An online voting system with privacy protection and 5g gateway signature verification

Abstract

The application discloses an online voting system and method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification, and the voting system comprises a background management end and a user voting end. The background management end comprises a key management module, a vote management module and a 5G gateway verification module. The key management module and the vote management module are independent of each other, the vote management module cannot obtain specific identity information of voters, and only the public key list of the voters can be used to verify whether the users have the voting right, and the key management module only records the identity information of the voters and cannot obtain specific voting information of the voters, so that the demand for the privacy of the user information of the non-recording voting and the voting qualification verification is met. Based on the system, a voting method for recording voting and non-recording voting is designed, different key distribution and signature modes are adopted, the memory occupation and the verification efficiency are reduced, the cheating behavior of a third party is prevented, and meanwhile, the voting result is ensured to be not tampered and verifiable.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of voting equipment technology, specifically relating to an online voting system and method that combines privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification. Background Technology

[0002] Offline voting, limited by geographical location and burdened by cumbersome manual vote counting, has been gradually replaced by online electronic voting. However, the flexibility of online electronic voting also presents new challenges to the design of the voting process and security verification methods.

[0003] In offline voting, participants must undergo identity verification before entering the venue; only those with voting rights are allowed entry. Therefore, everyone present is entitled to vote. Online electronic voting, however, cannot distinguish voting rights based on physical location and requires digital signatures for voter identification. Offline voting allows for separate staff for counting, tallying, and monitoring the votes to ensure fairness. Online electronic voting, on the other hand, requires digital signatures and verification of ballot data to prevent tampering and ensure the security of registered users' information. Furthermore, in offline voting, only voters in the venue have access to the distributed ballots and the ballot box; however, in online electronic voting, ballots may be intercepted and tampered with during network data transmission, or the voting system may receive a large number of invalid ballots, ballots submitted by users without voting rights, or multiple submissions by voters. The ballot management module may also be vulnerable to malicious cyberattacks.

[0004] Common electronic voting solutions in the current technology include centralized voting systems that rely on third-party institutions or service providers, and decentralized voting systems that are based on distributed systems and do not require third parties. Both can meet different needs such as identity verification, anonymous voting, vote limits, and large-scale application.

[0005] Voting systems based on third-party institutions rely entirely on the service provider's reputation for security and privacy, lacking other constraints. This makes them susceptible to issues like voter fraud or leaks of voter information. Distributed voting systems, on the other hand, use blockchain technology and a consensus mechanism to ensure data consistency across nodes. Each node participates in verifying and recording voting information, ensuring consensus on data changes. Even if some nodes tamper with their data, data can still be retrieved from other nodes. Furthermore, once data is added to a block, each block contains the hash of the previous block, forming a chain structure. Modifying existing block data will change the hash of subsequent blocks, leading to rejection by other nodes and preventing data tampering, thus guaranteeing the authenticity of the results. However, when a large number of participants are involved, the increasing blockchain scale requires each node to have significant storage capacity and processing power, resulting in high system deployment costs. In cases involving erroneous node verification, multiple nodes must participate, leading to network congestion and prolonged processing time, resulting in high computational overhead and low signature verification efficiency.

[0006] There are no effective solutions to the above problems in the existing technology. Summary of the Invention

[0007] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention proposes an online voting system and method that combines privacy protection with 5G gateway signature verification. Key management and ballot management are separated to prevent cheating by the central system. Different key distribution methods are used for registered and anonymous voting to ensure personal information security. Simultaneously, a 5G gateway is used to verify voter identity, preventing malicious attacks and multiple submissions from causing adverse effects.

[0008] An online voting system with privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification includes a backend management terminal and a user voting terminal. The backend management terminal includes a key management module, a ballot management module, and a 5G gateway verification module.

[0009] The user voting terminal registers a voting account based on the user's input identity information. This identity information is verified by the backend management terminal, confirming the user's status as a voter. The user can then receive keys distributed by the key management module and ballots distributed by the ballot management module. After completing the ballot content and key signature, the user submits the ballot to the backend management terminal.

