Lightweight access authentication method and system for power Internet of Things devices based on IBC system

By adopting a lightweight access authentication method for power Internet of Things (IoT) devices based on the IBC system, and using a key generation center to generate public and private key pairs for devices and conduct encryption key negotiation, the high resource consumption and complexity of traditional authentication methods are solved, and efficient and secure device access authentication and management are achieved.

CN113704736BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-26CHINA ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD +2
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202110830359.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-07-22
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2041-07-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional PKI certificate management is complex and resource-intensive, and traditional IBC cryptographic systems involve complex private key management and computation, making them unsuitable for access authentication of massive numbers of power IoT devices.

Method used

A lightweight access authentication method for power IoT devices based on the IBC system is adopted. The public and private key pairs of the devices are generated through the Key Generation Center (KGC), and the transmission is encrypted using symmetric keys. The encryption key negotiation between devices is achieved by combining key derivation algorithms and random number negotiation of master keys.

Benefits of technology

It enables efficient and secure access authentication for power IoT devices, enhances device security and intelligent management, and avoids information leakage issues caused by key escrow.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a lightweight access authentication method and system for power Internet of Things devices based on an IBC system, and belongs to the field of information security technology. The method of the present invention includes: application of a ciphertext of a public-private key pair of a target device, including: after the target device generates a key application parameter, a key generation center KGC generates a public-private key pair of a target device identity according to a unique identification ID of the target device, and after encrypting the public-private key pair using a symmetric key, transmits the ciphertext of the public-private key pair to the target device; encryption key negotiation between the target device and other devices, including: when the target device interacts with other devices, based on the public-private key pair of the identity of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate a master key, and a data encryption key is generated after calculation using a key derivation algorithm, that is, access authentication through a data encryption key. The method proposed by the present invention can realize efficient and secure access authentication of power Internet of Things devices, and enhance the security and intelligent management level of Internet of Things devices.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically, to a lightweight access authentication method and system for power Internet of Things devices based on an IBC system. Background Art

[0002] With the development of new technologies such as mobile Internet and artificial intelligence, the two-way interaction between power users and smart grids is becoming more and more frequent, and users have higher and higher requirements for the service form and service quality of the power grid. In order to meet the application needs of power users and enhance their perception and participation in smart grids, the power Internet of Things has emerged. The network environment of the power Internet of Things is open and complex, access control is flexible and changeable, and the types and quantity of connected devices are huge and the security performance is uneven. These devices will generate a large amount of data in the process of participating in the interaction with the power grid, which brings severe challenges to terminal trust management and network security. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out research on secure access authentication technology for massive power Internet of Things devices.

[0003] Traditional equipment security authentication is mainly based on the PKI system and is implemented using digital certificates. However, PKI certificate management is relatively complex and requires the construction of a multi-level CA system. In addition, certificate issuance, revocation, verification, and storage require a lot of resources. Device access authentication technology based on the IBC identification authentication system can effectively avoid complex certificate management issues. However, the traditional IBC cryptographic system has problems such as private key hosting and relatively complex cryptographic operations. The above technology is not suitable for access authentication of massive power IoT devices. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a lightweight access authentication method for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, the method comprising:

[0005] The application of the ciphertext of the public and private key pair of the target device includes: after the target device generates the key application parameters, the key generation center KGC generates the public and private key pair of the target device identity according to the unique identification ID of the target device, and transmits the ciphertext of the public and private key pair to the target device after encrypting it with the symmetric key;

[0006] The encryption key negotiation between the target device and other devices includes: when the target device interacts with other devices, based on the public and private key pairs of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate the master key, and a key derivation algorithm is used to calculate and generate a data encryption key, that is, access authentication through the data encryption key.

[0007] Optional, the target device public and private key pair ciphertext application, including:

[0008] The target device first selects a random number r1 and Among them is a cyclic group, The order of is q, and set A secure one-way hash function According to r1, q. and the target device ID, generate the target device's identity key pair application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)}, and send the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} to the key generation center KGC;

[0009] After receiving the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H(ID||r1)}, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameter k, Input the safety parameter k into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1;

[0010] in,

[0011] Where q is a safe prime number, G1 is a q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, G2 is a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group on the finite field, is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair, H1, H2 is the system hash function, where H1:{0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2;

[0012] The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the target device, and saves the system paramas1 through the target device;

