Block chain incentive distribution method and related equipment

Through the full-link design of on-chain staking contracts, off-chain multi-layer incentive contracts and on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, the high resource consumption, complexity and scalability of the incentive allocation mechanism in the blockchain system is solved, and efficient, fair and scalable incentive allocation is achieved.

CN120186151APending Publication Date: 2025-06-20SUN YAT SEN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202510380931.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-03-28
Publication Date
2025-06-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing blockchain systems, the incentive allocation mechanism has problems such as high resource consumption, complex and fragile mechanisms, insufficient incentive fairness and limited scalability, which seriously hinders the efficiency and practicality of the blockchain incentive system.

Method used

Blockchain incentive distribution is achieved through the full-link design of on-chain staking contracts, off-chain multi-layer incentive contracts and on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism. The on-chain pledge contract binds the responsibility of the collaboration node, and the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract includes basic incentives, task deposits and hash time lock rewards. The on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism automatically awards disputes.

Benefits of technology

Resource efficiency, fairness and scalability are significantly optimized, resource consumption on-chain is reduced, mechanism design is simplified, incentive fairness is ensured, and system throughput and scalability are improved.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a block chain incentive distribution method and related equipment, and the method comprises the steps: firstly building an on-chain pledge contract, enabling an initiating node and at least one following node to construct a cooperation relation through a block chain intelligent contract, and enabling the two parties to pledge funds and set a default fund automatic transfer rule; and then establishing an under-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the bottom layer pledges the basic incentive fund with the time lock by the initiating node, the middle layer follows the node pledge to prove the unlocking deposit of the task, and the upper layer initiating node binds the task reward by adopting the Hash time lock contract. Meanwhile, an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism is established, when the under-chain multi-layer incentive contract generates dispute, the contract state is submitted to the chain, and a verification node implements arbitration according to a contract execution log and the like and processes fund distribution and default penalty. Through cooperation of the on-chain pledge contract, the under-chain multi-layer incentive contract and the on-chain arbitration mechanism, efficient, fair and low-resource-consumption block chain incentive distribution is realized, and powerful support is provided for a distributed collaborative network.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of blockchain technology. More specifically, it relates to a blockchain incentive distribution method and related devices. Background Art

[0002] In current blockchain systems, incentive distribution is mainly achieved through on-chain reputation mechanisms, bet-hedging agreements, and cross-verification models. The on-chain reputation mechanism builds an evaluation system by recording node behaviors over a long period and dynamically adjusts the income of nodes according to their performance. The bet-hedging agreement requires nodes to pledge funds in advance and triggers corresponding reward or punishment measures according to the actual results of task completion. The cross-verification model relies on multiple nodes to cooperate with each other to verify the authenticity of tasks, thereby ensuring the fairness of distribution. However, it should be noted that all of these methods rely on on-chain smart contracts without exception, or rely on complex auditing processes, and complete the execution and supervision of incentive rules through frequent on-chain interaction operations, which have obvious limitations.

[0003] First, high on-chain resource consumption: During the execution of the on-chain reputation mechanism and the bet-hedging agreement, frequent auditing operations and dispute resolution processes require a large amount of on-chain interaction. This not only generates high Gas fees but also easily causes network congestion, greatly reducing the operating efficiency of the system.

[0004] Second, complex and fragile mechanisms: The design of long-term reputation evaluation rules is extremely complex, and dispute arbitration in the bet-hedging agreement, whether relying on manual processing or on-chain verification, is likely to introduce loopholes and cause processing delays, affecting the stability of the entire mechanism.

[0005] Third, insufficient incentive fairness: Due to information asymmetry between nodes or delays in task status updates, this may lead to uneven income distribution, thereby triggering cooperation conflicts between nodes and being unfavorable to the stable operation of the system.

[0006] Fourth, limited scalability: Solutions represented by cross-verification require multiple nodes to communicate in real time. When the node scale continues to expand, this real-time communication requirement is likely to form a network bottleneck and is difficult to meet the needs in large-scale cooperation scenarios, restricting the further development of blockchain systems.

[0007] These above-mentioned defects seriously hinder the efficiency improvement of blockchain incentive systems and greatly affect their practicality. Therefore, researching and developing a lightweight, automated, and highly scalable blockchain incentive distribution scheme has become an urgent problem to be solved currently. Summary of the Invention

[0008] This application provides a blockchain incentive allocation method and related devices. Through a full-link design of on-chain constraints, off-chain execution, and arbitration as a backup, while ensuring security, it significantly optimizes resource efficiency, fairness, and scalability, providing a reliable incentive infrastructure for distributed collaboration networks.

