A lightweight and secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes

Abstract

This invention relates to the field of secure arraying technology for intelligent nodes, and discloses a lightweight secure arraying method for mobile intelligent nodes. The method includes: a system initialization phase generating elliptic curve formula parameters and an IPFS public key set; a public key validity verification phase using Groth16 zk-SNARK for efficient proof of anonymous public key ownership; a cross-domain authentication phase generating a one-time temporary regional identifier and updating the IPFS set; a signature generation phase employing a short-ring signature algorithm to construct an aggregated signature to support efficient batch signature verification; and a traceability phase extracting traceable factors to locate the true signer. This invention balances node anonymity, lightweight design, and traceability, making it suitable for resource-constrained scenarios such as connected vehicles and the Internet of Things.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of secure formation technology for intelligent nodes, specifically a lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid development of Vehicle-to-Everything (VANET), drone swarms, and multi-robot systems, mobile intelligent node formation technology has received widespread attention. Early research focused on formation maintenance and path planning based on centralized control, using a central node or ground control station to issue formation commands in real time to achieve synchronous control of multiple nodes. However, as network size and the number of nodes increase, such methods suffer from high communication overhead and single-point-of-failure risks. Subsequently, distributed formation control algorithms emerged, utilizing neighborhood information exchange and consensus protocols to maintain formation stability among nodes without a central controller. Simultaneously, to meet the needs of rapid formation reconstruction in dynamic environments, researchers have proposed formation decision-making methods based on graph theory, queue theory, and graph neural networks, conducting in-depth discussions on node topology, formation transformation, and path planning. During this process, cryptographic techniques such as PKI, public key exchange, group signatures, and ring signatures have been introduced to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication requirements of inter-node communication, providing security support for formation decision-making and collaborative control.

[0003] Despite advancements in distributed queuing and secure communication, several unresolved issues remain. First, most anonymous authentication schemes (such as group signatures and ring signatures) are unsuitable for mobile nodes with limited computing power and energy consumption due to their high signature size or computational complexity, making them unsuitable for real-time queuing reconstruction. Second, when queuing across regions or subnets, efficient and secure solutions are still lacking for seamless node identity switching and dynamic updates of queuing member information, failing to ensure both anonymity and accountability. Third, existing queuing verification mechanisms largely rely on one-to-one signature verification or centralized aggregation, lacking methods for parallel and rapid verification of batch signatures or multiple messages, resulting in significant performance bottlenecks in large-scale collaborative scenarios. Furthermore, current queuing management employs relatively simplistic security strategies for node joining, leaving, and identity invalidation, making it difficult to address complex threats such as replay attacks, identity impersonation, and fault-based hijacking. These shortcomings limit the efficient queuing and secure communication performance of mobile intelligent nodes across various scenarios. Summary of the Invention

[0004] (I) Technical problems to be solved: In view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a lightweight secure swarming method for mobile intelligent nodes, which has the advantages of decentralized public key distribution and management based on IPFS, efficient public key holding proof based on Groth16 zk-SNARK, cross-domain one-time area anonymity identifier unrelated update, and short-ring aggregate signature and efficient batch signature verification. It solves the problems of low efficiency of public key distribution and verification, high overhead of signature and verification, and easy association of cross-domain identities in the existing technology.

[0005] (II) Technical Solution: To achieve the aforementioned goals of decentralized public key distribution based on IPFS, Groth16 zk-SNARK public key holding proof, cross-domain one-time anonymized zone identifier update, and short-ring aggregated signature and efficient batch signature verification, this invention provides the following technical solution: A lightweight secure queuing method for mobile intelligent nodes, characterized in that it includes:

[0006] System initialization: The administrator generates public parameters and public reference strings for the system; each mobile smart node generates a private key and an anonymous public key, which is published through the IPFS platform to form the current member public key set;

[0007] Public key validity verification: Each mobile intelligent node generates a public key holding certificate based on its private key, and other nodes or roadside units in the formation verify the public key holding certificate to confirm the validity of the anonymous public key;

[0008] Cross-domain authentication and area identifier update: When the mobile intelligent node crosses a communication area, it sends an authentication request message to the roadside unit of the target area; after the roadside unit confirms the message, it generates a new area anonymous identifier for the mobile intelligent node and updates the area anonymous identifier set of the formation members.