[0013] The target device generates a random number r2, and obtains the symmetric key k2 according to the key derivation algorithm for the random number r2, k2 = KDF (r2), and encrypts the symmetric key k2 through the key generation center KGC to obtain the encrypted symmetric key And calculate the symmetric key based on the target device ID The application parameters and the symmetric key The application parameters are sent to the key generation center KGC;

[0014] Among them, the symmetric key The application parameters are:

[0015] The key generation center KGC receives the symmetric key After applying for parameters, verify the symmetric key The integrity of the application parameters, if verified, decrypt the symmetric key to obtain And extract the target device ID, and check whether the target device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the target device identity public key P pub1 , P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The validity period of the device;

[0016] The key generation center KGC calculates the target device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters The target device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Ciphertext for private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Equipment validity period signature, obtain the information after signature and will Send to the target device;

[0017] The target device receives After verification If the signature information is verified, the public key P of the target device is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the identity private key of the target device

[0018] Optionally, the target device negotiates encryption keys with other devices, including:

[0019] Set the target device as device 1 and other devices as device 2. Use device 1 to set the device ID 1 and the private key validity period T v1 Sent to device 2, device 2 receives device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1 After that, determine the public key of device 1, the public key

[0020] Device 2 sends device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 Sent to device 1, device 1 receives device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 , determine the public key of device 2, public key

[0021] Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encrypting the random number r1, the ciphertext M1 is obtained. After signing M1 with the private key of device 1, the signature S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2;

[0022] After receiving M1 and S1, device 2 decrypts M1 and obtains And verify the legitimacy of signature S1. If the verification is successful, select a random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encrypting the random number r2, the ciphertext M2 is obtained. After signing M2 with the private key of device 2, the signature S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1;

[0023] After receiving M2 and S2, device 1 decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the value of the random number r1. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S2. If the verification passes, get Get the master key through the key derivation algorithm

[0024] Through the public key of device 2 Encrypt the random number r2 to get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), and send M3 and S3 to device 2;

[0025] After receiving the message sent by M3 and S3, device 2 decrypts M3 and obtains Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the random number r2. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S3. If the verification passes, get Get the encryption key through the key derivation algorithm

[0026] Device 1 and device 2 use encryption key Protect the information interaction between device 1 and device 2, that is, complete the lightweight access authentication of the power Internet of Things devices.

[0027] The present invention also proposes a lightweight access authentication system for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, including:

[0028] The device identity key pair application module is used to apply for the ciphertext of the public and private key pair of the target device, including: when the target device generates the key application parameters, the key generation center KGC generates the target device identity public and private key pair according to the unique identification ID of the target device, and transmits the ciphertext of the public and private key pair to the target device after encrypting it with the symmetric key;

[0029] The device encryption key negotiation module is used to negotiate the encryption keys of the target device and other devices, including: when the target device exchanges information with other devices, based on the public and private key pairs of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate the master key, and a key derivation algorithm is used to calculate and generate a data encryption key, that is, access authentication through the data encryption key.

[0030] Optional, the target device public and private key pair ciphertext application, including:

[0031] The target device first selects a random number r1 and Among them is a cyclic group, The order of is q, and set A secure one-way hash function According to r1, q. and the target device ID, generate the target device's identity key pair application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)}, and send the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} to the key generation center KGC;

[0032] After receiving the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H(ID||r1)}, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameter k, Input the safety parameter k into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1;

[0033] in,

[0034] Where q is a safe prime number, G1 is a q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, G2 is a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group on the finite field, is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair, H1, H2 is the system hash function, where H1:{0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2;

[0035] The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the target device, and saves the system paramas1 through the target device;

[0036] The target device generates a random number r2, and obtains the symmetric key k2 according to the key derivation algorithm for the random number r2, k2 = KDF (r2), and encrypts the symmetric key k2 through the key generation center KGC to obtain the encrypted symmetric key And calculate the symmetric key based on the target device ID The application parameters and the symmetric key The application parameters are sent to the key generation center KGC;

[0037] Among them, the symmetric key The application parameters are:

[0038] The key generation center KGC receives the symmetric key After applying for parameters, verify the symmetric key The integrity of the application parameters, if verified, decrypt the symmetric key to obtain And extract the target device ID, and check whether the target device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the target device identity public key P pub1 , P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The validity period of the device;

[0039] The key generation center KGC calculates the target device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters The target device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Ciphertext for private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Device validity period signature, obtain the information after signature and will Send to the target device;

[0040] The target device receives After verification If the signature information is verified, the public key P of the target device is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the identity private key of the target device

