A method and system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2

Abstract

The present application discloses a method and system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2. The method includes: separately creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard; separately executing verification rules on external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model; separately executing forward transformation and reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing the verification rules on the referenced external files. Using the solution of the present application, it is possible to verify whether the referenced external files meet the defined security constraints, thereby enhancing the credibility and reliability of the entire safety case. At the same time, by separately executing forward transformation and reverse transformation between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, lossless bidirectional migration of the safety case model between the SysML v2 platform and the EMF platform can be achieved, ensuring the consistency of model semantics.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application generally relates to the technical field of systems engineering modeling and safety demonstration. More specifically, this application relates to a method and system for creating a safety case compliant with SACM in SysML v2. Background Art

[0002] In the field of safety-critical system development, the demonstration of system safety is the core task to ensure that the product complies with functional safety standards. As a structured safety demonstration method, the safety case constructs a systematic demonstration structure through claims, evidence, and reasoning, and has been widely applied in industries such as aerospace, nuclear energy, rail transit, and healthcare. This method provides a traceable and verifiable evidence chain support for the safety of complex systems by formally describing system safety requirements, verification processes, and verification results.

[0003] With the development of model-based systems engineering (MBSE) technology, the model-based assurance case (MBAC) method has gradually become an industry trend. Its core lies in integrating safety case modeling with system models (such as structure models, behavior models, requirement models, and safety analysis models) on a unified platform to achieve structured, formal, and automated verification capabilities for demonstration modeling. The existing structured safety case metamodel (SACM) in the prior art provides a standardized semantic framework for safety case modeling, supporting cross-tool and cross-domain model interoperability and consistency verification.

[0004] As a new generation of system engineering modeling standard, the system modeling language SysML v2 has achieved significant improvements in semantic foundation, expression ability, and model scalability compared to the previous version (SysML v1), and has gradually become the mainstream language for complex system design. However, in the prior art, SysML v2 currently does not natively support safety case modeling and lacks an inheritance mechanism with the SAMC metamodel, resulting in low efficiency in safety case modeling, lack of traceability in the demonstration process, and difficulty in data linkage verification, which severely restricts the compliance certification and iteration speed of safety-critical systems in complex scenarios.

[0005] In view of this, there is an urgent need to provide a solution for creating a safety case compliant with SACM in SysML v2 to achieve the integration of supporting SACM and SysML v2 interoperability, unified verification rules, and external data reference, thereby improving the automation level and credibility of safety case modeling. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To at least solve one or more of the technical problems mentioned above, this application proposes solutions for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 in multiple aspects.

[0007] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2, including: separately creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard; separately executing verification rules on external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model; and separately performing forward conversion and reverse conversion on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing the verification rules on the referenced external files.

[0008] In some embodiments, during the process of creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model that complies with the SACM standard, according to the SACM standard, an EMF-based SACM safety case model including an argument package, an artifact package, and an FMEDA package is created in a safety case management environment; wherein, an external file path and verification rules are embedded in the Artifact element of the EMF-based SACM safety case model; the external file includes an FMEDA model constructed based on the FMEDA metamodel; and the FMEDA metamodel includes Component elements, FailureMode elements, and SafetyMechanism elements.

[0009] In some embodiments, during the process of executing verification rules on external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model, the following steps are performed: referencing an FMEDA model in SysML v2 format in the EMF tool for creating the EMF-based SACM safety case model; converting the FMEDA model in SysML v2 format into an EMF-based FMEDA model through mapping rules; calling the EOL engine to execute verification rules on the EMF-based FMEDA model, and feeding back the verification results to the Artifact element of the created EMF-based SACM safety case model.

[0010] In some embodiments, during the forward transformation of the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after performing verification rules on the referenced external files, the following steps are performed: Define the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2; According to the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, map the SACM metamodel to the corresponding SysML v2 definitions; Call the Epsilon Generation Language (EGL) engine to form the SysML v2 safety case model corresponding to the EMF-based SACM safety case model through the obtained corresponding SysML v2 definitions by mapping.

