Wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, device and system

Abstract

The present invention discloses a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, device and system, the method comprising receiving first registration information sent by a second node, and sending second registration information to the second node, the first registration information comprising the identity of the second node and the first function code hash value of the second node; the second registration information comprising the identity of the first node and the first function code hash value of the first node; generating a random number, reading the identity, function code and current timestamp of the first node, generating an authentication instruction; sending the authentication instruction to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to a signal that the second node successfully completes the authentication verification, obtaining a temporary session key negotiated with the second node, and completing wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation. The present invention can meet the functionality and security required by wireless sensor networks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of device identity authentication in a network environment, and in particular relates to a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, device and system. Background Art

[0002] Currently, wireless sensor networks have been widely used in various scenarios, and most of the sensor nodes are deployed in unattended environments. The real-time data collected by sensor nodes are often transmitted to gateway nodes through wireless channels. Due to the openness of wireless channels, malicious users may easily intercept, modify or even delete the transmitted information on unsafe public channels. On the other hand, the real-time data collected by sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks is very sensitive, often related to user privacy and even national security. Therefore, authorized access to sensor nodes and secure transmission of collected data have always been important topics worthy of in-depth research in wireless sensor networks, which need to meet the security requirements and goals of data confidentiality, integrity and validity.

[0003] For resource-constrained systems such as wireless sensor networks, the use of lightweight security protocols is an effective way to solve their security problems. The lightweight authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol is a key security technology to ensure real-time access to data and is the core security requirement of wireless sensor network systems. This method is used to solve the identity authentication and access control problems of users in resource-constrained systems. While completing the identity authentication, it establishes a session key for the subsequent secure access of both communicating parties to ensure that the target data can only be securely obtained by legitimate objects. Many scholars have conducted in-depth research on the AKA protocol and achieved fruitful results. However, since the application environment of wireless sensor networks is usually complex and changeable, and sensor nodes have the characteristics of limited resources, traditional mature authentication schemes cannot be directly applied to them. It is necessary to construct an AKA protocol suitable for wireless sensor network environments.

[0004] In recent years, researchers have proposed a series of AKA protocols for wireless sensor networks and their application scenarios, but these protocols generally have shortcomings such as low efficiency, poor security, and imperfect functions. Therefore, exploring a secure and efficient AKA protocol for wireless sensor networks has important theoretical significance and engineering application value. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, device and system, which can meet the functionality and security required by the wireless sensor network.

[0006] In order to achieve the above technical objectives and the above technical effects, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions:

[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, applied to a first node, comprising:

[0008] Receive first registration information sent by the second node, and send second registration information to the second node, the first registration information including the identity of the second node and the hash value of the first function code of the second node; the second registration information including the identity of the first node and the hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0009] Generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction;

[0010] The authentication instruction is sent to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to the signal that the second node successfully completes the authentication verification, a temporary session key negotiated with the second node is obtained to complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0011] Optionally, the authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp.

[0012] Optionally, when the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC Sensor =h(FC Sensor ), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node when registering.

[0013] Optionally, the authentication instruction is obtained by:

[0014] Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1;

[0015] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' Sensor =h(FC' Sensor );

[0016] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Posh ⊕ h (ID Sensor ||HFC′ Sensor ||TS1);

[0017] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1);

[0018] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0019] Optionally, sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps:

[0020] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0021] Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||TS1) and V'=h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1);

[0022] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0023] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0024] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K';

[0025] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node;

[0026] After receiving the authentication command {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0027] The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0028] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0029] Optionally, when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC APIndicates the function code of the access node during registration.

[0030] Optionally, the authentication instruction is obtained by:

[0031] Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1;

[0032] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP );

[0033] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Posh ⊕ h (ID AP ||HFC′ AP ||TS1);

[0034] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1);

[0035] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0036] Optionally, sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps:

[0037] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0038] Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||TS1) and V'=h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1);

[0039] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sinkand the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0040] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos');

[0041] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K';

[0042] Generate an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, and send the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} to the access node;

[0043] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0044] The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and

[0045] ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'), K = IEA (IDF', Pos), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0046] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0047] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, applied to a second node, comprising:

[0048] Receiving second registration information sent by the first node, and sending the first registration information to the first node, the first registration information including the identity of the second node and the hash value of the first function code of the second node; the second registration information including the identity of the first node and the hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0049] Receiving an authentication instruction, wherein the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node;

[0050] An authentication verification is performed based on the received authentication instruction. After the authentication verification is successfully completed, a temporary session key negotiated with the first node is obtained, and the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation are completed.

[0051] Optionally, the authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp.

