Methods for the safe use of confidential information

By using binary status marks and secret data marks in networked system components, combined with consistent inspection and rationality inspection, the problem of distinction and protection of secret data in the R&D and commissioning stages is solved, ensuring the safety of system components at each stage.

CN115668197BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-06MERCEDES BENZ GRP
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202180036383.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-05-22
Filing Date
2021-05-07
Publication Date
2024-12-06
Estimated Expiration
2041-05-07

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

During the research and development and commissioning of networked systems, it is difficult for existing technologies to effectively distinguish and protect secret data, resulting in insufficient security and increasing security risks.

Method used

By using binary status flags and secret data markers in system components, ensure that the system components can automatically identify the stage they are in and perform consistent inspections and rationality checks to prevent erroneous or illegal secret data use.

Benefits of technology

It effectively prevents the use of secret information for commissioning in the R&D stage and the use of test secret information for commissioning in the commission stage, ensures that the system components operate safely with appropriate secret information at each stage, and reduces security risks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN115668197B_ABST
    Figure CN115668197B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for securely using secret data (KM) in a plurality of system components (SK) of a networked system, wherein the system components are equipped with the secret data (KM), wherein the life cycle of each system component (SK) includes at least a development phase and a commissioning phase. The method of the invention is characterized in that all secret data (KM) are at least indirectly securely marked (M) as development data or commissioning data; each system component (KM) includes a binary status flag (FLAG), which indicates which phase the system component (SK) is in, and the status flag is protected from illegal tampering; each system component (SK) finds out which phase it is in through a determination function (4), based on which each system component (SK) performs a check (6), comparing the current phase with the mark (M) of the secret data (KM) within the scope of the check, wherein if the phase and the mark (M) are inconsistent, a security measure is initiated.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to a method of the type defined in detail in the preamble of claim 1 for the secure use of secret material in a plurality of system components of a networked system. Background Art

[0002] The method for the secure use of secret data is essentially aimed at the fact that different secret data must be used during the development phase of a system component of a networked system that is equipped with secret data than during the subsequent commissioning phase of the system component. This relates in particular, but not exclusively, to the field of so-called CarIT security for vehicles.

[0003] Modern vehicles, but also other systems, are characterized by increasing networking. In this context, vehicles are connected not only to general systems such as the World Wide Web, but also to specialized systems and servers operated by the vehicle manufacturer or OEM, such as the manufacturer's own applications and the manufacturer's own servers, which are often also called backend servers. These are developed, marketed and operated by the manufacturer specifically for its own fleet. All of this is also referred to as the vehicle ecosystem.

[0004] In practice, many new interfaces and applications arise due to the various communication relationships between these system components within this vehicle ecosystem, all of which should be protected by suitable cryptographic methods, such as mechanisms, protocols, etc. In principle, the cryptographic methods known from the prior art require various secret materials, such as asymmetric key pairs, symmetric keys, certificates, random numbers, etc., for this purpose. All of these are coordinated with each other and added to all participating system components before they are put into use in the vehicle ecosystem and can be used by them. The provision of secret materials, so-called configuration, is carried out, for example, within the scope of the manufacturing process. System components here include in particular control devices installed in the vehicle, but also other components, such as applications installed in the vehicle, OEM applications available on smartphones, etc.

[0005] In order to reliably prevent the possibility of intervening in protected communications, it is necessary to distinguish between the secret materials used in the R&D stage and the secret materials used in the commissioning stage, that is, in the actual use of the R&D product. The secret materials used in the R&D stage are also referred to as test secret materials below. Only the test secret materials should be used in the R&D stage. That is, the commissioning secret materials, and especially the confidential commissioning secret materials, must be protected against illegal access during the entire life of the system components. Such protection should be guaranteed here in an ideal situation by complying with a special protection process and using special protection mechanisms in the respective R&D departments and production workshops. However, this is usually only insufficiently guaranteed in the R&D stage, because most of the different modules of the networked system have not been or have not yet been implemented or realized in the R&D stage.