[0009] Signature generation and publication: The signature node downloads the updated set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions in the current area; constructs a formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions and generates an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm; broadcasts the aggregate signature along with the message content; the aggregate signature includes a traceable factor, a response value, and a challenge value;

[0010] Signature verification: The receiver uses a ring signature verification algorithm to verify the aggregated signature;

[0011] Traceable identification: When accountability is required, the authorized department extracts the traceable factors from the aggregated signature and locates the real signer through mapping queries on IPFS.

[0012] Furthermore, the mobile node deletes expired local anonymous identifiers and public key information at predetermined intervals, and retrieves an updated set of public keys to replace them.

[0013] Furthermore, the public key holding proof is specifically a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof constructed based on Groth16 zk-SNARK.

[0014] Furthermore, the message includes a timestamp, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, an anonymous public key, a hardware fingerprint, a source region identifier, and a target region identifier.

[0015] Furthermore, after confirming the message, the roadside unit generates a new regional anonymity identifier for the mobile intelligent node, including:

[0016] Check whether the timestamp is within a valid time window to prevent replay attacks;

[0017] The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is verified based on the public reference string and the anonymous public key to confirm that the mobile smart node holds the corresponding private key;

[0018] The anonymous public key, hardware fingerprint, and target area identifier are concatenated and hashed to generate an anonymous area identifier. The anonymous area identifier is then uploaded to IPFS, and the local area binding record of the roadside unit is updated.

[0019] Furthermore, the step of constructing the formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers of the formation member regions and generating an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm includes:

[0020] The group structure is constructed by treating the set of anonymous identifiers of the group members as the corresponding list of public keys, denoted as . ;

[0021] Calculate the traceability factor using the signer's private and public keys. : ;

[0022] In the formula, It is the signer's private key; It is the signer's public key; It is a hash function that maps to points on an elliptic curve;

[0023] The signer randomly selects a challenge value for each member of the team other than themselves.

[0024] The signer selects a random number and calculates a one-time commitment based on the system's published parameters. : ;

[0025] In the formula, It is a random number; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group;

[0026] The initial challenge value is calculated based on the message, traceability factor, and one-time commitment. : ;

[0027] In the formula, The challenge value for the signer at the next position in the ring signature; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a one-time commitment; It is a byte string concatenation operator;

[0028] Following the order of the members in the formation, the commitment value of each member is reconstructed and the subsequent challenge value is calculated in turn, until the challenge value of the signer's position is obtained again to complete the challenge chain closure: ; In the formula, It is the first The commitment value corresponding to each member; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is the first The public key of each member; It is the first Random response at each location; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group; It is the first New challenge values ​​for each location; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a byte string concatenation operator; Indicates from the signer's location Starting with the next member, the process continues in the order of the formation until the person who signed the signer is in front of them, thus completing the entire challenge chain.

[0029] Calculate the response value based on the sum of all challenge values: ; In the formula, It refers to the number of members in the formation; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is a random number randomly selected by the signer to generate a one-time commitment; It is the signer's own private key scalar; It is the order of the underlying elliptic curve group;

[0030] The output includes traceable factors. A response value and The aggregate signature of the challenge value.

[0031] Furthermore, the ring signature verification algorithm includes:

[0032] Based on the challenge and response values ​​in the received aggregate signatures, reconstruct the commitment values ​​of each member;

[0033] Each challenge value is recalculated based on the reconstructed commitment value and a predefined hash function;

[0034] The recalculated challenge value is compared one by one with the challenge value in the aggregate signature;

[0035] If all comparisons pass, output "Verification successful"; otherwise, output "Verification failed".

[0036] Furthermore, the authorized department can extract the traceable factor from the aggregated signature and locate the real signer through mapping queries on IPFS.

[0037] (III) Beneficial Effects: Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a lightweight and secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes, which has the following beneficial effects:

[0038] 1. This lightweight secure swarming method for mobile intelligent nodes publishes the anonymous public keys generated by each mobile intelligent node to a decentralized storage network based on IPFS during the system initialization phase. Then, during the public key validity verification phase, it introduces a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on Groth16, achieving secure distribution and rapid verification of public keys in an environment without a centralized trust anchor. This step utilizes IPFS's content addressing and distributed hash table mechanism to ensure the high availability and tamper resistance of the public key set. Simultaneously, leveraging the short, millisecond-level verification latency of Groth16 proofs, resource-constrained mobile intelligent nodes can efficiently complete public key ownership verification locally without exposing any identity information. This significantly reduces communication and computational overhead while maintaining anonymity, improving the system's scalability and operational stability.

