Mobile internet of things device traceable authentication method and system in privacy protection scenario

Abstract

The application discloses a mobile Internet of Things device traceable authentication method and system under privacy protection, belongs to the field of identity authentication and tracing, and mainly comprises four stages of initialization, mobile Internet of Things device registration, authentication, and tracing and revocation. The application is suitable for bidirectional identity authentication between edge node similar facilities and mobile Internet of Things devices, realizes authentication, on-demand tracing and revocation of the mobile device under the premise of guaranteeing the security of the identity information of the mobile Internet of Things device and the privacy of the mobile path, and well meets the requirements of privacy protection authentication and traceability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of identity authentication and tracking, and relates to a method and system for traceable authentication of mobile Internet of Things devices in a privacy protection scenario. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of IoT technology, the application scope of mobile IoT devices is also expanding. Typical IoT devices, such as smart home devices, are often located in fixed positions and communicate with user terminals only through a home gateway. Generally, security can be guaranteed simply by verifying the identity of the user terminal. Unlike typical IoT devices, mobile IoT devices change location during operation, making it difficult to determine the device's identity and posing new requirements for privacy protection in identity authentication.

[0003] Typical mobile IoT devices include connected vehicles, connected ships, and drones. Due to limited computing resources and low network bandwidth, these devices often cannot employ complex authentication algorithms to ensure security. Identity authentication for these devices faces significant challenges in both security and efficiency. Traditional authentication methods, such as those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are inefficient in resource-constrained environments and are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, some solutions require devices to maintain a continuous network connection, but mobile IoT devices may not be able to maintain a stable connection in complex network environments, further increasing the difficulty of the authentication process.

[0004] Against this backdrop, blockchain-based identity authentication solutions have begun to attract attention. The advantages of blockchain are: blockchain records device identities and interaction data through a distributed ledger, ensuring the integrity and traceability of information, while using smart contracts to strictly constrain the permissions of all parties, thus providing a secure and efficient identity authentication solution in resource-constrained and complex network environments. These solutions typically involve the following implementation scenarios and participants: 1) Mobile IoT devices (D): Responsible for generating device identifiers and interacting with authentication devices. These devices have limited resources and cannot perform complex encryption calculations. 2) Edge nodes (N): Computing devices deployed at the network edge, possessing certain computing and storage capabilities, and numerous in number. They are responsible for data aggregation, signature verification, and some authentication work, thereby reducing the burden on devices. 3) Domain Management Organizations (RSM): Responsible for monitoring devices and authentication operations within a specific network domain, but can only read the content on the blockchain and does not have write permissions. 4) Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA): Have read and write permissions on the blockchain and are responsible for handling the revocation of authentication for abnormal devices, identity updates, and intervention and evidence collection in special events. 5) Blockchain BC: The blockchain is jointly maintained by law enforcement agencies and domain management agencies. Its role in the system is reflected in its decentralized, immutable and transparent characteristics, which provide a trusted foundation for collaboration among multiple parties.

[0005] However, in existing technical solutions, the private keys of mobile IoT devices rely on a registration center for generation and distribution, posing a security risk due to key escrow. Furthermore, existing solutions do not support the unlinkability of mobile IoT device messages, meaning attackers could potentially infer the device's path information by linking two or more messages (linking means an attacker can determine that two messages were sent by the same mobile IoT device based on certain fields in the messages). In addition, key negotiation is required to ensure the security and efficiency of communication after authentication. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention provides a method and system for tracking and authenticating mobile IoT devices in a privacy-protected scenario. It not only addresses the shortcomings of existing IoT privacy authentication schemes but also enables law enforcement agencies to track specific mobile IoT devices as needed.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution of the present invention includes the following contents.