[0052] Optionally, when the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC Sensor =h(FC Sensor ), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node when registering.

[0053] Optionally, the authentication instruction is obtained by:

[0054] Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1;

[0055] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' Sensor =h(FC' Sensor );

[0056] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID Sensor ||HFC′ Sesor ||TS1);

[0057] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1);

[0058] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0059] Optionally, performing authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps:

[0060] The sink node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0061] Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||TS1) and V'=h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1);

[0062] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0063] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0064] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K';

[0065] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node, so that the sensor node performs the following operations:

[0066] After receiving the authentication command {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0067] The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0068] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0069] Optionally, when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration.

[0070] Optionally, the authentication instruction is obtained by:

[0071] Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1;

[0072] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP );

[0073] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID AP ||HFC′ AP ||TS1);

[0074] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1);

[0075] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0076] Optionally, performing authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps:

[0077] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0078] Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||TS1) and V'=h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1);

[0079] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0080] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0081] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K';

[0082] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the access node, so that the access node performs the following operations:

[0083] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0084] The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0085] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0086] In a third aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, applied to a first node, comprising:

[0087] A registration module, configured to receive first registration information sent by a second node, and send second registration information to the second node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; and the second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0088] An authentication instruction generation module, used to generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction;

[0089] The authentication and negotiation module is used to send the authentication instruction to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to the signal that the second node successfully completes the authentication verification, obtain the temporary session key negotiated with the second node, and complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0090] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, applied to a second node, comprising:

[0091] A registration module, configured to receive second registration information sent by the first node, and send the first registration information to the first node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; and the second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of a first function code of the first node;

[0092] An authentication instruction receiving module receives an authentication instruction, wherein the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node;

[0093] The authentication and negotiation module is used to perform authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction. After successfully completing the authentication verification, the temporary session key negotiated with the first node is obtained to complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0094] In a fifth aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0095] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0096] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of the first aspects.

[0097] In a sixth aspect, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0098] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0099] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of the second aspects.

[0100] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0101] Based on the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, device and system proposed in the present invention, there is no need to store shared keys in advance between participating nodes, and a random number is used to generate a session key during each authentication process. Therefore, the session key is dynamic and randomly changed during the authentication process. Even if an attacker obtains the session key of the current communication, it is impossible to obtain the previous session key, ensuring that the confidentiality of the previous communication will not be affected. Therefore, the present invention can achieve forward security.

[0102] In the present invention, after identity authentication is achieved, the communicating nodes negotiate a session key for protecting the secure communication between the two nodes. The session key is obtained by applying a random number to the identification field through an extraction algorithm, and any third party cannot obtain the session key in advance. Therefore, the present invention can achieve session key negotiation.

[0103] The present invention adopts the timestamp and random number method to resist replay attacks. In each session, the nodes of both communicating parties generate random numbers and random numbers respectively, which are used to ensure the freshness and independence of exchanged messages. In addition, there is a timestamp freshness detection mechanism for the nodes of both communicating parties, so even if the attacker replays the previous message, it cannot pass the authentication. Therefore, the present invention can resist replay attacks.

[0104] In the present invention, only the identity and function code are stored in the node, and no shared key is stored. Even if the attacker tampers with the function code, the integrity of the function code of the node will be verified during the authentication stage, so that it cannot pass the identity authentication. Therefore, the present invention can resist node capture attacks.

[0105] In the present invention, only the identity and function code are stored in the node, and the key information in the public channel is transmitted through encryption. Even if the attacker obtains the message, it is impossible to forge legal information and pass the identity authentication. Therefore, the present invention can resist the node counterfeiting attack.

[0106] The temporary session key of the present invention is generated by a special extraction algorithm based on a random number and an identification field, and an attacker cannot obtain the random number and the identification field, and it is even more impossible to calculate the session key of the current communication. Therefore, the present invention can resist online key guessing attacks.

[0107] In the present invention, the same secret value is not stored between participating nodes. In addition, when the session is completed, the participating nodes do not need to update any information. Therefore, the present invention can resist desynchronization attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0108] In order to make the content of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below based on specific embodiments and in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0109] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the registration phase process of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0110] Figure 2 The figure is a flowchart of the authentication and key negotiation phase according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0111] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0112] The application principle of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0113] Example 1

[0114] An embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, which is applied to a first node and includes:

[0115] Receive first registration information sent by the second node, and send second registration information to the second node, the first registration information including the identity of the second node and the hash value of the first function code of the second node; the second registration information including the identity of the first node and the hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0116] Generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction;

