Communication methods and cryptographic infrastructure systems based on cryptographic infrastructure systems

Abstract

This invention provides a communication method, system, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium based on a cryptographic infrastructure system, relating to the field of quantum secure communication technology. The method includes: a calling KMS obtaining a first session key request, and a called KMS obtaining a second session key request; the calling KMS generating a random number and sending it to a calling QKM; the calling QKM generating a basic session key based on the random number and sending it to the calling KMS, and the called QKM sending the basic session key to the called KMS; the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiating to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiating to obtain a second extended session key; the calling KMS and the called KMS generating a target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key, and the second extended session key, respectively; and the calling KMS and the called KMS sending the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can encrypt communication based on the target session key.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of quantum secure communication technology, and in particular to a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system, a cryptographic infrastructure system, an electronic device, and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of IP-based 4G and 5G mobile communication technologies, modern telecommunications operators face information security challenges. Traditional cryptographic methods, such as public key infrastructure (PKI)-based encryption systems, while providing reliable security for data transmission over the past few decades, are now threatened by the rapid advancements in quantum computing technology. The powerful computing capabilities of quantum computers may break existing asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, in the future, putting traditional PKI systems relying on these algorithms at risk of failure. Therefore, exploring a new generation of cryptographic infrastructure capable of resisting quantum attacks has become an urgent priority.

[0003] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), a novel key exchange technology based on the principles of quantum mechanics, offers a crucial approach to solving this problem with its core advantage of "unconditional security." QKD leverages the non-cloning nature of quantum states and the properties of measurement perturbation to ensure the security of the key distribution process, making it difficult to crack even in the face of attacks from quantum computers. This technology not only provides theoretical long-term security guarantees but also lays a solid foundation for building next-generation cryptographic infrastructure.

[0004] Currently, there are still some technical challenges in the quantum key distribution process. Because the coding distance is relatively short, it is necessary to go through a trusted relay. The key distributed by quantum key distribution may be transferred to multiple physical devices, resulting in a large number of attack exposure surfaces and low security of communication between terminals. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of the above problems, embodiments of the present invention are proposed to provide a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system, a cryptographic infrastructure system, an electronic device, and a computer-readable storage medium that overcomes or at least partially solves the above problems.

[0006] To address the aforementioned problems, this invention discloses a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system, applied to the cryptographic infrastructure system, which includes a calling key management system (KMS) corresponding to a calling terminal, a calling quantum key manager (QKM) to which the calling KMS belongs, a called KMS corresponding to a called terminal, and a called QKM to which the called KMS belongs; the method includes:

[0007] The calling KMS obtains the first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS obtains the second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier;

[0008] The calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM;

[0009] The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS, and the called QKM sends the basic session key to the called KMS.

[0010] The calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a first extended session key to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a second extended session key to obtain a second extended session key.

[0011] The calling KMS and the called KMS generate the final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key, respectively.

[0012] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can encrypt communication based on the target session key.

[0013] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS generating a random number and sending the random number to the calling QKM includes:

[0014] The calling KMS generates a first random number through a cryptographic machine and sends the random number to the calling QKM;

[0015] The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number, including:

[0016] The calling QKM obtains the first random number and generates a second random number;

[0017] The first random number and the second random number are used to perform operations to obtain the basic session key.

[0018] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a first extended session key to obtain a first extended session key, including:

[0019] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master key;

[0020] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively obtain the first seed key of the calling KMS and the second seed key of the called KMS from a preset shared key table;

[0021] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the first seed key and the second seed key to perform calculations to obtain the first extended session key.

[0022] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a second extended session key to obtain a second extended session key, including:

[0023] The calling KMS uses a post-quantum cryptography PQC signature algorithm signature key pair, a PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, a PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate to generate a first PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS; the first PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a third random number;

[0024] The called KMS obtains the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, obtains the third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS; the second PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a fourth random number.

[0025] The calling KMS obtains the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and obtains the fourth random number from the second PQC extended session key negotiation message;

[0026] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the third random number and the fourth random number to perform calculations to obtain the second extended session key.

