Complex underground fortification PNT system anti-replay attack method based on multi-mechanism fusion
By adopting a multi-mechanism fusion method in the complex underground fortification PNT system, including date filtering, serial number detection, random number verification and session mechanism encryption signature processing, the problem of replay attack is solved, the authenticity, integrity and freshness of the data packet are guaranteed, the stability of the system and the accuracy of navigation information are improved, and the efficient operation and emergency response of underground fortifications are supported.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510834708.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-06-20
- Publication Date
- 2025-09-19
AI Technical Summary
In the PNT systems of complex underground fortifications, existing technologies are unable to effectively prevent replay attacks, which can lead to positioning errors, navigation deviations, and other problems, and may even cause serious consequences.
A multi-mechanism integration approach is adopted, including date filtering, sequence number detection, random number verification, and session mechanism encryption signature processing, to build a strong security protection network to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and freshness of data packets.
Effectively identify and filter abnormal data packets, reduce the risk of positioning errors and navigation deviations caused by replay attacks, improve system stability and availability, ensure the accuracy and continuity of navigation information, and support efficient operation and emergency response of underground fortifications.
Smart Images

Figure CN120675769A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of supporting PNT systems, and in particular to an anti-replay attack method for complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion. Background Art
[0002] Replay attacks are a common cyberattack tactic. Attackers intercept legitimate data packets and resend them to recipients at a later time, aiming to deceive systems, gain illicit benefits, or disrupt normal communications. In complex underground PNT systems, replay attacks can cause recipients to receive outdated or false navigation and positioning information, leading to positioning errors, navigation deviations, and even serious consequences such as the failure of military operations and casualties.
[0003] Common anti-replay attack methods include: Timestamp scheme: Although relatively simple to implement and can intuitively reflect the freshness of data, it has high requirements for time synchronization. In complex underground fortifications, due to factors such as complex environments and signal obstruction, it is difficult to ensure accurate time synchronization between different devices. This may lead to legitimate requests being misjudged as replay requests or replay requests being mistaken for legitimate requests; Random number scheme: This scheme does not rely on strict time synchronization, and the uniqueness of random numbers increases the difficulty of replay attacks. However, as the number of requests increases, the server needs to store a large number of used random numbers, which places high demands on storage and query performance. Moreover, the generation of random numbers requires a certain amount of computing resources and algorithm support. If the generated random numbers are not random enough or are easy to guess, security will also be affected; Serial number-based method: No time synchronization is required, but once an attacker obtains the serial number, it may be possible to deceive the authentication end by incrementing it, thereby bypassing the protection mechanism.
[0004] In summary, given the limitations of a single anti-replay attack method in complex underground fortification PNT systems, it is particularly important to adopt a multi-mechanism fusion approach. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to propose an anti-replay attack method for complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion to solve the problems existing in the above-mentioned prior art. The method adopts the technical means of multi-mechanism fusion to effectively prevent replay attacks, and can identify and filter out abnormal or duplicate data packets, thereby ensuring the security of the PNT system.
[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following solutions: The anti-replay attack method for complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion includes: Perform date filtering and serial number detection on PNT systems; Use the random number mechanism to verify the detected data packets; The session mechanism is used to transmit the data packets after random number verification, and the data packets are encrypted and signed during the transmission process.
[0007] Optionally, date filtering for the PNT system includes: A timestamp is added to each data packet, and the receiver detects expired data packets and filters them by comparing the timestamps.
[0008] Optionally, performing the serial number detection includes: Assign a unique sequence number to each data packet and carry the corresponding sequence number in the data packet; The receiver detects duplicate packets based on the order of the sequence numbers and refuses to process duplicate packets.
[0009] Optionally, verifying the detected data packet using a random number mechanism includes: A random number is added to each data packet, and the uniqueness of the random number is verified at the receiving end. If the random number is repeated or invalid, the data packet is rejected.
[0010] Optionally, transmitting the data packet after random number verification by using the session mechanism includes: Authenticate and verify the integrity of each data packet.
[0011] Optionally, performing the identity authentication includes: By comparing the pre-stored digital signature, it can be confirmed whether the data comes from a trusted source.
[0012] Optionally, performing the integrity verification includes: By using a hash function, the data packet is operated to generate a unique check value; The receiver verifies the integrity of the data packet based on the same hash function and checksum.
