Identity-based elliptic curve multiple blind signature method, system, device and medium
Through the identity-based elliptic curve multiple blind signature method, the problem of reduced efficiency of multiple blind signatures is solved, the anonymity and security balance in the signature process is achieved, the complexity of key distribution is reduced, and the signature efficiency and privacy protection are improved. ability.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410734357.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-06-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-01
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-06-07
AI Technical Summary
Multiple blind signatures reduce efficiency when the number of signing parties increases, making it difficult to take into account both anonymity and security.
The elliptic curve multi-blind signature method is adopted to generate the signature's identity public key and private key through the key generation center. The signer randomly selects the secret value to calculate the secret point, and the signature requester's identity public key and secret point to the signature party Perform aggregation, blinding and signing, and secondary encryption is performed through the identity private key, and the final signature requester deblining and verifying the signature result.
It achieves a balance between anonymity and security in the multi-party signature process, reduces the complexity of key distribution, improves signature efficiency and privacy protection capabilities, avoids the increase in signature length, and achieves a safe and efficient signature operation.
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Figure CN118316628B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to an identity-based elliptic curve multiple blind signature method, system, device and medium. Background Art
[0002] With the continuous acceleration of the digital transformation of the economy, especially the rapid popularization and application of new technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things, data exchange is becoming more and more frequent, and the importance of data security is becoming more and more prominent. The elliptic curve encryption algorithm is based on the difficulty problem or bilinear mapping of the elliptic curve to achieve encryption, decryption, and signing operations. It is an important tool in modern cryptography and has higher computational efficiency than RSA encryption.
[0003] In scenarios such as e-commerce, electronic voting, and digital copyright protection that require joint or collective signatures, multi-blind signature technology is widely used. This signature technology allows a message to be blindly signed by multiple signers, and each signer can only see the message signed by himself, but cannot see the signature content and messages of other signers, which can protect the privacy and data security of the signer. However, while multi-blind signatures take into account the security and anonymity of the signing process, there are also some problems. The main problem is that as the number of signatories increases, the complexity of key distribution will increase, and the signature calculation amount and signature length will increase, resulting in a decrease in signature efficiency.
[0004] Therefore, how to overcome the decrease in efficiency of multi-blind signatures caused by the increase in the number of signatories and achieve a balance between anonymity and security in the multi-signature process is a technical problem that needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the invention
[0005] The technical task of the present invention is to provide an identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method, system, device and medium to solve the problem of how to overcome the decrease in multi-blind signature efficiency caused by the increase in the number of signatories and achieve a balance between anonymity and security in the multi-signature process.
[0006] The technical task of the present invention is achieved in the following way: an identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method, the method is as follows:
[0007] Initialization phase: The key generation center generates base points and private keys based on the elliptic curve algorithm, publishes a cryptographic hash function, generates corresponding public and private keys for each signatory, and sends the private keys to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel;
[0008] Blinding stage: Each signatory randomly selects a secret value and calculates the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point, and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value;
[0009] Signing stage: Each signatory signs the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypts it twice; and the signature requester aggregates the private key signatures of each signatory and their secondary encryption results;
[0010] Unblinding and verification phase: The signature requester unblinds the blind signature result, and the unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding phase together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed.
[0011] As a preference, the initialization phase is specifically as follows:
[0012] The key generation center KGC randomly selects a large prime number q, and selects a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q). G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n.
[0013] Randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and keep the private key d secret; where 1≤d≤n-1;
[0014] Publish a cryptographic hash function H of length integer: {0, 1} * →Z q ;
[0015] Publish the Signing Party P i ID i ; Where i=1, 2, …, k, i.e., there are k signing parties in total;
[0016] For the signatory P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(mod n), using the identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signing party P i .
[0017] Preferably, the blinding phase is as follows:
[0018] Signing Party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, ri Multiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0019] The signature requester P0 randomly selects two numbers α and β for all the signature parties P i The public key Q i and secret point R i Perform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is T= + =(x, y), and then get the first part of the signature t through t=x+H(m) (mod n);
[0020] The signature requester P0 uses α, β, t to blind the signature information m and obtains the blinded information m1=α -1 (t-β);
[0021] The signature requester P0 broadcasts (m1, t) to each signing party.
