Key acquisition method and device based on multistage key derivation, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a key acquisition method and device based on multistage key derivation, electronic equipment and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of satellite measurement and control security. The method comprises three levels of secret key derivation: an operation control center and a satellite respectively generate a first short-term identity secret key and a second short-term identity secret key which are the same based on a first permanent identity secret key, a second permanent identity secret key and first derivation information which are the same; the operation and control center transmits the first short-term identity key to a measurement and control center; and the measurement and control center and the satellite respectively generate a first data key and a second data key which are the same based on the first short-term identity key, the second short-term identity key and the second derivative information. According to the method, non-transmission acquisition of the multi-level key is realized by pre-storing the key and transmitting derivative information, and the key exposure risk is reduced. And meanwhile, through key control and use separation and multi-party hierarchical management and control, the controllability and safety of the measurement and control encryption and decryption are enhanced while the measurement and control encryption and decryption independence is kept, and a password architecture considering key autonomy and global controllability is provided for a multi-agent collaborative satellite measurement and control scene.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of satellite measurement and control security technology, and in particular to a key acquisition method, device, electronic equipment and storage medium based on multi-level key derivation. Background Art

[0002] As the 'kite line' connecting the satellite to the ground, the satellite's TT&C link is the 'lifeline' of the satellite and is crucial to ensuring the safe and stable operation of the satellite. The third-party TT&C center has a wide range of TT&C sites (which can be located on the ground, high-altitude platforms, or other satellites) and rich satellite management and control experience. It can provide satellite operators with low-cost, highly reliable TT&C management services to achieve the goal of reducing costs and increasing efficiency for satellite operators. To prevent attackers from eavesdropping on telemetry or counterfeiting remote control, the TT&C center and satellite need to perform real-time encryption and decryption of telemetry and remote control data transmitted on the TT&C link.

[0003] In the existing method for obtaining the TT&C encryption and decryption keys, the keys are generated and managed by the TT&C center. The satellite operator's operation and control center cannot participate in the management and control of the TT&C encryption and decryption keys, resulting in low controllability of the TT&C encryption and decryption keys. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a key acquisition method, device, electronic device and storage medium based on multi-level key derivation, which is used to solve the defect of low controllability of measurement and control encryption and decryption keys in the prior art. By pre-storing keys and transmitting derivative information, non-transmission acquisition of multi-level keys is achieved, reducing the risk of key exposure. At the same time, through the separation of key control and use and multi-party hierarchical management and control, while maintaining the independence of measurement and control encryption and decryption, its controllability and security are enhanced, providing a cryptographic architecture that takes into account key autonomy and global controllability for multi-agent collaborative satellite measurement and control scenarios.

[0005] The present invention provides a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, which is applied to an operation control center and includes the following steps: Acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The first short-term identity key is transmitted to a measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on a measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0006] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the first derivative information includes a first random number and a first activation time, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the validity time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, and the determining of the first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key includes: A first identity key is determined according to the first random number and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, and the first identity key and the first activation time constitute the first short-term identity key.

[0007] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the first derivative information further includes a first freshness and a one-time verification code, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, and the first derivative information is transmitted to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, including: The first derivative information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center transmits an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information. After receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code. When it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, the satellite determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the operation and control center through the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key. The transmitting the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center includes: When the verification success information is received, key encryption information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, where the key encryption information is obtained by encrypting the first short-term identity key, so that the measurement and control center decrypts the received key encryption information to obtain the first short-term identity key.

[0008] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the one-time verification code is obtained based on the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first random number, the first activation time, the first freshness and a preset verification code generation function.

[0009] The present invention provides a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, which is applied to a measurement and control center and includes the following steps: Acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; Obtaining second derivative information, and determining a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The second derivative information is transmitted to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0010] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key. Before acquiring the first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, the method further includes: receiving the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center, and transmitting an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite according to the first derivative information, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, so that after receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The verification success information transmitted by the satellite is received, and the verification success information is transmitted to the operation control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0011] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second activation time and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the first data key is determined according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, including: Determine a first short-term data key according to the second random number and the first short-term identity key, wherein the first short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the first data key; The transmitting the second derivative information to a satellite comprises: A data key derivation instruction is transmitted to the satellite, the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by encrypting the second derived information with the first short-term identity key, so that the satellite decrypts the derived encryption information in the key derivation instruction with the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derived information.

[0012] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, after transmitting the second derivative information to the satellite, the method further includes: receiving key acquisition information transmitted by the satellite, and updating the second freshness, wherein the key acquisition information is generated by the satellite after determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining the second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, and updating the current freshness, and the second short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the second data key.

[0013] The present invention provides a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, which is applied to a satellite and includes the following steps: Acquire the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key; Acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0014] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the step of acquiring first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center includes: Obtaining an on-orbit identity verification instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction is generated by the measurement and control center after the operation and control center transmits the first derivative information to the measurement and control center, and the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, and the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key; The determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derived information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key includes: Determining whether the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code; When it is determined that the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, a second identity key is determined according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key.

[0015] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, after determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the method further includes: Generate verification success information, and transmit the verification success information to the operation control center through the measurement and control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0016] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the step of acquiring second derivative information transmitted by a measurement and control center includes: Acquire a data key derivation instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, wherein the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by the measurement and control center encrypting the second derived information using the first short-term identity key; The derived encrypted information in the key derivation instruction is decrypted using the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derived information.

[0017] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second activation time and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, and the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the second data key is determined according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, including: determining whether the second freshness matches the stored current freshness; In the case of determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining a second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, the second short-term data key and the second enabling time forming the second data key; The current freshness is updated, and the key acquisition information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center updates the second freshness.

[0018] According to a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention, the first data key includes a first remote control key and a first telemetry key, the second data key includes a second remote control key and a second telemetry key, the first remote control key is the same as the second remote control key, and is used to encrypt and decrypt the remote control data transmitted on the measurement and control link, the first telemetry key is the same as the second telemetry key, and is used to encrypt and decrypt the telemetry data transmitted on the measurement and control link.

[0019] The present invention also provides a key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, comprising the following modules: A first acquisition module, configured to acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; a first transmission module, configured to transmit the first derivative information to a satellite, so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The second transmission module is used to transmit the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines the first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0020] The present invention also provides a key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, comprising the following modules: A second acquisition module is used to acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; a third acquisition module, configured to acquire second derivative information, and determine a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; a third transmission module, used to transmit the second derivative information to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0021] The present invention also provides a key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, comprising the following modules: A fourth acquisition module, used to acquire the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key; A fifth acquisition module is used to acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, wherein the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, wherein the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0022] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation as described above is implemented.

[0023] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation as described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0024] The present invention also provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer program implements any of the above-mentioned key acquisition methods based on multi-level key derivation.

[0025] The key acquisition method, device, electronic device and storage medium based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention realize the non-transmission acquisition of multi-level keys and reduce the risk of key exposure by pre-storing the same permanent identity key that is not transmitted in the entire link by the operation and control center and the satellite, and unidirectionally transmitting the derived information. At the same time, the operation and control center realizes the separation of key control and use and multi-party hierarchical management and control by securely distributing the short-term identity key to the measurement and control center, while maintaining the independence of measurement and control encryption and decryption, enhancing its controllability and security, and providing a cryptographic architecture that takes into account both key autonomy and global controllability for multi-agent collaborative satellite measurement and control scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0027] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a three-level key architecture of the key acquisition method provided by the present invention.