[0013] The beneficial effects of the present invention are: In terms of security, the present invention integrates multiple mechanisms such as timestamps, sequence numbers, random numbers, and encryption to form a powerful security protection network that can effectively identify and resist replay attacks, ensure the authenticity, integrity, and freshness of data packet navigation and positioning data, and greatly reduce the probability of the system being subjected to replay attacks that lead to positioning errors, navigation deviations, and other security risks. It provides reliable spatiotemporal information services for military operations, personnel and equipment scheduling, and other tasks in underground fortifications, effectively ensuring the precise execution of combat missions and personnel safety. From the perspective of system stability, the collaborative work of multiple mechanisms gives the system greater adaptability and fault tolerance in the complex and changing environment of underground fortifications. Even if some mechanisms are affected by environmental interference or attacks, other mechanisms can still function to maintain stable system operation, reduce system failures or interruptions caused by replay attacks, improve the overall availability and stability of the system, ensure the continuity of PNT services, and meet the needs of 24-hour uninterrupted operation of underground fortifications. In terms of data reliability and accuracy, this method can effectively prevent outdated or tampered navigation data from entering the system's subsequent processing flow, ensuring that the navigation and positioning information provided to users is accurate, and improving the accuracy of various PNT system-based operations in underground fortifications. Whether it is automatic driving of vehicles, precise transportation of materials, or positioning and rescue of personnel, it can be executed efficiently and accurately based on precise spatiotemporal data, enhancing the intelligence level of underground fortification operation management and emergency response capabilities to emergencies. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0014] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.
[0015] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for resisting replay attacks on a complex underground fortification PNT system based on multi-mechanism fusion according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0016] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0017] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0018] A PNT system for complex underground works is designed to provide high-precision, reliable, and continuous positioning, navigation, and timing services in complex underground environments. Its core approach is to utilize a variety of technologies and information sources to address the issues of obstruction and interference in traditional PNT signals (such as satellite signals) caused by the underground environment. This system provides precise spatial and temporal information for personnel, vehicles, and equipment in underground works, supporting efficient command, scheduling, and management of these works.
[0019] Data packets are units of data that carry positioning, navigation, and timing information. These packets typically contain data used to determine key information such as position, direction, speed, and time.
[0020] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment proposes a method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on the fusion of multiple mechanisms. This method is used to prevent replay attacks, a common network attack method in which attackers intercept legitimate data packets and resend them in the future to deceive the system. The specific content of this embodiment includes the following aspects: Perform date filtering and serial number detection on PNT systems; Use the random number mechanism to verify the detected data packets; The session mechanism is used to transmit the data packets after random number verification, and the data packets are encrypted and signed during the transmission process.
[0021] In complex underground environments, PNT systems face severe threats from replay attacks. A multi-mechanism-based anti-replay attack approach, integrating various strategies such as date filtering, sequence number detection, random number verification, and session mechanisms, builds a solid security defense, effectively ensuring the security and reliability of PNT systems.
[0022] Furthermore, date filtering for the PNT system includes: By adding a timestamp to each data packet to verify the timeliness of the data packet, the receiver can detect expired data packets by comparing the timestamps and refuse to process them.
[0023] Specifically, in the date filtering link of this embodiment, the key is to accurately add a high-precision timestamp to each data packet. The timestamp not only contains the conventional year, month, day, hour, minute, second and other information, but is also accurate to the millisecond level. When verifying the data packet, the receiver will strictly determine the validity of the data packet based on the preset delay threshold. For example, in the personnel positioning system of underground fortifications, if the delay threshold is set to 100 milliseconds, then once the difference between the timestamp of the received data packet and the current system time exceeds this threshold, the system will not hesitate to determine it as a replay attack data packet and reject it. This strict delay control can not only effectively filter out expired data, but also prevent attackers from using delayed data to interfere with the normal operation of the system. Furthermore, performing the serial number detection includes: Assign a unique sequence number to each data packet and carry the corresponding sequence number in the data packet; The receiver detects duplicate packets based on the order of the sequence numbers and refuses to process duplicate packets.
[0024] Specifically, in this embodiment, each data packet is assigned a unique, incrementing sequence number. The sequence number is a 64-bit unsigned integer with an initial value of 1. The sequence number increments by 1 for each data packet sent. The receiver maintains a list of received sequence numbers. When a new data packet is received, it checks whether the sequence number already exists and whether it conforms to the incrementing logic. If the sequence number is repeated or does not conform to the ascending order, it is determined to be a replay attack packet. To efficiently manage sequence numbers, a sliding window algorithm is used. The window size is dynamically adjusted based on the expected number of concurrent data packets in the underground fortification. For example, in a high-concurrency scenario, the window size is set to 1000 to balance security and system performance.
