Method for monitoring and managing communication object, trusted device, server, and communication object

Abstract

The invention proposes a method performed by a trusted device associated with a user for monitoring a communication object, the monitoring method comprising: a step (E40) of detecting the use of at least one persistent identifier (P-IDj) by at least one communication object (OBJj); and a step (E70, E90) of triggering at least one action interfering with said use of said at least one persistent identifier by said at least one communication object.

Description

Background Art

[0001] The present invention relates to the general field of telecommunications.

[0002] The invention more particularly relates to the management of communication objects capable of exchanging data with another entity via a communication interface. There is no restriction on the nature of such communication interface (radio interface such as a Bluetooth or Wi-Fi interface or a mobile network interface, network interface such as an IP (Internet Protocol) interface, etc.), nor on the nature of the communication objects under consideration (e.g. a connected watch, a sensor, a motion detector, a terminal such as a mobile phone or a smartphone, a wireless headset, etc.).

[0003] Thus, the present invention is preferably, but not restrictively, applicable to connected objects used in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT), for example.

[0004] As mentioned in the document RFC 8386 entitled “Privacy Considerations for Protocols Relying on IP Broadcast or Multicast” published by R. Winter et al. of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in May 2018, some communication protocols are known to use identifiers that persist over a long period of time and transmit these identifiers to other entities, for example, in messages broadcast using broadcast or multicast techniques. Such identifiers, referred to as “persistent”, can have various properties: MAC (Media Access Control) addresses, Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs), IP prefixes or addresses, etc. of the communication objects implementing the protocol in question. These identifiers are known to uniquely identify the communication devices to which they are attached, so that their long-term (in other words, persistent) use provides a third party with the possibility of obtaining information about the behavior and / or habits of the user of the communication device in question (including tracking the behavior and / or habits of the user).

[0005] An example of such tracking based on signals emitted by wireless headphones with a Bluetooth interface or a smartphone equipped with a Wi-Fi interface is described by R. Lea in the article published in Newsweek and entitled “How your Bluetooth headphones could be used to track you: ‘Extremely concerning’” (September 6, 2021). Listening to and analyzing these signals, which persistently carry a MAC address, makes it possible to obtain information about the movements of the user of the device that emits these signals.

[0006] Such technology could easily be generalized to create collaborative tools that allow for large-scale collection of information that, once correlated, could compromise the privacy of users.

[0007] Furthermore, the service features of the IoT (remote medical services, home monitoring, etc.) can be vulnerable, as the connected objects that support these services are at risk of being tracked and hacked based on their MAC addresses. In this regard, some recent Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have exploited this vulnerability, using connected objects as relays for attack traffic, thus significantly increasing the volume of attack traffic. In particular, in 2016, a botnet consisting of nearly 150,000 unprotected IP surveillance cameras capable of launching a Denial of Service attack of more than 1.5 Tbit / s was used to perform such an attack against one of the largest content hosts in Europe. This resulted in the unavailability of some of the content servers of the host in question for a long period of time.

[0008] In order to minimize such risks, some operating systems (OS) activate a procedure for randomizing MAC addresses, that is, these operating systems or objects embedded in them (e.g. mobile terminals) use randomly generated MAC addresses to communicate with other objects connected to the same local area network. However, most technologies implemented by communication objects and in particular by IoT objects such as motion detectors or temperature sensors do not support this procedure.

[0009] Finally, it should be noted that users are not necessarily informed of the ability of various communication objects to disclose persistent identifiers, such as when these communication objects are invoked by a controller to execute data collection commands or when these communication objects are exploited to relay attack traffic.

[0010] It should be noted that although the above disadvantages have been described with reference to persistent identifiers such as MAC addresses, these disadvantages also apply to other types of persistent identifiers (such as IP addresses or prefixes, UUIDs, etc.). Summary of the invention

[0011] The invention proposes a mechanism which makes it possible in particular to remedy these drawbacks and which can be advantageously applied to any type of persistent identifier (MAC address, IP address or prefix, UUID, etc.).

[0012] More specifically, the present invention relates to a method for monitoring a communication object performed by a trusted device associated with a user, the monitoring method comprising:

[0013] - a step of detecting the use of at least one persistent identifier by at least one communicating partner; and

[0014] - A step of triggering at least one action interfering with said usage of said at least one persistent identifier by said at least one communicating partner.

[0015] Relatedly, the present invention is also directed to a trusted device associated with a user, configured to monitor a communication object, the trusted device comprising:

[0016] a detection module configured to detect the use of at least one persistent identifier by at least one communication partner; and

[0017] - a triggering module configured to trigger at least one action interfering with said usage of said at least one persistent identifier by said at least one connected object.

[0018] No assumptions are made about the nature of the devices involved in the present invention, whether it is the nature of these communication objects (which can be, for example, sensors, terminals, connected watches, wireless headphones, webcams, etc. as mentioned above) or trusted devices (which can specifically be terminals such as smartphones, set-top boxes, CPE (customer premises equipment)), or the nature of the communication interfaces used by the communication objects (for example, radio communication interfaces such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi interfaces, IP network interfaces, etc.).

[0019] Additionally, a trusted device may be associated with one or more users.

[0020] The invention therefore proposes a mechanism based on detecting the use of a persistent identifier by a communication partner located "near" a trusted device of a user (that is to say, visible to said user), and on controlling this use via an interference action triggered by the trusted device. The trusted device is advantageously associated with a user; in other words, the trusted device is a trusted device of said user, authorized by him or with his consent for monitoring a given area (for example, the trusted device may have been designated or selected by said user to monitor a specific area). This trust may be granted by the user to the device in question, for example because the device belongs to said user, or said user manages the device or is responsible for its use. For example, CPEs are typically owned by a connectivity service provider; in this case, the clients (users within the meaning of the invention) can then express their consent to the connectivity service provider, for example when they subscribe to a connectivity service, so that the CPE plays the role of a trusted device within the meaning of the invention. Users can also indicate their consent using the management interface of the CPE or a dedicated portal of the operator. It can also be reinforced by hardware means, computer means, software means or computer security means, etc.

[0021] The area monitored by a trusted device associated with a user is not necessarily geographical; the area may be linked to a network, an IP address or a prefix, etc. Furthermore, various configurations may be envisaged: the same area may be monitored by one or more trusted devices associated with the same user, or different trusted devices may be configured to monitor different areas, e.g. depending on the nature of the service associated with the use of the monitored communication objects (e.g., an "IoT" area for networked objects, a "professional" area for communication objects used for strictly professional purposes (e.g., a company network), a "personal" area for communication objects used for strictly personal purposes, etc.).

[0022] It should be noted that the communication objects monitored by the trusted device do not necessarily belong to the user. However, it is possible that the context in which these objects operate and / or the relevance of the persistent identifiers they use leak identification information related to the user. Therefore, the user can select and / or configure the trusted device so that the trusted device monitors all communication objects that it can detect within the perimeter of the area where the user is located or wishes to visit (or more generally, the area where the user may be present). The trusted device can also be fixed or mobile.

[0023] Furthermore, no assumptions are made about how a trusted device is able to detect such a communication object. Thus, a variety of methods can be used to perform this detection: this can be based, for example, on the presence of a network connection to the object in question (via a wired or wireless network or both), on a mechanism for scanning for signals transmitted via one or more radio interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi), on information received from a third-party entity or from the communication object itself, on listening to signals broadcasted by the communication object (e.g., in broadcast or multicast mode), etc., or even a combination of all or some of these methods. In any case, these communication objects are located in a detection area managed by the trusted device and in which the presence of these communication objects is visible to the trusted device.

[0024] By interfering with the use of a persistent identifier by a communication object detected by a trusted device associated with a user, the present invention advantageously makes the identification information associated with the user that may be disclosed by the use obsolete. Specifically, these interference actions add noise (particularly about its level, its position, etc.) that can be controlled by a trusted device to the use of the persistent identifier, so that a malicious third party can no longer use the persistent identifier to infer clear identification information related to the user therefrom. Due to the variety of interference actions that can be performed, the present invention also makes it possible to adapt to the constraints of the communication object, for example, according to whether the communication object can perform such an action, according to the context in which the communication object and / or the user is located, and / or according to the security level of the user's characteristic data. Of course, other factors can be considered to select one or more interference actions to be triggered.

[0025] Therefore, in a specific embodiment, the monitoring method also includes: for at least one of the communication objects identified in the detection step and at least one persistent identifier used by the communication object, a step of determining whether the communication object is capable of performing the action of interfering with the use of the persistent identifier, and the triggering step includes, where applicable, sending a command to the communication object so that the communication object performs the interference action.

[0026] The trusted device can also verify whether the communication object is under the control of the user, usually whether the communication object belongs to the user or whether the user manages the communication object. Specifically, the fact that the user controls the communication object facilitates the control of the communication object so as to trigger the execution of the interference action locally where applicable (if the object is capable of performing the interference action).

[0027] Such interference actions include, for example, the communication partner in question replacing the persistent identifier with another identifier having the same properties as the persistent identifier, which other identifier can be selected by the communication partner or by a trusted device or by a trusted third party entity. Thus, by way of illustration, when the persistent identifier in question is a MAC address, the interference action may include an action to randomize the MAC address activated by the communication partner, provided that the communication partner is capable of implementing such a technique.

[0028] When such a perturbation action performed by the communication object and triggered by the trusted device comprises replacing the persistent identifier with another identifier of the same nature, the monitoring method may further comprise the step of updating at least one routing and / or traffic filtering rule associated with the communication object with said another identifier.