[0010] Based on the identity information entered by the user voting terminal, the key management module distributes keys to verified voters before the voting begins and sends the corresponding public key list to the 5G gateway verification module. For named voting, the key management module distributes a corresponding private key to each voter; for anonymous voting, it distributes a corresponding share of private keys to each voter.

[0011] The 5G gateway verification module verifies whether the voting account submitting the ballot is a verified voter user by matching the signature on the ballot with the public key list. The 5G gateway verification module only submits successfully matched ballots to the ballot management module, invalidates unmatched ballots, and sends an error message to the voting terminal of the user who submitted the ballot.

[0012] Before voting begins, the ballot management module informs the key management module whether the voting mode is named or anonymous, and distributes ballots to user voting terminals at the start of voting. After voting begins, it tallies the ballots submitted by the 5G gateway, and announces the voting results after the voting ends.

[0013] An online voting method that combines privacy protection and gateway signature verification, based on a voting system with separate key management and ballot management modules, specifically includes the following steps:

[0014] Step 1: Initialize the ballot management module by generating ballot content, minimum valid vote percentage, minimum valid vote winning percentage, and setting the voting format, start and end times, and minimum number of participants. The voting format includes both named and anonymous voting. After initialization, send the set information to the key management module.

[0015] Step 2: The key management module verifies user identity based on registration information, counts the number of users with voting rights (i.e., the number of voters), and reports this information to the ballot management module. If the number of voters has not reached the minimum participation requirement by the set voting start time, the voter and the ballot management module are notified that the vote is canceled, and the process ends; otherwise, proceed to Step 3.

[0016] Step 3: The key management module informs voters of the start and end times of the voting. Upon the start time, it distributes keys to voters according to the voting method and simultaneously sends a list of voters' public keys to the ballot management module, which then sends this list to the 5G gateway. For registered voting, the key management module distributes a corresponding private key to each voter; for anonymous voting, it distributes a corresponding key share to each voter based on the Feldman secret distribution algorithm. At the set start time, the ballot management module distributes ballots to verified users.

[0017] As a preferred option, in the named vote, voter U i public key pk i With private key sk i Satisfy PK i =sk i *G, where G is a base point on an elliptic curve.

[0018] As a preferred method, the key share generation method for anonymous voting is as follows:

[0019] s3.1. Let the shared private key be SK, p and q be large prime numbers, and satisfy SK∈p and q be large prime factors of p-1.

[0020] s3.2. Select an element g of order q with modulus p, i.e., g q =1 (mod p), where the generator g is an element over a finite field.

[0021] s3.3 Calculate the minimum valid vote count T based on the number of voters I and the minimum valid vote ratio, and randomly select T-1 parameters a1, a2, ..., a T-1 Construct f(x) i )=a0+a1x i +a2x i 2 +···+a T-1 x i T-1 (mod p), where a0 = SK.

[0022] s3.4 Calculate the commitments of the above T-1 parameters. And disclose c0, c1, ..., c T-1 , t=0,1…T-1.

[0023] s3.5, for voters U i Allocate a non-zero integer x i Its corresponding key share sk i =f(x) i (mod p), will (x i ,sk i )Sent to voter U i .

[0024] Step 4: For named votes, digitally sign the ballot using the private key after it is filled out. For anonymous votes, first verify the authenticity of the received key share, then digitally sign the ballot using the private key share after it is filled out. After completing the digital signature, add a timestamp and submit the ballot to the ballot management module.

[0025] As a preferred method, the authenticity verification method for key shares is: Voter U i Based on the received information (x) i ,sk i ), calculate the equation Check if it is valid; if it is, then the key share is valid.

[0026] As a preferred option, voter U i Use private key sk iFor the recorded ballot m i Perform digital signature, S i =sk i ·H(m i Where H() represents the hash function, H:{0,1} * →G1, G1, G2 are additive cyclic groups of order p, G T It is a multiplicative cyclic group of order p, where p is a prime number, and there exists a bilinear mapping G1×G2→G T .

