Unmanned aerial vehicle control authority rapid and safe handover method based on national secret algorithm
By using the national secret algorithm for identity authentication and encrypted communication during the control permission handover process of the drone remote control, the problem of lack of identity authentication and information encryption during the traditional handover process is solved, and the rapid and secure handover of the control permissions of the drone is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510268541.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-03-07
- Publication Date
- 2025-06-06
AI Technical Summary
The control permission handover process of traditional drone remote control lacks identity authentication and information encryption, and it is easy to steal interactive information by malicious devices and fake identity to seize control permissions.
The method based on the national secret algorithm is adopted to authenticate and encrypt the communication through the key server to ensure the authentication of the identity between the main and secondary remote controls and the secure handover of the drone control permissions. Specific steps include remote control registration, authentication, session key generation and encrypted communication.
It realizes the fast and secure handover of drone control permissions, prevents malicious devices from stealing interactive information, and ensures the security and efficiency of control permissions.
Smart Images
Figure CN120111490A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle control, and in particular relates to a method for quickly and securely handing over control authority of unmanned aerial vehicle based on a national secret algorithm. Background Art
[0002] The intelligent remote controller with dual control function supports the simultaneous transmission of images and data to two remote controllers, realizing the function of two pilots controlling the same aircraft separately. Based on this function, drones can achieve cross-regional logistics transportation. The main operator controls the drone to take off from the starting point, transfers the control authority at the appropriate handover point, and the co-operator controls the drone to land at the destination. However, the traditional remote control control authority handover process lacks the identity authentication of the drone to the remote controller, and the interactive information between devices lacks encryption, which makes it easy for malicious devices to steal the interactive information, forge identities and seize control authority. Summary of the invention
[0003] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for quickly and securely handing over control authority of a drone based on a national secret algorithm, which can achieve safe and fast control authority handover.
[0004] In order to achieve the above object, the solution of the present invention is:
[0005] A method for quickly and securely handing over the control authority of a drone based on a national secret algorithm is used to realize the handover of the control authority of a drone between a main remote controller and a secondary remote controller; including:
[0006] The secondary remote controller registers with the key server and obtains the declared public key W A , and based on the declared public key W A Get the secondary private key d A and the secondary public key P A ;
[0007] The secondary remote controller will have its own ID A and the secondary public key P A Sent to the master remote control, the master remote control based on the identity ID A Obtain the declared public key W of the secondary remote control from the key server A , perform secondary public key verification;
[0008] After the secondary public key is verified, the primary remote controller sends a random bit string u to the secondary remote controller, the secondary remote controller generates a signature sign based on the random number k and sends it to the primary remote controller, and the primary remote controller authenticates the signature sign;
[0009] After the identity authentication is passed, the main remote controller initiates a session request with the secondary remote controller to the key server, and the key server sends the ticket obtained by encrypting the session key sessionKey with the global symmetric key K to the main remote controller and the secondary remote controller; the main remote controller performs frequency matching with the drone, and sends the matching result to the secondary remote controller;
[0010] When the drone is in the handover area, the main remote controller initiates a handover request to the drone and the secondary remote controller. The drone authenticates the secondary remote controller and sends a confirmation handover request to the main remote controller after successful authentication. The main remote controller is disconnected.
[0011] Among them, the key server generates elliptic curve system parameters (F q ,a,b,G,n), where F q is a domain of size q, a,b∈F q is the elliptic curve equation E(F q ), G is a non-zero base point on the elliptic curve, and n is the order of the base point G; the key server randomly selects ms∈[1,n-1] as the system master private key and calculates the system master public key P PUB =[ms]G, where [ms] is the top function, i.e. an integer not less than ms.
[0012] The secondary remote controller registers with the key server and obtains the declared public key W A ,include,
[0013] The secondary remote controller generates elliptic curve system parameters (F q ,a,b,G,n), where F q is a domain of size q, a,b∈F q is the elliptic curve equation E(F q ), G is a non-zero base point on the elliptic curve, n is the order of the base point G; the secondary remote controller randomly selects d′ A ∈[1,n-1] as the partial private key and calculate the partial public key U A =[d′ A ]G;
[0014] The secondary remote controller initiates a registration request to the key server and sends its ID A and partial public key U A Send to key server;
[0015] The key server randomly selects w∈[1,n-1] according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm and calculates the partial private key t A =w+λ·ms modn and declared public key WA =U A +[w]G, and returns it to the secondary remote control; where λ is the identification summary of the secondary remote control, and ms is the system master private key.