[0029] The update makes it possible to avoid that the services provided or observed by the communication object are affected or degraded by the change of the identifier. In other words, the update aims to ensure that the services presented by the communication object or accessible to the communication object are not penalized when the communication object uses another identifier as a substitute for the persistent identifier, and that the substitution is transparent to the services provided or observed by the communication object.

[0030] In one embodiment, for at least one of the communication objects identified in the detection step and at least one persistent identifier used by the communication object, the triggering step includes sending an instruction to at least one remote server for triggering the use of the persistent identifier by at least one other communication object selected by the at least one remote server.

[0031] The trusted device and the remote server themselves preferably maintain a trust relationship; this trust relationship can be established, for example, via a previous mutual authentication mechanism implemented when establishing a connection between the trusted device and the remote server. It should be noted that one or more connections can be established between the trusted device and the server, particularly when the trusted device is associated with multiple users.

[0032] Depending on the context, this embodiment can be used as a supplement or alternative to the previous embodiment. For example, this embodiment can be implemented when the communication object does not belong to the user or more generally is not under the control of the user (and therefore cannot be easily controlled by the trusted device) and / or when the communication object is not able to perform the interference action. In this case, by means of this embodiment, the trusted device can address the remote server that manages other communication objects so that one or more interference actions are triggered and performed by all or some of these other communication objects.

[0033] The interfering actions triggered at these other communication objects include, for example, the use of the persistent identifier by these other communication objects. This use can be real, that is, the persistent identifier is actually used by the communication object to communicate with other entities, or virtual and simulated, that is, the use is fake, the object simulates the use of the persistent identifier, but the object does not use the persistent identifier for its own needs. This virtual use is referred to herein as "emulation of a persistent identifier file".

[0034] Thus, an example of a communication object emulating a persistent identifier includes assigning a persistent identifier to an interface of the communication object (the assignment can be selected by a server or by the communication object itself) and advertising the identifier so that the communication object is visible to devices located in the immediate vicinity of the communication object (such devices scan, for example, signals emitted by the communication object or analyze messages sent by the communication object); however, in the context of the emulation, for example, when the communication object sends an activity report at the request of an external controller, the communication object does not use the persistent identifier for its own needs. In addition, the communication object can also be configured to reject any attempt and / or request to establish a connection associated with a persistent identifier that has been assigned to the communication object. It should be noted that the same communication object can be configured to emulate multiple different identifiers.

[0035] In this way, identification information about the user that may be leaked by using the one or more persistent identifiers is interfered with because the one or more persistent identifiers are used by multiple communication objects (a communication object detected by the trusted device and one or more communication objects authorized by the remote server). In fact, this embodiment expands the area containing communication objects that can participate in interfering with information that may be leaked by using one or more persistent identifiers detected by the trusted device.

[0036] In a particular embodiment, the instructions sent to the remote server may also include other indications, such as an indication of the duration of use of the persistent identifier by the at least one other communication object and / or an indication of the area to which the at least one other communication object required to use the persistent identifier should be attached.

[0037] Of course, these examples are given by way of illustration only, and other indications are contemplated.

[0038] In a variant embodiment, the above indications or other indications (e.g. the maximum number of persistent identifiers associated with a user, the desired level of interference, the type of persistent identifier in question, the identity of the trusted device associated with the user, etc.) may be available in a profile associated with the user accessible to the remote server. This profile may have been provided to the remote server, for example, during mutual authentication of the trusted device with the remote server or may have been identified by the trusted device at the remote server, or may be made accessible to the remote server in a database, etc. In the above-mentioned case where the trusted device is associated with multiple users and only one connection is established between the trusted device and the server, it is conceivable to fill in the identifier of one of the users when calling the server to trigger the interference action, so that the server can associate the call with the profile of the user in question.

[0039] Thus, as is apparent in light of what has just been described, the present invention relies on one or more trusted devices associated with a user, but also on communication objects monitored by these trusted devices and capable of performing interference actions, on one or more remote servers authorized by the one or more trusted devices to implement actions interfering with the use of persistent identifiers as detected by the one or more trusted devices, where applicable, and also on communication objects controlled by these one or more remote servers in order to perform these interference actions.

[0040] According to another aspect, the present invention is therefore also directed to a method for managing communication objects performed by a server, the management method comprising:

[0041] - A step of receiving, from a trusted device associated with a user, an instruction for triggering the use of at least one given persistent identifier by at least one communication object managed by said server;

[0042] - a step of selecting, for the at least one persistent identifier specified in the instruction and for the user, at least one communication partner capable of using the at least one persistent identifier from among a plurality of communication partners managed by the server; and

[0043] - A step of sending a command to said at least one selected communication partner so that said at least one selected communication partner uses said at least one persistent identifier.

[0044] Relatedly, the present invention also relates to a server configured to manage communication objects, the server comprising:

[0045] a receiving module configured to receive, from at least one trusted device associated with a user, at least one instruction for triggering the use of at least one given persistent identifier by at least one communication object managed by the server;

[0046] a selection module configured to select, for the at least one persistent identifier specified in the at least one instruction and for the user, at least one communication object capable of using the at least one persistent identifier from among a plurality of communication objects managed by the server; and

[0047] - a control module configured to send a command to the at least one selected communication object so that the at least one selected communication object uses the at least one persistent identifier.

[0048] The management method and the server according to the present invention contribute to the same advantages mentioned above as the monitoring method and the trusted device according to the present invention.

[0049] In a particular embodiment, the management method further comprises a step of authenticating a trusted device associated with the user before performing the selecting step and the configuring step.

[0050] As mentioned above, this step makes it possible to ensure a trust relationship between the trusted device and the remote server.This step may also be accompanied by a step comprising the following operation: verifying that the trusted device is actually authorized to send such instructions to the remote server of the user.

[0051] In a particular embodiment, said at least one communication object is selected by the server from among a plurality of communication objects managed by said server and attached to an area defined for or by the user, to which at least one communication object the command using said at least one persistent identifier is sent.

[0052] In one embodiment, at least one of said communication objects to which the command using said at least one persistent identifier is sent is randomly selected by the server or according to at least one constraint defined for or by the user.

[0053] In a specific embodiment, the management method further comprises: for at least one communication object selected for the user, a step of canceling the command for using the at least one persistent identifier for which the communication object is selected or a step of updating the command.

[0054] These embodiments provide great flexibility in selecting communication partners using one or more persistent identifiers and / or configuration thereof and enable adapting the selection and / or the configuration to the context and the needs of the users and / or their preferences.

[0055] According to yet another aspect, the present invention is also directed to a method for using an identifier by a communication object, the method comprising:

[0056] - a step of receiving from a server a command to use a persistent identifier already in use by another communication partner, said command providing said communication partner with an indication of at least one action to be taken by said communication partner in the event that a third party device attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with said communication partner through said persistent identifier;

[0057] - The step of using said persistent identifier and performing said at least one action.

[0058] Relatedly, the present invention also relates to a communication object, the communication object comprising:

[0059] a receiving module configured to receive from a server a command to use a persistent identifier already in use by another communication partner, said command providing to said communication partner an indication of at least one action to be taken by said communication partner in the event that a third-party device attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with said communication partner via said persistent identifier;

[0060] - an execution module configured to use the persistent identifier and implement the at least one action.

[0061] The behavior that the communication object will take in the case of trying and / or requesting to establish a connection is usually to refuse the attempt and / or request to establish a connection, track the attempt and / or request to establish a connection, establish the connection, etc. The indication provided by the server makes it possible to define the mode in which the communication object uses the persistent identifier, that is, whether the communication object should simulate the persistent identifier (in other words, use the persistent identifier virtually, and advertise the persistent identifier without establishing a connection associated with the persistent identifier or using the persistent identifier for its own needs), or on the contrary actually use the persistent identifier. The use mode can be different depending on the context or on the communication object authorized by the server to use the persistent identifier. In fact, if a malicious third party tries to detect that multiple communication objects are configured to simulate persistent identifiers and systematically refuse any attempt and / or request to establish a connection based on the persistent identifier, this may cause suspicion of the third party and reduce the effectiveness of the interference implemented by the present invention.

[0062] The advantages associated with the communication object and the method of use according to the invention are the same as those listed above for the trusted device and the server and also for the monitoring and management methods respectively implemented thereby.

[0063] According to yet another aspect, the present invention is directed to a method for performing an interference action performed by a communication object, the method comprising:

[0064] - Steps for using persistent identifiers;

[0065] - receiving a command from a trusted device associated with the user causing the communication partner to perform an action interfering with the use of the persistent identifier; and

[0066] - A step of performing said interference action.

[0067] Relatedly, the present invention is also directed to a communication object, the communication object comprising:

[0068] - a communication module configured to use a persistent identifier;

[0069] a receiving module configured to receive a command from a trusted device associated with a user (U) causing the communication object to perform an action interfering with the use of the persistent identifier by the communication module; and

[0070] - an execution module, the execution module being configured to execute the interference action.

[0071] As mentioned above, such interference action controlled by the trusted device is, for example, that the communication object generates and replaces the persistent identifier with another identifier having the same properties as the persistent identifier. It is preferably applicable to all ongoing connections of the communication object that is using the persistent identifier.

[0072] The advantages associated with the communication object and the execution method according to the invention are the same as those mentioned above for the trusted device, server and communication object according to the invention and also for the monitoring, management and use methods according to the invention respectively implemented thereby.