[0025] Regarding sequence number checking, assigning a unique sequence number to each data packet is a key measure for ensuring packet order and uniqueness. The sequence number is a 64-bit unsigned integer, initially set to 1 and automatically incremented by 1 with each packet sent. The receiver maintains a list of received sequence numbers. When a new packet arrives, it carefully checks whether the sequence number already exists and whether it conforms to the incrementing logic. In the autonomous driving system for underground vehicles, if a sequence number is duplicated or not in ascending order, the system will decisively identify it as a replay attack packet and reject it. To efficiently manage sequence numbers, the system uses a sliding window algorithm, with the window size dynamically adjusted based on the expected number of concurrent packets in the underground. In high-concurrency scenarios, the window size can be set to 1000, ensuring both security and performance, avoiding data congestion or transmission delays caused by sequence number checking.
[0026] Furthermore, the random number mechanism is used to verify the detected data packet, including: A random number is added to each data packet, and the uniqueness of the random number is verified at the receiving end. If the random number is repeated or invalid, the data packet is rejected.
[0027] Specifically, in this embodiment, a random number is embedded in each data packet. This random number is generated using a highly secure random number generation algorithm, such as a hardware random number generator. The receiver verifies the uniqueness of the received random number and rejects the packet if it is duplicated or does not comply with security policies (for example, if the entropy value of the random number falls below a threshold). The random number is 128 bits long, ensuring sufficient randomness and unpredictability.
[0028] Furthermore, using the session mechanism to transmit the data packet after random number verification includes: Authenticate and verify the integrity of each data packet.
[0029] In this embodiment, the transmission of data packets is managed by establishing a session. During the session, identity authentication and integrity verification are performed on each data packet to ensure the legitimacy and correctness of the data packet.
[0030] Furthermore, performing the identity authentication includes: By comparing the pre-stored digital signature, it can be confirmed whether the data comes from a trusted source.
[0031] Performing the integrity verification includes: By using a hash function, the data packet is operated to generate a unique check value; The receiver verifies the integrity of the data packet based on the same hash function and checksum.
[0032] Specifically, in this embodiment, identity authentication is to verify whether the source of the data packet is credible. The authentication process is as follows: Data source provider (Alice): Generate signature -> Send data + signature -> Transmit if verification is successful, retransmit or issue an alarm if failure occurs.
[0033] Data recipient (Bob): Verify signature -> compare data source information -> confirm data source identity.
[0034] The data source provider uses its own private key to encrypt the data and generate a signature. This is used for identity authentication and data integrity verification. Follow the steps below to generate a signature.
[0035] 1) Step 1: splicing parameters; Parameters follow the key=value format, parameter names are sorted in ASCII dictionary order, and string encoding format is UTF-8.
[0036] 2) Step 2: Concatenate the API key; stringSign = stringA + "&key=*" The signature key is allocated by the aggregator and is a 32-bit UUID.
[0037] 3) Step 3: Generate signature; sign = HEX(SM3(stringSign)) (signature value hexadecimal lowercase string); HEX: represents converting the encrypted string of stringSign into a hexadecimal lowercase string; The data source provider sends the data and signature to the data recipient. The data recipient decrypts the signature using the data source provider's public key and compares the decrypted result with the original data for verification. If verification passes, the data source is considered trustworthy.
[0038] Choose a mature signature algorithm such as RSA, ECDSA, or SHA-256. Use a cryptographic library such as OpenSSL or Crypto++ to handle keys and signatures.
[0039] A pair of public and private keys is generated for each data packet. The private key is used to generate the signature, and the public key is used to verify the signature. Ensure the secure storage and transmission of the private key. Key management is an important part of ensuring information security, and its development includes the following key components: 1) Key generation: This is the first step in key management and involves generating public and private keys. Typically, public and private keys form a matching pair used to encrypt and decrypt data. Key generation requires the use of advanced algorithms such as RSA and ECC, ensuring key security and uniqueness.
[0040] 2) Key Storage: After keys are generated, they need to be stored securely. For individual users, private keys can be stored on a local computer or mobile device, while for enterprise users, private keys are usually stored in a secure key management system.
[0041] 3) Key transfer: When data needs to be encrypted or decrypted, the public key and private key must be used together. Usually, the key can be transferred through a secure channel or encrypted channel.
[0042] 4) Key Usage: When encrypting or decrypting data, the corresponding key is required. For encryption, the public key is used for encryption, while the private key can be used for decryption.
[0043] 5) Key Update and Rotation: As time goes by and security requirements change, keys need to be updated or rotated. This involves generating new key pairs, updating stored keys, and notifying relevant parties of the new keys.
