Tlcp communication method and system resistant to quantum attacks
By combining traditional public-key cryptography algorithms with quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms in a hybrid signature and key exchange method, a hybrid pre-master key is generated, which solves the security problem of TLCP communication under quantum computer attacks and achieves dual protection for secure communication and protocol transition.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- SHANDONG DUOFANG SEMICON CO LTD
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-09
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-08
AI Technical Summary
Existing TLCP communication methods are not resistant to quantum attacks and cannot guarantee secure communication between the client and the server.
A hybrid signature and key exchange method combining traditional public-key cryptography and quantum-resistant cryptography is adopted to generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed. The pre-master key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptography algorithm is used to resist attacks from quantum computers.
In a quantum computing environment, it ensures secure communication between the client and the server, provides dual protection, is compatible with the existing TLCP protocol, and enables a safe and smooth transition to quantum-resistant TLCP.
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Figure CN118631447B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically to a TLCP communication method and system resistant to quantum attacks. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid increase in the computing power of quantum computers, traditional public-key cryptography algorithms based on mathematically difficult problems will no longer be secure. Currently, existing TLCPs mainly use traditional public-key cryptography algorithms in the process of establishing communication between clients and servers. However, existing TLCPs do not yet have the ability to resist quantum attacks, and they face the security threats that quantum computers may pose to current traditional public-key cryptography algorithms.
[0003] Therefore, how to ensure that a reliable path is established between the client and the server has become a technical problem that urgently needs to be solved by those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention
[0004] In view of this, the present invention provides a TLCP communication method and system resistant to quantum attacks, which can ensure that the client and the server can securely establish communication in a quantum attack environment.
[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution:
[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks, comprising the following steps:
[0007] After receiving the communication request from the client, the server generates traditional key exchange parameters and a hybrid signature, which are then sent to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate.
[0008] The client verifies the hybrid signature dual certificate and the hybrid signature, constructs hybrid key exchange parameters and sends them to the server. At the same time, it generates a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for the derivation of other keys.
[0009] The server decrypts the hybrid key exchange parameters and generates a hybrid pre-master key, which serves as the key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0010] Furthermore, the server-side process for generating traditional key exchange parameters and hybrid signatures includes:
[0011] The server constructs the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and signs the private key ServerSK using its own quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm. PQCsig Generate quantum-resistant signatures sig that are resistant to the exchange parameters PQC =Sign PQC (ServerGMParams, ServerSK) PQCsig); Sign the private key ServerSK using its own traditional public-key cryptography algorithm. GMsig Generate a traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig for the exchanged parameters. GM =Sign GM (ServerGMParams, ServerSK GMsig Generate a mixed signature: Server_mixsig=sig PQC || sig GM ;
[0012] Send the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and the hybrid signature Server_mixsig to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate;
[0013] Among them, the hybrid signature dual certificate is a hybrid signature certificate and a hybrid encryption certificate that the server pre-applies to from the certificate authority, possessing both quantum-resistant cryptographic signature and traditional public-key cryptographic signature capabilities. ServerGMParams represents the traditional public-key cryptographic key exchange parameters of the existing TLCP server. Sign PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic signature operation, Sign GM () represents a traditional public-key cryptographic signature operation, || represents a join operation, and Server_mixsig represents a server-side mixed signature.
[0014] Furthermore, the client verifies the hybrid signature dual certificate by using a certificate chain to verify its validity.
[0015] Furthermore, the client verifies the mixed signature in the following way:
[0016] Extract the server-side quantum-resistant cryptographic signature public key ServerPK from the public key field of the hybrid signature certificate. PQCsig Compared with traditional public-key cryptography algorithms, the public key ServerPK is used for signing. GMsig ;
[0017] Extracting the quantum-resistant signature sig from the mixed signature Server_mixsig PQC The traditional key exchange parameter ServerGMParams and public key ServerPK are used. PQCsig Adversarial quantum signatures sig PQC To verify, calculate a = Verify PQC (sig PQC ServerGMParams, ServerPK PQCsig );
[0018] Extracting the traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig from Server_mixsig GM The traditional key exchange parameter ServerGMParams and public key ServerPK are used. SM2sig Traditional public-key cryptographic signatures sig GM To verify, calculate b = Verify. GM (sig GM ServerGMParams, ServerPK GMsig );
[0019] The verification passes when both a and b are true; otherwise, the client closes the connection with the server.