[0073] In a particular embodiment, the monitoring, managing, using and executing methods are computer-implemented.

[0074] The invention is also directed to a computer program on a recording medium, this program being able to be implemented in a computer or, more generally, in a trusted device according to the invention and comprising instructions designed to implement the monitoring method as described above.

[0075] The invention is also directed to a computer program on a recording medium, this program being able to be implemented in a computer or more generally in a server according to the invention and comprising instructions designed to implement the management method as described above.

[0076] The invention is also directed to a computer program on a recording medium, this program being able to be implemented in a computer or more generally in a communication object according to the invention and comprising instructions designed to implement the method of use as described above.

[0077] The invention is also directed to a computer program on a recording medium, capable of being implemented in a computer or, more generally, in a communication object according to the invention and comprising instructions designed to implement the execution method as described above.

[0078] Each of these programs can use any programming language, and can be in the form of source code, object code, or an intermediate code between source code and object code, such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other desired form.

[0079] The present invention is also directed to a computer-readable information medium or recording medium, which includes instructions of the computer program as mentioned above.

[0080] The information medium or recording medium may be any entity or device capable of storing a program. For example, the medium may include a storage device such as a ROM (e.g., a CD-ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM), or a magnetic recording device (e.g., a hard disk or a flash memory).

[0081] Furthermore, the information medium or recording medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal, which may be routed via an electrical or optical cable, by a radio link, by a wireless optical link, or by other means.

[0082] In particular, the program according to the invention can be downloaded from the Internet.

[0083] Alternatively, the information medium or recording medium may be an integrated circuit in which a program is incorporated, the circuit being designed to execute or be used to execute the monitoring, management, use and execution methods according to the present invention.

[0084] According to another aspect, the present invention is also directed to an interference system, the interference system comprising:

[0085] at least one trusted device associated with the user according to the invention, the at least one trusted device being configured to monitor a communication object;

[0086] - at least one server according to the invention; and

[0087] - a plurality of communication objects, the plurality of communication objects comprising at least one communication object according to the invention (typically a communication object configured to implement the execution method and / or a communication object configured to implement the use method).

[0088] The advantages associated with the jamming system are the same as those enumerated above for the trusted devices and servers and also for the monitoring and management methods respectively implemented thereby.

[0089] In addition, as mentioned above, the present invention is applicable to various types of persistent identifiers. For example, at least one of the persistent identifiers is:

[0090] -Media Access Layer MAC address;

[0091] - Internet Protocol IP address;

[0092] -IP prefix;

[0093] - Service Set Identifier SSID;

[0094] - an identifier of the trusted device; or

[0095] - An identifier assigned to the radio interface.

[0096] In other embodiments, it is also possible to envision the monitoring, use, execution and management methods, trusted devices, servers, communication objects and interference systems according to the present invention, which have all or some of the above-mentioned characteristics in combination. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0097] Other features and advantages of the invention will emerge from the following description given with reference to the accompanying drawings, which show an exemplary embodiment of the invention which is in no way limiting. In the drawings:

[0098] [ Figure 1 ] Figure 1 In its environment the jamming system according to the invention in a particular embodiment is shown;

[0099] [ Figure 2 ] Figure 2 Schematically shows the hardware architecture of a computer that can be or host a trusted device or server or Figure 1 The communication object of the interference system;

[0100] [ Figure 3 ] Figure 3 The main steps of the monitoring method according to the present invention are shown. In a specific embodiment, these steps are performed by Figure 1 The interference system is implemented by trusted devices;

[0101] [ Figure 4 ] Figure 4 The main steps of the implementation method according to the present invention are shown. In a specific embodiment, these steps are performed by Figure 1 The interference system is implemented by the communication object;

[0102] [ Figure 5 ] Figure 5 The main steps of the management method according to the present invention are shown. In a specific embodiment, these steps are performed by Figure 1 The interference system is implemented by the server;

[0103] [ Figure 6 ] Figure 6 Shows the time-dependent changes of the communication objects emulating persistent identifiers ( Figure 6 A and then Figure 6 B) is an example of a mapping; and

[0104] [ Figure 7 ] Figure 7 The main steps of the method of use according to the present invention are shown. In a specific embodiment, these steps are performed by Figure 1 The interference system is implemented by the communication object. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0105] Figure 1A jamming system (or obfuscation system) 1 according to the invention is shown in a particular embodiment. The jamming system 1 is configured to provide a user with what is known as a jamming service S, also designated herein as "Managing Privacy Inferred by Nearby Connected Objects" MANTEC. This MANTEC service S consists in detecting the use of persistent identifiers by communicating objects that could reveal identification information related to said user (e.g. information about the user's identity, habits, behavior, location, etc.), and in triggering actions to jam such use in order to render obsolete said identification information that could thus be obtained. Thus, the jamming system 1 makes it impossible to exploit, in particular for fraudulent purposes, the information that could be obtained from the use of persistent identifiers.

[0106] No assumptions are made about the nature of the communication partners that might use such persistent identifiers, or about the persistent identifiers in question.

[0107] Thus, for example, a communication object may be a sensor, a terminal such as a smartphone or a digital tablet, a networked watch, a wireless headset, a webcam, etc., having one or more communication interfaces, which can exchange data with other entities via the one or more communication interfaces. Such communication interfaces may be radio interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular mobile networks, etc.), IP network interfaces (wired or wireless or both), etc.

[0108] Furthermore, a persistent identifier specifies any type of information that uniquely or unambiguously identifies the communication device associated with it, such that its prolonged (that is, persistent, hence its name) use provides a third party with the possibility of obtaining information about the identity, behavior and / or habits of the user of the communication device in question (including tracking the identity, behavior and / or habits of the user). The persistent identifier may be, for example, a MAC address, an IP address or IP prefix, a UUID or SSID, a name associated with a communication device broadcast or assigned to a communication interface (e.g., "Bob's Headphones"), etc. The duration of use (beyond which the interference system 1 considers the identifier to be persistent) may vary depending on the context and nature of the identifier. For example, a maximum duration of use of 24 hours for an IP address, or a maximum duration of use of 60 minutes for a MAC address may be considered.

[0109] In the embodiment described here, in order to provide the service S, the interference system 1 comprises the following elements:

[0110] - At least one trusted device 2, according to the invention and associated with at least one user U, which may include one or more persons (e.g. a group of employees of a company), who has subscribed to a service S with the operator OP. For example, the trusted device 2 is selected by the user U and is thereby declared to the operator OP when subscribing to the service S or subsequently. This trust granted by the user U to the device 2 may be motivated by various reasons; for example, the user U owns the trusted device 2, or manages it, or is responsible for its use. It may be reinforced by a computer or software device or by any other device (e.g. a hardware device or a contextual device). Such a trusted device 2 may in particular be a smartphone of the user U or their connected watch, a CPE device or set-top box, a connected TV, a webcam, or an object dedicated to the invention, etc. It should be noted that the trusted device 2 may be fixed or mobile;

[0111] at least one server 3 according to the invention (also designated as "MANTEC server 3" in the rest of the description) capable of communicating with the trusted device 2 and assisting it, at its request, in carrying out interference actions; and

[0112] - a plurality of communication objects, comprising in particular communication objects O1, ..., Om, m designating an integer greater than or equal to 1, which are managed by said at least one MANTEC server 3 and which can be addressed by the MANTEC server 3 in order to perform interference actions when the MANTEC server assists the trusted device 2. Thus, the communication objects O1, ..., Om are capable and configured to perform, at the request of the MANTEC server 3, actions indicated by the MANTEC server 3 interfering with the use of one or more given identifiers (the same communication object is capable of performing actions interfering with a plurality of different identifiers, and a plurality of communication objects is capable of performing actions interfering with the same identifier). In the embodiment described here, the communication objects O1, ..., Om are according to the invention, and the interference actions that these communication objects are capable of performing are the use of one or more identifiers specified by the MANTEC server 3 according to a usage pattern defined by the MANTEC server 3. Various ways of using these one or more identifiers can be envisaged. Thus, for example, one interference action performed by the communication object O1, ..., Om may consist in emulating an identifier, that is to say, "simulating" its use: the identifier in question is assigned to a communication interface of the communication object (the interface in question may be selected by the communication object or by the MANTEC server 3) and advertised by this communication interface, so as to make the communication object visible to devices located in its immediate vicinity and that are listening to signals and / or messages transmitted via this interface. However, in the context of this simulation, the identifier is not used by the communication object to meet the needs of the service for which the communication object is natively used and for which the communication object is intended (for example, to collect data that may be periodically transmitted to an external controller). As a variant, it is conceivable that the MANTEC server 3 requires the communication object to actually use a given identifier, that is to say, to assign this identifier to one of the interfaces of the communication object (the interface in question may be selected by the communication object or by the MANTEC server 3), to advertise this identifier, and to establish connections with other entities based on this identifier. Such a communication object may or may not be intended to exclusively implement the present invention (that is to say, to be a communication object dedicated to interfering with persistent identifiers). These communication objects may be pre-existing communication objects (eg, CPE, hotspot, router, or IoT object) intended for other purposes and otherwise used for the needs of the present invention.

[0113] Each trusted device 2 associated with a user U is configured to monitor communication objects O1', O2', ..., Ok' located in its "neighborhood", k designating an integer greater than or equal to 1. All or some of these communication objects may be according to the invention and have a module configured to implement the execution method according to the invention in order to participate in the implementation of the service S. Where applicable, the communication objects configured in this way from among the communication objects O1', O2', ..., Ok' belong to the interference system 1.

