Perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, device, equipment, and medium

Abstract

The present invention provides a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, device, equipment and medium, the method comprising: monitoring the communication signal sent by the transmitting vehicle in the first lane, the perception signal sent by the interfering vehicle in the second lane, and the communication signal and perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle in the third lane, wherein the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal; determining the first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle; determining the third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal based on the first time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal; based on the third time range, jointly optimizing the transmitting power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the constraint conditions; and controlling the transmitting vehicle to send a communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range based on the optimized transmission power and motion trajectory. The embodiments of the present invention can realize secure communication between vehicles at the physical layer in an efficient and energy-saving manner.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network communication technology, and in particular to a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, device, equipment and medium. Background Art

[0002] In connected vehicle systems, vehicles are typically equipped with millimeter-wave radars for real-time environmental awareness, obtaining user link status information, and assisting safe driving. Millimeter-wave technology aims to utilize high-frequency radio bands to achieve high-bandwidth, low-latency, and high-capacity wireless communications and sensing. However, with the development of 6G technology, communication bands are gradually adopting higher frequency bands, even millimeter-wave bands, which will overlap with the frequency bands of on-board millimeter-wave radars. If the electromagnetic wave bands are the same or close, mutual interference will occur, affecting communication and perception performance.

[0003] In addition, in the Internet of Vehicles scenario, the demand for wireless communication is not limited to static point-to-point communication, but dynamic and mobile scenarios. Communication in a mobile environment is easily eavesdropped and communication security cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, due to the short wavelength of millimeter waves, it means that millimeter wave signals can concentrate energy in a specific direction. In high-speed mobile scenarios, once the beam cannot be aligned, it will be more susceptible to eavesdropping and physical layer secure communication cannot be achieved.

[0004] In the prior art, there is a method of suppressing eavesdroppers from eavesdropping by generating additional interference signals. However, the above method will cause additional energy consumption and interference burden. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer security communication method, device, equipment and medium to solve the problem of being unable to achieve physical layer security communication in an efficient and energy-saving manner in the field of vehicle networking technology.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, an embodiment of the present invention provides a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, including:

[0007] monitoring a communication signal sent from a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal sent from an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal;

[0008] Determining a first time range for the eavesdropping vehicle to receive the perception signal based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle;

[0009] determining, based on the first time range, a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range;

[0010] Calculating based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, determining a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal;

[0011] Jointly optimizing the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraints;

[0012] According to the optimized transmission power and the motion trajectory, the transmitting vehicle is controlled to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range.

[0013] Optionally, determining, based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle, a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal includes:

[0014] When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the earliest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle;

[0015] The earliest sending time is added to the first propagation time of the perception signal to determine the earliest receiving time when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal;

[0016] When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the minimum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the latest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle;

[0017] The latest sending time is added to the second propagation time of the perception signal to determine the latest receiving time when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal;

[0018] According to the earliest receiving time and the latest receiving time, it is determined that a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal sent by the interfering vehicle is later than or equal to the earliest receiving time and earlier than or equal to the latest receiving time.

[0019] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0020] Calculating based on the maximum interference distance and lane width to determine the maximum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0021] performing calculation according to the maximum interference distance and the propagation rate of the sensing signal to determine the first propagation time required for the sensing signal to propagate the maximum interference distance;

[0022] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the maximum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the first propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range.

[0023] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0024] Calculating based on the radar horizontal angle of the interfering vehicle and the lane width to determine the minimum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0025] performing calculation based on the minimum horizontal interference distance, the lane width, and the propagation rate of the perception signal to determine the second propagation time required for the perception signal to propagate the minimum interference distance;

[0026] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the minimum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the second propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the minimum interference distance of the perceived interference range.

[0027] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0028] Calculating the propagation time of the communication signal based on the positional relationship between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle and the propagation rate of the communication signal;

[0029] The method of calculating, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, determining a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal comprises:

[0030] The propagation duration of the communication signal is subtracted from each moment in the second time range to determine a third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal.

[0031] Optionally, based on the third time range, the transmission power and movement trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are jointly optimized according to the constraint conditions, including:

[0032] Within the third time range, the transmitting power and the motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are optimized respectively according to the constraint conditions and the alternating optimization algorithm until the alternating optimization algorithm converges.