[0008] A method for traceable authentication of mobile IoT devices in a privacy-preserving scenario, applied to a law enforcement agency, the method comprising:

[0009] Generate system private key pair (x sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ), and broadcast the system chameleon hash value CH sys and system public key Y sys The system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys ) is sent to the domain management authority and edge nodes; where k sys Indicates the system hash private key, x sys Indicates the system private key;

[0010] Obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D D and device chameleon hash value CH D And the signature σ and the device chameleon hash value CH D And the effective registration time T of mobile IoT device D EXP Submitted to the blockchain, received the transaction address TX D and the transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system public key Y sys The data is returned to mobile IoT device D so that mobile IoT device D and the edge node can communicate based on the transaction address TX. D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sysSystem public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D A challenge-response process is performed to complete the two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node; wherein, the signature σ is verified through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP The law enforcement agency generates a signature and stores the identity information ID locally. D and transaction address TX D The information pair.

[0011] Furthermore, the generated system private key pair (x sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ),include:

[0012] Select an elliptic curve E and obtain the base point P of the elliptic curve E;

[0013] Select a random number to generate the system private key And select random numbers and random numbers in, For a finite field;

[0014] Based on the system private key x sys And the base point P, generate the system public key Y sys ;

[0015] Based on random numbers Base point P, random number and system public key Y sys Generate the system chameleon hash value CH sys ;

[0016] Based on random numbers random numbers and system private key x sys Generate system hash private key k sys .

[0017] Furthermore, the step of obtaining the identity information ID of the mobile IoT device D... D and device chameleon hash value CH D ,include:

[0018] Select random number As the encryption and decryption private key for law enforcement agencies, and based on the encryption and decryption private key Calculate the encryption / decryption public key with base point P

[0019] The public key for encryption and decryption broadcast To enable mobile IoT device D to use the encryption / decryption public key Identity information ID D and device chameleon hash value CH D Encryption is performed, and the encrypted registration information is transmitted to law enforcement agencies via edge nodes and domain management authorities;

[0020] Use encryption / decryption private keys Decrypt the encrypted registration information to obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D. D and device chameleon hash value CH D .

[0021] Furthermore, the signature σ is obtained through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP Signature generation includes:

[0022] Select random number As a signing private key for law enforcement agencies, and based on the signing private key Calculate the signature public key with base point P Then, the public key for signing is broadcast.

[0023] Based on the elliptic curve signature algorithm and using the aforementioned signature private key Identity information ID D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP Perform a signature to obtain the signature σ.

[0024] Furthermore, the mobile IoT device D and the edge node are based on the transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D Before proceeding with the challenge-response process, the following also applies:

[0025] Mobile IoT device D based on transaction address TX D Obtain the signature σ from the blockchain and use the signature public key. The signature σ is verified; if the verification passes, it indicates that the mobile IoT device D has been successfully registered.

[0026] Furthermore, the mobile IoT device D and the edge node are based on the transaction address TX. D System Chameleon Hash Value CHsys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D Conduct a challenge-response process to complete two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node, including:

[0027] Mobile IoT device D generates system private key pair (x D ,Y D ) and equipment traps (k D ,x D ); where x D Y represents the device private key. D Represents the device public key, k D This represents the device's hash private key;

[0028] Mobile IoT device D selects a random number 'a', records the current time to generate a timestamp, and then uses the random number 'a', the timestamp, and the system public key 'Y' as the basis for its operation. sys Calculate the challenge r;

[0029] Mobile IoT device D is based on device trapdoor (k) D ,x D Given the challenge value r, calculate the first response value m. D And based on the random number a and the base point P, calculate the second response value A;

[0030] Mobile IoT device D sends a first message to edge node N; wherein the first message includes: a second response value A, a timestamp, and a device public key Y. D First response value m D And the pseudonym PID of the mobile IoT device, the pseudonym PID being based on the transaction address TX D And the challenge value r is generated;

[0031] The edge node checks the validity of the timestamp and, upon successful verification, uses the second response value A and the system private key x. sys And the timestamp thmestamp restores the challenge value r;

[0032] The edge node obtains the transaction address TX based on the challenge value r and the pseudonym PID. D And based on the transaction address TX D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D. D ;