[0027] In one or more embodiments, the cryptographic infrastructure system further includes a Certificate Authentication System (CAS) and a Cryptographic Management Service Platform (CMSP);

[0028] Before the calling KMS obtains the first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and before the called KMS obtains the second session key request sent by the called terminal, the method further includes:

[0029] All KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system generate commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pairs and PQC signature algorithm signature key pairs through their respective cryptographic machines.

[0030] All KMSs export a certificate issuance request file with the signature public key in a preset format. Using the certificate issuance request file, the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate and the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate are issued in the CAS respectively, and the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate and the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate are stored in their respective secure media.

[0031] Each KMS generates a temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm through its corresponding cryptographic machine, and stores the public key in the temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm in its own secure medium.

[0032] The CAS generates PQC encryption key pairs and commercial cryptography encryption key pairs for all KMS, issues PQC encryption certificates and commercial cryptography encryption certificates, generates a first encryption private key and a second encryption private key, and sends the PQC encryption certificate, the commercial cryptography encryption certificate, the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key to all KMS respectively.

[0033] Each KMS obtains its own PQC encryption algorithm certificate, commercial cryptography encryption algorithm certificate, first encryption private key, and second encryption private key, and stores them in its own secure medium.

[0034] The CMSP generates an encrypted shared key table and sends the encrypted shared key table to all KMSs respectively; the encrypted shared key table includes the seed key corresponding to each KMS;

[0035] All KMSs acquire the encrypted shared key table and store it in their respective secure media;

[0036] Each KMS obtains the encrypted shared key table, the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate from its respective secure medium. It also decrypts its own first encryption private key and second encryption private key, and decrypts its own encrypted shared key table to obtain the shared key table.

[0037] In one or more embodiments, generating the first and second encrypted private keys includes:

[0038] The private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the first encryption private key;

[0039] The private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the second encryption private key.

[0040] In one or more embodiments, the CMSP generates an encrypted shared key table, including:

[0041] The CMSP generates seed keys for each KMS.

[0042] A shared key table is generated using all the seed keys;

[0043] The shared key table is encrypted to obtain an encrypted shared key table.

[0044] In one or more embodiments, each KMS decrypts its respective first encryption private key and second encryption private key, including:

[0045] Each KMS decrypts the first encrypted private key using the private key in its respective commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and decrypts the second encrypted private key using the private key in its respective PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair.

[0046] Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention disclose a cryptographic infrastructure system, the system comprising:

[0047] The calling KMS is used to obtain the first session key request sent by the calling terminal.

[0048] The called party's KMS is used to obtain the second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier;

[0049] The calling KMS is also used to generate a random number and send the random number to the calling QKM;

[0050] The calling QKM is used to generate a basic session key based on the random number and send the basic session key to the calling KMS, and to send the basic session key to the called KMS through the called QKM;

[0051] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to perform a first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS perform a second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key.

[0052] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to generate the final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key, respectively;

[0053] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can perform encrypted communication based on the target session key.

[0054] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS is further configured to:

[0055] A first random number is generated using a cryptographic machine, and the random number is sent to the calling QKM.

[0056] The calling QKM is also specifically used for:

[0057] Obtain the first random number and generate the second random number;

[0058] The first random number and the second random number are used to perform operations to obtain the basic session key.

[0059] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS and the called KMS are further configured to:

[0060] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master key;

[0061] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively obtain the first seed key of the calling KMS and the second seed key of the called KMS from a preset shared key table;

[0062] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the first seed key and the second seed key to perform calculations to obtain the first extended session key.

[0063] In one or more embodiments, the calling KMS and the called KMS are further configured to:

[0064] The calling KMS uses a post-quantum cryptography PQC signature algorithm signature key pair, a PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, a PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate to generate a first PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS; the first PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a third random number;

[0065] The called KMS obtains the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, obtains the third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS; the second PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a fourth random number.

[0066] The calling KMS obtains the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and obtains the fourth random number from the second PQC extended session key negotiation message;

[0067] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the third random number and the fourth random number to perform calculations to obtain the second extended session key.

