Document tracing system and method based on reverse proxy and document hidden label

Abstract

The invention relates to a document traceability system and method based on a reverse proxy and a document hidden label in the technical field of data security. The document traceability system comprises a service system, a data security gateway, a plurality of PC terminals and an audit server. The data security gateway receives the initial network data traffic packet and updates an initial secret identifier of a source data document in the initial network data traffic packet; generating a gateway data traffic packet based on the updated initial secret identifier; the PC terminal realizing data communication with the data security gateway updates the gateway secret identifier of the source data document; updating the source data document based on the updated gateway secret identifier; the current PC terminal receives the previous PC data document and updates the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document; updating the previous PC data document based on the updated previous PC secret identifier; and the audit server performs document traceability based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier, so that the problem that a data transmission chain cannot be completely traced in the existing data security protection process is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to a document tracing system and method based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark. Background Art

[0002] In today's era of rapid development of informatization and digitalization, the data security of enterprise application systems is of vital importance, as it is related to the core competitiveness and business secrets of enterprises. At present, the data security protection technologies of enterprise application systems mainly include: 1. Encrypt sensitive data to ensure the security of data during transmission and storage; 2. Monitor and defend against external attacks through technical means such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to protect the security of enterprise networks and data; 3. Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS / IPS) can monitor network activities in real time, detect and report potential security threats. By deploying IDS / IPS, enterprises can promptly detect and respond to attacks on enterprise application systems; 4. Implement strict access control policies based on employee responsibilities and needs to limit access rights to sensitive data.

[0003] For enterprise application systems, although data security protection technology can protect data security to a certain extent, it still has the defect that it may not be possible to trace and hold accountable employees who have access to data for intentional leaks. For example, employee A has access to application system W and downloads important data from business system W for work use. Employee A sends the important data to employee B in violation of regulations. Employee B does not know the importance of the data and sends the important data to employee C. After employee C discovers the importance of the data and its economic value, he sends the data outside the enterprise.

[0004] When a data leakage accident occurs, the current DLP data leakage prevention technology solutions commonly used by enterprises can only audit that employee C sent the data out, but cannot trace back to employees A and B who participated in the circulation of important data before the important data was leaked, nor can it trace back to the source of the important data is business system W. In other words, the enterprise cannot trace back the complete chain of responsibility, making it impossible to provide safety education and hold violators accountable; on the other hand, with regard to the enterprise's need to confirm the ownership of the data it owns, when data is leaked or stolen, it cannot be traced back to the complete chain of responsibility, so it is impossible to prove that the data was generated within the enterprise and legally owned. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a document tracing system and method based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark, which solves the problem that the data transmission chain cannot be completely traced in the existing data security protection process.

[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention is solved by the following technical solutions:

[0007] A document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark, comprising a business system, a data security gateway, several groups of PC terminals and an audit server, wherein data communication is realized between the business system and the data security gateway, data communication is realized between the data security gateway and the multiple groups of PC terminals, and data communication is realized between the PC terminals;

[0008] The data security gateway is used to receive the initial network data flow packet sent by the business system, and update the initial secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data flow packet; based on the updated initial secret identifier, the source data document in the initial network data flow packet is updated, and a gateway data flow packet is generated;

[0009] The PC terminal that realizes data communication with the data security gateway is used to receive the gateway data flow packet and update the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the gateway data flow packet; update the source data document based on the updated gateway secret identifier and generate an initial PC data document;

[0010] When data communication is implemented between PC terminals, the current PC terminal is used to receive the previous PC data document sent by the previous PC terminal, and update the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document; based on the updated previous PC secret identifier, the previous PC data document is updated to obtain the current PC data document;

[0011] The audit server is used to receive the document unique ID, operation content and operation ID corresponding to the operation content sent by each group of PC terminals, and obtain the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier; and perform document tracing based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier.

[0012] Optionally, updating the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet, and updating the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet based on the updated gateway secret identifier, and generating a gateway data traffic packet, includes the following steps:

[0013] Reading the source data document of the initial network data flow packet, and performing an initial secret identifier existence detection on the source data document;

[0014] If the source data document contains an initial secret identifier, the initial secret identifier is used as the gateway secret identifier, and a gateway data flow packet is generated from the source data document containing the initial secret identifier and sent to the PC terminal;

[0015] If it is detected that there is no initial secret identifier in the source data document, a document unique ID and document ownership information are generated based on the source data document; the document unique ID and document ownership information are encrypted to obtain a gateway secret identifier; the gateway secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to generate a gateway data traffic packet, and the gateway data traffic packet is sent to the PC terminal.