[0039] 2. The lightweight secure swarming method for mobile intelligent nodes generates new, unassociated pseudo-identifiers for each new region each time the mobile intelligent node enters a new region through cross-domain authentication and one-time region anonymity identifier update steps. After constructing the swarming structure based on this identifier set during the signature generation and release phase, a lightweight short-ring aggregation signature algorithm is used to generate the signature. Combined with the batch verification mechanism in the ring signature verification phase, anonymous collaborative decision-making and efficient parallel verification in dynamic cross-region swarming are realized. Attached Figure Description

[0040] Figure 1A flowchart of the lightweight secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by the present invention;

[0041] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the lightweight and secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by the present invention;

[0042] Figure 3 A comparison chart of signature generation time for the lightweight secure queuing method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by the present invention;

[0043] Figure 4 A comparison chart of signature verification time for the lightweight secure queuing method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by this invention;

[0044] Figure 5 A comparison chart of signature lengths for the lightweight secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0045] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0046] Please see Figure 1 A lightweight and secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes, characterized by comprising:

[0047] System initialization: The administrator generates public parameters and public reference strings for the system; each mobile smart node generates a private key and an anonymous public key, which is published through the IPFS platform to form the current region's member public key set;

[0048] Public key validity verification: Each mobile intelligent node generates a public key holding certificate based on its private key, and other nodes or roadside units in the formation verify the public key holding certificate to confirm the validity of the anonymous public key;

[0049] Cross-domain authentication and area identifier update: When the mobile intelligent node crosses a communication area, it sends an authentication request message to the roadside unit of the target area; after the roadside unit confirms the message, it generates a new area anonymous identifier for the mobile intelligent node and updates the area anonymous identifier set of the formation members.

[0050] Signature generation and publication: The signature node downloads the updated set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions in the current area; constructs a formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions and generates an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm; broadcasts the aggregate signature along with the message content; the aggregate signature includes a traceable factor, a response value, and a challenge value;

[0051] Signature verification: The receiver uses a ring signature verification algorithm to verify the aggregated signature.

[0052] This invention provides a lightweight secure platooning method for typical scenarios involving interactions between mobile intelligent nodes, roadside units (RSUs), and IPFS networks. The method primarily comprises five stages: system initialization, public key validity verification, cross-domain authentication and area identifier update, signature generation and distribution, and signature verification. The platooning operation mode described in this invention is as follows: the initial platooning deployment requires executing all six stages sequentially, while subsequent routine platooning maintenance only requires executing four stages: public key validity verification, cross-domain authentication and area identifier update, signature generation and distribution, and signature verification.

[0053] During the system initialization phase, the management first generates the system's public parameters in the formation control center, including elliptic curve group parameters (curve equations, generators). Group Hash functions under the random oracle model Mapping function The parameters include a public reference string (CRS); subsequently, each mobile smart node generates a unique private key locally based on the aforementioned public parameters. and the corresponding anonymous public key The node will Uploaded via IPFS, a document titled "Current Zone Member Public Key Set" is created and accessible via IPNS or a pre-defined path. This ensures that all participants can obtain the latest public key list in a decentralized and highly available manner during subsequent grouping processes.

[0054] During the public key validity verification phase, each mobile intelligent node Based on private key Using the predefined hash function in the system's public reference string, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is constructed via Groth16. Subsequently, the node Will include the current timestamp Anonymous public key and proof The authentication request message is sent to the RSU in this region; after receiving it, the RSU first verifies... Whether to prevent replay attacks within the allowed time window, and then call... Algorithm verification Confirm the correctness. Only after obtaining a valid and unrevoked public key can a node be allowed to continue the subsequent assembly process.

[0055] During the cross-domain authentication and regional identifier update phase, mobile intelligent nodes After entering target area B, send an authentication request message containing the following fields to the roadside unit of area B: current timestamp. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs generated based on private keys Anonymous public key PUF hardware fingerprint Original area identification and target area identifier After receiving the message, the roadside unit first verifies... Whether it is within the preset valid time window to prevent replay attacks, and then call. The public key holding certificate is verified to confirm the node's legitimacy; after successful verification, the roadside unit proceeds according to... Calculate the new regional anonymity identifier And will include all nodes in this region. The collection of files is uploaded to IPFS, and its swarm member region anonymous identifier mapping table is updated for use in subsequent signing and verification phases.