[0041] Optionally, the target device negotiates encryption keys with other devices, including:

[0042] Set the target device as device 1 and other devices as device 2. Use device 1 to set the device ID 1 and the private key validity period T v1 Sent to device 2, device 2 receives device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1After that, determine the public key of device 1, the public key

[0043] Device 2 sends device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 Sent to device 1, device 1 receives device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 , determine the public key of device 2, public key

[0044] Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encrypting the random number r1, the ciphertext M1 is obtained. After signing M1 with the private key of device 1, the signature S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2;

[0045] After receiving M1 and S1, device 2 decrypts M1 and obtains And verify the legitimacy of signature S1. If the verification is successful, select a random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encrypting the random number r2, the ciphertext M2 is obtained. After signing M2 with the private key of device 2, the signature S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1;

[0046] After receiving M2 and S2, device 1 decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the value of the random number r1. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S2. If the verification passes, get Get the master key through the key derivation algorithm

[0047] Through the public key of device 2 Encrypt the random number r2 to get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), and send M3 and S3 to device 2;

[0048] After receiving the message sent by M3 and S3, device 2 decrypts M3 and obtains Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the random number r2. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S3. If the verification passes, get Get the encryption key through the key derivation algorithm

[0049] Device 1 and device 2 use encryption key Protect the information interaction between device 1 and device 2, that is, complete the lightweight access authentication of the power Internet of Things devices.

[0050] The method proposed in the present invention can realize efficient and secure access authentication of power Internet of Things devices, and enhance the security and intelligent management level of Internet of Things devices. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0051] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the device identity key pair application of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of the encryption key negotiation of the device of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 4 The figure is a flow chart of the system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] Now, exemplary embodiments of the present invention are described with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention can be implemented in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. These embodiments are provided to disclose the present invention in detail and completely and to fully convey the scope of the present invention to those skilled in the art. The terms used in the exemplary embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings are not intended to limit the present invention. In the accompanying drawings, the same units / elements are marked with the same reference numerals.

[0056] Unless otherwise specified, the terms (including technical terms) used herein have the commonly understood meanings to those skilled in the art. In addition, it is understood that the terms defined in commonly used dictionaries should be understood to have the same meanings as those in the context of the relevant fields, and should not be understood as idealized or overly formal meanings.

[0057] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with embodiments and drawings:

[0058] In order to achieve efficient and secure access authentication of power Internet of Things devices, the present invention proposes a lightweight access authentication method for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, such as Figure 1 As shown in the figure, it mainly includes two processes: device identity key pair application and encryption key negotiation. First, the device generates a key application file, and the key generation center KGC generates a device identity public and private key pair based on the device's unique identification ID, and uses a symmetric key to encrypt the private key and transmit it to the device; when information interaction is required between devices, a random number is introduced based on the identity key pair to negotiate the master key, and then the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the data encryption key.

[0059] The encryption key is generated by a key pair application and key negotiation method, which can effectively avoid problems such as information leakage caused by key escrow due to an unreliable key generation center.

[0060] Among them, the steps for applying for device identity key pair are as follows: Figure 2 As shown below:

[0061] The target device first selects a random number is a cyclic group of order q. It is a secure one-way hash function. According to the device ID, the device identity key pair is generated and the application parameters paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} are sent to the key generation center KGC.

[0062] After receiving the application parameters, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameters The safety parameter k is input into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1.

[0063]

[0064] Among them, q is a safe prime number, G1 is the q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, and G2 is the q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group over the finite field. is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair. H1, H2 are system hash functions. Among them, H1: {0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2.

[0065] The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the device and the device saves it.

[0066] The device generates a random number r2, obtains a symmetric key k2=KDF(r2) based on the key derivation algorithm, and encrypts k2 with the public key of the key generation center to obtain Calculate the identity key pair application parameters based on the device ID and send them to the key generation center KGC;

[0067] The identity key pair application parameters are:

[0068] After receiving the device identity key pair application parameters, the key generation center KGC first verifies the data integrity and decrypts it to obtain the symmetric key after verification. And extract the device ID to check whether the device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the device identity public key P pub1 , that is, P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The device validity period. After that, the key generation center KGC calculates the device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters. The device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Encrypt the private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Equipment validity period signature Get the information after signature Afterwards Send to device.

[0069] After receiving the identity public-private key pair response message, the device first verifies the signature information. If the signature verification passes, the device identity public key P is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the device identity private key

[0070] Among them, the device encryption key negotiation step is as follows: Figure 3 As shown below:

[0071] Device 1 (target device) sends its own device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1 Send it to device 2 (other device) together. After receiving it, device 2 will calculate the public key of device 1.

