A transaction information security processing method in a blockchain-based data transaction platform

Abstract

The application discloses a transaction information security processing method in a data transaction platform based on a block chain, and aims at information processing of a data transaction platform, a buyer user and a seller user in a transaction process with goods as transaction objects, constructs a general ring secret transaction method with a deterrent function after quantum security for one buyer multiple transactions and multiple buyer transactions, ensures correctness, balance, anonymity, unforgeability and inappropriateness deterrence of data, and any inappropriately behaved user can be punished, a deposit penalty can be given to an inappropriately behaved buyer by extracting a key, and a normally transacted buyer can successfully transact, so that fairness of both parties in the transaction is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of blockchain transaction technology, specifically relating to a method for securely processing transaction information in a blockchain-based data trading platform. Background Technology

[0002] There are three main privacy enhancement technologies in modern cryptocurrencies. The first is chainable ring signatures, which guarantee the detectability and anonymity of double-spending. The second is confidential transactions, which hides transaction amounts and ensures that the input amount for each transaction is equal to the output amount. The third is hidden addresses for recipient anonymity. Zero-knowledge proofs have become a key component in cryptocurrency privacy enhancement technologies.

[0003] The traditional Bitcoin transaction process based on blockchain generally involves the buyer making an immutable transfer to the seller's address. In real life, there are often scenarios where multiple buyers or a single buyer makes multiple transactions. If the buyer behaves improperly, such as by double-spending to avoid collisions, disputes can arise. Ensuring the fairness of transactions between buyers and sellers has become an urgent issue to be addressed. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the aforementioned problems in existing technologies, this invention provides a method for securely processing transaction information in a blockchain-based data trading platform. The technical problem to be solved by this invention is achieved through the following technical solution:

[0005] A method for securely processing transaction information in a blockchain-based data trading platform includes the following steps:

[0006] Step 1: The buyer of a ring member submits a transaction request to the trading platform;

[0007] Step two: The trading platform randomly selects the buyer's private key sk based on the transaction request. out ←{0,1} κ and the seller's private key sk in ←{0,1} κ The buyer's public key pk is calculated based on a pseudo-random function. out ←f(sk out ,0) and the seller's public key pk in ←f(sk in ,0); where κ is the safety parameter, and the pseudo-random function is f:{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} κ Com:{0,1} * →{0,1} κThis represents a commitment scheme based on a hash function;

[0008] Step 3: The buyer randomly selects the buyer's minting key ck. out ←{0,1} κ And according to the buyer's amount ε out and the buyer's minting key ck out ←{0,1} κ Generate buyer's minted coin out =Com(ε out ;ck out );

[0009] Step four, when (pk out ,ε out )∈R,(sk out ,(ε out ,ck out ))∈A s At that time, according to the pseudo-random function Calculate the serial number Where, ε out Let R represent the face value of the purchase, R represent the set of public keys and face values ​​of the ring members, and A represent the face value of the purchase. s This represents the set of private keys and coins belonging to the ring members;

[0010] Step 5, the buyer's side, based on (coin) out ,ck out The transaction tx is generated using the sequence number sn and the serial number sn. out coin out Given a sequence number set S = {sn}, and a pair of transaction objects M = (a, p) are signed according to the formula:

[0011] π=NIZKPoK{(K s A s ,{ε out ,ck out}):

[0012]

[0013] Where π represents the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of transaction tx, A represents the set of members' private keys and minted coins, and K... s =(pk out ,(ε out ,ck out )) represents the set of public keys and coins of the ring members; sk Σ This represents the buyer's partial private key; M = (a, p) represents the transaction object, where a represents the attribute of the transaction object, and p represents the model of the transaction object; ε in Indicates the selling amount, coin in Indicates the seller minting coins, ckin Indicates the seller's minting key;

[0014] Step 6: The buyer outputs a signature σ = (z, π, S) and broadcasts the data packet containing the signature to all nodes in the blockchain.

[0015] Step 7: After receiving the signature σ=(z,π,S), the seller verifies it. If the verification is successful, it sends the verification result to the trading platform.

[0016] Step 8: Based on the verification results, the trading platform determines whether any two trading objects are collision resistant. If they are collision resistant, the trading platform and the seller obtain a portion of the buyer's private key after decryption.

[0017] Step nine: The trading platform sends the buyer's deposit to the seller based on part of the buyer's private key.

