A Damage Assessment Method for HPMW Attack Reflector Antennas Based on EMT-BN

Abstract

This invention discloses a method for assessing the damage to radar reflector antennas under HPMW attacks based on EMT-BN, including two approaches: front-door coupling and rear-door coupling. Front-door coupling refers to high-power microwaves directly entering the radar receiving channel through the radar antenna and disrupting the circuitry within the receiving channel along the pulse signal propagation direction, thus degrading radar efficiency. This invention can establish a radar damage performance assessment model for reflector antennas under HPMW attacks, clearly and intuitively evaluating the degree and probability of radar damage under different HPMW attack conditions. It has practical significance in evaluating the effectiveness of radars against high-power microwave attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of radar technology, and in particular to a method for assessing damage to HPMW attack reflector antenna radar based on EMT-BN. Background Technology

[0002] High-power microwave weapons (HPMWs) are directed-energy weapons that utilize high-power microwave beams to inflict soft and hard kill damage on various targets. They are characterized by high attack speed, large strike range, low operational cost, all-weather applicability, and improved effectiveness against targets with higher levels of information technology. They can direct high-power, concentrated microwave beams at targets in a very short time, destroying key electronic components and interfering with or disrupting important sensors, computers, and communication systems. With the continuous development and application of HPMW technology, radar faces an increasingly severe threat from these attacks. Therefore, researching methods for evaluating the damage effectiveness of HPMW attacks on radar is of great military significance for understanding the baseline capabilities of existing radar equipment against HPMW attacks, researching strategies for hardening radar equipment against HPMW attacks, and improving the battlefield survivability of radar equipment.

[0003] Electromagnetic topology is a theoretical analysis method that combines electromagnetic theory with topological graph theory. It is used to analyze and solve the electromagnetic response problem of complex electronic systems under external electromagnetic influences. Its main idea is to introduce the concept of topology and, based on the "good approximate shielding principle," decompose the complex electronic system into multiple relatively independent sub-regions hierarchically. The electromagnetic coupling relationships between these sub-regions are qualitatively described using the system's topological graph, thus decomposing the electromagnetic coupling problem of the entire complex system into relatively independent and simple electromagnetic problems that can be solved.

[0004] The good shielding approximation principle assumes that the coupling effect of the electromagnetic field in the external space region of the system on the internal space region of the system cannot be ignored, while the influence of the internal space region of the system on the external space region of the electronic system can be ignored.

[0005] To study the coupling response of electromagnetic pulses in electronic systems using electromagnetic topology theory, the system needs to be decomposed into multiple relatively independent sub-regions surrounded by shielding surfaces. Based on the structural characteristics of the electronic system and the aforementioned regional division rules, the electromagnetic pulse response in any spatial region of the system can be clearly described. This topological diagram, which uses electromagnetic pulse shielding surfaces and spatial regions to describe the electromagnetic coupling problem of an electronic system, is called an electromagnetic topology diagram. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the aforementioned problems, this invention provides a method for assessing the damage of HPMW attack reflector antenna radar based on EMT-BN.

[0007] To solve the above problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0008] The HPMW attack radar damage assessment method based on EMT-BN includes two approaches: front-door coupling and rear-door coupling. The front-door coupling refers to the high-power microwave directly entering the radar receiving channel through the radar antenna and damaging the circuit in the radar receiving channel along the pulse signal transmission direction, causing the radar to operate in reduced efficiency.

[0009] When the HPMW main beam is aimed at the radar for attack, the radar component unit receives the maximum HPM power density, which is expressed as:

[0010]

[0011] Where: P is the radiated power of the HPM source; G is the antenna gain of the HPM source; R is the distance between the HPM source and the radar; and L is the spatial transmission loss.

[0012] When the main lobe of the radar antenna beam is aligned with the main lobe of the high-power microwave weapon antenna, the effective receiving area of ​​the radar antenna is the largest, the receiving gain is the largest, the HPM power entering the receiving channel is the largest, and it is most likely to cause damage to the electronic equipment in the radar receiving channel. According to formula (1), the maximum HPM power entering the radar receiving channel is:

[0013]

[0014] In the formula: A r G represents the effective receiving area of ​​the radar antenna. r For radar antenna receiving gain, L r λ represents the receiving channel loss, and λ represents the operating wavelength.

