RSMA data secure transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping

Abstract

The invention discloses an RSMA data secure transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping, and relates to the field of data transmission. The method comprises the following steps: based on a generalized RSMA system, under a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel, establishing an optimization problem by taking maximization of a minimum safety rate as a target, and determining a constraint condition based on a transmission rate and power of a user message; according to a receiving end of the RSMA system, a user in each user group regards a user message about other user groups as noise and decodes the user message about the user group where the user group is located, and the user message comprises a public message and a private message of the corresponding user group; an optimization problem is converted and solved based on an SCA method; and according to a solving result, allocating resources to each user group for data transmission. Compared with the prior art, the method not only considers the safety performance of the whole system, but also considers the fairness of each user.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data transmission, and more particularly, to an RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping. Background Art

[0002] Rate-Splitting Multiple Access (RSMA) is an advanced multiple access technology based on the rate-splitting scheme. Due to its excellent performance, strong potential, and high data processing ability, RSMA has become the focus of researchers in recent years. The rate-splitting multiple access technology provides a powerful interference management strategy for next-generation wireless communications. At the transmitter, the RSMA system divides the information sent to each user into a common part and a private part. After that, the private part of each user is independently encoded into a separate private stream; the common part of each user is jointly encoded using the same codebook, and all common messages are encoded into a common stream. Subsequently, the common stream and the private stream are sent into the precoder together and then sent into the wireless channel after precoding processing. At the receiver, the user first decodes the common stream, and the interference brought by the private stream is regarded as noise in this process. After that, the receiver uses the successive interference cancellation technique to remove the common stream to reduce the interference generated by the common stream during the decoding of the private stream. Subsequently, the system decodes the private stream. When decoding the private stream, the interference of other private streams is regarded as noise. RSMA bridges the gap between two extreme interference management strategies of completely decoding interference and treating interference as noise. It adopts the strategy of partially completely decoding interference and partially treating interference as noise. Due to its rich and more flexible interference management strategies, compared with other multiple access schemes such as non-orthogonal multiple access and space-division multiple access, RSMA shows more excellent performance.

[0003] Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, privacy / security is one of the most challenging and critical issues in wireless communications. Physical layer security utilizes the situation where the eavesdropper's channel is inferior to that of legitimate users to achieve secure communication. While ensuring the successful decoding of legitimate users, protecting the data transmission at the physical layer by preventing eavesdroppers from decoding is a promising method to enhance security. In the past few decades, physical layer security has attracted extensive attention in the industry. Since RSMA serves multiple users at the same time and frequency, when the base station sends messages to legitimate users, it may be threatened by potential eavesdroppers. Due to the concealment of potential eavesdroppers, it poses a huge threat to the security of the entire system. In addition, from the perspective of information theory, physical layer security has significant performance advantages by utilizing the inherent randomness and noise of the wireless channel. It also shows great potential in reducing computational complexity and serving as a supplement to traditional key encryption schemes.

[0004] External eavesdropping and internal eavesdropping are two popular topics in the research of RSMA physical layer security. When the eavesdropper is not a legitimate user within the RSMA system, it is external eavesdropping, and it cannot directly decode the common information. Currently, RSMA has proven to have excellent capabilities in dealing with external eavesdropping. The eavesdropper will first decode the common message and then the private message. However, when it cannot fully decode the common message, the undecoded common message can be regarded as a kind of interference when it decodes the private message, preventing the eavesdropper from decoding, thus realizing the function of suppressing eavesdropping. On the contrary, when the eavesdropper is a legitimate user within the RSMA system, it is internal eavesdropping. Since the eavesdropper is a legitimate user within RSMA, the eavesdropper can directly decode the common message. However, under the RSMA system, the common message is only used for interference management, which does not mean message sharing. Therefore, in the presence of internal eavesdroppers, RSMA can neither ensure the security of the common message nor suppress the eavesdropping of the private message by the eavesdropper. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present invention aims to overcome the defect that RSMA in the above-mentioned prior art cannot resist internal eavesdropping, and provides an RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0007] In a first aspect, an RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping includes:

[0008] Based on a generalized RSMA system, in a multi-user multiple-input single-output wireless channel, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate, and constraints are determined based on the transmission rate and power of user messages; wherein, at the receiving end of the RSMA system, users within each user group regard the user messages of users in other user groups as noise and decode the user messages of the user group where they are located, and the user messages include the common message and the private message corresponding to the user group.

