A zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method, system and device

Abstract

The present invention discloses a zero-privacy-leakage ciphertext data query method, system and device, in which the data to be matched and queried are entered into the system and saved in the form of key-value pairs; public parameters are generated by set security parameters, and the public parameters are sent to each user end; a key of the same length is generated according to the data of the module base in the public parameters; the user end decomposes the data to be queried into a single integer string, uses the string as an index, and generates a query ciphertext; the ciphertext is sent to the server; after the server obtains the ciphertext, it calls the database, uses the key value for matching and calculates the query result; the user end receives the ciphertext result and calls the decryption module, uses the key to decrypt the ciphertext result, and obtains the processing result in the plaintext state. The present invention improves the security and privacy protection of data during transmission and processing; and provides an effective technical solution to solve the data privacy and security problems in the cloud computing environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of data processing technology, and more specifically to a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method, system and device. Background Art

[0002] With the increasing demand for high computing power and the need for convenient data storage and access in modern society, local computers of individuals or enterprises are gradually unable to meet the needs of computing power and mobile data access. Emerging network services such as cloud computing that rely on cloud platforms have emerged. However, due to its outsourcing service model and the data security issues of the cloud platform itself, it has caused a crisis of trust in cloud services.

[0003] At present, data security has become the focus of attention in various industries. Whether it is financial transactions, medical record analysis and data privacy protection, or personal privacy information, it needs to be protected by effective encryption technology. Traditional encryption algorithms have played an important role in ensuring data confidentiality. However, the existing scheme uses plaintext storage and information transmission, resulting in low data security. The encrypted data cannot be used in ciphertext, making it impossible to perform effective computing operations in the ciphertext state. In addition, the encryption and decryption speed of the existing technology needs to be improved, and it is not suitable for data query scenarios that require high security. Therefore, it is urgent to solve the data privacy and security issues in the cloud computing environment and provide effective technical solutions. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the above technical problems, the present invention provides a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method, system and device, aiming to improve the security and privacy protection of data during transmission and processing; and provides an effective technical solution to solve data privacy and security problems in a cloud computing environment.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for querying ciphertext data with zero privacy leakage, the method comprising the following steps:

[0007] S1. Enter the data to be matched and queried into the system and save it in the form of key-value pairs;

[0008] S2. Generate public parameters based on the set security parameters, and send the public parameters to each user terminal;

[0009] S3, generating a key W of the same length according to the data of the module base in the public parameters;

[0010] S4, the user terminal decomposes the data to be queried into a string composed of single integers, uses the string as an index, and generates a query ciphertext C;

[0011] S5, sending the ciphertext C to the server;

[0012] S6. After the server obtains the ciphertext C, it calls the database, uses the key value to match and calculate the query result;

[0013] S7. The user terminal receives the ciphertext result, calls the decryption module, uses the key W to decrypt the ciphertext result, obtains the processing result in the plaintext state, and calls the front-end display module to visualize the result.

[0014] Furthermore, in S1, the key-value pair is in the form of:

[0015] ;

[0016] in, Indicates the maximum value of the system input data; and each Are all different.

[0017] Further, in S2, the common parameters include:

[0018] Depend on A module base set consisting of encrypted modules and set the number of aliased modulus components ,in, Indicates An encryption module, Indicates the number of encryption modules.

[0019] Furthermore, in S3, the key ,in .

[0020] Further, in S4, the user terminal sends the data to be queried Decompose into single integers to form a string , Indicates the length of string D, which is the total number of characters. Use string D as the index to generate the ciphertext of 1 in the query ciphertext C. , the ciphertext with other positions set to 0 ,in and They respectively represent the ciphertexts generated by homomorphic encryption of 1 and 0 using the key W, and are the unit ciphertexts that constitute the query ciphertext C.

