A method, system and device for security and privacy protection for wireless perception

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of security and privacy protection method, system and equipment for wireless perception, belong to wireless perception security technical field.Received perception wireless frame, utilize the same converted waveform parameter to carry out channel estimation and upload result to data processing module, judge whether current is in the validity period of user execution gesture password;Perception system carries out gesture password consistency test to the case not in validity period.The application is aimed at the attack of attacker active sending perception signal attack, attacker only executes gesture attack and eavesdrops the gesture information of user based on wireless signal perception, defense is carried out in physical layer to protect the security of gesture recognition system and user privacy.The application does not need any data for offline training, and the calculation complexity is small, without transmitting waveform parameter in air interface, higher security, can be flexibly used in existing wireless perception system, without modifying the process specified in standard protocol, with the compatibility of standard related protocol.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of wireless sensing security technology, and relates to a method, system and device for security and privacy protection for wireless sensing. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of wireless technology, transmitting information bits is no longer the only function of wireless signals. In next-generation wireless networks, signals must not only have communication capabilities but also meet the needs of perception. Because changes in the time, frequency, and Doppler of received signals can capture the characteristics and dynamics of objects, wireless signals are increasingly used to perceive the surrounding environment and identify human activities. Contactless gesture recognition is an important component of human-computer interaction, and gesture recognition control functions have been added to fields such as smart homes, smart wearable devices, smart cars, and VR / AR. In early wearable gesture recognition technology, gesture recognition required wearing dedicated sensor devices to collect information for identification. This method was costly and significantly impacted the user experience. Gesture recognition can also be achieved by collecting video data of gesture movements using video devices. However, this method is easily affected by lighting conditions; when the lighting is unstable, the recognition accuracy decreases, and there is also the issue of potential privacy leaks. As one of the important applications in the field of perception, contactless recognition systems have attracted increasing attention from researchers. For example, IEEE 802.11 established the 802.11bf working group for WLAN sensing as early as 2020. Wireless communication networks have become an indispensable part of people's daily lives. Gesture recognition methods based on wireless signals do not require the installation of cameras or sensors. By utilizing the fluctuations in channel state information (CSI) caused by hand movements, users can make devices perform related operations, such as opening doors and turning on lights, by completing corresponding gestures. It has many advantages such as low cost, convenient deployment, no need to carry equipment, and no impact from ambient lighting conditions.

[0003] However, due to the openness of wireless channels and the broadcast nature of signals, the sensing capabilities of wireless signals also bring new security challenges to wireless networks. On the one hand, since attackers can estimate the channel using publicly available training sequences without decoding the frame content, unauthenticated devices can steal users' private information, such as user-set gestures, by listening to channel state information, leading to privacy leaks. On the other hand, attackers can actively launch attacks to mislead the sensing system to achieve their own goals, such as deceiving a smart home system into performing actions like opening a door when no one is in the room. Most current gesture recognition methods are independent of factors such as device placement and the direction of the person performing the gesture; however, this also makes attacks on gesture recognition systems easier for attackers. Therefore, while facilitating people's lives, a method for protecting the security and privacy of wireless sensing gesture systems urgently needs to be proposed.

[0004] Existing protection methods focus more on passive attacks against wireless sensing systems, namely, eavesdropping on users' sensory privacy. Most of the proposed solutions, such as using smart reflective surfaces (IRS), require third-party devices to provide protection, which increases the difficulty of deployment and costs. At the same time, gesture recognition systems face different attacks than other sensing systems, namely attacks that only involve attackers performing gestures. Currently, there is a great lack of protection methods specifically for attacking gesture recognition systems. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to solve the problems of insecurity and lack of privacy in existing gesture recognition systems, and to provide a method, system and device for security and privacy protection in wireless sensing.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention employs the following technical solution:

[0007] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing, comprising the following steps:

[0008] Obtain the first waveform parameter sequence based on the first key, and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into the first waveform parameter;

[0009] Obtain the second waveform parameter sequence based on the second key, and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into the second waveform parameters;

[0010] Channel estimation is performed based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame, and the third sensing radio frame to obtain channel state information.