[0011] In some embodiments, during the process of creating the SysML v2 safety case model, the following steps are performed: Build the SysML v2 safety case model through SysML v2 definitions; Embed the external file path and verification rules in the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model; Call the EOL engine to execute the verification rules according to the type of the external file to verify the created SysML v2 safety case model, and feedback the verification result to the Artifact element of the SysML v2 safety case model; wherein, the external file includes an FMEDA model built based on the FMEDA metamodel; the FMEDA metamodel includes Component elements, FailureMode elements, and SafetyMechanism elements.

[0012] In some embodiments, the mapping rules from the SACM metamodel to SysML v2 include: class and abstract class mapping rules, connection relationship mapping rules, attribute and enumeration mapping rules, structural relationship mapping rules, and inheritance relationship mapping rules.

[0013] In some embodiments, during the process of performing verification rules on the external files referenced by the SysML v2 safety case model, the following steps are performed: Extract the external file path and verification rules from the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model; Call the EOL engine to execute the verification rules on the external file according to the type of the external file, and feedback the verification result to the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model.

[0014] In some embodiments, during the process of performing reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after verifying the rules for the referenced external files, the following steps are performed: Call the Epsilon model to generate an EMG generation program to generate the corresponding EMG script; Execute the EMG script to call the SACM metamodel to form the EMF-based SACM safety case model corresponding to the SysML v2 safety case model.

[0015] In some embodiments, after separately verifying the rules for the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, based on the verification results, it is respectively determined whether the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model meet the defined security constraints.

[0016] In a second aspect, the present application provides a system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 as described in any embodiment of the first aspect is adopted to implement SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2. The system includes: a model creation module for separately creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard; a verification execution module for separately executing verification rules on the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model; a mapping transformation module for performing forward transformation and reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after separately executing verification rules on the referenced external files.

[0017] Through the solution for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 provided above, the embodiments of the present application can verify whether the referenced external files meet the defined security constraints by executing verification rules on the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, thereby enhancing the credibility and reliability of the entire safety case. By separately performing forward transformation and reverse transformation between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, lossless bidirectional migration of the safety case model between the SysML v2 platform and the EMF platform can be achieved, ensuring the consistency of model semantics.

[0018] Furthermore, in some embodiments, by embedding the external file path and verification rules in the Artifact element of the EMF-based SACM security case model, the structure of the Artifact element of the SACM security case model is extended, supporting unified management of the path, type, and verification rules of the external file path, realizing the automatic linkage between the reference of external evidence and the security analysis task, and enhancing the openness and data fusion ability of the modeling process.

[0019] Even further, in some embodiments, during the process of executing the verification rules for the external files referenced by the SysML v2 security case model, by extracting the external file path and verification rules from the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 security case model, the automatic execution of the verification rules is realized, and it supports writing the verification results back to the original model, forming a closed-loop process of modeling-verification-feedback, significantly reducing the manual intervention and error probability during the verification process.

[0020] Still further, in some embodiments, during the process of performing the forward transformation between the EMF-based SACM security case model and the SysML v2 security case model, by defining the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, the semantic integrity of the argument structure and attributes can be maintained during the transformation of the security case model, supporting the traceability and semantic consistency between the argument structure in the security case and the system model and analysis data, and effectively improving the traceability and consistency management ability between modeling elements. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] By reading the following detailed description with reference to the accompanying drawings, the above and other objects, features, and advantages of the exemplary embodiments of the present application will become easily understandable. In the drawings, several embodiments of the present application are shown in an exemplary rather than restrictive manner, and the same or corresponding reference numerals represent the same or corresponding parts, where:

[0022] Figure 1 Shows an exemplary flowchart of a method for implementing SACM-compliant security case creation in SysML v2 according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Figure 2 Shows an exemplary flowchart of executing verification rules for external files referenced by an EMF-based SACM security case model according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0024] Figure 3 Shows an exemplary flowchart of executing verification rules for external files referenced by a SysML v2 security case model according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0025] Figure 4An exemplary structural block diagram of a system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of this application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the embodiments described are part of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0027] It should be understood that the terms "include" and "comprising" used in the description and claims of this application indicate the presence of described features, wholes, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, components and / or collections thereof.

[0028] It should also be understood that the terms used in this specification are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit this application. As used in this specification and claims, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be further understood that the term "and / or" as used in this specification and claims refers to any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items, including and including these combinations.