[0044] 6) Key backup and recovery: To prevent data decryption failure due to key loss, keys must be backed up regularly. A reliable recovery mechanism must also be provided to restore keys when necessary.
[0045] 7) Key lifecycle management: This includes the security management of the entire process of key generation, storage, transfer, use, update, rotation, backup, and recovery. Appropriate policies and procedures must be established to ensure that keys are properly managed throughout their lifecycle.
[0046] After receiving the data and signature, the public key is used to decrypt the signature and compare it with the original data. If they match, the data is considered to be from the authentic data source.
[0047] Signature verification is part of the signing process, used to verify the validity and correctness of a digital signature. Signature verification primarily involves the following steps: Receiving data and signature: The recipient receives the original data and signature. Verifying the signature date and time: Confirming that the signature date and time match the expected date and time to prevent replay attacks. Verifying that the signature has not been tampered with: Confirming that the signature has not been tampered with: This ensures the integrity and authenticity of the signature.
[0048] Verify the certificate to verify that the signer's public key certificate is valid and that the certificate was issued by a trusted certificate authority. Decrypt the signature using the public key to decrypt the signature using the signer's public key to obtain the decrypted hash value.
[0049] Calculate the hash value of the original data: Perform a hash operation on the received original data to obtain the hash value of the original data. Compare the decrypted hash value with the hash value of the original data. If the decrypted hash value is consistent with the hash value of the original data, the signature is considered valid; if not, the signature is considered invalid.
[0050] Specifically, in this embodiment, a hash function or checksum algorithm is used to calculate the data to generate a unique checksum value. The receiver can use the same algorithm and checksum value to verify the integrity of the data. If the data is tampered with during transmission, the checksum value will change, thereby detecting data inconsistency.
[0051] In this embodiment, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to execute the method in the above embodiment.
[0052] The above program can be executed in a processor or stored in a memory (also known as a computer-readable medium). Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and can be implemented using any method or technology to store information. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transmitting medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transitory computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.
[0053] These computer programs can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for executing on the computer or other programmable device to implement the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the functions specified in one or more blocks can be implemented by different modules corresponding to different steps.
[0054] This embodiment provides such a device or system. The system, referred to as a multi-mechanism fusion-based complex underground fortification PNT system anti-replay attack system, includes: a filtering detection module for performing date filtering and serial number detection on the PNT system; a random number verification module for verifying detected data packets using a random number mechanism; and an encrypted transmission module for transmitting random number-verified data packets using a session mechanism, encrypting and signing the data packets during transmission.
[0055] The system or device is used to implement the functions of the method in the above-mentioned embodiment. Each module in the system or device corresponds to each step in the method, which has been explained in the method and will not be repeated here.
[0056] For example: in the filtering detection module, it is used to add a timestamp in each data packet, and the receiver detects expired data packets and filters them by comparing the timestamps; it is also used to assign a unique serial number to each data packet and carry the corresponding serial number in the data packet; the receiver detects duplicate data packets based on the order of the serial numbers and refuses to process duplicate data packets.
[0057] The embodiments described above are merely descriptions of preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit of the present invention, various modifications and improvements made to the technical solutions of the present invention by persons skilled in the art should fall within the scope of protection defined by the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion, characterized by: include: Perform date filtering and serial number detection on PNT systems; Use the random number mechanism to verify the detected data packets; The session mechanism is used to transmit the data packets after random number verification, and the data packets are encrypted and signed during the transmission process.
2. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Date filtering for PNT systems includes: A timestamp is added to each data packet, and the receiver detects expired data packets and filters them by comparing the timestamps.
3. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Performing the serial number detection includes: Assign a unique sequence number to each data packet and carry the corresponding sequence number in the data packet; The receiver detects duplicate packets based on the order of the sequence numbers and refuses to process duplicate packets.
4. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Verification of detected data packets using a random number mechanism includes: A random number is added to each data packet, and the uniqueness of the random number is verified at the receiving end. If the random number is repeated or invalid, the data packet is rejected.
5. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The use of the session mechanism to transmit data packets after random number verification includes: Authenticate and verify the integrity of each data packet.
6. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Performing the identity authentication includes: By comparing the pre-stored digital signature, it can be confirmed whether the data comes from a trusted source.
7. The method for resisting replay attacks on complex underground fortification PNT systems based on multi-mechanism fusion according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Performing the integrity verification includes: By using a hash function, the data packet is operated to generate a unique check value; The receiver verifies the integrity of the data packet based on the same hash function and checksum.