[0028] Figure 2 This is one of the flow charts of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0029] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of a method for obtaining a one-time verification code and a first identity key provided by the present invention.

[0030] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the verification method of the on-orbit verification provided by the present invention and the method of obtaining the short-term identity key on the satellite side.

[0031] Figure 5 This is the second flow chart of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0032] Figure 6 This is the third flow chart of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0033] Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of the method for generating data keys at the operation control center and the satellite side provided by the present invention.

[0034] Figure 8 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0035] Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of short-term identity key generation and distribution provided by the present invention.

[0036] Fig.10 It is a schematic diagram of the process of generating the data key provided by the present invention.

[0037] Fig.11 It is a schematic diagram of the process of updating the data key provided by the present invention.

[0038] Fig.12 This is one of the structural schematic diagrams of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0039] Fig.13 This is the second structural schematic diagram of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0040] Fig.14 This is the third structural schematic diagram of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0041] Fig.15 It is a schematic diagram of the physical structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0043] As the 'kite line' connecting the satellite to the ground, the satellite's TT&C link is the 'lifeline' of the satellite and is crucial to ensuring the safe and stable operation of the satellite. The third-party TT&C center has a wide range of TT&C sites (which can be located on the ground, high-altitude platforms, or other satellites) and rich experience in satellite management and control. It can provide low-cost, highly reliable TT&C management services to the operation and control center, achieving the goal of reducing costs and increasing efficiency of the operation and control center. To prevent attackers from eavesdropping on telemetry or counterfeiting remote control, the TT&C center and satellite need to perform real-time encryption and decryption of telemetry and remote control data transmitted on the TT&C link.

[0044] In the existing encryption and decryption methods, the keys are generated and managed by the measurement and control center, and the operation and control center cannot participate in the management and control of the measurement and control encryption and decryption keys, resulting in low controllability of the measurement and control encryption and decryption keys.

[0045] In view of this, an embodiment of the present invention provides a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, by acquiring first derivative information, and determining a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite, so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key; transmitting the first short-term identity key to a measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center acquires second derivative information, and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key.

[0046] The following is a general description of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention.

[0047] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the three-level key architecture of the key acquisition method provided by the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the present invention designs a multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption method based on multi-level key derivation, which is applicable to a system architecture consisting of an operation and control center, a measurement and control center and a satellite, wherein the measurement and control center and the satellite are interconnected via a wireless measurement and control link, and the operation and control center and the measurement and control center are interconnected via a ground network. The key acquisition method provided by the present invention can be applicable to a variety of scenarios. Scenario 1 can be a ground measurement and control scenario: the operation and control center is the manager of low, medium and high orbit satellites, and the measurement and control center is a national measurement and control network or a commercial measurement and control company. Scenario 2 can be a space-based measurement and control scenario: the operation and control center is the manager of low-orbit satellites, and the measurement and control center is the manager of other medium-orbit or high-orbit satellites.

[0048] The key acquisition method is characterized by using Figure 1 The three-level key architecture shown in the figure includes permanent identity key K0, short-term identity key K1, and data key K2. The three-level keys have a derivative relationship, that is, K0 derives K1, and K1 derives K2. The derivative relationship is unidirectional. If K2 is known, K1 cannot be derived, and if K1 is known, K0 cannot be derived.

[0049] The permanent identity key K0 is shared by the operation control center and the satellite. The two establish a trust relationship by presetting the same permanent identity key, so that the two can mutually authenticate each other's legitimacy. The operation control center and the satellite need to ensure the confidentiality of the permanent identity key throughout its life cycle. The permanent identity key preset by the operation control center is called the first permanent identity key, and the permanent identity key preset by the satellite is called the second permanent identity key. The first permanent identity key and the second permanent identity key are the same.

[0050] The short-term identity key K1 is shared by the measurement and control center and the satellite to establish a trust relationship between the two. The operation and control center manages K1 to achieve control over the third-party measurement and control encryption and decryption keys. The operation and control center, the measurement and control center and the satellite need to ensure the confidentiality of the key K1 during its life cycle. Specifically, the measurement and control center's K1 is distributed by the operation and control center. The satellite uses the K1 derivative parameters distributed by the operation and control center to independently generate K1. Due to the one-way nature of key derivation, the measurement and control center cannot reverse K0 after obtaining K1 and K1 derivative parameters. The measurement and control center and the satellite use K1 to independently complete the encryption and decryption of telemetry and remote control data without the real-time participation of the operation and control center. At the same time, when the K1 key is leaked, the operation and control center can update K1 so that the attacker cannot use the original K1 to encrypt and decrypt the telemetry and remote control data. The short-term identity key corresponding to the measurement and control center is called the first short-term identity key, and the short-term identity key corresponding to the satellite is called the second short-term identity key. The first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key are the same.

[0051] The data key K2 is shared by the measurement and control center and the satellite. It is generated based on the K2 derivative parameters and K1 distributed by the measurement and control center and is used for measurement and control data encryption and decryption. The role of K2 is to prevent the short-term identity key K1 from being directly used for high-frequency telemetry and remote control data encryption and decryption. By reducing the frequency of use of K1, the risk of its exposure is reduced, and ultimately the frequency of transmission of K1 from the operation and control center to the measurement and control center is reduced. The data key corresponding to the measurement and control center is called the first data key, and the data key corresponding to the satellite is called the second data key. The first data key and the second data key are the same.

[0052] In the above-mentioned key acquisition method, K0 is never transmitted, and the key K0 is not updated throughout its life cycle. The updates of the keys K1 and K2 are controlled by the operation and control center and the measurement and control center respectively. Only the K1 derivative parameters and K2 derivative parameters are transmitted on the wireless air interface of the measurement and control link, and the keys are not directly transmitted. Even if an attacker who does not know K0 obtains the K1 derivative parameters, he cannot generate K1; even if an attacker who does not know K1 obtains the K2 derivative parameters, he cannot generate K2. The above mechanism effectively improves the security of the keys K0, K1, and K2. The activation time of the K1 update is generated by the operation and control center and notified to the satellite through the uplink measurement and control link. The activation time of the K2 update is generated by the measurement and control center and notified to the satellite through the uplink measurement and control link. At the same time, the delayed effectiveness mechanism ensures that the update process of the keys K1 and K2 does not affect the smoothness of the measurement and control data processing.

[0053] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0054] Figure 2This is one of the flow charts of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation can be applied to the operation control center, which can be various types of electronic devices with information processing capabilities during implementation. For example, the electronic device can include a personal computer, a laptop, a PDA or a server, etc.; the electronic device can also be a mobile terminal, for example, the mobile terminal can include a mobile phone, a car computer, a tablet computer or a projector, etc. Figure 1 As shown, the method may include the following steps 101 to 103: Step 101: Obtain first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key.

[0055] It should be noted that the first derivative information is used to derive a new key, so the first derivative information may include key derivation parameters, key validity period, etc. The first derivative information may be obtained by the operation control center itself or by receiving information transmitted by other devices. The present invention does not limit the method for obtaining the first derivative information.