[0016] Among them, the secondary remote control is based on the declared public key W A Get the secondary private key d A and the secondary public key P A ,include,
[0017] The secondary remote controller calculates the secondary private key d according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm. A =d′ A +t A and the secondary public key P A =[d A ]G.
[0018] Among them, the main remote control performs secondary public key verification, including:
[0019] The master remote controller is based on the declared public key W A , calculate the secondary remote control identification digest in It is W A Coordinates in bit string form, H A It is the hash value of the secondary remote controller's identifier, some elliptic curve system parameters and the system master public key. 256 is a cryptographic hash algorithm with a message digest length of 256 bits; verify equation P A =W A +[λ]P PUB , if the equation holds true, the secondary public key of the secondary remote controller is verified successfully.
[0020] The secondary remote controller generates a signature sign based on the random number k and sends it to the primary remote controller, including:
[0021] The remote controller randomly selects a random number k∈[1,n-1], and sets (x 1 ,y 1 )=[k]G, Calculate e = H 256 (M) Convert the data type of e to an integer and calculate r = e + x 1 modn, and then use the secondary private key d A Calculate s = (1 + d A ) -1 (kr×d A )modn, generate the signature sign=(r,s) and send it to the main remote control.
[0022] The main remote controller verifies the signature sign, including:
[0023] The master remote controller verifies whether r∈[1,n-1] and s∈[1,n-1] hold. If both hold, it calculates e=H(M), t=r+s modn, (x 1 ,y 1 )=[s]G+[t]P A , R=e+x 1 modn, verify the equation R=r; if the equation holds, the signature verification is successful and the identity authentication of the secondary remote controller is passed.
[0024] The main remote controller pairs with the drone and sends the pairing result to the secondary remote controller, including:
[0025] The main remote control and the secondary remote control use the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey;
[0026] The main remote controller and the drone are linked, the link result is encrypted by SM4 using the session key sessionKey to obtain ER, and then sent to the secondary remote controller;
[0027] The secondary remote controller uses the session key sessionKey to perform SM4 decryption on ER to obtain the frequency binding result;
[0028] The intermediate calculation result (x) of the master remote controller using the session key sessionKey to authenticate the identity of the slave remote controller 1 ,y 1 ) Perform SM4 encryption to obtain the authentication summary Abs, and send the authentication summary Abs and ticket to the drone;
[0029] The drone uses the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey, and uses the session key sessionKey to decrypt the authentication summary Abs to obtain the intermediate calculation result (x 1 ,y 1 ).
[0030] Among them, when the drone is in the handover area, the main remote controller sends a handover request to the drone and the sub-remote controller. The drone authenticates the sub-remote controller and sends a confirmation handover request to the main remote controller after successful authentication. The main remote controller disconnects, including:
[0031] When the drone flies to the handover area, the master remote controller sends a handover request to the drone and the slave remote controller;
[0032] The secondary remote controller uses the binding result of the primary remote controller to communicate with the drone, encrypts the random number k with the session key sessionKey using SM4, and sends it to the drone;
[0033] The drone uses the session key sessionKey to decrypt the random number k and quickly verifies the identity of the remote controller, that is, the verification equation (x 1 ,y 1 )=[k]G, if the equation holds, the identity authentication of the secondary remote controller is successful;
[0034] The drone sends a confirmation handover request to the master remote controller;
[0035] The master remote control is disconnected.
[0036] The national secret algorithm is a series of cryptographic algorithm standards issued by the State Cryptography Administration, including SM1, SM2, SM3, SM4, ZUC, etc., which aims to ensure national information security. The present invention selects the SM2 and SM4 algorithms, and adopts the certificateless and implicit certificate-free public key mechanism based on the SM2 algorithm and the SM4 symmetric block encryption algorithm to solve the problem of lack of authentication and encryption in the remote control authority handover process.