[0117] The authentication instruction is sent to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to the signal that the second node successfully completes the authentication verification, a temporary session key negotiated with the second node is obtained to complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0118] In a specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, when the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC SinkIndicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC Sensor =h(FC Sensor ), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node when registering. Figure 1 As shown in Figure 1, the registration process between the sensor node and the sink node is:

[0119] The sensor / aggregation node randomly generates its own identity ID (i.e. device number) based on its own UID Sensor and ID Sink ;

[0120] The sensor / sink node reads each function code (FC) and calculates HFC respectively. Sensor =h(FC Sensor ) and HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), then HFC Sensor and HFC Sink Send to the other party through a secure channel;

[0121] Sensor node storage ID Sensor 、ID Sink and HFC Sink to FLASH;

[0122] Sink node storage ID Sink ,ID Sensor ,HFC Sensor to FLASH to complete the registration process.

[0123] The authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp; Figure 2 As shown, the authentication instruction is obtained by the following method:

[0124] Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1;

[0125] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' Sensor =h(FC' Sensor );

[0126] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor nodeSensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID Sensor ||HFC′ Sensor ||TS1), || represents a join operation, and ⊕ represents an XOR operation;

[0127] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1);

[0128] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated for sending to the aggregation node.

[0129] The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps:

[0130] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0131] Get the current timestamp TS1 of the sink node * , if |TS1 * -TS1|<ΔT, it means that the current timestamp TS1 meets the freshness verification requirements, and ΔT is the maximum transmission delay;

[0132] Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||TS1) and V'=h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1);

[0133] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0134] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0135] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K';

[0136] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node;

[0137] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2. Specifically: Get the current timestamp TS2 of the sensor node * , if |TS2 * -TS2|<ΔT, it means that the current timestamp TS1 meets the freshness verification requirements, and ΔT is the maximum transmission delay;

[0138] The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0139] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0140] In another specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FCSink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration.

[0141] The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method:

[0142] Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1;

[0143] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP );

[0144] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID AP ||HFC′ AP ||TS1);

[0145] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1);

[0146] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0147] The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps:

[0148] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0149] Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP, calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||TS1) and V'=h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1);

[0150] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0151] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos');

[0152] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K';

[0153] Generate an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, and send the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} to the access node;

[0154] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0155] The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0156] If ID'Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0157] Example 2

[0158] An embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, which is applied to a second node and includes:

[0159] (1) receiving second registration information sent by the first node, and sending first registration information to the first node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; and the second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0160] (2) receiving an authentication instruction, where the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code, and current timestamp of the first node;

[0161] (3) Perform authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction. After successfully completing the authentication verification, obtain the temporary session key negotiated with the first node, and complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0162] In a specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, when the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC Sensor =h(FC Sensor ), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node when registering. Figure 1 As shown in Figure 1, the registration process between the sensor node and the sink node is:

[0163] The sensor / aggregation node randomly generates its own identity ID (i.e. device number) based on its own UID Sensor and ID Sink ;

[0164] The sensor / sink node reads each function code (FC) and calculates HFC respectively.Sensor =h(FC Sensor ) and HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), then HFC Sensor and HFC Sink Send to the other party through a secure channel;

[0165] Sensor node storage ID Sensor 、ID Sink and HFC Sink to FLASH;

[0166] Sink node storage ID Sink ,ID Sensor ,HFC Sensor to FLASH to complete the registration process.

[0167] The authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp; the authentication instruction is obtained by the following method:

[0168] Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1;

[0169] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' Sensor =h(FC' Sensor );

[0170] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID Sensor ||HFC′ Sensor ||TS1), || represents a join operation, and ⊕ represents an XOR operation;

[0171] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1);

[0172] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0173] The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps:

[0174] Based on the received authentication instruction, the sink node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 and performs the following steps:

[0175] Get the current timestamp TS1 of the sink node * , if |TS1 * -TS1|<ΔT, it means that the current timestamp TS1 meets the freshness verification requirements, and ΔT is the maximum transmission delay;

[0176] Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||TS1) and V'=h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1);

[0177] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0178] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm;

[0179] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (ID Sink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm; SK=K';

[0180] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node, so that the sensor node performs the following operations:

[0181] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; specifically: obtain the current timestamp TS2 of the sensor node * , if |TS2* -TS2|<ΔT, it means that the current timestamp TS1 meets the freshness verification requirements, and ΔT is the maximum transmission delay;

[0182] The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0183] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0184] In another specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes an identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration.

[0185] The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method:

[0186] Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1;

[0187] Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP);

[0188] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, MPos = Pos ⊕ h (ID AP ||HFC′ AP ||TS1);

[0189] Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1);

[0190] Based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V, an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} is generated.