[0114] In the example envisaged here, the communication objects O1', O2', ..., Ok' are located in the immediate vicinity of the trusted device 2, which neighborhood may be a radio neighborhood, that is, the trusted device 2 is able to receive radio signals emitted by such communication objects (e.g., Bluetooth signals, Wi-Fi signals, etc.) where applicable, and / or may be a network neighborhood, that is, the trusted device 2 is able to receive messages emitted by such objects, for example, via a local area network where applicable (e.g., ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) messages broadcast in broadcast mode). For example, by way of illustration, the trusted device 2 may be a CPE connected to a local area network, and the communication objects O1', O2', ..., Ok' may be devices connected to the local area network.

[0115] As a variant, it is also conceivable that the trusted device 2 is configured to also monitor communication objects located in less immediate neighborhoods, including the immediate radio / network neighborhood of the trusted device 2 that has just been described. In other words, according to this variant, communication objects located in the radio and / or network neighborhood of communication objects detected by the trusted device 2 in its immediate radio and / or network neighborhood can also be monitored by the trusted device 2. To this end, the trusted device 2 can receive signals and / or messages sent by communication objects located in its less immediate neighborhoods via communication objects located in its immediate neighborhood or via other intermediate devices. Therefore, according to this variant, once the trusted device 2 is able to detect signals and / or messages sent by the communication object and received directly from the communication object or via intermediate devices, the communication object in question is considered to be located in the neighborhood of the trusted device 2 and can be monitored thereby.

[0116] It should be noted that the communication objects monitored by the trusted device 2 do not necessarily belong to the user U. However, it is possible that the context in which the communication objects operate and / or the correlation of the persistent identifiers they use may reveal identification information related to the user U.

[0117] It should also be noted that the user U can configure the trusted device 2 to perform such monitoring at all times or only when the trusted device is located in a location called a given monitoring area (e.g., an area in which the user U is located or is envisioned to visit). Such a monitoring area can be characterized by one or more parameters, such as a network identifier (e.g., a service set identifier SSID of a wireless local area network (WLAN), an IP address or prefix (IPv4 or IPv6) assigned to the trusted device 2, GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates, or a combination of such parameters. The monitoring area can include, for the same trusted device 2, multiple sub-areas defined, for example, by the following operations: an OR operation "OR(value1, value2, ...)", where "value1, value2, ..." represents the value of the parameter considered in the sub-area in question; or an AND operation "AND(value1, value2, ...)", when multiple parameters are envisioned to characterize the monitoring area; or a logical combination of these operations. As a variant, the monitoring area can be defined by an exclusive operation "NOT(value1)"; in other words, the monitoring area corresponds to any area where the value of the parameter considered is not "value1".

[0118] By way of illustration, in the example envisaged here, it is assumed that the monitoring area Z2 is defined for the trusted device 2 of user U: in other words, the trusted device 2 is configured to implement service S when the trusted device detects that it is located in this monitoring area Z2; outside this monitoring area Z2, the trusted device does not participate in implementing service S for user U.

[0119] Each trusted device 2 is configured with a list of MANTEC servers 3, which it can address when necessary to trigger interference actions; each MANTEC server 3 is identified in the list by at least one reachability information item such as IP address, domain name, port number, etc.

[0120] As a variant, the list of MANTEC servers may be obtained dynamically by the trusted device 2, for example by querying another entity such as a database accessible to the trusted device 2. It should be noted that this list may change over time, depending on the location of the trusted device 2 or other parameters.

[0121] exist Figure 1In the example envisaged in , for simplicity, a single trusted device 2 is considered, which is associated with a single user U and is equipped with a single MANTEC server 3 capable of providing its assistance to the trusted device 2. However, these assumptions are not limiting in themselves, and other configurations of the interference system 1 can be envisaged, such as multiple trusted devices 2 associated with the same user (depending on the geographical area in which they are located or their mobility), or multiple MANTEC servers 3 equipped with trusted devices 2 and located in different geographical areas (which advantageously allows the trusted device 2 to contact multiple MANTEC servers 3 simultaneously without requiring any specific coordination of the MANTEC servers 3 with each other), or the same trusted device 2 associated with multiple users, etc.

[0122] It is assumed that there is a trust relationship between the trusted device 2 and each MANTEC server 3 configured for the trusted device, for example via the implementation of an association procedure between these devices. Therefore, authentication information can be provided to the trusted device 2 so that the trusted device can authenticate itself in this association with the MANTEC server 3, such authentication procedure being triggered by establishing a connection between the trusted device 2 and the MANTEC server 3. It is assumed that only one connection is established between the trusted device 2 of the user U and the MANTEC server 3.

[0123] This association allows the trusted device 2 to exchange various types of information with the MANTEC server 3 in order to implement the service S and in particular allows the MANTEC server 3 to be able to identify the user U for whom the MANTEC server is invoked. The MANTEC server 3 is then able to access the profile of this user U (locally stored or accessible from a remote entity) and implement interference actions according to the policy defined by the profile. Such a profile may in particular define all or some of the following information:

[0124] one or more intervention zones Z3 of a MANTEC server 3, which are placed in the context of the service S under the control of this server and in which interference actions can be performed (that is to say, all or some of the objects O1, ..., Om managed by the MANTEC server 3 are attached to this intervention zone or zones). The organization of the intervention zones and their association with the MANTEC server reflects the local policy of the operator implementing the provision of the service S. Such a local policy can be instantiated based on information provided by the users of the service S (for example, by the user U depending on their location at a given time or their travel plans). Such an intervention zone Z3 can be associated with a geographical area (for example, a district, a city, a department, a region, a country, etc.) or, as a variant, with a specific network (for example, the user's local area network, the operator's network, etc.) or with a service (for example, telemedicine, etc.). The intervention zone can be defined by the OR, AND and NOT operations mentioned above. If no intervention zone Z3 is defined in the profile of the user U, it is conceivable to use a default intervention zone corresponding, for example, to the user's home local area network;

[0125] - the expected level of interference (e.g., level of repetition of usage of persistent identifiers);

[0126] - one or more types of persistent identifiers in question;

[0127] - the maximum number of identifiers associated with a user to be jammed;

[0128] - the identity of the trusted device 2 associated with the user;

[0129] -etc.

[0130] All or some of the information contained in the profile of user U may be provided by user U himself, for example when subscribing to service S or at any other time, and / or by the operator OP of service S depending on the subscription type of user U (which may be defined, for example, according to the nature and maximum number of intervention areas), the context, the mobility of user U, the nature and capabilities of the connection objects managed by the MANTEC server 3, etc.

[0131] The association (and more specifically the connection) between the trusted device 2 and the MANTEC server 3 may be permanent, that is to say, present for the entire duration of the implementation of the service S for the user U, or one-time, that is to say, established only when the trusted device 2 requires the assistance of the MANTEC server 3 to implement the service S for the user U. It should be noted that, when the trusted device 2 is associated with multiple users, it is conceivable to establish one or more associations / connections (for example, one connection per user) between the trusted device 2 and the MANTEC server 3. If a single connection is used, the trusted device 2 should fill in the identifier of the user during its communication with the MANTEC server 3, so that this MANTEC server can associate the interference request with the profile of the user in question.

[0132] In the embodiment described here, each trusted device 2 of the interference system 1, each MANTEC server 3 and each communication object (in particular, the communication objects O1, ..., Om and the communication objects from among the objects O1', ..., Ok' configured to implement the execution method according to the invention) have the following Figure 2 The hardware architecture of the computer 4 schematically shown in FIG. 1 may be, or hosted by, such a computer.

[0133] The computer 4 comprises in particular a processor 5 , a random access memory 6 , a read-only memory 7 , a non-volatile memory 8 and communication means 9 , in particular enabling the entities of the interference system 1 to communicate with each other.

[0134] The read-only memory 7 of the computer 4 constitutes a recording medium according to the present invention, which can be read by the processor 5 and on which the computer program according to the present invention is recorded.

[0135] More specifically, when the computer 4 is or hosts the trusted device 2 according to the invention, the read-only memory 7 of this computer comprises a record of a computer program PROG2 comprising instructions defining the main steps of the monitoring method according to the invention.