[0037] After adopting the above scheme, the innovation of the present invention is embodied in:
[0038] (1) The key server and the device in the present invention perform secure key distribution through the pre-built-in key, and the communication content is encrypted by SM4 using the temporary session key generated by the key server between the devices, which can ensure the data security of important communication content such as frequency matching results and location information;
[0039] (2) The master and slave remote controllers of the present invention use a digital signature based on the certificateless SM2 for identity authentication. After the authentication is completed, the master remote controller (the party verifying the signature) provides the drone with an authentication summary so that the drone can quickly authenticate the slave remote controller (the party verifying the signature) when the control authority is transferred, thereby ensuring that the authority transfer process is efficient and safe. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0040] Figure 1 It is a working principle diagram of the device of the present invention;
[0041] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the present invention;
[0042] Figure 3 It is a control authority handover flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0043] The technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0044] Cooperate Figure 3 As shown, the present invention provides a method for quickly and securely handing over control authority of a drone based on a national secret algorithm, comprising the following steps:
[0045] 1. Key server system initialization
[0046] (1) The server generates elliptic curve system parameters (F) based on the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm. q ,a,b,G,n), where F q is a domain of size q, a,b∈F q is the elliptic curve equation E(F q ), G is a non-zero base point on the elliptic curve, and n is the order of the base point G. The server randomly selects ms∈[1,n-1] as the system master private key and calculates the system master public key P PUB =[ms]G, where [ms] is the top function, i.e. an integer not less than ms.
[0047] (2) The server generates a global symmetric key K that will be used for the entire system. Key K is built into the trusted device.
[0048] 2. Remote control initialization and registration
[0049] (1) Remote controller A randomly selects d′ according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm. A ∈[1,n-1] as the partial private key and calculate the partial public key U A =[d′ A ]G.
[0050] (2) Remote controller A sends a registration request to the server and sends its ID A and partial public key U A Send to the server.
[0051] (3) The server randomly selects w∈[1,n-1] according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm and calculates the partial private key t A =w+λ·ms modn and declared public key W A =U A +[w]G, where is the identification summary of remote control A, It is W A Coordinates in bit string form, H A It is the hash value of the remote control A's identifier, some elliptic curve system parameters and the system master public key. 256 is a cryptographic hash algorithm with a message digest length of 256 bits; then the server sends t A , W A And return to remote control A.
[0052] (4) Remote controller A calculates its own private key d based on the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm. A =d′ A+t A and the public key P A =[d A ]G.
[0053] 3. Remote control authentication
[0054] (1) The remote controller A that applies for access will be used as the secondary remote controller, and its ID A and the public key P A Sent to the master remote.
[0055] (2) The main remote control uses the ID of the secondary remote control A Get the secondary remote controller's declared public key W from the key server A ,calculate in It is W A Coordinates in bit string form, H A It is the hash value of the secondary remote controller's identifier, some elliptic curve system parameters and the system master public key. 256 is a cryptographic hash algorithm with a message digest length of 256 bits; verify equation P A =W A +[λ]P PUB , if the equation holds true, the public key of remote control A is verified successfully.
[0056] (3) The master remote controller randomly selects a random bit string u as the signature object and sends u to the slave remote controller A.
[0057] (4) The remote controller A randomly selects a random number k∈[1,n-1] and saves it. Let (x 1 ,y 1 )=[k]G, Calculate e = H 256 (M) Convert the data type of e to an integer and calculate r = e + x 1 modn, and then use the private key d A Calculate s = (1 + d A ) -1 (kr×d A )modn, generate the signature sign=(r,s) and send it to the main remote control.
[0058] (5) The master remote controller verifies whether r∈[1,n-1] and s∈[1,n-1] hold. If both hold, then e=H is calculated in sequence. 256 (M), t=r+s modn, (x 1 ,y 1 )=[s]G+[t]P A , R=e+x 1modn, verify the equation R=r; if the equation holds, the signature verification is successful and the identity authentication of the secondary remote controller is passed.