[0018] In one embodiment of the present invention, step seven specifically includes:

[0019] The seller received the signature σ single = (z,π,S) and then determine whether the verification algorithm for π is valid, whether the element in the sequence number set S has appeared before, and whether the set A belongs to a subset of the current ring member accounts;

[0020] If the verification algorithm for π is valid, the elements in the sequence number set S have not appeared before, and set A is a subset of the existing ring member accounts, then a successful verification result is sent to the trading platform.

[0021] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0022] This invention addresses the information processing of data trading platforms, buyers, and sellers in transactions involving goods. It constructs a universal, quantum-secure, ring-secret transaction method with deterrent capabilities, enabling multiple transactions by a single buyer and transactions by multiple buyers. This method ensures the correctness, balance, anonymity, unforgeability, and deterrent effect of data misconduct. Any user engaging in misconduct can be punished. By extracting the key of a buyer who misbehaves, a deposit penalty can be imposed. It also ensures that buyers engaging in legitimate transactions can successfully complete their transactions, thus guaranteeing fairness for both parties. Detailed Implementation

[0023] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments, but the implementation of the present invention is not limited thereto.

[0024] Example 1

[0025] Step one: The buyer side of a ring member submits a transaction request to the trading platform. A ring member refers to all users within the ring who can be buyers; when a user makes a transaction, that member (user) becomes the buyer. Each ring member has its own ring member account.

[0026] Step two is the key generation algorithm (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ ):

[0027] Step two: The trading platform randomly selects the buyer's private key sk based on the transaction request. out ←{0,1} κ and the seller's private key sk in ←{0,1} κ The buyer's public key pk is calculated based on a pseudo-random function. out ←f(sk out ,0) and the seller's public key pk in ←f(sk in ,0); where κ is the safety parameter, and the pseudo-random function is f:{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} κ Com:{0,1} * →{0,1} κ This represents a commitment scheme based on a hash function;

[0028] Step 3 is the minting algorithm (coin,ck) ← Mint(pk,ε):

[0029] Step 3: The buyer randomly selects the buyer's minting key ck. out ←{0,1} κ And according to the buyer's amount ε out and the buyer's minting key ck out ←{0,1} κ Generate buyer's minted coin out =Com(ε out ;ck out );

[0030] Here, minting can be understood as a commitment to the face value under the minting key. Generating buyer minting is also the calculation of the commitment to the face value, which can be preset.

[0031] Steps four through six are the spending algorithm (tx, σ) ← Spend(K) s A s (A,R):

[0032] Step four, when (pk out ,ε out )∈R,(sk out ,(ε out,ck out ))∈A s At that time, according to the pseudo-random function Calculate the serial number Where R represents the set of public keys and denominations of ring members, and A s This represents the set of private keys and coins belonging to the ring members;

[0033] Step 5, the buyer's side, based on (coin) out ,ck out The transaction tx is generated using the sequence number sn and the serial number sn. out coin out Given a sequence number set S = {sn}, and a pair of transaction objects M = (a, p) are signed according to the formula:

[0034] π=NIZKPoK{(K s A s ,{ε out ,ck out}):

[0035]

[0036] Where π represents the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of transaction tx, A represents the set of members' private keys and minted coins, and K... s =(pk out ,(ε out ,ck out )) represents the set of public keys and coins of the ring members; sk Σ This represents the buyer's partial private key; M = (a, p) represents the transaction object, where a represents the attribute of the transaction object, and p represents the model of the transaction object; ε in Indicates the selling amount, coin in Indicates the seller minting coins, ck in Indicates the seller's minting key;

[0037] Among them, the seller's face value, seller's mintage, and seller's mintage key are public information and can be obtained as needed. The information in A includes the private keys and mintage of ring members and the private keys and mintage of members outside the ring.

[0038] Step 6: The buyer outputs a signature σ = (z, π, S) and broadcasts the data packet containing the signature to all nodes in the blockchain.

[0039] Step seven is the verification algorithm: {0,1}←Verify(M,tx,σ):

[0040] Step 7: After receiving the signature σ=(z,π,S), the seller verifies it. The specific verification process is as follows: determine whether the verification algorithm of π is valid, determine whether the elements in the sequence number set S have appeared before, and determine whether the set A belongs to a subset of the existing accounts.

[0041] If the verification algorithm for π is valid, the elements in the sequence number set S have not appeared before, and set A is a subset of the existing ring member accounts, then a successful verification result is sent to the trading platform.

[0042] If the verification algorithm for π fails, an element in the sequence number set S has appeared before, or set A is not a subset of the existing ring member accounts, a verification failure result is sent to the trading platform, and the transaction is terminated. In the algorithm, if the verification is successful, 1 is output; otherwise, 0 is output.