[0022] Preferably, during the signing phase, each signatory performs a personal signature on the blinded information based on the identity private key and the secret value, and encrypts the signature using the identity private key. The signature requesting party collects the personal signatures and encryption results of the signatories and performs an aggregate signature.
[0023] Preferably, the signing phase is as follows:
[0024] Signing Party P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i , c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0025] Signature requester P0 to s i To verify the validity, calculate (s i +m1)·Q i+s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, and return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i=1, 2,..., k;
[0026] Signature requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where s= ; c = ; i=1, 2, …, k.
[0027] Preferably, the unblinding and verification phases are as follows:
[0028] The signature requester P0 unblinds the blind signature results s, c and obtains the second and third signatures S, C; where S=α·s, C=α·c;
[0029] (t, S, C) is the signature of the information m to be signed. Anyone can calculate (S+C)·G+t· =(x, y), determine whether t=x+H(m) (mod n) holds, and verify the validity of this signature.
[0030] An identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature system, which is used to implement the above-mentioned identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method; the system includes:
[0031] An initialization module is used to generate a base point and a private key based on an elliptic curve algorithm through a key generation center, publish a cryptographic hash function, generate a corresponding public key and private key for each signatory, and send the private key to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel;
[0032] The blinding module is used for each signatory to randomly select a secret value and calculate the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value.
[0033] The signature module is used by each signatory to sign the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypt it twice; and the signature requester performs an aggregate signature on the private key signature of each signatory and its secondary encryption result;
[0034] The unblinding and verification module is used by the signature requester to unblind the blind signature result. The unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding stage together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed.
[0035] Preferably, the initialization module includes:
[0036] Select submodule 1, which is used for the key generation center KGC to randomly select a large prime number q, select a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q), and G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n;
[0037] Select submodule 2, which is used to randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and secretly save the private key d; where 1≤d≤n-1;
[0038] Publish submodule 1, which is used to publish a cryptographic hash function H with an integer length: {0, 1} * →Z q ;
[0039] Publication submodule 2, used to publish the signature party P i ID i ; Where i=1, 2, …, k, i.e., there are k signing parties in total;
[0040] The private key generation submodule is used to generate the private key for the signing party P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(modn), using identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signing party P i ;
[0041] The blinding module includes:
[0042] Select submodule three to pass the signature party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, r i Multiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0043] The aggregation submodule is used to randomly select two numbers α and β from the signature requester P0 and i The public key Q i and secret point R iPerform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is T= + =(x, y), and then get the first part of the signature t through t=x+H(m) (mod n);
[0044] The blinding submodule is used to blind the signature information m by using α, β, t through the signature requester P0 to obtain the blinded information m1=α -1 (t-β);
[0045] The broadcast submodule is used to broadcast (m1, t) to each signatory through the signature requester P0;
[0046] The signature modules include:
[0047] Personal signature submodule, used by the signatory P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i , c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0048] The verification submodule is used to verify the signature requester P0 i To verify the validity, calculate (s i +m1)·Q i +s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i=1, 2, ..., k;
[0049] Aggregate signature submodule, used to sign requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where s= ; c = ; i = 1, 2, ..., k;
[0050] The unblinding and verification modules include:
[0051] The unblinding submodule is used to unblind the blind signature results s and c through the signature requesting party P0 to obtain the second and third signatures S and C; where S=α·s, C=α·c;
[0052] The verification submodule is used to use (t, S, C) as the signature of the information to be signed m. Anyone can verify the signature by calculating (S+C)·G+t· =(x, y), determine whether t=x+H(m) (mod n) holds, and verify the validity of this signature.
[0053] An electronic device comprising: a memory and at least one processor;
[0054] Wherein, the memory stores a computer program;
[0055] The at least one processor executes the computer program stored in the memory, so that the at least one processor performs the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method as described above.
[0056] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which can be executed by a processor to implement the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method as described above.