[0009] A blockchain incentive allocation method, comprising:

[0010] Establish an on-chain pledge contract, where the on-chain pledge contract stipulates that the initiating node and at least one following node establish a collaboration relationship through a blockchain smart contract. Both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and it is set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party will be automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0011] Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract. The middle layer of the contract stipulates that the following node pledges a margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof. The upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node binds the task reward using a hash time-lock contract;

[0012] Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, where the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the chain, and the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time-lock status, and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalty;

[0013] Perform blockchain incentive allocation based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0014] Optionally, the task proof includes at least one of proof of work PoW, Merkle root hash value, or verification path data based on Merkle tree.

[0015] Optionally, the threshold of the time-lock is dynamically adjusted according to the block generation rate of the blockchain network, and the reserved time needs to cover the maximum estimated duration required for task execution.

[0016] Optionally, the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time-lock status, and on-chain data, including:

[0017] The verification node verifies the signature validity of the contract verification execution steps based on the contract execution log, and the matching of the task proof with the preset rules;

[0018] The verification node detects the public status of the hash preimage in the on-chain block based on the on-chain data;

[0019] The verification node detects the time-lock timeout situation based on the time-lock status;

[0020] The verification node performs on-chain arbitration based on the signature validity, the matching, the public status, and the time-lock timeout situation.

[0021] Optionally, in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract between each node pair composed of an initiating node and a following node uses a unique hash lock and each contract is independently executed to prevent collusion among nodes to share hash pre-images.

[0022] Optionally, the verification of the proof of task is jointly executed by multiple independent verification nodes randomly selected in the blockchain network, and the verification result needs to be confirmed through a multi-signature mechanism and recorded on the chain.

[0023] A blockchain incentive distribution device, comprising:

[0024] An on-chain contract unit, configured to establish an on-chain pledge contract, where the on-chain pledge contract stipulates that an initiating node and at least one following node establish a cooperation relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and it is set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party are automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0025] An off-chain contract unit, configured to establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges basic incentive funds with a time lock to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the middle layer of the contract stipulates that the following node pledges a margin that needs to be unlocked by the proof of task, and the upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time-lock contract to bind the task reward;

[0026] A dispute arbitration unit, configured to establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, where the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the chain, and the verification node performs on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, the time-lock status, and the on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default punishment;

[0027] An allocation execution unit, configured to perform blockchain incentive distribution based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0028] A blockchain incentive distribution device, comprising a memory and a processor;

[0029] The memory is used for storing programs;

[0030] The processor is configured to execute the programs to implement the steps of the blockchain incentive distribution method as described in any one of the above.

[0031] A readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, characterized in that when the computer program is executed by a processor, each step of the blockchain incentive distribution method described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0032] A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that when the computer program is run by a processor, each step of the blockchain incentive distribution method described in any one of the above is executed.

[0033] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, a blockchain incentive distribution method and related devices provided by an embodiment of the present application achieve blockchain incentive distribution through the coordination of an on-chain pledge contract, an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and an on-chain arbitration mechanism. By means of the on-chain pledge contract, the responsibilities of cooperative nodes are bound. Through an off-chain hierarchical design, including basic incentives, task margin, and hash time lock rewards, lightweight task management is realized. Then, combined with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to automatically adjudicate disputes, efficient incentive distribution under multi-node cooperation is finally achieved.

[0034] In view of the existing defects, the present invention has made remarkable breakthroughs. Through the combination of time locks and hash locks in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the task execution and verification processes are transferred to the off-chain, and only key dispute arbitrations are placed on the on-chain, reducing redundant on-chain interactions and effectively reducing on-chain resource consumption. Clear task completion conditions, such as time lock release and hash lock verification, are used to replace complex reputation scoring rules, and the system complexity and maintenance costs are reduced through a hierarchical contract structure, greatly simplifying the mechanism design. The smart contract automatically executes the transfer of pledged funds and reward distribution, and cooperates with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to determine default behaviors in real time, eliminating distribution biases caused by human intervention and information asymmetry, and effectively ensuring incentive fairness. The off-chain hierarchical task allocation supports multi-node parallel cooperation, binds task dependencies through hash time locks, avoids large-scale node communication congestion, and also improves the system throughput, thereby enhancing the scalability.

[0035] In summary, through a full-link design of on-chain constraints, off-chain execution, and arbitration as a backup, the present invention significantly optimizes resource efficiency, fairness, and scalability while ensuring security, providing a reliable incentive infrastructure for distributed cooperation networks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only the embodiments of the present application. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without creative efforts.