[0033] Edge nodes are based on the device public key Y D and device chameleon hash value CH DAuthenticate mobile IoT device D, and if the identity of mobile IoT device D is successfully verified, record the current time and generate a timestamp2;

[0034] Edge nodes use challenge value r and system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys Calculate the third response value m N Using the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, second response value A, and system private key x sys Calculate the session key for this session. After calculating the hash value HASH1 using the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, and the session key, send the second message to the mobile IoT device D. The second message includes: a third response value m. N 1. Timestamp2 and HASH1;

[0035] Mobile IoT device D checks the validity of the timestamp timestamp2, and upon successful verification, outputs data based on the system chameleon hash value CH. sys and system public key Y sys Verify the identity of the edge node;

[0036] If the identity of the edge node is verified, the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, random number a, and system public key Y are used. sys Calculate the session key′ for this session, and use the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, and session key′ to calculate the hash value HASH′1;

[0037] When the hash value HASH1 and the hash value HASH′1 are equal, the mobile IoT device D calculates the hash value HASH2 of the first message message1, the second message message2, and the session key′, and sends the hash value HASH2 to the edge node.

[0038] The edge node calculates the hash value HASH′2 of the first message message1, the second message message2, and the session key for this session;

[0039] If the hash values ​​HASH2 and HASH′2 are equal, two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node is completed, and the mobile IoT device and the edge node communicate using the session key.

[0040] Furthermore, when the mobile IoT device D is in its initial stage or cross-domain movement stage, based on the transaction address TX... D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D from the blockchain. D ;

[0041] When the mobile IoT device D is in the intra-domain fast handover authentication phase, based on the transaction address TX D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D from a nearby edge node. D .

[0042] Furthermore, when a domain management authority detects malicious behavior by mobile IoT device D, the method further includes:

[0043] The device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D D Report to law enforcement agencies;

[0044] Law enforcement agencies use equipment with chameleon hash value CH D A query on the blockchain yields the transaction address TX. D ;

[0045] Law enforcement agencies located the transaction address TX based on locally stored information. D The corresponding mobile IoT device D's identity information ID D .

[0046] Furthermore, when the domain management authority discovers malicious behavior of mobile IoT device D or mobile IoT device D actively requests to deregister, the method further includes:

[0047] The domain management authority sends the Chameleon hash value CH of the device to its subordinate edge nodes within the domain. D The cancellation message;

[0048] After receiving the revocation message, the edge node stores the (TX) data locally. D CH D ) entries to delete that involve the device's chameleon hash value CH D Entries;

[0049] Law enforcement agencies use smart contracts to transfer the device's chameleon hash value (CH) to the blockchain. D The transaction address involved is TX D Set to an invalid value.

[0050] A mobile IoT device traceability and authentication system for privacy protection scenarios, the system comprising: a law enforcement agency, a domain management agency, an edge node, and a mobile IoT device D; wherein, the law enforcement agency is used for:

[0051] Generate system private key pair (x sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ), and broadcast the system chameleon hash value CH sys and system public key Y sys The system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys ) is sent to the domain management authority and edge nodes; where k sys Indicates the system hash private key, x sys Indicates the system private key;

[0052] Obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D D and device chameleon hash value CH D And the signature σ and the device chameleon hash value CH D And the effective registration time T of mobile IoT device D EXP Submitted to the blockchain, received the transaction address TX D and the transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system public key Y sys The data is returned to mobile IoT device D so that mobile IoT device D and the edge node can communicate based on the transaction address TX. D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D A challenge-response process is performed to complete the two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node; wherein, the signature σ is verified through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP The law enforcement agency generates a signature and stores the identity information ID locally. D and transaction address TX D The information pair.

[0053] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects.

[0054] (1) In this invention, the pseudonym and chameleon hash value used by the mobile IoT device in the authentication process are generated by itself, which realizes the unlinkability of the mobile IoT device message and avoids the security risks that may be caused by hosting.

[0055] (2) In this invention, the chameleon hash function is used to realize the two-way authentication and key negotiation between mobile IoT devices and edge nodes, which reduces the computational complexity. For edge nodes, batch authentication of mobile IoT devices can be achieved.