[0029] In the existing technology, when implementing model-driven safety case modeling based on SysML v2, there are the following key technical defects:

[0030] First, the lack of a unified semantic mapping mechanism between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2 prevents safety case modeling from directly reusing modeling artifacts from system models (such as structural, behavioral, and requirement models). For example, safety analysis results (such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and FMEDA) cannot be structured and integrated into the safety case evidence chain, resulting in data gaps between models. Furthermore, bidirectional conversion or co-evolution between SACM and SysML v2 models is difficult, hindering cross-team collaborative modeling and consistency verification.

[0031] Second, the SysML v2 metamodel does not define the specialized semantic elements required for safety argumentation (such as claim hierarchy, evidence types, and inference rules). This forces users to implement safety case modeling through non-standard methods (such as extended tag values or custom diagrams). This non-native modeling approach is prone to semantic ambiguity, reducing model reusability and maintainability, and making it difficult to meet the semantic accuracy requirements of formal verification.

[0032] Third, existing safety case tools are mostly built on the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF), while system models and security analysis models often utilize heterogeneous languages like SysML v2. Due to the lack of a unified verification rule expression framework and portable execution mechanism, verification logic (such as verification of security goal satisfaction and verification of evidence chain integrity) is often fixed within specific tools, making verification rules difficult to reuse or extend across platforms. Furthermore, verification results must be manually annotated into the model, making it impossible to achieve an automated closed-loop verification and modeling process. This significantly reduces engineering efficiency and increases the complexity of version tracking.

[0033] Fourth, the current SACM metamodel lacks a standardized interface for referencing external safety analysis artifacts (such as failure probability data generated by FMEDA and qualitative / quantitative analysis results from FTA). This prevents these key pieces of evidence from being structured and embedded in the safety case model. This lack of integration not only fragments the data flow between safety analysis and demonstration modeling but also reduces the credibility of the verification chain, making it difficult to meet the complete chain of evidence required by high-security systems.

[0034] In view of this, the embodiments of the present application provide a solution for implementing SACM-compliant security case creation in SysML v2, so as to solve the problems of lack of semantic mapping and bidirectional conversion between EMF-based SACM security cases and SysML v2 SACM security case models, lack of semantic support for security case modeling in SysML v2, difficulty in migrating and automatically executing security verification rules between multiple platforms, lack of consistent links between assurance modeling and security analysis, and the problem that existing tools verification is not visible, traceable, or interactive.

[0035] Figure 1 An exemplary flow chart of a method 100 for implementing SACM-compliant security case creation in SysML v2 according to an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0036] like Figure 1 As shown, in step S110, an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard are created respectively.

[0037] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model that complies with the SACM standard, according to the SACM standard, an EMF-based SACM safety case model including an argument package, an artifact package, and an FMEDA package is created in a safety case management environment.

[0038] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model including an argument package, an artifact package, and an FMEDA package, the SACM metamodel is loaded, and an EMF-based SACM safety case model is generated based on the SACM metamodel.

[0039] In an embodiment of the present application, the SACM metamodel includes basic components, safety case components, argument components, artifact components, terminology components, etc.

[0040] In an embodiment of the present application, an external file path and a verification rule are embedded in the Artifact element of the EMF-based SACM safety case model. That is, an external file path and a verification rule are embedded in the artifact of the artifact package.

[0041] In an embodiment of the present application, to solve the problem that the SACM metamodel cannot directly reference external files, the structure of the Artifact element of the SACM metamodel is extended to enable it to have the ability to record external file paths and file types. The specific field mapping relationships are as follows: the referenced file path is stored in: artifact.property.description.content.value.content; the file type information is stored in: artifact.property.implementationconstraint.content.value.content; the verification rule content is stored in: artifact.implementation.content.value.content.

[0042] Through the Artifact element structure of the SACM metamodel, unified management of the paths, types, and verification rules of external files is supported, the linkage between the reference of external evidence and the security analysis task is realized automatically, and the openness and data fusion ability of the modeling process are enhanced.

[0043] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of creating a SysML v2 safety case model, first, a SysML v2 safety case model is constructed through SysML v2 definitions. Then, an external file path and a verification rule are embedded in the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model.

[0044] In an embodiment of the present application, the SysML v2 definition includes the FMEDA definition and the SCAM definition. The constructed SysML v2 safety case model includes FMEDA use cases and SCAM use cases.