[0037] Figure 1Flowchart of a blockchain incentive distribution method disclosed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0038] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the execution process of an on-chain staking contract disclosed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0039] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the execution process of an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract disclosed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0040] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the execution process of a multi-party cooperation disclosed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0041] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of a blockchain incentive distribution device disclosed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0042] Figure 6 Hardware structure block diagram of a blockchain incentive distribution device disclosed in an embodiment of the present application. Detailed implementation manners

[0043] Next, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present application.

[0044] The present application can be used in many general-purpose or special-purpose computing device environments or configurations. For example: personal computers, server computers, handheld devices or portable devices, tablet devices, multi-processor devices, distributed computing environments including any of the above devices or equipment, and so on.

[0045] Next, the solutions of the present application will be introduced. The present application proposes the following technical solutions. For details, please refer to the following text.

[0046] Figure 1 Flowchart of a blockchain incentive distribution method disclosed in an embodiment of the present application.

[0047] As Figure 1 shown, the method may include:

[0048] Step S1, establish an on-chain staking contract, where the on-chain staking contract stipulates that the initiating node and at least one following node establish a cooperation relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain staking contract respectively, and it is set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party will be automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party.

[0049] Specifically, the on-chain pledge contract is used to stipulate that the initiating node and at least one following node build a collaborative relationship with the help of blockchain smart contracts. Both parties participating in the cooperation need to pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and set that when one party defaults, the funds pledged by the defaulting party will be automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party.

[0050] Specifically, the on-chain contract in the present invention provides a credit endorsement for the establishment of a cooperative relationship between any two blockchain nodes within the system, and its mode is as Figure 2 shown. Generally, the cooperative relationship is initiated by one party and formally established after the other party responds. The node that actively initiates a cooperation request is called the initiating node, while the node that responds to the cooperation request is called the following node.

[0051] In a decentralized network environment, the initiating node can recruit following nodes through a decentralized node discovery protocol and then establish a cooperative relationship with them. The public key addresses and receiving account information of both parties to the cooperation will be recorded in the on-chain smart contract. At the same time, in order to enhance the trust between the two parties, both parties to the cooperation need to pledge a certain amount of funds to the contract.

[0052] When the cooperative relationship is normally terminated, the funds pledged by both parties will be returned to their respective receiving accounts. However, if one party engages in malicious behavior during the cooperation process, the funds pledged by the malicious party will be directly distributed to the other honest and non-defaulting party.

[0053] Step S2: Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the contract bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract middle layer stipulates that the following node pledges a margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the contract upper layer stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time-lock contract to bind task rewards.

[0054] Specifically, an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract is constructed, which has a clear hierarchical design and function planning. As Figure 3 shown, the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node needs to pledge time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract; the middle layer requires the following node to pledge a margin that can only be unlocked by virtue of task proof; the upper layer stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time-lock contract to bind task rewards.

[0055] The specific details are as follows:

[0056] ① Task proof: Task proof covers at least one of the forms of proof of work PoW, Merkle root hash value, or verification path data based on the Merkl tree. The verification of task proof is jointly executed by multiple independent verification nodes randomly selected in the blockchain network, and the verification result is confirmed through a multi-signature mechanism and recorded on the blockchain.

[0057] ② Time lock setting: The threshold of the time lock is dynamically adjusted according to the block generation rate of the blockchain network, and the reserved time must cover the maximum estimated duration required for task execution, so as to ensure the effectiveness and adaptability of the time lock mechanism.

[0058] In addition, in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract system, each contract between a pair of nodes consisting of an initiating node and a following node uses a unique hash lock, and each contract is executed independently. This design effectively prevents the risk of nodes colluding with each other and sharing hash pre-images. In addition to on-chain contracts, the off-chain protocol introduced by the present invention reduces the regulatory pressure on general malicious behaviors on the chain while ensuring secure incentives. The off-chain protocol consists of three layers of contracts, and each layer of contract has specific functions. These contracts are established between the two cooperating nodes, and the two parties are responsible for recording and maintaining the contract execution status.

[0059] The following will further introduce each layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract:

[0060] Bottom layer: Lock the basic incentive

[0061] The bottom layer function of the contract provides basic incentive guarantee for task execution, avoiding honest nodes getting nothing due to cooperation failure. Operation mechanism: At the bottom layer of the protocol, the initiating node needs to pledge a certain amount of funds in the contract as subsidy incentives. These subsidy funds are locked in the contract by the time lock, and when the time lock times out, the funds will be automatically unlocked and directly distributed to the following node. This design ensures that even if the task fails to be completed for various reasons, the following node can still obtain the minimum incentive, effectively avoiding the risk that honest following nodes cannot obtain rewards at all due to the dishonest behavior of the initiating node.

