Vehicle network security communication method, user terminal, equipment and medium

Abstract

The present invention provides a method, user terminal, device, and medium for secure communication in an Internet of Vehicles (IoV), comprising: a requesting user terminal negotiates with a responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process; the requesting user terminal sends a first encrypted message obtained by encrypting the symmetric key and an identifier of the requesting user terminal to the responding user terminal; the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal based on the identifier of the requesting user terminal, and decrypts the first encrypted message using the symmetric key to obtain a first message; the responding user terminal generates a second message corresponding to the first message, and encrypts the second encrypted message using the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message; the responding user terminal sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal; the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message using the symmetric key to obtain a second message. The solution of the present invention establishes a shared key authenticated by both parties based on an implicit certificate, thereby improving the efficiency of secure communication in the IoV.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, and in particular to a vehicle networking secure communication method, user terminal, device and medium. Background Art

[0002] Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology has attracted considerable attention. V2X communication scenarios encompass secure communications between vehicles, between roads, and between vehicles and devices. In practical applications, secure V2X communication requires message signing and encryption to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of message transmission.

[0003] Among them, confidentiality requires that the message sent by the message sender can only be known to the designated recipient; authenticity requires that the information received by the message recipient is true; message integrity requires that the message is not illegally replaced, added, deleted, etc. during the transmission process; non-repudiation requires that the message sender can prove that the message was sent by himself.

[0004] In some example technologies, messages are signed and encrypted using V2X implicit certificates to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of message transmissions during communication. Currently, V2X implicit certificate message encryption technology uses public key cryptography, which is computationally intensive and inefficient for secure vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present invention provides a method, user terminal, device and medium for secure communication in an Internet of Vehicles (IoV) to address the low efficiency of IoV secure communication in the prior art. Messages are encrypted and decrypted using a symmetric key obtained through an implicit certificate key negotiation process, thereby improving the efficiency of secure communication in an IoV.

[0006] The present invention provides a method for secure communication in an Internet of Vehicles, which is applied to a requesting user end, and the method includes: the requesting user end negotiates with a responding user end to obtain a symmetric key according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process; the requesting user end encrypts a first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message; the requesting user end sends the first encrypted message and an identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end, so that the responding user end determines the requesting user end according to the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the requesting user end receives a second encrypted message sent by the responding user end, the second encrypted message is obtained by the responding user end encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key, and the second message is generated by the responding user end based on the first message; the requesting user end decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

[0007] According to a secure communication method for an internet of vehicles provided by the present invention, the requesting user end obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding user end in accordance with an implicit certificate key negotiation process, including: the requesting user end obtains the public key of a certificate authentication center; the requesting user end sends a first certificate application to the certificate authentication center; the requesting user end receives a first implicit certificate and a first declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center; the requesting user end calculates the private key of the requesting user end and the public key of the requesting user end based on the first implicit certificate, the first declared private key and the public key of the certificate authentication center; the requesting user end selects a first random number and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting user end based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user end; the requesting user end generates a first signature value based on the temporary public key of the requesting user end and the first implicit certificate; the requesting user end sends the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting user end and the first implicit certificate to the responding user end, so that the responding user end calculates the public key of the requesting user end based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user end ; and, after the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; the requesting user terminal receives the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate sent by the responding user terminal; wherein the second signature value is the result of the responding user terminal hashing the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal using the private key of the responding user terminal The requesting user end calculates the public key of the responding user end based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the second signature value through the public key of the responding user end; after the second signature value is verified, the requesting user end performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user end, the public key of the responding user end, the temporary public key of the responding user end, the temporary private key of the requesting user end, the ID of the requesting user end, and the ID of the responding user end to obtain the symmetric key.

[0008] According to a secure communication method for the Internet of Vehicles provided by the present invention, before the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, the method further includes: the requesting user terminal verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve holds; the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, specifically including: if the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve is verified, the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal.

[0009] The present invention also provides a method for secure communication in an Internet of Vehicles, which is applied to a responding user terminal, and the method includes: the responding user terminal negotiates with the requesting user terminal to obtain a symmetric key according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process; the responding user terminal receives a first encrypted message sent by the requesting user terminal and an identifier of the requesting user terminal, the first encrypted message being obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to the symmetric key; the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal; the responding user terminal decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the responding user terminal generates a second message based on the first message, and encrypts the second message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message; the responding user terminal sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

[0010] According to a vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, the responding user terminal negotiates and obtains a symmetric key with the requesting user terminal in accordance with the implicit certificate key negotiation process, including: the responding user terminal obtains the public key of the certificate authentication center; the responding user terminal sends a second certificate application to the certificate authentication center; the responding user terminal receives the second implicit certificate and the second declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center; the responding user terminal calculates and obtains the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal based on the second implicit certificate, the second declared private key and the public key of the certificate authentication center; the responding user terminal selects a second random number, and calculates the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal; the responding user terminal receives the first signature value sent by the requesting user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal and the first implicit certificate; the responding user terminal calculates the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user terminal; the responding user terminal verifies the first signature value After passing, a hash calculation is performed based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; the responding user terminal signs the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate with the private key of the responding user terminal to obtain a second signature value; the responding user terminal sends the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal calculates the public key of the responding user terminal according to the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the second signature value through the public key of the responding user terminal; and, after the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key.

[0011] According to a secure communication method for an internet of vehicles provided by the present invention, before the responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates a temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, the method further includes: the responding user terminal verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve holds; the responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, specifically including: if the relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve is verified to be successful, the responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal.

[0012] The present invention also provides a requesting user terminal, comprising: a first negotiation module, used to negotiate with a responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process; a first encryption module, used to encrypt a first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message; a first sending module, used to send the first encrypted message and an identifier of the requesting user terminal to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; a first receiving module, used to receive a second encrypted message sent by the responding user terminal, the second encrypted message is obtained by the responding user terminal encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key, and the second message is generated by the responding user terminal based on the first message; a first decryption module, used to decrypt the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

[0013] The present invention also provides a responding user terminal, including: a second negotiation module, used to negotiate with the requesting user terminal to obtain a symmetric key according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; a second receiving module, used to receive a first encrypted message sent by the requesting user terminal and an identifier of the requesting user terminal, the first encrypted message being obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to the symmetric key; a determination module, used to determine the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal; a second decryption module, used to decrypt the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; a generation module, used to generate a second message based on the first message; a second encryption module, used to encrypt the second message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message; and a second sending module, used to send the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

[0014] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the vehicle network security communication method as described above is implemented.

