Lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on dynamic key

Through dynamic key technology and Hash function, efficient authentication and key negotiation between the vehicle and the RSU are solved, and the authentication efficiency and communication security of the vehicle are improved when driving at high speeds are improved. sex.

CN119071781AActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03ANHUI NORMAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411093452.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-09
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-08-09

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing Internet of Vehicle authentication methods have problems such as insufficient security, high delay, high authentication complexity and frequent repeated authentication during the communication between the vehicle and the RSU, especially when the vehicle is switching the RSU at high speed.

Method used

The lightweight Internet of Vehicle authentication method based on dynamic keys is adopted, and the key is generated and distributed through the trusted organization TA. The vehicle and the RSU are directly authenticated and synchronized, and the Hash function and pseudo-random number algorithm are used to reduce the risk of key leakage. Realize efficient authentication and key negotiation between the vehicle and the RSU to reduce repeated authentication overhead.

Benefits of technology

Improve the authentication efficiency between the vehicle and RSU, reduce the authentication overhead of the vehicle when switching the RSU, enhance the emergency message response efficiency during driving, ensure communication security and variability of keys, and prevent key leakage and Experience attack.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on a dynamic key, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the authentication through employing a trusted authority TA which is responsible for generating and recording the related information of each communication entity in a communication network and distributing the key, a roadside unit RSU which directly communicates with a vehicle and provides a service for the vehicle, and a vehicle V which directly requests the service from the RSU; comprising the steps that 1, a system is initialized, a TA selects a safe one-way hash function as Hash () and a random sequence generation function Rands () and publishes the functions, and safe long connection is established between the TA and an RSU and between the TA and the RSU; step 2, vehicle registration; 3, the vehicle is subjected to primary online authentication; 4, vehicle switching RSU re-authentication is carried out; and step 5, the vehicle is off-line. According to the method, the authentication efficiency of the vehicle and the RSU is improved, the authentication overhead when the vehicle frequently switches the RSU communication target is reduced, and the response efficiency of the vehicle for receiving the emergency message from the Internet of Vehicles service in the driving process is improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of vehicle networking, and in particular to a lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys. Background Art

[0002] At present, facing some major challenges of modern transportation, such as improving traffic safety, alleviating congestion, and reducing fuel consumption and pollution, intelligent transportation systems are key factors in realizing these visions. With the advancement of wireless network technology, the Internet of Vehicles based on wireless sensor technology has emerged, providing a feasible solution for intelligent transportation systems. Among them, the Internet of Vehicles is an Internet-enabled vehicle that allows connection to external devices such as networks, different entities (infrastructure, roadside units, mobile devices, etc.), applications, services, etc. In the Internet of Vehicles, vehicles can plan driving routes more reasonably, actively avoid dangers, and even achieve the purpose of safe automatic driving through the intelligent transportation services provided in the network. During driving, vehicles mainly rely on wireless communication to request related services with the help of nearby RSUs. Therefore, the communication between vehicles and RSUs (Vehicle-to-Road, V2R) is an important link in data exchange in the Internet of Vehicles, providing a direct communication channel for the establishment of smart transportation.

[0003] When vehicles access intelligent transportation services through the Internet of Vehicles, unsafe communication processes or high communication delays can easily expose vehicles to malicious attacks, leading to various traffic accidents and damage to personal and property safety. In this regard, although traditional cryptographic schemes such as elliptic curves can solve the communication security problem to a certain extent, the implementation of this scheme requires high physical resources and will result in high latency. Although the use of overly simple cryptographic algorithms can reduce the complexity of the authentication process, it has great limitations and uncertainties in terms of security. Therefore, these methods are difficult to apply to the V2R communication process in actual applications. In addition, the signal coverage of the RSU is extremely limited, which makes it impossible for a moving vehicle to maintain a long connection mode with a fixed RSU. Frequent re-establishment of communication links makes the communication process complicated. The frequent repeated authentication of traditional authentication in this process greatly increases the computing burden of the vehicle. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on dynamic keys, which improves the authentication efficiency of vehicles and RSUs, reduces the authentication overhead of vehicles when frequently switching RSU communication targets, and improves the response efficiency of vehicles receiving emergency messages from Internet of Vehicles services during driving.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys, which uses a trusted authority TA responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit RSU that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services for the vehicle, and a vehicle V that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including:

[0006] Step 1: System initialization, TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public, and TA establishes a secure long connection with RSU and between RSUs;

[0007] Step 2: Vehicle registration;

[0008] Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification;

[0009] Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication;

[0010] Step 5: The vehicle is offline.