[0045] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model, an external file path and verification rules are embedded in the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model, so as to integrate structured engineering data and support relevant safety analysis tasks. This mechanism extends the association ability between the safety case model and external files, and improves the flexibility of the modeling process.

[0046] In an embodiment of the present application, the aforementioned external file is an Excel spreadsheet, an FMEDA model constructed based on the FMEDA metamodel, or a model generated by a third-party modeling tool, and the user can select the external file according to actual needs.

[0047] In an embodiment of the present application, the FMEDA metamodel includes a Component element, a FailureMode element, and a SafetyMechanism element. The Component element is used to define a functional component including a failure rate and a safety-related identifier in the FMEDA metamodel. The FailureMode element is used to describe possible failure types and probabilities. The SafetyMechanism element is used to evaluate the diagnostic coverage by modeling detection and protection mechanisms for specific failures.

[0048] In an embodiment of the present application, the FMEDA model can be directly referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, and at the same time, verification rules can be executed on the FMEDA model to determine whether it meets the defined safety constraints.

[0049] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of creating a SysML v2 safety case model, the semantics of the SACM metamodel are strictly aligned through the SysML v2 modeling library, so that the created SysML v2 safety case model has the ability to express structured safety arguments. The ability of structured safety argumentation is introduced without destroying its original modeling system, thereby making up for the semantic gap in the safety argumentation modeling of the SysML v2 model. This mechanism realizes the unified modeling of safety cases and models such as system structure, behavior, and requirements in the same language framework, and provides a unified platform for safety modeling in systems engineering.

[0050] After step S110 is executed, in step S120, verification rules are respectively executed on external files referenced by the SACM safety case model based on EMF and the SysML v2 safety case model.

[0051] In the embodiments of the present application, the specific process involved in executing the verification rules on the external files referenced by the SACM safety case model based on EMF can be referred to Figure 2 .

[0052] Figure 2 The exemplary flowchart of executing the verification rules on the external files referenced by the SACM safety case model based on EMF in the embodiments of the present application is shown.

[0053] As Figure 2 shown, in step S210, the FMEDA model in SysML v2 format is referenced in the EMF tool for creating the SACM safety case model based on EMF. In step S220, the FMEDA model in SysML v2 format is converted into an EMF-based FMEDA model through mapping rules. In step S230, the EOL engine is called to execute the verification rules on the EMF-based FMEDA model, and the verification results are fed back to the Artifact element of the created SACM safety case model based on EMF.

[0054] The FMEDA model in SysML v2 format is converted into an EMF-based FMEDA model through mapping rules to ensure the lossless migration of functional safety analysis data (FMEDA) between cross-domain modeling languages, so as to establish a standardized data channel between systems engineering (SysML) and safety engineering (SACM) and break through the tool chain barrier.

[0055] By adopting the EOL engine to execute the verification rules on the EMF-based FMEDA model and feeding back the verification results to the Artifact element of the created SACM safety case model based on EMF, it is possible to cover quality dimensions such as integrity, consistency, and compliance in the verification process, realize the dynamic binding of the verification results and the Artifact element, and construct a traceable safety argument evidence chain.

[0056] By reversely injecting the verification results into the Artifact element of the created SACM safety case model based on EMF, an iterative optimization loop of modeling - transformation - verification is formed.

[0057] In the embodiments of the present application, the specific process involved in executing the verification rules on the external files referenced by the SysML v2 safety case model can be referred to Figure 3 .

[0058] Figure 3An exemplary flowchart showing the execution of verification rules on external files referenced by the SysML v2 security case model in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0059] As Figure 3 shown, in step S310, the external file path and verification rules are extracted from the Artifact elements of the created SysML v2 security case model. In step S320, the EOL engine is called to execute the verification rules on the external file according to the type of the external file, and the verification result is fed back to the Artifact elements of the created SysML v2 security case model.

[0060] In an embodiment of the present application, when the external file is an FMEDA model, the FMEDA model is converted into an FMEDA model in EMF expression form, the EOL engine is called to execute the verification rules on the FMEDA model in EMF expression form, and the verification result is fed back to the Artifact elements of the created SysML v2 security case model.