[0011] The validity of channel state information is determined, and the channel state information is valid within the validity period of the user's gesture password to achieve wireless sensing security and privacy protection.

[0012] Preferably, the derived first key and second key are known keys, and the keys are updated with each signal interaction.

[0013] Preferably, the length of the selected first waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the first key space;

[0014] The length of the selected second waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the second key space.

[0015] Preferably, the waveform of the first sensing wireless frame uses parametric waveform modulation, and the parameters used are the first waveform parameters;

[0016] The first sensing wireless frame is a preamble frame, which consists of a cyclic prefix, a preamble, and a protection timestamp.

[0017] Preferably, the method for determining the validity of channel state information using a gesture recognition system is as follows:

[0018] If the user's gesture password is valid, the corresponding gesture operation will be executed directly.

[0019] If the user's gesture password is not valid, gesture recognition is performed based on the channel information, and the recognition result is compared with the pre-stored gesture password set by the user. If the gesture passwords are the same, the subsequent recognized gesture is executed, and the operation corresponding to the gesture is performed. If the gesture passwords are different, the matching fails.

[0020] Preferably, the validity period of the gesture password is a time preset by the system; gesture recognition is performed based on channel status information; and the gesture password is a preset gesture password.

[0021] Preferably, wireless sensing attack methods include attackers launching attacks by actively sending sensing signals, attackers eavesdropping to obtain users' gesture information, and attackers launching attacks through their own gestures.

[0022] This invention proposes a wireless sensing-based security and privacy protection system, comprising:

[0023] The first waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire a first waveform parameter sequence according to a first key and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into a first waveform parameter.

[0024] The second waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire a second waveform parameter sequence according to a second key and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into second waveform parameters.

[0025] A channel state information acquisition module is used to perform channel estimation based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame, and the third sensing radio frame to obtain channel state information.

[0026] The channel state information discrimination module is used to determine the validity of the channel state information. The channel state information is valid within the validity period of the user's gesture password, thus realizing wireless sensing security and privacy protection.

[0027] A computer device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, the processor executing the computer program to implement steps of a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing.

[0028] A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements steps of a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing.

[0029] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0030] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing. It employs a derived key from the protocol as the key for generating waveform parameter sequences. This ensures consistency of waveform parameters between the transmitter and receiver, and eliminates the need for over-the-air transmission, increasing parameter confidentiality and security. Furthermore, the protocol's derived key changes with each sensing frame transmission, guaranteeing consistent waveform parameter changes. Using parameterized waveforms and gesture passwords not only protects user privacy but also prevents attackers from actively sending deceptive signals to trick the gesture recognition system and avoids attacks by repeating the same gesture. By encrypting the signal with waveform parameters, eavesdroppers cannot estimate the correct channel information from the received signal and cannot know the user's actual gesture. If an attacker actively sends a deceptive signal, the receiving device cannot demodulate it due to the lack of waveform parameters during modulation, thus failing to recognize the gesture. Simultaneously, the use of a gesture password for device activation and a password expiration period ensures that attackers' attempts to attack by repeating the same gesture will fail, thus solving the security and privacy problems of the gesture recognition system at the signal level. This method does not require data training and is a lightweight, computationally inexpensive, highly reliable, and robust protection scheme.

[0031] Furthermore, by using the existing derived key as the parameter sequence, only simple calculations and transformations are required. There is no need to transmit the key over the air interface. At the same time, the waveform parameter sequence can be updated along with the key updates, and no changes to the sensing-related processes are required. This is a protection scheme with good security and standard compatibility.

[0032] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection system for wireless sensing. By dividing the system into a first waveform parameter acquisition module, a second waveform parameter acquisition module, a channel state information acquisition module, and a channel state information discrimination module, it achieves wireless sensing security and privacy protection. The modular approach ensures that each module is independent, facilitating unified management of all modules. Attached Figure Description

[0033] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0034] Figure 1This is a flowchart of the security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing according to the present invention.

[0035] Figure 2 This is a detailed flowchart of the overall security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing according to the present invention.