[0056] (3) In this invention, the chameleon hash value of all registered vehicles is stored and shared using blockchain, which realizes cross-domain authentication of mobile IoT devices and enhances scalability in large-scale practical application scenarios. Attached Figure Description

[0057] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an embodiment of the method of the present invention.

[0058] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of the registration algorithm in this invention.

[0059] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of the authentication algorithm in this invention.

[0060] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of the tracking and undoing algorithm in this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0061] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The examples given are only for explaining the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0062] This invention uses a chameleon hash function of elliptic curve variant, with a finite field F. q Elliptic curve y on 2 =x 3 The operations on +ax+b(mod q) (where q is a prime number or a power of a prime number) can be defined as follows:

[0063] 1. Point addition: For two points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) on a curve, the result of point addition (R = P + Q) can be calculated using the following formula, where λ represents the slope of the line connecting P and Q:

[0064] When P≠Q:

[0065] When P = Q:

[0066] Calculate the coordinates of R: x R =λ 2 -x1-x2 mod q

[0067] y R =λ(x1-x) R )-y1mod q

[0068] 2. Scalar multiplication: For a given scalar k and a point p, the result of scalar multiplication kP is k additions of point P.

[0069] The security of each cryptographic function in this invention is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, and can be defined as follows:

[0070] Let E be a finite field defined on E q Let P be an elliptic curve on which G lies, and P be the point on which the elliptic curve originates. The elliptic curve has order n (i.e., satisfying nP = O, where O is at infinity). For any point G on the elliptic curve, if there exists an integer t satisfying G = tP, then t is called the discrete logarithm of G with respect to P. When q and n are sufficiently large prime numbers and of comparable size, and the chosen elliptic curve possesses certain properties, calculating the value of t given G and P becomes difficult.

[0071] The chameleon hash function of the elliptic curve variant used in this invention can be defined as follows:

[0072] set up Given the initial input, the trapdoor (k,x) satisfies... The hash key (P,Y) satisfies that P is F q Let Y = xP be a point of prime order p on the upper elliptic curve. Then the hash value is calculated as follows:

[0073] CH(m,r)=mP+rY

[0074] Where m = k - rx mod q.

[0075] For entities that do not hold trapdoors, it is difficult to find (m,r) = (m′,r′) such that CH(m,r) = CH(m′,r′), meaning that the chameleon hash function is collision resistant.

[0076] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention mainly includes four stages: initialization, mobile IoT device registration, authentication, and tracking and revocation.

[0077] 1. Initialization phase.

[0078] During the initialization phase, law enforcement agencies initialize parameters, generate system public and private key pairs, system chameleon hash values, and trapdoors, and broadcast the public key and chameleon hash values ​​through a public channel, while distributing the trapdoors to edge nodes and other authentication entities through a secure channel.

[0079] Specifically, in this invention, all edge nodes use a shared system chameleon hash value and a corresponding trapdoor to achieve identity verification. The specific implementation steps for hash value, trapdoor generation, and sharing are as follows:

[0080] (1) The law enforcement agency selects an elliptic curve E and a base point P, and selects a random number generation system private key. And generate random numbers Computing system public key Y sys System hash private key k sys And the system chameleon hash value CH sys The formula is as follows:

[0081] Y sys =x sys P

[0082]

[0083] Law enforcement agencies select random numbers Used as the encryption / decryption private key and signing private key by law enforcement agencies, and to calculate the corresponding encryption / decryption public key. and signing public key

[0084] Each domain management agency selects a random number Used as its encryption / decryption private key and signing private key, and calculate the encryption / decryption public key. and signing public key And decrypt the public key and signing public key Send to law enforcement agencies;

[0085] Each edge node selects a random number Used as its private key for encryption and decryption, and calculate the public key for encryption and decryption. And decrypt the public key Send it to the domain administration authority of the domain.