[0043] Step eight is the extraction algorithm Ext(pk,M1,M2,σ1,σ2):

[0044] Step 8: Based on the verification results, the trading platform determines whether any two trading objects are collision resistant. If they are collision resistant, it indicates that the buyer's behavior is improper, and the trading platform and the seller obtain a portion of the buyer's private key after decryption.

[0045] The specific process of step eight is as follows:

[0046] When i = 1, 2, respectively σ i M i Corresponding to (z) i ,π i (,S) and (a,p) i ),

[0047] If M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) satisfy p1 ≠ p2, that is, M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) are collision-resistant, then obtain the decrypted partial private key of the buyer. Therefore, if the buyer behaves improperly, that is, if the buyer is conducting an abnormal transaction (a fraudulent transaction), the trading platform can obtain the buyer's private key, and after obtaining the buyer's private key, it can obtain the buyer's funds.

[0048] Step nine: The trading platform sends the buyer's deposit to the seller using a portion of the buyer's private key. The trading platform obtains the buyer's deposit using a portion of the buyer's private key, and the seller then requests the deposit from the platform using the obtained portion of the buyer's private key. The trading platform then sends the buyer's deposit to the buyer.

[0049] If M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) are not collision resistant after successful verification in step six, i.e., p1 = p2, then the extraction step is terminated and the normal transaction steps can continue.

[0050] In this embodiment, both the buyer and seller can ensure the secure storage of transaction funds. The buyer on the trading platform cannot misappropriate the transaction funds, and the seller can only truly obtain the funds after the buyer's explicit consent. If the buyer acts improperly, the trading platform and the seller can extract the buyer's private key and simultaneously obtain the transaction deposit amount through the blockchain. During normal transactions, the trading platform cannot obtain the method used to generate the user's private key, nor can it know the user's private key, ensuring that the transaction is not influenced by one party and that external parties cannot threaten economic security by attacking the server. The transaction ensures the anonymity of the buyer, the anonymity of the seller, and the concealment of the transaction amount.

[0051] Specifically, any buyer running the spending algorithm can generate a valid transaction tuple (z,π,S) in the deterministic confidential transaction algorithm, and any buyer can generate (z,π,S) in a deterministic confidential transaction with i inputs and j outputs. i These users can control the anonymity of anyone and the anonymity of the sender / receiver account to ensure accuracy.

[0052] On the one hand, buyers can spend cryptocurrency from their accounts. On the other hand, the total amount spent during the transaction must not be less than the total amount spent. Therefore, the balance of deterrent confidential transactions can be guaranteed based on the reliability of the proof system and the security of the symmetric key primitives.

[0053] No one can be certain which account in any given set is the input account (buyer's account). Therefore, by utilizing the adaptive zero-knowledge nature of pseudo-random functions and the pseudo-randomness of one-way functions, the anonymity of confidential blockchain transactions can be guaranteed.

[0054] Malicious buyers cannot generate valid outputs; that is, they cannot forge users who generate valid outputs. Therefore, the adaptive zero-knowledge and one-way pseudo-randomness of the pseudo-random function can ensure the unforgeability of confidential blockchain transactions that can deter such activity.

[0055] Any buyer engaging in misconduct can be punished, with penalties including deposit deductions and other misconduct imposed by extracting the buyer's key. Therefore, the fairness of deterrent blockchain confidential transactions can be guaranteed by extracting the key from the signatures of two collided transactions.

[0056] Example 1 can be seen as a specific implementation process in a buyer transaction scenario. Example 2 will be used to describe in detail the specific implementation processes in multiple buyer scenarios.

[0057] In one feasible implementation, the algorithm principle of this invention is as follows:

[0058] Key generation algorithm KeyGen(1) κ (pk, sk): Given the security parameter κ, randomly select the signing key sk. ∑ ∈{0,1} κ The pseudo-random function bound to the key value β∈D calculate And output the private key sk = (sk Σ ,sk PRF ) and public key pk = (pk Σ ,crs,β,c), where the common reference string crs←Setup Π (1 κ X, D, Y ∈ {0, 1} κ .

[0059] Ring signature algorithm Sign({pk i} i∈[l] ,sk,M): Randomly select a one-way function f, sign the message M=(a,p), and compute the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π:

[0060]

[0061] Return the signature σ = (z, π).

[0062] Verification algorithm Verify({pk i} i∈[l] ,a,p,σ)=b: If the verification is true, i.e. b=1, then the algorithm outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0.