[0136] This program PROG2 defines the functional modules of the trusted device 2, which rely on or control the hardware elements 5 to 9 of the computer 4 listed above. In the embodiment described here, these modules include in particular:

[0137] - a first detection module 2A configured to detect whether the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2 and, if applicable, to activate other modules of the trusted device 2 that participate in the implementation of the service S for the user U. To this end, the first detection module 2A uses one or more parameters characterizing the monitoring zone Z2 (e.g. a network identifier, an IP address or prefix, GPS coordinates or a combination of these parameters) which the user U has previously configured for the trusted device 2. In the embodiment described here, the first detection module 2A is configured to continuously (that is to say without interruption) monitor whether the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2. As a variant, this first detection module can be statically or dynamically configured by the user U to perform this monitoring within a given period of time via a user interface provided for this purpose;

[0138] - a second detection module 2B configured to detect the use of at least one persistent identifier by at least one communication object O1', ..., Ok' monitored by the trusted device 2. To this end, the second detection module 2B is here configured to scan continuously or at a determined frequency (for example, at a regular frequency) for signals and / or messages emitted by the communication objects O1', ..., Ok' located in its radio and / or network neighborhood, as mentioned above, and to analyze these signals and / or messages. As indicated above, in a variant in which the trusted device 2 is configured to also monitor communication objects located in its less immediate neighborhood (generally not directly visible to the device 2), the trusted device may receive these signals and / or messages from an intermediate device (generally a communication object among the communication objects located in its immediate neighborhood); and

[0139] - a triggering module 2C configured to trigger at least one action that interferes with such use detected by the second detection module 2B. In the embodiment described here, the triggering module 2C comprises three submodules:

[0140] o a first submodule 2C1 configured to determine which type or types of interference action are to be triggered following the detection by the second detection module 2B and in particular to determine whether such interference action is to be triggered at the communication object at the origin of the detected use and / or at the remote MANTEC server 3. To this end, the first submodule 2C1 may take into account the capabilities of the communication object at the origin of the detected use, whether the communication object belongs to the user U, the detected persistent identifier, the desired interference level, etc., as further described below;

[0141] o A second submodule 2C2 and a third submodule 2C3, which are selectively or cumulatively activated by the first submodule 2C1. The second submodule 2C2 or the third submodule 2C3 are configured to trigger, respectively, at a remote MANTEC server 3, an action to interfere with the use detected at the communication object at the origin of the use, from which the trusted device 2 requests assistance.

[0142] References below Figure 3 The steps of the monitoring method according to the invention presented in FIG. 1 describe in more detail the functions of the modules 2A to 2C of the trusted device 2 .

[0143] When the computer 4 is or hosts a MANTEC server 3 according to the invention, the read-only memory 7 of the computer 4 comprises a record of a computer program PROG3 comprising instructions defining the main steps of the management method according to the invention.

[0144] This program PROG3 defines the functional modules of the MANTEC server 3, which are dependent on or control the hardware elements 5 to 9 listed above of the computer 4. In the embodiment described here, these modules include in particular:

[0145] a receiving module 3A configured to receive, from at least one trusted device associated with a user (in this case, in the example envisaged herein, from a trusted device 2 associated with the user U), at least one instruction for triggering the use of at least one given persistent identifier by at least one communication object managed by the MANTEC server 3;

[0146] a selection module 3B configured to select, for said at least one persistent identifier specified in said at least one instruction and for said user, at least one communication object capable of using said at least one persistent identifier from among a plurality of communication objects O1, ..., Om managed by the MANTEC server 3. As mentioned above, for this purpose, the selection module 3B may take into account information contained in the profile of the user in question; and

[0147] - A control module 3C configured to send a command to the at least one selected communication object so that the at least one selected communication object uses the at least one persistent identifier. The command may include an indication of the mode of use of the at least one persistent identifier (e.g., an indication whether the use should be real or fictitious (simulation) and / or an indication of the behavior to be adopted by the communication object in the event that a third party entity attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with the communication object based on the at least one identifier). The attempt to establish a connection (also called a partial request) here comprises initiating a connection request by sending a message to the communication object, but not terminating the connection request.

[0148] References below Figure 4 The steps of the management method according to the invention presented in FIG. 1 describe in more detail the functions of the modules 3A to 3C of the MANTEC server 3 .

[0149] When the computer 4 is or hosts a communication object Oj (j=1, . . . , m) according to the invention, the read-only memory 7 of the computer 4 comprises a record of a computer program PROG comprising instructions defining the main steps of the method of use according to the invention.

[0150] The program PROG defines the functional modules of the communication object Oj, which are dependent on or control the hardware elements 5 to 9 listed above of the computer 4. In the embodiment described here, these modules include in particular:

[0151] a receiving module 10A configured to receive from the MANTEC server 3 a command to use a persistent identifier already in use by another communication partner, the command providing the communication partner Oj with an indication of at least one behavior to be adopted by said communication partner in the event that a third-party device attempts and / or requests to establish a connection through said persistent identifier. As mentioned above, this behavior more particularly defines the mode of use of the persistent identifier recommended by the MANTEC server 3 (for example, real use or virtual use); and

[0152] - an execution module 10B configured to use said persistent identifier and to implement said at least one action.

[0153] Finally, when the computer 4 is or hosts a communication object Oi' according to the invention (an integer belonging to {1, ..., k} (e.g. Figure 1 When i=1)), the read-only memory 7 of the computer 4 comprises a record of a computer program PROG' comprising instructions defining the main steps of the execution method according to the invention.

[0154] The program PROG' defines the functional modules of the communication object Oi', which are dependent on or control the hardware elements 5 to 9 of the computer 4 listed above. In the embodiment described here, these modules include in particular:

[0155] - a communication module 11A configured to use a persistent identifier;

[0156] a receiving module 11B configured to receive a command from the trusted device 2 causing the communication object Oi′ to perform an action interfering with the use of the persistent identifier by the communication module 11A; and

[0157] An execution module 11C configured to execute the interference action.

[0158] Now refer to Figures 3 to 7 Given the monitoring ( Figure 3 ),manage( Figure 5 ) and use ( Figure 7 ) Description of the main steps of the method. Figure 4 The main steps of the execution method are shown, which are carried out by a communication object among the communication objects O1 ′, . . . , Ok′ monitored by the trusted device 2 where applicable.

[0159] refer to Figure 3 As mentioned above, in the embodiment described here, the first detection module 2A of the trusted device 2 associated with the user U monitors whether the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2 (test step E10). To this end, for example, the first detection module uses one or more parameters characterizing the monitoring zone Z2 and compares the one or more parameters with the corresponding one or more parameters of the zone in which the trusted device is located.

[0160] Thus, by way of illustration, if the parameter used to characterize the monitoring zone Z2 is a network identifier with the value NwID, the first detection module 2A compares the identifier of the network or networks to which the trusted device 2 is connected with the value NwID; if this first detection module detects a match, this means that the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2, otherwise the trusted device is located outside this zone. As mentioned above, as a variant, the monitoring zone Z2 can be defined by an operation excluding certain values ​​from the parameter in question (e.g., “NOT (NwID)”). In this case, the first detection module 2A detects that the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2 if the trusted device 2 is not connected to any network with the identifier NwID.

[0161] As long as the trusted device 2 is not located in its monitoring zone Z2 (“No” response in the test step E10 ), the modules 2B to 2C of the trusted device 2 remain inactive.

[0162] When the first detection module 2A detects that the trusted device 2 is located in its monitoring zone Z2 (“yes” response in step E10 ), it activates the other modules of the trusted device 2 , and more particularly the second detection module 2B.

[0163] After this activation, the second detection module 2B scans the radio signals (e.g., Bluetooth signals, Wi-Fi signals) and / or messages (e.g., ARP broadcast messages) emitted by the communication objects O1', ..., Ok' located in its immediate radio and / or network neighborhood (step E20) in order to detect whether at least one of these communication objects is using a persistent identifier. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the trusted device 2 only monitors the communication objects located in its immediate neighborhood. However, as detailed above, as a variant, it is also conceivable that the trusted device 2 also monitors the communication objects located in a less immediate neighborhood, which is, for example, located at a greater distance from the trusted device 2 and is connected to the communication objects located in the immediate neighborhood of the trusted device 2 via a network or radio interface.

[0164] In order to detect the use of one or more persistent identifiers, the second detection module 2B can be configured to identify a specific identifier (e.g., MAC address, IP address, etc.) or a data sequence that is repeatedly used among the data carried by the signal / message detected in its neighborhood. This configuration may include, for example, a message header and / or type of the identifier to be searched in these data. For each communication object detected and monitored in its neighborhood, in the embodiment described herein, the second detection module 2B updates a list LIST (step E30) of identifiers carried by these communication objects, and analyzes the duration of the communication objects using these identifiers to determine whether these identifiers are persistent identifiers that may leak identification information about user U. For this reason, the maximum acceptable persistence duration Dmax is configured at the second detection module 2B. It should be noted that the maximum persistence duration may depend on the context (e.g., safe or unsafe environment) of the communication object O1', ..., Ok' monitored by the trusted device 2, etc. Such a duration is, for example, 2 hours, 24 hours, 1 week, etc.

[0165] As a variant, the second detection module 2B may be configured with parameters obtained via the execution of a machine learning algorithm, the execution of which may be based, for example, on the generation and operation of a neural network, making it possible to detect the presence of persistent identifiers in the data, and to provide the persistence duration and the type of each persistent identifier thus detected. The type of persistent identifier may be explicitly indicated in the message with these persistent identifiers or inferred by comparison with other known types of identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses), or generated by the configuration of the operator OP or the user U, etc.

[0166] Based on the list LIST and based on one or more maximum acceptable persistence durations Dmax, the second detection module 2B is therefore able to identify the communication objects that use persistent identifiers (test step E40). In the rest of this specification, OBJ1, ..., OBJn (n specifies an integer greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to k) represent communication objects O1', ..., Ok' that use persistent identifiers detected by the second detection module 2B where applicable. It should be noted that the communication objects OBJ1, ..., OBJn can use one or more persistent identifiers. For simplicity, it will be considered that each communication object OBJ1, ..., OBJn uses a single persistent identifier, respectively denoted as P-ID1, ..., P-IDn; however, assuming that the same communication object uses multiple persistent identifiers, the content described below for one persistent identifier is reproduced for all persistent identifiers used.