[0072] Device 2 sends its own device ID2 and private key validity period T v2 Send them to device 1 together. After receiving them, device 1 will calculate the public key of device 2

[0073] Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encryption, the ciphertext is obtained Then, after signing with the private key of device 1, S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2;

[0074] After receiving the information, device 2 first decrypts M1 to obtain Then verify the signature S1. After verification, select the random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encryption, the ciphertext is obtained Then, after signing with the private key of device 2, S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1;

[0075] After receiving the information, device 1 first decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the original value. If they are equal, verify the signature S2. After verification, calculate Then the master key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm Then use the public key of device 2 After encrypting r2, we get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), then M3 and S3 are sent to device 2;

[0076] After receiving the information, device 2 first decrypts M3 to obtain Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the original value. If they are equal, verify the signature S3. After verification, calculate the same Then the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the device encryption key

[0077] The information exchange between device 1 and device 2 is securely protected based on the device encryption key k.

[0078] The present invention also proposes a lightweight access authentication system 200 for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, such as Figure 4 As shown, including:

[0079] The device identity key pair application module 201 is used to apply for the ciphertext of the public and private key pair of the target device, including: when the target device generates the key application parameters, the key generation center KGC generates the target device identity public and private key pair according to the unique identification ID of the target device, and transmits the ciphertext of the public and private key pair to the target device after encrypting it with the symmetric key;

[0080] The device encryption key negotiation module 202 is used to negotiate the encryption keys of the target device and other devices, including: when the target device exchanges information with other devices, based on the public and private key pairs of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate the master key, and a key derivation algorithm is used to calculate and generate a data encryption key, that is, access authentication is performed through the data encryption key.

[0081] The application of the target device's public and private key pair ciphertext specifically includes:

[0082] The target device first selects a random number r1 and Among them is a cyclic group, The order of is q, and set A secure one-way hash function According to r1, q. and the target device ID, generate the target device's identity key pair application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)}, and send the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} to the key generation center KGC;

[0083] After receiving the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H(ID||r1)}, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameter k, Input the safety parameter k into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1;

[0084] in,

[0085] Where q is a safe prime number, G1 is a q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, G2 is a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group on the finite field, is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair, H1, H2 is the system hash function, where H1:{0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2;

[0086] The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the target device, and saves the system paramas1 through the target device;

[0087] The target device generates a random number r2, and obtains the symmetric key k2 according to the key derivation algorithm for the random number r2, k2 = KDF (r2), and encrypts the symmetric key k2 through the key generation center KGC to obtain the encrypted symmetric key And calculate the symmetric key based on the target device ID The application parameters and the symmetric key The application parameters are sent to the key generation center KGC;

[0088] Among them, the symmetric key The application parameters are:

[0089] The key generation center KGC receives the symmetric key After applying for parameters, verify the symmetric key The integrity of the application parameters, if verified, decrypt the symmetric key to obtain And extract the target device ID, and check whether the target device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the target device identity public key P pub1 , P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The validity period of the device;

[0090] The key generation center KGC calculates the target device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters The target device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Ciphertext for private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Device validity period signature, obtain the information after signature and will Send to the target device;

[0091] The target device receives After verification If the signature information is verified, the public key P of the target device is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the identity private key of the target device

[0092] The target device negotiates encryption keys with other devices, including:

[0093] Set the target device as device 1 and other devices as device 2. Use device 1 to set the device ID 1 and the private key validity period T v1 Sent to device 2, device 2 receives device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1 After that, determine the public key of device 1, the public key

[0094] Device 2 sends device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 Sent to device 1, device 1 receives device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 , determine the public key of device 2, public key

[0095] Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encrypting the random number r1, the ciphertext M1 is obtained. After signing M1 with the private key of device 1, the signature S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2;

[0096] After receiving M1 and S1, device 2 decrypts M1 and obtains And verify the legitimacy of signature S1. If the verification is successful, select a random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encrypting the random number r2, the ciphertext M2 is obtained. After signing M2 with the private key of device 2, the signature S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1;

[0097] After receiving M2 and S2, device 1 decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the value of the random number r1. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S2. If the verification passes, get Get the master key through the key derivation algorithm

[0098] Through the public key of device 2 Encrypt the random number r2 to get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), and send M3 and S3 to device 2;

[0099] After receiving the message sent by M3 and S3, device 2 decrypts M3 and obtains Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the random number r2. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S3. If the verification passes, get Get the encryption key through the key derivation algorithm

[0100] Device 1 and device 2 use encryption key Protect the information interaction between device 1 and device 2, that is, complete the lightweight access authentication of the power Internet of Things devices.