[0063] Extraction algorithm Ext(pk,M1,M2,σ1,σ2): Given a signature message pair σ i M i The signature message pairs correspond to (z) i ,π i ) and (a,p i If M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) satisfy p1 ≠ p2 and Verify(pk, M... i ,σ i If ) = 1, then return Otherwise, return ⊥.

[0064] Example 2

[0065] For a confidential transaction with i inputs (multiple buyers) and j outputs (multiple signatures), f:{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} κ For pseudo-random functions, Com:{0,1} * →{0,1}κ This is a commitment scheme based on hash functions.

[0066] Step 201: The buyer side of a ring member submits a transaction request to the trading platform. A ring member refers to all users who can be buyers; when a user makes a transaction, that member (user) becomes the buyer. Each ring member has its own ring member account.

[0067] Step 202 is the key generation algorithm (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ ):

[0068] Step 202: The trading platform randomly selects the buyer's private key sk based on the transaction request. out,j ←{0,1} κ and the seller's private key sk in,i ←{0,1} κ The buyer's public key pk is calculated based on a pseudo-random function. out,j ←f(sk out,j ,0) and the seller's public key pk in,i ←f(sk in,i ,0); where κ is the safety parameter, and the pseudo-random function is f:{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} κ Com:{0,1} * →{0,1} κ This represents a commitment scheme based on a hash function;

[0069] Step 203 is the minting algorithm (coin,ck) ← Mint(pk,ε):

[0070] Step 203: The buyer randomly selects the buyer's minting key ck. out,j ←{0,1} κ And according to the buyer's amount ε out,j and the buyer's minting key ck out,j ←{0,1} κ Generate buyer's minted coin out,j =Com(ε out,j ;ck out,j );

[0071] Here, minting can be understood as a commitment to the face value under the minting key. Generating buyer minting is also the calculation of the commitment to the face value, which can be preset.

[0072] Steps 204-206 are the spending algorithm (M, tx, π, S) ← Spend(K) s A s (A,R):

[0073] Step 204, when (pk out,j ,ε out,j )∈R,(sk out,j ,(ε out,j ,ck out,j ))∈A s At that time, according to the pseudo-random function Calculate the serial number Where R represents the set of public keys and denominations of ring members, and A s This represents the set of private keys and coins of the ring members.

[0074] Step 205, the buyer's side according to (coin) out,j ,ck out,j ) and serial number sn i Generate transaction tx = (A, {pk out,j coin out,j} j∈[|R|] ) and serial number set And sign the transaction object M = (a, p) according to Formula 2:

[0075] π=NIZKPoK{(K s A s ,{ε out,j ,ck out,j} j∈|R| ):

[0076]

[0077] Where π represents the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of transaction tx, A represents the set of members' private keys and minted coins, and K... s =(pk out,j ,(ε out,j ,ck out,j )) represents the set of public keys and coins of the ring members; sk ∑,j This represents the buyer's partial private key; M = (a, p) represents the transaction object, where a represents the attribute of the transaction object, and p represents the model of the transaction object; ε in,i Indicates the selling amount, coin in,i Indicates the seller minting coins, ck in,i Indicates the seller's minting key;

[0078] Among them, the seller's face value, seller's mintage, and seller's mintage key are public information and can be obtained as needed. The information in A includes the private keys and mintage of ring members and the private keys and mintage of members outside the ring.

[0079] Step 206, the buyer outputs the signature σ = (z i,j ,π i ,S), and broadcast the signed data packet to each node of the blockchain;

[0080] Step 207 is the verification algorithm: Verify(M,tx) i ,σ i ,π)

[0081] Step 207, the seller receives the signature σ = (z i,j ,π i After S), the verification is carried out. The specific verification process is as follows: determine whether the verification algorithm of π is valid, determine whether the elements in the sequence number set S have appeared before, and determine whether set A belongs to a subset of the current ring member accounts.

[0082] If the verification algorithm for π is valid, the elements in the sequence number set S have not appeared before, and set A is a subset of the existing ring member accounts, then a successful verification result is sent to the trading platform.

[0083] If the verification algorithm for π fails, an element in the sequence number set S has appeared before, or set A is not a subset of the existing ring member accounts, a verification failure result is sent to the trading platform, and the transaction is terminated.

[0084] Step 208 is the extraction algorithm Ext(pk,M1,M2,σ1,σ2):

[0085] Step 208: Based on the verification results, the trading platform determines whether any two trading objects are collision resistant. If they are collision resistant, it indicates that the buyer's behavior is improper, and the trading platform and the seller obtain the decrypted portion of the buyer's private key.