[0062] Middle layer: Lock the task performance bond

[0063] The middle layer function of the contract is to prevent the improper behavior of the following node from not performing the work but attempting to obtain the minimum subsidy incentive. Operation mechanism: In the middle layer of the protocol, the following node needs to provide a performance bond for the task, and this bond is also locked by both the time lock and the task lock. The following node must submit a task completion certificate to unlock the task lock and retrieve the bond. If the following node fails to complete the task or submit a valid certificate before the time lock times out, the pledged bond will be transferred to the initiating node to compensate for the task rewards pledged by the initiating node.

[0064] Upper layer: Lock the task reward

[0065] The upper layer of the contract aims to implement a fair reward distribution mechanism based on the task completion rate. Operating mechanism: At the upper layer of the protocol, the standard Hash Time Lock Contract (HTLC) is used to lock the task reward (Prepaid BlockReward, PBR) prepaid by the initiating node in the contract. The initiating node generates a random hash value and uses this hash value to set the hash lock in the HTLC, thereby locking the task reward in the contract to prevent the following node from obtaining the PBR in advance. The contract clearly stipulates that the following node needs to complete the assigned task and obtain the hash preimage generated by the initiating node to unlock the reward. After the task is completed, the initiating node needs to announce the hash preimage in the newly generated block, specifically by attaching the preimage to the block header of the new block. The following node can obtain the required hash preimage by observing the blocks on the chain, and then unlock the contract to obtain the PBR. If the time lock expires and the task is not completed, the PBR will be returned to the initiating node.

[0066] Task lock mechanism in the middle layer: The time lock and hash lock designs in this invention are the same as those in the existing HTLC solutions, while the task lock is a unique design of this invention. The task lock is a fund locking mechanism set by the task assigner (i.e., the initiating node) in the contract. It allows the executor (i.e., the following node) to unlock the task lock and obtain the funds in the contract by providing proof of task completion after completing a specific task. As long as these proofs meet the rules set by the task assigner, they can open the task lock in the contract, rather than relying on a fixed value. Both parties signing the contract will retain copies of each execution step of the contract and confirm them with their signatures. The task assigner will not actively review the proofs submitted by the executor, but the verification nodes on the chain will verify whether the executor has correctly completed the established work (for example, when the executor executes a transaction, the verification nodes on the chain can verify whether the executor has correctly executed the transaction based on the block validity). This setting greatly reduces the verification workload of the task assigner. The proof of task execution can be used as the basis for determining the solution to disputes when disputes occur between the task assigner and the executor.

[0067] Principle of the security incentive mechanism: In an ideal honest cooperation scenario, the most basic incentive mechanism can be achieved with the help of the Hash Time Lock Contract HTLC. That is, the task assigner and the executor sign a hash time lock contract. After the executor completes the task, the task assigner actively announces the hash preimage required by the HTLC, and the executor can obtain the incentive. However, in a trustless distributed blockchain system, both the task initiator and the executor may act maliciously, resulting in losses for one of them.

[0068] Among them, if the task assigner is malicious, there may be two malicious acts against the executor. First, the malicious task assigner packages invalid blocks, resulting in the invalid blocks embedded with the HTLC hash preimage being unable to be chained, so that the executor cannot obtain the hash preimage announced by the task assigner and thus cannot obtain the incentive (i.e., the block reward prepaid by the task assigner). Second, the malicious task assigner does not announce the hash preimage in the block even if the block is chained, resulting in the executor being unable to obtain the incentive. For the first case, the present invention sets a basic incentive at the bottom layer of the off-chain protocol as a guarantee measure for the executor to obtain the incentive, ensuring that the basic incentive is necessarily distributed to the executor. For the second case, the present invention proposes an on-chain dispute resolution solution, and the executor can unilaterally initiate on-chain arbitration to safeguard its own interests.

[0069] If the task executor is malicious, there may also be two malicious acts against the task assigner. First, the malicious executor submits invalid or incorrect task execution results to the task assigner, interfering with its block generation process. Since the task assigner does not actively verify the execution results of the executor, it is difficult to determine the reason for the failure to generate a block. Second, the malicious executor does not execute the task and only waits for the task assigner to distribute the basic incentive. For the first case, the present invention allows the node (task assigner) to request the block verification result from the verification nodes in the blockchain system and gives a certain amount of funds as an incentive; or multiple adjacent nodes (task assigners) cooperate with each other. If an adjacent node finds that there are invalid task execution results in the block, it will send the verification result to the node that generates the block. The motivation for cooperation among nodes is that verifying invalid blocks will consume the time and computing power of each verification node, thus affecting its own benefits. For the second case, a performance bond mechanism is introduced in the second layer of the protocol. The executor needs to pledge funds equal to the basic incentive before accepting the task. If it does not execute the task, the task assigner obtains the performance bond and the executor obtains the basic incentive, and neither party suffers financial losses.