[0006] Thus, for example, "the secure generation of the required secrets" cannot yet be fully implemented or tested. The secure transmission of secrets from a generation server, the so-called secret server, to a system manufacturer, such as a supplier, may not yet be ensured. "The secure input of secrets into system components" cannot yet be or cannot yet be finally implemented. It may not yet be possible to store secrets securely in system components, because, for example, the target system does not yet have a hardware security module (HSM) installed, although this will still be installed at a later time. "The secure use of secrets in the system" may not yet be possible, for example, because there are development interfaces required for testing and debugging, which have read and write access to the entire system and therefore also allow access to installed secrets in particular during the development phase. However, they are necessary during development and are usually available to all participants and / or companies during the development process.

[0007] This therefore leads to the inability to ensure that the test secret data is not tampered with or read. But here it is such that the test secret data is the same as the commissioning secret data used later in terms of its structure and form. Therefore, it is also suitable for use in later operations, that is, in the commissioning phase of each system component. Therefore, it is particularly important that the test secret data, which are relatively weak in protection and therefore quite likely to cause damage, are not misused in the commissioning system. It is also serious that the commissioning secret data are introduced into the system components during the research and development phase. The data that was originally classified as very safe can then also be tampered with or read in whole or in part. Therefore, it is no longer confidential and cannot be used. If the error is never noticed or deliberately concealed, the system components that are later transformed into the commissioning phase lose their protection.

[0008] In practice, the security regulations and guidelines are implemented by the people who use the system components in this phase. Therefore, errors, mistakes and intentional tampering cannot be ruled out. Therefore, there is always the following danger in principle, that is, test secrets remain in system components that have been switched to the commissioning phase or commissioning secrets are used on system components that are still in the development phase. All secrets used intentionally or unintentionally in the development phase are likely to be damaged due to the many open interfaces, etc. The danger ultimately leads to higher security risks. This is a serious flaw in existing practices.

[0009] Now, EP 0 735 722 B1 can also be mentioned as a further prior art. This publication describes a key management system for generating, distributing and managing keys, i.e. secret material. A plurality of individual processing components and domains are involved, which are managed accordingly by a central computer or server to ensure the secure exchange of keys between the system partners of the networked system. Summary of the invention

[0010] The object of the present invention is now to specify an improved method for using confidential data in system components having a development phase and a commissioning phase, which method particularly effectively solves the above-mentioned disadvantages with regard to security.

[0011] This object is achieved according to the invention by a method having the features of claim 1, in particular the features of the characterizing part of claim 1. Advantageous embodiments and developments of the method are derived from the dependent claims.

[0012] The method according to the present invention is used for the safe use of secret materials in multiple system components such as control devices, applications, etc. They are components of a networked system and are equipped with secret materials. These system components have a life cycle that includes at least a development phase and a commissioning phase. In order to prevent secret materials from the development phase from being used in the commissioning phase or vice versa reliably and without the risk of human error, the method of the present invention now stipulates multiple steps. They include that all secret materials are at least indirectly securely marked as development materials or commissioning materials. Individual elements that cannot be directly marked, such as keys, can be marked indirectly by corresponding certificates. This can be protected by a password, for example. For example, the corresponding marks with TEST and PROD prove that the secret material is a test secret material or a commissioning secret material. It can be read and verified at any time with the assistance of appropriate encryption measures corresponding to its protection.

[0013] Now, the cryptographically protected mark itself is not enough to prevent the use of test data in real system components in the commissioning phase or, conversely, to prevent the use of commissioning secret data in the development phase. Although the cryptographically protected mark can be used to clearly distinguish the test secret data from the commissioning secret data. However, it is impossible to ensure that the data actually exists in the system component entering the commissioning phase. In order to do this now, it is necessary that the system component can automatically and tamper-proof identify whether it is in the development phase or the commissioning phase.