[0057] The identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method, system, device and medium of the present invention have the following advantages:
[0058] (1) The present invention uses identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signatures, which can not only achieve a balance between anonymity and security in the multi-party signature process, but also effectively overcome the decrease in multi-blind signature efficiency caused by the increase in the number of signatories, thereby achieving a safe and efficient signature operation;
[0059] (ii) The present invention introduces a key generation center and uses the identity information of the signer (such as name, email address, etc.) to directly generate the signer's public key and private key pair, thereby reducing the complexity of key distribution in the traditional public key system;
[0060] (III) The present invention utilizes the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve to allow the signature requester to perform partial and overall verification of the signature result, track the identity ID of invalid personal signatures, and improve the flexibility of multi-signatures;
[0061] (iv) The present invention provides the signature requester with stronger and more efficient privacy protection capabilities through the effective combination of identity-based signature technology, elliptic curve cryptography and multiple blind signature technology;
[0062] (V) The present invention utilizes the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve to achieve a safe and efficient signature operation. At the same time, no signatory can know the specific content of the signed information during the signing process, thus solving the problem of information anonymity in the multi-signature process.
[0063] (VI) In order to effectively overcome the decline in the efficiency of multiple blind signatures caused by the increase in the number of signatories, the present invention designs an identity-based signature mechanism that associates the signer's public key with his or her identity; and by eliminating the traditional certificate authority (CA), a trusted third party uses the signer's identity information (such as name, email address, etc.) to directly generate the signer's public key and private key pair; in this way, the signing process is simpler and more efficient, and the complexity of key distribution in the traditional public key system is reduced;
[0064] (VII) The present invention has a faster signing speed and a shorter signature length at the same security level, and the signature length will not increase due to an increase in the number of signatories. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0065] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0066] Attached Figure 1 The figure is a flowchart of the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0067] The identity-based elliptic curve multiple blind signature method, system, device and medium of the present invention are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments of the specification.
[0068] Embodiment 1: As attached Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides an identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method, which is specifically as follows:
[0069] S1, Initialization phase: The key generation center generates base points and private keys based on the elliptic curve algorithm, publishes a cryptographic hash function, generates corresponding public keys and private keys for each signatory, and sends the private keys to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel;
[0070] S2, blinding stage: Each signatory randomly selects a secret value and calculates the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point, and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value;
[0071] S3, Signing stage: Each signatory signs the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypts it twice; and the signature requester aggregates the private key signatures of each signatory and their secondary encryption results;
[0072] S4, unblinding and verification stage: The signature requester unblinds the blind signature result, and the unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding stage together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed.
[0073] In step S1 of this embodiment, the key generation center generates a pair of public and private keys (G, d) according to the elliptic curve algorithm, publishes a cryptographic hash function H, generates corresponding identity-based public and private keys for each signatory, and sends the identity private key to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel.
[0074] The initialization phase in step S1 of this embodiment is specifically as follows:
[0075] S101. The key generation center KGC randomly selects a large prime number q, and selects a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q), where G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n;
[0076] S102, randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and keep the private key d in secret; where 1≤d≤n-1;
[0077] S103. Publish a cryptographic hash function H with an integer length: {0, 1} * →Z q ;
[0078] S104. Publish the Signing Party P i ID i ; Where i=1, 2, …, k, i.e., there are k signing parties in total;
[0079] S105, for the signing party P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(mod n), using the identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signing party P i .
[0080] The blinding stage in step S2 of this embodiment is specifically as follows:
[0081] S201, Signing Party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, r iMultiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i=1, 2,…, k;
[0082] S202: The signature requesting party P0 randomly selects two numbers α and β, and i The public key Q i and secret point R i Perform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is T= + =(x, y), and then get the first part of the signature t through t=x+H(m) (mod n);
[0083] S203, the signature requester P0 uses α, β, t to blind the signature information m, and obtains the blinded information m1=α -1 (t-β);
[0084] S204. The signature requesting party P0 broadcasts (m1, t) to each signing party.
[0085] In the signing stage in step S3 of this embodiment, each signatory performs a personal signature on the blinded information based on the identity private key and the secret value, and encrypts the signature using the identity private key. The signature requesting party collects the personal signatures and encryption results of the signatories and performs an aggregate signature.