[0070] Furthermore, the task assigner may cooperate with multiple executors at the same time, and the contracts between each pair of cooperative nodes are independent of each other, such as Figure 4 . All task rewards are locked with different hash locks, effectively preventing multiple executors from colluding to share a single hash preimage and defrauding more rewards. In addition, the winner-takes-all feature of the blockchain consensus mechanism may cause the blocks of the task assigner to be unable to be chained for a long time. At this time, the executor can choose to terminate the cooperation with the current task assigner and instead cooperate with a more competitive task assigner. The role of the time lock is to ensure that the node can recover its own funds when the set timeout time arrives. The setting of the time lock timeout time can be dynamically adjusted according to the changes in the blockchain performance, which entirely depends on the will of both parties to the cooperation, but sufficient time needs to be reserved for the executor to complete the assigned task.

[0071] Step S3: Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism. The on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the on-chain, and the verification nodes conduct on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status, and on-chain data, and execute fund allocation and default penalties.

[0072] Specifically, an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism is built. This mechanism clearly stipulates that once a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status needs to be submitted to the on-chain. Subsequently, the verification nodes carry out on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status, and on-chain data, and implement fund allocation and default penalty measures.

[0073] The verification nodes conduct on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status, and on-chain data, including:

[0074] ① The verification nodes verify the signature validity of the contract execution steps in the contract execution log, as well as the matching degree between the proof of task and the preset rules;

[0075] ② The verification nodes detect the public status of the hash preimage in the on-chain block based on the on-chain data;

[0076] ③ The verification nodes detect the time lock timeout situation based on the time lock status;

[0077] ④ The verification nodes conduct on-chain arbitration according to the signature validity, the matching degree, the public status, and the time lock timeout situation.

[0078] Specifically, the verification nodes verify the signature validity of the execution steps in the contract execution log, and at the same time check whether the proof of task matches the preset rules. By confirming the authenticity of the signature, the legality of the contract execution steps can be ensured; and verifying the matching degree between the proof of task and the preset rules can judge the compliance of task execution. The verification nodes use the on-chain data to detect the public status of the hash preimage in the on-chain block. This step is crucial for judging whether the task assigner publicly discloses the hash preimage as required, because whether the hash preimage is correctly disclosed directly affects whether the executor can obtain the reward smoothly. The verification nodes check whether the time lock has timed out based on the time lock status. Whether the time lock times out is an important basis for judging whether the contract execution is completed within the specified time and has a key impact on the arbitration result. The verification nodes comprehensively consider various factors such as signature validity, matching degree, public status, and time lock timeout situation, and finally make an on-chain arbitration award. This comprehensive judgment method can comprehensively and objectively judge the contract dispute and ensure the fairness and reasonableness of the arbitration result.

[0079] In some specific situations, off-chain contracts may be difficult to resist some malicious attacks, such as:

[0080] Malicious behavior of the task assigner: The task assigner releases an invalid hash preimage or fails to announce the hash preimage on time before the time lock expires for other reasons, which will cause the executor to be unable to obtain the pre-paid block reward. In the face of such a situation, the executor has the right to initiate on-chain arbitration.

[0081] Malicious behavior of the executor: The executor provides invalid proof of task execution, resulting in the block of the task assigner not being able to be added to the chain. However, in this case, the executor may take away the performance bond it pledged and may even obtain the basic incentive provided by the task assigner. Once such a problem occurs, the task assigner can initiate on-chain arbitration.

[0082] To effectively protect the interests of honest execution nodes, the present invention designs the following on-chain arbitration mechanism:

[0083] ① Node initiates the arbitration process: The node can submit the states of each layer of contracts in the off-chain security incentive protocol to the chain. These contract states record in detail the execution of each step of the contract, and each execution step needs to be signed and confirmed by both parties to be considered valid. These valid execution steps will serve as an important basis for initiating on-chain arbitration, providing detailed and reliable information support for subsequent arbitration work.