[0016] Optionally, updating the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the gateway data traffic packet includes the following steps:

[0017] The PC terminal receives the gateway data flow packet, and performs a gateway secret identification detection on the source data document in the gateway data flow packet;

[0018] If there is no gateway secret identifier in the source data document, there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data flow packet;

[0019] If the gateway secret identifier exists in the source data document, determining whether the gateway secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key;

[0020] If the decryption is successful, the operation ID of the PC terminal and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID are obtained, the operation ID is added to the decrypted gateway secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the initial PC secret identifier; the operation ID, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server, wherein the operation content is the operation content of data reception or data transmission;

[0021] If the decryption fails, there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data traffic packets.

[0022] Optionally, updating the source data document based on the updated gateway secret identifier and generating an initial PC data document includes the following steps:

[0023] The initial PC secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to generate an initial PC data document.

[0024] Optionally, updating the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document includes the following steps:

[0025] The current PC terminal receives the previous PC data document, and performs a previous PC secret identifier existence detection on the previous PC data document;

[0026] If the previous PC secret identifier does not exist in the previous PC data document, there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data document;

[0027] If the previous PC secret identifier exists in the previous PC data document, determining whether the previous PC secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key;

[0028] If the decryption is successful, the operation ID of the current PC terminal and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID are obtained, the operation ID is added to the previous PC secret identifier after decryption, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the current PC secret identifier; the operation ID, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server, wherein the operation content is the operation content of data reception or data transmission;

[0029] If the decryption fails, there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data file.

[0030] Optionally, updating a previous PC data document based on the updated previous PC secret identifier to obtain a current PC data document includes the following steps:

[0031] The current PC data document is generated by inserting the current PC secret identifier into the previous PC data document.

[0032] Optionally, the audit server performs document tracing based on the unique ID of the document in the initial secret identifier, including the following steps:

[0033] According to the document unique ID, searching the audit server for the target secret identifier corresponding to the document unique ID;

[0034] After decrypting the target secret identifier, all operation IDs of the target document on the audit server and the operation contents corresponding to the operation IDs are searched according to the document unique ID in the target secret identifier;

[0035] All the found operation IDs and the operation contents corresponding to the operation IDs are sorted to obtain the flow link of the target document.

[0036] Optionally, the audit server is also used to display the flow link of the target document in a graphical interface.

[0037] Optionally, the business system is used to send an initial network data traffic packet based on a data request from a PC terminal.

[0038] A document tracing method based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark, wherein the document tracing method is applied to a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark as described in any one of the above.

[0039] Compared with the prior art, the technical solution provided by the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0040] The present application inserts a secret identifier into the source data document, so that the user can record the document operation without any code-level modification, which is convenient for subsequent tracing. At the same time, after the source data document is inserted with the secret identifier, there is no trace for the user using the source data document, and during the storage, transmission, and use of the source data document, the user will not perceive that the secret identifier has been inserted. On the other hand, since the secret identifier is completely integrated with the source data document, the secret identifier will not be lost even if the source data document is copied, moved, or renamed, thereby ensuring the reliability of document traceability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0042] Figure 1 This is a system framework diagram of a document traceability system based on reverse proxy and document hidden markup proposed in the first embodiment;

[0043] Figure 2 This is a data transmission link diagram of a document traceability system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark proposed in the first embodiment;

[0044] Figure 3 This is a processing flow chart of the data security gateway proposed in the first embodiment;

[0045] Figure 4 This is a processing flow chart of the PC terminal proposed in the first embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with embodiments. The following embodiments are for explanation of the present invention but the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.

[0047] Embodiment 1

[0048] like Figure 1 As shown, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark includes a business system, a data security gateway, several groups of PC terminals and an audit server. Data communication is realized between the business system and the data security gateway, data communication is realized between the data security gateway and multiple groups of PC terminals, and data communication is realized between PC terminals. Several PC terminals all realize data communication with the audit server.

[0049] like Figure 2As shown, the business system is used to send the initial network data traffic packet to the data security gateway based on the data request of the PC terminal. After the data security gateway receives the initial network data traffic packet sent by the business system, it updates the initial secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet; based on the updated initial secret identifier, the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet is updated, and a gateway data traffic packet is generated. In this embodiment, the network data traffic packet contains the source data document.