[0021] Further, in S6, after the server obtains the ciphertext C, the calculation module calls the database, uses the key in the key-value pair for matching, and uses the value to calculate the return of the query result; the specific process includes:

[0022] S61. The key in each key-value pair in the database All decomposed into integer strings , Display key Decompose a string into integers, converting individual characters As an index, extract the single ciphertext at the corresponding position in the ciphertext C line by line , , is the query ciphertext C Line The unit ciphertext of the column;

[0023] S62, select from S61 The ciphertexts are homomorphically encrypted and then multiplied by the corresponding , get the Search results, here , and finally get query results;

[0024] S63, the query result obtained in S62 is homomorphically added using homomorphic encryption to obtain a final ciphertext result;

[0025] S64, calling the communication module on the server side according to the ciphertext result and sending it back to the corresponding user side.

[0026] In a second aspect, the present invention further provides a zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query system for performing ciphertext data query, the system comprising: a user end and a server end, the user end and the server end are connected via a network, wherein:

[0027] The user terminal includes: an initialization module, an encryption and decryption module, a key management module, a communication module and a front-end display module, wherein:

[0028] The initialization module is used to initialize the system and generate system parameters; the encryption and decryption module is used to fully homomorphically encrypt the original data and fully homomorphically decrypt the processing results; the key management module is used to control the generation of keys, storage of keys and destruction of keys, and to manage the keys throughout their life cycle; the communication module is used to interact with the server side; the front-end display module is used for visual interaction of data;

[0029] The server side includes: a communication layer, a computing module and a database, wherein:

[0030] The communication layer is used to realize information interaction with the user terminal; the computing module is used for ciphertext data calculation; the database is a ciphertext database based on fully homomorphic encryption, which is used to store the ciphertext data after calculation and complete the addition, deletion, modification and query of data in the ciphertext state.

[0031] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores machine executable instructions that can be executed by the processor, and the processor executes the machine executable instructions to implement the above-mentioned zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query method.

[0032] In a fourth aspect, the present invention also provides a storage medium on which one or more programs readable by a computing device are stored, and the one or more programs include instructions, which, when executed by the computing device, enable the computing device to execute a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method as described above.

[0033] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial technical effects:

[0034] 1. The present invention encrypts the user-side query data into ciphertext, and the data returned by the server calculation is also in ciphertext state, so that the data can be queried in ciphertext state, ensuring the confidential transmission of the entire query process and zero leakage of data privacy. It is suitable for data query scenarios that require high security, such as ciphertext databases and cloud searches.

[0035] 2. The present invention uses an index to construct a query ciphertext, which also greatly improves the encryption and decryption speed.

[0036] 3. In the process of data query, the present invention uses the calculation of the query ciphertext by extracting data from the database, which greatly reduces the amount of calculation in the ciphertext calculation process, significantly improves the efficiency of data processing, and reduces the computing resource consumption of the system.

[0037] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in the following description, and partly become apparent from the description, or understood by practicing the present invention. The purpose and other advantages of the present invention can be realized and obtained by the structures particularly pointed out in the written description and the accompanying drawings.

[0038] The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, a brief introduction will be given below to the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0040] The accompanying drawings are used to provide further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. They are used to explain the present invention together with the embodiments of the present invention and do not constitute a limitation of the present invention.

[0041] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for querying encrypted data with zero privacy leakage is provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments.

[0044] In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that: in some processes described in the specification and drawings of this application, multiple operations appearing in a specific order are included, but it should be clearly understood that these operations may not be performed in the order in which they appear in this document or may be performed in parallel. In addition, various serial numbers are only used for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0045] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the invention claimed for protection, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0046] Embodiment 1:

[0047] See also Figure 1 As shown, the embodiment of the present invention provides a method for querying ciphertext data with zero privacy leakage. The specific implementation of the method of the present invention is as follows:

[0048] S1. The system administrator logs in to the server and enters the data to be matched and queried into the system and saves it in the database in the form of The key-value pair can be called when querying. The max here represents the maximum value of the data entered by the system, and each key here is different to ensure the independence of the data.

[0049] S2. Generate public parameters through the security parameters set by the system, where the public parameters include the encryption module And set the number of aliased modulus components ; Then the server sends the public parameters to each user end through the communication module. Confusion modular components is a new encryption technology based on mathematical confusion and modular operations. Its core idea is to increase the uncertainty and complexity of the decryption process by introducing multiple modular operations and confusion components, thereby improving the security of encrypted data.