[0020] Among them, Verify PQC () represents the verification operation for quantum-resistant cryptographic signatures, Verify. GM () indicates the verification operation of traditional public-key cryptographic signatures.
[0021] Furthermore, the client constructs the hybrid key exchange parameters and hybrid pre-master key in the following way:
[0022] The client extracts the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm public key, ServerPK, from the public key field of the hybrid encryption certificate. PQCenc Encrypting the public key ServerPK with traditional public-key cryptography algorithms GMenc Using the public key ServerPK PQCenc Perform quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operations to generate quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulated ciphertext c. PQC With shared key ss, (c PQC, ss)=Enc PQC (ServerPK PQCenc );
[0023] Using a randomly selected pre-master key pms and public key ServerPK GMenc Generate traditional public-key cryptographic ciphertext c GM =Enc GM (pms,ServerPK GMenc Generate the mixed key exchange parameter ClientMixParams=c PQC ||c GM Mixed pre-master key mixpms=ss||pms;
[0024] Among them, Enc PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operation, Enc GM() indicates traditional public-key cryptography encryption operations, and ClientMixParams indicates the client's mixed key exchange parameters.
[0025] Furthermore, the server-side process of decrypting the hybrid key exchange parameters and generating the hybrid pre-master key includes:
[0026] The server first extracts the quantum-resistant cryptographic key from the hybrid key exchange parameters and encapsulates the ciphertext c. PQC Compared to traditional public-key cryptography, ciphertext c GM Then, using its own quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm, the private key ServerSK PQCenc Decapsulation C PQC Get the sharing key ss=Dec PQC (c PQC ServerSK PQCenc ); Encrypt the private key ServerSK using its own traditional public-key cryptography. GMenc Decrypting C GM Obtain the pre-master key pms= Dec GM (c GM ServerSK GMenc Generate a mixed pre-master key mixpms=ss||pms;
[0027] Among them, Dec PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic key decapsulation operation. Dec GM () indicates a traditional public-key cryptography decryption operation.
[0028] Furthermore, the server uses the traditional public-key cryptographic signature algorithm SM2 and the quantum-resistant cryptographic signature algorithm Dilithium; the client uses the quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm Kyber and the traditional public-key cryptographic encryption algorithm SM2.
[0029] Secondly, the present invention provides a quantum-resistant dual-system TLCP communication method, comprising the following steps:
[0030] The client sends a communication request to the server. After receiving the communication request from the client, the server determines whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol. When executing the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol, it follows the communication method described above for resisting quantum attacks.
[0031] Thirdly, the present invention provides a quantum attack-resistant TLCP communication system, which is applicable to the above-mentioned quantum attack-resistant TLCP communication method; comprising: a signature module, a verification module, and a decryption module;
[0032] The signature module is used to generate traditional key exchange parameters and hybrid signatures on the server side, and send them to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate;
[0033] The verification module is used to verify the hybrid signature dual certificate and hybrid signature on the client side, construct hybrid key exchange parameters and send them to the server side, and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0034] The decryption module is used to decrypt the hybrid key exchange parameters on the server side and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0035] Fourthly, the present invention provides a dual-system TLCP communication system resistant to quantum attacks, comprising: an existing TLCP protocol module, a quantum-resistant TLCP protocol module, and a judgment module;
[0036] The existing TLCP protocol module is used to execute the existing TLCP protocol;
[0037] The quantum-resistant TLCP protocol module is used to execute the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol according to the above-mentioned communication method for resisting quantum attacks, and to generate a hybrid pre-master key on the client and server sides respectively;
[0038] The judgment module is used to determine whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol after the server receives a communication request sent by the client.