[0015] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements any of the above-described vehicle network security communication methods.

[0016] The present invention also provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements any of the above-described vehicle network security communication methods.

[0017] In the user terminal, device and medium of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, during the vehicle network security communication process, the symmetric key obtained through the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. Compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, the time for message encryption and decryption is saved and the efficiency of vehicle network security communication is improved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, a brief introduction is given below to the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0019] Figure 1 This is one of the flow charts of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention.

[0020] Figure 2 This is the second flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention.

[0021] Figure 3 This is the third flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention.

[0022] Figure 4 This is the fourth flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention.

[0023] Figure 5 It is an interactive flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention.

[0024] Figure 6 It is a structural diagram of the requesting user terminal provided by the present invention.

[0025] Figure 7 It is a structural diagram of the response user terminal provided by the present invention.

[0026] Figure 8 It is a structural schematic diagram of the electronic device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0027] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the embodiments described are only some of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0028] The following specific embodiments are used to describe in detail the technical solution of the present application and how the technical solution of the present application solves the above technical problems. The following specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be repeated in some embodiments. Figures 1-4 The invention describes a secure communication method for an internet of vehicles.

[0029] Figure 1 This is one of the flow charts of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps 101 to 105.

[0030] In practical applications, the execution entity of the IoV secure communication method can be a requesting user terminal. This can be implemented in a variety of ways, including through a computer program, such as application software, or a chip. Alternatively, it can be implemented as a medium storing the relevant computer program, such as a USB flash drive or cloud storage device. Alternatively, it can be implemented as a physical device, such as a server, that integrates or installs the relevant computer program.

[0031] Step 101: The requesting client negotiates with the responding client to obtain a symmetric key according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process.

[0032] In practical applications, the Vehicle to Everything (V2X) refers to an open, mobile, self-organizing network in a traffic environment, comprised of vehicles, roadside units, and pedestrians as nodes. By combining the Global Positioning System (GPS) with wireless communication technologies, such as wireless LANs and cellular networks, V2X establishes wireless multi-hop connections, providing high-speed data access for high-speed mobile vehicles and enabling information exchange between vehicles and other devices. By integrating diverse information, V2X can develop personalized applications for different users, providing travelers with more convenient and safe transportation services.

[0033] In this embodiment, the requesting user terminal is the user terminal that initiates communication, and the responding user terminal is the user terminal that communicates with the requesting user terminal. In one example, the requesting user terminal can be a vehicle, and the responding user terminal can be a vehicle, a road unit, a mobile device, a cloud network, etc. In another example, the requesting user terminal can be a road unit, another vehicle, a mobile device, a cloud network, etc., and the responding user terminal can be a vehicle.

[0034] Among them, the implicit certificate (Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate, referred to as ECQV) has the characteristics of small data volume and fast processing speed. It can be understood that the requesting user end negotiates with the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process and obtains the symmetric key K AB , and in the communication process between the requesting user end and the responding user end, according to the symmetric key K AB Encrypting and decrypting messages can ensure the security of secure communications in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0035] In practical applications, the symmetric key K AB It refers to the key obtained through negotiation between the requesting user end and the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, and the requesting user end and the responding user end use the same key. It can be understood that during the secure communication process of the Internet of Vehicles, the requesting user end and the responding user end use the symmetric key K AB Encrypting or decrypting messages can reduce the computational complexity of encryption and decryption during secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Compared with public key encryption and decryption, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0036] It should be noted that the requesting user end and responding user end in this embodiment are merely examples of a single communication process. In conjunction with the above description, during secure communication in an IoV network, a vehicle can communicate with multiple devices, such as road units, other vehicles, and mobile devices. In practical applications, vehicles, road units, other vehicles, and mobile devices can serve as both requesting and responding user ends.

[0037] Step 102: Request the user terminal to encrypt the first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message.

[0038] Specifically, the user terminal is requested to generate or obtain a first message based on the current communication demand. For example, the first message is represented by M. Further, the user terminal is requested to generate or obtain a first message based on the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the first message M to obtain the first encrypted message C A .

[0039] Step 103: The requesting user terminal sends the first encrypted message and the identifier of the requesting user terminal to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message.

[0040] The identifier of the requesting user terminal uniquely represents the requesting user terminal and is used by other user terminals to identify the requesting user terminal. For example, the identifier of the requesting user terminal is represented by ID A It is understandable that the responding user terminal responds to the requesting user terminal's ID A The requesting user end can be determined, that is, the user end of the current communication can be determined.

[0041] Combined with the above description, the requesting client follows the implicit certificate key negotiation process and negotiates with the responding client to obtain the symmetric key K AB , therefore, the responding user also has the symmetric key K AB Specifically, the client is requested to send the first encrypted message C A and the requesting client's ID A After sending to the responding client, the responding client will use the ID of the requesting client to A The requesting user end can be determined; the responding user end can be determined based on the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A Decryption is performed to obtain the first message M.

[0042] Optionally, in order to further ensure the reliability of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, in one example, the first encrypted message C A and the requesting client's ID A The requesting user terminal sends the first message data to the responding user terminal. Correspondingly, after receiving the first message data, the responding user terminal parses the first message data to obtain the first encrypted message C A and the requesting client's ID A The user responds based on the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A Decryption is performed to obtain the first message M.

[0043] Step 104: The requesting user terminal receives a second encrypted message sent by the responding user terminal. The second encrypted message is obtained by the responding user terminal encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key. The second message is generated by the responding user terminal based on the first message.

[0044] In actual application, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C AAfter decrypting and obtaining the first message M, the current communication requirement can be determined based on the first message M. The second message N is then generated or obtained based on the first message M. It can be understood that the first message M and the second message N correspond to each other. For example, the first message M is an access request, and the second message N is a response granting or denying access. For another example, the first message M is a data acquisition request, and the second message N is the data to be acquired.

[0045] Furthermore, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the second message N to obtain the second encrypted message C B In combination with the above description, the responding user terminal can determine the requesting user terminal of the current communication according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal. Further, the requesting user terminal receives the second encrypted message C sent by the responding user terminal. B .

[0046] Step 105: Request the user terminal to decrypt the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second message.

[0047] Combined with the above description, the requesting client follows the implicit certificate key negotiation process and negotiates with the responding client to obtain the symmetric key K AB Specifically, the client is requested to use the symmetric key K AB The second encrypted message C B Decrypt and obtain the second message N.