[0167] For each communication object OBJj (j=1, ..., n) (steps E50 and E110), the trusted device 2 then determines, via its first submodule 2C1, which type or types of interference actions to trigger in order to interfere with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object OBJj. For this purpose, in the embodiment described here, the trusted device 2 takes into account the following two factors: the possibility of controlling the communication object OBJj (so that the trusted device 2 can send commands to the communication object and have these commands accepted by the communication object OBJj), and the ability of the object OBJj to perform interference actions itself (commanded by the trusted device 2) if applicable (such as replacing the persistent identifier being used by the object with another identifier).

[0168] Therefore, the first submodule 2C1 first determines whether it or more specifically the user U can control the communication object OBJj using the persistent identifier P-IDj (test step E60). To this end, in the embodiment described here, the first submodule 2C1 determines whether the communication object OBJj belongs to the user U or whether said user manages the communication object. The first submodule 2C1 can use a variety of techniques for this purpose.

[0169] For example, if the trusted device 2 is a CPE of user U connected to the local area network of user U and the persistent identifier P-IDj is a MAC address, the first submodule 2C1 can consult the active connection table in the local area network maintained by the trusted device 2 (for example, an ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) table or a DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) database) and verify whether the object OBJj is connected to the local area network using its MAC address P-IDj.

[0170] According to another technique, in order to determine whether the communication object OBJj can be controlled by the user U, the first submodule 2C1 can exchange messages with the communication object OBJj, such as ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) messages, or establish an association with the communication object OBJj by using the radio interface used by it (e.g., Bluetooth).

[0171] According to yet another technique, the first submodule 2C1 may ask the user U to indicate whether they can control the object OBJj (e.g., indicate whether the object OBJj belongs to them or whether the user manages the object), for example by displaying a message on the user U's terminal (e.g., a smartphone, a display screen of a CPE, a networked TV).

[0172] According to yet another technique, the first submodule 2C1 may rely on statements made by the user U when subscribing to the service S.

[0173] Of course, other techniques may be envisaged as a supplement or alternative to the above techniques. As mentioned above, the fact that the communication object OBJj is under the control of the user U allows the communication object to be controlled here by the trusted device 2 (as designated by the user U), and therefore allows the trusted device 2 to address commands to perform interference actions to the communication object OBJj, which is configured to accept these commands and execute them (if it is able to do so).

[0174] In the embodiment described here, if the communication object OBJj is not under the control of the user U (the response in the test step E60 is "No"), the first submodule 2C1 triggers an action (step E70) at the MANTEC server 3 via the third submodule 2C3 to interfere with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object OBJj, as described in more detail below.

[0175] If the communication object OBJj is under the control of the user U (response "yes" in test step E60), for example because the communication object belongs to the user U, the first submodule 2C1 then verifies whether the communication object OBJj is capable of performing an action that interferes with the communication object's use of the persistent identifier P-IDj (test step E80). More specifically, in the embodiment described herein, the first submodule 2C1 determines whether the communication object OBJj is capable of performing an action that randomizes the persistent identifier P-IDj that the communication object is using. This technique includes, for example, selecting or generating a new identifier having the same properties as the identifier P-IDj (in this example: generating a MAC address or an IP address, respectively generating a new MAC address or a new IP address) on demand, for example by the communication object OBJj, and replacing the identifier P-IDj with the new identifier thus generated by the communication object OBJj. As a variant, the new identifier having the same properties as the persistent identifier P-IDj can be selected or generated by another entity, such as a trusted device 2 or a third-party entity, and can be provided to the communication object OBJj by the trusted device 2 or directly by the other entity.

[0176] The first submodule 2C1 is able to determine the capability of the communication object OBJj to perform such interference actions in various ways.

[0177] For example, the first submodule may interrogate the communication object OBJj or consult a database indexing such capabilities.

[0178] As a variant, it is conceivable to define a specific DHCP or DHCPv6 or ICMPv6 option sent by the communication object OBJj (for example, when the communication object is connected to the local area network of the trusted device 2 in the case where the trusted device 2 is a CPE or in response to an ICMP message sent by the trusted device 2 to the communication object OBJj). By way of illustration and without any limitation, when the identifier in question is a MAC address, this specific option will be called "MAC_UPDATE". This option may contain an identifier of an API (application programming interface) supported by the communication object OBJj for requesting an update of the MAC address; such an API is, for example, the DHCP RECONFIGURE reconfiguration procedure described in the document RFC 8415 (November 2018, paragraph 16.11) entitled "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)" published by the IETF. As a variant, other procedures may be used.

[0179] If the communication object OBJj is not capable of performing an interference action (response “No” in the test step E80), and more particularly here an action of randomizing the persistent identifier P-IDj being used by the communication object, the first submodule 2C1 triggers, via the third submodule 2C3, an action of using the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object OBJj at the MANTEC server 3 (step E70), as will be described below with reference to Figure 5 Described in more detail.

[0180] If, on the other hand, the communication object OBJj is capable of performing a jamming action (response “yes” in test step E80), and more particularly here of randomizing the persistent identifier P-IDj that the communication object is using, then the communication object OBJj is a communication object according to the invention that uses the persistent identifier P-IDj (see Figure 4 , and having a module configured to implement the execution method according to the present invention (see Figure 1 Then, the first submodule 2C1 triggers the execution of this interference action at the communication object OBJj via the second submodule 2C2 of the trusted device 2 in order to force the communication object OBJj to use another identifier having the same properties as the identifier P-IDj (step E90).

[0181] In this sense, the second submodule 2C2 of the trusted device 2 sends a command CMD to the communication object OBJj.

[0182] By way of illustration, such command CMD comprises instructions for triggering the DHCP RECONFIGURE reconfiguration procedure and comprises the above-mentioned specific option (MAC_UPDATE option for the MAC address identifier), which comprises an indication of an update interval for the persistent identifier, which update interval is preferably less than or equal to the maximum acceptable persistence duration of the identifier in question. According to another example, no indication of an update interval is provided, but the second submodule 2C2 of the trusted device 2 is configured to trigger the update of the persistent identifier periodically (with a period preferably less than or equal to the maximum acceptable persistence duration of the identifier in question) or at a given time (for example, when the communication object OBJj is called to respond to a command generated by the controller).

[0183] refer to Figure 4, after receiving the command CMD from the trusted device 2 (step H20), the communication object OBJj performs the interference action it is required to perform, that is, here, the action of randomizing the persistent identifier P-IDj (step H30). More specifically, the communication object obtains a new identifier IDj' having the same properties as the identifier P-IDj (the communication object can, for example, generate the identifier or use the new identifier IDj' provided by the trusted device 2 or by a third-party entity as mentioned above) and uses the new identifier as a replacement for the identifier P-IDj according to the instructions indicated by the command CMD. For example, the communication object uses the identifier IDj' for all ongoing connections in which it is using the persistent identifier P-IDj.

[0184] After the communication object OBJj has updated the persistent identifier P-IDj with a new identifier IDj' of the same nature, the trusted device 2 can, if necessary, update the routing and / or traffic filtering rules related to the communication object OBJj in order to take into account the new identifier IDj' used thereby (step E100). When the trusted device 2 is a CPE, the update can be performed directly by the trusted device 2. As a variant, the update can be triggered by the trusted device 2 at another appropriate entity. The purpose of this update is to avoid that the service provided by the communication object OBJj is affected by the modification of the identifier (in particular from the point of view of access to the service), and in particular to avoid degradation of the service.

[0185] A more detailed description will now be given of the actions triggered by the trusted device 2 at the MANTEC server 3 to interfere with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object OBJj, as envisaged in particular in step E70. It should be noted that in the embodiment described here, the trusted device 2 invokes the assistance of the MANTEC server 3, for example here a technique for generating a random identifier, when the communication object OBJj is not under the control of the user U or when the communication object OBJj itself is not able to perform a given interference action. However, these assumptions are not restrictive and it is conceivable to invoke the MANTEC server 3 in other cases. In particular, the MANTEC server 3 can be invoked, including when the communication object OBJj is under the control of the user U and when the communication object itself is able to perform a given interference action in order to intensify the interference of the communication object OBJj with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj (and increase the noise level associated with the interference).

[0186] refer to Figure 5 The intervention of the MANTEC server 3 is described with the main steps of the management method according to the invention, which is then implemented by said MANTEC server 3. This involves triggering actions that interfere with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communicating object OBJj within the meaning of the invention.

[0187] More specifically, the intervention of the MANTEC server 3 is triggered in step E70 by the third submodule 2C3 of the trusted device 2, which, after having established for the user U an association / connection with the one or more MANTEC servers 3 configured for the trusted device, sends to the one or more MANTEC servers 3 a command message, the command message comprising instructions for triggering the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj being used by the communication object OBJj by at least one other communication object selected by the one or more MANTEC servers 3. As indicated above, in the example envisaged here for simplicity, the third submodule 2C3 of the trusted device 2 sends the command message to a single MANTEC server 3.

[0188] In the embodiment described here, the command messages addressed to the MANTEC server 3 rely on a specific method dedicated to the invention (that is to say defined for this purpose), for example called MIRROR. The MIRROR command message comprises a list of persistent identifiers to be used by the communication objects selected by the MANTEC server 3 (for example, a list of identifiers to be simulated, that is to say to be used "artificially" in order to add noise to their original use. It should be noted that the list of persistent identifiers contained in the MIRROR command message can group together persistent identifiers used by multiple communication objects OBJ1, ..., OBJn or one or more persistent identifiers used by a single communication object OBJj. In other words, the MIRROR command message can group together instructions related to multiple communication objects OBJj (j=1, ..., n) and therefore multiple persistent identifiers P-IDj used by these communication objects respectively, or instructions related to only one of these communication objects. In the latter case, a MIRROR command message is sent for each eligible object OBJj (that is to say, the object has been decided to trigger assistance from the MANTEC server 3).