[0039] The existing TLCP protocol module is also used to use the hybrid pre-master key generated by the server and client as a seed to derive other keys through the key derivation algorithm in the existing TLCP protocol.
[0040] As can be seen from the above technical solution, compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0041] 1. This invention simultaneously uses a pre-master key derived from a traditional public-key algorithm and a pre-master key derived from a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to calculate a hybrid pre-master key. Current TLCP is based on GB / T38636-2020, which uses traditional public-key cryptography algorithms to derive the pre-master key. Relatively speaking, under quantum computing attacks, the pre-master key derived from the traditional public-key algorithm is insecure, while the pre-master key derived from the quantum-resistant algorithm is secure, thus making the hybrid pre-master key secure. Therefore, this invention's quantum-resistant TLCP communication method can resist the threat of quantum computers, ensuring secure communication between the client and server even under future quantum computer attacks.
[0042] 2. The quantum-resistant TLCP in the dual-system communication protocol of this invention adds a quantum-resistant algorithm while ensuring the correctness of the traditional public-key cryptography algorithm, which has the advantage of double protection.
[0043] 3. The dual-system protocol of this invention is compatible with existing TLCP, which is conducive to the gradual deployment of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms in the future, making the transition of existing TLCP and its applications to quantum-resistant TLCP more secure and smooth. Attached Figure Description
[0044] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.
[0045] Figure 1 A flowchart of the TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;
[0046] Figure 2 The flowchart illustrates the selection process for the dual-system TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks in Embodiment 2 of this invention. Detailed Implementation
[0047] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0048] Example 1:
[0049] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment of the invention discloses a TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks, comprising the following steps:
[0050] S1. After receiving the communication request from the client, the server generates traditional key exchange parameters and a hybrid signature, and sends them to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate.
[0051] S2. The client verifies the hybrid signature dual certificate and the hybrid signature, constructs hybrid key exchange parameters and sends them to the server. At the same time, it generates a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for the derivation of other keys.
[0052] S3. The server decrypts the hybrid key exchange parameters and generates a hybrid pre-master key as the key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0053] The following provides further explanation of each of the above steps.
[0054] S1. After receiving the client's request to establish communication, the server constructs the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and signs the private key ServerSK using its own quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm. PQCsig Generate quantum-resistant signatures sig that are resistant to the exchange parameters PQC =Sign PQC (ServerGMParams, ServerSK PQCsig ); Sign the private key ServerSK using its own traditional public-key cryptography algorithm. GMsig Generate a traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig for the exchanged parameters. GM =Sign GM (ServerGMParams, ServerSK GMsig Generate a mixed signature: Server_mixsig=sig PQC || sig GM ;
[0055] The traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and the hybrid signature Server_mixsig are sent to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate;
[0056] Among them, the hybrid signature dual certificate is a hybrid signature certificate and a hybrid encryption certificate that the server pre-applies to from the certificate authority, possessing both quantum-resistant cryptographic signature and traditional public-key cryptographic signature capabilities; ServerGMParams represents the traditional public-key cryptographic key exchange parameters of the existing TLCP server; Sign PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic signature operation, Sign GM () represents a traditional public-key cryptographic signature operation, || represents a join operation, and Server_mixsig represents a server-side mixed signature.
[0057] S2. After receiving the hybrid signature dual certificate, the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams, and the hybrid signature Server_mixsig, the client first uses the certificate chain to verify the validity of the hybrid signature dual certificate.
[0058] Next, the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic signature public key, ServerPK, is extracted from the public key field of the hybrid signature certificate. PQCsig Compared with traditional public-key cryptography algorithms, the public key ServerPK is used for signing. GMsig ;
[0059] Extracting the quantum-resistant signature sig from the mixed signature Server_mixsig PQC The traditional key exchange parameter ServerGMParams and public key ServerPK are used. PQCsig Adversarial quantum signatures sig PQC To verify, calculate a = Verify PQC (sig PQC ServerGMParams, ServerPK PQCsig );
[0060] Extracting the traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig from Server_mixsig GM The traditional key exchange parameter ServerGMParams and public key ServerPK are used. SM2sig Traditional public-key cryptographic signatures sig GM To verify, calculate b = Verify. GM (sig GM ServerGMParams, ServerPK GMsig );
[0061] If both a and b are true, the verification passes and the client continues with the following steps; otherwise, the client closes the connection with the server and stops executing the following steps.