[0056] Among them, the method for determining the first short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key can be generated by a preset key derivation function, or determined by a preset algorithm, etc. The present invention does not limit the method for determining the first short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key.

[0057] Step 102: Transmit the first derivative information to a satellite, so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0058] It should be noted that the first derivative information may be transmitted to the satellite directly or via other devices. The present invention does not limit the method for transmitting the first derivative information to the satellite.

[0059] Among them, the first permanent identity key and the second permanent identity key can be implemented by software or hardware in both the operation and control center and the satellite. The embodiment of the present application considers a hardware identity card, in which the same K0 is stored. Once K0 is written, it cannot be modified, and the value of K0 cannot be read, or only the value K0hash after K0 is transformed by a hash function can be read, that is, K0hash=Hash(K0), where the hash function Hash includes but is not limited to SHA-256 and SHA-3. Exemplarily, the first permanent identity key and the second permanent identity key can be preset in the hardware identity cards of the operation and control center and the satellite, respectively.

[0060] Step 103: Transmitting the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0061] It should be noted that the first short-term identity key may be transmitted to the measurement and control center by direct transmission or encrypted transmission, and the present invention does not limit the method for transmitting the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0062] It can be understood that the present invention proposes a key acquisition method for multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption based on multi-level key derivation, that is, a one-way derived three-level key system. The permanent identity key is shared by the operation and control center and the satellite; after the two independently generate short-term identity keys based on the permanent identity key and the derived information transmitted by the operation and control center, the operation and control center securely distributes the short-term identity key to the measurement and control center; the measurement and control center and the satellite independently generate data keys based on the short-term identity key and the derived information distributed by the measurement and control center. The present invention realizes the independent acquisition of encryption and decryption key functions of the satellite and the measurement and control center, giving the operation and control center flexible key distribution and revocation capabilities; and improves the security of multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption through multi-level key derivation.

[0063] In some embodiments, the first derivative information includes a first random number and a first activation time, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effectiveness time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, and determining the first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key may include: determining the first identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first identity key and the first activation time constituting the first short-term identity key.

[0064] It should be noted that the hardware identity card has computing power and can generate a random number RAND according to international standards. For example, the first random number can be generated by the hardware identity card of the operation and control center. The first activation time is the activation time of the short-term identity key. At the time agreed by this parameter, the measurement and control center and the satellite simultaneously delay the activation of the short-term identity key.

[0065] The first random number RAND can ensure that the one-time verification code AUTN generated each time is different, and is used to provide key derivation parameters for the satellite, so that the satellite can generate the same K1 key as the operation control center.

[0066] The first activation time, i.e., the activation time of K1, is used to synchronize the activation time of key K1 on the satellite and the measurement and control center. To ensure that the generation and update of K1 does not affect the smoothness of measurement and control data processing, K1 can only be activated after the on-orbit verification of K0 and the generation of K1 on the satellite are completed.

[0067] It is understandable that the updating of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key is controlled by the operation control center, and the smoothness of measurement and control during the key updating process can be ensured by delaying the effectiveness.

[0068] In some embodiments, the first derivative information further includes a first freshness and a one-time verification code, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the transmitting the first derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, may include: transmitting the first derivative information to the measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center transmits an identity on-orbit verification instruction to the satellite, the identity on-orbit verification instruction includes the first derivative information, after receiving the identity on-orbit verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, determines the second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the operation and control center through the measurement and control center, the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The transmitting of the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center may include: upon receiving the verification success information, transmitting key encryption information to the measurement and control center, wherein the key encryption information is obtained by encrypting the first short-term identity key, so that the measurement and control center decrypts the received key encryption information to obtain the first short-term identity key.

[0069] It should be noted that the first freshness SQN (Sequence number) can use the incremental sequence number SQN as freshness information to prevent replay attacks. The one-time authentication code MAC-tag can be used to protect the integrity of the one-time credential AUTN, so that attackers who do not know K0 cannot forge or tamper with AUTN; at the same time, since only entities that know K0 can generate the correct MAC-tag, the satellite can authenticate the identity of the operation and control center.

[0070] For example, the hardware ID card has computing capability and can generate a random number RAND according to international standards. The one-time verification code can obtain AUTN and K1 through input parameters and calculation functions. Among them, the RAND (Random challenge) random number can be generated by the hardware ID card of the operation control center.

[0071] Exemplarily, the operation and control center sends AUTN in plain text to the measurement and control center through the ground network. After receiving AUTN, the measurement and control center sends a remote control instruction of "on-orbit verification of the identity of the operation and control center" to the satellite through the satellite-to-ground measurement and control link. This instruction is in plain text and contains AUTN. After receiving this remote control instruction, the satellite verifies the freshness and legitimacy of AUTN in the instruction based on its locally stored K0 and the hash-based message authentication code generation function HMAC. When the satellite verifies that the freshness and legitimacy of AUTN meet the conditions, it generates K1=KDF(K0, RAND) based on the random number RAND carried in AUTN, K0 and key derivation function KDF stored locally in the satellite; and according to the activation time of K1 in AUTN, it takes effect at the agreed time with a delay; then the satellite sends a "verification successful" message to the measurement and control center. After receiving this message, the measurement and control center sends a "verification successful" message to the operation and control center. After receiving this message, the operation and control center sends K1 and its activation time to the measurement and control center. If the verification fails to meet the conditions, the satellite sends a "verification failed" message to the measurement and control center. After receiving this message, the measurement and control center sends a "verification failed" message to the operation and control center, and the message is accompanied by the reason for the verification failure.

[0072] Furthermore, the one-time verification code is obtained according to the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first random number, the first activation time, the first freshness, and a preset verification code generation function.

[0073] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the method for obtaining the one-time verification code and the first identity key provided by the present invention. Figure 3 As shown in FIG. 1 , the one-time check code AUTN = SQN||RAND||K1's activation time||MAC-tag, where "||" represents string concatenation. It is worth noting that AUTN does not include K1 and K0.

[0074] Among them, MAC-tag = HMAC (K0, freshness information, RAND, K1 activation time) is a 64-bit authentication code. It is combined with K0 stored locally in the operation control center to protect the integrity of the three parameters SQN, RAND, and K1 activation time in the message. Attackers who do not know K0 cannot generate a normal MAC-tag.

[0075] The operation control center sends AUTN to the satellite. After receiving AUTN, the satellite uses its locally stored key K0 to calculate the functions HMAC and KDF to complete the on-orbit verification.