[0056] During the signature generation and distribution phase, the signing node first pulls the set of anonymous identifiers of the current region's swarm members from the IPFS platform, and constructs the swarm structure based on this set; subsequently, the node uses its own private key... and public key Calculate the traceable factor And generate a one-time commitment using a short-ring signature algorithm. Challenge Value With response value This yields the final aggregate signature. Finally, the signing node will aggregate the signature. Information on formation actions to be released It is broadcast to the roadside unit and other formation members to enable anonymous collaborative decision-making and subsequent efficient batch verification.

[0057] During the signature verification phase, the recipient verifies the signature based on the system's published parameters, the list of array public keys, and the array action command message. and the received aggregate signature Reconstruct the commitment values ​​of each member. And recalculate the challenge value. Then verify each Is it equal to the signature? And verify the response value With all The system checks whether the cumulative relationship is valid to confirm the integrity and legality of the signature; if the verification is successful, the receiver accepts and processes the formation action instruction message; otherwise, it refuses to receive it.

[0058] As a preferred embodiment, such as Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by this embodiment of the invention specifically includes the following steps: A lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes, characterized in that it includes:

[0059] System initialization: The administrator generates public parameters and public reference strings for the system; each mobile smart node generates a private key and an anonymous public key, which is published through the IPFS platform to form the current region's member public key set;

[0060] Public key validity verification: Each mobile intelligent node generates a public key holding certificate based on its private key, and other nodes or roadside units in the formation verify the public key holding certificate to confirm the validity of the anonymous public key;

[0061] Cross-domain authentication and area identifier update: When the mobile intelligent node crosses a communication area, it sends an authentication request message to the roadside unit of the target area; after the roadside unit confirms the message, it generates a new area anonymous identifier for the mobile intelligent node and updates the area anonymous identifier set of the formation members.

[0062] Signature generation and publication: The signature node downloads the updated set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions in the current area; constructs a formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions and generates an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm; broadcasts the aggregate signature along with the message content; the aggregate signature includes a traceable factor, a response value, and a challenge value;

[0063] Signature verification: The receiver uses a ring signature verification algorithm to verify the aggregated signature.

[0064] Furthermore, the mobile node deletes expired local anonymous identifiers and public key information at predetermined intervals, and retrieves an updated set of public keys to replace them.

[0065] Specifically, during the node's local periodic maintenance phase, the system automatically triggers an update at midnight each day or when the cache capacity exceeds a preset threshold: The node first scans the locally stored region anonymity identifiers and public key information, deleting expired or revoked entries based on their respective generation timestamps to free up storage space and prevent the use of expired credentials; then, it pulls the latest published public key set file through a pre-configured IPFS address, verifies its integrity, and replaces the original local cache. This ensures that mobile nodes always use the latest and most legitimate key materials while controlling local resource consumption, achieving a dual optimization of system lightweightness and security.

[0066] Furthermore, the public key ownership proof is specifically a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof constructed based on Groth16 zk-SNARK. Specifically, further, in the public key ownership proof generation stage, the mobile intelligent node first generates a Groth16 public-private key pair using the key ownership proof circuit corresponding to the anonymous public key during the trusted setup stage, and distributes the generated verification key as part of the system common reference string (CRS); subsequently, the node locally constructs a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof using Groth16 based on the CRS, calculating a concise proof data. It contains only a fixed-size proof element and can be verified without multiple rounds of interaction; Groth16 zk-SNARK, while ensuring zero knowledge and soundness, has extremely low proof size and verification overhead, and can run efficiently in mobile environments with limited computing power and bandwidth, thus balancing security, anonymity and lightweight system requirements.

[0067] Furthermore, the message includes a timestamp, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, an anonymous public key, a hardware fingerprint, a source region identifier, and a target region identifier.