[0033] Optionally, the constraint conditions include one or more of the following:

[0034] The transmission power of the transmitting vehicle is greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to a first threshold;

[0035] The absolute value of the traveling speed of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a second threshold;

[0036] The absolute value of the acceleration of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a third threshold;

[0037] The communication reliability index of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fourth threshold;

[0038] The probability of successful ranging perception of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fifth threshold.

[0039] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication device, comprising:

[0040] a first monitoring module, configured to monitor a communication signal transmitted from a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal transmitted from an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal;

[0041] A first determining module is configured to determine a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal according to the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle;

[0042] a second determining module, configured to determine, based on the first time range, a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range;

[0043] a third determining module, configured to calculate, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, a third time range within which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal;

[0044] A first optimization module is configured to jointly optimize the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraint conditions;

[0045] The first control module is configured to control the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range according to the optimized transmission power and the motion trajectory.

[0046] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a network device, comprising: a processor, a memory, and a program stored on the memory and runnable on the processor, wherein the program, when executed by the processor, implements the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of the above items.

[0047] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a readable storage medium, comprising: a program is stored on the readable storage medium, and when the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of the above items are implemented.

[0048] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer program product, including computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any of the above items.

[0049] At least one of the above technical solutions of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0050] In the above scheme, the existing perception signal is used as an interference signal to ensure that the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal when it is interfered with by the perception signal, so as to achieve eavesdropping of the communication signal by the eavesdropping vehicle through interference with the perception signal. There is no need to introduce additional signals, and unfavorable signals are converted into favorable signals, which can not only improve the confidentiality and reliability of the communication link, but also save energy and improve efficiency. At the same time, since the transmitting vehicle is constantly moving when transmitting the communication signal, the transmitting power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are jointly optimized according to the constraint conditions, thereby optimizing the confidentiality rate and further improving the confidentiality and reliability of the communication link. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0051] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a signal propagation scenario according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 3 This is a structural diagram of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer security communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0055] like Figure 1As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, including:

[0056] Step S101, monitoring a communication signal sent by a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal sent by an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal;

[0057] In step S101, the transmitting vehicle and the receiving vehicle are located in the first lane and are traveling in the same direction, the interfering vehicle is located in the second lane and is traveling in the opposite direction of the transmitting vehicle, and the eavesdropping vehicle is located in the third lane between the first and second lanes and is traveling in the same direction as the transmitting vehicle. Each vehicle has a sensing function and a communication function, wherein the sensing function is achieved by equipping the vehicle with a millimeter-wave radar. For example, the vehicle's forward radar can use a 77GHz medium-range radar. To facilitate subsequent calculations, it is assumed that the horizontal detection angle of the forward radar is θ and the maximum detection distance is R max , the radar transmission power is P sen The communication function is achieved by equipping the vehicle with a single antenna. To facilitate subsequent calculations, it is assumed that the transmission power of the communication signal transmitted by the transmitting vehicle through the single antenna is P com It should be noted that the communication frequency band of a single antenna is the same as the sensing frequency band of the millimeter-wave radar. Therefore, the sensing signal sent by the forward radar will interfere with the communication signal of the single antenna. In this embodiment of the present invention, the sensing signal sent by the interfering vehicle is used as the interference signal. In addition, due to the real-time sensing function of the radar, the channel link status information of the receiving vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle is perfectly known.

[0058] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, for the convenience of testing, a signal propagation scenario is constructed, in which the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are equal and all equal to D. The customer satisfaction index (CSI) of each vehicle is perfectly known. The transmitting vehicle is denoted as a, the receiving vehicle is denoted as b, the eavesdropping vehicle is denoted as e, and the interfering vehicle is denoted as c. Each vehicle has both perception and communication functions. It is assumed that the propagation speeds of the communication signal and the perception signal are both Where μ is the electrolyte constant, ε is the magnetic permeability, and it is assumed that all vehicles travel at a constant speed v, and the coordinate axis is established with the launch vehicle as the coordinate origin. The direction of travel of the launch vehicle is the positive direction of the X axis, and the direction from the first lane to the second lane is the positive direction of the Y axis. The position of vehicle i at the kth moment is recorded as (x i [k],y i [k]), for example, the position of the transmitting vehicle at time 0 is (xa [0],y a [0]).