[0076] Figure 4 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the verification method of the on-orbit verification provided by the present invention and the method of obtaining the short-term identity key on the satellite side. Figure 4As shown, the operation control center sends AUTN to the satellite. After receiving AUTN, the satellite uses its locally stored key K0 to calculate the functions HMAC and KDF to complete the on-orbit verification. Specifically, after receiving AUTN, the satellite first checks whether the value of SQN in the message is increasing compared with the value of SQN received previously. If it is not increasing, AUTN is discarded to prevent replay attacks; otherwise, XMAC-tag and K1 are generated. If the values ​​of XMAC-tag and MAC-tag contained in AUTN are the same, the satellite sends a "verification successful" message to the operation control center after verification, stores K1 locally, and enables K1 at the agreed time delay according to the startup time parameter of K1 in AUTN. After receiving the "verification successful" message, the operation control center encrypts K1 to obtain K1enc, that is, the key encryption information, and sends K1enc to the measurement and control center for decryption to obtain K1. The keys used for encryption and decryption in this part can be symmetric or asymmetric, and the distribution and use of the two are as follows. 1. Symmetric key: The operation control center and the measurement and control center preset the same key Ktrans, then the operation control center uses Ktrans to encrypt K1, and the measurement and control center uses Ktrans to decrypt K1enc. 2. Asymmetric key: The measurement and control center generates public key Q and private key P according to algorithms such as ECC and RSA, and sends the public key Q to the operation control center. Then the operation control center uses the public key Q to encrypt K1, and the measurement and control center uses the private key P to decrypt K1enc.

[0077] It is understandable that the security of the encryption and decryption keys of multi-party collaborative measurement and control is improved through multi-level key derivation, on-orbit identity verification and encryption key transmission.

[0078] In some embodiments, the operation and control center also has the ability to update keys K1 and K2: i. The operation and control center can update the key K1 by re-initiating an on-orbit check to the satellite, and by setting the K1 activation time, the updated K1 takes effect with a delay, thereby not affecting the smoothness of measurement and control.

[0079] The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention includes: ii. The operation and control center and the satellite save the same permanent identity key K0. iii. The satellite performs on-orbit verification of the identity of the operation and control center based on the key K0. After the on-orbit verification passes, the satellite and the operation and control center independently generate the same key K1 based on the K1 derivative parameters and the key K0 they save respectively, and use K1 with a delay based on the K1 activation time. iv. The operation and control center securely sends the key K1 and the activation time of K1 to the measurement and control center. v. After receiving the key K1 and the activation time of K1, the measurement and control center generates the K2 derivative parameters and the K2 activation time, and transmits them to the satellite. vi. The satellite and the measurement and control center independently generate the same K2 based on the K2 derivative parameters and the key K1 they save respectively, and use K2 with a delay based on the K2 activation time. In addition, it also has anti-attack characteristics: i. An attacker who does not know the key K0 cannot pass the on-orbit identity verification; ii. If the K1 derivative parameters, key K1 and the method of generating K1 are known, K0 cannot be restored; iii. If the K2 derivative parameters, key K2 and the method of generating K2 are known, K1 cannot be restored; iv. An attacker who does not know K0 cannot tamper with the activation time of K1 on the satellite by forging signaling; an attacker who does not know K1 cannot tamper with the activation time of K2 on the satellite by forging signaling. Figure 5 This is the second flow chart of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation can be applied to a measurement and control center, which can be various types of electronic devices with information processing capabilities during implementation. For example, the electronic device can include a personal computer, a laptop, a PDA or a server, etc.; the electronic device can also be a mobile terminal, for example, the mobile terminal can include a mobile phone, a car computer, a tablet computer or a projector, etc. Figure 5 As shown, the method may include the following steps 201 to 203: Step 201: Acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by an operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key.

[0080] Step 202: Obtain second derivative information, and determine a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key.

[0081] Step 203: Transmit the second derivative information to the satellite, so that the satellite determines the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0082] It should be noted that the second derivative information is used to derive a new key, so the second derivative information may include key derivation parameters, key validity period, etc. The second derivative information may be obtained by generating it by itself or by receiving information transmitted by other devices. The present invention does not limit the method for obtaining the second derivative information.

[0083] It can be understood that the present invention proposes a key acquisition method for multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption based on multi-level key derivation, that is, a one-way derived three-level key system. The permanent identity key is shared by the operation and control center and the satellite; after the two independently generate short-term identity keys based on the permanent identity key and the derived information transmitted by the operation and control center, the operation and control center securely distributes the short-term identity key to the measurement and control center; the measurement and control center and the satellite independently generate data keys based on the short-term identity key and the derived information distributed by the measurement and control center. The present invention realizes the independent acquisition of encryption and decryption key functions of the satellite and the measurement and control center, giving the operation and control center flexible key distribution and revocation capabilities; and improves the security of multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption through multi-level key derivation.

[0084] In some embodiments, the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key. Before obtaining the first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, the method may also include: receiving the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and generating a first derivative information according to the first derivative information. The derivative information is used to transmit an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, so that after receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The verification success information transmitted by the satellite is received, and the verification success information is transmitted to the operation control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0085] In some embodiments, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second enabling time, and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second enabling time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, and the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and determining the first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key includes: Determine a first short-term data key according to the second random number and the first short-term identity key, wherein the first short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the first data key; The transmitting the second derivative information to the satellite may include: transmitting a data key derivation instruction to the satellite, the data key derivation instruction including derived encryption information, the derived encryption information being obtained by encrypting the second derivative information with the first short-term identity key, so that the satellite decrypts the derived encryption information in the key derivation instruction with the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derivative information.

[0086] In some embodiments, after transmitting the second derivative information to the satellite, the method may further include: receiving key acquisition information transmitted by the satellite, and updating the second freshness, wherein the key acquisition information is generated by the satellite after determining a second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key when determining that the second freshness matches a stored current freshness, and updating the current freshness, and the second short-term data key and the second enabling time constitute the second data key.

[0087] Understandably, Figure 5 The contents of the embodiment shown can be referred to Figures 2 to 4 Description of the illustrated embodiment.

[0088] Figure 6 This is the third flow chart of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation can be applied to satellites, and the satellite can be various types of electronic devices with information processing capabilities during implementation. For example, the electronic device can include a personal computer, a laptop, a PDA or a server, etc.; the electronic device can also be a mobile terminal, for example, the mobile terminal can include a mobile phone, a car computer, a tablet computer or a projector, etc. Figure 6 As shown, the method may include the following steps 301 to 302: Step 301: Acquire first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key.

[0089] Step 302: Obtain the second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine the second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the second data key is the same as the first data key, and is used to encrypt and decrypt the data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0090] It can be understood that the present invention proposes a key acquisition method for multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption based on multi-level key derivation, that is, a one-way derived three-level key system. The permanent identity key is shared by the operation and control center and the satellite; after the two independently generate short-term identity keys based on the permanent identity key and the derived information transmitted by the operation and control center, the operation and control center securely distributes the short-term identity key to the measurement and control center; the measurement and control center and the satellite independently generate data keys based on the short-term identity key and the derived information distributed by the measurement and control center. The present invention realizes the independent acquisition of encryption and decryption key functions of the satellite and the measurement and control center, giving the operation and control center flexible key distribution and revocation capabilities; and improves the security of multi-party collaborative measurement and control encryption and decryption through multi-level key derivation.

[0091] In some embodiments, the obtaining of the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center may include: obtaining an on-orbit identity verification instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, the on-orbit identity verification instruction being generated by the measurement and control center after the operation and control center transmits the first derivative information to the measurement and control center, the on-orbit identity verification instruction including the first derivative information, the first derivative information including a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code, the first random number being a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time being used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness being used to counter replay attacks, and the one-time verification code being used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key; Determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derived information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key may include: determining whether the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code; When it is determined that the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, a second identity key is determined according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key.