[0050] Among them, the initial secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet is updated, the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet is updated based on the updated initial secret identifier, and a gateway data traffic packet is generated. Specifically, the following steps are included: first, the source data document of the initial network data traffic packet is read, and the source data document is detected for the existence of the initial secret identifier. This is because the secret identifier contains the document's unique ID and document ownership information, which is equivalent to marking the source data document. Therefore, the document traceability of this application is achieved by tracking the document flow with the help of the secret identifier. Therefore, before each update of the secret identifier, it is necessary to detect whether the obtained data document contains the secret identifier to ensure that the flow of important data can be monitored.

[0051] like Figure 3 As shown, if the initial secret identifier is detected in the source data document, the initial secret identifier is used as the gateway secret identifier, and the source data document containing the initial secret identifier is used to generate a gateway data traffic packet and sent to the PC terminal.

[0052] If it is detected that the initial secret identifier does not exist in the source data document, a document unique ID and document ownership information are randomly generated based on the source data document using the globally unique identifier GUID; the document unique ID and document ownership information are encrypted using the enterprise key to obtain a gateway secret identifier; the gateway secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to replace the initial secret identifier in the source data document, thereby generating a gateway data traffic packet based on the source data document carrying the gateway secret identifier, and at the same time recording that the source data document carrying the gateway secret identifier is generated in the business system, and finally the gateway data traffic packet is sent to the PC terminal.

[0053] Among them, when detecting whether there is an initial secret identifier in the source data document, it is achieved by reading whether there is an initial secret identifier in a specific position in the source data document. The specific position mentioned here refers to a space in the source data document for placing the initial secret identifier. It only needs to detect whether there is data in the specific position to know whether it contains the initial secret identifier.

[0054] After the PC terminal receives the gateway data traffic packet from the data security gateway, it updates the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the gateway data traffic packet; updates the source data document based on the updated gateway secret identifier, and generates an initial PC data document.

[0055] Specifically, Figure 4 As shown, the following steps are included: the PC terminal receives the gateway data traffic packet, and performs a gateway secret identification detection on the source data document in the gateway data traffic packet.

[0056] If there is no gateway secret identifier in the source data document, it means that the source data document in the gateway data traffic package is not a confidential file that the business system wants to protect or track, and there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data traffic package.

[0057] If the gateway secret identifier exists in the source data document, it is determined whether the gateway secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key.

[0058] If the decryption fails, it means that the source data document where the gateway's secret identifier is located is not the encrypted file that the company needs to track, but an encrypted file of another company. Therefore, there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data traffic package.

[0059] If the decryption is successful, it means that the source data document where the gateway's secret identifier is located is an encrypted file that the company needs to track. Since the client program is installed on the PC terminal, the client program has its own monitoring strategy, which will monitor all document receiving and sending operations on the PC terminal. Therefore, the operation ID of the PC terminal and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID are obtained through the monitoring strategy. Among them, the operation ID and the operation content are in a one-to-one correspondence. The operation content is the operation content of data reception or data sending, and the operation content includes the operation user, data source, download path, download time, document name, and data size.

[0060] Therefore, if the operation content is data reception, the operation ID corresponding to the data reception is added to the decrypted gateway secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the initial PC secret identifier; the initial PC secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to generate the initial PC data document; the operation ID corresponding to the data reception, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID, and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server.

[0061] If the operation content also sends data, the operation ID corresponding to the data sending is added to the decrypted initial PC secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain a new initial PC secret identifier; the new initial PC secret identifier is inserted into the initial PC data document to generate a new initial PC data document; the operation ID corresponding to the data sending, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID, and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server.

[0062] In addition, if there is data communication between PC terminals, similarly, the current PC terminal receives the previous PC data document sent by the previous PC terminal, and updates the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document; the previous PC data document is updated based on the updated previous PC secret identifier to obtain the current PC data document.

[0063] Specifically, the method comprises the following steps: the current PC terminal receives the previous PC data document, and performs a previous PC secret identification detection on the previous PC data document.

[0064] If the previous PC secret mark does not exist in the previous PC data document, it means that the previous PC data document is not a confidential file to be protected or tracked by the business system, and there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data document.

[0065] If the previous PC secret identifier exists in the previous PC data document, it is determined whether the previous PC secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key.