[0059] It should be noted that radar interference generally comes from two sources: direct interference from oncoming vehicles and echo interference from vehicles ahead. Since the receiving vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle are in the same lane with no other vehicles ahead, echo interference can be ignored. Therefore, the perceived interference caused by the interfering vehicle to the receiving vehicle is: The perceptual interference caused by the jamming vehicle to the eavesdropping vehicle is: Among them, h c→b is the channel state between the receiving vehicle and the interfering vehicle, h c→e The channel status between the jamming vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle is Represents the effective aperture of the radar receiver, G r is the antenna receiving gain, Represents the power density per unit distance from the interference source, and are the distances from the interfering vehicle to the receiving vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle, respectively.

[0060] Step S102, determining a first time range within which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle;

[0061] In step S102, the perception radar equipped on the interfering vehicle has a certain perception interference range. According to the perception interference range, the earliest time when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal and the latest time when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal within the perception interference range can be determined.

[0062] Step S103, determining a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal based on the first time range, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range;

[0063] In step S103, it is necessary to ensure that the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal when it is interfered with by the perception signal, so that the perception signal can prevent the eavesdropping vehicle from eavesdropping on the communication signal. Therefore, based on the first time range, a second time range is determined in which the eavesdropping vehicle can receive the communication signal, wherein the earliest moment of the second time range is later than or equal to the earliest moment of the first time range, and the latest moment of the second time range is earlier than or equal to the latest moment of the first time range.

[0064] Step S104, calculating based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal to determine a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal;

[0065] In step S104, the propagation duration of the communication signal is added to each moment in the second time range, so as to determine the third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal.

[0066] Step S105, based on the third time range, jointly optimize the transmission power and movement trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the constraint conditions;

[0067] In step S105, the ultimate optimization goal of the embodiment of the present invention is to maximize the confidentiality rate (a measure of the rate at which a wireless communication system can securely transmit information in the presence of an eavesdropper) under the premise of secure communication. For ease of processing, the driving time of the transmitting vehicle on the road section is evenly divided into N time slots, t[0] is recorded as the time of entering the road section, and t[n] is recorded as the time of leaving the road section. The goal is to maximize the confidentiality rate by adjusting the transmission power P of the transmitting vehicle. com =[P com [k start ],…,P com [k end ]] T and the trajectory along the x-axis X Alice =[X Alice [k start ],…,X Alice [k end ]] T Perform joint optimization to maximize the confidentiality rate. Assuming the path loss α = 2, the optimization objective can be expressed as: in, is the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving vehicle, σ b is the noise power received by the receiving vehicle, h a→b is the channel status between the transmitting vehicle and the receiving vehicle, is the distance between the transmitting vehicle and the receiving vehicle; is the signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropped vehicle, σ e is the noise power received by the eavesdropping vehicle, h a→e The channel status between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle, is the distance between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle.

[0068] Step S106: Control the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range according to the optimized transmission power and the movement trajectory.

[0069] In step S106, after optimizing the transmission power and motion trajectory (i.e., when the confidentiality rate is maximized), the transmitting vehicle is controlled to send a communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range, which can achieve secure communication at the physical layer with low energy consumption and high efficiency.

[0070] In an embodiment of the present invention, in order to ensure the secure communication of vehicles at the physical layer, the problem is divided into two parts for solution. The first part utilizes the existing perception signal and uses the perception signal as an interference signal to ensure that the communication signal is received when the eavesdropping vehicle is interfered with by the perception signal, thereby realizing the eavesdropping of the communication signal by the eavesdropping vehicle through interference with the perception signal. There is no need to introduce additional signals, and the existing unfavorable signals are converted into favorable signals, which can not only improve the confidentiality and reliability of the communication link, but also save energy and improve efficiency. In the second part, since the transmitting vehicle is constantly moving when transmitting the communication signal, the transmitting power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are jointly optimized according to the constraint conditions, thereby optimizing the confidentiality rate and further improving the confidentiality and reliability of the communication link.

[0071] Optionally, determining, based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle, a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal includes:

[0072] When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the earliest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle;

[0073] The earliest sending time of the perception signal is added to the first propagation time of the perception signal to determine the earliest receiving time of the perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle;

[0074] When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the minimum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the latest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle;

[0075] The latest sending time is added to the second propagation time of the perception signal to determine the latest receiving time when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal;

[0076] According to the earliest receiving time and the latest receiving time of the perception signal, it is determined that the first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal sent by the interfering vehicle is later than or equal to the earliest receiving time and earlier than or equal to the latest receiving time.