[0189] The MIRROR command message may also include other optional information, such as an indication of the user U to whom the message refers, a duration of use of the persistent identifier specified by the command message and / or an indication of the zone to which one or more communication objects that will use the one or more persistent identifiers should be attached, selected by the MANTEC server 3, a mode of use of the persistent identifier by the communication objects selected by the MANTEC server 3 (e.g. real or virtual use or a mixture of both). As a variant, this information may be obtained by the MANTEC server 3 in other ways (e.g. by consulting the profile of the user U). According to another variant, if this information is not mentioned in the MIRROR command message or in the profile of the user U, the MANTEC server 3 may use a default value (e.g. a duration of use of 24 hours).

[0190] If the trusted device 2 wishes to update the intervention of the MANTEC server 3 beyond the scope of the indication provided in the MIRROR command message, in this case the trusted device may send a new MIRROR command message to the MANTEC server 3. Conversely, if the trusted device 2 wishes to interrupt the intervention of the MANTEC server 3, the trusted device may send a message to this effect to the MANTEC server, for example based on the DELETE method as defined by the RESTCONF protocol, the message being adapted such that it indicates the list of persistent identifiers affected by the interruption.

[0191] There is no restriction on the protocol used to support the communication between the trusted device 2 and the MANTEC server 3. The protocol may be, for example, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), QUIC, RESTCONF, HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol), CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol), etc. For HTTP, RESTCONF or CoAP protocols, the MIRROR method may be implemented using any of the PUT or POST mechanisms supported by these protocols.

[0192] refer to Figure 5 , the MANTEC server 3 receives the MIRROR command message (step F10). In the remainder of this description, for simplicity, it is assumed that the MIRROR command message received by the MANTEC server 3 comprises a single persistent identifier P-IDj used by the communication object OBJj. When the command message comprises a plurality of persistent identifiers used by the same communication object or by a plurality of different communication objects, a person skilled in the art will have no difficulty in adapting the following steps.

[0193] In the embodiment described here, the MANTEC server 3 determines, via its receiving module 3A, when it receives a MIRROR command message from a trusted device 2, the user U to whom the MIRROR command message relates and which is associated with the trusted device 2. This information can be obtained by the receiving module 3A by means of a previous association of the trusted device 2 with the MANTEC server 3, which association was performed when establishing the connection of the trusted device with the MANTEC server and on the basis of which the trusted device 2 sent its command message. The receiving module 3A then verifies whether the trusted device 2 is authorized to address such a message for the user U to the receiving module (test step F20). This verification may include, for example, authenticating a connection establishment request from the trusted device 2. Other checks may be performed during this verification, such as ensuring that the trusted device 2 is indeed authorized to address the command message related to the user U, or that the trusted device 2 is still able to address the interference request of the user U with respect to the maximum number of identifiers associated with the user U to be interfered with, etc., and the information allowing the execution of these verifications can be obtained by the MANTEC server 3 based on the profile of the user U or based on the information declared by the user U when subscribing to the service S. If the trusted device 2 is used by multiple users and only one connection to the MANTEC server 3 is used for the needs of service S, it is conceivable that the MIRROR command message identifies the user U and that the MANTEC server 3 consults the profile of the user U indicated by the trusted device 2 in the MIRROR message in order to determine whether this profile is explicitly associated with said user.

[0194] If the trusted device 2 is not authorized ("No" response in the test step F20), the MANTEC server 3 rejects the MIRROR command message via its reception module 3A (step F30). In other words, the MANTEC server 3 does not carry out an interference action.

[0195] Otherwise (“yes” response in test step F20), the receiving module 3A of the MANTEC server 3 verifies the MIRROR command message and extracts the various information contained in it (list of persistent identifiers to be used, possible duration of use, area triggering use, etc.) (step F40).

[0196] Thus, by way of illustration, in the example envisaged here, the receiving module 3A extracts the persistent identifier P-IDj from the MIRROR message and determines that the user U is involved in the message (directly based on the MIRROR message or based on the association with the trusted device 2 as mentioned above), thereby allowing the receiving module to access the above-mentioned elements contained in the profile of the user U relating to the interference to be adopted (for example, the intervention zone Z3 of the MANTEC server 3, the desired interference level, the type of persistent identifier, etc.).

[0197] Based on these elements, the selection module 3B of the MANTEC server 3 selects one or more communication objects from the communication objects O1, ..., Om that it manages, so as to use (in addition to the communication object OBJj) the persistent identifier P-IDj extracted from the MIRROR message (step F50). S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) (i(j) specifies an integer greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m) is used to specify one or more communication objects that are therefore selected by the selection module 3B to use the identifier P-IDj. The number i(j) depends on the expected interference level, that is, on the noise level that is expected to be introduced when the use of the identifier P-IDj is interfered with in order to eliminate the influence of the communication object OBJj's persistent use of the identifier P-IDj. This noise level can reflect the preferences expressed by the user, or can be imposed by the operator OP of the service S, for example, depending on the conditions under which the user U subscribes to the service S, or depends on the context to determine, etc. Here, the noise level is defined in the profile of the user U.

[0198] In the embodiment described here, the selection module 3B also determines, for each of the selected objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j), a pattern of use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by these objects. This usage pattern may vary from object to object (and from persistent identifier to persistent identifier if the same object uses multiple persistent identifiers); for example, some objects may be selected to emulate the persistent identifier P-IDj, and other objects may be selected to actually use the persistent identifier. In the example envisaged here, the usage pattern is characterized by one or more actions to be taken by the object in question in the event that another entity attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with the object based on the persistent identifier P-IDj, such as rejecting the establishment attempt and / or request, storing the establishment attempt and / or request (that is, in order to track them), accepting the establishment attempt and / or request, etc. However, this assumption itself is not restrictive, and it is conceivable to characterize the usage mode selected for the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) in different ways (for example, by associating a specific name (for example, "EMUL") with the usage mode, which name corresponds to one or more actions to be adopted by the communication object (for example, "reject any connection attempt and / or request").

[0199] It should be noted that the usage mode of the persistent identifiers P-IDj may be selected individually by the MANTEC server 3 and / or taking into account instructions provided by the trusted device 2 (eg in a MIRROR message as mentioned above), or be defined by default.

[0200] In the illustrative example envisaged here, it is assumed, for simplicity, that the selection module 3B requests the emulation of a persistent identifier P-IDj by each of the objects S-OBJp (p=1, . . . , i(j)).

[0201] As mentioned above, this simulation of the persistent identifier P-IDj consists in artificially using, for objects S-OBJp, p=1, ..., i(j), the identifier P-IDj so that the use of this identifier by the communication object OBJj no longer makes it possible to reveal information characteristics of the user U, that is to say it is no longer possible to identify the user or to reveal elements about the user's behavior or even habits. In other words, by means of this simulation, communication objects other than the communication object OBJj that can be "attached" to the user U (although not necessarily belonging to this user U, as mentioned above) will be associated with the use of the identifier P-IDj. Since these communication objects are located in a suitably chosen context (for example, in a geographical area that is "unimportant" to the user U, usually an area where they are unlikely to be located), the simultaneous use of the identifier P-IDj by the objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) and the communication object OBJj will eliminate any possibility of inferring information critical to the user U from this use.

[0202] More specifically, the emulation of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object S-OBJp comprises here assigning the identifier P-IDj to one of the interfaces of the communication object S-OBJp, making the communication object visible to the device scanning the area to which it is attached or performing said association. The communication object S-OBJp is also configured not to use this identifier P-IDj for its own needs (for example, when the communication object sends an activity report at the request of an external controller) and to reject any attempt and / or request for establishing a connection received by the communication object from a third party based on this identifier.

[0203] The communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) can be selected from the communication objects O1, ..., Om managed by the MANTEC server 3 according to various criteria: randomly, depending on at least one constraint defined for or by the user U (for example, intervention area Z3, mobility situation, etc.), etc.

[0204] In the example envisaged here, the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) are selected from the intervention zone Z3 defined, where applicable, in the profile of the user U. For example, the user U is a person who performs a business task in a company; the zone Z2 monitored by the trusted device 2 corresponds to the local area network of the company, while the zone Z3 is defined for the user U according to the travel plan of the user U in accordance with their business task (this zone is, for example, an area that the user U must visit as part of this task). The communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) are selected so as to be evenly distributed in the zone Z3. As a variant, a zone Z3 far from the places involved in the travel plan of the user U can be envisaged.

[0205] As a variant, the identification of this intervention zone Z3 may be carried in the MIRROR message received from the trusted device 2 , or may be defined by default.

[0206] The selected communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) may be connected to the same network as the MANTEC server 3 or belong to a dedicated network and are attached to an intervention zone Z3. The intervention zone Z3 may be a district, a city, a CPE network, a hotspot network, etc. Similar to the zone Z2, attachment to the intervention zone Z3 is therefore not necessarily linked to a geographical location; the intervention zone Z3 may be characterized, for example, by a network identifier, an IP prefix or address, GPS coordinates defining a geographical area, or a combination of such parameters. The communication objects attached to this intervention zone Z3 are managed by the MANTEC server 3 and are under the control of this MANTEC server.