[0191] The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps:

[0192] The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps:

[0193] Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', Pos'=MPos⊕h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||TS1) and V'=h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1);

[0194] If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink );

[0195] Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos');

[0196] Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, M = R ⊕ h (IDSink ||HFC′ Sink ||TS2), APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K';

[0197] Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the access node, so that the access node performs the following operations:

[0198] After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2;

[0199] The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), R′=M⊕h(ID Sink ||HFC Sink ||TS2), IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'), K = IEA(IDF',Pos);

[0200] If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

[0201] Example 3

[0202] Based on the same inventive concept as that of Embodiment 1, an embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, which is applied to a first node and includes:

[0203] A registration module, configured to receive first registration information sent by a second node, and send second registration information to the second node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; and the second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of the first function code of the first node;

[0204] An authentication instruction generation module, used to generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction;

[0205] The authentication and negotiation module is used to send the authentication instruction to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to the signal that the second node successfully completes the authentication verification, obtain the temporary session key negotiated with the second node, and complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0206] The rest are the same as in Example 1.

[0207] Example 4

[0208] Based on the same inventive concept as that of Embodiment 2, an embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, which is applied to a second node and includes:

[0209] A registration module, configured to receive second registration information sent by the first node, and send the first registration information to the first node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; and the second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of a first function code of the first node;

[0210] An authentication instruction receiving module receives an authentication instruction, wherein the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node;

[0211] The authentication and negotiation module is used to perform authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction, and after successfully completing the authentication verification, obtain the temporary session key negotiated with the first node to complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation.

[0212] The rest are the same as in Example 2.

[0213] Example 5

[0214] Based on the same inventive concept as that of Embodiment 1, an embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0215] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0216] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of the embodiments 1.

[0217] Example 6

[0218] Based on the same inventive concept as that of Embodiment 2, an embodiment of the present invention provides a wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0219] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0220] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of the second embodiments.

[0221] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented in one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that contain computer-usable program code.

[0222] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0223] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0224] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the computer or other programmable device. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0225] The embodiments of the present invention are described above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but the present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned specific implementation methods. The above-mentioned specific implementation methods are merely illustrative and not restrictive. Under the enlightenment of the present invention, ordinary technicians in this field can also make many forms without departing from the scope of protection of the purpose of the present invention and the claims, which all fall within the protection of the present invention.

[0226] The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the present invention and the advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention to be protected. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, characterized in that: Applied to the first node, including: Receive first registration information sent by the second node, and send second registration information to the second node, the first registration information including the identity of the second node and the hash value of the first function code of the second node; the second registration information including the identity of the first node and the hash value of the first function code of the first node; Generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction; Sending the authentication instruction to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; in response to a signal from the second node that the authentication verification is successfully completed, obtaining a temporary session key negotiated with the second node, and completing wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation; When the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC S ink=h(FC S ink), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sens and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC S ensor=h(FC S ensor), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' S ensor=h(FC' S ensor); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K', LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node; After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; Enables the sensor node to read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K=IEA(IDF',Pos); if ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed, and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K; When the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC S ink=h(FC S ink), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP ); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Po' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K', LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm; Generate an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, and send the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} to the access node; After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

2. A wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp.

3. A wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method, applied to a second node, characterized in that: include: Receiving second registration information sent by the first node, and sending the first registration information to the first node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; The second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of a first function code of the first node; Receiving an authentication instruction, wherein the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node; Perform authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction, and after successfully completing the authentication verification, obtain the temporary session key negotiated with the first node, and complete the wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation; When the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC S ink=h(FC S ink), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sens and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC S ensor=h(FC S ensor), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' S ensor=h(FC' S ensor); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps: Based on the received authentication instruction, the sink node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 and performs the following steps: Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K'; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node; so that the sensor node performs the following operations: After receiving the authentication command {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated; when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP ); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Po' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K'; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the access node, so that the access node performs the following operations: After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

4. A wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The authentication instruction includes: a pseudo-random number, an authentication parameter and a current timestamp.