[0086] The signature phase in step S3 of this embodiment is specifically as follows:
[0087] S301, Signing Party P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i , c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0088] S302, signature requester P0 to s i To verify the validity, calculate (si +m1)·Q i +s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i=1, 2, ..., k;
[0089] S303, signature requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where s= ; c = ; i=1, 2, …, k.
[0090] The unblinding and verification phases in step S4 of this embodiment are specifically as follows:
[0091] S401, the signature requesting party P0 unblinds the blind signature results s, c to obtain the second and third signatures S, C; where S=α·s, C=α·c;
[0092] S402, (t, S, C) is the signature of the information to be signed m. Anyone can calculate (S+C)·G+t· =(x, y), determine whether t=x+H(m) (mod n) holds, and verify the validity of this signature.
[0093] Embodiment 2: This embodiment provides an identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature system, which is used to implement the above-mentioned identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method; the system includes:
[0094] An initialization module is used to generate a base point and a private key based on an elliptic curve algorithm through a key generation center, publish a cryptographic hash function, generate a corresponding public key and private key for each signatory, and send the private key to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel;
[0095] The blinding module is used for each signatory to randomly select a secret value and calculate the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value.
[0096] The signature module is used by each signatory to sign the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypt it twice; and the signature requester performs an aggregate signature on the private key signature of each signatory and its secondary encryption result;
[0097] The unblinding and verification module is used by the signature requester to unblind the blind signature result. The unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding stage together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed.
[0098] The initialization module in this embodiment includes:
[0099] Select submodule 1, which is used for the key generation center KGC to randomly select a large prime number q, select a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q), and G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n;
[0100] Select submodule 2, which is used to randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and secretly save the private key d; where 1≤d≤n-1;
[0101] Publish submodule 1, which is used to publish a cryptographic hash function H with an integer length: {0, 1} * →Z q ;
[0102] Publication submodule 2, used to publish the signature party P i ID i ; Where i=1, 2, ..., k, i.e. there are k signatories in total;
[0103] The private key generation submodule is used to generate the private key for the signing party P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(modn), using identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signing party P i .
[0104] The blinding module in this embodiment includes:
[0105] Select submodule three to pass the signature party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, r i Multiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0106] The aggregation submodule is used to randomly select two numbers α and β from the signature requester P0 and i The public key Q i and secret point R i Perform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is T= + =(x, y), and then get the first part of the signature t through t=x+H(m) (mod n);
[0107] The blinding submodule is used to blind the signature information m by using α, β, t through the signature requester P0 to obtain the blinded information m1=α -1 (t-β);
[0108] The broadcast submodule is used to broadcast (m1, t) to each signing party through the signature requesting party P0.
[0109] The signature module in this embodiment includes:
[0110] Personal signature submodule, used by the signatory P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i , c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; where i=1, 2, …, k;
[0111] The verification submodule is used to verify the signature requester P0 against s i To verify the validity, calculate (s i +m1)·Q i +s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i=1, 2, ..., k;
[0112] Aggregate signature submodule, used to sign requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where s= ; c = ; i=1, 2, …, k.
[0113] The unblinding and verification module in this embodiment includes:
[0114] The unblinding submodule is used to unblind the blind signature results s and c through the signature requesting party P0 to obtain the second and third signatures S and C; where S=α·s, C=α·c;
[0115] The verification submodule is used to use (t, S, C) as the signature of the information to be signed m. Anyone can verify the signature by calculating (S+C)·G+t· =(x, y), determine whether t=x+H(m) (mod n) holds, and verify the validity of this signature.
[0116] Embodiment 3: This embodiment also provides an electronic device, including: a memory and a processor;
[0117] Wherein, the memory stores computer-executable instructions;
[0118] The processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory, so that the processor executes the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method in any embodiment of the present invention.
[0119] The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.