[0077] In the embodiment of the present invention, Figure 2As shown in , the radar equipped by the jamming vehicle has a certain perception interference range. The eavesdropping vehicle can only receive the perception signal sent by the jamming vehicle within the perception interference range. The earliest sending of the perception signal is the earliest sending time of the perception signal sent by the jamming vehicle that can interfere with the eavesdropping vehicle, which is recorded as The earliest receiving time of the sensing signal is the earliest moment when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the sensing signal, which is recorded as t1 is the first propagation time required for the maximum interference distance of the sensing signal propagation. At that moment, the eavesdropping vehicle happened to enter the sensing interference range.

[0078] The latest sending time of the sensing signal is the latest sending time of the sensing signal sent by the interfering vehicle that can interfere with the eavesdropping vehicle, which is recorded as The latest reception time of the perception signal is the latest moment when the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal. t2 is the second propagation time required for the minimum interference distance of the sensing signal propagation. At that moment, the eavesdropping vehicle just left the sensing interference range.

[0079] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0080] Calculating based on the maximum interference distance and lane width to determine the maximum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0081] performing calculation according to the maximum interference distance and the propagation rate of the sensing signal to determine the first propagation time required for the sensing signal to propagate the maximum interference distance;

[0082] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the maximum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the first propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range.

[0083] In the embodiment of the present invention, the width of each lane is D. Therefore, the horizontal distance between two adjacent vehicles in different lanes is approximately equal to D; the maximum detection distance of the radar of the interfering vehicle is R max , and the perception interference range formed is a fan-shaped interference area, so the radius of the fan-shaped interference area is R max , when the eavesdropping vehicle enters the sensing interference range, the horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interference vehicle is Therefore, the maximum horizontal interference distance that an interfering vehicle can interfere with in the embodiment of the present invention is: The first propagation time required to perceive the maximum interference distance of the signal

[0084] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the jamming vehicle is equal to the sum of the maximum horizontal jamming distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the first propagation time, that is, When the eavesdropping vehicle is able to receive the perception signal just when it enters the perception interference range, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time meets the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range.

[0085] In addition, the above formula can be used to calculate:

[0086] First time:

[0087] Second time:

[0088] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0089] Calculating based on the radar horizontal angle of the interfering vehicle and the lane width to determine the minimum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0090] performing calculation based on the minimum horizontal interference distance, the lane width, and the propagation rate of the perception signal to determine the second propagation time required for the perception signal to propagate the minimum interference distance;

[0091] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the minimum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the second propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the minimum interference distance of the perceived interference range.

[0092] In the embodiment of the present invention, the width of each lane is D, so the horizontal distance between two adjacent vehicles in different lanes is approximately equal to D; the maximum detection distance of the radar of the interfering vehicle is R max , the horizontal angle is θ, and the perceived interference range is a fan-shaped interference area. Therefore, the radius of the fan-shaped interference area is R max The central angle of the fan-shaped interference area is θ. When the eavesdropping vehicle is about to leave the sensing interference range, the horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is Therefore, the minimum horizontal interference distance that an interfering vehicle can interfere with in the embodiment of the present invention is: The second propagation time required for the minimum interference distance of the perceived signal

[0093] When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the minimum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the second propagation time, that is, When , the eavesdropping vehicle can receive the perception signal just when it leaves the perception interference range, so it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time meets the minimum interference distance of the perception interference range.

[0094] In addition, the above formula can be used to calculate:

[0095] First time:

[0096] Second time:

[0097] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0098] Calculating the propagation time of the communication signal based on the positional relationship between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle and the propagation rate of the communication signal;

[0099] The method of calculating, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, determining a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal comprises:

[0100] The propagation duration of the communication signal is subtracted from each moment in the second time range to determine a third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal.

[0101] In the embodiment of the present invention, the propagation rate of the communication signal is Among them, μ is the electrolyte constant, ε is the magnetic permeability, and the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle are both moving at a constant speed v, so their positions are relatively fixed, that is, in, Represents the propagation time of the communication signal, and the solution is:

[0102] The second time range is the second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal. The propagation time of the communication signal is subtracted from each moment in the second time range to obtain the third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal. For the convenience of calculation, it is first assumed that the earliest moment in the second time range is the same as the earliest moment in the first time range, which is recorded as The earliest time when the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal In order to ensure that the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal when it is interfered with by the sensing signal, the second time range is included in the first time range. In fact, the earliest time when the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal is Similarly, for the convenience of calculation, it is assumed that the latest time of the second time range is the same as the latest time of the first time range, which is recorded as The latest time when the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal The second time range is included in the first time range, and the latest time when the transmitting vehicle actually sends the communication signal Therefore, the third time range is [k start , k end ].