[0015] Preferably, the rear door coupling refers to the HPM coupling or penetration into the electronic system through gaps, cables, shielding bodies, etc. The HPM coupling radar equipment working cabin has ventilation openings and external cable adapters, and the power station cabin needs to open the door for ventilation.

[0016] Preferably, the HPM's backdoor coupling to the radar is closely related to factors such as radar structure materials, openings, and cables. Based on the principle of shielding approximation and radar system structure, the radar system structure is transformed into a spatial region. The HPM transmits unidirectionally from the spatial region outside the electromagnetic pulse shielding layer to the spatial region inside the shielding layer, coupling into the radar electronic system layer by layer from the outside in. The electromagnetic pulse effects between spatial regions do not affect each other. The electromagnetic shielding layers of the radar electronic system include the radome, the working cabin wall, and the power station cabin wall. The radar transmitter air conditioning cabinet is outside the working cabin, and the cooling unit has a separate transmitter air conditioning shielding layer.

[0017] The radome is equipped with a servo subsystem, which includes azimuth drive, pitch drive, automatic leveling, azimuth measurement, and lift control. It also includes an antenna feeder subsystem, which includes an antenna and a feed source.

[0018] The working bulkhead includes a receiving subsystem, which includes a limiter, a field amplifier, and a receiver, as well as a signal processing subsystem, which includes an A / D pulse compressor and an MTD.

[0019] The working container wall includes a launch subsystem, which includes a power amplifier assembly, a power divider, a power combiner, a power supply, a control unit, and a monitoring unit.

[0020] The working bulkhead includes an automatic admission system, which includes an admission display, GPS, network processing and a main display unit, and also includes a monitoring system, which includes a monitoring module, an industrial control computer and a secondary display unit.

[0021] The power station cabin wall includes a power subsystem, which includes a diesel generator and a distribution box;

[0022] The transmitter's air conditioning shielding layer includes a cooling unit;

[0023] The shielding effectiveness of each shielding layer was determined by experimental methods, and the maximum HPM coupling power density received by each component unit can be expressed as:

[0024] S i =S / SE j (3)

[0025] In the formula: S i For component unit V (3,i) The maximum coupling power density of the received HPM, S is the HPM radiation received by the radar equipment. i The maximum power density of the light, SE j Radar component unit V (3,i) The shielding effectiveness of the electromagnetic shielding layer.

[0026] Preferably, during the HPM attack radar process, the electromagnetic pulse is coupled and transmitted to each component unit after passing through each shielding layer. Specifically, the electromagnetic pulse entering the antenna feeder is coupled and transmitted between component units along the receiving path. The electromagnetic topology diagram of the radar system is used to describe the coupling path and action process of the electromagnetic pulse under HPM action inside the radar, indicating the action path of HPM causing electromagnetic interference and damage and the flow of electromagnetic pulse energy. The electromagnetic topology diagram analyzes the HPM power density or field strength in a certain spatial area of ​​the radar and calculates the damage probability of the radar component units in that spatial area.

[0027] Preferably, radar component units exhibit two states under HPM action: normal (N) and damaged (F). When the HPM received power or irradiation power of a radar component unit exceeds its damage threshold, causing physical damage or functional failure, this is considered component damage. HPM damage to radar systems and subsystems is classified into four damage levels—minor damage, moderate damage, severe damage, and complete destruction—based on the degree of target damage and functional integrity. The damage threshold of radar component units is determined through experiments and simulations. Given the known damage threshold, the probability of damage to a radar component unit is calculated using the following formula:

[0028]

[0029] or

[0030] In the formula, P k P represents the probability of damage to a radar component unit. i Indicates radar component unit V (3,i) Maximum HPM power received, Indicates radar component unit V (3,i) The damage power threshold, S i Indicates radar component unit V (3,i) The maximum coupling power density of the HPM received. Indicates radar component unit V (3,i) The damage power density threshold is denoted by s, which represents the margin coefficient. Since radar component units themselves have differences, the margin coefficient s is used to represent their error range. Different radar component units have different margin coefficients, which generally range from 0.8 to 1.2.

[0031] Preferably, the signal processing subsystem interface board transmits P / A video and detection video, receives reset and transmits A display video. The interface board is connected to the low-beam channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board and an MTD board. The interface board is connected to the stealth channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board. The interface board is connected to the high-beam channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board and an MTD board. The interface board is connected to the north, incremental, and video selection control via a clock board. The clock board transmits, receives, records, monitors, and queries the sub-unit through various synchronization mechanisms.