[0050] S3. Assume that one of the user terminals receives the public parameters from the server terminal and needs to query a certain data data; first, a secret key of the same length is generated according to the data of the module in the public parameters. , here ;

[0051] S4. The user terminal decomposes the data to be queried into a string of single integers , assuming that the single integer character decomposed here takes the value [0,9], use string D as the index to generate the ciphertext of 1 in the query ciphertext C , the ciphertext with other positions set to 0 , specifically:

[0052] ;

[0053] ;

[0054] here and They respectively represent the ciphertexts generated by homomorphic encryption of 1 and 0 using the secret key W, also called the unit ciphertexts that constitute the query ciphertext C.

[0055] According to the properties of modular operations, there are the following homomorphisms:

[0056] ;

[0057] Among them, a represents the original data a, b represents the original data b, E represents the fully homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the symbol and It means that the operation under the ciphertext is equivalent to the operation under the plaintext. That is, the fully homomorphic processing of the encrypted data is equivalent to the same processing of the plaintext. Therefore, in the present invention, the data can be processed under privacy protection without obtaining the plaintext state of the data.

[0058] S5. Call the communication module through the ciphertext C and send the ciphertext C to the server;

[0059] S6. After the server obtains the ciphertext C, the calculation module calls the database, uses the key in the key-value pair to match, and uses the value to calculate the return of the query result; specifically:

[0060] S61. The key in each key-value pair in the database All decomposed into integer strings , Display key Decompose a string into integers, converting individual characters As an index, extract the single ciphertext at the corresponding position in the ciphertext C line by line , , is the query ciphertext C Line The unit ciphertext of the column;

[0061] S62, select from S61 The ciphertexts are homomorphically encrypted and then multiplied by the corresponding , get the Search results, here , and finally get query results;

[0062] S63, using homomorphic encryption technology to perform homomorphic addition on the query result obtained in S62 to obtain a final ciphertext result;

[0063] S64, calling the communication module of the server side according to the ciphertext result and sending it back to the corresponding user side;

[0064] S7. The user end receives the ciphertext result, then calls the decryption module, uses the key W to decrypt the ciphertext result, and obtains the processing result in the plaintext state. The user end calls the front-end display module to display the result to the user for user visualization.

[0065] From the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can know that: the embodiment of the present invention provides a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method, which is a data encryption and ciphertext data processing technology, which aims to improve the security and privacy protection of data during transmission and processing. This method uses the advantages of modular operations to realize fully homomorphic encryption calculations, so that effective computing operations can be performed in the ciphertext state, and is suitable for data processing scenarios that require high security, such as banking, medical care and other fields with strict privacy protection requirements. Through this technology, the system can not only achieve secure data storage and transmission, but also perform complex data calculations and analysis without leaking sensitive information.

[0066] Embodiment 2:

[0067] The embodiment of the present invention further provides a zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query system, which is applied to a zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query method described in the above embodiment 1 to perform ciphertext data processing. The system includes: a user end and a server end, and the user end and the server end are connected via a network, wherein:

[0068] The user end includes: initialization module, encryption and decryption module, key management module, communication module and front-end display module, among which:

[0069] The initialization module is used to initialize the system and generate system parameters; the encryption and decryption module is used to fully homomorphically encrypt the original data and fully homomorphically decrypt the processing results; the key management module is used to control the generation, storage and destruction of keys, and manage the keys throughout their life cycle; the communication module is used for information interaction with the server; the front-end display module is used for visual interaction of data;

[0070] The server side includes: communication layer, computing module and database, among which:

[0071] The communication layer is used to realize information interaction with the user end; the computing module is used for ciphertext data calculation; the database is a ciphertext database based on fully homomorphic encryption, which is used to store ciphertext data after calculation and complete the addition, deletion, modification and query of data in the ciphertext state.

[0072] In this embodiment, on the user side, system parameters are generated through the initialization module, and the key management module is called through the system parameters to generate a key; the encryption module is called through the key to perform encryption operations on user data to obtain ciphertext; the communication module is called through the ciphertext to send the ciphertext to the server; and at the same time, the communication module is called to send the user operation instructions to the server.