[0048] Optionally, in order to further ensure the reliability of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, in one example, the responding user terminal sends the second encrypted message C B The responding user terminal sends the second message data to the requesting user terminal. Correspondingly, after receiving the second message data, the requesting user terminal parses the second message data to obtain the second encrypted message C. B . Request the user to use the symmetric key K AB The second encrypted message C B Decrypt and obtain the second message N.

[0049] In this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt messages, which can ensure the security of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0050] In addition, for the implicit certificate key negotiation process, in one possible implementation, Figure 2 This is the second flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, such as Figure 2As shown, the above step 101 includes: steps 201 to 209.

[0051] Step 201: Request the client to obtain the public key of the certificate authority.

[0052] Step 202: Request the user terminal to send a first certificate application to a certificate authentication center.

[0053] Step 203: Request the user terminal to receive the first implicit certificate and the first declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center.

[0054] In actual application, the public key Q of the pre-made certificate authentication center is used by the requesting user end and the responding user end. CA Specifically, the requesting user terminal sends a first certificate request to the certificate authentication center to receive the first implicit certificate and the first declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center. As an example, the first certificate request includes the identification ID of the requesting user terminal. A and the random point R of the elliptic curve generated by the requesting client A In actual application, the user is requested to generate a random number k A , request the user end to use the random number k A Generate a random point R on the elliptic curve A , R A =k A G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve. Correspondingly, the certificate authentication center uses the ID of the requesting user to A Identify the requesting user and use the random point R of the elliptic curve A Generate the first declared public key P A , P A =R A +k·G, where k is a random number on a non-zero n-order finite field selected by the certificate authentication center. A , first declared public key P A , the identity of the certificate authentication center, the certificate authentication center information, generate the first implicit certificate Cert A Furthermore, the certificate authority authenticates the first implicit certificate Cert A Perform hash calculation to obtain the first implicit certificate Cert A The corresponding hash value e A , e A =H0(Cert A ). Further, the certificate authentication center is based on the hash value e A and the private key d of the certificate authority CA Generate the first declared private key t A , t A =e A k+dCA (mode n), where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point G. Further, the certificate authority sends the first implicit certificate Cert A and the first declared private key t A Correspondingly, the requesting client receives the first implicit certificate Cert sent by the certificate authentication center. A and the first declared private key t A .

[0055] Step 204: The requesting client calculates and obtains the private key and the public key of the requesting client based on the first implicit certificate, the first declared private key, and the public key of the certificate authentication authority.

[0056] Specifically, the client is requested to authenticate the first implicit certificate Cert A Perform hash calculation to determine the first implicit certificate Cert A The corresponding hash value e A . Request the client to authenticate the first implicit certificate Cert A Decode and obtain the first declared public key P A , P A =R A +k·G. Further, the user terminal is requested to use the first declared public key P A , the first implicit certificate Cert A The corresponding hash value e A and the public key Q of the certificate authority CA , calculate and determine the public key Q of the requesting user A , request the user's public key Q A The expression is Q A =e A ·P A +Q CA . Request the client to use the first implicit certificate Cert A The corresponding hash value e A , random number k A and the first declared private key t A , calculate the private key d of the requesting user A , d A =e A ·k A +t A (mode n).

[0057] Step 205: The requesting client selects a first random number, and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting client based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting client.

[0058] Specifically, the requesting user terminal selects a first random number a, and calculates the elliptic curve point corresponding to the requesting user terminal according to the first random number a, (XA , Y A )=(a+d A -1 )*G. Calculate the temporary public key X of the requesting user, X=(h A +X A )*G, where h A The private key d of the requesting client A The hash value corresponding to the first random number a, h A =H1(d A , a).

[0059] Step 206: The requesting client generates a first signature value according to the temporary public key of the requesting client and the first implicit certificate.

[0060] Specifically, the requesting client uses the requesting client's private key d A The temporary public key X of the requesting client and the first implicit certificate Cert A Sign and get the first signature value S A .

[0061] Step 207: The requesting user terminal sends the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, and the first implicit certificate to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal calculates the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user terminal; and, after the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID identifier of the requesting user terminal, and the ID identifier of the responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key.

[0062] Step 208: The requesting user terminal receives the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate sent by the responding user terminal; wherein, the second signature value is obtained by the responding user terminal signing the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate using the private key of the responding user terminal.

[0063] Specifically, the requesting user terminal sends the first signature value S to the responding user terminal. A , request the user's temporary public key X, the first implicit certificate Cert A Correspondingly, the responding user terminal pre-calculates the temporary public key Y of the responding user terminal and receives the second implicit certificate Cert sent by the certificate authentication center B Specifically, in response to the user terminal calculating the first implicit certificate Cert A The hash value e A , and calculate the public key Q of the requesting user A , Q A=e A ·P A +Q CA . Further, in response to the user's request for the user's public key Q A For the first signature value S A If the verification is successful, the responding client uses the responding client's private key d B The temporary public key X of the requesting client, the temporary public key Y of the responding client and the second implicit certificate Cert B Sign and obtain the second signature value S B Furthermore, the responding user terminal sends a second signature value S to the requesting user terminal. B , respond to the user's temporary public key Y and the second implicit certificate Cert B . Further, the responding user terminal is based on the responding user terminal's private key d B , request the user's public key Q A , the temporary private key y of the responding user, the temporary public key X of the requesting user, the ID identification A of the requesting user, the ID identification B of the responding user, and the hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB , K AB =H2(d B Q A ,y·Q A , d B ·X, y·X, A, B). Where y is the temporary private key of the responding user, A is the ID of the requesting user, and B is the ID of the responding user.

[0064] Step 209: The requesting client calculates the public key of the responding client based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication authority, and verifies the second signature value using the public key of the responding client.

[0065] Step 210: After the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key.

[0066] Specifically, the client is requested to calculate the second implicit certificate Cert B The hash value e B , and calculate the public key Q of the responding user B , Q B =e B *P B +Q CA , where P B The second declaration public key corresponding to the responding user terminal. Further, the requesting user terminal passes the public key Q of the responding user terminal. BFor the second signature value S B If the verification is successful, the requesting client will use the private key d A , respond to the user's public key Q B , the temporary public key Y of the responding user, the temporary private key x of the requesting user, the ID identification A of the requesting user, the ID identification B of the responding user, and the hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB , K AB =H2(d A Q B , d A ·Y,x·Q B , x·Y,A,B). Where x is the temporary private key of the requesting user, A is the ID of the requesting user, and B is the ID of the responding user.

[0067] In this implementation, the requesting and responding clients negotiate a symmetric key through an implicit certificate key negotiation process. This symmetric key allows for message encryption and decryption during secure IoV communications, ensuring the security of these communications. Compared to public key encryption and decryption, this reduces encryption and decryption time and improves the efficiency of secure IoV communications.