[0014] The method of the invention uses a binary status flag for this purpose, which indicates the development phase or the commissioning phase. It is implemented in the system component and is protected against illegal manipulation. Through these two measures, it is now possible for each system component to unambiguously identify which secret material is loaded or provided to the component for loading. In addition, the system component can determine its own status based on the status flag, i.e., it knows whether it is in the development phase or the commissioning phase.

[0015] The system component then performs a check in the method according to the invention, in which the current phase, i.e. the development phase or the commissioning phase, is compared with the identification of the secret data. If there is no agreement, i.e. the wrong secret data is installed or provided for installation in the current phase, suitable safety measures are initiated to thus prohibit the use of the "wrong" secret data which is dangerous in terms of safety in the corresponding phase. The safety measures can be designed in various ways here, provided that they can exclude or at least indicate an unsafe state. The details of the safety measures will be further described later.

[0016] The method according to the invention has significant advantages in this regard. On the one hand, it ensures that system components are not operated intentionally or accidentally with commissioning secrets that may not be adequately protected during the development phase. On the other hand, the method ensures that system components are not operated intentionally or accidentally with potentially unsafe test secrets during the commissioning phase. As a result, the system components themselves can now ensure that they are operated securely with correspondingly suitable secrets. Therefore, neither intentional tampering nor inadvertent errors during the production process can prevent the safe operation of the respective system component.

[0017] According to an advantageous design of the invention, both the status flag and the secret material marking can be protected by cryptographic measures. Thus, for example, the marking can be placed in a certificate corresponding to the key and signed accordingly with the private key. The corresponding marking can then be queried and verified at any time with the aid of the associated public key. Instead of such a digital signature, other cryptographic methods suitable for protecting the integrity of the marked secret material, such as a symmetric message authentication code (MAC), can obviously also be used.

[0018] Alternatively or additionally, in particular for the status flags, according to a very advantageous improvement of the method according to the invention there are other possibilities for designing them tamper-proof. These possibilities are essentially based on hardware and, for example, protect the status flags in such a way that they are written to a WORM memory. This WORM (write-once-read-many) memory allows only one change in its state, for example, by setting the value from a development flag with a value of 0 to 1, which corresponds to the commissioning flag. This is relatively safe, but has the following possible disadvantages, namely, that the system component cannot be switched back once it enters the commissioning phase, which may increase the development costs if errors must be eliminated after the initial replacement. As an alternative, the status flag can therefore also be stored in a hardware security module, the so-called HSM (Hardware Security Module), because it is essentially protected against tampering, but can also be changed again by the manufacturer or OEM as needed.

[0019] If such hardware-based protection is not possible for technical reasons, for example because WORM or HSM is not provided or because the system hardware is not managed by the OEM, such as in smartphone applications, then the software-assisted protection proposed above by means of cryptographic measures can also be considered, as already explained. In principle, this can also be combined with a hardware solution in the case of existing WORM memories or HSMs, but in practice this is usually not necessary.

[0020] By means of the two measures of the method according to the invention, i.e. marking the secret material and implementing the status flag, the system component can now reliably identify whether the secret material entered is marked in accordance with the operating phase that occurs. This should ideally be ensured before the secret material is used. For this purpose, the consistency check can be performed directly at different times. According to a particularly advantageous improvement of the method according to the invention, two common approaches are possible here. This means that a consistency check is performed before each secret material is used, i.e., a separate check is performed before the corresponding material, such as a certain key or a certain certificate, is about to be used. Alternatively and preferably, the consistency check is performed once for all secret materials.

[0021] Here, according to a very advantageous design of the method of the present invention, it is stipulated that the consistency check is performed for all secret materials directly when they are provided, that is, when the system components are loaded. The check during the so-called configuration of the secret materials is very safe, because the secret materials are not stored or applied anywhere in the system components before this moment. But in fact this is not always feasible, because the execution of the consistency check requires the system components to be started, that is, it must be running. But depending on the design, the provision or configuration can also be carried out directly in the memory without the need for the system components to start running for this purpose. This can be carried out, for example, when the start-up operation of the system components is based on the existence of secret materials in advance. So in these cases, the consistency check should be carried out as early as possible, that is, especially when or during the initial start-up operation of the system components after the secret materials are provided. Similar situations are also particularly applicable when the secret materials are supplemented, for example, in the scope of system updates, so this is correspondingly applicable to the initial start-up operation after the secret materials expanded, for example, are re-provided.

