An industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid anti-quantum cryptography

Abstract

The application discloses an industrial internet data security communication method based on a hybrid anti-quantum password and relates to the technical field of data communication, which comprises the following steps: obtaining a key pair and an anti-quantum security certificate; sending a connection request to a data receiver device to complete the trusted authentication of the certificate and sending the anti-quantum security certificate of the device; receiving a shared key seed sent by the data receiver device; decrypting and encapsulating the ciphertext to obtain the shared key seed and generating a corresponding shared key according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiver device; signing the original data using a signature private key, splicing the signature with the original data to obtain spliced data, encrypting the spliced data using the shared key based on an AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain encrypted ciphertext and an ML-DSA signature, and sending the encrypted ciphertext to the data receiver device. The application simplifies the key distribution step, optimizes the signature verification calculation overhead, and improves the data communication efficiency.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of data communication, and in particular to an industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography. BACKGROUND

[0002] At present, some industrial control communication protocols have begun to explore support for hybrid quantum-resistant key agreement mechanisms to build a secure communication framework for the future. However, the full and secure deployment of hybrid quantum-resistant encryption mechanisms in industrial internet systems still faces the following key challenges and technical bottlenecks:

[0003] (1) Large computational overhead, difficult to meet the performance limitations of industrial terminals. Industrial field devices (such as embedded controllers, sensors) generally have limited computing power, limited memory, strict power consumption control, and other problems. PQC algorithms such as Kyber based on lattices or SPHINCS+ based on hash often require large computing resources and storage space when running on these devices, significantly increasing system load, reducing communication efficiency and device response speed, and not conducive to real-time protection of industrial systems.

[0004] (2) Poor compatibility of existing industrial systems, high upgrade cost. Many industrial internet systems are still based on traditional TLS, VPN or proprietary communication protocols to build security systems, using RSA or ECDH algorithms. Direct replacement with PQC schemes may lead to protocol incompatibility, software and hardware adaptation difficulties, and even system stability problems. Therefore, how to smoothly integrate hybrid quantum-resistant mechanisms without changing the existing system architecture is a problem that needs to be solved in the industrial field.

[0005] (3) Complex key management, increased communication and storage overhead. Hybrid quantum-resistant encryption usually needs to maintain both traditional keys and quantum-resistant keys, and the key generation, negotiation, update and distribution process is more complex. For industrial internet systems with multi-node, multi-level network topology, how to efficiently and securely manage the key life cycle is a difficulty in communication security design.

[0006] (4) Lack of optimized design for industrial multi-user communication mode. Most current PQC research focuses on point-to-point communication mode, while industrial internet commonly used multi-user collaborative control, device networking, cross-domain access and other scenarios have higher requirements for encrypted communication. In these environments, how to implement efficient quantum-resistant key agreement, group key management, access control and identity authentication mechanisms still lacks mature and available technical solutions and implementation frameworks.

[0007] Therefore, the present application develops an industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography to solve the above problems. SUMMARY

[0008] The application provides an industrial internet data security communication method based on a hybrid anti-quantum password to solve the problems of large calculation overhead, poor compatibility, complex key management and low industrial multi-user communication efficiency of the existing data communication method.

[0009] The application achieves the above-mentioned purpose through the following technical solutions:

[0010] The application provides an industrial internet data security communication method based on a hybrid anti-quantum password, which comprises the following steps:

[0011] Obtaining a key pair and an anti-quantum security certificate required for key encapsulation and signature of the device, wherein the key pair is generated by an industrial internet key management center based on an ML-KEM-768 algorithm and an ML-DSA algorithm, and the anti-quantum security certificate is generated by an industrial internet certificate management system based on an ML-DSA algorithm;

[0012] Sending a connection request to a data receiving device to complete certificate trusted authentication and sending the anti-quantum security certificate of the device;

[0013] Receiving a shared key seed sent by the data receiving device, wherein the shared key seed is encapsulated by the data receiving device based on the anti-quantum security certificate of the device using an ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm after verifying the validity of the certificate;

[0014] Decrypting the encapsulated ciphertext to obtain the shared key seed and generating a corresponding shared key according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device;

[0015] Signing the original data using a signature private key, splicing the signature and the original data to obtain spliced data, encrypting the spliced data using a shared key based on an AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain encrypted ciphertext and an ML-DSA signature, and then sending the encrypted ciphertext to the data receiving device, wherein the encrypted ciphertext is used for decrypting by the data receiving device using the shared key and verifying the validity of the ML-DSA signature using a signature public key of the data receiving device.