[0036] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the key derivation process of the IEEE 802.11az standard of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the DAFT modulation system framework of the present invention.

[0038] Figure 5 This is the first attack mode targeted by the present invention.

[0039] Figure 6 This is the second attack mode targeted by the present invention.

[0040] Figure 7 This is the third attack mode targeted by the present invention.

[0041] Figure 8 This is a diagram of the wireless sensing security and privacy protection system of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0042] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0043] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the invention.

[0044] It should be noted that similar labels and letters in the following figures indicate similar items. Therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.

[0045] In the description of the embodiments of the present invention, it should be noted that if terms such as "upper," "lower," "horizontal," or "inner" indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly used when the product of the invention is in use, they are only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention. Furthermore, terms such as "first" and "second" are only used to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0046] Furthermore, the use of the term "horizontal" does not imply that the component must be absolutely horizontal, but rather that it can be slightly tilted. For example, "horizontal" simply means that its direction is more horizontal than "vertical," and does not mean that the structure must be completely horizontal, but can be slightly tilted.

[0047] In the description of the embodiments of the present invention, it should also be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "set," "install," "connect," and "link" should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they can refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they can refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; and they can refer to the internal connection of two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in the present invention according to the specific circumstances.

[0048] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings:

[0049] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing, such as... Figure 1 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0050] S1. Obtain the first waveform parameter sequence according to the first key, and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into the first waveform parameter;

[0051] The derived first and second keys are known keys, and the keys are updated with each signal interaction.

[0052] S2. Obtain the second waveform parameter sequence according to the second key, and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into the second waveform parameters;

[0053] The length of the selected first waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the first key space;

[0054] The length of the selected second waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the second key space.

[0055] S3. Perform channel estimation based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame, and the third sensing radio frame to obtain channel state information.

[0056] The waveform of the first sensing wireless frame uses parametric waveform modulation, and the parameters used are the first waveform parameters;

[0057] The first sensing wireless frame is a preamble frame, which consists of a cyclic prefix, a preamble, and a protection timestamp.

[0058] S4. The validity of the channel state information is determined. The channel state information is valid within the validity period of the user's gesture password execution, thereby achieving wireless sensing security and privacy protection.

[0059] The method for determining the validity of channel state information using a gesture recognition system is as follows:

[0060] If the user's gesture password is valid, the corresponding gesture operation will be executed directly.

[0061] If the user's gesture password is not valid, gesture recognition is performed based on the channel information, and the recognition result is compared with the user's pre-stored gesture password. If the gesture passwords are the same, the subsequent recognized gesture is executed, and the operation corresponding to that gesture is performed. If the gesture passwords are different, the matching fails.

[0062] The validity period of the gesture password is the time preset by the system; gesture recognition is based on channel status information; the gesture password is a preset gesture password.

[0063] Wireless sensing attack methods include attackers launching attacks by actively sending sensing signals, attackers eavesdropping on users' gesture information, and attackers attacking through their own gestures.

[0064] The specific process is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0065] Step 1: The first and second devices are configured according to the following... Figure 3 The IEEE 802.11az standard-derived first key for the uplink long training sequence ista-ltf-key and the second key for the downlink long training sequence rsta-ltf-key are shown.

[0066] In the IEEE 802.11az standard, the key derived key (KDK) is encrypted using a hash function to generate a long training sequence key seed ltf-keyseed. Then, the key derivation function is used to derive the first key ista-ltf-key and the second key rsta-ltf-key based on ltf-keyseed and the Secure LTF Counter.

[0067] Step 2: The first device uses the first x-bit sequence C1 and C2 of the first key ista-ltf-key as the first waveform parameter sequence. The second device uses the same key portion as the first device as the second waveform parameter sequence.

[0068] Step 3: The first device converts the first waveform parameter sequence into first waveform parameters. The second device converts the second waveform parameter sequence into second waveform parameters.

[0069] It is known that in Discrete Affine Fourier Transform (DAFT) modulation, the waveform parameters c1, c2 ∈ [-0.5, 0.5] can convert the C1 and C2 sequences from binary to decimal fractions, and then add the minimum value (-0.5) that the waveform parameters can be selected.