[0068] Furthermore, to further ensure the reliability and accuracy of secure IoV communications, as an example, in one possible implementation, prior to step 205, the IoV secure communications method further includes: the requesting user terminal verifying whether the relationship between the requesting user terminal's private key and the requesting user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve holds. Step 205 specifically includes: if the relationship between the requesting user terminal's private key and the requesting user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve is verified successfully, the requesting user terminal selecting a first random number and calculating a temporary public key for the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the requesting user terminal's private key.

[0069] In this embodiment, before the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, the requesting user terminal verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve holds, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0070] In the vehicle network security communication method provided by this embodiment, the requesting user end obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding user end in accordance with the implicit certificate key negotiation process; the requesting user end sends the first encrypted message obtained by symmetric key encryption and the identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end; the responding user end determines the requesting user end based on the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message based on the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the responding user end generates a second message corresponding to the first message, and obtains a second encrypted message through symmetric key encryption; the responding user end sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user end; the requesting user end decrypts the second encrypted message based on the symmetric key to obtain the second message. In the solution of this embodiment, during the vehicle network security communication process, the symmetric key obtained through negotiation in the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, this saves the time of message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of vehicle network security communication.

[0071] Figure 3 This is the third flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, such as Figure 3 As shown, the method includes the following steps 301 to 306.

[0072] In practical applications, the executor of the vehicle network security communication method can be a responding user terminal. There are many ways to implement the responding user terminal, for example, it can be implemented through a computer program, such as application software, or a chip. It can also be implemented as a medium storing the relevant computer program, such as a USB flash drive or cloud storage device, or it can be implemented through a physical device that integrates or installs the relevant computer program, such as a server.

[0073] Step 301: The responding client negotiates with the requesting client to obtain a symmetric key according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process.

[0074] Among them, the implicit certificate has the characteristics of small data volume and fast processing speed. It can be understood that the responding user end negotiates with the requesting user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB , and in the communication process between the requesting user end and the responding user end, according to the symmetric key K AB Encrypting and decrypting messages can ensure the security of secure communications in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0075] In practical applications, the symmetric key K AB It refers to the key obtained through negotiation between the requesting user end and the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, and the requesting user end and the responding user end use the same key. It can be understood that in the process of Internet of Vehicles security, the requesting user end and the responding user end use the symmetric key K ABEncrypting or decrypting messages can reduce the computational complexity of encryption and decryption during secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Compared with public key encryption and decryption, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0076] Step 302: The responding user terminal receives a first encrypted message and an identifier of the requesting user terminal sent by the requesting user terminal, where the first encrypted message is obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to a symmetric key.

[0077] Specifically, the requesting user terminal generates or obtains the first message M based on the current communication demand. In combination with the above description, the responding user terminal negotiates with the requesting user terminal according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB , therefore, the requesting user also has the symmetric key K AB . Further, the user is requested to use the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the first message M to obtain the first encrypted message C A Furthermore, in response to the user terminal receiving the request, the user terminal sends a first encrypted message C A and the identifier of the requesting client.

[0078] Step 303: The responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal.

[0079] Step 304: The responding user terminal decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message.

[0080] The identifier of the requesting user terminal uniquely represents the requesting user terminal. For example, the identifier of the requesting user terminal is represented by ID A Specifically, the responding user terminal responds to the requesting user terminal's ID A The requesting user end can be determined, that is, the user end of the current communication can be determined. Further, the responding user end can be determined based on the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A Decryption is performed to obtain the first message M.

[0081] Step 305: The responding user terminal generates a second message based on the first message, and encrypts the second message using the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message.

[0082] In actual application, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A After decryption and obtaining the first message M, the current communication demand can be determined according to the first message M, and the second message N is generated or obtained based on the first message M. It can be understood that the first message M corresponds to the second message N.

[0083] Step 306: The responding user terminal sends a second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second message.

[0084] Furthermore, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the second message N to obtain the second encrypted message C B In combination with the above description, the responding user terminal can determine the requesting user terminal of the current communication according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal. Specifically, the responding user terminal sends the second encrypted message C B Sent to the requesting client.

[0085] Combined with the above description, the responding user end negotiates with the requesting user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process and obtains the symmetric key K AB Specifically, the client is requested to use the symmetric key K AB The second encrypted message C B Decrypt and obtain the second message N.

[0086] In this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt messages, which can ensure the security of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0087] In addition, for the implicit certificate key negotiation process, in one possible implementation, Figure 4 This is the second flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, such as Figure 4 As shown, the above step 301 includes: steps 401 to 410.

[0088] Step 401: Respond to the user terminal to obtain the public key of the certificate authentication center.

[0089] Step 402: The responding client sends a second certificate request to the certificate authentication center.

[0090] Step 403: Respond to the user terminal receiving the second implicit certificate and the second declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center.

[0091] In actual application, the public key Q of the pre-made certificate authentication center is used by the requesting user end and the responding user end. CA Specifically, the responding user terminal sends a second certificate request to the certificate authentication center to receive the second implicit certificate and the second declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center. As an example, the second certificate request includes the identification ID of the responding user terminal. B and a random point R of the elliptic curve generated by the response client BIn actual application, the response client generates a random number k B , responding to the user end according to the random number k B Generate a random point R on the elliptic curve B , R B =k B G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve. Correspondingly, the certificate authentication center responds to the user's ID B Identify the responding user end and use the random point R of the elliptic curve B Generate the second declared public key P B , P B =R B +k·G, where k is a random number on a non-zero n-order finite field selected by the certificate authentication center. B , the second declared public key P B , the identity of the certificate authentication center, the certificate authentication center information, generate the second implicit certificate Cert B Furthermore, the certificate authority authenticates the second implicit certificate Cert B Perform hash calculation to obtain the second implicit certificate Cert B The corresponding hash value e B , e B =H0(Cert B ). Further, the certificate authentication center is based on the hash value e B and the private key d of the certificate authority CA Generate the second declared private key t B , t B =e B k+d CA (mode n), where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point G. Further, the certificate authority sends the second implicit certificate Cert B and the second declared private key t B Correspondingly, the responding user terminal receives the second implicit certificate Cert sent by the certificate authentication center B and the second declared private key t B .

[0092] Step 404: The responding user terminal calculates and obtains the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key based on the second implicit certificate, the second declared private key, and the public key of the certificate authentication authority.