[0061] In an embodiment of the present application, when the external file is a file such as.xlsx, there is no need to convert it, and the verification rules are directly executed on the external file.

[0062] By extracting the external file path and verification rules from the Artifact elements of the created SysML v2 model, the automatic association between the model and the external data source (such as the FMEDA model) is realized, ensuring that the sources of the verification rules and the input data are clearly traceable.

[0063] By converting the external FMEDA model into the EMF (Eclipse Modeling Framework) format, the data expression form is unified, making it adaptable to the EMF-based tool chain (such as the EOL engine), and solving the compatibility problem between heterogeneous tools.

[0064] By calling the EOL engine to execute rule verification and feeding back the result to the original model, a model-verification-feedback closed loop is formed to ensure the integrity and consistency of the security case.

[0065] In an embodiment of the present application, after executing the verification rules on the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM security case model and the SysML v2 security case model respectively, it is determined based on the verification results whether the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM security case model and the SysML v2 security case model meet the defined security constraints.

[0066] In some embodiments of the present application, the SPFM value of an external file is used as the verification result. Specifically, it is determined whether the SPFM value of the external file is greater than the SPFM threshold. In response to the corresponding SPFM value being greater than the SPFM threshold, it is determined that the referenced external file meets the defined security constraints. In response to the corresponding SPFM value not being greater than the SPFM threshold, it is determined that the referenced external file does not meet the defined security constraints.

[0067] In other embodiments of the present application, other evaluation data of the external file may also be used as the verification result, and the present application does not limit this here.

[0068] Specifically, SPFM (Single Point Failure Metrics) is used to evaluate the reliability and impact when a single point failure occurs in a system or component.

[0069] In the embodiments of the present application, the SPFM threshold is set according to actual needs and historical experience, and the present application does not limit this here. For example, in some embodiments, the SPFM threshold is set to 90%.

[0070] In the embodiments of the present application, the calculation formula for the SPFM value is: , represents the probability related to Single-Point Faults, represents the probability related to Residual Faults, represents the probability related to all faults, represents summing over all faults.

[0071] In the embodiments of the present application, when the value of SPFM is close to 1, it indicates that the risk of a single point failure occurring in the system is very low, and the design of the system has a high fault tolerance when dealing with single point failures. When the value of SPFM is close to 0, it indicates that the risk of a single point failure occurring in the system is relatively high, and once a certain component fails, the overall function of the system may be affected.

[0072] Based on the verification results, it is respectively determined whether the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM security case model and the SysML v2 security case model meet the defined security constraints, and a clear and quantifiable mechanism is established to determine whether the referenced external files meet the preset security or reliability standards, providing a clear decision basis for whether the EMF-based SACM security case model and the SysML v2 security case model accept or use a certain external file.

[0073] After step S120 is executed, in step S130, forward transformation and reverse transformation are performed on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after verifying the rules for the externally referenced files respectively.

[0074] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of performing forward transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after verifying the rules for the externally referenced files, first, mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2 are defined. Then, according to the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, the SACM metamodel is mapped to the corresponding SysML v2 definition. Then, the Epsilon Generation Language EGL engine is called to form the SysML v2 safety case model corresponding to the EMF-based SACM safety case model through the obtained corresponding SysML v2 definition by mapping.

[0075] In an embodiment of the present application, during the process of performing reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after verifying the rules for the externally referenced files, first, the Epsilon Model Generation EMG generation program is called to generate the corresponding EMG script. Then, the EMG script is executed to call the SACM metamodel to form the EMF-based SACM safety case model corresponding to the SysML v2 safety case model.

[0076] Through the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, the structural consistency and semantic alignment between SysML v2 and the SACM metamodel are achieved, laying a technical foundation for the mutual transformation between the SysML v2 safety case model and the EMF-based SACM safety case model.

[0077] In an embodiment of the present application, the mapping rules from the SACM metamodel to SysML v2 include: class and abstract class mapping rules, connection relationship mapping rules, attribute and enumeration mapping rules, structural relationship mapping rules, and inheritance relationship mapping rules.

[0078] In an embodiment of the present application, in the class and abstract class mapping rules, the ordinary class (class) element in the SACM metamodel is mapped to the part def in SysML v2. The abstract class (abstract class) element in the SACM metamodel is mapped to the abstract part def in SysML v2. Both are used to define the core modeling units in the EMF-based SACM safety case model to ensure the consistency of the expression of structural nodes.