[0032] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0033] Electromagnetic topology theory is used to describe the electromagnetic stress transmission and action process of HPMW within a radar system, and an electromagnetic topology diagram of an HPMW-attack reflector antenna radar is constructed. Bayesian networks are used to describe the interaction relationships between component units and the radar system and subsystems, and a radar Bayesian network structure diagram is constructed. By combining the HPMW-attack radar electromagnetic topology diagram and the radar Bayesian network structure diagram, an HPMW-attack reflector antenna radar damage effectiveness assessment model is established. This model can clearly and intuitively assess the damage degree and probability of radar under different HPMW attack conditions, and has practical significance in evaluating the radar's resistance to high-power microwave damage. Attached Figure Description

[0034] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the electromagnetic topology of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 2 This is a diagram of the front door coupled electromagnetic topology of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 3 This is a graph showing the relationship between the maximum HPM power density and the attack range of the radar equipment of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 4 This is a graph showing the relationship between the maximum power of the HPM entering the receiving channel and the attack distance according to the present invention.

[0038] Figure 5 This is a diagram of the electromagnetic shielding layers and components of the radar of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 6 This is a diagram of the electromagnetic topology of the back door coupling of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 7 This is a graph showing the relationship between the maximum coupling power density (HPM) of the radar component unit of this invention and the attack range (HPMW).

[0041] Figure 8 This is the electromagnetic topology diagram of the HPM attack radar of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 9 This is a simplified schematic diagram of the Bayesian network of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 10 This is a diagram of the radar Bayesian network structure of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 11 This is a damage probability diagram for a certain type of radar component unit of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 12 This is a diagram of the HPM attack radar damage effectiveness evaluation model of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 13This is a damage level and probability diagram of each radar subsystem of the present invention;

[0047] Figure 14 This is a damage level and probability diagram of the radar system of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 15 This is the state table of the radar component unit node of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 16 This is a damage level table for the radar system and subsystems of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0050] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0051] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the terms "center," "longitudinal," "lateral," "length," "width," "thickness," "upper," "lower," "front," "rear," "left," "right," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inner," "outer," "clockwise," and "counterclockwise," etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings. They are used only for the convenience of describing this invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limiting this invention.

[0052] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the stated features. In the description of this invention, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified. Furthermore, the terms "installed," "connected," and "linked" should be interpreted broadly; for example, they may refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they may refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they may refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; and they may refer to the internal connection of two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this invention based on the specific circumstances.

[0053] Example 1:

[0054] Reference Figure 1-16A method for assessing the damage of HPMW attack reflector antenna radar based on EMT-BN;

[0055] Electromagnetic topology is a theoretical analysis method that combines electromagnetic theory with topological graph theory. It is used to analyze and solve the electromagnetic response problem of complex electronic systems under external electromagnetic influences. Its main idea is to introduce the concept of topology and, based on the "good approximate shielding principle," decompose the complex electronic system into multiple relatively independent sub-regions hierarchically. The electromagnetic coupling relationships between these sub-regions are qualitatively described using the system's topological graph, thus decomposing the electromagnetic coupling problem of the entire complex system into relatively independent and simple electromagnetic problems that can be solved.

[0056] The good shielding approximation principle assumes that the coupling effect of the electromagnetic field in the external space region of the system on the internal space region of the system cannot be ignored, while the influence of the internal space region of the system on the external space region of the electronic system can be ignored.

[0057] To study the coupling response of electromagnetic pulses in electronic systems using electromagnetic topology theory, the system needs to be decomposed into multiple relatively independent sub-regions surrounded by shielding surfaces. Based on the structural characteristics of the electronic system and the aforementioned regional division rules, the electromagnetic pulse response in any spatial region of the system can be clearly described. This topological diagram, which uses electromagnetic pulse shielding surfaces and spatial regions to describe the electromagnetic coupling problem of an electronic system, is called an electromagnetic topology diagram, such as... Figure 1 As shown;

[0058] The electromagnetic topology diagram is based on the electromagnetic pulse shielding surface S. i Spatial region node V (i,j) Composed of directed edges. Electromagnetic pulse shielding surface S i This refers to electromagnetic shielding layers and structures that provide electromagnetic pulse shielding effectiveness for a specific spatial region. Spatial region node V (i,j) This corresponds to a node within a spatial region defined by an electromagnetic shielding surface. The directed edges between nodes represent electromagnetic stress transmission and coupling paths. A spatial region can contain multiple spatial sub-regions, and within the same spatial region, there can be multiple spatial region nodes used to indicate the location of the nodes, but each spatial region has only one electromagnetic shielding surface.