[0073] In this embodiment, the communication layer of the server side receives the ciphertext data and the user operation instruction from the user side, and sends the ciphertext data and the user operation instruction to the calculation module; the calculation module performs the corresponding ciphertext operation on the ciphertext data and the user operation instruction to obtain the ciphertext result after the operation; and stores the ciphertext result in the database of the server side;

[0074] In this embodiment, the ciphertext stored in the database of the server side is sent back to the communication module of the client side through the communication layer of the server side. The client side receives the ciphertext and then calls the decryption module to decrypt the ciphertext using the key to obtain the processing result in the plaintext state.

[0075] In this embodiment, the database is a ciphertext data storage based on modular components, which is used to store ciphertext data after calculation and processing. The database is also used to assign random identifiers to the stored ciphertext data. All data in the database are in ciphertext state, and each ciphertext data has a unique identifier. The identifier is used to distinguish different ciphertext data and does not contain any information in the plaintext state of the ciphertext data. The database proposed in this scheme is a fully homomorphic ciphertext database, and its data processing logic is quite different from that of traditional databases. Traditional databases can directly perform conditional judgments under plaintext data when performing operations such as conditional judgments. Its underlying logic is the numerical judgment of plaintext data. When the fully homomorphic ciphertext database proposed in this scheme performs operations such as conditional judgments, a new method different from plaintext judgment is constructed, and the traditional ciphertext processing scheme is transformed by fully homomorphic thinking, which can realize basic database operations in the ciphertext state.

[0076] The embodiment of the present invention provides a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query system, whose implementation principle and technical effects are the same as those of the aforementioned method embodiment. For the sake of brief description, parts not mentioned in this embodiment can be referred to the corresponding contents in the aforementioned method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0077] Example 3

[0078] Reference Figure 2 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device for zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query, which may include a processor 10, a memory 11, a communication bus 12 and a communication interface 13, and may also include a computer program stored in the memory 11 and executable on the processor 10.

[0079] The processor 10 may be composed of an integrated circuit in some embodiments, for example, a single packaged integrated circuit, or a plurality of packaged integrated circuits with the same or different functions, including one or more central processing units (CPUs), microprocessors, digital processing chips, graphics processors, and a combination of various control chips. The processor 10 is the control core (ControlUnit) of the electronic device, which uses various interfaces and lines to connect the various components of the entire electronic device, and executes or executes programs or modules stored in the memory 11, and calls the data stored in the memory 11, so as to execute various functions of the electronic device and process data.

[0080] Embodiment 4:

[0081] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a storage medium on which one or more programs readable by a computing device are stored. The one or more programs include instructions. When the instructions are executed by the computing device, the computing device executes a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method in Example 1.

[0082] Examples of computer-readable storage media include: read-only memory (ROM), random-access programmable read-only memory (PROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), random-access memory (RAM), dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), static random-access memory (SRAM), flash memory, non-volatile memory, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, Blu-ray or optical disk storage, hard disk drive (HDD), solid-state drive (SSD), card-type memory (such as a multimedia card, a secure digital (SD) card, or an extreme digital (XD) card), magnetic tape, floppy disk, magneto-optical data storage device, optical data storage device, hard disk, solid-state disk, and any other device configured to store a computer program and any associated data, data files, and data structures in a non-transitory manner and provide the computer program and any associated data, data files, and data structures to a processor or computer so that the processor or computer can execute the computer program. The computer program in the above-mentioned computer-readable storage medium can be executed in an environment deployed in a computer device such as a client, a host, an agent device, a server, etc. In addition, in one example, the computer program and any associated data, data files, and data structures are distributed on a networked computer system, so that the computer program and any associated data, data files, and data structures are stored, accessed, and executed in a distributed manner by one or more processors or computers.

[0083] It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems or computer program products, etc. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.

[0084] It should be noted that the word "comprising" does not exclude the presence of components or steps not listed in the claims. The word "a" or "an" preceding a component does not exclude the presence of a plurality of such components. The invention can be implemented by means of hardware comprising several distinct components, and by means of a suitably programmed computer.