[0009] The optimization problem is transformed and solved based on the SCA method;

[0010] According to the solution result, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission.

[0011] In a second aspect, an electronic device includes:

[0012] A memory for storing computer-executable instructions or computer programs;

[0013] A processor for implementing the method described in the first aspect when executing the computer-executable instructions or computer programs stored in the memory.

[0014] In a third aspect, a computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, at least one program, a code set, or an instruction set, and the at least one instruction, at least one program, code set, or instruction set is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the method described in the first aspect.

[0015] In a fourth aspect, a computer program product includes a computer program or computer-executable instructions, and when the computer program or computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method described in the first aspect is implemented.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the technical solution of the present invention are as follows:

[0017] This application proposes a grouped RSMA framework. Each user can only decode the user messages of its own group and cannot decode the user messages of other groups, which reduces the threat of internal eavesdroppers to the public messages to a certain extent. When there are internal eavesdroppers in RSMA, when the eavesdroppers eavesdrop on the public messages or private messages of users in other groups, the undecoded public messages can be regarded as a kind of interference, thus suppressing the threat of eavesdroppers. In addition, this application takes into account the fairness and security of users, and establishes an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate of the entire system, considering not only the security performance of the entire system but also the fairness of each user. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the framework of the RSMA transmission system in Embodiment 1 of this application.

[0019] Figure 2 It is a schematic flowchart of the data security transmission method in Embodiment 1 of this application.

[0020] Figure 3 It is another schematic flowchart of the data security transmission method in Embodiment 1 of this application.

[0021] Figure 4 It is a worst-case simulation result diagram of the data security transmission method in Embodiment 2 of this application.

[0022] Figure 5 It is a general-case simulation result diagram of the data security transmission method in Embodiment 2 of this application.

[0023] Figure 6 It is a beam diagram of the data security transmission method in Embodiment 2 of this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0024] In the description and claims of this application and the above-mentioned drawings, terms such as "first", "second", etc. are used to distinguish similar objects and do not necessarily describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such terms can be interchanged under appropriate circumstances, which is merely a way of distinguishing objects with the same attributes when describing embodiments of this application. In addition, the terms "comprising" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, system, product or device including a series of units does not have to be limited to those units, but may include other units not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The term "determine" broadly covers a variety of actions, which may include obtaining, calculating, computing, processing, deriving, researching, searching (e.g., searching in a table, database or other data structure), ascertaining, and similar actions, and may also include receiving (e.g., receiving information), accessing (e.g., accessing data in a memory) and similar actions, and may also include generating, creating, establishing and similar actions, as well as parsing, selecting, picking and similar actions, etc. The relevant definitions of other terms will be given in the following description.

[0025] It should be noted that when an element is considered to be "connected" to another element, it may be directly connected to the other element or connected to the other element through an intermediate element. In addition, in the following embodiments, "connection", if there is a transmission of electrical signals or data between the connected objects, should be understood as "electrical connection", "communication connection", etc.

[0026] The drawings are only for illustrative purposes and should not be construed as a limitation of this patent;

[0027] To better illustrate this embodiment, some components in the drawings are omitted, enlarged or reduced, which do not represent the dimensions of the actual product;

[0028] For those skilled in the art, it is understandable that some well-known structures and their descriptions in the drawings may be omitted.

[0029] The technical solutions of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the drawings and embodiments.

[0030] Embodiment 1

[0031] Figure 1 An RSMA transmission system framework is provided, which includes two main parts: a transmitting end and a receiving end.