[0103] Optionally, based on the third time range, the transmission power and movement trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are jointly optimized according to the constraint conditions, including:

[0104] Within the third time range, the transmitting power and the motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are optimized respectively according to the constraint conditions and the alternating optimization algorithm until the alternating optimization algorithm converges.

[0105] In the embodiment of the present invention, according to the optimization target: It can be seen that due to the existence of [·] + , making the problem non-smooth. In addition, the above objective function is relative to x and P com It is non-concave and difficult to solve directly. Therefore, the problem is decomposed into two sub-problems: optimizing the transmission power and optimizing the motion trajectory. The two sub-problems are optimized alternately by an alternating optimization algorithm until the algorithm converges. In addition, it should be noted that when the confidentiality rate is negative, the transmission power is set to 0, and the above problem is expressed as R S =max{R t -R e ,0},R S is the confidentiality rate, R t -R e represent

[0106] Optionally, the constraint conditions include one or more of the following:

[0107] The transmission power of the transmitting vehicle is greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to a first threshold;

[0108] The absolute value of the traveling speed of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a second threshold;

[0109] The absolute value of the acceleration of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a third threshold;

[0110] The communication reliability index of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fourth threshold;

[0111] The probability of successful ranging perception of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fifth threshold.

[0112] In the embodiment of the present invention, the constraints during joint optimization are specifically described as follows:

[0113] Power Constraints:

[0114] Velocity constraint: |v[k]|≤v max (1c);

[0115] Acceleration constraints:

[0116] Communication reliability constraints:

[0117] Constraints on the probability of successful ranging perception:

[0118] Among them, P com [k] is the transmitting power of the transmitting vehicle, v[k] is the speed of the transmitting vehicle, a0[k] is the acceleration of the transmitting vehicle, 1-P co is the communication reliability index of the transmitting vehicle, is the probability of successful ranging of the transmitting vehicle.

[0119] Combined with the above constraints, the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are described in detail:

[0120] A. Optimize the transmission power under a given driving trajectory. Assuming the driving trajectory is known, the problem can be simplified to:

[0121]

[0122] st(1b);

[0123] in, Since the non-negative weighted sum still maintains the concave function characteristics, the Lagrange multiplication number can be obtained:

[0124]

[0125] Among them, λ lag is the Lagrange multiplier, which can be obtained through the previous iteration. Solving the above equation, we can get the optimization result of communication transmission power:

[0126]

[0127] In addition, due to the limitation of the maximum communication transmission power, the communication transmission power should meet When the channel of the receiving vehicle is worse than that of the eavesdropping vehicle, the transmit power should be set to 0 to ensure security.

[0128] B. Optimize driving trajectory under given transmission power.

[0129] Prerequisite: The transmitting power of the transmitting vehicle is P com =[P com [k start ],…,P com [k end ]] T , the trajectory along the x-axis is X Alice =[X Alice [k start ],…,X Alice [k end ]] T , the optimization goal is Since the objective function is non-concave and cannot be solved directly, we introduce the slack variable u=[u[k start ],…,u[k end ]] T , v=[v[k start ],…,v[k end ]] T , transforming the original problem into:

[0130]

[0131] (1c), (1d), (1e), (1f).

[0132] in, function For u[k] is convex, -x a [k] 2 For x a [k] is concave, so it can be solved using Taylor expansion, given the initial point (x0, u0), where x0 = [x0[k start ],…,x0[k end ]] T ,function The first-order Taylor expansion of is:

[0133]

[0134] The expansion of is:

[0135]

[0136] Ignoring the constant term, the problem can be expressed as:

[0137]

[0138] stv[k]-x a [k] 2 +2x e [k]x a [k]-x e [k] 2 ;

[0139] (1c), (1d), (1e), (1f), (2b).

[0140] The final objective function is concave, and the problem can be solved using the Convex Optimization Toolbox (CVX) tool in the Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) or other tools.