[0084] ② Verifier verifies the contract state: The verifiers on the blockchain will gradually verify each operation in the submitted contract state. This process includes confirming the validity of the contract execution steps, verifying the task completion proof (such as the state root) provided by the node, and reviewing the time lock state to determine whether the task is completed as agreed. It should be noted that some verification work needs to be determined based on the content in the on-chain block, such as identifying the invalid hash preimage announced by the malicious task assigner. During the entire arbitration process, the verifiers should consist of a decentralized network of independent nodes. Through the participation of multiple parties, it can effectively avoid partiality that may be caused by centralized verification, ensuring the fairness and objectivity of the arbitration process.

[0085] ③ Ruling and fund distribution rules: When a dispute occurs, on-chain arbitration can verify the working status of the node by auditing the task execution log. Specifically, this includes in-depth analysis of information such as the intermediate results or execution snapshots submitted by the node to further ensure the fairness of the ruling. If the verifiers determine that the task assigner fails to announce a valid hash preimage on time and the executor provides a valid task completion proof, then the remaining funds in the contract will be directly distributed to the task executor; conversely, if the determination result is that the task completion proof provided by the executor is invalid, that is, the task is not completed, then according to the contract rules, the remaining funds in the contract will be returned to the task assigner. This way of fund distribution based on clear determination results can clearly and reasonably solve the problem of the ownership of funds in contract disputes.

[0086] ④ Supplementary punishment mechanism: To further standardize node behavior and strengthen the constraint on contract execution, when the validator determines that one of the two parties in a cooperation fails to fulfill the contract, a supplementary punishment mechanism can be introduced. The specific approach is to distribute the funds pledged by the malicious party in the on-chain contract to the honest party to compensate for the possible additional losses suffered by the honest party. This punishment mechanism not only serves as a deterrent to malicious behavior but also helps maintain the fairness and stability of the entire blockchain system and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all participants.

[0087] Step S4: Perform blockchain incentive distribution based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0088] Specifically, the on-chain pledge contract lays the foundation for cooperation trust, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract refines the incentive rules from different aspects to stimulate the enthusiasm of nodes. The on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism arbitrates based on various data when disputes arise in the contract, determining the fund distribution and implementing punishments. The three work together to ensure fair, just, and efficient incentive distribution and guarantee the stable operation of node cooperation within the blockchain system.

[0089] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, a blockchain incentive distribution method and related devices provided in the embodiments of the present application achieve blockchain incentive distribution through the coordination of an on-chain pledge contract, an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and an on-chain arbitration mechanism. By means of the on-chain pledge contract, the responsibilities of cooperative nodes are bound. Through an off-chain hierarchical design, including basic incentives, task margin, and hash time lock rewards, lightweight task management is realized. Combined with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to automatically adjudicate disputes, efficient incentive distribution under multi-node cooperation is finally achieved.

[0090] In response to existing defects, the present invention has made significant breakthroughs. Through the combination of time locks and hash locks in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the task execution and verification processes are transferred off-chain, and only key dispute arbitration is placed on-chain, reducing redundant on-chain interactions and effectively reducing on-chain resource consumption. Clear task completion conditions, such as time lock release and hash lock verification, replace complex reputation scoring rules, and the system complexity and maintenance costs are reduced through a hierarchical contract structure, greatly simplifying the mechanism design. The smart contract automatically executes the transfer of pledged funds and reward distribution, and cooperates with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to determine default behaviors in real time, eliminating distribution biases caused by human intervention and information asymmetry and effectively guaranteeing incentive fairness. The off-chain hierarchical task distribution supports multi-node parallel cooperation, binds task dependencies through hash time locks, avoids large-scale node communication congestion, and also improves the system throughput, thereby enhancing the scalability.

[0091] In summary, through the full-link design of on-chain constraints, off-chain execution, and arbitration as a backup, the present invention significantly optimizes resource efficiency, fairness, and scalability while ensuring security, providing a reliable incentive infrastructure for distributed collaborative networks.

[0092] Next, a blockchain incentive allocation device provided by an embodiment of the present application will be described. The blockchain incentive allocation device described below can be correspondingly referred to the blockchain incentive allocation method described above.

[0093] See Figure 5 , Figure 5 which is a schematic diagram of a blockchain incentive allocation device disclosed in an embodiment of the present application.