[0068] In one or more embodiments, the cryptographic infrastructure system further includes a Certificate Authentication System (CAS) and a Cryptographic Management Service Platform (CMSP);

[0069] All KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system are also used to generate commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pairs and PQC signature algorithm signature key pairs respectively through their respective cryptographic machines;

[0070] All KMS are also used to export certificate issuance request files with the signature public key in a preset format, and to issue commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and PQC signature algorithm signature certificates in the CAS using the certificate issuance request files, and to store the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and PQC signature algorithm signature certificates in their respective secure media.

[0071] All KMS are also used to generate temporary encryption key pairs for the PQC encryption algorithm through their respective cryptographic machines, and to store the public key in the temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm in their respective secure media.

[0072] The CAS is used to generate PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pairs and commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pairs for all KMS respectively, and to issue PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificates and commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificates. It also generates a first encryption private key and a second encryption private key, and sends the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key to all KMS respectively.

[0073] All KMSs are also used to obtain their respective PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificates, commercial encryption algorithm encryption certificates, first encryption private keys and second encryption private keys, and store them in their respective secure media.

[0074] The CMSP is used to generate an encrypted shared key table and send the encrypted shared key table to all KMSs respectively; the encrypted shared key table includes the seed key corresponding to each KMS;

[0075] All KMSs are also used to obtain the encrypted shared key table and store it in their respective secure media;

[0076] All KMSs are also used to obtain the encrypted shared key table, the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate from their respective secure media, and to decrypt their respective first and second encrypted private keys and their respective encrypted shared key tables to obtain the shared key table.

[0077] In one or more embodiments, the CAS is specifically used for:

[0078] The private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the first encryption private key;

[0079] The private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the second encryption private key.

[0080] In one or more embodiments, the CMSP is specifically used for:

[0081] The CMSP generates seed keys for each KMS.

[0082] A shared key table is generated using all the seed keys;

[0083] The shared key table is encrypted to obtain an encrypted shared key table.

[0084] In one or more embodiments, all KMS are further used specifically for:

[0085] Each KMS decrypts the first encrypted private key using the private key in its respective commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and decrypts the second encrypted private key using the private key in its respective PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair.

[0086] Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention disclose an electronic device, including: a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the various steps of the above-described communication method embodiments based on a cryptographic infrastructure system.

[0087] Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention disclose a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the various steps of the above-described communication method embodiments based on a cryptographic infrastructure system.

[0088] The embodiments of the present invention have the following advantages:

[0089] The calling KMS acquires a first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS acquires a second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier; the calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM; the calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS, and the called QKM sends the basic session key to the called KMS; the calling KMS and the called KMS communicate with the called terminal. The calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a first extended session key to obtain a first extended session key. Then, the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a second extended session key to obtain a second extended session key. The calling KMS and the called KMS generate a final target session key based on the base session key, the first extended session key, and the second extended session key, respectively. The calling KMS and the called KMS send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can encrypt communication based on the target session key. Through the above method, the key exchange mode of classical commercial cryptography and the SSL handshake protocol are integrated, as well as the key relay mode of quantum key distribution combined with the PQC key negotiation mode combining PQC signature algorithm and PQC encryption algorithm. This provides a diversified and secure key distribution for cryptographic infrastructure systems, offering diverse quantum resistance capabilities for communication between terminals and improving their security. Attached Figure Description

[0090] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to the present invention.

[0091] Figure 2 This is a communication architecture diagram of the cryptographic infrastructure system of the present invention;

[0092] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the steps in a second embodiment of a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0093] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0094] One of the core concepts of this invention is to integrate the key exchange modes of classical commercial cryptography and SSL handshake protocol, as well as the key relay mode of quantum key distribution with the PQC key negotiation mode that combines PQC signature algorithm and PQC encryption algorithm, and other technologies to provide a variety of security-overlapping key distribution for cryptographic infrastructure systems. This can provide diversified quantum resistance support for communication between terminals and improve their security.

[0095] Reference Figure 1 This diagram illustrates a flowchart of a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method is applied to a cryptographic infrastructure system, which is a collection of hardware, software, personnel, policies, and procedures used to implement functions such as key and digital certificate generation, management, storage, distribution, and revocation. Specifically, the cryptographic infrastructure system may include:

[0096] The quantum communication layer is used to implement quantum key distribution. It includes a quantum key manager (QKM), a quantum key distributor (QKD), and a quantum key distribution network controller (QKDNC). It executes the QKD protocol through QKD links and generates QKD keys in conjunction with key relays.