[0120] The memory can be used to store computer programs and / or modules. The processor realizes various functions of the electronic device by running or executing the computer programs and / or modules stored in the memory, and calling the data stored in the memory. The memory can mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area can store an operating system, at least one application required for a function, etc.; the data storage area can store data created according to the use of the terminal, etc. In addition, the memory can also include a high-speed random access memory, and can also include a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk, a memory, a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (SMC), a secure digital (SD) card, a flash memory card, at least one disk storage period, a flash memory device, or other volatile solid-state storage devices.
[0121] Embodiment 4: This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a plurality of instructions are stored, and the instructions are loaded by a processor, so that the processor executes the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method in any embodiment of the present invention. Specifically, a system or device equipped with a storage medium can be provided, on which a software program code that implements the functions of any of the above embodiments is stored, and a computer (or CPU or MPU) of the system or device reads and executes the program code stored in the storage medium.
[0122] In this case, the program code itself read from the storage medium can realize the function of any one of the above-mentioned embodiments, and thus the program code and the storage medium storing the program code constitute a part of the present invention.
[0123] Examples of storage media for providing program code include floppy disks, hard disks, magneto-optical disks, optical disks (such as CD-ROM, CD-R, CD-RW, DVD-ROM, DVD-RYM, DVD-RW, DVD+RW), magnetic tapes, non-volatile memory cards, and ROMs. Alternatively, program code may be downloaded from a server computer via a communication network.
[0124] In addition, it should be clear that the functions of any of the above embodiments can be implemented not only by executing the program code read by the computer, but also by enabling an operating system operating on the computer to complete part or all of the actual operations based on instructions from the program code.
[0125] In addition, it can be understood that the program code read from the storage medium is written to a memory provided in an expansion board inserted into the computer or written to a memory provided in an expansion unit connected to the computer, and then based on the instructions of the program code, a CPU installed on the expansion board or the expansion unit is enabled to perform part or all of the actual operations, thereby realizing the functions of any of the above-mentioned embodiments.
[0126] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or replace some or all of the technical features therein with equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. An identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method, characterized in that: The method is as follows: Initialization phase: The key generation center generates base points and private keys based on the elliptic curve algorithm, publishes a cryptographic hash function, generates corresponding public and private keys for each signatory, and sends the private keys to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel; the details are as follows: The key generation center KGC randomly selects a large prime number q, and selects a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q). G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n. Randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and keep the private key d secret; where 1≤d≤n-1; Publish a cryptographic hash function H of length integer: {0,1} * →Z q ; Publish the Signing Party P i ID i ; Where i = 1, 2, ..., k, i.e., there are k signing parties in total; For the signatory P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(mod n), using the identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signatory P i ; Blind phase: Each signatory randomly selects a secret value and calculates the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point, and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value; the details are as follows: Signing Party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, r i Multiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i = 1, 2, ..., k; The signature requester P0 randomly selects two numbers α and β for all the signature parties P i The public key Q i and secret point R i Perform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is: Then, the first part of the signature t is obtained by t=x+H(m)(mod n); The signature requester P0 uses α, β, t to blind the signature information m and obtains the blinded information m1 = α -1 (t-β); The signature requester P0 broadcasts (m1, t) to each signing party; Signing stage: Each signatory signs the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypts it twice; and the signature requester aggregates the private key signatures of each signatory and their secondary encryption results; During the signing stage, each signatory signs the blinded information based on his / her private key and secret value, and encrypts the signature with his / her private key. The signature requester collects the individual signatures and encryption results of the signatories and performs an aggregate signature; the details are as follows: Signing Party P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i ,c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; wherein, i=1,2,……,k; Signature requester P0 to s i To verify the validity, calculate (s i +m1)·Q i +s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, and return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i = 1, 2, ..., k; Signature requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where, Unblinding and verification phase: The signature requester unblinds the blind signature result, and the unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding phase together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed.
2. The identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The details of the unblinding and verification phases are as follows: The signature requester P0 unblinds the blind signature results s, c and obtains the second and third signatures S, C; where S = α·s, C = α·c; (t, S, C) is the signature of the information m to be signed. Anyone can calculate the signature based on the public information. Determine whether t=x+H(m)(mod n) holds and verify the validity of this signature.
