculates the expected hash value based on the current business message and the previous hash value.
[0056] Determine whether the current hash value based on the current business message is equal to the expected hash value.
[0057] If so, the message integrity verification passes, and the current hash value is stored.
[0058] If not, reject the current business message and trigger a security alert.
[0059] It should be noted that the current hash value is data transmitted from the sender (control-end communication security layer) to the receiver (device-end communication security layer). The current hash value is calculated by the sender according to the hash chain update formula, encapsulated in an encrypted data packet, and transmitted along with the encrypted data packet.
[0060] Specifically, regarding the hash chain update algorithm: First, initialize the initial value of the hash chain. The initial state H0 of the hash chain is randomly generated during system initialization. For the i-th business message, the hash chain update formula is: in, It is the complete data of the i-th business message (including message content, sequence number, timestamp, etc.). Let be the hash value of the i-th business message. For the previous hash value, It uses the Blake2b hash function. This chained structure ensures the order and continuity of messages.
[0061] Specifically, regarding the integrity verification algorithm: When verifying the i-th business message, the receiver uses the stored previous hash value and the complete data of the received business message. Calculate the expected hash value: The verification conditions are: If they are equal, the message integrity verification passes, and the stored hash value is updated. Otherwise, reject the message and trigger a security alert.
[0062] This embodiment combines the sequence number SEQ and timestamp T into the message data, enabling the system to detect and prevent replay attacks. The verification process checks the continuity of the sequence number and the validity of the timestamp to ensure the uniqueness and timeliness of each message.
[0063] This solution has the following technical advantages: 1. Synergistic Enhancement of Quantum Computing Attacks and Performance Optimization: This invention organically integrates NTRU lattice-based cryptography with dynamic prime selection, multi-layer hash chains, and lightweight Vernam stream ciphers. It not only inherits the natural advantage of NTRU lattice-based cryptography in resisting Shor's algorithm attacks, but also reduces key exchange overhead through dynamic key management. Combined with lightweight Vernam stream ciphers, the overall encryption and decryption time is controlled within 1 millisecond, solving the technical problem that traditional anti-quantum schemes cannot balance security and performance.
[0064] 2. Significantly improves overall execution efficiency: According to tests, the complete process of the prime number counting and hash chain encryption algorithm of this invention (including key generation, key exchange, message encryption, hash chain update and verification) takes only 0.715 milliseconds on a Raspberry Pi 4, which fully meets the real-time requirements of industrial control.
[0065] 3. Optimized resource utilization efficiency: This solution significantly reduces memory usage. Through lightweight Vernam stream cipher design and dynamic key management mechanism, it achieves high-performance secure communication on resource-constrained embedded devices, expands the deployment scope of SCADA systems, and solves the problem of excessive memory usage in traditional RSA algorithms.
[0066] 4. Enhanced real-time processing capabilities: This invention is based on an optimized implementation of Vernam stream cipher, requiring only 4 CPU clock cycles for each byte encryption. Combined with the parallel processing mechanism of hash chains, it ensures stable communication performance even in high-speed data acquisition scenarios, providing reliable real-time security protection for critical infrastructure.
[0067] 5. Flexible Key Management System: Forward-secure key updates are achieved through dynamic prime number selection and session key mechanisms. It supports multiple communication modes, reduces key storage requirements by over 50%, and provides a scalable management solution for large-scale distributed systems.
[0068] refer to Figure 4 This embodiment provides an industrial control system. The system includes a field device layer 10, a communication security layer 30, and a control center layer 20, each with clearly defined functions. The communication security layer 30 includes a device-side communication security layer 302 and a control-side communication security layer 301. The control center layer 20 communicates with the field device layer 10 through the control-side communication security layer 301 and the device-side communication security layer 302. The field device layer 10 is used to perform industrial control tasks and data acquisition. The field device layer 10 includes programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), sensors, etc. The communication security layer 30 is used to execute the lightweight secure communication processing method described in the above embodiment. The control center layer 20 is used for overall monitoring, strategy formulation, and centralized management of the field device layer. The control center layer 20 includes master terminal units (MTUs), human-machine interfaces (HMIs), etc. The system adopts a modular design, with standardized interfaces between modules for data exchange, ensuring the system's scalability and maintainability.