5. A wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, applied to a first node, characterized in that: include: A registration module, configured to receive first registration information sent by a second node, and send second registration information to the second node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; The second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of a first function code of the first node; An authentication instruction generation module, used to generate a random number, read the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node, and generate an authentication instruction; An authentication and negotiation module, configured to send the authentication instruction to the second node, so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction; In response to a signal from the second node that the authentication verification is successfully completed, a temporary session key negotiated with the second node is obtained to complete wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation; When the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sens and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC S ensor=h(FC S ensor), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' Sensor =h(FC' Sensor ); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the sensor node's ID Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K', LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node; After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; Enables the sensor node to read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'), K=IEA(IDF',Pos); if ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed, and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K; When the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC Sink =h(FC Sink ), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP ); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The step of sending the authentication instruction to the second node so that the second node performs authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction comprises the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Po' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), SK=K', LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm; Generate an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, and send the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} to the access node; After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

6. A wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement device, applied to a second node, characterized in that: include: A registration module, configured to receive second registration information sent by the first node, and send the first registration information to the first node, wherein the first registration information includes an identity identifier of the second node and a hash value of a first function code of the second node; The second registration information includes an identity identifier of the first node and a hash value of a first function code of the first node; An authentication instruction receiving module receives an authentication instruction, wherein the authentication instruction is generated by the first node by generating a random number, reading the identity identifier, function code and current timestamp of the first node; An authentication and negotiation module, used to perform authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction, and after successfully completing the authentication verification, obtain a temporary session key negotiated with the first node, and complete wireless sensor network authentication and key negotiation; When the first node is a sensor node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node. Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC S ink=h(FC S ink), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the sensor node Sens and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , HFC S ensor=h(FC S ensor), FC Sensor Indicates the function code of the sensor node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the sensor node's identity ID Sensor 、Current function code FC' Sensor and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , HFC' S ensor=h(FC' S ensor); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the sensor node's identity ID Sensor , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID Sensor ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps: Based on the received authentication instruction, the sink node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 and performs the following steps: Read the ID of the sensor node Sensor and the first function code hash value HFC of the sensor node Sensor , calculate the second random number Pos' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID Sensor ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF = h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K'; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the sensor node; so that the sensor node performs the following operations: After receiving the authentication command {M, APS, TS2}, the sensor node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The sensor node reads the ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the sensor node identification field IDF', the sensor node secret key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID Sensor ||HFC Sensor ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated; when the first node is an access node and the second node is a sink node, the first registration information includes the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , HFC S ink=h(FC S ink), h() indicates hash calculation, FC Sink Indicates the function code of the aggregation node during registration; the second registration information includes the identity ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , HFC AP =h(FC AP ), FC AP Indicates the function code of the access node during registration; The authentication instruction is obtained by the following method: Generate the first random number Pos and read the identity ID of the access node AP 、Current function code FC' AP and the current timestamp TS1; Calculate the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , HFC' AP =h(FC' AP ); Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the hash value HFC' of the second function code of the access node AP , calculate the first pseudo-random number MPos, Based on the first random number Pos, the current timestamp TS1, and the identity ID of the access node AP , calculate the first authentication parameter V, V = h(ID AP ||Pos||TS1); Generate an authentication instruction {MPos, V, TS1} based on the first pseudo-random number MPos, the current timestamp TS1 and the first authentication parameter V; The authentication verification based on the received authentication instruction includes the following steps: The authentication instruction is sent to the aggregation node, so that the aggregation node verifies the freshness of the current timestamp TS1 based on the received authentication instruction and performs the following steps: Read the ID of the access node AP and the first function code hash value HFC of the access node AP , calculate the second random number Po' and the second authentication parameter V', and V' = h(ID AP ||Pos'||TS1); If V'=V, read the identity ID of the sink node Sink and the current function code FC' Sink , and calculate the second function code hash value HFC' of the sink node Sink =h(FC' Sink ); Generate a third random number R, calculate the sink node identification field IDF and the sink node secret key K', IDF=h(ID Sink ||HFC' Sink ||R), K'=IEA(IDF,Pos'), IEA represents the identification extraction algorithm; Get the current timestamp TS2, calculate the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the temporary session key SK, APS=LEA(ID Sink ||Pos'||TS2,K'), LEA represents lightweight encryption algorithm, SK=K'; Based on the third authentication parameter M, the encrypted data APS and the current timestamp TS2, an authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is generated, and the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2} is sent to the access node, so that the access node performs the following operations: After receiving the authentication instruction {M, APS, TS2}, the access node verifies the freshness of the timestamp TS2; The access node reads the identity ID of the aggregation node Sink and the hash value of the first function code HFC of the sink node Sink , calculate the fourth random number R', the access node identification field IDF', the access node key K', and ID' Sink ||Pos'||TS2=LDA(APS,K), LDA represents lightweight decryption algorithm, IDF'=h(ID AP ||HFC AP ||R'),K=IEA(IDF',Pos); If ID' Sink =ID Sink , and Pos'=Pos, it means that the authentication verification is successfully completed and the temporary session key SK is calculated, SK=K.

7. A wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, characterized in that: including storage media and processors; The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2.

8. A wireless sensor network authentication and key agreement system, characterized in that: including storage media and processors; The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of claims 3 to 4.

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