[0059] Electromagnetic topology diagrams can clearly depict the coupling path and action process of electromagnetic pulses within electronic systems, providing a very intuitive visual description for analyzing and solving the problem of electromagnetic pulse coupling and transmission within electronic systems.

[0060] HPMW attack radars employ two methods: front-door coupling and back-door coupling. Front-door coupling refers to high-power microwaves (HPM) directly entering the radar receiving channel through the radar antenna and, along the pulse signal propagation direction, disrupting the circuitry within the radar receiving channel, causing the radar to operate at reduced efficiency or even become inoperable. The electromagnetic topology analysis of HPM on the front-door coupling of radar is as follows... Figure 2 As shown;

[0061] Because there are cables connecting electronic devices, and the signal is transmitted between them along the cables, there is no electromagnetic shielding layer in the electromagnetic topology analysis. The magnitude of the HPM power received by the electronic device only needs to be calculated according to the transmission path.

[0062] When the HPMW main beam is aimed at the radar for attack, the HPM power density received by the radar component unit is at its maximum, which can be expressed as:

[0063]

[0064] Where: P is the radiated power of the HPM source; G is the antenna gain of the HPM source; R is the distance between the HPM source and the radar; and L is the spatial transmission loss.

[0065] Assuming the peak HPMW power P = 20 GW and the antenna main lobe gain G = 30 dB, the maximum HPMW power density received by the radar varies with the HPMW attack range as follows: Figure 3 As shown;

[0066] When the main lobe of the radar antenna beam is aligned with the main lobe of a high-power microwave weapon antenna, the effective receiving area of ​​the radar antenna is maximized, the receiving gain is maximized, and the HPM power entering the receiving channel is maximized, making it most likely to damage the electronic equipment within the radar receiving channel. Combining this with formula (1), the maximum HPM power entering the radar receiving channel is:

[0067]

[0068] In the formula: A r G represents the effective receiving area of ​​the radar antenna. r For radar antenna receiving gain, L r λ represents the receiving channel loss, and λ represents the operating wavelength.

[0069] Given that the main lobe receiving gain of a certain type of radar antenna is 33dB and the receiving channel loss is approximately 3dB, the relationship between the maximum power (HPM) entering the receiving channel from the radar antenna main lobe and the HPMW distance is as follows: Figure 2 as well as Figure 4 As shown;

[0070] Backdoor coupling refers to a coupling method in which HPM (High-Performance Particulate Matter) enters the internal structure of an electronic system through gaps, cables, shielding, etc. Because radar equipment working compartments have ventilation openings and external cable adapters, and power station compartments need to be ventilated while operating, HPM can more easily enter the radar equipment through backdoor coupling, causing functional damage to the radar.

[0071] The backdoor coupling of the HPM (Electromagnetic Pulse) to the radar is closely related to factors such as radar structural materials, openings, and cables, making it highly complex. Based on the principle of good shielding approximation and the structural characteristics of the radar system, the radar system structure is transformed into a spatial region. The HPM is transmitted unidirectionally from the spatial region outside the electromagnetic pulse shielding layer to the spatial region inside the shielding layer, coupling into the radar electronic system layer by layer from the outside in; the electromagnetic pulse effects between spatial regions do not affect each other. The electromagnetic shielding layers existing in the radar electronic system include the radome, the working cabin wall, and the power station cabin wall. Since the radar transmitter air conditioning cabinet is outside the working cabin, a separate transmitter air conditioning shielding layer is set for the cooling unit.

[0072] The radome is equipped with a servo subsystem, which includes azimuth drive, pitch drive, automatic leveling, azimuth measurement, and lift control. It also includes an antenna feeder subsystem, which includes an antenna and a feed source.

[0073] The working bulkhead includes a receiving subsystem, which includes a limiter, a field amplifier, and a receiver, as well as a signal processing subsystem, which includes an A / D pulse compressor and an MTD.

[0074] The working container wall includes a launch subsystem, which includes a power amplifier assembly, a power divider, a power combiner, a power supply, a control unit, and a monitoring unit.

[0075] The working bulkhead includes an automatic admission system, which includes an admission display, GPS, network processing and a main display unit, and also includes a monitoring system, which includes a monitoring module, an industrial control computer and a secondary display unit.