[0066] If the decryption fails, it means that the previous PC data document where the previous PC secret identifier is located is not an encrypted file that the company needs to track, but an encrypted file of another company. Therefore, there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data document.

[0067] If the decryption is successful, it means that the previous PC data document where the previous PC secret identifier is located is an encrypted file that the company needs to track, and proceed to the next step.

[0068] Since the operation content is data reception or data sending, if the operation content is data reception, the operation ID corresponding to the data reception is added to the decrypted previous PC secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the current PC secret identifier; the current PC secret identifier is inserted into the previous PC data document to generate the current PC data document; the operation ID corresponding to the data reception, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID, and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server.

[0069] If the operation content also sends data, the operation ID corresponding to the data sending is added to the decrypted current PC secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain a new current PC secret identifier; the new current PC secret identifier is inserted into the old current PC data document to generate a new current PC data document; the operation ID corresponding to the data sending, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID, and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server.

[0070] The audit server is used to receive the document unique ID, operation content and operation ID corresponding to the operation content sent by each group of PC terminals, and obtain the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier; and perform document traceability based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier.

[0071] Among them, the audit server performs document tracing based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier, including the following steps: according to the document unique ID, search for the target secret identifier corresponding to the document unique ID in the audit server; after decrypting the target secret identifier, search for all operation IDs of the target document on the audit server and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID according to the document unique ID in the target secret identifier; sort all the operation IDs and operation contents corresponding to the operation ID found to obtain the circulation link of the target document.

[0072] Specifically, when the target document needs to be traced, the target secret identifier corresponding to the target document is first searched in the initial secret identifier through the target document. Then, after decrypting the target secret identifier, all historical operations corresponding to the target secret identifier are queried based on the document unique ID in the target secret identifier. Then, all historical operations are sorted to obtain the circulation link, and finally the circulation link of the target document is displayed in a graphical interface.

[0073] At this point, the document traceability is completed. This application inserts a secret identifier into the source data document, so that users can record document operations without making any code-level modifications, which is convenient for subsequent tracing. At the same time, after the source data document is inserted with a secret identifier, there is no trace for the user using the source data document. During the storage, transmission, and use of the source data document, the user will not perceive that the secret identifier has been inserted. On the other hand, since the secret identifier is completely integrated with the source data document, the secret identifier will not be lost even if the source data document is copied, moved, or renamed, thereby ensuring the reliability of document traceability.

[0074] It should be noted that the gateway secret identifier in this application refers to the secret identifier attached to the data document processed in the data security gateway; the previous PC secret identifier and the current PC secret identifier refer to the secret identifier attached to the data document processed in the PC terminal.

[0075] Furthermore, this embodiment takes the example that employee A has access rights to application system W and downloads important data from business system W for work use. Employee A sends the important data to employee B in violation of regulations. Employee B does not know the importance of the data and sends the important data to employee C. After employee C discovers the importance of the data and its economic value, he sends the data outside the enterprise to demonstrate the above tracing process.

[0076] First, when employee A downloads a network data traffic package from business system W, the source data document in the network data traffic package will first pass through the data security gateway. The data security gateway is based on network traffic analysis and interception technology. When it monitors that the downstream network data traffic package of business system W contains the source data document, the data security gateway will extract the source data document from the network data traffic package and check whether a secret identifier has been attached to the source data document.

[0077] If the document has not been attached with a secret identifier, the data security gateway generates a plaintext secret identifier, which includes a randomly generated document unique ID and enterprise ownership information. The plaintext secret identifier is encrypted using the enterprise's unique key and then inserted into the source data document. Finally, the source data document with the attached secret identifier replaces the original document in the network data traffic package. The document downloaded by employee A is a document with a secret identifier. At the same time, the data security gateway records that the data document was generated in business system W.

[0078] Since the client program has been installed on employee A's office PC terminal, when the client program monitors the download and sending behavior of the PC terminal, it first checks whether the source data document contains a secret identifier. If it does, it uses the enterprise's unique key (the client's enterprise's unique key is the same as the data security gateway's enterprise's unique key) to decrypt the secret identifier. If the decryption is successful, an operation ID for document download or sending is added to the secret identifier, and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID1 (including the operating user, data source, download path, download time, document name, data size, etc.) is sent to the audit server.