[0032] Among them, the transmitting end includes

[0033] Message splitter: Split the user's message into a common part and a private part for each group;

[0034] Message combiner: Combines the intra-group public messages of users in each user group;

[0035] Encoder: Encodes the corresponding messages of users into corresponding data streams;

[0036] Liner precoder: Performs linear precoding on the encoded data stream to reduce the interference generated by other signals on the target user.

[0037] And, the receiving end includes:

[0038] Decoder: Decodes the information in the data stream;

[0039] SIC (Successive Interference Cancellation): Reconstructs the decoded signal, passes through encoding, precoding, and channel processing, and removes it from the received signal;

[0040] Split (Rate splitting): Splits the public message of its own part from the decoded message;

[0041] Eavesdrop: The messages that a user can eavesdrop as an eavesdropper.

[0042] The data stream after precoding (i.e., user messages, including public messages and private messages) is sent to the receiving end through a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless channel.

[0043] Among them, at the sending end, the base station sends the messages {W 1 ,..., W K} to K receiving users with the same time and frequency resources. The message W k of each user should only be decoded by itself and needs to be kept confidential for other users. At the sending end, the user's message needs to be split into two major parts. Among them, represents the g-th group, and there are a total of G groups. The set of all groups is represented as represents the public message provided by user k to the g-th group; W p,k represents the private message transmitted by user k. The set of all users is represented as In the g-th group, the public messages provided by all users within the group to the group are combined into a super public message Therefore, at the sending end, the messages of all users are divided into public messages and private messages w p ={W p,1 ,...,W p,K}. After all messages are encoded, they are encoded into corresponding data streams. After the corresponding data stream is precoded, it is sent to the transmitting antenna as the transmission signal.

[0044] Based on the above system framework, this embodiment provides an RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping. Refer to Figure 2 , including:

[0045] Based on the generalized RSMA system, under the multi-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) wireless channel, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate, and the constraint conditions are determined based on the transmission rate and power of the user messages; wherein, at the receiving end of the RSMA system, the users within each user group regard the user messages of the users in other user groups as noise and decode the user messages regarding the user group where they are located, and the user messages include the public messages (i.e., intra-group public messages) corresponding to the user group and private messages;

[0046] Convert and solve the optimization problem based on the SCA method;

[0047] According to the solution result, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission.

[0048] It should be noted that since the inter-group public messages (defined as the public messages that can be decoded by the users in all user groups) can be decoded by all users, the inter-group public messages will be decoded by the internal eavesdroppers and the inter-group public messages do not have confidentiality. Therefore, no inter-group public messages are set in the use of the system in this embodiment.

[0049] It should be noted that for any user in the system, the user messages received by it not only include the public messages of its own user group and its own private messages, but also include the private messages of other users and the public messages of other user groups.

[0050] In this embodiment, each user can only decode the intra-group public messages of its own group and cannot decode the public messages of other groups, which reduces the threat of the internal eavesdroppers to the public messages to a certain extent. When the eavesdropper eavesdrops on the public messages or private messages of other group users, the undecoded public messages can be regarded as a kind of interference to suppress the threat of the eavesdropper; at the same time, considering the fairness and security of the users, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate, which not only considers the security performance of the entire system, but also considers the fairness of each user.

[0051] The method described in this embodiment enables the common message of RSMA to transmit useful information within the system and suppress internal eavesdroppers in the presence of internal eavesdroppers. Compared with the prior art, this embodiment improves the performance of RSMA in dealing with internal eavesdroppers and lays a solid foundation for the research on the physical layer security of RSMA.

[0052] In some preferred embodiments, establishing an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate in a multi-user multiple-input single-output wireless channel includes:

[0053] Express the transmitted signal of the transmitter as:

[0054]

[0055] where P represents the precoding matrix, s represents the data stream vector to be transmitted, N t represents the number of transmit antennas; represents the i-th user group the common stream within the group of the precoding vector, p k represents the precoding vector of the private stream s k of user k; represents the set of all user groups; G represents the number of user groups; represents the set of all users, and K represents the number of users in the system;

[0056] Express the received signal of the receiver as:

[0057]

[0058] where represents the wireless channel between the transmitter and the receiver, and n k represents the Gaussian white noise generated at the receiver during reception, represents the set of all users;

[0059] At the receiver, user k regards the common messages and private messages of other user groups as noise in a certain decoding order, first decodes the common message within its own user group, that is, the common stream within the group. The transmitted signals s are all independent and have a power of E{ss H} = I. When decoding the common stream within the group, the SINR of this segment of the signal is:

[0060]

[0061] User k uses SIC to remove the decoded common message to prevent interference when decoding the private signal.