[0016] Further, the key encapsulation public and private key pair is generated based on an ML-KEM-768 algorithm , wherein:

[0017] ;

[0018] ;

[0019] ;

[0020] ;

[0021] In the above formula, Encapsulate the public key for the private key. Encapsulate the private key with the public key matrix, where A is the public key matrix, q is the modulus, ρ is the public key seed, and S1 and S2 are both private key polynomials. It is a polynomial vector. This represents the matrix generating function, where e is the error vector;

[0022] The key is encapsulated into a public-private key pair, encrypted, and stored in the hardware security module. The encapsulated public-private key pair is also recorded in the key database.

[0023] Generate signature key pairs based on ML-DSA algorithm ,in:

[0024] ;

[0025] ;

[0026] ;

[0027] ;

[0028] In the above formula, For the signature public key, t1 is the signature private key, d is the public key compression bit width, t1 is the compressed public key, and K is the key used for challenge computation. It is a random number. It is a random number.

[0029] Furthermore, the steps by which the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System generates the quantum-resistant security certificate based on the ML-DSA algorithm are as follows:

[0030] Generate CA key pairs based on the ML-DSA algorithm;

[0031] Receive a registration request, which includes a device ID and a public / private key encapsulated in a key;

[0032] The identity of the industrial internet device is verified through a pre-defined whitelist or a third-party authentication service based on the registration request.

[0033] If the verification is successful, the quantum-resistant security certificate is generated based on the registration request, the encapsulated public key, and the signing public key, and the certificate hash value is calculated. The certificate hash value is signed using the private key in the CA key pair. After that, the quantum-resistant security certificate and the signature are encrypted and transmitted to the user terminal, and synchronized to the certificate database of the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System.

[0034] Furthermore, the data receiving device completes certificate trust authentication based on the connection request, including:

[0035] The data receiving device parses the encrypted quantum-resistant security certificate and signature of this device to obtain the key encapsulation public key and the signature public key of this device;

[0036] The certificate hash value is calculated based on the device's signature public key, and the validity of the device's quantum-resistant security certificate is verified using the public key in the CA key pair.

[0037] Furthermore, the data receiving device uses the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm to encapsulate the resulting ciphertext, which includes:

[0038] Generate a random seed as the shared key seed;

[0039] Based on the quantum-resistant security certificate of this device, the shared key seed is encapsulated using the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm, and the shared key and encapsulated ciphertext are calculated.

[0040] The session key is derived based on the shared key and the encapsulated ciphertext using the KMAC256 algorithm.

[0041] Further, the encapsulated ciphertext is decrypted to obtain a shared key seed, and a corresponding shared key is generated according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device, including:

[0042] The data receiver device receives the encapsulated ciphertext and the quantum-resistant security certificate of the data receiver device, which is issued by the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System.

[0043] Verify the quantum-resistant security certificate of the data receiving device;

[0044] If the verification is successful, the private key is used to decrypt the encapsulated ciphertext to obtain the corresponding shared key;

[0045] Based on the corresponding shared key, a session key is derived using the KMAC256 algorithm.

[0046] Furthermore, the original data is signed using the signing private key, and the signature is concatenated with the original data to obtain concatenated data. The concatenated data is then encrypted using the shared key based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain encrypted ciphertext, including:

[0047] Based on the signature private key of this device The data M is signed, and the public key matrix is ​​recovered based on the public key seed. This indicates the compression key for this device. This represents the private key polynomial of this device. It is a random number;

[0048] The public key matrix can be recovered from ρ. ;

[0049] Calculate the hash digest of the data tr is a hash value generated from the signing public key;

[0050] The signing process includes a loop process, which includes generating a random vector. ρ' is the random seed for temporary sampling. For counters; calculate w=Ay using the public key matrix and random vector, where w is an intermediate parameter, and read the high-order bits of w. , Used to confirm the interception range. The high-order value extraction function is used; the hash challenge is computed by further reusing SHAKE256 and converted into a sparse polynomial expression. ; Generate response ,calculate and extract , This is the function for extracting the least significant bit; finally, verification is performed. and Check if the statement is true; if true, output the signature. ,β、 , , Parameters for validity verification, among which , This indicates the calculation prompt bit, where h is auxiliary information. NTT denotes number-theoretical transformation function;

[0051] The signature is appended to the data M to obtain the signed data. The signed data is then encrypted using a shared key based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the encrypted ciphertext, thus constructing an ML-DSA signature. , This is the public key for signing this device.