[0079] When employee A sends data to employee B, the client program on employee A's PC terminal monitors that employee A sends data with a secret identifier, and records the operation content and sends it to the audit server; the client program modifies the secret identifier in the data, adds operation ID2 in the secret identifier to record employee A's outgoing action.

[0080] When employee B receives data from employee A, the client program has been installed on employee B's office PC. The client program monitors that employee B receives data with a secret identifier. At this time, since each modification of the secret identifier and the operation ID are added and written, the previous operation ID is not deleted. Therefore, the received secret identifier already contains two operation IDs (operation ID1 for employee A to download data, and operation ID2 for employee A to send data). Therefore, when employee B receives a document with a secret identifier, it can be determined based on the most recent operation ID that the document was sent by employee A, and then the operation content such as data source, receiving channel, receiving time, document name, data size, etc. is sent to the audit server.

[0081] Then, employee B's client program modifies the secret identifier in the data and adds operation ID3 to the secret identifier to record employee B's receiving action.

[0082] When employee B sends data to employee C, the client program on employee B's PC terminal monitors that employee B sends data with a secret mark, and records the sending path, document name, original document, sending time, employee account and other operations and sends them to the audit server; the client program modifies the secret mark in the data and adds operation ID4 to the secret mark to record employee B's outgoing action.

[0083] When employee C receives data from employee B, the client program on employee C's PC terminal monitors that employee C receives data with a secret identifier. By reading the secret identifier in the data, it can be determined that the data is sent by employee B to employee C. The data is recorded as coming from employee B, the receiving channel, the receiving time, the document name, the data size and other operation contents, and the operation contents are sent to the audit server. At the same time, the client program modifies the secret identifier in the data and adds operation ID5 to the secret identifier to record employee C's receiving action.

[0084] When employee C sends data to outside the enterprise, the client program on employee C's PC terminal monitors that employee C sends data with a secret mark, and records the sending path, document name, original document, sending time, employee account and other operation contents, and then sends the operation contents to the audit server. The client program modifies the secret mark in the data and adds operation ID6 in the secret mark to record employee C's outbound action.

[0085] When the enterprise needs to restore this circulation link later, the audit server reads the secret identifier in the source data document, and can query all historical operation information corresponding to the secret identifier. Based on this historical operation information, the traceability result is restored in the entire link through a graphical interface, and finally the 6 operation IDs of the document are restored.

[0086] The enterprise can determine the entire file leakage process based on the 6 operation IDs obtained.

[0087] Embodiment 2

[0088] A document tracing method based on reverse proxy and document hidden markup specifically includes the following steps:

[0089] Receive the initial network data flow packet sent by the business system at the data security gateway, and update the initial secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data flow packet; update the source data document in the initial network data flow packet based on the updated initial secret identifier, and generate a gateway data flow packet;

[0090] At a PC terminal that realizes data communication with a data security gateway, a gateway data flow packet is received, and a gateway secret identifier of a source data document in the gateway data flow packet is updated; the source data document is updated based on the updated gateway secret identifier, and an initial PC data document is generated;

[0091] When data communication is implemented between PC terminals, the current PC terminal is used to receive the previous PC data document sent by the previous PC terminal, and update the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document; based on the updated previous PC secret identifier, the previous PC data document is updated to obtain the current PC data document;

[0092] The audit server receives the document unique ID, operation content and operation ID corresponding to the operation content sent by each group of PC terminals, and obtains the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier; and performs document traceability based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier.

[0093] It should be noted that, since the document tracing method of this embodiment is applied to the document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark as described in the first embodiment, it will not be repeated in this embodiment.

[0094] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not any formal or substantial limitation of the present invention. It should be pointed out that ordinary technicians in this technical field can make several improvements and supplements without departing from the method of the present invention, and these improvements and supplements should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention. Any technician familiar with this profession, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, can make some changes, modifications and evolutions of the technical content disclosed above, which are equivalent embodiments of the present invention; at the same time, any changes, modifications and evolutions of any equivalent changes made to the above embodiments based on the essential technology of the present invention are still within the scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims

1. A document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark, characterized in that: It includes a business system, a data security gateway, several groups of PC terminals and an audit server, wherein data communication is realized between the business system and the data security gateway, data communication is realized between the data security gateway and the multiple groups of PC terminals, and data communication is realized between the PC terminals; The data security gateway is used to receive the initial network data flow packet sent by the business system, and update the initial secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data flow packet; Updating the source data document in the initial network data traffic packet based on the updated initial secret identifier, and generating a gateway data traffic packet; The PC terminal that realizes data communication with the data security gateway is used to receive the gateway data flow packet and update the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the gateway data flow packet; update the source data document based on the updated gateway secret identifier and generate an initial PC data document; When data communication is implemented between PC terminals, the current PC terminal is used to receive the previous PC data document sent by the previous PC terminal, and update the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document; based on the updated previous PC secret identifier, the previous PC data document is updated to obtain the current PC data document; The audit server is used to receive the document unique ID, operation content and operation ID corresponding to the operation content sent by each group of PC terminals, and obtain the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier; and perform document tracing based on the document unique ID in the initial secret identifier.