[0062] After user k decodes the common message of the user group it belongs to, it decodes its own private message by treating the common messages of other user groups (i.e., undecoded common messages) and the private messages of other users as noise. The SINR of this segment of the signal is expressed as:

[0063]

[0064] Then, the achievable rate of the intra-group common message and the achievable rate of the private message of user k are respectively expressed as:

[0065]

[0066] R p,k =log 2 (1 + γ p,k ) (60)

[0067] To ensure that the common message within the group can be decoded by all users within the transmission rate of the group common message is:

[0068]

[0069] Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, the messages transmitted by all users may be threatened by noise from potential eavesdroppers. When user k is a potential eavesdropper within RSMA, an additional layer of SIC will be introduced to reduce the interference generated by the private message during eavesdropping. When user k is an eavesdropper, the eavesdropping of the common message of other user groups of and the private message s n of are respectively:

[0070]

[0071] In the formula, represents the set of the user group where user k is located;

[0072] The achievable rates of the common stream n in other user groups and the private stream s and R e,n←k of user k are respectively:

[0073]

[0074] Define the security rate of the intra-group common message as:

[0075]

[0076] In the formula, represents the proportion of user k in the user group ; among them, satisfies and [x] + = max{x, 0};

[0077] Define the security rate of the private message as:

[0078]

[0079] Therefore, the security rate of the RSMA system is defined as:

[0080]

[0081] Then, the optimization problem is established as:

[0082]

[0083] tr(PP H ) ≤ P t (72)

[0084] Among them, equation (70) is used to ensure that the common stream within the group cannot be decoded by users outside the group, and equation (71) is used to ensure that users within the group can decode the common stream within the group; equation (72) is the power constraint.

[0085] It should be emphasized that in the above embodiments, users in each user group first decode the common message (i.e., the common message within the group) of their own user group. At this time, the common streams of other user groups and all private streams are regarded as noise; after decoding the common message within the group, the private message of their own user group (denoted as the private message within the group) is decoded. At this time, the undecoded common streams (i.e., the common streams of non-own user groups) and the private streams of other user groups are regarded as noise.

[0086] It should be noted that the above problem is a non-convex problem and is usually difficult to solve. To solve this problem, this embodiment uses the SCA method to transform the above optimization problem. Refer to Figure 3 , including:

[0087] First, introduce the first auxiliary variable λ to transform the original problem into a maximization problem:

[0088] (71)(72)(73)

[0090] Since equations (74), (71), and (72) are still non-convex problems, introduce the second auxiliary variable group α p,k 、 α e,k←n , there is:

[0091]

[0092] R p,k ≥α p,k (77)

[0093] R e,k←n ≤α e,k←n (78)

[0094] Introduce the third auxiliary variable to solve Equation (75), and satisfy:

[0095]

[0096] Substitute Equations (79) and (80) into Equation (75), we get

[0097]

[0098] Equation (81) is equivalent to

[0099]

[0100] Equations (76), (77), (78), and (80) are non-convex functions. For the convenience of solving, this part is disassembled into two groups and grouped for transformation to solve; among them,

[0101] For Equations (77) and (80), introduce the fourth auxiliary variable group, and use the first-order Taylor expansion for approximation to convert Equations (77) and (80) into convex functions; and,

[0102] For Equations (76) and (78), introduce the sixth auxiliary variable group, and use the first-order Taylor expansion for approximation to convert Equations (76) and (78) into convex functions;

[0103] Combined with the grouped transformation results, the optimization problem is converted into a convex problem.

[0104] In the above embodiments, the continuous convex approximation scheme can effectively convert the originally difficult-to-solve non-convex optimization problem into a convex optimization problem and has good convergence.