[0069] In some embodiments, the industrial control system may be a SCADA system or an Internet of Things (IoT) system.
[0070] This embodiment organically integrates NTRU lattice-based cryptography with dynamic prime selection, multi-layer hash chains, and lightweight Vernam stream ciphers. It not only inherits the inherent advantage of NTRU lattice-based cryptography in resisting Shor's algorithm attacks, but also reduces key exchange overhead through dynamic key management. Combined with lightweight Vernam stream ciphers, the overall encryption and decryption time is controlled to within 1 millisecond, solving the technical challenge of traditional quantum-resistant schemes failing to balance security and performance. High-performance secure communication is achieved on resource-constrained embedded devices, significantly reducing memory usage and expanding the deployment scope of SCADA / IoT systems, thus resolving the problem of excessive memory consumption in traditional RSA algorithms. For real-time monitoring IoT systems of critical infrastructure such as power, water conservancy, and oil, this solution can significantly improve communication performance while ensuring high security.
[0071] In one specific implementation, the device-side communication security layer and the control-side communication security layer of this solution adopt the same set of data processing algorithms, and each includes the following four functional modules: The key management module generates session keys and distributes them to the encrypted communication module and / or integrity verification module. Essentially, this module facilitates secure key exchange via the NTRU encryption module during the secure session establishment phase, providing the generated session keys to the encrypted communication and integrity verification modules. The key management module does not directly participate in the encryption and decryption of business messages; it only provides the key materials. The key management module is responsible for the generation, distribution, updating, and destruction of session keys, ensuring that both communicating parties can securely establish a shared key. This module employs a dynamic prime number selection mechanism and quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to provide forward-secure key management capabilities for the system.
[0072] The encrypted communication module is used to encrypt and decrypt business messages based on the received session key during the secure message transmission phase. It is understood that this module does not directly interact with the NTRU encryption module. The encrypted communication module is responsible for encrypting and decrypting transmitted data to ensure data confidentiality. This module uses an optimized Vernam stream cipher, providing high-efficiency encryption and decryption performance while ensuring theoretical information security.
[0073] The integrity verification module generates specific fields in a hash chain based on the received session key, and verifies the integrity of business messages based on the generated hash chain. The integrity verification module ensures message integrity and order through a hash chain mechanism, preventing data tampering and replay attacks. This module establishes an irreversible verification chain, ensuring that any modification to historical messages will be detected.
[0074] The NTRU encryption module, invoked by the key management module during the secure session establishment phase, encrypts the session key using the NTRU public key to obtain an encrypted random number, which is then used to securely transmit the seed material of the session key. The NTRU encryption module is no longer used during the secure message transmission phase to reduce the high computational overhead of asymmetric encryption. This module is based on lattice cryptography principles and is resistant to attacks from quantum computers.
[0075] Those skilled in the art will further recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of the various examples have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this invention.