[0092] In some embodiments, after determining the second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the method may further include: generating verification success information, and transmitting the verification success information to the operation control center through the measurement and control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0093] In some embodiments, obtaining the second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center may include: obtaining a data key derivation instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, the data key derivation instruction including derived encryption information, the derived encrypted information being obtained by the measurement and control center encrypting the second derivative information using the first short-term identity key; decrypting the derived encrypted information in the key derivation instruction using the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derivative information.

[0094] In some embodiments, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second activation time and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, and the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and determining the second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key may include: determining whether the second freshness matches the current freshness stored; when it is determined that the second freshness matches the current freshness stored, determining the second short-term data key based on the second random number and the second short-term identity key, the second short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the second data key; updating the current freshness, and transmitting the key acquisition information to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center updates the second freshness.

[0095] In some embodiments, the first data key includes a first remote control key and a first telemetry key, the second data key includes a second remote control key and a second telemetry key, the first remote control key and the second remote control key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt the remote control data transmitted on the measurement and control link, and the first telemetry key and the second telemetry key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt the telemetry data transmitted on the measurement and control link.

[0096] Figure 7 Schematic diagram of the method for generating data keys of the operation control center and the satellite side provided by the present invention. Figure 7 As shown, the generation and update of K2 can adopt the preset key derivation function KDF, such as Figure 7 As shown, based on the input random number ri (i=0,1,2,3…) and key K1, K2-i (i=0,1,2,3…) is generated.

[0097] Understandably, Figure 6-Figure 7 The contents of the embodiment shown can be referred to Figures 2 to 5 Description of the illustrated embodiment. The following describes an exemplary application of an embodiment of the present invention in a practical application scenario.

[0098] Figure 8 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. Figure 8 As shown, the method includes the following steps 401 to 404: Step 401: Ground configuration of permanent identity keys.

[0099] Among them, the operation control center generates a permanent identity key K0 before the satellite leaves the factory, and stores K0 in the hardware modules of the operation control center and the satellite respectively. The generation and storage of K0 need to ensure its confidentiality. After storage, the value of K0 will no longer be updated and cannot be read by external modules.

[0100] Step 402: On-orbit verification of permanent identity keys, and generation and update of short-term identity keys.

[0101] Among them, in order to realize the on-orbit control of measurement and control encryption and decryption by the operation and control center, the satellite needs to perform on-orbit verification of the identity of the operation and control center, and generate or update K1 after the verification passes.

[0102] Step 403: secure distribution of short-term identity keys; Among them, the operation and control center needs to send K1 (K1old or K1new) and its activation time to the measurement and control center through the ground network. This transmission process faces the risks of external threats (ground network attacks) and internal threats (untrustworthy operators), and the confidentiality of the transmission needs to be ensured.

[0103] To this end, the transmission encryption and decryption function is introduced. After the operation and control center generates K1, it uses the transmission encryption key to encrypt K1 and its activation time to generate K1enc, and sends K1enc to the measurement and control center, which uses the transmission decryption key to decrypt K1enc to obtain K1 and its activation time.

[0104] Step 404: Generate or update the data key, and encrypt and decrypt the measurement and control data.

[0105] Among them, the measurement and control center and the satellite share the key K1 (K1old or K1new). Since the two need to exchange telemetry and remote control data frequently, directly using K1 to encrypt and decrypt data will allow attackers to obtain a large number of ciphertext samples, greatly increasing the possibility of K1 being cracked by brute force. To this end, the data key K2 derived from the short-term identity key K1 is used to encrypt and decrypt the measurement and control data, and K2 is updated frequently to make it difficult for attackers to crack the ciphertext measurement and control data.

[0106] Since the frequency, frame size and required security level of remote control and telemetry data transmission are different, they use different keys and adopt different update frequencies. Therefore, the data key K2 is specifically divided into two categories: remote control key K2k and telemetry key K2c.

[0107] To prevent replay attacks, a serial number is added to the measurement and control data. Each time the measurement and control data is sent, the serial number is increased by one. td and ts are used to represent the remote control data serial numbers maintained by the measurement and control center and the satellite. The measurement and control center and the satellite keep their serial numbers synchronized.

[0108] Fig. 9 Schematic diagram of the overall process of generating and distributing short-term identity keys provided by the present invention. Fig. 9 As shown, the generation process of K1 is as follows: 1. The operation control center generates a random number RAND, and based on the permanent identity key K0 and key derivation function KDF stored in it, generates a one-time verification code AUTN and K1=KDF(K0,RAND), where AUTN contains freshness information (time or serial number, etc.), random number RAND, and activation time of K1. At the same time, based on the permanent identity key K0 and the hash-based message authentication code generation function HMAC, an authentication code MAC-tag=HMAC(K0,AUTN) is generated. HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code). MAC-tag generation function, such as HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA512, etc. KDF (keyderivation function), key derivation function, such as HKDF (HMAC-based Key DerivationFunction), PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2), Argon2, etc. Among them, a) Freshness information is used to combat replay attacks; b) The random number RAND ensures that each generated AUTN is different. On the other hand, it is used to provide key derivation parameters for the satellite, so that the satellite can generate the same K1 key as the operation and control center.

[0109] c) The activation time of K1 is used to synchronize the activation time of key K1 on the satellite and the TT&C center. To ensure that the generation and update of K1 does not affect the smoothness of TT&C data processing, K1 can only be activated after the on-orbit verification of K0 and the generation of K1 on the satellite are completed.

[0110] d) The authentication code MAC-tag is used to protect the integrity of AUTN, so that attackers who do not know K0 cannot forge or tamper with AUTN; at the same time, since only entities with known K0 can generate the correct MAC-tag, the satellite can authenticate the identity of the operation and control center.

[0111] 2. The operation and control center sends AUTN in plain text to the measurement and control center through the ground network. After receiving AUTN, the measurement and control center sends the remote control command of "operation and control center identity on-orbit verification" to the satellite through the satellite-to-ground measurement and control link. This command is in plain text and contains AUTN.

[0112] 3. After receiving this remote control command, the satellite verifies the freshness and legitimacy of AUTN in the command based on its locally stored K0 and the hash-based message authentication code generation function HMAC.

[0113] a) When the satellite verifies that the freshness and legality of AUTN meet the conditions, it generates K1=KDF(K0,RAND) based on the random number RAND carried in AUTN, K0 and key derivation function KDF stored locally in the satellite; and according to the activation time of K1 in AUTN, it takes effect at the agreed time after delay; then the satellite sends a "verification successful" message to the measurement and control center, and after receiving this message, the measurement and control center sends a "verification successful" message to the operation and control center. After receiving this message, the operation and control center sends K1 and its activation time to the measurement and control center according to the following 3 steps.

[0114] b) If the verification fails to meet the conditions, the satellite sends a "verification failed" message to the tracking and control center. After receiving this message, the tracking and control center sends a "verification failed" message to the operation and control center, and the message is accompanied by the reason for the verification failure.

[0115] K1 can also be updated on demand. The update process of K1 is as follows: The short-term identity key that the tracking and control center and the satellite have shared is called K1old, and the short-term identity key generated after the update is called K1new. The specific steps are as follows: First, the operation control center generates AUTNnew and K1new according to step 1 in the K1 generation process (AUTNnew includes the activation time of K1new), and sends AUTNnew in plain text to the measurement and control center.