[0093] Specifically, respond to the user end for the second implicit certificate Cert B By performing hash calculation, the second implicit certificate Cert can be determined B The corresponding hash value e B . Respond to the user end for the second implicit certificate CertB Decode and get the second declared public key P B , P B =R B +k·G. Further, the responding user terminal responds to the second declared public key P B , the second implicit certificate Cert B The corresponding hash value e B and the public key Q of the certificate authority CA , calculate and determine the public key Q of the responding user B , responding to the user's public key Q B The expression is Q B =e B ·P B +Q CA The client responds to the second implicit certificate Cert B The corresponding hash value e B , random number k B and the second declared private key t B , calculate the private key d of the responding user B , d B =e B ·k B +t B (mode n).

[0094] Step 405: The responding user terminal selects a second random number, and calculates a temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal.

[0095] Specifically, the responding user terminal selects a second random number b, and calculates the elliptic curve point corresponding to the responding user terminal according to the second random number b, (X B , Y B )=(b+d B -1 )*G. Calculate the temporary public key Y of the responding user, Y=(h B +X B )*G, where h B In response to the user's private key d B And the hash value corresponding to the second random number b, h B =H1(d B , b).

[0096] Step 406: The responding client receives the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting client, and the first implicit certificate sent by the requesting client.

[0097] Specifically, the requesting client uses the requesting client's private key d A The temporary public key X of the requesting client and the first implicit certificate Cert ASign and get the first signature value S A . In response to the user end receiving the first signature value S sent by the requesting user end A , request the user's temporary public key X, the first implicit certificate Cert A .

[0098] Step 407: The responding client calculates the public key of the requesting client based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication authority, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting client.

[0099] Step 408: After the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the responding user terminal's private key, the requesting user terminal's public key, the responding user terminal's temporary private key, the requesting user terminal's temporary public key, the requesting user terminal's ID, and the responding user terminal's ID to obtain a symmetric key.

[0100] Step 409: The responding client signs the temporary public key of the requesting client, the temporary public key of the responding client, and the second implicit certificate using the private key of the responding client to obtain a second signature value.

[0101] Specifically, the client calculates the first implicit certificate Cert A The hash value e A , and calculate the public key Q of the requesting user A , Q A =e A ·P A +Q CA . Further, in response to the user's request for the user's public key Q A For the first signature value S A If the verification is successful, the responding client uses the responding client's private key d B The temporary public key X of the requesting client, the temporary public key Y of the responding client and the second implicit certificate Cert B Sign and obtain the second signature value S B . Further, the responding user terminal is based on the responding user terminal's private key d B , request the user's public key Q A , the temporary public key y of the responding user, the temporary public key X of the requesting user, the ID identification A of the requesting user, the ID identification B of the responding user, and the hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB , K AB =H2(d B Q A ,y·Q A , d B·X, y·X, A, B). Where y is the temporary private key of the responding user, A is the ID of the requesting user, and B is the ID of the responding user.

[0102] Step 410: The responding user terminal sends the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal and the second implicit certificate to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal calculates the public key of the responding user terminal based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the second signature value through the public key of the responding user terminal; and, after the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID identifier of the requesting user terminal and the ID identifier of the responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key.

[0103] Specifically, the responding user terminal sends the second signature value S to the requesting user terminal. B , respond to the user's temporary public key Y and the second implicit certificate Cert B Correspondingly, the client is requested to calculate the second implicit certificate Cert B The hash value e B , and calculate the public key Q of the responding user B , Q B =e B *P B +Q CA , where P B The second declaration public key corresponding to the responding user terminal. Further, the requesting user terminal passes the public key Q of the responding user terminal. B For the second signature value S B If the verification is successful, the requesting client will use the private key d A , respond to the user's public key Q B , the temporary public key Y of the responding user, the temporary private key x of the requesting user, the ID identification A of the requesting user, the ID identification B of the responding user, and the hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB , K AB =H2(d A Q B , d A ·Y,x·Q B , x·Y,A,B). Where x is the temporary private key of the requesting user, A is the ID of the requesting user, and B is the ID of the responding user.

[0104] In this implementation, the responding and requesting clients negotiate a symmetric key through an implicit certificate key negotiation process. This symmetric key allows for message encryption and decryption during secure IoV communications, ensuring the security of these communications. Compared to public key encryption and decryption, this reduces encryption and decryption time and improves the efficiency of secure IoV communications.

[0105] Furthermore, to further ensure the reliability and accuracy of secure communications within the Internet of Vehicles, as an example, in one possible implementation, prior to step 405, the method further includes: the responding user terminal verifying whether the relationship between the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve holds. Step 405 specifically includes: if the relationship between the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve is verified successfully, the responding user terminal selecting a second random number and calculating a temporary public key for the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the responding user terminal's private key.

[0106] In this embodiment, the responding user terminal selects a second random number, and before calculating the temporary public key Y of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, the responding user terminal verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve holds, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0107] It should be noted that the vehicle network security communication methods provided in the above embodiments can be implemented in combination or separately. Figure 5 This is an interactive flow chart of the vehicle network security communication method provided by the present invention, such as Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle network security communication method includes: step 501, the requesting user end and the responding user end negotiate and obtain a symmetric key according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process. Step 502, the requesting user end encrypts the first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message. Step 503, the requesting user end sends the first encrypted message and the identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end. Step 504, the responding user end determines the requesting user end according to the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message. Step 505, the responding user end generates a second message based on the first message, and encrypts the second message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message. Step 506, the responding user end sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user end. Step 107, the requesting user end decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second message.

[0108] In the vehicle network security communication method provided by this embodiment, the requesting user end obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding user end in accordance with the implicit certificate key negotiation process; the requesting user end sends the first encrypted message obtained by symmetric key encryption and the identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end; the responding user end determines the requesting user end based on the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message based on the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the responding user end generates a second message corresponding to the first message, and obtains a second encrypted message through symmetric key encryption; the responding user end sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user end; the requesting user end decrypts the second encrypted message based on the symmetric key to obtain the second message. In the solution of this embodiment, during the vehicle network security communication process, the symmetric key obtained through negotiation in the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, this saves the time of message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of vehicle network security communication.

[0109] The requesting user end and the responding user end provided by the present invention are described below. The requesting user end and the responding user end described below can correspond to the vehicle network security communication method described above.

[0110] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the requesting user terminal provided by the present invention. Figure 6 As shown, the requesting user terminal includes a first negotiation module 61 , a first encryption module 62 , a first sending module 63 , a first receiving module 64 and a first decryption module 65 .

[0111] The first negotiation module 61 is configured to request the client to obtain a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding client according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process.