[0027] Step 5: The 5G gateway first matches and verifies the digital signature on the ballot using the voter's public key list. It then determines whether the vote was cast before the deadline based on the timestamp. Only ballots that match and were submitted before the deadline are forwarded to the ballot management module, while the rest are invalidated.

[0028] Step 6: When the voting deadline is reached, the ballot management module counts the received ballots and calculates the ratio of the number of received ballots to the number of voters. If the ratio is less than the set minimum valid voting ratio, the vote is declared invalid and the process ends; otherwise, proceed to step 7.

[0029] Step 7: For named voting, use the BLS aggregation signature algorithm to generate an aggregation signature to replace the original digital signature on the ballot, and then publish the ballot data, the BLS aggregation signature, and the final voting results. For anonymous voting, reconstruct the key and generate a group signature for the voting results to replace the original digital signature on the ballot, and then publish the final voting results and the group signature.

[0030] As a preferred method, in named voting, the BLS aggregate signature algorithm is used to combine the digital signatures S1, S2, ..., S on all ballots. n They are aggregated into a single signature S, where S = S1 + S2 + ... + S n .

[0031] As a preferred method, Lagrange interpolation is used for calculation. The shared private key SK is reconstructed.

[0032] Step 8: The key management module verifies the digital signature of the voting results generated by the ballot management module. For the ballot data published in the registered vote and the BLS aggregate signature, the key management module verifies the aggregate signature S and the public key list pk1~pk1. n Verify the equation e(G,S)=e(pk1,H(m1))*e(pk2,H(m2))*…*e(pk n ,H(m nIf the equation holds true, the aggregate signature is valid; if the equation does not hold true, there is data forgery. For the voting results and group signatures published by anonymous voting, the key management module can determine whether there is cheating by comparing whether the private key used by the group signature is the shared private key SK.

[0033] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0034] 1. Throughout the process, the key management module and the ballot management module are separated. The voting system cannot obtain the specific identity information of the voters. It can only verify whether the user has the right to vote through the list of public keys of the voters sent by the key management module. The key management module only records the identity information of the voters and cannot obtain the specific voting information of the voters. It takes into account the needs of user information privacy and voting qualification verification in anonymous voting. The named and anonymous voting designed for different application scenarios can both prevent third-party cheating and ensure that the voting results are not tampered with and are verifiable.

[0035] 2. For named voting, the BLS aggregate signature scheme is used to reduce storage space and improve the efficiency of transmission and verification.

[0036] 3. When voters submit ballots to the ballot management module, the digital signature on the ballot is authenticated based on the storage and computing capabilities of the 5G gateway. Only successfully authenticated ballots can be submitted to the ballot management module, effectively preventing voting behavior by malicious users without voting rights.

[0037] 4. Compared to blockchain technology, which uses multiple nodes for confirmation and verification, 5G gateways can independently verify each ballot, enabling them to quickly process and verify large amounts of data traffic. At the same time, 5G networks have high bandwidth and low latency, which can further improve the verification speed.

[0038] 5. The authentication, intrusion detection and prevention system based on the 5G gateway, as well as traffic analysis, can prevent malicious attacks.

[0039] 6. Once the voting data is published, the key management module can verify the authenticity of the data at any time, without being restricted by the user status or the ballot management module.

[0040] 7. By changing the minimum valid vote ratio, minimum valid vote percentage, and ballot content set in the ballot management module, the application needs of different scenarios such as equal-number voting and differential voting can be met. Attached Figure Description

[0041] Figure 1 A flowchart of an online voting system;

[0042] Figure 2This is a flowchart of the online voting process for anonymous voting in Example 1;

[0043] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the online voting process for named voting in Example 2. Detailed Implementation

[0044] The present invention will be further explained below with reference to the accompanying drawings;

[0045] like Figure 1 As shown, an online voting system with privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification includes a backend management terminal and a user voting terminal. The backend management terminal includes a key management module, a ballot management module, and a 5G gateway verification module.