[0070] Step 4: The first device sends a second sensing radio frame x to the second device, which is the modulated first sensing radio frame a. The waveform of the first sensing radio frame a is modulated using parametric waveform DAFT to obtain the second sensing radio frame x, and its modulation method is as follows: Figure 4 As shown.

[0071] Assume the original first sensing radio frame after constellation mapping is a; perform DAFT modulation on the first sensing radio frame a to obtain the modulated second sensing radio frame x, the modulation method is as follows:

[0072] 1) Construct the encryption matrix as follows

[0073] Where c1 and c2 are the first waveform parameters, n is the subcarrier index, j is the imaginary unit, m is the time index, e is the base of the natural logarithm, and N is the number of DAFT points.

[0074] 2) The second sensing wireless frame transmitted after waveform encryption and modulation is:

[0075] x = Φ H a

[0076] Where Φ is the matrix form of Φ[n,m], and H represents the conjugate transpose.

[0077] Step 5: The second sensing wireless frame x sent by the first device passes through the wireless channel h, and the second device receives the third sensing wireless frame r(c1,c2) ​​= h*x(c1,c2) ​​+ n, where n is Gaussian white noise, * denotes convolution, and x(c1,c2) ​​and r(c1,c2) ​​represent the second sensing wireless frame modulated using waveform parameters c1 and c2, and the received third sensing wireless frame, respectively. Using the second waveform parameters... The first sensing radio frame a, stored locally, and the received third sensing radio frame r are used to perform channel estimation using the MMSE algorithm to obtain the results. σ represents the noise standard deviation, and I is the identity matrix. Let x be a lower triangular Topelitz matrix, defined by x = [x0, x1, ..., x...]. N-1 ]constitute, Indicates the use of The Φ matrix is ​​calculated using waveform parameters in Φ[n,m].

[0078] After channel estimation, Channel State Information (CSI) is obtained and uploaded to the data processing module of the gesture recognition system.

[0079] Step 6: The gesture recognition system determines whether the current Channel State Information (CSI) is within the validity period of the user's gesture password. The gesture recognition system pre-stores the gesture password for the user, and the password validity period is usually set to about 10 seconds. If it is within the validity period, the corresponding operation of the gesture is executed directly; if it is not within the validity period, gesture recognition is performed based on the channel information, and the recognition result is compared with the pre-stored gesture password set by the user. If the gesture passwords match, the subsequent recognized gesture is executed, and the corresponding operation is performed; if they do not match, the match fails.

[0080] Wireless sensing active and passive attacks include the following three methods:

[0081] (1) If the attacker launches an attack by actively sending sensing signals: such as Figure 5 In the attack mode shown (1), the legitimate device can receive the signal sent by the attacker. The attacker can send a deceptive sensory signal to make the system misidentify it as a certain gesture, or send a sensory signal while the attacker makes a gesture outside the room to make the system execute the attacker's command.

[0082] (2) If the attacker is eavesdropping to obtain the user's gesture information: such as Figure 6 In the attack mode shown (2), the attacker deploys two devices outside the room to receive signals transmitted by legitimate users. Assuming that the user inside the room is performing a certain gesture, since the pilot signal is a public sequence, the attacker will perform channel estimation based on the signals received by the two devices and use the obtained CSI to perform the same gesture recognition as the legitimate system. According to the gesture recognition principle, the user's gesture can be observed.

[0083] (3) If the attacker attacks solely through their own gestures: such as Figure 7 The attack mode shown (3) involves an attacker who is outside the room without any transceiver equipment and attacks the legitimate system by performing the same gestures as the legitimate user.

[0084] Regarding attack mode (1), in this mode, the attacker exploits the public nature of the first sensing wireless frame. Since the legitimate system uses the first waveform parameters to encrypt and modulate the first sensing wireless frame, if the attacker sends the first sensing wireless frame modulated with guessed first waveform parameters c1′ and c2′ without knowing the correct first waveform parameters, and the legitimate system uses the second waveform parameters for channel estimation, the channel estimation result of the gesture recognition system... This will be different from what the attackers expected: Where r′(c1′,c2′) represents the third sensing wireless frame received by the second device using c1′,c2′ modulation.