[0068] Specifically, in constructing the cross-domain authentication request message, the mobile intelligent node will use the current timestamp Groth16 non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs generated based on private keys and public reference strings. Anonymous public key PUF hardware fingerprint Original area identification and target area identifier The request is packaged into a structured authentication request and sent to RSU via a secure channel. A timestamp is introduced to defend against replay attacks; zero-knowledge proofs are used to verify a node's ownership of the public key without revealing the private key; an anonymous public key identifies the node while maintaining privacy; a hardware fingerprint binds the device's physical attributes to prevent forgery by spoofed nodes; and the original and target region identifiers provide the necessary input for generating new temporary region identifiers and updating the IPFS set. By carrying these multiple fields, RSU can efficiently complete cross-domain legitimacy verification and one-time region identifier updates in a decentralized trust anchor environment, ensuring node anonymity, security, and accountability.

[0069] Furthermore, after the roadside unit confirms the message, it generates a new regional anonymous identifier for the mobile intelligent node, including: checking whether the timestamp is within a valid time window to prevent replay attacks; confirming the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on the public reference string and the anonymous public key to confirm that the mobile intelligent node holds the corresponding private key; performing a hash operation on the concatenation of the anonymous public key, hardware fingerprint, and target area identifier to generate the regional anonymous identifier, and uploading the regional anonymous identifier to IPFS, while updating the local area binding record of the roadside unit.

[0070] Specifically, roadside units After completing cross-domain authentication, first verify the timestamp in the message. Is it within the preset effective time window? Internally, to prevent replay attacks; then call Law on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs Verification is performed to confirm that the node does indeed hold the corresponding private key; then, Use anonymous public key PUF hardware fingerprint and target area identifier according to Formula concatenation and hashing generate new anonymous identifiers for regions ;at last, This will include all areas in this region. The collection file is uploaded to IPFS (e.g., overwriting the path / ipfs / regionB / member_list), and used in the local binding record. Replace the original identifier. On the one hand, a dual guarantee of timeliness and legitimacy for cross-domain requests is achieved through time windows and zero-knowledge verification; on the other hand, the generated... It is irreversible and one-time use, and can be distributed with high availability in decentralized storage networks while maintaining the unassociated and traceable identity of nodes.

[0071] Furthermore, the step of constructing the formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers of the formation member regions and generating an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm includes:

[0072] The group structure is constructed by treating the set of anonymous identifiers of the group members as the corresponding list of public keys, denoted as . ;

[0073] Calculate the traceability factor using the signer's private and public keys. : ;

[0074] In the formula, It is the signer's private key; It is the signer's public key; It is a hash function that maps to points on an elliptic curve;

[0075] The signer randomly selects a challenge value for each member of the team other than themselves.

[0076] The signer selects a random number and calculates a one-time commitment based on the system's published parameters. : ;

[0077] In the formula, It is a random number; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group;

[0078] The initial challenge value is calculated based on the message, traceability factor, and one-time commitment. : ;

[0079] In the formula, The challenge value for the signer at the next position in the ring signature; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a one-time commitment; It is a byte string concatenation operator;

[0080] Following the order of the members in the formation, the commitment value of each member is reconstructed and the subsequent challenge value is calculated in turn, until the challenge value of the signer's position is obtained again to complete the challenge chain closure: ; In the formula, It is the first The commitment value corresponding to each member; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is the first The public key of each member; It is the first Random response at each location; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group; It is the first New challenge values ​​for each location; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a byte string concatenation operator; Indicates from the signer's location Starting with the next member, the process continues in the order of the formation until the person who signed the signer is in front of them, thus completing the entire challenge chain.

[0081] Calculate the response value based on the sum of all challenge values: ; In the formula, It refers to the number of members in the formation; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is a random number randomly selected by the signer to generate a one-time commitment; It is the signer's own private key scalar; It is the order of the underlying elliptic curve group;

[0082] The output includes traceable factors. A response value and The aggregate signature of the challenge value .

[0083] Specifically, the node will pull a set of temporary region identifiers from IPFS. Consider it as the corresponding public key list Construct the array structure; then, the signer uses their own private key. Mapping function in the formulaic parameters Calculate the traceable factor This factor can uniquely identify the signatory during subsequent accountability without affecting the anonymity of the signature; then, the signatory randomly selects a scalar based on the published parameters. And calculate one-time commitments And the signer is based on the message to be signed. Calling the hash function Calculate the initial challenge value This ensures that no member in the chain can know the starting point of the challenge chain in advance; subsequently, the nodes reconstruct the commitments of each member in sequence according to the formation structure. The system calculates subsequent challenge values ​​until the loop is closed; this mechanism simultaneously guarantees the integrity and immutability of the signature; finally, the node obtains the response value by summing all challenge values. This results in an aggregated signature; while ensuring anonymity, accountability, and signature integrity, the aggregated signature significantly reduces the signature size and supports parallel batch verification, achieving the beneficial effects of lightweight and high efficiency.