[0079] In an embodiment of the present application, in the connection relationship mapping rule, elements in the SACM metamodel used to represent the inference and context relationship (such as SupportedBy, InContextOf, etc.) are mapped to the connection def of SysML v2. It is used to represent the connection logic between modeling elements and helps to restore the complete argument chain structure in SysML v2.

[0080] In an embodiment of the present application, in the attribute and enumeration mapping rule, all attributes in the SACM metamodel are mapped to attributes in SysML v2, retaining their parameter role in the modeling semantics. If an attribute involves an enumeration type (enum), it is reconstructed in the form of an enum def in SysML v2 to maintain the consistency of data constraints and option ranges.

[0081] In an embodiment of the present application, in the structural relationship mapping rule, the reference type in the SACM metamodel is mapped to ref...defined by... in SysML v2 to express a non-ownership relationship. The composition type in the SACM metamodel is mapped to part...defined by... in SysML v2 to model an ownership or containment relationship. This mapping rule clearly distinguishes the hierarchical relationship between modeling entities and helps with the hierarchical parsing and verification decomposition of the model structure.

[0082] In an embodiment of the present application, in the inheritance relationship mapping rule, the inheritance structure (extends) in the SACM metamodel is uniformly mapped to specializes in SysML v2.

[0083] In an embodiment of the present application, during the forward and reverse transformation processes between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model respectively, an EGL (Epsilon Generation Language) engine and EMG (Epsilon Model Generation) are used to construct a model transformation chain between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model to achieve the M2T transformation from the EMF-based SACM safety case model to the SysML v2 safety case model and the reverse restoration. This transformation chain can maintain the consistency of the model hierarchy, attribute information, and semantic definitions, providing a path for the visual expression, verification execution, and feedback integration of the model, improving the understandability of the model and the user interaction experience, and also facilitating the integration, co-construction, and sharing with other system models.

[0084] In summary, through the solution for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 provided above, the embodiments of the present application can verify whether the referenced external files meet the defined security constraints by executing verification rules on the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, thereby enhancing the credibility and reliability of the entire safety case. By separately executing the forward transformation and reverse transformation between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, lossless bidirectional migration of the safety case model between the SysML v2 platform and the EMF platform can be achieved, ensuring the consistency of model semantics.

[0085] Furthermore, in some embodiments, by embedding the external file path and verification rules in the Artifact element of the EMF-based SACM safety case model, the structure of the Artifact element of the SACM safety case model is extended, supporting unified management of the path, type, and verification rules of the external file path, realizing the automatic linkage between the reference of external evidence and the security analysis task, and enhancing the openness and data fusion ability of the modeling process.

[0086] Even further, in some embodiments, during the process of executing verification rules on the external files referenced by the SysML v2 safety case model, by extracting the external file path and verification rules from the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model, automatic execution of the verification rules can be achieved, and it supports writing the verification results back to the original model, forming a closed-loop process of modeling-verification-feedback, significantly reducing manual intervention and error probability during the verification process.

[0087] Still further, in some embodiments, during the process of executing the forward transformation between the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, by defining the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, the semantic integrity of the argument structure and attributes can be maintained during the transformation of the safety case model, supporting the traceability and semantic consistency between the argument structure in the safety case, the system model, and the analysis data, and effectively improving the traceability and consistency management ability between modeling elements

[0088] The embodiments of the present application also provide a system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2. It can use the aforementioned method 100 for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 to create a safety case that complies with SACM in SysML v2, or other methods can also be used to create a safety case that complies with SACM in SysML v2. The present application does not limit this here.

[0089] Figure 4 Shows an exemplary structural block diagram of a system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0090] As Figure 4 shown, the system 400 includes a model creation module 410, a verification execution module 420, and a mapping conversion module 430. In an embodiment of the present application, the model creation module 410, the verification execution module 420, and the mapping conversion module 430 may be separate units or integrated in the same integrated circuit, and the present application does not limit this here.

[0091] Specifically, the model creation module 410 is used to create an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard respectively.