[0105] In some alternative embodiments, for Equations (77) and (80), introduce the fourth auxiliary variable group ρ p,k , there is:

[0106]

[0107] (85) and (86) are still non-convex functions, and the fifth auxiliary variable group is introduced

[0108]

[0109] Since equations (87) and (88) are still non-convex, in this embodiment, a first-order Taylor expansion is used to replace the original function We have:

[0110]

[0111] Substitute (87) and (88) into (91), we get:

[0112]

[0113] ρ p,k ≤Ω [t] (p k ,h k ,β p,k ) (93)

[0114] Up to this point, the conversion of (77) and (80) is completed.

[0115] For equations (76) and (78), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and ρ e,k←n , we have:

[0116]

[0117] Since equations (94) and (95) are non-convex functions, a first-order Taylor expansion approximation is used, and it is defined as:

[0118]

[0119] Substitute equations (94) and (95) into equation (98), we get:

[0120]

[0121] 1 + ρ e,k←n ≤Ψ [t] (α e,k←n ) (100)

[0122] The seventh auxiliary variable group is introduced and ρ e,k←n Equations (96) and (97) are made equivalent, and we have:

[0123]

[0124] Equations (103) and (104) are still non-convex functions, and a first-order Taylor expansion approximation is used:

[0125]

[0126] Substituting (103) and (104) into (105) gives

[0127]

[0128] Thus, the conversion of (76) and (78) into convex functions is completed.

[0129] Furthermore, define

[0130] Then the original optimization problem (15) is equivalent to:[[]]

[0131]

[0132] Subject to (82)(83)(84)(89)(90)(92)(93)(99)(100)(101)(102)(106)(107).

[0133] In some preferred embodiments, a convex optimization tool such as CVX is used to solve the converted optimization problem.

[0134] In some specific implementation processes, the pseudo-code of the iterative solution algorithm proposed for solving the optimization problem (69) is shown in Table 1:[[]]

[0135] Table 1 Pseudo-code of the iterative solution algorithm for the optimization problem

[0136]

[0137] Example 2

[0138] This example conducts a simulation experiment based on the method described in Example 1 and the space division multiple access scheme mainly based on linear precoding.

[0139] In the scenario of a fixed channel with three antennas and three users, under the condition that the channel strength ||h 1 ||:||h 2 ||:||h 3 || = 1:1:1, a simulation is carried out. Figure 4 The worst-case scenario for three users is simulated. All three users are eavesdroppers within the system and attempt to eavesdrop on the messages of other users; Figure 5 The case of only one eavesdropper is simulated. User 3 acts as an eavesdropper and attempts to eavesdrop on the messages of other users. It can be seen that the method described in the example performs better than the space division multiple access scheme mainly based on linear precoding in terms of the performance of the minimum rate security rate.

[0140] For the convenience of those skilled in the art to implement, this embodiment also provides a beam schematic diagram of the method described in Embodiment 1 in a three-user scenario. Refer to Figure 6 . In the three-user scenario, this embodiment divides members 1, 2, and 3 into user groups {1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3}. User 1 is a legitimate user of user groups {1, 2} and {1, 3}, and it can normally decode the common messages between groups. When User 1 acts as an eavesdropper, since the common message of user group {2, 3} cannot be decoded by User 1, at this time, the common message of user group {2, 3} can be used as interference to suppress User 1 from eavesdropping on the confidential messages of User 2 and User 3.

[0141] Embodiment 3

[0142] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which at least one instruction, at least one piece of program, code set or instruction set is stored. The at least one instruction, at least one piece of program, code set or instruction set is loaded and executed by a processor, so that the processor executes some or all of the steps of the method provided in Embodiment 1 of this application.

[0143] It can be understood that the storage medium can be transient or non-transient. Exemplarily, the storage medium includes but is not limited to various media that can store program codes such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks or optical discs.

[0144] Exemplarily, the processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor unit (MPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0145] Exemplarily, the read-only memory includes but is not limited to MASK ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash, etc.