[0101] The method proposed in the present invention can realize efficient and secure access authentication of power Internet of Things devices, and enhance the security and intelligent management level of Internet of Things devices.

[0102] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes. The schemes in the embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in various computer languages, for example, object-oriented programming language Java and literal scripting language JavaScript, etc.

[0103] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0104] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0105] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the computer or other programmable device. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0106] Although the preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, those skilled in the art may make other changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention.

[0107] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A lightweight access authentication method for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, the method comprising: The application of the ciphertext of the public and private key pair of the target device includes: after the target device generates the key application parameters, the key generation center KGC generates the public and private key pair of the target device identity according to the unique identification ID of the target device, and transmits the ciphertext of the public and private key pair to the target device after encrypting it with the symmetric key; The target device negotiates encryption keys with other devices, including: when the target device exchanges information with other devices, based on the public and private key pairs of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate a master key, and a key derivation algorithm is used to calculate and generate a data encryption key, that is, access authentication through data encryption keys; The target device negotiates an encryption key with other devices, including: Set the target device as device 1 and other devices as device 2. Use device 1 to set the device ID 1 and the private key validity period T v1 Sent to device 2, device 2 receives device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1 After that, determine the public key of device 1, the public key Device 2 sends device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 Sent to device 1, device 1 receives device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 , determine the public key of device 2, public key Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encrypting the random number r1, the ciphertext M1 is obtained. After signing M1 with the private key of device 1, the signature S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2; After receiving M1 and S1, device 2 decrypts M1 and obtains And verify the legitimacy of signature S1. If the verification is successful, select a random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encrypting the random number r2, the ciphertext M2 is obtained. After signing M2 with the private key of device 2, the signature S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1; After receiving M2 and S2, device 1 decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the value of the random number r1. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S2. If the verification passes, get Get the master key through the key derivation algorithm Through the public key of device 2 Encrypt the random number r2 to get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), and send M3 and S3 to device 2; After receiving the message sent by M3 and S3, device 2 decrypts M3 and obtains Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the random number r2. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S3. If the verification passes, get Get the encryption key through the key derivation algorithm Device 1 and device 2 use encryption key Protect the information interaction between device 1 and device 2, that is, complete the lightweight access authentication of the power Internet of Things devices.