[0052] Furthermore, the data receiving device decrypts the encrypted ciphertext using a shared key and verifies the validity of the ML-DSA signature using the data receiving device's signing public key, including:

[0053] Use the shared key to decrypt the encrypted ciphertext;

[0054] Using h and public key Refactoring get ;

[0055] calculate ,verify , Let H be the sampling function within the sphere, and H be the hash function.

[0056] Finally, verify the response. and If all responses pass, the signature is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected, thus completing quantum-resistant secure data communication.

[0057] This invention discloses an industrial internet data security communication system based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography, comprising:

[0058] The acquisition module is used to acquire the key pair and quantum-resistant security certificate required for key encapsulation and signing. The key pair is generated by the Industrial Internet Key Management Center based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm and the ML-DSA algorithm, and the quantum-resistant security certificate is generated by the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System based on the ML-DSA algorithm.

[0059] The sending module is used to send a connection request to the data receiving device to complete certificate trust authentication and send a quantum-resistant security certificate;

[0060] The receiving module is used to receive the shared key seed sent by the data receiving device. The shared key seed is the encapsulated ciphertext obtained by the data receiving device after verifying the validity of the certificate, based on the quantum-resistant security certificate and encapsulated using the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm.

[0061] The decryption module is used to decrypt the encapsulated ciphertext to obtain a shared key seed, and generate a corresponding shared key according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device.

[0062] The signing module is used to sign the original data using a signing private key, and then concatenate the signature with the original data to obtain concatenated data. Based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm, the concatenated data is encrypted using a shared key to obtain encrypted ciphertext and an ML-DSA signature. The encrypted ciphertext is then sent to the data receiving device, which uses the shared key to decrypt it and verifies the validity of the ML-DSA signature using the data receiving device's signing public key.

[0063] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0064] (1) This invention realizes quantum-resistant secure data communication throughout the entire process. The NIST post-quantum standard algorithm ML-KEM (quantum-resistant key encapsulation) and ML-DSA (quantum-resistant digital signature) are used to realize secure data communication for the industrial Internet. At the same time, the KMAC256 key derivation function is used to optimize the ML-KEM algorithm to achieve quantum-resistant security throughout the entire process, ensuring the long-term security of key negotiation and identity authentication in the future quantum computing environment.

[0065] (2) In this invention, the Key Management Center (KMC) implements a two-level key separation and dynamic rotation strategy, which simplifies the key distribution steps, has strong scalability, and is easy to expand to multi-user communication scenarios.

[0066] (3) The present invention proposes an industrial Internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography. By reusing SHAKE256 to optimize the computational overhead of ML-DSA algorithm signature verification, the data communication efficiency is improved while ensuring quantum-resistant security. Attached Figure Description

[0067] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography, as described in this application.

[0068] Figure 2 This is an architecture diagram of an industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography, as described in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0069] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0070] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the invention.

[0071] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In a specific implementation, this device is designated as User_A, the data sender, and User_B, the data receiver.

[0072] like Figure 1 and Figure 2As shown, an industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography includes:

[0073] S1: Obtain the key pair and quantum-resistant security certificate required for key encapsulation and signing of this device. The key pair is generated by the Industrial Internet Key Management Center based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm and the ML-DSA algorithm, and the quantum-resistant security certificate is generated by the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System based on the ML-DSA algorithm.

[0074] S11: During the initialization phase, the Industrial Internet Key Management Center (KMC) is responsible for generating global parameters, providing the foundation for subsequent key management and encrypted communication. First, the KMC selects the ML-KEM-768 parameter set to ensure the security and efficiency of the key encapsulation mechanism. Specifically, it chooses a modulus q and a polynomial ring dimension n=256, a choice that guarantees a balance between security and computational overhead in the algorithm. Meanwhile, error distribution... A central binomial distribution is used to ensure randomness and attack resistance during key generation. Furthermore, other parameters of ML-KEM-768 are determined, including matrix dimensions. These parameters are used to control the size and security of the key.

[0075] S12: To ensure the security of key management, KMC further defines key derivation rules. Specifically, AES-256-GCM is used as the symmetric encryption algorithm. To guarantee quantum-resistant security throughout the entire industrial internet data transmission process, a quantum-resistant key derivation function, KMAC256, is specified for deriving session keys. The key derivation process is as follows: , This indicates key derivation and is a context label string used to prevent misuse. The content can be specified, with optional additional contextual information such as the IDs of the communicating parties and the protocol version; L indicates the output key length.