[0062] Among them, Verify PQC () represents the verification operation for quantum-resistant cryptographic signatures, Verify. GM () indicates the verification operation of traditional public-key cryptographic signatures.
[0063] Next, the client extracts the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm public key, ServerPK, from the public key field of the hybrid encryption certificate. PQCenc Encrypting the public key ServerPK using traditional public-key cryptography algorithms GMenc Using the public key ServerPK PQCenc Perform quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operations to generate quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulated ciphertext c. PQC With shared key ss, (c PQC, ss)=Enc PQC (ServerPK PQCenc );
[0064] Using a randomly selected pre-master key pms and public key ServerPK GMenc Generate traditional public-key cryptographic ciphertext c GM =Enc GM (pms,ServerPK GMencGenerate the mixed key exchange parameter ClientMixParams=c PQC ||c GM The mixed pre-master key is set to mixpms=ss||pms; at the same time, the client uses the mixed pre-master key as a seed to derive other keys.
[0065] Among them, Enc PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operation, Enc GM () indicates traditional public-key cryptography encryption operations, and ClientMixParams indicates the client's mixed key exchange parameters.
[0066] S3. After receiving the hybrid key exchange parameters from the client, the server first extracts the quantum-resistant cryptographic key from the hybrid key exchange parameters to encapsulate the ciphertext c. PQC Compared to traditional public-key cryptography, ciphertext c GM Then, using its own quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm, the private key ServerSK PQCenc Decapsulation C PQC Get the sharing key ss=Dec PQC (c PQC ServerSK PQCenc ); Encrypt the private key ServerSK using its own traditional public-key cryptography. GMenc Decrypting C GM Obtain the pre-master key pms= Dec GM (c GM ServerSK GMenc Generate a mixed pre-master key mixpms=ss||pms; the server uses the mixed pre-master key as a seed to derive other keys.
[0067] Among them, Dec PQC () indicates a quantum-resistant cryptographic key decapsulation operation. Dec GM () indicates a traditional public-key cryptography decryption operation.
[0068] The following descriptions will take the quantum-resistant cryptographic signature algorithm Dilithium, the quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm Kyber, the traditional Chinese cryptographic signature algorithm SM2, and the traditional Chinese cryptographic encryption algorithm SM2 as examples.
[0069] S1. After receiving the ClientHello message requesting the client to establish communication, the server sends the client a hybrid signature dual certificate, which simultaneously possesses a quantum-resistant Dilithium signature and a traditional public-key cryptography SM2 signature. These are the hybrid signature certificate and the hybrid encryption certificate.
[0070] The server constructs the traditional public-key cryptography SM2 key exchange parameters ServerSM2Params, and then uses its own quantum-resistant Dilithium-based private key ServerSK to sign the key. Dilithiumsig Generate quantum-resistant signatures sig that are resistant to the exchange parameters Dilithium =Sign Dilithium (ServerSM2Params, ServerSK Dilithiumsig Using its own traditional public-key cryptography SM2 signature private key ServerSK SM2sig Generate a traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig for the exchanged parameters. SM2 =Sign SM2 (ServerSM2Params, ServerSK) SM2sig This generates a mixed signature Server_mixsig=sig Dilithium || sig SM2 The ServerSM2Params and Server_mixsig are sent together to the client.
[0071] Where ServerSM2Params represents the traditional public-key cryptography SM2 key exchange parameters on the existing TLCP server side, and Sign... Dilithium () indicates a Dilithium signature operation against quantum cryptography. Sign SM2 () indicates a traditional public-key cryptography SM2 signature operation, || indicates a join operation, and Server_mixsig indicates a server-side mixed signature.