2. According to claim 1, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark is characterized in that: Updating the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the initial network data flow packet, and updating the source data document in the initial network data flow packet based on the updated gateway secret identifier, and generating a gateway data flow packet, including the following steps: Reading the source data document of the initial network data flow packet, and performing an initial secret identifier existence detection on the source data document; If the source data document contains an initial secret identifier, the initial secret identifier is used as the gateway secret identifier, and a gateway data flow packet is generated from the source data document containing the initial secret identifier and sent to the PC terminal; If it is detected that there is no initial secret identifier in the source data document, a document unique ID and document ownership information are generated based on the source data document; the document unique ID and document ownership information are encrypted to obtain a gateway secret identifier; the gateway secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to generate a gateway data traffic packet, and the gateway data traffic packet is sent to the PC terminal.

3. According to claim 2, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark is characterized in that: Updating the gateway secret identifier of the source data document in the gateway data flow packet includes the following steps: The PC terminal receives the gateway data flow packet, and performs a gateway secret identification detection on the source data document in the gateway data flow packet; If there is no gateway secret identifier in the source data document, there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data flow packet; If the gateway secret identifier exists in the source data document, determining whether the gateway secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key; If the decryption is successful, the operation ID of the PC terminal and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID are obtained, the operation ID is added to the decrypted gateway secret identifier, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the initial PC secret identifier; the operation ID, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server, wherein the operation content is the operation content of data reception or data transmission; If the decryption fails, there is no need to continue tracking the gateway data traffic packets.

4. According to claim 3, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark is characterized in that: The source data document is updated based on the updated gateway secret identifier, and an initial PC data document is generated, including the following steps: The initial PC secret identifier is inserted into the source data document to generate an initial PC data document.

5. According to claim 1, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark is characterized in that: Updating the previous PC secret identifier in the previous PC data document includes the following steps: The current PC terminal receives the previous PC data document, and performs a previous PC secret identifier existence detection on the previous PC data document; If the previous PC secret identifier does not exist in the previous PC data document, there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data document; If the previous PC secret identifier exists in the previous PC data document, determining whether the previous PC secret identifier can be decrypted by the enterprise key; If the decryption is successful, the operation ID of the current PC terminal and the operation content corresponding to the operation ID are obtained, the operation ID is added to the previous PC secret identifier after decryption, and then encrypted in combination with the document unique ID and document ownership information to obtain the current PC secret identifier; the operation ID, the operation content corresponding to the operation ID and the document unique ID are sent to the audit server, wherein the operation content is the operation content of data reception or data transmission; If the decryption fails, there is no need to continue tracking the previous PC data file.

6. A document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark according to claim 5, characterized in that: The method of updating the previous PC data document based on the updated previous PC secret identifier to obtain the current PC data document includes the following steps: The current PC data document is generated by inserting the current PC secret identifier into the previous PC data document.

7. According to claim 1, a document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark is characterized in that: The audit server performs document tracing based on the unique ID of the document in the initial secret identifier, including the following steps: According to the document unique ID, searching the audit server for the target secret identifier corresponding to the document unique ID; After decrypting the target secret identifier, all operation IDs of the target document on the audit server and the operation contents corresponding to the operation IDs are searched according to the document unique ID in the target secret identifier; All the found operation IDs and the operation contents corresponding to the operation IDs are sorted to obtain the flow link of the target document.

8. A document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark according to claim 7, characterized in that: The audit server is also used to display the flow link of the target document in a graphical interface.

9. A document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hiding mark according to claim 1, characterized in that: The business system is used to send an initial network data flow packet based on a data request from a PC terminal.

10. A document tracing method based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark, characterized in that: The document tracing method is applied to the document tracing system based on reverse proxy and document hidden mark as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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