[0022] As already explained, the status flag is an anti-tampering indicator indicating which stage the system component is in. This can be set, for example, by a competent authority with corresponding authority at an appropriate time during the manufacture of the equipment. However, the status flag set to "put into use" cannot guarantee in practice that the confidential information installed in the system component is actually fully protected. For example, there may also be research and development and debugging interfaces that are intentionally or unintentionally forgotten to be turned off or uninstalled. A very advantageous design of the method of the present invention therefore proposes that if the determination function has indicated that the system component is in the commissioning stage, that is, the status flag is correspondingly set to "put into use", the system component performs a rationality check for the commissioning stage. To this end, the conditions set for the commissioning stage are checked to verify that all requirements for the commissioning stage actually exist and thus ensure the protection of the commissioning confidential information. The generally predetermined conditions checked in the rationality check may, for example, involve a predetermined list of research and development and debugging interfaces, for which it is stipulated that they should no longer be available in the commissioning stage. The check therefore determines whether these interfaces are correspondingly turned off or uninstalled.

[0023] Therefore, the rationality check for the commissioning phase ensures compliance with the conditions for the commissioning mode. It does not work for the development phase, so no check is performed here or this does not lead to the activation of corresponding safety measures, which are then activated when the individual interfaces have not yet been deactivated in the commissioning phase.

[0024] Similar to the consistency check, the rationality check can be performed at different times here. Preferably, it is performed before providing the secret data to the respective system components. It can be ensured by this that the provision or configuration has never been performed before, and the secret data set for the commissioning phase will not enter the potentially unsafe system components at all. However, as explained above, this is not always possible, because the system component must be started for the execution of the rationality check. If the configuration is performed directly in the memory as described above, the rationality check can also be performed as described above before the system component is started for the first time after the secret data is provided or re-provided. It is important at this time that this is performed as early as possible and preferably before the consistency check.

[0025] If the consistency check or the rationality check fails, the system component takes corresponding safety measures. According to a very advantageous embodiment of the method according to the invention, these safety measures include at least one alarm to make the operator of the networked system and / or other system components aware that a "problem" has occurred. If the consistency check for example determines that test secrets were used during the commissioning phase, there is a potentially unsafe state of the system component. In addition to the warnings generated by the system component, other suitable measures such as limiting or completely stopping the use are possible.

[0026] If, for example, the consistency check in the R&D phase and the rationality check in the commissioning phase indicate an error, the system component should assume that the installed secret data is no longer safe. It is impossible to make the once potentially disclosed secret data safe again, because its confidentiality cannot be restored. It can be responded to as a safety measure, for example, in the following manner. First, the provision of secret data that has not yet been (completely) completed, i.e., configuration, can be prohibited or at least interrupted. In addition, the use of potentially damaging secret data can be stopped, for example, by safely deleting it in the system component. If the secret data has been uploaded and one of the checks fails when the system component is first started, a warning can also be output, for example, it is written and / or sent to a log file. If a display is available, this can also be directly displayed. In the production of system components, for example, sound display, etc. can also be imagined. Therefore, the potential installed secret data for commissioning is not safe and must be abandoned accordingly. If the system component is linked to a central server, such as a secret data server, the warning can also include a notification for a central agency.

[0027] In practice, there may also be situations where, despite the potential for corruption of the secret data of a certain system component, it is generally not possible to forgo the use of the installed secret data in other participating system components of the vehicle ecosystem for cost or technical reasons. This may be the case, for example, when the secret data can no longer be replaced in other participating system components. In this case, decommissioning the system component may help to minimize the probability of actual corruption of the used secret data. The installed used secret data is then immediately and securely deleted in the relevant system component, as has already been indicated.