[0086] (2) Law enforcement agencies use the encryption and decryption public keys of subordinate domain management agencies. Encryption trapdoor, the system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys The data is sent to the domain management authority, which uses the encryption / decryption public key of the edge node. The system trapdoor is reissued until every edge node receives it. The system chameleon hash value CH... sys and the public key Y of the law enforcement agency's system sys Public keys for encryption and decryption Signature public key The signature public key of the domain management organization can be broadcast to various domain management authorities and edge nodes. It is broadcast to all edge nodes in the domain.

[0087] 2. Mobile IoT device registration phase.

[0088] Mobile IoT devices register, autonomously generate a chameleon hash value, and securely send it to law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies record the mobile IoT device's identity information and the chameleon hash value, and then encrypt and submit the relevant data to the blockchain. The mobile IoT device then receives system parameters and relevant authentication information.

[0089] In one embodiment, the chameleon hash value CH of the mobile IoT device D Generated autonomously by the mobile IoT device, with the mobile IoT device D selecting the random number. Computing device public key Y D median Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D and device hash private key k D The formula is as follows:

[0090] Y D =x D P

[0091]

[0092] Among them, ID D Let D represent a mobile IoT device, and H() be a hash function.

[0093] like Figure 2 As shown, the specific implementation steps of the registration algorithm are as follows:

[0094] (1) Mobile IoT device D generates device chameleon hash value CH D And register with the domain management authority. Mobile IoT device D uses the public key of the law enforcement agency. Encrypted identity information ID D With device chameleon hash value CH D Obtain encrypted registration information And through secure means (such as offline registration or encryption using the domain administrator's public key) The document is delivered to the domain management agency, which then forwards it to the law enforcement agency, LEA.

[0095] (2) Law enforcement agencies use decryption private keys Decrypt encrypted registration information Obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D D and device chameleon hash value CH D Set an effective registration time T for mobile IoT device D according to actual needs. EXP (i.e. T) EXP After a certain period of time, mobile IoT devices failed authentication. Subsequently, an elliptic curve signature algorithm was used, along with the signature private key from a law enforcement agency. Identity information ID DDevice Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP After signing, a signature is obtained.

[0096] (3) Law enforcement agencies will {σ,CH D ,T EXP Submit to the blockchain and obtain the transaction address TX D ;

[0097] (4) Local storage of law enforcement agencies {TX D ID D};

[0098] (5) Law enforcement agencies return {TX} to mobile IoT device D. D CH sys ,Y sys Mobile IoT devices check whether the relevant information has been uploaded to the blockchain and use the law enforcement agency's signature public key. Verify the signature σ of law enforcement agency, i.e., check Is the result true?

[0099] 3. Certification stage.

[0100] Mobile IoT devices perform identity authentication. Edge nodes extract authentication information from the temporary identity information of the mobile IoT devices and obtain the hash value of the mobile IoT devices from the blockchain. Both parties conduct a challenge-response process to complete two-way authentication and key negotiation.

[0101] In one embodiment, such as Figure 3 As shown, the specific implementation steps of the authentication algorithm are as follows:

[0102] If a mobile IoT device is in its initial stage or in the cross-domain movement stage, that is, when it performs its first authentication with an edge node within a certain domain:

[0103] (1) Mobile IoT device D selects a random number a, records the current time to generate a timestamp, and calculates r = H(aY). sys (timestamp), and use trapdoor (k D ,x D Calculate the first response value m D =k D -rx D The second response value A = aP;

[0104] (2) The mobile IoT device sends data to the edge node N. r}( (This is an XOR operation), where PID is a pseudonym for the mobile IoT device.