[0059] 4. The main remote control initiates a session request with the secondary remote control A to the server.
[0060] 5. The server randomly generates a session key sessionKey, uses the global symmetric key K to perform SM4 encryption on the session key to obtain the ticket, and sends it to the main remote control and the sub-remote control A.
[0061] 6. The main remote control and the secondary remote control A use the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey.
[0062] 7. The main remote controller and the drone are frequency-bound, and the frequency-bound result is encrypted by SM4 using the session key sessionKey to obtain ER, and then sent to the secondary remote controller.
[0063] 8. The slave remote controller uses the session key sessionKey to perform SM4 decryption on ER to obtain the binding result.
[0064] 9. The intermediate calculation result (x) of the master remote controller using the session key sessionKey to authenticate the identity of the slave remote controller 1 ,y 1 ) Perform SM4 encryption to obtain the authentication summary Abs, and send the authentication summary Abs and ticket to the drone.
[0065] 10. The drone uses the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey, and uses the session key to decrypt the authentication summary Abs to obtain the intermediate calculation result (x 1 ,y 1 ).
[0066] 11. Transfer of control authority
[0067] (1) When the UAV flies to the handover area, the master remote controller initiates a handover request to the UAV and the slave remote controller.
[0068] (2) The slave remote controller uses the binding result of the master remote controller to communicate with the drone, encrypts the random number k with the session key sessionKey using SM4, and sends it to the drone.
[0069] (3) The drone uses the session key sessionKey to decrypt the random number k and quickly verify the identity of the remote controller, that is, the verification equation (x 1 ,y 1 )=[k]G, if the equation holds true, the identity authentication of the secondary remote controller is successful.
[0070] (4) The drone sends a confirmation handover request to the master remote controller.
[0071] (5) The main remote control is disconnected.
[0072] Figure 1 and Figure 2 The principle of the present invention is shown. It can be seen that in the present invention, after the main remote controller performs complete identity authentication on the sub-remote controller, the drone can use the intermediate calculation results to quickly authenticate the sub-remote controller, avoiding tedious calculations in the complete authentication process and improving authentication efficiency; in addition, the key server in the present invention performs symmetric encryption through built-in keys, and the session key is dynamically updated, which has stronger security.
[0073] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes. The schemes in the embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in various computer languages, for example, object-oriented programming language Java and literal scripting language JavaScript, etc.
[0074] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0075] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0076] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.
[0077] Although the preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, those skilled in the art may make other changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention.
[0078] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A method for quickly and securely handing over the control authority of a drone based on a national secret algorithm, which is used to realize the handover of the control authority of a drone between a main remote controller and a secondary remote controller; it is characterized by: include, The secondary remote controller registers with the key server and obtains the declared public key W A , and based on the declared public key W A Get the secondary private key d A and the secondary public key P A ; The secondary remote controller will have its own ID A and the secondary public key P A Sent to the master remote control, the master remote control based on the identity ID A Obtain the declared public key W of the secondary remote control from the key server A , perform secondary public key verification; After the secondary public key is verified, the primary remote controller sends a random bit string u to the secondary remote controller, the secondary remote controller generates a signature sign based on the random number k and sends it to the primary remote controller, and the primary remote controller authenticates the signature sign; After the identity authentication is passed, the main remote controller initiates a session request with the secondary remote controller to the key server, and the key server sends the ticket obtained by encrypting the session key sessionKey with the global symmetric key K to the main remote controller and the secondary remote controller; the main remote controller performs frequency matching with the drone, and sends the matching result to the secondary remote controller; When the drone is in the handover area, the main remote controller initiates a handover request to the drone and the secondary remote controller. The drone authenticates the secondary remote controller and sends a confirmation handover request to the main remote controller after successful authentication. The main remote controller is disconnected.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The key server generates elliptic curve system parameters (F q ,a,b,G,n), where F q is a domain of size q, a,b∈F q is the elliptic curve equation E(F q ), G is a non-zero base point on the elliptic curve, and n is the order of the base point G; The key server randomly selects ms∈[1,n-1] as the system master private key and calculates the system master public key P PUB =[ms]G, where [ms] is the top function, i.e. an integer not less than ms.