[0097] The key management system (KMS) obtains and provides the QKD-distributed session keys to the terminal from the quantum communication layer. The cryptography management service platform (CMSP) provides cryptographic service resource management and routing for the system. The certificate authority system (CAS) provides digital certificate issuance and query for users and various components of the system.

[0098] The terminal is equipped with a secure SIM (Subscriber Identification Module) card or software cryptographic module, and interacts with a secure middleware and key management system, certificate authentication system, and identity and access management system.

[0099] Based on this Figure 2The communication architecture based on a cryptographic infrastructure system is illustrated, including a calling KMS corresponding to the calling terminal, a calling QKM to which the calling KMS belongs, a called KMS corresponding to the called terminal, a called QKM to which the called KMS belongs, a certificate authentication system (CAS), and a cryptographic management service platform (CMSP). The method may specifically include the following steps:

[0100] Step 101: The calling KMS obtains the first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS obtains the second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier.

[0101] Specifically, the terminals of both parties conducting encrypted communication can apply to the cryptographic infrastructure system for a session key to conduct encrypted communication. That is, the calling terminal can send a session key application (referred to as "first session key application") to the calling KMS carrying the session identifier of the encrypted communication session, and at the same time, the called terminal can also send a session key application (referred to as "second session key application") to the called KMS carrying the session identifier.

[0102] Step 102: The calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM.

[0103] After receiving the first session key request, the calling KMS can generate a random number (denoted as the "first random number") through the physical noise source built into the cryptographic machine and send the first random number to the calling QKM.

[0104] Step 103: The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS; and the called QKM sends the basic session key to the called KMS.

[0105] After obtaining the first random number, the calling QKM can generate a second random number using a quantum random number generator. Then, it performs an operation, such as an XOR operation, between the first and second random numbers to obtain the basic session key Kb. This basic session key is then transmitted to the called QKM via a trusted relay and secure distribution through a quantum communication network. Finally, the calling and called QKMs obtain a consistent basic session key, which they then send to the calling KMS and called KMS, respectively.

[0106] Step 104: The calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a first extended session key to obtain a first extended session key; and the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a second extended session key to obtain a second extended session key.

[0107] Specifically, the calling KMS and the called KMS each use a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master key (pre_master_secret). Then, the calling KMS and the called KMS each obtain the calling KMS's seed key Ki (denoted as "first seed key") and the called KMS's seed key Kr (denoted as "second seed key") from a preset shared key table. The preset standard can be the commercial cryptographic standard GB / T "0024-2023 SSL VPN Technical Specification," or other standards. In practical applications, the specific standard can be set according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the invention does not impose any restrictions on this.

[0108] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the first seed key, and the second seed key to perform operations to obtain the extended session key (denoted as the "first extended session key"). For example, the first seed key is derived from the second seed key, that is, Ki⊕Kr is used as the hash key to perform a cryptographic hash operation HMAC on the session identifier and other information:

[0109] KE=HMAC(Ki⊕Kr,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED)

[0110] Then, the first extended session key Ke-SM is obtained using KE:

[0111] Ke-SM=HMAC(KE⊕pre_master_secret,ClientHello.random||ServerHello.random||"expand secret"||SessionID)

[0112] In the above formula, the parameters are explained in accordance with the commercial cryptographic standard GB / T "0024-2023 SSL VPN Technical Specification". pre_master_secret is the pre-master key, "expand secret" is a custom string, ClientHello.random is a random number generated by the client (caller), and ServerHello.random is a random number generated by the server (callee).

[0113] Furthermore, the calling KMS generates a random number Ri (denoted as the "third random number"), and uses the third random number, the PQC signature algorithm signature key pair, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate to generate a PQC extended session key negotiation message (denoted as the "first PQC extended session key negotiation message"), and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS.