[0105] (3) The edge node checks the validity of the timestamp. If it passes the check, the challenge value r′=H(Ax) is calculated. sys (,timestamp), where Ax sys =aPx sys =aY sys Therefore, r′=r, and the transaction address is obtained. Use transaction address TX D Retrieves the Chameleon Hash Value (CH) of a mobile IoT device from the blockchain. D And verify the identity of the mobile IoT device, using the following formula:

[0106]

[0107] (4) Edge nodes generate timestamp2, using the challenge value r′ and the system trapdoor (k). sys ,x sys Calculate the third response value m N =k sys -r′x sys And calculate the session key and hash value for this session, as follows:

[0108] session key=H(PID,timestamp2,Ax sys )

[0109] HASH=H(PID,timestamp2,session key)

[0110] Then message2 = {m N Send the timestamp2 and hash to D.

[0111] (5) Mobile IoT devices check the validity of timestamp2, and if it passes, use the system CH. sys and Y sys To verify the identity of the edge node, calculate and verify the session key, using the following formula:

[0112]

[0113] session key′=H(PID,timestamp2,aY sys )

[0114]

[0115] (6) The mobile IoT device calculates the hash values ​​of message1, message2 and session key′ and sends them to the edge node. The edge node also calculates the hash values ​​of message1, message2 and session key and compares them with the hash values ​​sent by the mobile IoT device. If they are equal, the mobile IoT device and the edge node communicate using the session key.

[0116] If the mobile IoT device is in the intra-domain fast handover authentication phase, then in step (3), the edge node uses the (TX) obtained from the neighboring edge node. D CH D The chameleon hash of the mobile IoT device is obtained through a relationship, rather than by querying the blockchain; the other steps are the same as the initial authentication.

[0117] When there are many authentication messages from mobile IoT devices, in (3), multiple authentication messages from mobile IoT devices can be processed at once through batch authentication. The batch authentication formula is as follows:

[0118]

[0119] 4. Tracking and Cancellation Phase.

[0120] When a mobile IoT device engages in malicious behavior or actively requests to be deregistered, law enforcement agencies can use the mobile IoT device's hash value to find its true identity information to trace it, or modify the mobile IoT device's status on the blockchain to achieve revocation.

[0121] In one embodiment, such as Figure 4 As shown, the specific implementation steps of the tracking and undo algorithm are as follows:

[0122] (1) The domain management authority detects malicious behavior by a vehicle and transmits the vehicle's CH via a secure channel. D Report to law enforcement agencies. Simultaneously, record the current time and generate a timestamp T. revocation Send a revocation message to subordinate edge nodes within the domain.

[0123] (2) Law enforcement agencies use mobile IoT devices CH D A query on the blockchain yields the transaction address TX. D ;

[0124] (3) After receiving the revocation message, the edge node first checks the timestamp T. revocation The timeliness of the signature is verified afterward to ensure its correctness. If the verification passes, check if it exists in its internal storage (TX).D CH D If an entry for ) exists, delete that entry;

[0125] (4) Law enforcement agencies found TX in their local storage. D Corresponding mobile IoT device real identity ID D Enables on-demand tracking;

[0126] (5) Law enforcement agencies use smart contracts to connect mobile IoT devices on the blockchain. EXP The field is set to an invalid value;

[0127] (6) When the mobile IoT device attempts to authenticate again, the edge node cannot obtain device information from neighboring nodes and cannot obtain the hash value of the mobile IoT device from the blockchain, thus failing to complete the authentication process.

[0128] In summary, this invention is applicable to two-way identity authentication between edge node-like facilities and mobile IoT devices. It enables authentication, on-demand tracking, and revocation of mobile devices while ensuring the security of mobile IoT device identity information and the privacy of movement paths, thus well meeting the needs of privacy protection authentication and traceability.

[0129] Although specific embodiments of the invention have been disclosed for illustrative purposes to aid in understanding and implementing the invention, those skilled in the art will understand that various substitutions, variations, and modifications are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention and the appended claims. Therefore, the invention should not be limited to the content disclosed in the preferred embodiments, and the scope of protection claimed by the invention is defined by the claims.