[0076] The power station cabin wall includes a power subsystem, which includes a diesel generator and a distribution box;

[0077] The transmitter's air conditioning shielding layer includes a cooling unit;

[0078] Electromagnetic topology analysis was performed on the backdoor coupling of the HPM attack radar, and an electromagnetic topology diagram of the HPM attack radar backdoor coupling was established, such as... Figure 6 As shown;

[0079] V (3,i) S represents a radar system component unit. iRepresenting each electromagnetic shielding layer, the shielding effectiveness of each shielding layer can be determined through experiments and other methods. The maximum coupling power density of HPM received by each component unit can then be expressed as:

[0080] S i =S / SE j (3)

[0081] In the formula: S i For component unit V (3,i) The maximum coupled power density of the received HPM, S is the maximum power density of the radar equipment irradiated by the HPM, and SE is the maximum coupled power density of the received HPM. j For component unit V (3,i) The shielding effectiveness of the electromagnetic shielding layer in which it is located;

[0082] Combination Figure 2 and Figure 6 Establish an electromagnetic topology map of the HPM attack radar, such as Figure 8 As shown;

[0083] Figure 8 In the diagram, the arrows indicate the direction of HPM coupling and transmission within the radar equipment. During an HPM attack on a radar, the electromagnetic pulse is coupled and transmitted to each component unit after passing through each shielding layer. Specifically, the electromagnetic pulse entering the antenna feeder is coupled and transmitted between component units along the receiving path.

[0084] An electromagnetic topology diagram of a radar system can be used to describe the coupling path and action process of electromagnetic pulses (HPMs) within the radar, representing the pathways through which HPMs cause electromagnetic interference and damage, as well as the direction of electromagnetic pulse energy flow. Therefore, the power density or field strength of HPMs within a specific spatial region of the radar can be analyzed based on the electromagnetic topology diagram, thereby calculating the probability of damage to radar components within that region.

[0085] Bayesian networks are probabilistic graphical models based on Bayesian methods. They primarily obtain global variable relationships by integrating descriptions of local interactions between variables and using conditional probability distributions to describe joint distributions. They are among the most effective theoretical models for representing and reasoning about uncertain knowledge. Figure 9 As shown;

[0086] Based on the structural characteristics of radar systems, a hierarchical Bayesian network structure diagram of radar is established, with radar component units as root nodes, each subsystem as a second-level child node, and the radar system as a first-level node, combining the interaction relationships between radar subsystems and component units. For example... Figure 10 As shown.

[0087] Figure 10 In the middle, V (1,1) V represents a radar system node. (2,i) V represents the radar subsystem. (3,j)The arrows between the nodes represent the radar component unit nodes, and indicate the interaction between the nodes, that is, the influence of the parent node state on the child node state. This influence includes the impact of the node's damage state and its functional state.

[0088] Radar component units exhibit two states under HPM (High-Performance Radar) conditions: Normal (N) and Damaged (F). When the HPM received power or irradiation power of a component unit exceeds its damage threshold, causing physical damage or functional failure, the component is considered damaged. Figure 15 As shown;

[0089] HPM damage to radar systems and subsystems can be classified into four levels based on the degree of target damage and functional integrity: minor damage, moderate damage, severe damage, and complete destruction. Figure 16 As shown;

[0090] The damage threshold of radar component units can be determined through experiments and simulations. Given the damage threshold of a component unit, the formula for calculating the damage probability of that component unit is:

[0091]

[0092] or

[0093] In the formula, P k P represents the probability of damage to a component unit. i Indicates component unit V (3,i) Maximum HPM power received, Indicates component unit V (3,i) The damage power threshold, S i Indicates component unit V (3,i) The maximum coupling power density of the HPM received. Indicates component unit V (3,i) The damage power density threshold is defined by s, which represents the margin coefficient. Due to the inherent differences between component units, the margin coefficient s is used to represent their error range. Different component units have different margin coefficients, typically ranging from 0.8 to 1.2.

[0094] Given the HPM damage threshold of a certain type of reflector antenna radar component element, the damage probability of the component element under different HPM power densities is as follows: Figure 11 As shown;

[0095] Some unit nodes have interactive relationships. Limited experiments cannot completely solve the uncertainty of mutual influence between component units. The conditional probability between nodes can be determined by combining the logical relationship between component units and experimental test results, and then the damage probability of the unit nodes can be calculated.