[0114] The first PQC extended session key negotiation message is as follows:

[0115] LABEL ||SessionID ||

[0116] In this context, LABEL represents the PQC key negotiation tag as a fixed string, KMS_IP-CALL and KMS_IP-CALLED are the IP addresses of the calling KMS and the called KMS, respectively, Ri is a random number generated by the calling KMS, CertS_PQC_KMS-CALL represents the calling KMS's PQC signing certificate, CertE_PQC_KMS-CALL represents the calling KMS's PQC encryption certificate, and PQC_Sign indicates that the private key PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALL is signed using the calling KMS's PQC signing algorithm.

[0117] After the called KMS obtains the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, it generates a random number Rr (denoted as the "fourth random number"), performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, obtains a third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message using the fourth random number, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS.

[0118] The second PQC extended session key negotiation message is as follows:

[0119] LABEL||SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||CertS_PQC_KMS-CALLED||PQC_Encap(Rr,PUB_PQC _KMS-CALL)PQC_Sign(LABEL||SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||Rr,PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALLED)

[0120] Where Rr is a random number generated by the called KMS, CertS_PQC_KMS-CALLED represents the called KMS's PQC signing certificate, PQC_Encap represents the encryption of Rr by using the public key (obtained from the called KMS's PQC encryption certificate CertE_PQC_KMS-CALL) in the called KMS's PQC encryption algorithm, and PQC_Sign represents the signing of the private key PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALLED using the called KMS's PQC signing algorithm.

[0121] After the calling KMS obtains the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, it performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, encrypts the private key in the key pair using the PQC encryption algorithm, and decrypts Rr in the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to obtain the fourth random number Rr.

[0122] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the third random number, and the fourth random number to calculate the extended session key Ke_PQC (denoted as the "second extended session key"), as follows:

[0123] Ke-PQC=HMAC(Ri⊕Rr,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||"expand pqcsecret")

[0124] "expand pqc secret" is a custom string.

[0125] Step 104: The calling KMS and the called KMS generate the final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key, and the second extended session key, respectively.

[0126] Specifically, the calling KMS and the called KMS generate the final session key (denoted as the "target session key") using the basic session key Kb, the first extended session key Ke-SM, and the second extended session key Ke-PQC, respectively, as follows:

[0127] Session-Key=HMAC(Kb⊕Ke_SM⊕Ke_PQC,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||"session secret")

[0128] "session secret" is a custom string.

[0129] Step 105: The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can perform encrypted communication based on the target session key.

[0130] After the calling KMS and the called KMS obtain the target session key, they can send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal respectively through a secure channel.

[0131] After obtaining the target session key, the calling terminal and the called terminal can use the target session key for encrypted communication.

[0132] In this embodiment of the invention, the calling KMS obtains a first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS obtains a second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier; the calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM; the calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS, and the called QKM sends the basic session key to the called KMS; the calling KMS and... The called KMS performs a first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS perform a second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key. The calling KMS and the called KMS generate a final target session key based on the base session key, the first extended session key, and the second extended session key, respectively. The calling KMS and the called KMS send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can encrypt communication based on the target session key. Through the above method, the key exchange mode of classical commercial cryptography and the SSL handshake protocol are integrated, as well as the key relay mode of quantum key distribution combined with the PQC key negotiation mode combining PQC signature algorithm and PQC encryption algorithm. This provides a diversified and secure key distribution for cryptographic infrastructure systems, offering diverse quantum resistance capabilities for communication between terminals and improving their security.

[0133] Reference Figure 3 The diagram illustrates a second embodiment of a communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to the present invention. Applied to a cryptographic infrastructure system, the method specifically includes the following steps:

[0134] Step 301: All KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system generate commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pairs and PQC signature algorithm signature key pairs through their respective cryptographic machines.

[0135] In practical applications, cryptographic infrastructure systems can include not only calling KMS, calling QKM, calling QKD, called KMS, called QKM, and called QKD, but also other KMS, QKM, and QKD systems. Figure 2 To facilitate the explanation of encrypted communication between the calling and called terminals, the cryptographic infrastructure system has been simplified and does not represent the complete cryptographic infrastructure system.