[0112] In this embodiment, the requesting user terminal is the user terminal that initiates communication, and the responding user terminal is the user terminal that communicates with the requesting user terminal. In one example, the requesting user terminal can be a vehicle, and the responding user terminal can be a vehicle, a road unit, a mobile device, etc. In another example, the requesting user terminal can be a road unit, another vehicle, a mobile device, etc., and the responding user terminal can be a vehicle.

[0113] Among them, the implicit certificate has the characteristics of small data volume and fast processing speed. It can be understood that the first negotiation module 61 negotiates with the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB , and in the communication process between the requesting user end and the responding user end, the first encryption module 62 and the first decryption module 65 use the symmetric key K AB Encrypting and decrypting messages can ensure the security of secure communications in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0114] In practical applications, the symmetric key K ABIt refers to the key obtained through negotiation between the first negotiation module 61 and the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, and the requesting user end and the responding user end use the same key. It can be understood that during the secure communication process of the Internet of Vehicles, the requesting user end and the responding user end use the symmetric key K AB Encrypting or decrypting messages can reduce the computational complexity of encryption and decryption during secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Compared with public key encryption and decryption, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0115] The first encryption module 62 is configured to request the user terminal to encrypt the first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message.

[0116] Specifically, the user terminal is requested to generate or obtain a first message based on the current communication demand. For example, the first message is represented by M. Further, the first encryption module 62 generates or obtains a first message based on the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the first message M to obtain the first encrypted message C A .

[0117] The first sending module 63 is used to request the user end to send the first encrypted message and the identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end, so that the responding user end determines the requesting user end according to the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message.

[0118] The identifier of the requesting user terminal uniquely represents the requesting user terminal and is used by other user terminals to identify the requesting user terminal. AB , therefore, the responding user also has the symmetric key K AB Specifically, the first sending module 63 sends the first encrypted message C A and the requesting client's ID A After being sent to the responding user end, the responding user end can identify the requesting user end according to the identifier of the requesting user end; the responding user end can identify the requesting user end according to the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A Decryption is performed to obtain the first message M.

[0119] The first receiving module 64 is used to request the user end to receive a second encrypted message sent by the responding user end, where the second encrypted message is obtained by the responding user end by encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key, and the second message is generated by the responding user end based on the first message.

[0120] In actual application, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C AAfter decryption and obtaining the first message M, the current communication demand can be determined according to the first message M, and the second message N is generated or obtained based on the first message M. It can be understood that the first message M corresponds to the second message N.

[0121] Furthermore, the responding user terminal uses the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the second message N to obtain the second encrypted message C B In combination with the above description, the responding user terminal can determine the requesting user terminal of the current communication according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal. Specifically, the first receiving module 64 receives the second encrypted message C sent by the responding user terminal. B .

[0122] The first decryption module 65 is configured to request the user terminal to decrypt the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second message.

[0123] In combination with the above description, the first negotiation module 61 negotiates with the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB Specifically, the first decryption module 65 uses the symmetric key K AB The second encrypted message C B Decrypt and obtain the second message N.

[0124] In this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt messages, which can ensure the security of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0125] In addition, in a possible embodiment, the above-mentioned first negotiation module 61 is specifically used to: request the user terminal to obtain the public key of the certificate authentication center. The requesting user terminal sends a first certificate application to the certificate authentication center. The requesting user terminal receives the first implicit certificate and the first declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center. The requesting user terminal calculates and obtains the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate, the first declared private key and the public key of the certificate authentication center. The requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal. The requesting user terminal generates a first signature value based on the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal and the first implicit certificate. The requesting user terminal sends a first signature value, a temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, and a first implicit certificate to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal calculates the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user terminal; and after the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation to obtain a symmetric key based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal. The requesting user terminal receives a second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate sent by the responding user terminal; wherein the second signature value is obtained by the responding user terminal signing the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate using the private key of the responding user terminal. The requesting user terminal calculates the public key of the responding user terminal based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the second signature value using the public key of the responding user terminal. After the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain a symmetric key.

[0126] In this embodiment, the first negotiation module 61 and the responding client negotiate a symmetric key through an implicit certificate key negotiation process. Based on this, messages are encrypted and decrypted during secure IoV communications, ensuring the security of IoV communications. Compared to public key encryption and decryption, this reduces encryption and decryption time and improves the efficiency of secure IoV communications.

[0127] In addition, in a possible embodiment, the requesting user terminal further includes: a first verification module; the first verification module is used to verify whether the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve holds. The first negotiation module 61 is used to request the user terminal to select a first random number, and calculate the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal. Specifically, if the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve is verified, the requesting user terminal selects a first random number, and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal.

[0128] In this embodiment, before the first negotiation module 61 selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, the first verification module verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve holds, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0129] In the requesting user end provided by this embodiment, the first negotiation module obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; the first sending module sends the first encrypted message obtained through symmetric key encryption and the identifier of the requesting user end to the responding user end; the responding user end determines the requesting user end according to the identifier of the requesting user end, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the responding user end generates a second message corresponding to the first message, and obtains the second encrypted message through symmetric key encryption; the first receiving module receives the second encrypted message sent by the responding user end; the first decryption module decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message. In the solution of this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through negotiation in the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, this saves the time for message encryption and decryption, and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0130] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the response user terminal provided by the present invention. Figure 7 As shown, the responding user terminal includes a second negotiation module 71 , a second receiving module 72 , a determination module 73 , a second decryption module 74 , a generation module 75 , a second encryption module 76 and a second sending module 77 .

[0131] The second negotiation module 71 is configured to respond to the symmetric key obtained by the client through negotiation with the requesting client according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process.

[0132] Among them, the implicit certificate has the characteristics of small data volume and fast processing speed. It can be understood that the second negotiation module 71 negotiates with the requesting user end according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB , and in the communication process between the requesting user end and the responding user end, the second decryption module 74 and the second encryption module 76 use the symmetric key K AB Encrypting and decrypting messages can ensure the security of secure communications in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0133] In practical applications, the symmetric key K AB It means that the second negotiation module 71 and the responding user end negotiate according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, and the requesting user end and the responding user end use the same key. It can be understood that during the secure communication process of the Internet of Vehicles, the requesting user end and the responding user end use the symmetric key K AB Encrypting or decrypting messages can reduce the computational complexity of encryption and decryption during secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Compared with public key encryption and decryption, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0134] The second receiving module 72 is configured to receive, in response to the user terminal, a first encrypted message sent by the requesting user terminal and an identifier of the requesting user terminal, where the first encrypted message is obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to a symmetric key.