2. According to the method of claim 1, the application of the target device public and private key pair ciphertext specifically comprises: The target device first selects a random number r1 and Among them is a cyclic group, The order of is q, and set A secure one-way hash function H: According to r1, q、H: and the target device ID, generate the target device's identity key pair application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)}, and send the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} to the key generation center KGC; After receiving the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H(ID||r1)}, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameter k, Input the safety parameter k into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1; in, Where q is a safe prime number, G1 is a q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, G2 is a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group on the finite field, is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair, H1, H2 is the system hash function, where H1:{0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2; The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the target device, and saves the system paramas1 through the target device; The target device generates a random number r2, and obtains the symmetric key k2 according to the key derivation algorithm for the random number r2, k2 = KDF (r2), and encrypts the symmetric key k2 through the key generation center KGC to obtain the encrypted symmetric key And calculate the symmetric key based on the target device ID The application parameters and the symmetric key The application parameters are sent to the key generation center KGC; Among them, the symmetric key The application parameters are: The key generation center KGC receives the symmetric key After applying for parameters, verify the symmetric key The integrity of the application parameters, if verified, decrypt the symmetric key to obtain And extract the target device ID, and check whether the target device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the target device identity public key P pub1 , P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The validity period of the device; The key generation center KGC calculates the target device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters The target device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Ciphertext for private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Equipment validity period signature, obtain the information after signature and will Send to the target device; The target device receives After verification If the signature information is verified, the public key P of the target device is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the identity private key of the target device 3. A lightweight access authentication system for power Internet of Things devices based on the IBC system, the system comprising: The device identity key pair application module is used to apply for the ciphertext of the public and private key pair of the target device, including: when the target device generates the key application parameters, the key generation center KGC generates the target device identity public and private key pair according to the unique identification ID of the target device, and transmits the ciphertext of the public and private key pair to the target device after encrypting it with the symmetric key; The device encryption key negotiation module is used to negotiate the encryption keys of the target device and other devices, including: when the target device exchanges information with other devices, based on the public and private key pairs of the target device and other devices, a random number is introduced to negotiate the master key, and a data encryption key is generated after calculation using a key derivation algorithm, that is, access authentication through the data encryption key; The target device negotiates an encryption key with other devices, including: Set the target device as device 1 and other devices as device 2. Use device 1 to set the device ID 1 and the private key validity period T v1 Sent to device 2, device 2 receives device ID 1 and private key validity period T v1 After that, determine the public key of device 1, the public key Device 2 sends device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 Sent to device 1, device 1 receives device ID 2 and private key validity period T v2 , determine the public key of device 2, public key Device 1 selects a random number r1 and uses the public key of device 2 After encrypting the random number r1, the ciphertext M1 is obtained. After signing M1 with the private key of device 1, the signature S1=H1(M1||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M1 and S1 are sent to device 2; After receiving M1 and S1, device 2 decrypts M1 and obtains And verify the legitimacy of signature S1. If the verification is successful, select a random number r2 and use the public key of device 1 After encrypting the random number r2, the ciphertext M2 is obtained. After signing M2 with the private key of device 2, the signature S2 = H1(M2||r2||r1) is obtained, and the ciphertext M2 and S2 are sent to device 1; After receiving M2 and S2, device 1 decrypts M2 to obtain Compare the decrypted r1 to see if it is equal to the value of the random number r1. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S2. If the verification passes, get Get the master key through the key derivation algorithm Through the public key of device 2 Encrypt the random number r2 to get the ciphertext Will verify the information V p , after signing the ciphertext M3, r1, r2, we get S3 = H1 (V p ||M3||r1||r2), and send M3 and S3 to device 2; After receiving the message sent by M3 and S3, device 2 decrypts M3 and obtains Compare the decrypted r2 to see if it is equal to the random number r2. If they are equal, verify the legitimacy of the signature S3. If the verification passes, get Get the encryption key through the key derivation algorithm Device 1 and device 2 use encryption key Protect the information interaction between device 1 and device 2, that is, complete the lightweight access authentication of the power Internet of Things devices.

4. According to the system of claim 3, the application of the target device public and private key pair ciphertext specifically comprises: The target device first selects a random number r1 and Among them is a cyclic group, The order of is q, and set A secure one-way hash function H: According to r1, q、H: and the target device ID, generate the target device's identity key pair application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)}, and send the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H (ID || r1)} to the key generation center KGC; After receiving the application parameter paramas0 = {ID, r1, q, H(ID||r1)}, the key generation center KGC calculates the security parameter k, Input the safety parameter k into the parameter generator to generate the system parameter paramas1; in, Where q is a safe prime number, G1 is a q-order additive subgroup on the elliptic curve that satisfies the bilinear mapping property, G2 is a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group on the finite field, is a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2, n is the length of the plaintext data, P is any generator of G1, that is, P∈G1, P pub is the system public key, P pub =ks·P, s is the master key factor of the system, P r =ks,P pub and P r is the system public and private key pair, H1, H2 is the system hash function, where H1:{0,1} * →G1, H2:{0,1} n →G2; The key generation center KGC sends the system parameter paramas1 to the target device, and saves the system paramas1 through the target device; The target device generates a random number r2, and obtains the symmetric key k2 according to the key derivation algorithm for the random number r2, k2 = KDF (r2), and encrypts the symmetric key k2 through the key generation center KGC to obtain the encrypted symmetric key And calculate the symmetric key based on the target device ID The application parameters and the symmetric key The application parameters are sent to the key generation center KGC; Among them, the symmetric key The application parameters are: The key generation center KGC receives the symmetric key After applying for parameters, verify the symmetric key The integrity of the application parameters, if verified, decrypt the symmetric key to obtain And extract the target device ID, and check whether the target device ID is legal. If it is legal, calculate the target device identity public key P pub1 , P pub1 =H1(ID||T v ), where T v The validity period of the device; The key generation center KGC calculates the target device identity private key based on the system master key factor and security parameters The target device identity private key is encrypted with the symmetric key k2 to obtain Ciphertext for private key Device identity public key P pub1 and T v Equipment validity period signature, obtain the information after signature and will Send to the target device; The target device receives After verification If the signature information is verified, the public key P of the target device is obtained. pub1 , use the symmetric key k2 to decrypt the private key ciphertext information to obtain the identity private key of the target device