[0076] in, For shared keys, Usually Through this method, KMC sets a key policy that stipulates: shared keys and session keys have different lifecycles; each session key is used only for a specific communication session and cannot be reused; and the conditions for triggering the key update mechanism, such as session timeout, anomaly detection, or policy change, ensure that the key lifecycle is reasonable and prevent the risk of key leakage due to long-term use.

[0077] S13: KMC generates ML-DSA parameters to provide authentication and data integrity guarantees. KMC defines the ML-DSA parameters. ML-DSA is used as a quantum-resistant signature algorithm, and relevant parameters are defined, including the modulus q, the number of bits in public key compression d, the lattice dimension n, and the relation matrix dimension. KMC generates ML-DSA signature keys for the CA. To improve security, the SHAKE-256 algorithm is chosen to generate three random values. The public key seed ρ is used to generate the public key matrix. , This represents the generating matrix, and the private key seed σ is used to generate the private key polynomial. , The distribution is represented by uniformly randomized samples of integers from the interval [−η, η]. The key K is used for challenge computation. The public key vector is computed. Compressed public key Output CA key pair And send the key to the CA. The CA's private key pair The public key of the CA key pair is stored offline in tamper-proof hardware. Publicly distributed.

[0078] S2: Send a connection request to the data receiving device to complete certificate trust authentication, and send the device's quantum-resistant security certificate.

[0079] S21: During the registration process of industrial internet terminal devices, KMC is responsible for generating key pairs for the registered devices. First, a public-private key pair is generated and encapsulated based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm: , This represents the key generation function. Wherein, Use the public key for random sampling S is the private key and the parameter. KMC will... After encryption, the key is stored in the hardware security module, and the device key is recorded in the key database. Next, a signature key pair is generated based on the ML-DSA algorithm: ,in, For public key, is the private key, and i represents the number of the engineering Internet terminal device. For example, in this specific embodiment, the number of the data sender device is A, and the number of the data receiver device is B.

[0080] S22: The CA issues quantum-resistant certificates. Industrial Internet terminal devices submit registration requests to the CA. CA verifies the identity of industrial internet devices through a pre-defined whitelist or third-party authentication services, and issues quantum-resistant security certificates. , The certificate hash value is calculated by sequentially representing the version, domain, object, start time, and end time. Where H is a hash function. ML-DSA private key pair. Sign , To signify a signature, the CA will issue the certificate. The certificate is encrypted and transmitted to the user's terminal, and synchronized to the KMC's certificate database. The user who receives the certificate calculates its hash value. The validity of the certificate is verified using the CA's public key. If the verification is successful, it means that the certificate was issued by a trusted CA and has not been tampered with.

[0081] S3: Receive the shared key seed sent by the data receiving device. The shared key seed is the encapsulated ciphertext obtained by the data receiving device after verifying the validity of the certificate, based on the quantum-resistant security certificate of the device, using the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm.

[0082] S31, Certificate Validity Verification. Industrial Internet terminal device User_A sends a connection request to device User_B to complete certificate trust authentication and sends a quantum-resistant security certificate. User_B parses User_A's quantum-resistant security certificate. Obtain User_A's key and encapsulate the public key. and signing public key And calculate the certificate hash value. And through the CA's signing public key Verify the validity of the certificate If the verification is successful, it means that the certificate was issued by a trusted CA and has not been tampered with.

[0083] S32, Key Encapsulation and Shared Key Generation. After successful certificate verification, both parties generate a shared key based on the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm. The industrial internet terminal device User_B generates a random seed m as the shared key seed, and uses the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm to encapsulate m to calculate the shared key and ciphertext. , This indicates key encapsulation, using the KMAC256 algorithm to derive the session key. User_B will combine the encrypted ct with... The certificate is sent together with User_A, and User_A verifies it. After obtaining the certificate, use the private key. Unseal the ciphertext ct to obtain The session key is derived according to the KMAC256 algorithm. , Session key - a key used directly for symmetric encryption.

[0084] S4: Decrypt the encapsulated ciphertext to obtain the shared key seed, and generate the corresponding shared key according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device.