3. An identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature system, characterized in that: The system is used to implement the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method described in claim 1 or 2; the system includes: An initialization module is used to generate a base point and a private key based on an elliptic curve algorithm through a key generation center, publish a cryptographic hash function, generate a corresponding public key and private key for each signatory, and send the private key to the corresponding signatory through a secure secret channel; The blinding module is used for each signatory to randomly select a secret value and calculate the corresponding secret point on the elliptic curve. The signature requester aggregates the signatory's identity public key and secret point and blinds the signature information with the aggregated value. The signature module is used by each signatory to sign the blinded information with his / her private key and encrypt it twice; and the signature requester performs an aggregate signature on the private key signature of each signatory and its secondary encryption result; The unblinding and verification module is used by the signature requester to unblind the blind signature result. The unblinded information and the aggregate value obtained in the blinding stage together constitute the signature result of the information to be signed; Among them, the initialization module includes: Select submodule 1, which is used for the key generation center KGC to randomly select a large prime number q, select a secure elliptic curve E defined on a finite field F(q), and G is a base point on the elliptic curve E with an order of prime number n; Select submodule 2, which is used to randomly select an integer d, publish the base point G, and secretly save the private key d; where 1≤d≤n-1; Publish submodule 1, which is used to publish a cryptographic hash function H with an integer length: {0,1} * →Z q ; Publication submodule 2, used to publish the signature party P i ID i ; Where i = 1, 2, ..., k, i.e., there are k signing parties in total; The private key generation submodule is used to generate the private key for the signing party P i Generate an identity based ID i The private key psk i =d·H(ID i )(mod n), using the identity ID i The private key psk i Calculate the public key Q for the signer i =psk i G, announces the signing party P i The public key Q i , and send the identity private key psk through a secure secret channel i Sent to the signatory P i ; The blinding module includes: Select submodule three to pass the signature party P i Randomly select a number r i As the secret value, r i Multiply with the base point G to encrypt and get the secret point R on the elliptic curve i , that is, R i =r i G, and the secret point R i Sent to the signature requester P0; where i = 1, 2, ..., k; The aggregation submodule is used to randomly select two numbers α and β from the signature requester P0 and i The public key Q i and secret point R i Perform aggregation calculation to obtain the aggregate value of all signatory identity public keys and secret points. The formula is: Then, the first part of the signature t is obtained by t=x+H(m)(mod n); The blinding submodule is used to blind the signature information m by using α, β, t through the signature requesting party P0 to obtain the blinded information m1 = α -1 (t-β); The broadcast submodule is used to broadcast (m1, t) to each signatory through the signature requester P0; The signature modules include: Personal signature submodule, used by the signatory P i After receiving (m1, t), the blinded information m1 is personally signed based on the identity private key and secret value to obtain s i =(1+psk i ) -1 ·(r i -m1·psk i ) and use the identity private key to s i Encrypted to get c i =s i ·psk i , send(s i ,c i ) to the signature requesting party P0; wherein, i=1,2,……,k; The verification submodule is used to verify the signature requester P0 i To verify the validity, calculate (s i +m1)·Q i +s i G=R i Whether it is established, and judge the validity of the obtained personal signature, and return the invalid signature to the corresponding signer for re-signing; where i = 1, 2, ..., k; Aggregate signature submodule, used to sign requester P0 to s i , c i Perform aggregate signature to obtain blind signature results s, c; where, 4. The identity-based elliptic curve blind multi-signature system according to claim 3, characterized in that: The unblinding and verification module comprises: The unblinding submodule is used to unblind the blind signature results s and c through the signature requesting party P0 to obtain the second and third signatures S and C; where S = α·s, C = α·c; The verification submodule is used to use (t, S, C) as the signature of the information to be signed m. Anyone can verify the signature by calculating the public information. Determine whether t=x+H(m)(mod n) holds and verify the validity of this signature.
5. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: memory and at least one processor; Wherein, the memory stores a computer program; The at least one processor executes the computer program stored in the memory, so that the at least one processor performs the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method as claimed in claim 1 or 2.
6. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which can be executed by a processor to implement the identity-based elliptic curve multi-blind signature method as described in claim 1 or 2.