[0072] S2. After receiving the hybrid signature dual certificate, traditional key exchange parameters, and hybrid signature from the server, the client first verifies the validity of the hybrid signature dual certificate using the certificate chain. Then, it extracts the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic signature public key, ServerPK, from the public key field of the signature certificate. DIlithiumsig Compared to traditional public-key cryptography signature public key ServerPK SM2sig Then, extract the quantum-resistant signature sig from the mixed signature Server_mixsig. Dilithium The traditional key exchange parameters ServerSM2Params and public key ServerPK are used. Dilithiumsig Adversarial quantum signatures sig Dilithium To verify, calculate a = Verify Dilithium (sig Dilithium ServerSM2Params, ServerPK Dilithiumsig Extract the traditional public-key cryptographic signature sig from the mixed signature Server_mixsig. SM2The traditional key exchange parameters ServerSM2Params and public key ServerPK are used. SM2sig Traditional public-key cryptographic signatures sig SM2 To verify, calculate b = Verify. SM2 (sig SM2 ServerSM2Params, ServerPK SM2sig The verification will only pass if both a and b are true, and the client will continue to the next step. Otherwise, the client will close the connection with the server and will not continue to execute the following steps.
[0073] Among them, Verify Dilithium () represents the verification operation for quantum-resistant Dilithium signatures, Verify. SM2 () Verification operation of traditional public-key cryptography SM2 signature.
[0074] Then, the client extracts the server's quantum-resistant Kyber key from the public key field of the encryption certificate and encapsulates the public key ServerPK. Kyberenc Compared to traditional public-key cryptography, SM2 encryption of public key ServerPK SM2enc Using the public key ServerPK Kyberenc Perform quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operations to generate quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulated ciphertext c. Kyber With shared key ss, (c Kyber ,ss)=Enc Kyber (ServerPK Kyberenc Using a randomly selected pre-master key pms and public key ServerPK SM2enc Generate traditional public-key cryptographic ciphertext c SM2 =Enc SM2 (pms,ServerPK SM2enc This generates the mixed key exchange parameter ClientMixParams=c Kyber ||c SM2 The client uses the mixed pre-master key `mixpms=ss||pms` as a seed to derive other keys, and sends the mixed key exchange parameter `ClientMixParams` to the server.
[0075] Among them, Enc Kyber () denotes the quantum-resistant Kyber key encapsulation operation, Enc SM2 () indicates the traditional SM2 encryption operation, and ClientMixParams indicates the client-side mixed key exchange parameters.
[0076] S3. After receiving the hybrid key exchange parameters from the client, the server first extracts the quantum-resistant cryptographic key from the hybrid key exchange parameters and encapsulates the ciphertext c. Kyber Compared to traditional public-key cryptography, ciphertext c SM2 Then, the private key ServerSK was encapsulated using its own quantum-resistant Kyber key. Kyberenc Decapsulation C PKyber Get the sharing key ss=Dec Kyber (c Kyber ServerSK Kyberenc Using its own traditional SM2 encryption private key ServerSK SM2enc Decrypting C SM2 Obtain the pre-master key pms= Dec SM2 (c SM2 ServerSK SM2enc This generates a mixed pre-master key, mixpms=ss||pms. The server uses this mixed pre-master key as a seed to derive other keys.
[0077] Among them, Dec Kyber () indicates the decapsulation operation of the quantum-resistant Kyber key. Dec SM2 () indicates the traditional SM2 decryption operation.
[0078] Example 2:
[0079] This invention provides a quantum-resistant dual-system TLCP communication method, comprising the following steps:
[0080] A new quantum-resistant cryptographic suite is added to the existing TLCP protocol. The client sends the selected cryptographic suite as part of the communication request to the server. After receiving the communication request from the client, the server determines whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol based on the cryptographic suite name. The selection process is as follows: Figure 2 As shown;
[0081] When executing the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol, the quantum attack-resistant communication method described in Example 1 is followed, and a hybrid pre-master key is generated on both the client and server sides.