[0094] As Figure 5 shown, the blockchain incentive allocation device may include:

[0095] An on-chain contract unit 110, configured to establish an on-chain pledge contract, where the on-chain pledge contract stipulates that an initiating node and at least one following node establish a collaborative relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and it is set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party are automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0096] An off-chain contract unit 120, configured to establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the middle layer of the contract stipulates that the following node pledges a margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node binds the task reward using a hash time-lock contract;

[0097] A dispute arbitration unit 130, configured to establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, where the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the on-chain, and the verification node implements on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, the time-lock status, and the on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalty;

[0098] An allocation execution unit 140, configured to perform blockchain incentive allocation based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0099] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, a blockchain incentive allocation method and related devices provided by the embodiments of the present application achieve blockchain incentive allocation through the coordination of an on-chain pledge contract, an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and an on-chain arbitration mechanism. By means of the on-chain pledge contract, the responsibilities of cooperative nodes are bound. Through off-chain hierarchical design, including basic incentives, task margin, and hash time lock rewards, lightweight task management is realized. Then, combined with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to automatically adjudicate disputes, efficient incentive allocation under multi-node cooperation is ultimately achieved.

[0100] In view of the existing defects, the present invention has made remarkable breakthroughs. Through the combination of time lock and hash lock in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the task execution and verification processes are transferred to the off-chain, and only key dispute arbitrations are placed on the on-chain, reducing redundant on-chain interactions and effectively reducing on-chain resource consumption. Clear task completion conditions, such as time lock release and hash lock verification, are used to replace complex reputation scoring rules, and the system complexity and maintenance costs are reduced through a hierarchical contract structure, greatly simplifying the mechanism design. The smart contract automatically executes the transfer of pledged funds and reward distribution, and cooperates with the on-chain arbitration mechanism to determine default behaviors in real time, eliminating distribution biases caused by human intervention and information asymmetry, and effectively guaranteeing incentive fairness. Off-chain hierarchical task allocation supports multi-node parallel cooperation. By binding task dependencies through hash time locks, large-scale node communication congestion is avoided, and the system throughput is also improved, thereby enhancing the scalability.

[0101] In summary, through the full-link design of on-chain constraints, off-chain execution, and arbitration as a backup, the present invention significantly optimizes resource efficiency, fairness, and scalability while ensuring security, providing a reliable incentive infrastructure for distributed cooperation networks.

[0102] Optionally, the task proof includes at least one of proof of work PoW, Merkle root hash value, or verification path data based on Merkle tree.

[0103] Optionally, the threshold of the time lock is dynamically adjusted according to the block generation rate of the blockchain network, and the reserved time needs to cover the maximum estimated duration required for task execution.

[0104] Optionally, the verification node performs on-chain arbitration based on contract execution logs, time lock status, and on-chain data, including:

[0105] The verification node verifies the signature validity of the contract verification execution step based on the contract execution log, as well as the matching of the task proof and the preset rules;

[0106] The verification node detects the public state of the hash preimage in the on-chain block based on the on-chain data;

[0107] The verification node detects the time lock timeout situation based on the time lock status;

[0108] The verification node performs on-chain arbitration based on the signature validity, the matching, the public status, and the time-lock timeout situation.

[0109] Optionally, in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, each contract between a node pair composed of an initiating node and a following node uses a unique hash lock and each contract is executed independently to prevent collusion between nodes to share hash pre-images.

[0110] Optionally, the verification of the proof of task is jointly performed by multiple independent verification nodes randomly selected in the blockchain network, and the verification result needs to be confirmed through a multi-signature mechanism and recorded on the chain.

[0111] The blockchain incentive distribution device provided by the embodiments of the present application can be applied to a blockchain incentive distribution device. Figure 6 shows a hardware structure block diagram of a blockchain incentive distribution device. Refer to Figure 6 , the hardware structure of the blockchain incentive distribution device may include: at least one processor 1, at least one communication interface 2, at least one memory 3, and at least one communication bus 4;

[0112] In the embodiments of the present application, the number of the processor 1, the communication interface 2, the memory 3, and the communication bus 4 is at least one, and the processor 1, the communication interface 2, and the memory 3 complete mutual communication through the communication bus 4;

[0113] The processor 1 may be a central processing unit CPU, or a specific integrated circuit ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of the present invention, etc.;

[0114] The memory 3 may include a high-speed RAM memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory;

[0115] Among them, the memory stores a program, and the processor can call the program stored in the memory. The program is used for:

[0116] Establish an on-chain pledge contract, which stipulates that the initiating node and at least one following node establish a cooperative relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party are automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0117] Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the contract bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract middle layer stipulates that the following nodes pledge margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the contract upper layer stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time-lock contract to bind task rewards;

[0118] Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, which stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the on-chain, and the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time-lock status and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalty;

[0119] Conduct blockchain incentive distribution based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0120] Optionally, the refined functions and extended functions of the program can be referred to the above description.