[0085] Regarding attack mode (2), in this mode, the attacker eavesdrops on the channel to obtain the gesture password. However, since the correct second waveform parameters cannot be known, the attacker relies on guessing the second waveform parameters. Attacker's channel estimation results This will be different from the legitimate end: Where X′ is the lower triangular Toplitz matrix formed by x′, Indicates the use of The Φ matrix is ​​calculated using waveform parameters in Φ[n,m].

[0086] Regarding attack mode (3), in this mode, the attacker cannot send sensing signals, but instead influences channel changes by performing gestures during legitimate device signal interactions to achieve the attack objective. Since the attacker is unaware of the user's gesture password, they cannot successfully launch an attack outside the password's validity period or when the user is not present.

[0087] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection system for wireless sensing, such as... Figure 8 As shown, it includes a first waveform parameter acquisition module, a second waveform parameter acquisition module, a channel state information acquisition module, and a channel state information discrimination module;

[0088] The first waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire a first waveform parameter sequence according to a first key, and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into a first waveform parameter;

[0089] The second waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire the second waveform parameter sequence according to the second key, and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into the second waveform parameters;

[0090] The channel state information acquisition module is used to perform channel estimation based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame and the third sensing radio frame to obtain channel state information.

[0091] The channel state information discrimination module is used to determine the validity of the channel state information. Within the validity period of the user's gesture password, the channel state information enables wireless sensing security and privacy protection.

[0092] The terminal device provided in this embodiment of the invention includes: a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps in the various method embodiments described above. Alternatively, when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the functions of each module / unit in the various device embodiments described above.

[0093] The computer program can be divided into one or more modules / units, which are stored in the memory and executed by the processor to complete the present invention.

[0094] The terminal device may be a desktop computer, laptop, handheld computer, or cloud server, etc. The terminal device may include, but is not limited to, a processor and a memory.

[0095] The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc.

[0096] The memory can be used to store the computer program and / or module. The processor implements various functions of the terminal device by running or executing the computer program and / or module stored in the memory and calling the data stored in the memory.

[0097] If the modules / units integrated into the terminal device are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can also be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording media, USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, optical disks, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media, etc. It should be noted that the content included in the computer-readable medium can be appropriately added or removed according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media do not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunication signals.

[0098] This invention proposes a security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing. It employs a derived key from the protocol as the key for generating waveform parameter sequences. This ensures consistency of waveform parameters between the transmitter and receiver, and eliminates the need for over-the-air transmission, increasing parameter confidentiality and security. Furthermore, the protocol's derived key changes with each sensing frame transmission, guaranteeing consistent waveform parameter changes. Using parameterized waveforms and gesture passwords not only protects user privacy but also prevents attackers from actively sending deceptive signals to trick the gesture recognition system and avoids attacks by repeating the same gestures. By encrypting the signal with waveform parameters, eavesdroppers cannot estimate the correct channel information from the received signal and cannot know the user's actual gestures. If an attacker actively sends a deceptive signal, the receiving device cannot demodulate it due to the lack of waveform parameters during modulation, thus failing to recognize the gesture. Simultaneously, the use of a gesture password for device activation and a password expiration period ensures that attackers' attempts to attack by repeating the same gestures will fail, thus solving the security and privacy problems of the gesture recognition system at the signal level. This method does not require data training and is a lightweight, computationally inexpensive, highly reliable, and robust protection scheme. On the one hand, it prevents attackers from sending sensory signals to deceive the gesture recognition system or launching attacks that only execute gestures; on the other hand, it prevents eavesdroppers from obtaining users' gesture information and causing sensory privacy leaks.

[0099] It has the following advantages:

[0100] First, this invention provides security and privacy protection based on the waveform parameters of the transmitted signal modulation waveform. It does not require the addition of third-party devices or data training, and solves the security and privacy leakage problems of gesture recognition systems at the signal level. It is a lightweight protection solution with low computational complexity.