[0207] Thus, at the end of the selection step F50, the MANTEC server 3 has a "map" of the communication objects to be contacted in order to perform an action interfering with the use of the persistent identifier P-IDj by the communication object OBJj and more particularly here emulating the identifier P-IDj. It should be noted that the mapping in question may vary over time (periodically or at determined times), as determined by Figure 6 A and 6B in order to simulate, for example, a mobility situation (in other words, the communication objects selected by the selection module 3B and possibly the number of these communication objects may vary over time). Figure 5 A and 5B show an example of the change of the communication object mapping between two times t=t0 and t=t1, the white circles represent the communication objects O1, ..., Om managed by the MANTEC server 3, and the gray circles represent the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) selected by the MANTEC server 3 to emulate the persistent identifier P-IDj.

[0208] The MANTEC server 3 then sends, via its control module 3C, a command to use the persistent identifier P-IDj to the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) thus selected (step F60). This command can be executed by the communication object in question as soon as it has been received, or starting from the time indicated in the command (in particular in the case where the communication object selected for emulating the identifier P-IDj varies over time). Such a command can be, for example, a message according to the NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol, for example called SET in the example envisaged herein, comprising the identifier P-IDj to be used and possibly other information, such as the duration of use of the identifier P-IDj by the communication object addressed by the command, or one or more actions to be adopted in the case of a connection request associated with this identifier (for example, accepting association requests, broadcasting only the identifier but not accepting association requests, or tracking connection establishment requests), or more generally the mode of use of the identifier P-IDj by the communication object, etc. It should be noted that, depending on the implementation details chosen for implementing the present invention, the message SET may implicitly include the usage mode of the persistent identifier P-IDJj selected by the selection module 3B (e.g., emulation of the persistent identifier P-IDJj) or include a parameter explicitly indicating the usage mode (e.g., a certain value of a parameter indicating the behavior to be adopted in the event of an attempt and / or request to establish a connection based on the persistent identifier, or more generally indicating a usage mode of the persistent identifier with one or more associated behaviors, such as "EMUL", which is associated with the behavior "reject any attempt and / or request to establish a connection based on the identifier P-IDj").

[0209] refer to Figure 7 After receiving (G10) the command SET from the MANTEC server 3 via its corresponding receiving module 10A, the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) use their execution modules 10B to execute the instructions implicitly and / or explicitly contained in the command and use the identifier P-IDj according to these instructions (G20). This advantageously results in the use of the identifier P-IDj by the interference object OBJj.

[0210] It should be noted that if another trusted device 2 has called the MANTEC server 3 for the user U and for the persistent identifier P-IDj, the MANTEC server 3 can decide to use the communication objects selected when calling the other trusted device and extend the duration of use of the identifier P-IDj by these communication objects.

[0211] At any time, the MANTEC server 3 can contact the communication objects S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j) selected to use the identifier P-IDj in order to cancel or update the use of the identifier P-IDj by these communication objects (optional step F70). This can be performed by appropriate commands, for example according to the NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol.

[0212] It should be noted that the present invention has just been described in a specific embodiment in which the interference system 1 comprises at least one trusted device associated with a user, at least one MANTEC server, and a plurality of communication objects managed by the MANTEC server and configured to implement the method of use according to the present invention. Of course, other configurations can be envisaged. The interference system 1 can in particular include one or more communication objects configured to implement the execution method according to the present invention among the communication objects monitored by the trusted device. Typically, the interference system 1 relies on a plurality of communication objects according to the present invention, which can be configured to implement the execution method according to the present invention and / or the method of use according to the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for monitoring a communication object (O1', ..., Ok') performed by a trusted device (2) associated with a user, the monitoring method comprising: - a step (E40) of detecting the use of at least one persistent identifier (P-IDj) by at least one communication object (OBJj); as well as - A step (E70, E90) of triggering at least one action interfering with said use of said at least one persistent identifier by said at least one communicating partner.

2. The monitoring method as described in claim 1 also includes a step (E60, E80) of determining whether at least one of the communication objects (OBJj) identified in the detection step and at least one persistent identifier (P-IDj) used by the communication object is capable of performing the action of interfering with the use of the persistent identifier, and the triggering step includes sending (E90) a command to the communication object when applicable so that the communication object performs the interference action.

3. The monitoring method according to claim 2, wherein: The interference action includes the communication object replacing the persistent identifier with another identifier having the same property as the persistent identifier.

4. The monitoring method according to claim 3, wherein: The further identifier is selected by the communication partner or by the trusted device.

5. The monitoring method according to claim 3 or 4, further comprising a step (E100) of updating at least one routing and / or traffic filtering rule associated with the communication object using the other identifier.

6. The monitoring method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein: For at least one of the communication objects identified in the detection step and at least one persistent identifier used by the communication object, the triggering step includes sending (E70) to at least one remote server an instruction for triggering the use of the persistent identifier by at least one other communication object selected by the at least one remote server.

7. The monitoring method according to claim 6, wherein: The instructions also include a duration of usage of the persistent identifier by the at least one other communication object and / or an indication of a zone to which the at least one other communication object should be attached.

8. A method for managing a communication object executed by a server (3), the management method comprising: - a step (F10) of receiving, from a trusted device (2) associated with the user, instructions for triggering an action of interfering with the use of at least one persistent identifier by a communication object (OBJ), said interfering action consisting in the use of said at least one persistent identifier by at least one other communication object managed by said server; - a step (F40) of selecting, for said at least one persistent identifier specified in said instruction and for said user, at least one communication object (S-OBJ1, ..., S-OBJi(j)) capable of using said at least one persistent identifier from among a plurality of communication objects (O1, ..., Om) managed by the server; and - A step (F50) of sending a command using said at least one persistent identifier to said at least one selected communication partner.

9. The management method of claim 8, further comprising the step of authenticating the trusted device associated with the user before performing the selecting step and the sending step.

10. The management method according to claim 8 or 9, wherein: The at least one selected communication object is selected by the server from among a plurality of communication objects managed by the server and attached to a zone (Z3) defined for the user.

11. The management method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, wherein: At least one of the selected communication partners is randomly selected by the server or according to at least one constraint defined for the user.

12. The management method according to any one of claims 8 to 11, further comprising, for at least one of the communication objects selected for the user, a step (F60) of canceling the command to use the at least one persistent identifier for which the communication object was selected or a step (F60) of updating the command.

13. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 12, wherein: At least one of the persistent identifiers is: -Media Access Layer MAC address; - Internet Protocol IP address; -IP prefix; - Service Set Identifier SSID; - an identifier of the trusted device; or - An identifier assigned to the radio interface.

14. A method for using an identifier by a communication object (S-OBJp), the method comprising: - a step (G10) of receiving from the server (3) a command for executing an action of interfering with the use of a persistent identifier by another communication object, said interfering action comprising the use by the communication object (S-OBJp) of said persistent identifier already in use by said other communication object, said command providing said communication object with an indication of at least one action to be taken by said communication object in the event that a third party device attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with said communication object via said persistent identifier; - A step (G20) of using said persistent identifier and performing said at least one action.

15. A method for performing an interference action performed by a communication object, the method comprising: - a step of using a persistent identifier (H10); - a step (H20) of receiving a command from a trusted device associated with a user (U) causing the communication object to perform an action interfering with the use of said persistent identifier; and - A step of performing said interference action (H30).

16. A trusted device (2) associated with a user, configured to monitor a communication object, the trusted device comprising: - a detection module (2B) configured to detect the use of at least one persistent identifier by at least one communication partner; as well as - a triggering module (2C) configured to trigger at least one action interfering with said usage of said at least one persistent identifier by said at least one connected object.

17. A server (3) configured to manage a communication object, the server comprising: a receiving module (3A) configured to receive, from at least one trusted device associated with a user, at least one instruction for triggering an action of interfering with the use of at least one persistent identifier by a communication object (OBJ), said interfering action comprising the use of said at least one persistent identifier by at least one other communication object managed by said server; a selection module (3B) configured to select, for the at least one persistent identifier specified in the at least one instruction and for the user, at least one communication object capable of using the at least one persistent identifier from among a plurality of communication objects managed by the server; as well as - a control module (3C) configured to send a command to use said at least one persistent identifier to said at least one selected communication partner.

18. A communication object (Oj), comprising: - a communication module (11A) configured to use a persistent identifier; - a receiving module (11B) configured to receive a command from a trusted device associated with a user (U) causing the communication object to perform an action interfering with the use of the persistent identifier by the communication module; as well as - an execution module (11C) configured to execute the interference action.

19. A communication object (O1, ..., Om), comprising: a receiving module (10A) configured to receive from a server a command to perform an action of interfering with the use of a persistent identifier by another communication partner, the interfering action comprising using the persistent identifier already used by the other communication partner, the command providing the communication partner with an indication of at least one action to be taken by the communication partner in the event that a third-party device attempts and / or requests to establish a connection with the communication partner via the persistent identifier; - an execution module (10B) configured to use said persistent identifier and to implement said at least one action.

20. An interference system (1), comprising: - at least one trusted device (2) associated with the user as claimed in claim 16, the at least one trusted device being configured to monitor the communication object; - at least one server (3) as claimed in claim 17; and - a plurality of communication objects, comprising at least one communication object (Oj') according to claim 18 and / or at least one communication object (O1, . . . , Om) according to claim 19.

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