[0121] The embodiment of the present application also provides a readable storage medium, which can store a program suitable for a processor to execute, and the program is used for:

[0122] Establish an on-chain pledge contract, which stipulates that the initiating node and at least one following node establish a cooperative relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party are automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0123] Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the contract bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract middle layer stipulates that the following nodes pledge margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the contract upper layer stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time-lock contract to bind task rewards;

[0124] Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, which stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the on-chain, and the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time-lock status and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalty;

[0125] Conduct blockchain incentive distribution based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0126] Optionally, the refined functions and extended functions of the program can be referred to the above description.

[0127] The embodiments of the present application also provide a computer program product, including a computer program, and the method executed when the computer program runs on a processor is as follows:

[0128] Establish an on-chain pledge contract, which stipulates that the initiating node and at least one following node establish a collaborative relationship through a blockchain smart contract, both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract respectively, and set that the pledged funds of the defaulting party are automatically transferred to the non-defaulting party;

[0129] Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, where the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges time-locked basic incentive funds to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the middle layer of the contract stipulates that the following node pledges a margin that needs to be unlocked with a task certificate, and the upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node binds task rewards using a hash time-lock contract;

[0130] Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism, which stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, submit the contract status to the on-chain, and the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time-lock status, and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default punishment;

[0131] Perform blockchain incentive distribution based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

[0132] Optionally, the refined functions and extended functions of the program can be referred to the above description.

[0133] Finally, it should also be noted that in this article, relational terms such as first and second are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the term "including", "comprising" or any other variant thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements not only includes those elements, but also includes other elements not expressly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. Without further limitation, an element defined by the statement "including a..." does not exclude the existence of additional identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the element.

[0134] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner. Each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other.

[0135] The foregoing description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to implement or use the present application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein can be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present application. Therefore, the present application will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A blockchain incentive allocation method, characterized in that: include: Establishing an on-chain pledge contract, which stipulates that the initiating node and at least one follower node establish a collaborative relationship through a blockchain smart contract, and both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract, and set the defaulting party's pledged funds to be automatically transferred to the abiding party; Establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, wherein the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges the basic incentive funds with time lock to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the middle layer of the contract stipulates that the follower node pledges the margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time lock contract to bind task rewards; Establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism. The on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute arises in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the chain, and the verification node conducts on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalties; Blockchain incentives are distributed based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The task proof includes at least one of proof of work PoW, a Merkle tree root hash value, or verification path data based on a Merkle tree.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The threshold of the time lock is dynamically adjusted according to the block generation rate of the blockchain network, and the reserved time must cover the maximum estimated duration required for task execution.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The verification node implements on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status and on-chain data, including: The verification node verifies the validity of the signature of the execution step based on the contract execution log contract, and the matching of the task proof with the preset rules; The verification node detects the public status of the hash original image in the on-chain block based on the on-chain data; The verification node detects a time lock timeout based on the time lock state; The verification node performs on-chain arbitration based on the signature validity, the matching, the public status and the time lock timeout.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that In the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, each contract between a node pair consisting of an initiating node and a following node uses a unique hash lock and each contract is executed independently to prevent collusion between nodes to share the hash original image.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The verification of the task proof is jointly performed by multiple independent verification nodes randomly selected from the blockchain network, and the verification results must be confirmed through a multi-signature mechanism and recorded on the chain.

7. A blockchain incentive distribution device, characterized in that: include: The on-chain contract unit is used to establish an on-chain pledge contract. The on-chain pledge contract stipulates that the initiating node and at least one follower node establish a cooperative relationship through a blockchain smart contract. Both parties pledge funds to the current on-chain pledge contract, and set the defaulting party's pledged funds to be automatically transferred to the abiding party. The off-chain contract unit is used to establish an off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, wherein the bottom layer of the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract stipulates that the initiating node pledges the basic incentive funds with time lock to the current off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the middle layer of the contract stipulates that the follower node pledges the margin that needs to be unlocked by task proof, and the upper layer of the contract stipulates that the initiating node uses a hash time lock contract to bind the task reward; The dispute arbitration unit is used to establish an on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism. The on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism stipulates that when a dispute occurs in the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, the contract status is submitted to the chain, and the verification node implements on-chain arbitration based on the contract execution log, time lock status and on-chain data, and executes fund allocation and default penalties; An allocation execution unit is used to allocate blockchain incentives based on the on-chain pledge contract, the off-chain multi-layer incentive contract, and the on-chain dispute arbitration mechanism.

8. A blockchain incentive distribution device, characterized in that: including memory and processor; The memory is used to store programs; The processor is used to execute the program to implement each step of the blockchain incentive allocation method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, each step of the blockchain incentive allocation method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the blockchain incentive allocation method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 are executed.