[0028] As already explained, the method can be used in a wide variety of networked systems for various system components. Its use is particularly effective when the networked system is a vehicle ecosystem, since here the corresponding requirements associated with complex development involving multiple parties often make compliance with security guidelines difficult in practice. By implementing the method according to the invention and thus by means of self-testing of the respective system components, the risk of potential security breaches can be significantly reduced. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] Further advantageous designs result from the embodiments described in detail below with reference to the figures.

[0030] The single FIGURE shows a schematic diagram of a possible embodiment of the method according to the invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] A possible embodiment of the method according to the invention is shown in the single figure. The method ensures that a system component SK is not operated with incorrect secret data KM in the test mode, neither intentionally nor accidentally. The aim is to ensure the safe use of secret data KM both in the development phase and in the commissioning phase of the system component SK, which is to be part of the vehicle ecosystem. The system component SK can be, for example, a vehicle, a separate control device, an external device, an OEM application, for example a backend server of an OEM, etc. The system components SK are all equipped with secret data KM and have a life cycle consisting of at least two phases, namely, a development phase and a commissioning phase.

[0032] All secret materials KM are generated on the secret material server KMS in the first step 1 and are marked accordingly and signed with the private key PrivKey of the secret material server KMS in the second step. The corresponding mark M proves that the secret material KM is a test secret material or a commissioning secret material. It can be used at any time with the public key PubKey of the secret material server KMS. KMS was verified with the assistance of.

[0033] Therefore, the drawing shows the protection of the mark by means of encryption method. Specifically, this tamper-proof syntactic mark can be carried out, for example, in an X.509 certificate by appending to one of the subfields of the X.509 subject field, by appending the string TEST for the research and development phase or PROD for the commissioning phase. As an alternative, special extensions such as TEST and PROD with corresponding content can also be listed and adopted for this purpose in this certificate. Therefore, the private key PrivKey to which it belongs is also indirectly, that is, indirectly marked by the mark M of the certificate itself. Secret material KM that is not related to the certificate, such as symmetric secret material, can also be associated with a mark M, which is meaningfully TEST and PROD again, based on the certificate. Here, the connection is represented as follows by a double-line symbol. The result is then signed by a central agency, for example, the secret material server KMS. The correctness of the certificate or signature SIGN can be verified at any time using the issuer's public key PubKey KMS The signature M of the respective secret data KM can be securely determined by checking the signature M. This check can also be done securely at any time during the operation of the system component SK in which the signed secret data KM is installed, for example.

[0034] The third step is now to provide the secret material KM associated with the corresponding feature M. The secret material KM is signed accordingly and now enters the system component SK during configuration and is stored accordingly in the memory there. For this purpose, a hardware security module HSM is used, in which a status flag is also stored, which is represented by "FLAG" in the drawing of the figure. The status flag FLAG is thus protected against tampering here by the HSM and its storage in the HSM. As explained above, alternative methods such as WORM memory and / or encryption methods are also conceivable.

[0035] Then, in the fourth step, a determination function is performed, whereby the system component SK can determine in which phase it is in, i.e., in the commissioning phase or in the development phase. For this purpose, FLAG is evaluated. If, according to the determination function, it is determined that the system component SK is in the commissioning phase, a rationality check is performed in the fifth step. Within the scope of the rationality check, it is checked in the system component whether all predetermined interfaces implemented only for development are switched off and / or uninstalled to ensure that no unwanted, impermissible access to the system component SK can be made. If the result of the rationality check is also "yes", a consistency check is performed in the sixth step. If the determination function indicates that the system component SK is not in the commissioning phase, but in the development phase, the fifth step is skipped.