[0116] Secondly, after receiving AUTNnew, the tracking and control center sends the remote control command of "K1 in-orbit update" to the satellite through the satellite-to-ground tracking and control link. This command is in plain text and contains AUTNnew.

[0117] Finally, the satellite verifies the freshness and legitimacy of AUTNnew in the instruction according to step 3 of the above K1 generation process.

[0118] When the satellite verifies that the freshness and legality of AUTNnew meet the conditions, K1new is generated; and according to the activation time of K1new in AUTNnew, it takes effect at the agreed time with a delay; at the same time, a message of "K1 update success" is sent to the measurement and control center. After receiving this message, the measurement and control center sends a message of "K1 update success" to the operation and control center. After receiving this message, the operation and control center sends K1new and its activation time to the measurement and control center according to the following step S3.

[0119] If the verification fails to meet the conditions, the satellite sends a "K1 update failed" message to the measurement and control center. After receiving this message, the measurement and control center sends a "K1 update failed" message to the operation and control center, and the message is accompanied by the reason for the verification failure.

[0120] 3: Safe distribution of K1 (and K1 delay activation time) As described in step 2, the operation and control center needs to send K1 (K1old or K1new) and its activation time to the measurement and control center through the ground network. This transmission process faces the risks of external threats (ground network attacks) and internal threats (untrustworthy operators), and the confidentiality of the transmission needs to be ensured.

[0121] To this end, the transmission encryption and decryption function is introduced. After the operation and control center generates K1, it uses the transmission encryption key to encrypt K1 and its activation time to generate K1enc, and sends K1enc to the measurement and control center, which uses the transmission decryption key to decrypt K1enc to obtain K1 and its activation time.

[0122] Fig.10 This is a schematic diagram of the process of generating the data key provided by the present invention. Fig.10 As shown in the figure, the process of generating a data key includes: 1. The measurement and control center generates a random number r-0, and based on K1 and KDF, generates K2 = KDF(K1, r-0) (including K2k and K2c); then sends a data key derivation instruction to the satellite, with the random number r-0 and the current sequence number td in the message, and this message is encrypted using K1.

[0123] 2. After receiving the data key derivation instruction, the satellite uses K1 to decrypt and determine whether the serial number td in the instruction is the same as the serial number ts on the satellite.

[0124] a) If they are different, an error message “serial number is not synchronized” is sent to the measurement and control center.

[0125] b) If they are the same, increase the value of ts by 1, read the random number r-0 attached to the instruction, use the locally stored K1 and the key derivation function KDF to generate K2=KDF(K1,r-0) (including K2k and K2c); if the whole process is successful, send a success message to the measurement and control center, use K2k to decrypt the subsequent remote control information, and use K2c to encrypt the subsequent telemetry data. The satellite will no longer respond to unencrypted remote control information.

[0126] 3. After the measurement and control center receives the information that "the data key has been obtained", it increases the value of td by 1, uses K2k to encrypt the subsequent remote control information, and uses K2c to decrypt the subsequent telemetry data. The ground will no longer process unencrypted telemetry information.

[0127] Fig.11 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of updating the data key provided by the present invention. Fig.11 As shown in the figure, the data key update process is as follows: K2 needs to be updated frequently. In order to ensure that the K2 update does not affect the smoothness of satellite-to-ground measurement and control, the following mechanism based on serial number delayed update of K2 is designed. This mechanism updates the telemetry and telecontrol keys independently, and the updates of both data keys are initiated by the measurement and control center. Since the two data keys K2 (K2k and K2c) use the same update and switching mechanism, K2 is used uniformly below to illustrate the working mode of this mechanism. Before the update starts, the measurement and control center and the satellite have synchronized the use of the same data key, which is represented by K2-0.

[0128] 1. The measurement and control center generates a set of random numbers ri (i=1,2,3…), and based on K1 (K1old or K1new) and the key derivation function KDF, generates a set of update keys K2-i=KDF(K1,ri) (i=1,2,3…); then initiates a data key update command to the satellite, and the message is accompanied by this set of random numbers ri (i=1,2,3…), sequence number td, and the activation sequence number ti (i=1,2,3…) of this set of update keys. This message is encrypted using the key (i=1,2,3…).

[0129] 2. After receiving the data key update command, the satellite uses K2-0 to decrypt and determine whether the sequence number td in the command is the same as the sequence number ts maintained by the satellite, and whether the difference between the enabled sequence number ti (i=1,2,3…) of this group of updated keys and the current sequence number td is greater than a preset threshold TH.

[0130] a) If the satellite and ground serial numbers are different or the serial number difference is not greater than TH, an error message of "serial number is not synchronized" or "serial number difference is less than TH" will be sent to the measurement and control center.

[0131] b) If the satellite and ground serial numbers are the same and the difference in serial numbers is greater than the preset threshold, the random number ri (i=1,2,3…) attached to the instruction is read, and the locally stored K1 (K1old or K1new) and the key derivation function KDF are used to generate the updated key K2-i= KDF(K1,ri) (i=1,2,3…), and the key K2-i (i=1,2,3…) is enabled at the moment when the serial number is ti to decrypt the remote control information; if the above process is successful, a success message is sent to the measurement and control center.

[0132] 3. After receiving the success message, the measurement and control center activates the key K2-i (i=1,2,3...) at the time of sequence number ti to encrypt the remote control information.

[0133] It can be understood that by setting the activation sequence number ti (i=1,2,3…) for updating the key, the measurement and control center can adjust the update frequency of K2 and achieve “one-time one-key” at the highest.

[0134] In the whole process of generating K2-0 and updating K2-i, only the key derivation parameters (random number ri, i=0,1,2,3…) are transmitted on the wireless measurement and control link. Even if an attacker who does not know K1 (K1old or K1new) obtains the key derivation parameters through eavesdropping, he cannot generate K2-i, i=0,1,2,3…. In addition, the K2 key generation and update instructions sent by the measurement and control center are encrypted and protected by K1 and K2-0 respectively, so attackers cannot forge the above key generation and update instructions.

[0135] The measurement and control center has the ability to update K2 at a set frequency (the highest frequency can achieve a different key for each telemetry or remote control), and by setting the K2 activation time, the updated K2 takes effect with a delay, so as not to affect the smoothness of measurement and control.

[0136] In addition, the security of the system is improved by protecting the keys. Specifically, the long-lifecycle keys are effectively protected through the one-way derivation of multi-level keys, avoiding the direct use of permanent identity keys for encryption and decryption, and not transmitting permanent identity keys. At the same time, the protection of medium- and short-lifecycle keys is strengthened by avoiding the transmission of short-term identity keys and data keys on the wireless air interface and encrypting the process of sending short-term identity keys from the operation and control center to the measurement and control center.

[0137] Based on the foregoing embodiments, an embodiment of the present invention provides a key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation. The modules included in the device and the units included in each module can be implemented by a processor; of course, they can also be implemented by a specific logic circuit; in the implementation process, the processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor (MPU), a digital signal processor (DSP) or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0138] The key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention is described below. The key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation described below and the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation described above can be referred to each other.