[0141] To sum up, the embodiments of the present invention, from the perspective of physical layer security, use co-frequency sensing signals to suppress eavesdropping channels, rather than being limited to communication signals. The sensing interference signals that are traditionally considered unfavorable are defined as favorable signals, which can not only improve the security and reliability of the communication link, but also reduce energy consumption. In addition, since the vehicle is in a real-time mobile state, the embodiments of the present invention, on the basis of communication security, jointly optimize the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle, thereby maximizing the confidentiality rate and improving transmission efficiency.

[0142] like Figure 3 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a perception-enabled endogenous physical layer security communication device, comprising:

[0143] A first monitoring module 301 is configured to monitor a communication signal sent by a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal sent by an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal;

[0144] A first determining module 302 is configured to determine a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the sensing signal based on the sensing interference range of the interfering vehicle;

[0145] A second determining module 303 is configured to determine, based on the first time range, a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range;

[0146] A third determining module 304 is configured to calculate, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, a third time range within which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal;

[0147] A first optimization module 305 is configured to jointly optimize the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraint conditions;

[0148] The first control module 306 is configured to control the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range according to the optimized transmission power and the movement trajectory.

[0149] Optionally, the first determining module 302 includes:

[0150] a first determining unit, configured to determine, when the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range, that the current time is the earliest time for the interfering vehicle to send a perception signal;

[0151] a first calculation unit, configured to add the earliest sending time of the perception signal to the first propagation duration of the perception signal to determine the earliest receiving time of the perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle;

[0152] a second determining unit, configured to determine, when the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the minimum interference distance of the perception interference range, that the current time is the latest time for the interfering vehicle to send the perception signal;

[0153] a second calculating unit, configured to add the latest sending time of the perception signal to the second propagation time of the perception signal to determine the latest receiving time of the perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle;

[0154] The third determining unit is used to determine, based on the earliest receiving time and the latest receiving time of the perception signal, that a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal sent by the interfering vehicle is later than or equal to the earliest receiving second time and earlier than or equal to the latest receiving fourth time.

[0155] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0156] a first calculation module, configured to calculate, based on the maximum interference distance and the lane width, a maximum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0157] a second calculation module, configured to calculate, based on the maximum interference distance and the propagation rate of the sensing signal, to determine the first propagation time required for the sensing signal to propagate the maximum interference distance;

[0158] The fourth determination module is used to determine that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range when the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the maximum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the first propagation time.

[0159] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0160] a third calculation module, configured to calculate, based on the radar horizontal angle of the interfering vehicle and the lane width, a minimum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width;

[0161] a fourth calculation module, configured to calculate, based on the minimum horizontal interference distance, the lane width, and a propagation rate of the perception signal, to determine the second propagation time required for the perception signal to propagate the minimum interference distance;

[0162] The fifth determination module is used to determine that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the minimum interference distance of the perceived interference range when the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the minimum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the second propagation time.

[0163] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0164] a fifth calculation module, configured to calculate, based on a positional relationship between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle and a propagation rate of the communication signal, to obtain a propagation duration of the communication signal;

[0165] The third determining module 304 includes:

[0166] The fourth determining unit is configured to subtract the propagation duration of the communication signal from each moment in the second time range to determine a third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal.

[0167] Optionally, the first optimization module 305 includes:

[0168] The first optimization unit is configured to optimize the transmission power and the motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the constraint conditions and the alternating optimization algorithm within the third time range, until the alternating optimization algorithm converges.

[0169] Optionally, the constraints in the first optimization module 305 include one or more of the following:

[0170] The transmission power of the transmitting vehicle is greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to a first threshold;

[0171] The absolute value of the traveling speed of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a second threshold;

[0172] The absolute value of the acceleration of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a third threshold;

[0173] The communication reliability index of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fourth threshold;

[0174] The probability of successful ranging perception of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fifth threshold.

[0175] It should be noted that the embodiment of the device is a device corresponding to the embodiment of the above method, and all implementation methods in the embodiment of the above method are applicable to the embodiment of the device and can achieve the same technical effect.

[0176] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a network device, comprising: a processor, a memory, and a program stored on the memory and runnable on the processor. When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of the above items, and can achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.

[0177] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a readable storage medium, comprising: a program stored on the readable storage medium, and when the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any of the above items are implemented, and the same technical effect can be achieved. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here. Among them, the computer-readable storage medium is such as a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0178] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer program product, including computer instructions. When the computer instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any of the above items are implemented, and the same technical effect can be achieved. To avoid repetition, they will not be repeated here.

[0179] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or terminal device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device comprising the element.