[0092] Specifically, the verification execution module 420 is used to execute verification rules on external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model respectively;

[0093] Specifically, the mapping conversion module 430 is used to perform forward conversion and reverse conversion on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing verification rules on the referenced external files respectively.

[0094] When the system 400 uses the method 100 for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 described above to implement SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2, the foregoing step S110 is executed by the model creation module 410, the foregoing step S120 is executed by the verification execution module 420, and the foregoing step S130 is executed by the mapping conversion module 430. The specific execution process can be referred to the foregoing text and will not be elaborated here.

[0095] Although multiple embodiments of the present application have been shown and described herein, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that such embodiments are provided by way of example only. Those skilled in the art can think of many changes, alterations, and alternative ways without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. It should be understood that various alternative solutions to the embodiments of the present application described herein can be adopted in the process of practicing the present application. The appended claims are intended to define the scope of protection of the present application and thus cover equivalents or alternative solutions within the scope of these claims.

Claims

1. A method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2, characterized in that, Including: Create an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that conform to the SACM standard respectively; Execute verification rules for external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model respectively; Execute forward transformation and reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing verification rules for the referenced external files respectively; Among them, during the process of executing forward transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing verification rules for the referenced external files, the following steps are executed: Define mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2; According to the mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2, map the SACM metamodel to the corresponding SysML v2 definition; Call the Epsilon Generate Language EGL engine to generate the corresponding SysML v2 definition obtained by mapping to form the SysML v2 safety case model corresponding to the EMF-based SACM safety case model; During the process of executing reverse transformation on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after executing verification rules for the referenced external files, the following steps are executed: Call the Epsilon Model Generate EMG generation program to generate the corresponding EMG script; Execute the EMG script to call the SACM metamodel to form the EMF-based SACM safety case model corresponding to the SysML v2 safety case model.

2. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1, wherein During the process of creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model that conforms to the SACM standard, according to the SACM standard, create an EMF-based SACM safety case model including an argument package, an artifact package, and an FMEDA package in the safety case management environment; Among them, embed the external file path and verification rules in the Artifact element of the EMF-based SACM safety case model; The external file includes an FMEDA model built based on the FMEDA metamodel; The FMEDA metamodel includes a Component element, a FailureMode element, and a SafetyMechanism element.

3. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, During the process of executing verification rules for external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model, the following steps are executed: Reference the FMEDA model in SysML v2 format in the EMF tool for creating the EMF-based SACM safety case model; Convert the FMEDA model in SysML v2 format to an EMF-based FMEDA model through mapping rules; Call the EOL engine to execute verification rules on the EMF-based FMEDA model and feedback the verification results to the Artifact element of the created EMF-based SACM safety case model.

4. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1, characterized in that, The mapping rules between the SACM metamodel and SysML v2 include: class and abstract class mapping rules, connection relationship mapping rules, attribute and enumeration mapping rules, structural relationship mapping rules, and inheritance relationship mapping rules.

5. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1, wherein In the process of creating a SysML v2 safety case model, the following steps are executed: Build a SysML v2 safety case model through SysML v2 definitions; Embed the external file path and verification rules in the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model; Among them, the external file includes an FMEDA model built based on the FMEDA metamodel; The FMEDA metamodel includes Component elements, FailureMode elements, and SafetyMechanism elements.

6. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1 or 5, characterized in that, In the process of executing the verification rules for the external files referenced by the SysML v2 safety case model, the following steps are executed: Extract the external file path and verification rules from the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model; Call the EOL engine to execute the verification rules for the external files according to the type of the external files, and feedback the verification results to the Artifact element of the created SysML v2 safety case model.

7. The method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 according to claim 1, characterized in that, After respectively executing the verification rules for the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model, judge whether the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the external files referenced by the SysML v2 safety case model meet the defined security constraints based on the verification results.

8. A system for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2, characterized in that, Use the method for implementing SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2 as described in any one of claims 1-7 to implement SACM-compliant safety case creation in SysML v2. The system includes: A model creation module for respectively creating an EMF-based SACM safety case model and a SysML v2 safety case model that comply with the SACM standard; A verification execution module for respectively executing verification rules for the external files referenced by the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model; A mapping conversion module for performing forward conversion and reverse conversion on the EMF-based SACM safety case model and the SysML v2 safety case model after respectively executing verification rules for the referenced external files.

Images