[0086] The specific process of step 208 is as follows:

[0087] When i = 1, 2, respectively σ i M i Corresponding to (z) i,j ,π i (,S) and (a,p) i ),

[0088] If M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) are collision-resistant, i.e., p1 ≠ p2, then obtain the decrypted portion of the buyer's private key. Therefore, if the buyer acts improperly, that is, if the buyer is conducting an abnormal transaction (a fraudulent transaction), the trading platform and the seller can obtain part of the buyer's private key. After obtaining part of the buyer's private key, they can obtain the buyer's funds.

[0089] Step 209: The trading platform sends the buyer's deposit to the seller using a portion of the buyer's private key. The trading platform obtains the buyer's deposit using a portion of the buyer's private key, and the seller then requests the deposit from the platform using the obtained portion of the buyer's private key. The trading platform then sends the buyer's deposit to the buyer.

[0090] If M1 = (a, p1) and M2 = (a, p2) are not collision resistant after successful verification in step 207, i.e., p1 = p2, then the extraction step is terminated and the normal transaction steps can continue.

[0091] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of this invention, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0092] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification.

[0093] The above description, in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, provides a further detailed explanation of the present invention. It should not be construed that the specific implementation of the present invention is limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art, various simple deductions or substitutions can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and all such modifications and substitutions should be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1.A method for secure processing of transaction information in a blockchain-based data transaction platform, characterized in that, The method, used for information processing in transactions involving data commodities to ensure the accuracy, balance, anonymity, non-forgeability, and deterrent effect of data misconduct, includes the following steps: Step 1: The buyer of a ring member submits a transaction request to the trading platform; Step two: The trading platform randomly selects the buyer's private key sk based on the transaction request. out ←{0,1} κ and the seller's private key sk in ←{0,1} κ The buyer's public key pk is calculated based on a pseudo-random function. out ←f(sk out ,0) and the seller's public key pk in ←f(sk in ,0); where κ is the safety parameter, and the pseudo-random function is f:{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} κ Com:{0,1} * →{0,1} κ This represents a commitment scheme based on a hash function; Step 3: The buyer randomly selects the buyer's minting key ck. out ←{0,1} κ And according to the buyer's amount ε out and the buyer's minting key ck out ←{0,1} κ Generate buyer's minted coin out =Com(ε out ;ck out ); where, minting is understood as a commitment to the face value under the minting key, and generating buyer minting is the calculation of the commitment to the face value; Step four, when (pk out ,ε out )∈R,(sk out ,(ε out ,ck out ))∈A s At that time, according to the pseudo-random function Calculate the serial number Where, ε out Let R represent the face value of the purchase, R represent the set of public keys and face values ​​of the ring members, and A represent the face value of the purchase. s This represents the set of private keys and coins belonging to the ring members; Step five, the buyer side generates a transaction tx = (A, (pk out , coin out )) and a sequence number set S = {sn} according to (coin out , ck out ) and the sequence number sn, and signs the transaction object M = (a, p) according to the formula: π = NIZKPoK{(K s ,A s ,{ε out ,ck out}): Where π represents the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of transaction tx, A represents the set of members' private keys and minted coins, and K s =(pk out ,(ε out ,ck out )) represents the set of public keys and coins of the ring members; sk Σ This represents the buyer's partial private key; M = (a, p) represents the transaction object, where a represents the attribute of the transaction object, and p represents the model of the transaction object; ε in Indicates the selling amount, coin in Indicates the seller minting coins, ck in This indicates the seller's minting key; among which, the seller's face value, the seller's mintage, and the seller's minting key are public information. Step 6: The buyer outputs a signature σ = (z, π, S) and broadcasts the data packet containing the signature to all nodes in the blockchain. Step 7: After receiving the signature σ=(z,π,S), the seller verifies it. If the verification is successful, it sends the verification result to the trading platform. Step 8: Based on the verification results, the trading platform determines whether any two trading objects are collision resistant. If they are collision resistant, the trading platform and the seller obtain a portion of the buyer's private key after decryption. Step nine: The trading platform sends the buyer's deposit to the seller based on part of the buyer's private key; Step seven specifically includes: The seller end receives the signature σ single = (z, π, S) and judges whether the verification algorithm of π is correct, whether the elements in the serial number set S have appeared before, and whether the set A belongs to the subset of the current ring member accounts. If the verification algorithm for π is valid, the elements in the sequence number set S have not appeared before, and set A is a subset of the existing ring member accounts, then a successful verification result is sent to the trading platform.

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