[0135] Specifically, the requesting user terminal generates or obtains the first message M based on the current communication demand. In combination with the above description, the second negotiation module 71 negotiates with the requesting user terminal according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process to obtain the symmetric key K AB , therefore, the requesting user also has the symmetric key K AB . Further, the user is requested to use the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the first message M to obtain the first encrypted message C A Furthermore, the second receiving module 72 receives a request for the user terminal to send a first encrypted message C A and the identifier of the requesting client.

[0136] The determining module 73 is configured to determine the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal by the responding user terminal.

[0137] The second decryption module 74 is configured to decrypt the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key in response to the user terminal to obtain the first message.

[0138] The identifier of the requesting user terminal uniquely represents the requesting user terminal. For example, the identifier of the requesting user terminal is represented by ID A Specifically, the determination module 73 determines the ID of the requesting user terminal according to the ID AThe requesting user end can be determined, that is, the user end of the current communication can be determined. Further, the second decryption module 74 can use the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A Decryption is performed to obtain the first message M.

[0139] The generating module 75 is configured to generate a second message based on the first message in response to the user terminal.

[0140] In actual application, the second decryption module 74 uses the symmetric key K AB For the first encrypted message C A After decrypting and obtaining the first message M, the generation module 75 can determine the current communication demand according to the first message M, and generate or obtain the second message N based on the first message M. It can be understood that the first message M corresponds to the second message N.

[0141] The second encryption module 76 is configured to encrypt the second message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message.

[0142] The second sending module 77 is configured to send a second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal in response to the user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second message.

[0143] Furthermore, the second encryption module 76 uses the symmetric key K AB Encrypt the second message N to obtain the second encrypted message C B In combination with the above description, the determining module 73 can determine the requesting user end of the current communication according to the identifier of the requesting user end. Specifically, the second sending module 77 sends the second encrypted message C B Sent to the requesting client.

[0144] In combination with the above description, the second negotiation module 71 negotiates with the requesting user end to obtain the symmetric key K according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process. AB Specifically, the client is requested to use the symmetric key K AB The second encrypted message C B Decrypt and obtain the second message N.

[0145] In this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt messages, which can ensure the security of the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, it saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0146] In addition, in a possible embodiment, the above-mentioned second negotiation module 71 is specifically used to: the responding user terminal obtains the public key of the certificate authentication center. The responding user terminal sends a second certificate application to the certificate authentication center. The responding user terminal receives the second implicit certificate and the second declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center. The responding user terminal calculates the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal based on the second implicit certificate, the second declared private key and the public key of the certificate authentication center. The responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal. The responding user terminal receives the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, and the first implicit certificate sent by the requesting user terminal. The responding user terminal calculates the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user terminal. After the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the responding user terminal's private key, the requesting user terminal's public key, the responding user terminal's temporary private key, the requesting user terminal's temporary public key, the requesting user terminal's ID, and the responding user terminal's ID to obtain a symmetric key. The responding user terminal signs the requesting user terminal's temporary public key, the responding user terminal's temporary public key, and the second implicit certificate using the responding user terminal's private key to obtain a second signature value.

[0147] In this embodiment, the second negotiation module 71 and the requesting client negotiate a symmetric key through an implicit certificate key negotiation process. This symmetric key is then used to encrypt and decrypt messages during secure IoV communication, ensuring the security of IoV communications. Compared to public key encryption and decryption, this reduces encryption and decryption time and improves the efficiency of secure IoV communications.

[0148] In addition, in a possible embodiment, the responding user terminal further includes a second verification module, which is used by the responding user terminal to verify whether the relationship between the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve holds. The second negotiation module 71 is used by the responding user terminal to select a second random number, and to calculate the responding user terminal's temporary public key based on the second random number and the responding user terminal's private key. Specifically, if the relationship between the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key on the elliptic curve is verified to be successful, the responding user terminal selects a second random number, and calculates the responding user terminal's temporary public key based on the second random number and the responding user terminal's private key.

[0149] In this embodiment, the second negotiation module 71 selects a second random number, and before calculating the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, the second verification module verifies whether the relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve holds, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of secure communication in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0150] In the responding user terminal provided by this embodiment, the second negotiation module obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the requesting user terminal according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; the second receiving module receives the first encrypted message sent by the requesting user terminal and the identifier of the requesting user terminal; the determination module determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal, and the second decryption module decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; the generation module generates a second message corresponding to the first message, and the second encryption module encrypts the second encrypted message through the symmetric key; the second sending module sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal; the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message. In the solution of this embodiment, during the secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles, the symmetric key obtained through negotiation in the implicit certificate key negotiation process is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Compared with the public key encryption and decryption method, this saves the time for message encryption and decryption and improves the efficiency of secure communication of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0151] Figure 8 Schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention, such as Figure 8 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 810, a communication interface 820, a memory 830, and a communication bus 840, wherein the processor 810, the communication interface 820, and the memory 830 communicate with each other via the communication bus 840. The processor 810 may call the logic instructions in the memory 830 to execute the vehicle network security communication method.

[0152] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 830 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when sold or used as an independent product. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0153] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program. The computer program can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the vehicle network security communication method provided by the above methods.

[0154] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which is implemented when the computer program is executed by a processor to execute the vehicle network security communication method provided by the above methods.

[0155] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, i.e., they may be located in one location or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected based on actual needs to achieve the objectives of the present embodiment. Persons of ordinary skill in the art will be able to understand and implement the present invention without inventive effort.

[0156] Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, or of course, by hardware. Based on this understanding, the essence of the above technical solution or the part that contributes to the existing technology can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., and includes a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or certain parts of the embodiments.