[0046] The user voting terminal registers a voting account based on the user's input identity information. This account is used to receive keys distributed by the key management module and ballots distributed by the ballot management module. After completing the ballot content and key signature, the user submits the ballot to the backend management terminal. Before voting begins, the key management module distributes keys to verified voters based on the user's input identity information and sends the corresponding public key list to the 5G gateway verification module. The 5G gateway verification module verifies whether the submitting voting account is a verified voter by matching the signature on the ballot with the public key list. Only successfully matched ballots are submitted to the ballot management module; unmatched ballots are invalidated, and an error message is sent to the user voting terminal that submitted them. Before voting begins, the ballot management module informs the key management module whether the voting mode is named or anonymous. Ballots are distributed to user voting terminals at the start of voting. After voting begins, the module tallies the votes submitted by the 5G gateway and publishes the voting results after the voting ends.

[0047] Example 1

[0048] This embodiment describes a method for anonymous voting based on the aforementioned online voting system, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0049] Step 1: The user information participating in the vote is verified by the key management module and authenticated as the voter. The ballot management module completes the initial voting settings, informing the key management module that this is an anonymous vote, as well as the start and end times and the minimum number of participants.

[0050] Step 2: The key management module counts the number of certified voters. If the number of voters does not reach the minimum participation requirement when the voting time arrives, the vote is cancelled; otherwise, proceed to Step 3.

[0051] Step 3: When the number of voters reaches the minimum number of participants, the key management module sends the start and end times of the vote to the registered voters and informs the ballot management module of the number of participants.

[0052] Step 4: Upon arrival of the voting time, the key management module generates a shared key SK based on the Feldman secret distribution algorithm and distributes a corresponding key share to each voter. Simultaneously, it sends a list of voters' public keys to the ballot management module. The ballot management module receives the list of voters' public keys and sends it to the 5G gateway, while also sending ballots to registered voters.

[0053] Step 5: Voters receive the ballot and private key share. They first verify the authenticity of the received key share, then digitally sign the ballot using the private key share and add a timestamp after filling it out, and finally submit the ballot to the ballot management module.

[0054] Step 6: The 5G gateway first matches and verifies the digital signature on the ballot using the voter's public key list. It then determines whether the vote was submitted before the deadline based on the timestamp. Only the successfully matched ballots submitted before the deadline are forwarded to the ballot management module. The remaining ballots are invalidated, and an error message is sent to the voter who submitted the ballot.

[0055] Step 7: After the voting period ends, the ballot system calculates the number of ballots. If the ratio of the number of ballots to the number of voters is less than the set minimum valid vote ratio, the vote is declared invalid; otherwise, proceed to Step 8.

[0056] Step 8: If the number of votes for an option reaches the minimum valid vote ratio, the election is declared successful. The shared key is reconstructed to generate a group signature to replace the original digital signature on the ballot, and all ballot data and election results are published; otherwise, the election is declared unsuccessful.

[0057] Step 9: After the voting results are announced, the key management module uses the voters' shared keys to verify the digital signature of the voting results, thereby verifying the ballot data announced by the ballot management module. If the comparison passes, it means that there is no cheating in the ballot data and the voting results are valid; otherwise, it means that the ballot data may have been tampered with and the vote is declared invalid.

[0058] Example 2

[0059] This embodiment describes a method for registered voting based on the aforementioned online voting system, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0060] Step 1: The user information participating in the vote is verified by the key management module and authenticated as the voter. The ballot management module completes the initial voting settings, informing the key management module that this is a registered vote, as well as the start and end times and the minimum number of participants.

[0061] Step 2: The key management module counts the number of certified voters. If the number of voters does not reach the minimum participation requirement by the voting time, the vote is cancelled; otherwise, proceed to Step 3.

[0062] Step 3: When the number of voters reaches the minimum number of participants, the key management module sends the start and end times of the vote to the registered voters and informs the ballot management module of the number of participants.