[0076] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented directly by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0077] It is understood that the above embodiments only illustrate preferred embodiments of the present invention, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can freely combine the above technical features without departing from the concept of the present invention, and can also make several modifications and improvements, all of which fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, all equivalent transformations and modifications made with respect to the scope of the claims of the present invention should fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A lightweight secure communication processing method, characterized in that, The lightweight secure communication processing method includes a secure session establishment phase and a secure message transmission phase. The secure session establishment phase includes the following steps: S11. The control terminal communication security layer selects prime numbers from the prime number set through a cyclic counter, and calculates the square root of the prime number fraction based on the prime numbers. S12. Generate a session key based on the square root of the prime fraction and the current timestamp; S13. Generate an initial random number, encrypt the session key using the NTRU public key encryption algorithm to obtain an encrypted random number, calculate the key salt based on the square root of the prime number fraction and the current timestamp, and package the encrypted random number, the key salt, the hash-based message authentication code and the current timestamp into a secure data packet and send it to the field device layer to complete the key exchange and establish a secure communication channel. The secure message transmission phase includes the following steps: S21. Generate a message key based on the session key, the prime fraction square root and the current service message sequence number, and use the message key to encrypt and transmit the service message using Vernam stream cipher. S22. Update the hash chain state based on the business message, and verify the integrity of the hash chain through the hash chain manager to ensure that the communication data has not been tampered with or replayed.
2. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secure session establishment phase, prior to step S11, also includes: Receive key exchange request.
3. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Step S11 includes: Pre-store a set of prime numbers P = {p1, p2, ..., p...} n }; where each prime number p i All greater than 2 1024 ; Upon receiving a key exchange request, a prime number p is selected from the set of prime numbers P based on the current count value k of the loop counter. k And calculate the square root of its prime fraction; for different key exchange requests, rely on the incremental logic of the loop counter to make the prime numbers selected each time different; k=1,……,n.
4. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The update formula for the loop counter is: in, The index value used previously is n, where n is the size of the set of prime numbers, and mod n represents the modulo operation, causing the index to cycle in the range [0, n-1].
5. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S12 includes: The square root of a prime fraction is concatenated with the current timestamp and then fed into the Blake2b hash function to generate a session key with a binary bit length of 256 bits.
6. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, Step S13 also includes: A hash-based message authentication code is calculated based on the session key, the current timestamp, the square root of the prime fraction, and the encrypted random number. The device-side communication security layer responds to the security data packet processing request by decrypting the security data packet, calculating the same session key, and completing key negotiation.
7. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 6, characterized in that, NTRU public-key encryption algorithm is based on a model The operation, and the modulus of each polynomial coefficient of the initial random number. After centering to the symmetric interval [- / 2, / 2] inside; The NTRU public key decryption algorithm is based on a modulo... The operation is performed to extract the initial random number from the secure data packet; wherein, For large modules, It is a small module, and > .
8. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The polynomial degree N=503 and the modulus of the NTRU public-key encryption algorithm are... =256, Modulus =3, density parameter d=100.
9. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S21 includes: The message key generation algorithm is as follows: in, For message keys; For session key; It is the square root of a prime fraction; This is the sequence number of the current business message, used to ensure that a different key stream is used for each encryption; For connection operation; The plaintext of the current business message is XORed byte by byte using Vernam stream cipher to obtain the ciphertext; Generate a message authentication code based on the message key, the ciphertext, and the timestamp; The message key, the ciphertext, and the message authentication code are packaged into an encrypted data packet and sent to the field device layer.
10. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S22 includes: The device-side communication security layer calculates the expected hash value based on the current service message and the previous hash value; Determine whether the current hash value based on the current business message is equal to the expected hash value; If so, the message integrity verification passes, and the current hash value is stored; If not, the current business message is rejected and a security alert is triggered.
11. The lightweight secure communication processing method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The update formula for the hash chain is: in, Let be the hash value of the i-th business message. For the previous hash value, This is the complete data for the i-th business message.
12. An industrial control system, characterized in that, include: The field device layer is used to perform industrial control tasks and data acquisition; The control center layer is used for overall monitoring, strategy formulation, and centralized management of the field equipment layer; A communication security layer, comprising a device-side communication security layer and a control-side communication security layer, wherein the control center layer communicates with the field device layer through the control-side communication security layer and the device-side communication security layer, and the communication security layer is used to execute the lightweight secure communication processing method as described in any one of claims 1-11.
13. The industrial control system according to claim 12, characterized in that, The industrial control system is either a SCADA system or an Internet of Things (IoT) system.