[0082] The hybrid pre-master key generated by the server and client is used as a seed to derive other keys using the key derivation algorithm in the existing TLCP protocol, which conforms to the GB / T38636-2020 standard.
[0083] Example 3:
[0084] This invention also provides a quantum attack-resistant TLCP communication system, which is applicable to the quantum attack-resistant TLCP communication method described in Embodiment 1; it includes: a signature module, a verification module, and a decryption module;
[0085] The signature module is used to generate traditional key exchange parameters and hybrid signatures on the server side, and send them to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate;
[0086] The verification module is used to verify the hybrid signature dual certificate and hybrid signature on the client side, construct hybrid key exchange parameters and send them to the server side, and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0087] The decryption module is used to decrypt the hybrid key exchange parameters on the server side and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation.
[0088] Example 4:
[0089] This invention also provides a dual-system TLCP communication system resistant to quantum attacks, comprising: an existing TLCP protocol module, a quantum-resistant TLCP protocol module, and a judgment module;
[0090] The existing TLCP protocol module is used to execute the existing TLCP protocol;
[0091] The quantum-resistant TLCP protocol module is used to execute the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol according to the quantum attack-resistant communication method described in Embodiment 1, and generate a hybrid pre-master key on the client and server respectively;
[0092] The judgment module is used to determine whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol after the server receives a communication request sent by the client.
[0093] The existing TLCP protocol module is also used to use the hybrid pre-master key generated by the server and client as a seed to derive other keys through the key derivation algorithm in the existing TLCP protocol.
[0094] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the method section.
[0095] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
Claims
1. A TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: After receiving the communication request from the client, the server generates traditional key exchange parameters and a hybrid signature, which are then sent to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate. The client verifies the hybrid signature dual certificate and the hybrid signature, constructs hybrid key exchange parameters and sends them to the server. At the same time, it generates a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for the derivation of other keys. The server decrypts the hybrid key exchange parameters and generates a hybrid pre-master key as the key seed for subsequent key derivation. The client constructs the hybrid key exchange parameters and hybrid pre-master key in the following way: The client extracts the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm public key ServerPKPQCenc and the traditional public-key cryptographic algorithm encryption public key ServerPKGMenc from the public key field of the hybrid encryption certificate. It then uses the public key ServerPKPQCenc to perform quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operation to generate quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation ciphertext cPQC and a shared key ss, where (cPQC, ss) = EncPQC(ServerPKPQCenc). Using a randomly selected pre-master key pms and public key ServerPKGMenc, generate traditional public-key cryptographic ciphertext cGM=EncGM(pms,ServerPKGMenc), and generate mixed key exchange parameters ClientMixParams=cPQC||cGM and mixed pre-master key mixpms=ss||pms; Where EncPQC() represents quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation operation, EncGM() represents traditional public-key cryptographic encryption operation, ClientMixParams represents client mixing key exchange parameters; || represents connection operation.
2. The TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The server-side process of generating traditional key exchange parameters and hybrid signatures includes: The server constructs the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams, and uses its own quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to sign the private key ServerSKPQCsig to generate a quantum-resistant signature sigPQC=SignPQC(ServerGMParams,ServerSKPQCsig); it also uses its own traditional public-key cryptographic algorithm to sign the private key ServerSKGMsig to generate a traditional public-key cryptographic signature sigGM=SignGM(ServerGMParams, ServerSKGMsig); and finally generates a mixed signature Server_mixsig=sigPQC|| sigGM. Send the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and the hybrid signature Server_mixsig to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate; Among them, the hybrid signature dual certificate is a hybrid signature certificate and a hybrid encryption certificate that the server has applied for in advance from the certificate authority, which have both quantum-resistant cryptographic signature and traditional public-key cryptographic signature; ServerGMParams represents the traditional public-key cryptographic key exchange parameters of the existing TLCP server, SignPQC() represents the quantum-resistant cryptographic signature operation, SignGM() represents the traditional public-key cryptographic signature operation, || represents the join operation, and Server_mixsig represents the server's hybrid signature.