[0101] Second: This invention uses existing derived keys as parameter sequences, requiring only simple calculations and conversions. It does not require over-the-air transmission of the keys and can keep up with key updates to ensure the waveform parameter sequences are updated. Furthermore, it does not require modification of the sensing-related processes, making it a security-friendly and standards-compatible protection scheme.

[0102] Third: This invention addresses both active and passive attacks on wireless sensing. Even if an attacker launches an attack by actively sending signals or eavesdropping on user gestures (i.e., sensing privacy), the waveform parameters are only held by the legitimate transmitting and receiving parties. If the attacker sends a sensing signal with incorrect waveform parameters, the legitimate receiver will not be able to demodulate it correctly, thus failing to achieve the desired effect. At the same time, even if an eavesdropper receives a sensing signal from a legitimate device, demodulating it with incorrect waveform parameters will also prevent them from obtaining the user's gesture information. Therefore, as long as the attacker cannot obtain the waveform parameters in a timely manner, the method employed in this invention can simultaneously resist active attacks and privacy eavesdropping.

[0103] Fourth: This invention addresses the unique gesture attack on gesture recognition systems, namely, the attack by an attacker making the same gesture as a legitimate user. It employs a protection method that sets a gesture password and a password validity period to ensure that the attacker's method of attacking by making the same gesture is ineffective. This makes up for the lack of protection methods for gesture-only attacks in traditional solutions that only consider the attacker sending or receiving signals.

[0104] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Obtain the first waveform parameter sequence based on the first key, and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into the first waveform parameter; Obtain the second waveform parameter sequence based on the second key, and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into the second waveform parameters; Based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame, and the third sensing radio frame, the MMSE algorithm is used to perform channel estimation and obtain channel state information; wherein, the second sensing radio frame is transmitted by the first device. via wireless channel The second device receives the third sensing wireless frame. ,in, It is Gaussian white noise. Represents convolution. and These respectively represent the use of waveform parameters The modulated second sensing radio frame and the received third sensing radio frame, These are the parameters of the first waveform; The validity of channel state information is determined. Within the validity period of the user's gesture password, wireless sensing security and privacy protection are achieved. If the gesture password is valid, the corresponding operation is executed directly. If it is not valid, gesture recognition is performed based on the channel information, and the recognition result is compared with the user's pre-stored gesture password. If the gesture passwords match, the subsequent recognized gesture is executed, and the corresponding operation is performed. If the gesture passwords do not match, the matching fails. The waveform of the first sensing wireless frame uses parametric waveform modulation, and the parameters used are the first waveform parameters; the first sensing wireless frame is a preamble frame. The derived first and second keys are known keys, and the keys are updated with each signal interaction; The length of the selected first waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the first key space; the length of the selected second waveform parameter sequence is the same as that of the second key space; The first sensing wireless frame consists of a cyclic prefix, a preamble, and a protection timestamp.

2. The security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, The validity period of the gesture password is the time preset by the system; gesture recognition is based on channel status information; the gesture password is a preset gesture password.

3. The security and privacy protection method for wireless sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, Wireless sensing attack methods include attackers launching attacks by actively sending sensing signals, attackers eavesdropping on users' gesture information, and attackers attacking through their own gestures.

4. A security and privacy protection system for wireless sensing, characterized in that, The method described by any one of claims 1 to 3 includes: The first waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire a first waveform parameter sequence according to a first key and convert the first waveform parameter sequence into a first waveform parameter. The second waveform parameter acquisition module is used to acquire a second waveform parameter sequence according to a second key and convert the second waveform parameter sequence into second waveform parameters. A channel state information acquisition module is used to perform channel estimation based on the second waveform parameters, the first sensing radio frame, and the third sensing radio frame to obtain channel state information. The channel state information discrimination module is used to determine the validity of the channel state information. The channel state information is valid within the validity period of the user's gesture password, thus realizing wireless sensing security and privacy protection.

5. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes a computer program, it implements the steps of the wireless-aware security and privacy protection method as described in any one of claims 1 to 3.

6. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the wireless-aware security and privacy protection method as described in any one of claims 1 to 3.

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