[0180] Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if such changes and modifications fall within the scope of the claims and their equivalents, the present invention is intended to include such changes and modifications.

Claims

1. A perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method, characterized in that: include: monitoring a communication signal sent from a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal sent from an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal; Determining a first time range for the eavesdropping vehicle to receive the perception signal based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle; determining, based on the first time range, a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range; Calculating based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, determining a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal; Jointly optimizing the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraints; According to the optimized transmission power and the motion trajectory, the transmitting vehicle is controlled to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range.

2. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Determining, based on the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle, a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal, includes: When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the earliest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle; The earliest sending time of the perception signal is added to the first propagation time of the perception signal to determine the earliest receiving time of the perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle; When the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle at the current time satisfies the minimum interference distance of the perception interference range, determining the current time as the latest sending time of the perception signal by the interfering vehicle; The latest sending time of the perception signal is added to the second propagation time of the perception signal to determine the latest receiving time of the perception signal received by the eavesdropping vehicle; According to the earliest receiving time and the latest receiving time of the perception signal, it is determined that the first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal sent by the interfering vehicle is later than or equal to the earliest receiving time and earlier than or equal to the latest receiving time.

3. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Calculating based on the maximum interference distance and lane width to determine the maximum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width; performing calculation according to the maximum interference distance and the propagation rate of the sensing signal to determine the first propagation time required for the sensing signal to propagate the maximum interference distance; When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the maximum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the first propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the maximum interference distance of the perception interference range.

4. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Calculating based on the radar horizontal angle of the interfering vehicle and the lane width to determine the minimum horizontal interference distance of the interfering vehicle in the horizontal direction; wherein the widths of the first lane, the second lane, and the third lane are the same and equal to the lane width; performing calculation based on the minimum horizontal interference distance, the lane width, and the propagation rate of the perception signal to determine the second propagation time required for the perception signal to propagate the minimum interference distance; When the current horizontal distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle is equal to the sum of the minimum horizontal interference distance and the displacement distance of the eavesdropping vehicle within the second propagation duration, it is determined that the distance between the eavesdropping vehicle and the interfering vehicle meets the minimum interference distance of the perceived interference range.

5. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Calculating the propagation time of the communication signal based on the positional relationship between the transmitting vehicle and the eavesdropping vehicle and the propagation rate of the communication signal; The method of calculating, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, determining a third time range for the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal comprises: The propagation duration of the communication signal is subtracted from each moment in the second time range to determine a third time range in which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal.

6. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Jointly optimizing the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraints, including: Within the third time range, the transmitting power and the motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle are optimized respectively according to the constraint conditions and the alternating optimization algorithm until the alternating optimization algorithm converges.

7. The method for sensing-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication according to claim 1 or 6, characterized in that: The constraints include one or more of the following: The transmission power of the transmitting vehicle is greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to a first threshold; The absolute value of the traveling speed of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a second threshold; The absolute value of the acceleration of the transmitting vehicle is less than or equal to a third threshold; The communication reliability index of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fourth threshold; The probability of successful ranging perception of the transmitting vehicle is greater than a fifth threshold.

8. A perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication device, characterized in that: include: a first monitoring module, configured to monitor a communication signal transmitted from a transmitting vehicle in a first lane to a receiving vehicle, a perception signal transmitted from an interfering vehicle in a second lane, and the communication signal and the perception signal received by an eavesdropping vehicle in a third lane, wherein the third lane is located between the first lane and the second lane, and the perception signal has the same frequency as the communication signal; A first determining module is configured to determine a first time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the perception signal according to the perception interference range of the interfering vehicle; a second determining module, configured to determine, based on the first time range, a second time range in which the eavesdropping vehicle receives the communication signal, wherein the second time range is included in the first time range; a third determining module, configured to calculate, based on the second time range and the propagation duration of the communication signal, a third time range within which the transmitting vehicle sends the communication signal; A first optimization module is configured to jointly optimize the transmission power and motion trajectory of the transmitting vehicle according to the third time range and the constraint conditions; The first control module is configured to control the transmitting vehicle to send the communication signal to the receiving vehicle within the third time range according to the optimized transmission power and the motion trajectory.

9. A network device, characterized in that: include: A processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the program, when executed by the processor, implements the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A readable storage medium, characterized in that: include: The readable storage medium stores a program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

11. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the perception-enabled endogenous physical layer secure communication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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