3. The TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The client verifies the hybrid signature dual certificate by using a certificate chain to verify its validity.
4. The TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 2, characterized in that, The client verifies the mixed signature in the following way: Extract the server's quantum-resistant cryptographic signature public key ServerPKPQCsig and the traditional public-key cryptographic algorithm signature public key ServerPKGMsig from the public key field of the hybrid signature certificate; Extract the quantum-resistant signature sigPQC from the mixed signature Server_mixsig, and verify the quantum-resistant signature sigPQC using the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and the public key ServerPKPQCsig. Calculate a=VerifyPQC(sigPQC, ServerGMParams, ServerPKPQCsig). Extract the traditional public-key cryptographic signature sigGM from the mixed signature Server_mixsig. Verify the traditional public-key cryptographic signature sigGM using the traditional key exchange parameters ServerGMParams and the public key ServerPKSM2sig. Calculate b=VerifyGM(sigGM, ServerGMParams, ServerPKGMsig). The verification passes when both a and b are true; otherwise, the client closes the connection with the server. VerifyPQC() represents the verification operation of quantum-resistant cryptographic signatures, while VerifyGM() represents the verification operation of traditional public-key cryptographic signatures.
5. The TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 4, characterized in that, The server-side process of decrypting the hybrid key exchange parameters and generating the hybrid pre-master key includes: The server first extracts the quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation ciphertext cPQC and the traditional public-key cryptographic ciphertext cGM from the mixed key exchange parameters. Then, it uses its own quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm private key ServerSKPQCenc to decapsulate cPQC and obtain the shared key ss=DecPQC(cPQC, ServerSKPQCenc). It then uses its own traditional public-key cryptographic encryption private key ServerSKGMenc to decrypt cGM and obtain the pre-master key pms= DecGM(cGM, ServerSKGMenc), generating the mixed pre-master key mixpms=ss||pms. In this context, DecPQC() represents the quantum-resistant cryptographic key decapsulation operation, and DecGM() represents the traditional public-key cryptographic decryption operation.
6. The TLCP communication method resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 5, characterized in that, The server uses the traditional public-key cryptographic signature algorithm SM2 and the quantum-resistant cryptographic signature algorithm Dilithium; the client uses the quantum-resistant cryptographic key encapsulation algorithm Kyber and the traditional public-key cryptographic encryption algorithm SM2.
7. A quantum-resistant dual-system TLCP communication method, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The client sends a communication request to the server. After receiving the communication request from the client, the server determines whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol. When executing the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol, the communication method for resisting quantum attacks as described in any one of claims 1-6 is executed.
8. A TLCP communication system resistant to quantum attacks, characterized in that, It is applicable to the quantum-resistant TLCP communication method according to any one of claims 1-6; comprising: a signature module, a verification module, and a decryption module; The signature module is used to generate traditional key exchange parameters and hybrid signatures on the server side, and send them to the client along with the hybrid signature dual certificate; The verification module is used to verify the hybrid signature dual certificate and hybrid signature on the client side, construct hybrid key exchange parameters and send them to the server side, and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation. The decryption module is used to decrypt the hybrid key exchange parameters on the server side and generate a hybrid pre-master key as a key seed for subsequent key derivation.
9. A quantum-resistant dual-system TLCP communication system, characterized in that, include: There are existing TLCP protocol modules, quantum-resistant TLCP protocol modules, and judgment modules; The existing TLCP protocol module is used to execute the existing TLCP protocol; The quantum-resistant TLCP protocol module is used to execute the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol according to the quantum-resistant communication method as described in any one of claims 1-6, and generate a hybrid pre-master key on the client and server respectively; The judgment module is used to determine whether to execute the existing TLCP protocol or the quantum-resistant TLCP protocol after the server receives a communication request sent by the client. The existing TLCP protocol module is also used to use the hybrid pre-master key generated by the server and client as a seed to derive other keys through the key derivation algorithm in the existing TLCP protocol.
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