[0085] Data signing and encryption: Industrial Internet terminal device User_A first uses the signing private key... Sign the data M. According to... To recover the matrix Secondly, calculate the data hash digest. tr is a hash value generated from the signing public key, which can be viewed as a concatenation of the public key. To simplify the signature verification process, we optimize the ML-DSA algorithm through SHAKE256 function reuse. This μ can retain the state of SHAKE for subsequent calls, reducing multiple Keccak initializations. During the signing process, the generated candidate signatures need to meet specific mathematical constraints, so a certain iterative process is also required: generating a random vector. , This represents the process of converting the hash output into a challenge polynomial. It is a random seed for temporary sampling. This is a counter; an intermediate value is calculated using the signature vector z and other parameters. Read the high-order bits of w , Used to confirm the cutoff range; the hash challenge is computed by continuing to reuse SHAKE256 and converted into a sparse polynomial expression. ; Generate response ,calculate and extract ;

[0086] Final verification check and Output signature , 'h' represents auxiliary information. ; Attach the signature to the data The AES-256-GCM algorithm for data Encrypt AES-256-GCM.Encrypt .

[0087] S5: Sign the original data using the signing private key, and concatenate the signature with the original data to obtain concatenated data. Based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm, encrypt the concatenated data using the shared key to obtain encrypted ciphertext and ML-DSA signature. Then, send the encrypted ciphertext to the data receiving device. The encrypted ciphertext is used by the data receiving device to decrypt using the shared key and to verify the validity of the ML-DSA signature using the signing public key of the data receiving device.

[0088] Industrial Internet terminal device User_B decrypts data , It is encrypted and signed with the public key of User_A. Verify ML-DSA signature Valid / Invalid indicates valid / invalid, based on the signature. The signature public key of this device Using h and public key Refactoring ;calculate ,verify Finally, verify the response. , If all responses pass, the signature is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected. This completes quantum-resistant secure data communication.

[0089] (1) This invention realizes quantum-resistant secure data communication throughout the entire process. The NIST post-quantum standard algorithm ML-KEM (quantum-resistant key encapsulation) and ML-DSA (quantum-resistant digital signature) are used to realize secure data communication for the industrial Internet. At the same time, the KMAC256 key derivation function is used to optimize the ML-KEM algorithm to achieve quantum-resistant security throughout the entire process, ensuring the long-term security of key negotiation and identity authentication in the future quantum computing environment.

[0090] (2) In this invention, the Key Management Center (KMC) implements a two-level key separation and dynamic rotation strategy, which simplifies the key distribution steps, has strong scalability, and is easy to expand to multi-user communication scenarios.

[0091] (3) The present invention proposes an industrial Internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography. By reusing SHAKE256 to optimize the computational overhead of ML-DSA algorithm signature verification, the data communication efficiency is improved while ensuring quantum-resistant security.

[0092] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the technical principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for secure data communication in the industrial internet based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography, characterized in that, include: The key pair and quantum-resistant security certificate required for key encapsulation and signing of this device are obtained. The key pair is generated by the Industrial Internet Key Management Center based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm and the ML-DSA algorithm, and the quantum-resistant security certificate is generated by the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System based on the ML-DSA algorithm. Send a connection request to the data receiving device to complete certificate trust authentication, and send the device's quantum-resistant security certificate; The shared key seed sent by the data receiving device is a ciphertext obtained by the data receiving device after verifying the validity of the certificate, which is encapsulated using the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm based on the quantum-resistant security certificate of this device. Decrypt the encapsulated ciphertext to obtain the shared key seed, and generate the corresponding shared key according to the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device; The original data is signed using the signing private key, and the signature is concatenated with the original data to obtain the concatenated data. The concatenated data is then encrypted using the shared key based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the encrypted ciphertext and ML-DSA signature. The encrypted ciphertext is then sent to the data receiving device, which uses the shared key to decrypt it and verifies the validity of the ML-DSA signature using the data receiving device's signing public key.

2. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 1, characterized in that, The steps for the Industrial Internet Key Management Center to generate key pairs based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm are as follows: Generate a public-private key pair based on the ML-KEM-768 algorithm. ,in: ； ； ； ； In the above formula, Encapsulate the public key for the private key. Encapsulate the private key with the public key matrix, where A is the public key matrix, q is the modulus, ρ is the public key seed, and S1 and S2 are both private key polynomials. It is a polynomial vector. Let i represent the matrix generating function, i be the serial number of the engineering Internet terminal device, e be the error vector, and R be the set of real numbers; The key is encapsulated into a public and private key pair, encrypted, and stored in the hardware security module. The encapsulated public and private key pair is also recorded in the key database. Generate signature key pairs based on ML-DSA algorithm ,in: ； ； ； ； In the above formula, For the signature public key, t1 is the signature private key, d is the public key compression bit width, t1 is the compressed public key, and K is the key used for challenge computation. R is a random number. k It refers to all points in k-dimensional space.

3. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 2, characterized in that, The steps for the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System to generate quantum-resistant security certificates based on the ML-DSA algorithm are as follows: Generate CA key pairs based on the ML-DSA algorithm; Receive a registration request, which includes the device ID and a public / private key encapsulated in a key. Verify the identity of industrial internet devices based on the registration request using a pre-defined whitelist or third-party authentication service; If the verification is successful, a quantum-resistant security certificate is generated based on the registration request, the encapsulated public key, and the signing public key, and the certificate hash value is calculated. The certificate hash value is signed using the private key in the CA key pair. After that, the quantum-resistant security certificate and the signature are encrypted and transmitted to the user terminal, and synchronized to the certificate database of the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System.

4. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 3, characterized in that, The data receiving device completes certificate trust authentication based on the connection request, including: The data receiving device parses the encrypted quantum-resistant security certificate and signature of this device to obtain the key encapsulation public key and the signature public key of this device; The certificate hash value is calculated based on the device's signature public key, and the validity of the device's quantum-resistant security certificate is verified using the public key in the CA key pair.

5. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 4, characterized in that, The data receiving device uses the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm to encapsulate the data into ciphertext, which includes: Generate a random seed as the shared key seed; Based on the quantum-resistant security certificate of this device, a shared key seed is encapsulated using the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm, and a shared key and encapsulated ciphertext are calculated. The session key is derived based on the shared key and the encapsulated ciphertext using the KMAC256 algorithm.

6. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 5, characterized in that, Decrypting the encapsulated ciphertext yields the shared key seed, and a corresponding shared key is generated using the same shared key generation algorithm as the data receiving device, including: The system receives the encapsulated ciphertext and the quantum-resistant security certificate of the data receiving device sent by the data receiving device. The quantum-resistant security certificate of the data receiving device is issued by the Industrial Internet Certificate Management System. Verify the quantum-resistant security certificate of the data receiving device; If the verification is successful, the private key is used to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the corresponding shared key. Based on the corresponding shared key, a session key is derived using the KMAC256 algorithm.

7. A method for secure industrial internet data communication based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography as described in claim 2 or 6, characterized in that, The original data is signed using the signing private key, and the signature is concatenated with the original data to obtain the concatenated data. The concatenated data is then encrypted using the shared key based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the encrypted ciphertext, including: Based on the device's signature private key The data M is signed, and the public key matrix is ​​recovered based on the public key seed. This indicates the compression key for this device. This represents the private key polynomial of this device. It is a random number; The public key matrix can be recovered from ρ. ExpandA indicates that it is used to generate a public key matrix A from the public key seed ρ, expanding the array to the specified rows and columns; Calculate the hash digest of the data tr is a hash value generated from the signing public key; The signing process involves a loop, which includes generating a random vector. , This represents the process of converting the hash output into a challenge polynomial. It is a random seed for temporary sampling. For counters; calculated using a public key matrix and a random vector. w is an intermediate parameter; read the high-order bits of w. , Used to confirm the interception range. The high-order value extraction function is used; the hash challenge is computed by further reusing SHAKE256 and converted into a sparse polynomial expression. ; Generate response ,calculate and extract , The least significant bit extraction function; final verification. and If true, output the signature. ,β、 , , Parameters for validity verification, among which , This indicates the calculation prompt bit, where h is auxiliary information. NTT denotes number-theoretical transformation function; The signature is appended to the data M to obtain the signed data. The signed data is then encrypted using a shared key based on the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the encrypted ciphertext, thus constructing the ML-DSA signature. , This is the public key for signing this device.

8. The industrial internet data security communication method based on hybrid quantum-resistant cryptography according to claim 7, characterized in that, The data receiving device uses a shared key to decrypt the encrypted ciphertext and verifies the validity of the ML-DSA signature using the data receiving device's signing public key, including: Decrypt the encrypted ciphertext using the shared key; Using h and public key Refactoring get ; calculate ,verify , Let H be the sampling function within the sphere, and H be the hash function. Finally, verify the response. and If all responses pass, the signature is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected, thus completing quantum-resistant secure data communication.

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