[0011] Preferably, step 2 comprises:

[0012] Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier V for vehicle V id and the master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information;

[0013] Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Sent to vehicle V via a secure tunnel.

[0014] Preferably, step 3 comprises:

[0015] Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, a message sequence number s, and a current timestamp T s , calculate x′=Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts, calculate the authentication message e x’= En(P m ,x′,T s ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s} to RSU 1 Request certification;

[0016] Step 3.2: RSU 1 Receive message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s}, send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id} to TA;

[0017] Step 3.3: TA receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id}, calculate x′=Dec(P m ,e x′ ,T s ), x″=x′⊕V id ⊕T s , calculate the temporary key P t =TKGen(x″∥V id ∥T s ∥P m ), TA uses the temporary key P t Distributed to RSUs 1 ;

[0018] Step 3.4: RSU 1 Receive temporary key P t , RSU 1 Select a message sequence number k, current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), send the message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k} to vehicle V;

[0019] Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k}, calculate P t =TKGen(x‖V id ‖T s ‖P m ), check e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the RSU 1 Private communication key Pr =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), use P r RSU 1 Send an authentication success signal; otherwise, disconnect;

[0020] Step 3.6: RSU 1 Receive and detect the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0021] Preferably, step 4 comprises:

[0022] Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, the current message sequence number s′, and the current timestamp T s′ , calculate x′=V id ⊕x⊕s′⊕T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′= En(Pt,x′,T s′ ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s′,T s′} to RSU 2 Request certification;

[0023] Step 4.2: RSU 2 Receive message {e x′ , V id , s′, T s′}, calculate x′=Dec(Pm, e x′ ,T s′ ), x″=x′⊕Vid⊕T s′ ⊕s′, select a message sequence number k′, the current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ‖V id ‖RSU id2 ‖T k′ ‖x″), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), send the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′, T k′} to vehicle V;

[0024] Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′, T k′}, calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id2 ∥T k′ ), check e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), if the equation holds, use the communication key P r2 RSU 2 Send an authentication success signal; otherwise, disconnect;

[0025] Step 4.4: RSU 2 Receive and detect the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0026] Preferably, step 5 comprises:

[0027] Step 5.1: The vehicle completes this trip and sends an offline message to the RSU;

[0028] Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the offline message of the vehicle, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding areas; if there is no vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

[0029] Preferably, the steps of the encryption operation En(P, m, t) and the decryption operation Dec(P, m, t) are:

[0030] Step a: Input parameters key P, message m and timestamp t;

[0031] Step b: Calculate the random number seed P'=Hash(P‖t)+t, the message length is L=len(m);

[0032] Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream S = RandS (P', L) of the same length as the message;

[0033] Step d: Performing an XOR operation on the message and the random sequence stream can obtain an encryption result or a decryption result M=S⊕m.

[0034] Preferably, the steps of the temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen(x) and the random dynamic key generation operation RKGen(x) are:

[0035] Step a': Input dynamic key generation parameter x and initialize P to an empty binary string;

[0036] Step b': Calculate S = Hash(x), P = P ‖ S, x = x + 1;

[0037] Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, the corresponding sequence output is intercepted from P; otherwise, step b' is repeated.

[0038] Preferably, the target RSU distributes P to other nearby RSU nodes. t There is no restriction on the mode of distributing keys.

[0039] According to the above technical scheme, the communication entities used in the present invention include a trusted institution TA, a roadside unit RSU and a car V. The authentication method includes five processes: system initialization, vehicle registration, vehicle initial online authentication, vehicle switching RSU re-authentication and vehicle offline. The method realizes lightweight authentication and key synchronization between the vehicle and the RSU while ensuring security authentication between the vehicle and the RSU. Among them, the dynamic key technology is used to allow the communicating parties to calculate the key by themselves to reduce the risk of key leakage. The trust transfer mode is used to make the re-authentication of the vehicle when switching the RSU communication entity more efficient. This can better adapt to the situation where the vehicle frequently switches the RSU communication entity during high-speed driving, reducing the overhead of repeated vehicle and RSU authentication, and can meet the efficient authentication needs of the vehicle during actual driving.

[0040] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in detail in the following detailed description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. Together with the following specific embodiments, they are used to explain the present invention but do not constitute a limitation of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:

[0042] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an authentication process in a lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on a dynamic key provided by the present invention;

[0043] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of the initial online authentication of a vehicle in the lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys provided by the present invention;

[0044] Figure 3 The present invention is a flowchart of re-authentication of a vehicle switching RSU in a lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on a dynamic key provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] The specific implementation of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific implementation described here is only used to illustrate and explain the present invention, and is not used to limit the present invention.