[0063] Step 4: Upon arrival of the voting time, the key management module distributes a corresponding private key to each voter and simultaneously sends a list of voters' public keys to the ballot management module. The ballot management module receives the list of voters' public keys and sends it to the 5G gateway, while also sending ballots to registered voters.

[0064] Step 5: Voters receive the ballot and private key, fill in the ballot and add a digital signature and timestamp, and then submit the ballot to the ballot management module.

[0065] Step 6: The 5G gateway first matches and verifies the digital signature on the ballot using the voter's public key list. It then determines whether the vote was submitted before the deadline based on the timestamp. Only the successfully matched ballots submitted before the deadline are forwarded to the ballot management module. The remaining ballots are invalidated, and an error message is sent to the voter who submitted the ballot.

[0066] Step 7: After the voting period ends, the ballot system calculates the number of ballots. If the ratio of the number of ballots to the number of voters is less than the set minimum valid vote ratio, the vote is declared invalid; otherwise, proceed to Step 8.

[0067] Step 8: If the number of votes for an option reaches the minimum valid vote ratio, the election is declared successful. The digital signatures on all ballots are aggregated using the BLS algorithm to generate an aggregated signature, and the ballot data, BLS aggregated signature, and final election results are published. Otherwise, the election is declared unsuccessful.

[0068] Step 9: After the voting results are announced, the key management module uses the voters' public key information to verify the BLS aggregate signature published by the ballot management module. If the verification passes, it means that there is no cheating in the ballot data and the voting results are valid; if the verification fails, it means that the ballot data may have been tampered with, and the vote is declared invalid.

Claims

1. An online voting method that combines privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification, characterized in that: The online voting system is based on the following: a backend management system and a user voting system. The user voting terminal registers voting accounts based on the user's input identity information and uploads the user's identity information to the backend management terminal for identity verification; the backend management terminal includes a key management module, a ballot management module, and a 5G gateway verification module; Specifically, the following steps are included: Step 1: Initialize the ballot management module by generating ballot content, minimum valid vote ratio, minimum valid vote percentage, and setting the voting format, start and end times, and minimum number of participants. The voting format includes registered voting and anonymous voting. After initialization, send the set information to the key management module. Step 2: The key management module verifies the identity of users based on their registration information, counts the number of users with voting rights (i.e., the number of voters), and feeds this information back to the ballot management module. If the number of voters has not reached the minimum number of participants by the set start time of the vote, the voter and the ballot management module are notified that the vote is canceled and the process ends; otherwise, proceed to step 3. Step 3: The key management module informs voters of the start and end times of the voting. Upon the start time, it distributes keys to voters according to the voting method and simultaneously sends a list of voters' public keys to the ballot management module, which then sends the list to the 5G gateway. For registered voting, the key management module distributes a corresponding private key to each voter; for anonymous voting, it distributes a corresponding key share to each voter based on the Feldman secret distribution algorithm. At the set start time, the ballot management module distributes ballots to verified users. Step 4: For named voting, digitally sign the ballot using the private key after filling it out; for anonymous voting, first verify the authenticity of the received key share, then digitally sign the ballot using the private key share after filling it out; after completing the digital signature, add a timestamp and submit the ballot to the ballot management module. Step 5: The 5G gateway first matches and verifies the digital signature on the ballot using the voter's public key list, and then determines whether the vote was submitted before the deadline based on the timestamp. Only the successfully matched ballots submitted before the deadline are forwarded to the ballot management module, and the rest are invalidated. Step 6: When the voting deadline is reached, the ballot management module counts the received ballots and calculates the ratio of the number of received ballots to the number of voters. If the ratio is less than the set minimum valid voting ratio, the vote is declared invalid and the process ends; otherwise, proceed to step 7. Step 7: For named voting, use the BLS aggregate signature algorithm to generate an aggregate signature to replace the original digital signature on the ballot, and then publish the ballot data, the BLS aggregate signature, and the final voting results; for anonymous voting, reconstruct the key and generate a group signature for the voting results to replace the original digital signature on the ballot, and then publish the final voting results and the group signature. Step 8: The key management module verifies the digital signature of the voting results generated by the ballot management module. For the ballot data published in the registered vote and the BLS aggregate signature, the key management module verifies the aggregate signature S and the public key list. ~ Verify the equation The equation is checked to determine if it holds true. If true, the aggregate signature is valid; otherwise, data forgery or cheating has occurred. Here, G is a base point on an elliptic curve, and H() represents the hash function. Indicates voters For the recorded ballots, and for the published voting results and group signatures of the anonymous ballots, the key management module can determine whether there is any cheating by comparing whether the private key used for the group signature is the shared private key SK.

2. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 1, characterized in that: Voters in a recorded vote public key With private key satisfy .

3. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 2, characterized in that: Voters Use private key ballots for recorded voting Perform digital signature, Where H() represents the hash function, , , It is an additive cyclic group of order p. It is a multiplicative cyclic group of order p, where p is a prime number, and has a bilinear mapping. .

4. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 3, characterized in that: In a named vote, the BLS aggregate signature algorithm is used to display the digital signatures on all ballots. Aggregate into a single signature S. .

5. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The key share generation method for anonymous voting is as follows: s3.

1. Let the shared private key be SK, and p and q be large prime numbers, satisfying that SK∈p and q are large prime factors of p-1; s3.2 Select an element of order q with modulus p. ,Right now The generator g is an element over a finite field; s3.3 Calculate the minimum number of valid votes T based on the number of voters I and the minimum valid vote ratio, and randomly select T-1 parameters. ,structure ,in ; s3.4 Calculate the commitments of the above T-1 parameters. And made public , t=0,1…T-1; s3.5, for voters Allocate a non-zero integer Its corresponding key share ,Will( Send to voters .

6. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 5, characterized in that: The method for verifying the authenticity of key shares is as follows: Voters Based on the information received ( ), calculate the equation Check if it is valid; if it is, then the key share is valid.

7. The online voting method for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 5, characterized in that: Calculation using Lagrange interpolation The shared private key SK is reconstructed.

8. An online voting system with privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification, characterized in that: This system is used to implement the online voting method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7; the system includes a backend management terminal and a user voting terminal; The user voting terminal registers voting accounts based on the user's input identity information and uploads the user's identity information to the backend management terminal for identity verification; the backend management terminal includes a key management module, a ballot management module, and a 5G gateway verification module; The user voting terminal is a user verified as a voter by the backend management terminal. It receives a key distributed by the key management module and a ballot distributed by the ballot management module. After completing the ballot content, key signature and adding timestamp, the user submits the ballot to the backend management terminal. Based on the identity information entered by the user voting terminal, the key management module distributes keys to verified voters before the voting begins and sends the corresponding public key list to the 5G gateway verification module. For named voting, the key management module distributes a corresponding private key to each voter; for anonymous voting, it distributes a corresponding private key share to each voter. The 5G gateway verification module verifies whether the voting account submitting the ballot is a verified voter user by matching the signature on the ballot with the public key list. The 5G gateway verification module only submits successfully matched ballots to the ballot management module, invalidates unmatched ballots, and sends an error message to the voting terminal of the user who submitted the ballot. Before the voting begins, the ballot management module informs the key management module whether the voting mode is named or anonymous, and distributes ballots to the user voting terminal when the voting begins; after the voting begins, it counts the voting content for the ballots submitted by the 5G gateway, and announces the voting results after the voting ends.

9. The online voting system for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 8, characterized in that: For anonymous voting, the Feldman secret distribution algorithm is used to distribute a corresponding share of key to each voter.

10. The online voting system for privacy protection and 5G gateway signature verification as described in claim 8, characterized in that: For named voting, the ballot management module aggregates the digital signatures on the ballots based on the BLS aggregation algorithm.

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