Claims

1. A method for traceable authentication of mobile IoT devices in a privacy-preserving scenario, characterized in that, Applied to a law enforcement agency, the method includes: Generate system private key pair (x sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ), and broadcast the system chameleon hash value CH sys and system public key Y sys The system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys ) is sent to the domain management authority and edge nodes; where k sys Indicates the system hash private key, x sys Indicates the system private key; Obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D D and device chameleon hash value CH D And the signature σ and the device chameleon hash value CH D And the effective registration time T of mobile IoT device D EXP Submitted to the blockchain, received the transaction address TX D and the transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system public key Y sys The data is returned to mobile IoT device D so that mobile IoT device D and the edge node can communicate based on the transaction address TX. D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D A challenge-response process is performed to complete the two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node; wherein, the signature σ is verified through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP The law enforcement agency generates a signature and stores the identity information ID locally. D and transaction address TX D Information pairs; The method further includes, when the domain management authority discovers malicious behavior by mobile IoT device D or when mobile IoT device D actively requests to be deregistered, the following: The domain management authority sends the chameleon hash value CH of the device to its subordinate edge nodes within the domain. D The cancellation message; After receiving the revocation message, the edge node stores the (TX) data locally. D CH D ) entries to delete that involve the device's chameleon hash value CH D Entries; Law enforcement agencies use smart contracts to transfer the device's chameleon hash value (CH) to the blockchain. D The valid registration time T involved EXP Set to an invalid value.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generated system private key pair (x) sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ),include: Select an elliptic curve E and obtain the base point P of the elliptic curve E; Select a random number to generate the system private key And select random numbers and random numbers in, For a finite field; Based on the system private key x sys And the base point P, generate the system public key Y sys ; Based on random numbers Base point P, random number and system public key Y sys Generate the system chameleon hash value CH sys ; Based on random numbers random numbers and system private key x sys Generate system hash private key k sys .

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The identity information ID of the mobile IoT device D is obtained. D and device chameleon hash value CH D ,include: Select random number As the encryption and decryption private key for law enforcement agencies, and based on the encryption and decryption private key Calculate the encryption / decryption public key with base point P The public key for encryption and decryption broadcast To enable mobile IoT device D to use the encryption / decryption public key Identity information ID D and device chameleon hash value CH D Encryption is performed, and the encrypted registration information is transmitted to law enforcement agencies via edge nodes and domain management authorities; Use encryption / decryption private keys Decrypt the encrypted registration information to obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D. D and device chameleon hash value CH D .

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The signature σ is obtained through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP Signature generation includes: Select random number As a signing private key for law enforcement agencies, and based on the signing private key Calculate the signature public key with base point P Then, the public key for signing is broadcast. Based on the elliptic curve signature algorithm and using the aforementioned signature private key Identity information ID D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP Perform a signature to obtain the signature σ.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Mobile IoT device D and edge node based on transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D Before proceeding with the challenge-response process, the following also applies: Mobile IoT device D based on transaction address TX D Obtain the signature σ from the blockchain and use the signature public key. The signature σ is verified; if the verification passes, it indicates that the mobile IoT device D has been successfully registered.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The mobile IoT device D and the edge node are based on transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D Conduct a challenge-response process to complete two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node, including: Mobile IoT device D generates system private key pair (x D ,Y D ) and equipment traps (k D ,x D ); where x D Y represents the device private key. D Represents the device public key, k D This represents the device's hash private key; Mobile IoT device D selects a random number 'a', records the current time to generate a timestamp, and then uses the random number 'a', the timestamp, and the system public key 'Y' as the basis for its operation. sys , Computational challenge r; Mobile IoT device D is based on device trapdoor (k) D ,x D Given the challenge value r, calculate the first response value m. D And based on the random number a and the base point P, calculate the second response value A; Mobile IoT device D sends a first message to edge node N; wherein the first message includes: a second response value A, a timestamp, and a device public key Y. D First response value m D And the pseudonym PID of the mobile IoT device, the pseudonym PID being based on the transaction address TX D And the challenge value r is generated; The edge node checks the validity of the timestamp and, upon successful verification, uses the second response value A and the system private key x. sys And the timestamp restores the challenge value r; The edge node obtains the transaction address TX based on the challenge value r and the pseudonym PID. D And based on the transaction address TX D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D. D ; Edge nodes are based on the device public key Y D and device chameleon hash value CH D Authenticate mobile IoT device D, and if the identity of mobile IoT device D is successfully verified, record the current time and generate a timestamp2; Edge nodes use challenge value r and system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys Calculate the third response value m N Using the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, second response value A, and system private key x sys Calculate the session key for this session. After calculating the hash value HASH1 using the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, and session key, send the second message to the mobile IoT device D; wherein the second message includes: the third response value m. N 1. Timestamp2 and HASH1; Mobile IoT device D checks the validity of the timestamp timestamp2, and upon successful verification, outputs data based on the system chameleon hash value CH. sys and system public key Y sys Verify the identity of the edge node; If the identity of the edge node is verified, the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, random number a, and system public key Y are used. sys Calculate the session key′ for this session, and use the pseudonym PID, timestamp2, and session key′ to calculate the hash value HASH1′. If the hash value HASH1 and the hash value HASH1′ are equal, the mobile IoT device D calculates the hash value HASH2 of the first message message1, the second message message2 and the session key′, and sends the hash value HASH2 to the edge node. The edge node calculates the hash value HASH′2 of the first message message1, the second message message2, and the session key for this session; If the hash values ​​HASH2 and HASH′2 are equal, two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node is completed, and the mobile IoT device and the edge node communicate using the session key.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, When the mobile IoT device D is in its initial stage or in the cross-domain movement stage, based on the transaction address TX D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D from the blockchain. D ; When the mobile IoT device D is in the intra-domain fast handover authentication phase, based on the transaction address TX D Obtain the device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D from a nearby edge node. D .