[0157] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the various embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure communication method for an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: Applied to a requesting user terminal, the method includes: The requesting client obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding client according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; The requesting user end encrypts the first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message; The requesting user terminal sends the first encrypted message and the identifier of the requesting user terminal to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; The requesting client receives a second encrypted message sent by the responding client, where the second encrypted message is obtained by the responding client encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key, and the second message is generated by the responding client based on the first message; The requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message; The requesting client obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the responding client according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, including: The requesting client obtains the public key of the certificate authentication center; The requesting user terminal sends a first certificate request to the certificate authentication center; The requesting client receives the first implicit certificate and the first declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center; The requesting client calculates and obtains the private key and the public key of the requesting client based on the first implicit certificate, the first declared private key, and the public key of the certificate authentication authority; The requesting user terminal selects a first random number, and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal; The requesting client generates a first signature value according to the temporary public key of the requesting client and the first implicit certificate; The requesting user terminal sends the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal and the first implicit certificate to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal calculates the public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting user terminal; and, after the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; The responding user terminal performs hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB The expression is: K AB =H2(d B ·Q A ,y·Q A ,d B ·X,y·X,A,B) Among them, d B In response to the user's private key, Q A is the public key of the requesting client, y is the temporary private key of the responding client, X is the temporary public key of the requesting client, A is the ID of the requesting client, and B is the ID of the responding client; The requesting client receives the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding client, and the second implicit certificate sent by the responding client; wherein the second signature value is obtained by the responding client signing the temporary public key of the requesting client, the temporary public key of the responding client, and the second implicit certificate using the private key of the responding client; The requesting client calculates the public key of the responding client based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication authority, and verifies the second signature value using the public key of the responding client; After the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; The requesting client performs a hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB The expression is: K AB =H2(d A ·Q B ,d A ·Y,x·Q B ,x·Y,A,B) Among them, d A To request the private key of the user, Q B is the public key of the responding user, Y is the temporary public key of the responding user, and x is the temporary private key of the requesting user.

2. The vehicle network security communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, the method further includes: The requesting client verifies whether a relationship between the private key of the requesting client and the public key of the requesting client on the elliptic curve holds; The requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates a temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal, specifically including: If the relationship between the private key of the requesting user terminal and the public key of the requesting user terminal on the elliptic curve is verified, the requesting user terminal selects a first random number and calculates the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal based on the first random number and the private key of the requesting user terminal.

3. A secure communication method for an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: Applied to responding to a user terminal, the method includes: The responding client obtains a symmetric key through negotiation with the requesting client according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; The responding user terminal receives a first encrypted message and an identifier of the requesting user terminal sent by the requesting user terminal, where the first encrypted message is obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to the symmetric key; The responding client determines the requesting client according to the identifier of the requesting client; The responding user terminal decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; The responding user terminal generates a second message based on the first message, and encrypts the second message using the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message; The responding user terminal sends the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message; The responding client obtains the symmetric key through negotiation with the requesting client according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process, including: The responding user terminal obtains the public key of the certificate authentication center; The responding user terminal sends a second certificate request to the certificate authentication center; The responding user terminal receives the second implicit certificate and the second declared private key sent by the certificate authentication center; The responding user terminal calculates and obtains the responding user terminal's private key and the responding user terminal's public key based on the second implicit certificate, the second declared private key, and the public key of the certificate authentication authority; The responding user terminal selects a second random number, and calculates a temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal; The responding client receives the first signature value, the temporary public key of the requesting client, and the first implicit certificate sent by the requesting client; The responding client calculates the public key of the requesting client based on the first implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the first signature value based on the public key of the requesting client; After the first signature value is verified, the responding user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the responding user terminal, the public key of the requesting user terminal, the temporary private key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; The responding user terminal performs hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB The expression is: K AB =H2(d B ·Q A ,y·Q A ,d B ·X,y·X,A,B) Among them, d B In response to the user's private key, Q A is the public key of the requesting client, y is the temporary private key of the responding client, X is the temporary public key of the requesting client, A is the ID of the requesting client, and B is the ID of the responding client; The responding client signs the temporary public key of the requesting client, the temporary public key of the responding client, and the second implicit certificate using the private key of the responding client to obtain a second signature value; The responding user terminal sends the second signature value, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, and the second implicit certificate to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal calculates the public key of the responding user terminal based on the second implicit certificate and the public key of the certificate authentication center, and verifies the second signature value by using the public key of the responding user terminal; and, after the second signature value is verified, the requesting user terminal performs a hash calculation based on the private key of the requesting user terminal, the public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary public key of the responding user terminal, the temporary private key of the requesting user terminal, the ID of the requesting user terminal, and the ID of the responding user terminal to obtain the symmetric key; The requesting client performs a hash calculation to obtain the symmetric key K AB The expression is: K AB =H2(d A ·Q B ,d A ·Y,x·Q B ,x·Y,A,B) Among them, d A To request the private key of the user, Q B is the public key of the responding user, Y is the temporary public key of the responding user, and x is the temporary private key of the requesting user.

4. The vehicle network security communication method according to claim 3, characterized in that: Before the responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates a temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, the method further includes: The responding user terminal verifies whether a relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve holds; The responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates a temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal, specifically including: If the relationship between the private key of the responding user terminal and the public key of the responding user terminal on the elliptic curve is verified, the responding user terminal selects a second random number and calculates the temporary public key of the responding user terminal based on the second random number and the private key of the responding user terminal.

5. A requesting user terminal, characterized in that: The requesting user terminal executes the vehicle network security communication method according to claim 1, and the requesting user terminal includes: A first negotiation module is configured to obtain a symmetric key through negotiation with a responding user terminal according to an implicit certificate key negotiation process; A first encryption module, configured to encrypt the first message according to the symmetric key to obtain a first encrypted message; a first sending module, configured to send the first encrypted message and the identifier of the requesting user terminal to the responding user terminal, so that the responding user terminal determines the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal, and decrypts the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; a first receiving module, configured to receive a second encrypted message sent by the responding user terminal, where the second encrypted message is obtained by the responding user terminal encrypting the second message according to the symmetric key, and the second message is generated by the responding user terminal based on the first message; The first decryption module is used to decrypt the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

6. A responding user terminal, characterized in that: The responding user terminal executes the vehicle network security communication method according to claim 3, and the responding user terminal includes: The second negotiation module is used to negotiate the obtained symmetric key with the requesting user terminal according to the implicit certificate key negotiation process; a second receiving module, configured to receive a first encrypted message and an identifier of the requesting user terminal sent by the requesting user terminal, wherein the first encrypted message is obtained by the requesting user terminal encrypting the first message according to the symmetric key; a determination module, configured to determine the requesting user terminal according to the identifier of the requesting user terminal; a second decryption module, configured to decrypt the first encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the first message; A generating module, configured to generate a second message based on the first message; A second encryption module, configured to encrypt the second message according to the symmetric key to obtain a second encrypted message; The second sending module is used to send the second encrypted message to the requesting user terminal, so that the requesting user terminal decrypts the second encrypted message according to the symmetric key to obtain the second message.

7. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the program, it implements the vehicle network security communication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 2, or when the processor executes the program, it implements the vehicle network security communication method as described in any one of claims 3 to 4.

8. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the vehicle network security communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 2, or when the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the vehicle network security communication method according to any one of claims 3 to 4.

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