[0046] See also Figures 1 to 3 The present invention provides a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys, which uses a trusted authority TA responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit RSU that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services for the vehicle, and a vehicle V that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including:

[0047] Step 1: System initialization, TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public, and TA establishes a secure long connection with RSU and between RSUs;

[0048] Step 2: Vehicle registration;

[0049] Specifically, step 2 includes:

[0050] Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier V for vehicle V id and the master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information;

[0051] Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Sent to vehicle V via a secure tunnel.

[0052] Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification;

[0053] Specifically, step 3 includes:

[0054] Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, a message sequence number s, and a current timestamp T s , calculate x′=Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts, calculate the authentication message e x’= En(P m ,x′,T s ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s} to RSU 1 Request certification;

[0055] Step 3.2: RSU 1 Receive message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s}, send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s,RSU id} to TA;

[0056] Step 3.3: TA receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id}, calculate x′=Dec(P m ,e x′ ,T s ), x″=x′⊕V id ⊕T s , calculate the temporary key P t =TKGen(x″∥V id ∥T s ∥P m ), TA uses the temporary key P t Distributed to RSUs 1 ;

[0057] Step 3.4: RSU 1 Receive temporary key P t , RSU 1 Select a message sequence number k, current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), send the message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k} to vehicle V;

[0058] Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k}, calculate P t =TKGen(x‖V id ‖T s ‖P m ), check e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the RSU1 Private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), use P r RSU 1 Send an authentication success signal; otherwise, disconnect;

[0059] Step 3.6: RSU 1 Receive and detect the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0060] Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication;

[0061] Specifically, step 4 includes:

[0062] Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, the current message sequence number s′, and the current timestamp T s′ , calculate x′=V id ⊕x⊕s′⊕T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′= En(Pt,x′,T s′ ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s′,T s′} to RSU 2 Request certification;

[0063] Step 4.2: RSU 2 Receive message {e x′ , V id , s′, T s′}, calculate x′=Dec(Pm, e x′ ,T s′ ), x″=x′⊕Vid⊕T s′ ⊕s′, select a message sequence number k′, the current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ‖V id ‖RSU id2 ‖T k′ ‖x″), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), send the message {e rsu2 , RSUid2 , k′, T k′} to vehicle V;

[0064] Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′, T k′}, calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id2 ∥T k′ ), check e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), if the equation holds, use the communication key P r2 RSU 2 Send an authentication success signal; otherwise, disconnect;

[0065] Step 4.4: RSU 2 Receive and detect the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0066] Step 5: The vehicle is offline;

[0067] Specifically, step 5 includes:

[0068] Step 5.1: The vehicle completes this trip and sends an offline message to the RSU;

[0069] Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the offline message of the vehicle, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding areas; if there is no vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

[0070] In this embodiment, the steps of the encryption operation En(P, m, t) and the decryption operation Dec(P, m, t) are preferably:

[0071] Step a: Input parameters key P, message m and timestamp t;

[0072] Step b: Calculate the random number seed P'=Hash(P‖t)+t, the message length is L=len(m), where t is the current timestamp;

[0073] Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream S = RandS (P', L) of the same length as the message;

[0074] Step d: Performing an XOR operation on the message and the random sequence stream can obtain an encryption result or a decryption result M=S⊕m.

[0075] In this embodiment, the steps of the temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen(x) and the random dynamic key generation operation RKGen(x) are preferably as follows:

[0076] Step a': Input dynamic key generation parameter x and initialize P to an empty binary string;

[0077] Step b': Calculate S = Hash(x), P = P ‖ S, x = x + 1;

[0078] Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, the corresponding sequence output is intercepted from P; otherwise, step b' is repeated.

[0079] Among them, the target RSU distributes P to other nearby RSU nodes t There is no restriction on the mode of distributing keys.