[0036] As part of the consistency check, it is now checked whether the identification M of the secret data KM matches the phase detected by the determination function. In other words, if the system component SK is in the development phase, the identification M of the secret data KM should be "TEST". If the system component SK is in the commissioning phase, the identification M of the secret data KM should be "PROD". If this is the case, the appropriate secret data for the respective phase is present in the system component SK. The method then continues and the system component can begin the operation intended for it within the networked vehicle ecosystem.

[0037] If it is now determined in the rationality check of the fifth step (assuming that this step is executed, that is, the system component SK is in the commissioning phase) that these interfaces have not been uninstalled or closed, then the safety measures can be started immediately, especially before the consistency check. If the result of the rationality check is "yes", that is, all the prerequisites for the commissioning phase in which it is located are met within the system component SK, then a consistency check is also performed here as described above. The result of the consistency check can now also indicate that there is an error. Therefore, for example, it is possible to use potentially damaging test secrets in the commissioning phase, or it is possible to use commissioning secrets in the research and development phase. Commissioning secrets should not be used in the research and development phase, which may be damaged because the confidentiality of the secret data KM cannot be restored once it is exposed. Therefore, in these two cases of unsuccessful consistency checks, safety measures are also started, which basically do not need to be distinguished from the safety measures during the rationality check.

[0038] The consistency check and rationality check should be directly carried out when configuring if possible. If it is determined that the rationality check or the consistency check is abnormal in this stage, then suitable safety measures can be started, for example, an alarm can be output, or it can be issued and stored in the network, and the configuration process can preferably be interrupted. If the confidential information KM has been input, then it is reliably deleted. If the consistency check and the rationality check cannot be performed when configuring, because for example, the configuration is carried out when the system component SK has not yet started to run, then the rationality check and the consistency check should also be carried out as soon as possible. In this case, this can be carried out when the system component is started to run, i.e. preferably in its first start-up process. Here, corresponding safety measures can also be started when the rationality check and / or the consistency check are abnormal, and it can additionally stipulate in this case: deactivate the system component SK or at least can only run the system component SK very significantly and limitedly.

Claims

1. A method for securely using secret material (KM) in a plurality of system components (SK) of a networked system, the system components being provided with the secret material (KM), wherein: The life cycle of each of the system components (SK) includes at least a research and development phase and a commissioning phase. Its characteristics are: All confidential information (KM) is at least indirectly marked as security information (M) as research and development information or deployment information. Each of said system components (KM) comprises a binary status flag (FLAG) which indicates which stage the system component (SK) is in and which is protected from illegal tampering, Each of the system components (SK) ascertains by means of a determination function (4) which phase it is in, upon which each of the system components (SK) performs a check (6) in the context of which the current phase is compared with a signature (M) of the secret material (KM), wherein a security measure is initiated if the phase and the signature (M) do not correspond. The consistency check is performed in the system component (SK) after the secret data (KM) has been made available or when the secret data (KM) is made available to the respective system component (SK) during the initial start-up of the system component (SK). If the determination function indicates that the system component (SK) is in the commissioning phase, the system component (SK) performs a plausibility check for the commissioning phase, for which conditions set for the commissioning phase are checked, wherein a safety measure is initiated if at least one of the predetermined conditions is not met, The predetermined condition includes that all R&D and debugging interfaces are shut down or uninstalled.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The identification (M) of the secret data (KM) and / or the status flag (FLAG) are protected by cryptographic measures.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The status flag (FLAG) is protected by being implemented in a memory that can be written only once or in a hardware security module (HSM).

4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The consistency check is carried out within the system component (SK) before each use of the secret data (KM) or once for all secret data (KM).

5. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The plausibility check is carried out in the system component (SK) before the initial consistency check and after the secret data (KM) has been made available or before the secret data (KM) has been made available to the respective system component (SK).

6. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The safety measures include at least one alarm.

7. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The security measures include interrupting or preventing the provision of the confidential data (KM), wherein any inappropriate confidential data (KM) that may have been entered in the system component (SK) are securely deleted.

8. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The safety measure comprises: stopping operation of the system component (SK).

9. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: Use the vehicle ecosystem as a connected system.