[0139] Fig.12 This is one of the structural schematic diagrams of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. Fig.12 As shown, the device 500 is applied to the operation control center, and includes a first acquisition module 501, a first transmission module 502 and a second transmission module 503, wherein: A first acquisition module 501 is used to acquire first derivative information and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; A first transmission module 502 is configured to transmit the first derivative information to a satellite, so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The second transmission module 503 is used to transmit the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines the first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key. The first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0140] In some embodiments, the first derivative information includes a first random number and a first activation time, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, and the first acquisition module 501 is specifically used to: determine the first identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, and the first identity key and the first activation time constitute the first short-term identity key.

[0141] In some embodiments, the first derivative information further includes a first freshness and a one-time verification code, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first transmission module 502 is specifically used to: transmit the first derivative information to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center transmits an identity on-orbit verification instruction to the satellite, the identity on-orbit verification instruction includes the first derivative information, after receiving the identity on-orbit verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the operation and control center through the measurement and control center, the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The second transmission module 503 is specifically used to: upon receiving the verification success information, transmit key encryption information to the measurement and control center, wherein the key encryption information is obtained by encrypting the first short-term identity key, so that the measurement and control center decrypts the received key encryption information to obtain the first short-term identity key.

[0142] In some embodiments, the one-time verification code is obtained according to the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first random number, the first activation time, the first freshness, and a preset verification code generation function.

[0143] Fig.13 This is the second structural diagram of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. Fig.13 As shown, the device 600 is applied to a measurement and control center, and includes a second acquisition module 601, a third acquisition module 602 and a third transmission module 603, wherein: A second acquisition module 601 is used to acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; A third acquisition module 602, configured to acquire second derivative information, and determine a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The third transmission module 603 is used to transmit the second derivative information to the satellite, so that the satellite determines the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0144] In some embodiments, the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, and the device further includes an information receiving module, and the information receiving module is specifically used to: receiving the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center, and transmitting an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite according to the first derivative information, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, so that after receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The verification success information transmitted by the satellite is received, and the verification success information is transmitted to the operation control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0145] In some embodiments, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second activation time, and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, and the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the third acquisition module is specifically used to: determine the first short-term data key according to the second random number and the first short-term identity key, and the first short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the first data key; The third transmission module is specifically used to: transmit a data key derivation instruction to the satellite, the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by encrypting the second derived information with the first short-term identity key, so that the satellite decrypts the derived encryption information in the key derivation instruction with the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derived information.

[0146] In some embodiments, the device further includes an information updating module, configured to receive the key acquisition information transmitted by the satellite and update the second freshness, wherein the key acquisition information is generated by the satellite after determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining the second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, and updating the current freshness, and the second short-term data key and the second enabling time constitute the second data key.

[0147] Fig.14 This is the third structural diagram of the key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation provided by the present invention. Fig.14 As shown, the device 700 is applied to a satellite, and includes a fourth acquisition module 701 and a fifth acquisition module 702, wherein: The fourth acquisition module 701 is used to acquire the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key; The fifth acquisition module 702 is used to acquire the second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine the second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt the data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0148] In some embodiments, the fourth acquisition module 701 is specifically used to: obtain the identity on-orbit verification instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, the identity on-orbit verification instruction is generated by the measurement and control center after the operation control center transmits the first derivative information to the measurement and control center, the identity on-orbit verification instruction includes the first derivative information, the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key; And specifically used for: determining whether the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code; when it is determined that the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, determining the second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key.

[0149] In some embodiments, the device also includes an information generation module, which is used to: generate verification success information, and transmit the verification success information to the operation control center through the measurement and control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

[0150] In some embodiments, the fifth acquisition module 702 is specifically used to: obtain the data key derivation instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by the measurement and control center encrypting the second derivative information using the first short-term identity key; decrypting the derived encrypted information in the key derivation instruction using the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derivative information.

[0151] In some embodiments, the second derivative information includes a second random number, a second activation time, and a second freshness, the second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key, the second activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key, and the second freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the fifth acquisition module is further specifically used to: determining whether the second freshness matches the stored current freshness; In the case of determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining a second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, the second short-term data key and the second enabling time forming the second data key; The current freshness is updated, and the key acquisition information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center updates the second freshness.

[0152] In some embodiments, the first data key includes a first remote control key and a first telemetry key, the second data key includes a second remote control key and a second telemetry key, the first remote control key and the second remote control key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt the remote control data transmitted on the measurement and control link, and the first telemetry key and the second telemetry key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt the telemetry data transmitted on the measurement and control link.

[0153] Fig.15 Schematic diagram of the physical structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention. Fig.15 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 810, a communication interface 820, a memory 830 and a communication bus 840, wherein the processor 810, the communication interface 820 and the memory 830 communicate with each other through the communication bus 840. The processor 810 may call the logic instructions in the memory 830 to execute a key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, the method comprising: Acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The first short-term identity key is transmitted to a measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on a measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0154] Alternatively, obtaining a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the obtained first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; Obtaining second derivative information, and determining a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The second derivative information is transmitted to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0155] Alternatively, obtaining first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key; Acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0156] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 830 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when it is sold or used as an independent product. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

[0157] On the other hand, the present invention further provides a computer program product, the computer program product comprising a computer program, the computer program can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the above methods, the method comprising: Acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key being the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key being the same as the first short-term identity key; The first short-term identity key is transmitted to a measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on a measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0158] Alternatively, obtaining a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the obtained first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; Obtaining second derivative information, and determining a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The second derivative information is transmitted to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0159] Alternatively, obtaining first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key; Acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0160] The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present invention is generated in whole or in part. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can store or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated therein. The available medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid-state drive Solid State Disk (SSD)), etc.

[0161] In another aspect, the present invention further provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which is implemented when the computer program is executed by a processor to execute the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation provided by the above methods, the method comprising: Acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The first short-term identity key is transmitted to a measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on a measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

[0162] Alternatively, obtaining a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the obtained first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; Obtaining second derivative information, and determining a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The second derivative information is transmitted to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

[0163] Alternatively, obtaining first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key; Acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

[0164] The above-mentioned computer-readable storage medium can adopt any combination of one or more computer-readable media. The computer-readable medium can be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, - but not limited to - an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device or device, or any combination of the above. More specific examples (non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable storage media include: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM) or flash memory, an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. In this document, a computer-readable storage medium can be any tangible medium containing or storing a program, which can be used by an instruction execution system, device or device or used in combination with it.

[0165] Computer-readable signal media may include a data signal propagated in baseband or as part of a carrier wave, which carries a computer-readable program code. Such propagated data signals may take a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination of the above. Computer-readable signal media may also be any computer-readable medium other than a computer-readable storage medium, which may send, propagate, or transmit a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0166] The program code embodied on the computer-readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wire, optical cable, radio frequency (RF), etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0167] Computer program code for performing the operations of the present specification may be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" or similar programming languages. The program code may be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a separate software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., through the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0168] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative labor.