[0085] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referenced to each other.

[0086] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables one skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to one skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but rather to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query method, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1. Enter the data to be matched and queried into the system and save it in the form of key-value pairs; the key-value pair form is: {<key1,value1>,<key2,value2>,...,<key max ,value max >}; Among them, max represents the maximum value of the system input data; and each key is different; S2. Generate public parameters based on the set security parameters, and send the public parameters to each user terminal; the public parameters include: The module base set P consists of n encryption modules = {p1, p2, ..., p n } and set the number of aliased modulus components t, where p n represents the nth encryption module base, where n represents the number of encryption modules; S3. Generate a key W of the same length according to the data of the module base in the public parameters; key W = {w1, w2, ..., w i , ...w n }, where w i ∈[1,t],i∈[1,n]; S4. The user terminal decomposes the data to be queried into a string of single integers, and uses the string as an index to generate a query ciphertext C; specifically: The user end decomposes the data to be queried into a single integer string D = data1||data2||...||data dlen , dlen represents the length of string D, which is the total number of characters. Use string D as the index to generate the ciphertext of 1 in the query ciphertext C The ciphertext with other positions set to 0 in and They represent the ciphertexts generated by homomorphic encryption of 1 and 0 using the key W, respectively, and are the unit ciphertexts that constitute the query ciphertext C; S5, sending the ciphertext C to the server; S6. After the server obtains the ciphertext C, it calls the database, uses the key value to match and calculate the query result; specifically: After the server obtains the ciphertext C, the calculation module calls the database, uses the key in the key-value pair to match, and uses the value to calculate the query result. The specific process includes: S61. The key in each key-value pair in the database l are decomposed into integers to form a string K l =key l，1 ||key l，2 ||..||key l，dlen , K l Indicates key l Decompose into a string of integers, and convert the single character key l，j As an index, extract the single ciphertext at the corresponding position in the ciphertext C line by line It is the key in row number in the query ciphertext C. l，row The unit ciphertext of the column; S62, perform homomorphic encryption on the dlen ciphertexts selected from S61 and then multiply them by the corresponding value l , get the lth query result, where l∈[1,max], and finally get max query results; S63, the query result obtained in S62 is homomorphically added using homomorphic encryption to obtain a final ciphertext result; S64, calling the communication module of the server side according to the ciphertext result and sending it back to the corresponding user side; S7. The user terminal receives the ciphertext result, calls the decryption module, uses the key W to decrypt the ciphertext result, obtains the processing result in the plaintext state, and calls the front-end display module to visualize the result.

2. A zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query system, characterized in that: When applied, a zero privacy leakage ciphertext data query method as claimed in claim 1 is executed to query ciphertext data. The system includes: a user end and a server end, wherein the user end and the server end are connected via a network, wherein: The user terminal includes: an initialization module, an encryption and decryption module, a key management module, a communication module and a front-end display module, wherein: The initialization module is used to initialize the system and generate system parameters; the encryption and decryption module is used to fully homomorphically encrypt the original data and fully homomorphically decrypt the processing results; the key management module is used to control the generation of keys, storage of keys and destruction of keys, and to manage the keys throughout their life cycle; the communication module is used to interact with the server side; the front-end display module is used for visual interaction of data; The server side includes: a communication layer, a computing module and a database, wherein: The communication layer is used to realize information interaction with the user terminal; the computing module is used for ciphertext data calculation; the database is a ciphertext database based on fully homomorphic encryption, which is used to store the ciphertext data after calculation and complete the addition, deletion, modification and query of data in the ciphertext state.

3. An electronic device, characterized in that: It includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores machine executable instructions that can be executed by the processor, and the processor executes the machine executable instructions to implement a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method as claimed in claim 1.

4. A storage medium having stored thereon one or more programs readable by a computing device, characterized in that: The one or more programs include instructions, which, when executed by a computing device, enable the computing device to execute a zero-privacy leakage ciphertext data query method as claimed in claim 1.

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