[0084] Furthermore, the ring signature verification algorithm includes: reconstructing the commitment value of each member based on the challenge value and response value in the received aggregate signature; recalculating each challenge value based on the reconstructed commitment value and a predefined hash function; comparing the recalculated challenge value with the challenge value in the aggregate signature one by one; outputting verification success when all comparisons pass, otherwise outputting verification failure.

[0085] Specifically, based on the received aggregate signature Challenge Value and response value The commitment values ​​of each member were reconstructed, restoring the commitment nodes originally constructed by the signers: Then, based on the reconstructed commitment value... Formation action command messages and traceable factors Using a predefined hash function Recalculate each challenge value: Then the challenge value is recalculated. Original challenge value in aggregate signature Each signature is compared one by one. Only when all comparisons are consistent can it be determined that the signature has not been tampered with and was indeed signed by a legitimate member of the formation. If all comparisons pass, the algorithm outputs "verification successful," and the receiver trusts the message and executes subsequent formation decisions. If any comparison fails, "verification failed" is output, and the message is rejected to prevent forgery or tampering.

[0086] Furthermore, the authorized department can extract the traceable factor from the aggregated signature and locate the real signer through mapping queries on IPFS.

[0087] Specifically, the authorized department first accesses the pre-published traceable factors on IPFS. To anonymous public key The mapping index file, through Used as the query key to retrieve the corresponding anonymous public key. Subsequently, the authorized department will then rely on the information stored in the security filing system. The mapping table to the actual node identifier will Convert to mobile intelligent node The actual identity information; thus, the anonymity of node signatures is maintained in the public network, and only with authorized permissions, relying on the IPFS decentralized mapping and local filing system, accurate accountability for malicious or abnormal behavior can be achieved.

[0088] The embodiments of the present invention have achieved some positive results during the research and development or use process, and have indeed great advantages compared with the prior art. The following content describes them in conjunction with the data, charts and other information of the experimental process.

[0089] like Figure 3 As shown, as the number of members in the queue increases from 2 to 128, the signature generation time of the LARRS method linearly increases from approximately 10ms to approximately 270ms, while the DualRing method spikes from approximately 15ms to 650ms. This invention, however, consistently maintains a small fluctuation below 10ms (even at 128 nodes, it is only about 25ms). This invention achieves this through a single random commitment and a one-time response. By merging multi-member signatures, the resampling and hashing operations are avoided for each member, thus achieving almost constant signature generation overhead and greatly improving real-time performance in large-scale formation scenarios.

[0090] like Figure 4 As shown, within the same scale, the signature verification time of the LARRS method increases from approximately 15ms to approximately 260ms, the DualRing method jumps even further from approximately 20ms to approximately 640ms, while the verification time of this invention remains stable below 10ms (approximately 20ms with 128 nodes). This invention employs aggregated challenge value chains and single-response... The refactoring-hashing closure mechanism makes the total complexity of the refactoring commitment and recalculation challenge linear with the number of members but with a smaller constant, while supporting batch parallel processing. This ensures integrity verification without performance bottlenecks during large-scale ring signature verification.

[0091] like Figure 5 As shown, as the number of members increases from 1 to 64, the signature length of the LARRS method rapidly expands from approximately 13KB to approximately 63KB; the DualRing (linked) scheme remains at approximately 5–10KB; the signature length of this invention is slightly longer than that of the DualRing method, but remains stable between 6–8KB. This invention outputs a traceable factor. A response value and Challenge Values This avoids generating independent responses for each member, thus keeping the signature size within a range that is linear with the number of members but with a very small coefficient. This balances anonymity and accountability while also meeting the storage and transmission requirements of resource-constrained nodes.

[0092] This concludes the entire process.