[0096] In the radar Bayesian network structure diagram, the interaction relationships between nodes can be expressed using conditional probabilities, thus determining the degree of mutual influence between nodes. Using the damage probability of the underlying component units as input variables, and reasoning through the conditional probabilities between nodes, the damage extent and probability of the radar system can be evaluated.

[0097] By reconstructing and combining the radar's hierarchical Bayesian network structure diagram and electromagnetic topology diagram, a damage effectiveness assessment model for HPM attack radar is established, such as... Figure 12 As shown;

[0098] Figure 12 In this model, the electromagnetic topology domain describes the coupling and transmission process of HPM attack radar, which can be used to analyze and calculate the maximum power or power density of HPM received by radar component units. The Bayesian network structure domain describes the interaction relationships between the radar system, subsystems, and component units, and can be used to analyze the damage level and probability of the radar using conditional probability reasoning. The HPMW attack radar damage effectiveness assessment model not only demonstrates the effect of HPM on the radar's internal processes but also intuitively describes the conditional probability relationships of damage between radar system nodes. This makes it easier to calculate and analyze the damage probability of radar component units and the damage level and probability of the radar system.

[0099] Assuming the HPMW pulse peak power is 20GW and the antenna gain is 30dB, an attack is launched against a certain type of reflector antenna radar located 3km in the direction of the main pulse beam. Figure 7 and Figure 11 Calculate the probability of damage to each component unit. Based on experiments and expert experience, determine... Figure 12 The conditional probabilities of each node are used to simulate and calculate the damage level and probability of each subsystem of the radar, as follows: Figure 13 As shown;

[0100] Damage level and probability of radar system as follows Figure 14 As shown.

[0101] When the HPMW attacks the radar at a range of 3km, the probability of the radar suffering moderate damage is 91.58%. The automatic acquisition subsystem, monitoring subsystem, and power supply subsystem are the most severely damaged.

[0102] The signal processing subsystem interface board transmits P / A video and detection video, receives reset data and transmits A-display video. The interface board is connected to the low-beam channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board and an MTD board. The interface board is connected to the stealth channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board. The interface board is connected to the high-beam channel intermediate frequency via an A / D pulse compression board and an MTD board. The interface board is connected to the north, incremental, and video selection control via a clock board. The clock board transmits, receives, records, monitors, and queries this subunit through various synchronization mechanisms.

[0103] In summary, this scheme utilizes electromagnetic topology theory to describe the electromagnetic stress transmission and action process of HPMW within the radar system, constructing an electromagnetic topology diagram of an HPMW-attack reflector antenna radar. It also uses Bayesian networks to describe the interaction relationships between component units and the radar system / subsystems, constructing a radar Bayesian network structure diagram. By combining the HPMW-attack radar electromagnetic topology diagram and the radar Bayesian network structure diagram, a damage effectiveness assessment model for an HPMW-attack reflector antenna radar is established. This model can clearly and intuitively assess the damage degree and probability of the radar under different HPMW attack conditions, and has practical significance in evaluating the radar's resistance to high-power microwave damage.

[0104] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A radar damage assessment method for EMT-BN based HPMW attack reflector antenna, including two ways of front door coupling and back door coupling, characterized in that, The front door coupling means that the high power microwave directly enters the radar receiving channel through the radar antenna, and destroys the circuit in the radar receiving channel along the direction of the pulse signal transmission, so that the radar works inefficiently. The maximum HPM power density received by the radar component unit when the HPM main beam is aimed at the radar is represented as: ; In the formula, P is the radiation power of the HPM source; G is the antenna gain of the HPM source; R is the distance between the HPM source and the radar; and L is the spatial transmission loss. When the radar antenna beam main lobe is aligned with the main lobe of the high power microwave weapon, the radar antenna effective receiving area is maximum, the receiving gain is maximum, the HPM power entering the receiving channel is maximum, and the electronic equipment in the radar receiving channel is most easily damaged. In combination with formula (1), the maximum HPM power entering the radar receiving channel is In the formula: is the radar antenna effective receiving area, is the radar antenna receiving gain, is the receiving channel loss, is the working wavelength; The radar component unit under the action of the HPM shows two states of normal (N) and damage (F), the HPM receiving power or irradiation power of the radar component unit exceeds the damage threshold, causing physical damage or functional failure of the radar component unit, which is component damage; the damage of the HPM to the radar system and subsystem is divided into four damage levels of light damage, moderate damage, severe damage and destruction according to the target damage degree and functional integrity. The radar component unit damage threshold is determined by experiment and simulation method. Under the condition of known radar component unit damage threshold, the damage probability calculation formula of radar component unit is: In the formula, The damage probability of radar component unit is represented by, The radar component unit The maximum HPM power received, The radar component unit, The damage power threshold of, The radar component unit The maximum coupling power density of HPM received, The radar component unit, The damage power density threshold of, S represents the margin coefficient. There are differences in radar component units themselves. The margin coefficient S is used to represent the error range. The margin coefficients of different radar component units are different. The value range is generally 0.8~1.