[0169] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0170] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applied to the operation control center, including: Acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; transmitting the first derivative information to a satellite so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key based on the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key being the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key being the same as the first short-term identity key; The first short-term identity key is transmitted to a measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the first data key and the second data key are the same and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on a measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

2. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first derivative information includes a first random number and a first activation time, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the validity time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, and the determining the first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key includes: A first identity key is determined according to the first random number and the pre-stored first permanent identity key, and the first identity key and the first activation time constitute the first short-term identity key.

3. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 2, characterized in that: The first derivative information further includes a first freshness and a one-time verification code, wherein the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key. The transmitting the first derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key includes: The first derivative information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center transmits an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information. After receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code. When it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, the satellite determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the operation and control center through the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key. The transmitting the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center includes: When the verification success information is received, key encryption information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, where the key encryption information is obtained by encrypting the first short-term identity key, so that the measurement and control center decrypts the received key encryption information to obtain the first short-term identity key.

4. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The one-time verification code is obtained according to the pre-stored first permanent identity key, the first random number, the first activation time, the first freshness, and a preset verification code generation function.

5. A key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applied to measurement and control centers, including: Acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; Obtaining second derivative information, and determining a first data key based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; The second derivative information is transmitted to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

6. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 5, characterized in that: The first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code. The first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key. The first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key. The first freshness is used to resist replay attacks. The one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key. Before obtaining the first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, the method further includes: receiving the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center, and transmitting an on-orbit identity verification instruction to the satellite according to the first derivative information, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, so that after receiving the on-orbit identity verification instruction, the satellite determines whether the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code, and when it is determined that the identity of the operation and control center meets the on-orbit verification requirement, determines a second identity key according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, generates verification success information and transmits the verification success information to the measurement and control center, wherein the second identity key is the same as the first identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key; The verification success information transmitted by the satellite is received, and the verification success information is transmitted to the operation control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

7. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 5, characterized in that: The second derivative information includes a second random number, a second enabling time, and a second freshness. The second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key. The second enabling time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key. The second freshness is used to resist replay attacks. The determining the first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key includes: Determine a first short-term data key according to the second random number and the first short-term identity key, wherein the first short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the first data key; The transmitting the second derivative information to a satellite comprises: A data key derivation instruction is transmitted to the satellite, the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by encrypting the second derived information with the first short-term identity key, so that the satellite decrypts the derived encryption information in the key derivation instruction with the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derived information.

8. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 7, characterized in that: After transmitting the second derivative information to the satellite, the method further comprises: receiving key acquisition information transmitted by the satellite, and updating the second freshness, wherein the key acquisition information is generated by the satellite after determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining the second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, and updating the current freshness, and the second short-term data key and the second activation time constitute the second data key.

9. A key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applications in satellites include: Acquire the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key; Acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

10. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 9, characterized in that: The obtaining of the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center includes: Obtaining an on-orbit identity verification instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, wherein the on-orbit identity verification instruction is generated by the measurement and control center after the operation and control center transmits the first derivative information to the measurement and control center, and the on-orbit identity verification instruction includes the first derivative information, and the first derivative information includes a first random number, a first activation time, a first freshness, and a one-time verification code, the first random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first activation time is used to indicate the effective time of the first short-term identity key and the second short-term identity key, the first freshness is used to resist replay attacks, and the one-time verification code is used to verify the correctness of the first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key; The determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derived information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key includes: Determining whether the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements according to the first freshness and the one-time verification code; When it is determined that the identity of the operation control center meets the on-orbit verification requirements, a second identity key is determined according to the first random number and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second identity key and the first activation time constitute the second short-term identity key.

11. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 10, characterized in that: After determining the second short-term identity key according to the first derived information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the method further includes: Generate verification success information, and transmit the verification success information to the operation control center through the measurement and control center, so that the operation control center transmits the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center.

12. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 9, characterized in that: The obtaining of the second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center includes: Acquire a data key derivation instruction transmitted by the measurement and control center, wherein the data key derivation instruction includes derived encryption information, and the derived encryption information is obtained by the measurement and control center encrypting the second derived information using the first short-term identity key; The derived encrypted information in the key derivation instruction is decrypted using the second short-term identity key to obtain the second derived information.

13. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 12, characterized in that: The second derivative information includes a second random number, a second enabling time, and a second freshness. The second random number is a derivative parameter for generating the first data key and the second data key. The second enabling time is used to indicate the effective time of the first data key and the second data key. The second freshness is used to resist replay attacks. Determining the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key includes: determining whether the second freshness matches the stored current freshness; In the case of determining that the second freshness matches the stored current freshness, determining a second short-term data key according to the second random number and the second short-term identity key, the second short-term data key and the second enabling time forming the second data key; The current freshness is updated, and the key acquisition information is transmitted to the measurement and control center, so that the measurement and control center updates the second freshness.

14. The key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation according to claim 9, characterized in that: The first data key includes a first remote control key and a first telemetry key, the second data key includes a second remote control key and a second telemetry key, the first remote control key is the same as the second remote control key, and is used to encrypt and decrypt the remote control data transmitted on the measurement and control link, the first telemetry key is the same as the second telemetry key, and is used to encrypt and decrypt the telemetry data transmitted on the measurement and control link.

15. A key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applied to the operation control center, including: A first acquisition module, configured to acquire first derivative information, and determine a first short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; a first transmission module, configured to transmit the first derivative information to a satellite, so that the satellite determines a second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and a pre-stored second permanent identity key, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key; The second transmission module is used to transmit the first short-term identity key to the measurement and control center so that the measurement and control center obtains second derivative information and determines the first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, and the measurement and control center transmits the second derivative information to the satellite so that the satellite determines the second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite.

16. A key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applied to measurement and control centers, including: A second acquisition module is used to acquire a first short-term identity key transmitted by the operation control center, where the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation control center according to the acquired first derivative information and a pre-stored first permanent identity key; a third acquisition module, configured to acquire second derivative information, and determine a first data key according to the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key; a third transmission module, used to transmit the second derivative information to the satellite, so that the satellite determines a second data key according to the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, the first data key and the second data key are the same, and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, the second short-term identity key is determined by the satellite according to the first derivative information transmitted by the operation and control center and the pre-stored second permanent identity key, the pre-stored first permanent identity key and the pre-stored second permanent identity key are the same, and the second short-term identity key is the same as the first short-term identity key.

17. A key acquisition device based on multi-level key derivation, characterized in that: Applications in satellites include: A fourth acquisition module, used to acquire the first derivative information transmitted by the operation control center, and determine the second short-term identity key according to the first derivative information and the pre-stored second permanent identity key; A fifth acquisition module is used to acquire second derivative information transmitted by the measurement and control center, and determine a second data key based on the second derivative information and the second short-term identity key, wherein the second data key is the same as the first data key and is used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted on the measurement and control link between the measurement and control center and the satellite, wherein the first data key is determined by the measurement and control center based on the second derivative information and the first short-term identity key, wherein the first short-term identity key is determined by the operation and control center based on the acquired first derivative information and the pre-stored first permanent identity key and transmitted to the measurement and control center, wherein the pre-stored first permanent identity key is the same as the pre-stored second permanent identity key, and the first short-term identity key is the same as the second short-term identity key.

18. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

19. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

20. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the key acquisition method based on multi-level key derivation as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

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