[0146] Exemplarily, the random access memory includes but is not limited to DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, DDR SDRAM, etc.

[0147] In some examples, a computer program product is provided, which can be implemented specifically in the form of hardware, software, or a combination thereof. As a non-limiting example, the computer program product can be embodied as the storage medium, or can also be embodied as a software product, such as an SDK (Software Development Kit), etc.

[0148] As a non-limiting example, a computer program product is provided, which includes a computer program or computer-executable instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of the electronic device reads the computer program or computer-executable instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer-executable instructions, so that the electronic device executes some or all of the steps of the method described in the embodiments of the present application.

[0149] In some examples, a computer program is provided, including computer-readable code. When the computer-readable code runs on a computer device, the processor in the computer device executes some or all of the steps for implementing the method.

[0150] This embodiment also proposes an electronic device, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores at least one instruction, at least one program, a code set, or an instruction set. When the processor executes the at least one instruction, at least one program, the code set, or the instruction set, some or all of the steps of the method described in Embodiment 1 are implemented.

[0151] In some examples, a hardware entity of the electronic device is provided, including: a processor, a memory, and a communication interface; wherein, the processor generally controls the overall operation of the electronic device; the communication interface is used to enable the electronic device to communicate with other terminals or servers through a network; the memory is configured to store instructions and applications executable by the processor, and can also cache data to be processed or already processed by the processor and each module in the electronic device (including but not limited to image data, audio data, voice communication data, and video communication data), and can be implemented by flash memory (FLASH), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or random access memory (RAM).

[0152] The processor may include one or more processing elements. Accordingly, the processor may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of the processor. In addition, each integrated circuit may include circuits (e.g., a first circuit, a second circuit, and other circuits, etc.) configured to perform the functions of the processor.

[0153] Further, data transmission may occur between the processor, the communication interface, and the memory via a bus, which may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges that connect various circuits of one or more processors and memories together.

[0154] It can be understood that the optional items in the above-mentioned Embodiment 1 are equally applicable to this embodiment, and thus will not be described repeatedly here.

[0155] Identical or similar reference numerals correspond to identical or similar components;

[0156] The terms describing the positional relationships in the drawings are for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as a limitation of this application;

[0157] It should be noted that, without conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of this application may be combined with each other.

[0158] In different specific implementations, the methods or systems described in this application may be implemented in software, hardware, or a combination thereof. In addition, the order of the steps of the method may be changed, and various elements may be added, reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc.

[0159] Obviously, the above embodiments of this application are merely examples given to clearly illustrate this application and are not intended to limit the implementation manners of this application. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other different forms of changes or alterations can be made based on the above description. Each discrete structural / functional module or unit may be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module may exist alone, or two or more modules may be integrated to form an independent part. The structures and functions of the discrete components can be implemented as a combined structure or component. It is not necessary and impossible to enumerate all the implementation manners here. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this application shall be included within the protection scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping, characterized in that: include: Based on the generalized RSMA system, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum safe rate under a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel, and constraints are determined based on the transmission rate and power of user messages; wherein, at the receiving end of the RSMA system, users in each user group regard user messages about other user groups as noise, decode the user messages about their user group, and the user messages include public messages and private messages corresponding to the user group; Transform and solve the optimization problem based on the SCA method; According to the solution results, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission.

2. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 1, characterized in that: The optimization problem is established under a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate, including: The sending signal of the transmitter is expressed as: Where P represents the precoding matrix, s represents the data flow vector sent, N t Indicates the number of transmitting antennas; Represents the i-th user group Public flow in the group The precoding vector, p k represents the private flow s of user k k The precoding vector of represents the set of all user groups, G represents the number of groups into which all users are grouped; represents the set of all users, K represents the number of users in the system; The received signal at the receiving end is expressed as: In the formula, represents the wireless channel between the transmitter and the receiver, n k It represents the Gaussian white noise generated by the receiving end during reception. Represents the set of all users; The public message in the user group where user k belongs is defined as the public message within the group. At the receiving end, user k first decodes the public message within the group and regards the private stream and the public stream of other user groups as noise. The SINR of this signal is: User k uses SIC to remove the public stream in the decoded group to prevent interference when decoding private signals. After decoding the public message of the user group, it decodes its own private message by treating the public streams of other user groups and the private streams of other users as noise. The SINR of this signal is expressed as: Then, the reachable rate of public messages and private messages within the group of user k are expressed as: R p,k =log2(1+γ p,k ) (6) To ensure that public messages within the group can be All users in the group are decoded The transmission rate of public messages is: When user k is a potential eavesdropper within RSMA, an additional layer of SIC will be referenced to reduce the interference of private messages on eavesdropping; when user k is an eavesdropper, he eavesdrops on the public messages of other user groups. of and private messages n of They are: In the formula, represents the set of user groups to which user k belongs; User k has access to public flows in other user groups. and private streams n The achievable rate and R e,n←k They are: The safe rate of public messages within a group is defined as: In the formula, Indicates that user k is in the user group The proportion of satisfy and [x] + =max{x,0}; The safe rate for private messages is defined as: Therefore, the safety rate of the RSMA system is defined as: Then, the optimization problem is established as: tr(PP H )≤P t (18) Among them, formula (16) is used to ensure that the public flow within the group will not be decoded by users outside the group, formula (17) is used to ensure that users within the group can decode the public message; formula (18) is the power constraint.

3. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The step of converting and solving the optimization problem based on the SCA method includes: Since the optimization problem is a non-convex problem, the first auxiliary variable λ is introduced to convert the optimization problem into a maximization problem: (16)(17)(18) Since equations (16), (17), and (20) are still non-convex problems, we introduce the second auxiliary variable group α p,k , α e,k←n ,have: R p,k ≥α p,k (23) R e,k←n ≤α e,k←n (24) Introducing the third auxiliary variable To solve equation (22), and satisfy: Substituting equations (25) and (26) into equation (21), we get Formula (27) is equivalent to Formulas (22), (23), (24), and (26) are non-convex functions for grouping transformation; among them, For equations (23) and (26), the fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced, and the first Taylor expansion is used for approximation to convert equations (23) and (26) into convex functions; and, For equations (22) and (24), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced, and the first Taylor expansion is used for approximation to convert equations (22) and (24) into convex functions; Combined with the grouping conversion results, the optimization problem is converted into a convex problem.

4. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The introduction of the fourth auxiliary variable group and the use of a Taylor expansion for approximation include: For equations (22) and (24), the fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced ρ p,k ,have: (32) and (33) are still non-convex functions, and the fifth auxiliary variable group is introduced Since equations (34) and (35) are still non-convex, we use a Taylor expansion to replace the original function have: Substituting (34) and (35) into (38), we have: r p,k ≤Ω [t] (p k ,h k ,b p,k ) (39).

5. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The introduction of the sixth auxiliary variable group and the use of a Taylor expansion for approximation include: For equations (24) and (27), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and ρ e,k←n ,have: Since equations (40) and (41) are non-convex functions, the first-order Taylor expansion approximation is used and defined as: Substituting equations (40) and (41) into equation (44), we have: Introducing the seventh auxiliary variable group and ρ e,k←n Equivalence of equations (42) and (43) yields: Equations (49) and (50) are still non-convex functions and are approximated using the first-order Taylor expansion: Substituting (49) and (50) into (51), we obtain 6. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 5, characterized in that: The step of converting the optimization problem into a convex problem comprises: definition Then the original optimization problem (15) is equivalent to: Subject to(18)(28)(29)(30)(35)(36)(38)(39)(45)(46)(47)(48)(52)(53).

7. A RSMA data secure transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The converted optimization problem is solved using a convex optimization tool.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory for storing computer executable instructions or computer programs; A processor, used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executing computer executable instructions or computer programs stored in the memory.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores at least one instruction, at least one program, a code set or an instruction set, and the at least one instruction, at least one program, a code set or an instruction set is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer program product comprising a computer program or computer executable instructions, characterized in that: When the computer program or computer executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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