2.

2. The EMT-BN based HPMW attack reflector antenna radar damage assessment method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The back door coupling means that the HPM enters the electronic system through the hole, cable, shielding body coupling or penetration, and the radar equipment working shelter has a ventilation opening, an external cable adapter plate, and the power station shelter needs to open the door for ventilation.

3. The EMT-BN based HPMW attack reflector antenna radar damage assessment method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The backdoor coupling of HPM to radar is closely related to the structure material, aperture and cable of radar. Based on the shielding approximation principle and the structure of radar system, the structure of radar system is converted into spatial regions, and HPM is transmitted from the outside of the electromagnetic shielding layer to the inside of the electromagnetic shielding layer, and coupled into the radar electronic system from outside to inside and layer by layer. The electromagnetic pulse effects between the spatial regions have no influence on each other. The electromagnetic shielding layers of the radar electronic system include the antenna cover, the working cabin wall and the power station cabin wall. The radar transmitter air conditioner cabinet is outside the working cabin, and the cooling unit is separately set as a transmitter air conditioner shielding layer. The antenna cover is provided with a servo subsystem, which includes an azimuth drive, an elevation drive, an automatic leveling, an azimuth measurement and a lifting control. The antenna cover also includes an antenna feed line subsystem, which includes an antenna and a feed source. The working cabin wall includes a receiving subsystem, which includes an amplitude limiter, a field amplifier and a receiver. The working cabin wall also includes a signal processing subsystem, which includes an A / D pulse pressure and an MTD. The working cabin wall includes a transmitting subsystem, which includes a power amplifier assembly, a power distributor, a power combiner, a power supply, a control unit and a monitoring unit. The working cabin wall includes an automatic recording subsystem, which includes a recording display, a GPS, a networking processing and a main display branch. The working cabin wall also includes a monitoring subsystem, which includes a monitoring module, an industrial computer and a secondary display branch. The power station cabin wall includes a power supply subsystem, which includes a diesel generator and a distribution box. The transmitter air conditioner shielding layer includes a cooling unit. The shielding effectiveness of each shielding layer is determined by experimental method, and the maximum coupling power density of HPM received by each component unit can be represented as: wherein: is the maximum coupling power density of HPM received by the radar component unit S is the maximum power density of radar equipment irradiated by HPM, is the maximum coupling power density of HPM received by the radar component unit the shielding effectiveness of the electromagnetic shielding layer where the radar component unit is located.

4. The EMT-BN based HPMW attack reflector antenna radar damage assessment method according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the HPM attack on the radar, the electromagnetic pulse is coupled and transmitted between the component units after passing through each shielding layer, wherein the electromagnetic pulse entering the antenna feeder is coupled and transmitted between the component units along the receiving path; the electromagnetic topology diagram of the radar is used to describe the coupling path and action process of the electromagnetic pulse in the radar under the action of the HPM, represent the action path of the electromagnetic interference and damage caused by the HPM and the flow direction of the electromagnetic pulse energy, and analyze the HPM power density or field strength in a certain space region of the radar, and calculate the damage probability of the radar component unit in the space region.

5. The EMT-BN based HPMW attack reflector antenna radar damage assessment method according to claim 2, wherein, The interface board of the signal processing subsystem sends P / A video and detection video, receives reset and sends A display video, is connected with the A / D pulse compression board and the MTD board of the low-beam channel intermediate frequency, is connected with the A / D pulse compression board of the shadow channel intermediate frequency, is connected with the A / D pulse compression board and the MTD of the high-beam channel intermediate frequency, is connected with the north, increment and video selection control of the clock board, and the clock board sends and receives, records, monitors and inquires the substation through various synchronizations.

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