[0093] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0094] Although embodiments of the invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A lightweight and secure grouping method for mobile intelligent nodes, characterized in that, include: System initialization: The administrator generates public parameters and public reference strings for the system; each mobile smart node generates a private key and an anonymous public key, which is published through the IPFS platform to form the current region's member public key set; Public key validity verification: Each mobile intelligent node generates a public key holding certificate based on its private key, and other nodes or roadside units in the formation verify the public key holding certificate to confirm the validity of the anonymous public key; Cross-domain authentication and area identifier update: When the mobile intelligent node crosses a communication area, it sends an authentication request message to the roadside unit of the target area; After confirming the message, the roadside unit generates a new regional anonymous identifier for the mobile intelligent node and updates the regional anonymous identifier set of the formation members. Signature generation and publication: The signature node downloads the updated set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions in the current region; constructs a formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers for the formation members' regions and generates an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm; The aggregated signature is broadcast along with the message content; the aggregated signature includes a traceable factor, a response value, and a challenge value. Signature verification: The receiver uses a ring signature verification algorithm to verify the aggregated signature.

2. The lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 1, characterized in that: The mobile intelligent node deletes expired local anonymous identifiers and public key information at predetermined intervals, and pulls the updated public key set for replacement.

3. The lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 2, characterized in that: The public key holding proof is specifically a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof constructed based on Groth16 zk-SNARK.

4. The lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 3, characterized in that: The message includes a timestamp, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, an anonymous public key, a hardware fingerprint, a source region identifier, and a target region identifier.

5. A lightweight and secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 4, characterized in that, After confirming the message, the roadside unit generates a new regional anonymity identifier for the mobile intelligent node, including: Check whether the timestamp is within a valid time window to prevent replay attacks; The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is verified based on the public reference string and the anonymous public key to confirm that the mobile smart node holds the corresponding private key; The anonymous public key, hardware fingerprint, and target area identifier are concatenated and hashed to generate an anonymous area identifier. The anonymous area identifier is then uploaded to IPFS, and the local area binding record of the roadside unit is updated.

6. A lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of constructing a formation structure based on the set of anonymous identifiers for formation member regions and generating an aggregate signature using a short-ring signature algorithm includes: The group structure is constructed by treating the set of anonymous identifiers of the group members as the corresponding list of public keys, denoted as . ; Calculate the traceability factor using the signer's private and public keys. : ; In the formula, It is the signer's private key; It is the signer's public key; It is a hash function that maps to points on an elliptic curve; The signer randomly selects a challenge value for each member of the team other than themselves. The signer selects a random number and calculates a one-time commitment based on the system's published parameters. : ; In the formula, It is a random number; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group; The initial challenge value is calculated based on the message, traceability factor, and one-time commitment. : ; In the formula, The challenge value for the signer at the next position in the ring signature; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a one-time commitment; It is a byte string concatenation operator; Following the order of the members in the formation, the commitment value of each member is reconstructed and the subsequent challenge value is calculated in turn, until the challenge value of the signer's position is obtained again to complete the challenge chain closure: ； In the formula, It is the first The commitment value corresponding to each member; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is the first The public key of each member; It is the first Random response at each location; It is a generator of the elliptic curve group; It is the first New challenge values ​​for each location; It is the hash function in the system's public parameters; This is a pending signature message; It is a traceable factor; It is a byte string concatenation operator; Indicates from the signer's location Starting with the next member, the process continues in the order of the formation until the person who signed the signer is in front of them, thus completing the entire challenge chain. Calculate the response value based on the sum of all challenge values: ； In the formula, It refers to the number of members in the formation; It is the first Challenge value at each position; It is a random number randomly selected by the signer to generate a one-time commitment; It is the signer's own private key scalar; It is the order of the underlying elliptic curve group; The output includes traceable factors. A response value and The aggregate signature of the challenge value.

7. A lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 6, characterized in that, The ring signature verification algorithm includes: Reconstruct the commitment value of each member based on the challenge value and response value in the received aggregate signature; Each challenge value is recalculated based on the reconstructed commitment value and a predefined hash function; The recalculated challenge value is compared one by one with the challenge value in the aggregate signature; If all comparisons pass, output "Verification successful"; otherwise, output "Verification failed".

8. A lightweight secure formation method for mobile intelligent nodes according to claim 7, characterized in that: The authorized department can extract the traceable factor from the aggregated signature and locate the real signer through mapping queries on IPFS.

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