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, When a domain management authority detects malicious behavior by mobile IoT device D, the method further includes: The device chameleon hash value CH of mobile IoT device D D Report to law enforcement agencies; Law enforcement agencies use equipment with chameleon hash value CH D A query on the blockchain yields the transaction address TX. D ; Law enforcement agencies located the transaction address TX based on locally stored information. D The corresponding mobile IoT device D's identity information ID D .

9. A mobile IoT device traceability and authentication system for privacy protection scenarios, characterized in that, The system includes: law enforcement agencies, domain management agencies, edge nodes, and mobile IoT devices D; wherein, the law enforcement agencies are used for: Generate system private key pair (x sys ,Y sys ), System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system trapdoor (k sys ,x sys ), and broadcast the system chameleon hash value CH sys and system public key Y sys The system trapdoor (k) sys ,x sys ) is sent to the domain management authority and edge nodes; where k sys Indicates the system hash private key, x sys Indicates the system private key; Obtain the identity information ID of mobile IoT device D D and device chameleon hash value CH D And the signature σ and the device chameleon hash value CH D And the effective registration time T of mobile IoT device D EXP Submitted to the blockchain, received the transaction address TX D and the transaction address TX D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys and system public key Y sys The data is returned to mobile IoT device D so that mobile IoT device D and the edge node can communicate based on the transaction address TX. D System Chameleon Hash Value CH sys System public key Y sys And the device chameleon hash value CH in the blockchain D A challenge-response process is performed to complete the two-way authentication between the mobile IoT device D and the edge node; wherein, the signature σ is verified through the identity information ID. D Device Chameleon Hash Value CH D And valid registration time T EXP The law enforcement agency generates a signature and stores the identity information ID locally. D and transaction address TX D Information pairs; Among these, when the domain management authority discovers malicious behavior by mobile IoT device D or when mobile IoT device D actively requests to be deregistered, the following measures are also included: The domain management authority sends the chameleon hash value CH of the device to its subordinate edge nodes within the domain. D The cancellation message; After receiving the revocation message, the edge node stores the (TX) data locally. D CH D ) entries to delete that involve the device's chameleon hash value CH D Entries; Law enforcement agencies use smart contracts to transfer the device's chameleon hash value (CH) to the blockchain. D The valid registration time T involved EXP Set to an invalid value.

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