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The secondary remote controller registers with the key server and obtains the declared public key W A ,include, The secondary remote controller generates elliptic curve system parameters (F q ,a,b,G,n), where F q is a domain of size q, a,b∈F q is the elliptic curve equation E(F q ), G is a non-zero base point on the elliptic curve, n is the order of the base point G; the secondary remote controller randomly selects d′ A ∈[1,n-1] as the partial private key and calculate the partial public key U A =[d′ A ]G; The secondary remote controller initiates a registration request to the key server and sends its ID A and partial public key U A Send to key server; The key server randomly selects w∈[1,n-1] according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm and calculates the partial private key t A =w+λ·ms modn and declared public key W A =U A +[w]G, and returns it to the secondary remote control; where λ is the identification summary of the secondary remote control, and ms is the system master private key.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The secondary remote controller is based on the declared public key W A Get the secondary private key d A and the secondary public key P A ,include, The secondary remote controller calculates the secondary private key d according to the certificateless and implicit certificate public key mechanism of the SM2 algorithm. A =d′ A +t A and the secondary public key P A =[d A ]G.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The master remote controller performs secondary public key verification, including: The master remote controller is based on the declared public key W A , calculate the secondary remote control identification digest in It is W A Coordinates in bit string form, H A It is the hash value of the secondary remote controller's identifier, some elliptic curve system parameters and the system master public key. 256 is a cryptographic hash algorithm with a message digest length of 256 bits; verify equation P A =W A +[λ]P PUB , if the equation holds true, the secondary public key of the secondary remote controller is verified successfully.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The secondary remote controller generates a signature sign based on the random number k and sends it to the primary remote controller, including: The remote controller randomly selects a random number k∈[1,n-1], and sets (x1,y1)=[k]G. Calculate e = H 256 (M) Convert the data type of e to an integer and calculate r = e + x1 mod n, then use the secondary private key d A Calculate s = (1 + d A ) -1 (kr×d A )modn, generate the signature sign=(r,s) and send it to the main remote control.
7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The master remote controller verifies the signature sign, including: The master remote controller verifies whether r∈[1,n-1] and s∈[1,n-1] hold. If both hold, it calculates e=H(M), t=r+smodn, (x1,y1)=[s]G+[t]P in sequence. A , R=e+x1 modn, verify the equation R=r; if the equation holds, the signature verification is successful and the identity authentication of the secondary remote controller is passed.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The main remote controller pairs with the drone and sends the pairing result to the secondary remote controller, including: The main remote control and the secondary remote control use the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey; The main remote controller and the drone are linked, the link result is encrypted by SM4 using the session key sessionKey to obtain ER, and then sent to the secondary remote controller; The secondary remote controller uses the session key sessionKey to perform SM4 decryption on ER to obtain the frequency binding result; The master remote controller uses the session key sessionKey to perform SM4 encryption on the intermediate calculation result (x1, y1) of the identity authentication of the slave remote controller to obtain the authentication summary Abs, and sends the authentication summary Abs and the ticket ticket to the drone; The drone uses the global symmetric key K to decrypt the ticket to obtain the session key sessionKey, and uses the session key sessionKey to decrypt the authentication summary Abs to obtain the intermediate calculation result (x1, y1).
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that: When the drone is in the handover area, the main remote controller sends a handover request to the drone and the secondary remote controller. The drone authenticates the secondary remote controller and sends a confirmation request to the main remote controller after successful authentication. The main remote controller is disconnected, including: When the drone flies to the handover area, the master remote controller sends a handover request to the drone and the slave remote controller; The secondary remote controller uses the binding result of the primary remote controller to communicate with the drone, encrypts the random number k with the session key sessionKey using SM4, and sends it to the drone; The drone uses the session key sessionKey to decrypt the random number k and quickly verifies the identity of the remote controller, that is, the verification equation (x1, y1) = [k] G. If the equation holds, the identity authentication of the remote controller is successful. The drone sends a confirmation handover request to the master remote controller; The master remote control is disconnected.