[0080] Through the above technical scheme, the communication entities used in the present invention include a trusted institution TA, a roadside unit RSU and a car V. The authentication method includes five processes: system initialization, vehicle registration, vehicle initial online authentication, vehicle switching RSU re-authentication and vehicle offline. The method only uses a low-computational difficulty Hash function and a pseudo-random number algorithm to realize the mutual authentication and key negotiation process between the vehicle and the RSU, which effectively improves the efficiency of the authentication process; a temporary key mechanism is introduced, and the RSU pushes the temporary key of the vehicle to other nearby RSU nodes to realize trust transfer, so that the vehicle can be directly authenticated with other RSUs without TA, and the master key of TA will not be leaked, which ensures the security of TA and reduces the authentication burden and communication overhead of TA. The direct authentication of the vehicle and the RSU and the re-communication of the independent random communication key further improve the efficiency of the authentication and protect the security between the RSUs. In addition, compared with the direct sharing key method currently used in the Internet of Vehicles, in the method provided by the present invention, the RSU obtains the temporary key generated by TA through TA, and the RSU completes the authentication and key exchange with the vehicle through the temporary key, which effectively protects the security of the original key and prevents the spread of the danger caused by the communication key after a leak. At the same time, compared with the current authentication technology in the Internet of Vehicles, the communication key of the vehicle in the present invention will be dynamically generated by both parties when it goes back online and switches the RSU, thus avoiding the risk of leakage caused by key exchange. In addition, the variability of the key can also effectively combat empirical attacks.

[0081] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the specific details in the above embodiments. Within the technical concept of the present invention, a variety of simple modifications can be made to the technical solution of the present invention, and these simple modifications all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0082] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the present invention will not further describe various possible combinations.

[0083] In addition, various embodiments of the present invention may be arbitrarily combined, and as long as they do not violate the concept of the present invention, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed by the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on dynamic keys, characterized in that: The method uses a trusted authority TA responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit RSU that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services for the vehicle, and a vehicle V that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including: Step 1: System initialization, TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public, and TA establishes a secure long connection with RSU and between RSUs; Step 2: Vehicle registration; Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification; Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication; Step 5: The vehicle is offline.

2. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Step 2 includes: Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier V for vehicle V id and the master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information; Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Sent to vehicle V via a secure tunnel.

3. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 2 is characterized in that: Step 3 includes: Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, a message sequence number s, and a current timestamp T s , calculate x′=Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts, calculate the authentication message e x’= En(P m ,x′,T s ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s }To RSU1 request authentication; Step 3.2: RSU1 receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s }, send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id } to TA; Step 3.3: TA receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id }, calculate x′=Dec(P m ,e x′ ,T s ), x″=x′⊕V id ⊕T s , calculate the temporary key P t =TKGen(x″∥V id ∥T s ∥P m ), TA uses the temporary key P t Distributed to RSU1; Step 3.4: RSU1 receives the temporary key P t , RSU1 selects a message sequence number k, the current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), send the message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k } to vehicle V; Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k }, calculate P t =TKGen(x‖V id ‖T s ‖P m ), check e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the private communication key P with RSU1 r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), use P r Send an authentication success signal to RSU1; otherwise, disconnect; Step 3.6: RSU1 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

4. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Step 4 includes: Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, the current message sequence number s′, and the current timestamp T s′ , calculate x′=V id ⊕x⊕s′⊕T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′= En(Pt,x′,T s′ ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s′,T s′ }To RSU2 request authentication; Step 4.2: RSU2 receives the message {e x′ , V id , s′, T s′ }, calculate x′=Dec(Pm, e x′ ,T s′ ), x″=x′⊕Vid⊕T s′ ⊕s′, select a message sequence number k′, the current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ‖V id ‖RSU id2 ‖T k′ ‖x″), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), send the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′, T k′ } to vehicle V; Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′, T k′ }, calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id2 ∥T k′ ), check e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), if the equation holds, use the communication key P r2 Send an authentication success signal to RSU2; otherwise, disconnect; Step 4.4: RSU2 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

5. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Step 5 includes: Step 5.1: The vehicle completes this trip and sends an offline message to the RSU; Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the offline message of the vehicle, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding areas; if it does not have the vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

6. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The steps of encryption operation En(P, m, t) and decryption operation Dec(P, m, t) are: Step a: Input parameters key P, message m and timestamp t; Step b: Calculate the random number seed P'=Hash(P‖t)+t, the message length is L=len(m); Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream S = RandS (P', L) of the same length as the message; Step d: Performing an XOR operation on the message and the random sequence stream can obtain an encryption result or a decryption result M=S⊕m.

7. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The steps of the temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen(x) and the random dynamic key generation operation RKGen(x) are: Step a': Input dynamic key generation parameter x and initialize P to an empty binary string; Step b': Calculate S = Hash(x), P = P ‖ S, x = x + 1; Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, intercept the corresponding sequence output from P; otherwise, repeat step b'.

8. The lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The target RSU distributes P to other nearby RSU nodes. t There is no restriction on the mode of distributing keys.

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