[0136] Based on this, all KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system can call their respective cryptographic machines to generate commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pairs and PQC signature algorithm signature key pairs.

[0137] Step 302: All KMSs export certificate issuance request files with the signature public key in a preset format. Using the certificate issuance request files, commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and PQC signature algorithm signature certificates are issued in the CAS, and the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and the PQC signature algorithm signature certificates are stored in their respective secure media.

[0138] Specifically, each KMS can export a certificate issuance request file with the signing public key in a preset format, and then use the certificate issuance request file to issue commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signing certificates and PQC signature algorithm signing certificates offline in CAS. Each KMS then stores the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signing certificates and PQC signature algorithm signing certificates in its own secure medium.

[0139] The preset format can be PKSC#10 or other formats. In practical applications, the specific format of the certificate issuance request file can be set according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the invention does not limit this.

[0140] Step 303: Each KMS generates a temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm through its corresponding cryptographic machine, and stores the public key in the temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm into its respective secure medium.

[0141] Each KMS can call its corresponding cryptographic machine to generate a temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm. Then, each KMS stores the public key in the temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm into its own secure medium.

[0142] Step 304: The CAS generates PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pairs and commercial cryptography encryption algorithm encryption key pairs for all KMS, issues PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificates and commercial cryptography encryption algorithm encryption certificates, generates a first encryption private key and a second encryption private key, and sends the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the commercial cryptography encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key to all KMS respectively.

[0143] Specifically, CAS generates PQC encryption key pairs and commercial cryptographic encryption key pairs for each KMS through the KMS and cryptographic machine connected to it, and issues PQC encryption certificate and commercial cryptographic encryption certificate. Then, it encrypts the private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption key pair with the public key in the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain an encrypted private key (denoted as "first encrypted private key"). It also encrypts the private key in the PQC encryption key pair with the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain an encrypted private key (denoted as "second encrypted private key"). Finally, it sends the PQC encryption certificate, the commercial cryptographic encryption certificate, the first encrypted private key, and the second encrypted private key to each KMS.

[0144] Step 305: Each KMS obtains its own PQC encryption algorithm certificate, commercial encryption algorithm certificate, first encryption private key, and second encryption private key, and stores them in its own secure medium.

[0145] After each KMS obtains its own PQC encryption algorithm certificate, commercial encryption algorithm certificate, first encryption private key, and second encryption private key, each KMS stores the PQC encryption algorithm certificate, commercial encryption algorithm certificate, first encryption private key, and second encryption private key into its own secure medium.

[0146] Step 306: The CMSP generates an encrypted shared key table and sends the encrypted shared key table to all KMSs respectively; the encrypted shared key table includes the seed key corresponding to each KMS.

[0147] The CMSP generates seed keys for each KMS through a cryptographic machine connected to it. Then, it uses all the seed keys to generate a key table (denoted as the "shared key table"). The shared key table is then encrypted using a hybrid cryptographic envelope to obtain an encrypted shared key table, which is then sent to each KMS.

[0148] When encrypting the shared key table, two temporary random numbers can be generated. The XOR of the two temporary random numbers is used as the symmetric key to encrypt the shared key table. The temporary random numbers are protected by the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm and the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair (from the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate issued by CAS in the secure medium), as well as the public key in the commercial cryptography encryption algorithm and the commercial cryptography encryption algorithm encryption key pair (from the commercial cryptography encryption algorithm encryption certificate issued by CAS in the secure medium).

[0149] Step 307: All KMSs obtain the encrypted shared key table and store it in their respective secure media.

[0150] After obtaining the encrypted shared key table, each KMS can store it in its own secure medium.

[0151] Step 308: Each KMS obtains the encrypted shared key table, the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate from its respective security medium. It also decrypts its own first encryption private key and second encryption private key, and decrypts its own encrypted shared key table to obtain the shared key table.

[0152] Specifically, each KMS obtains an encrypted shared key table, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signing certificate, a PQC signature algorithm signing certificate, a PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate from its respective secure medium. Then, each KMS decrypts the first encrypted private key using the private key from its respective commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signing key pair to obtain the private key for the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair. Simultaneously, each KMS decrypts the second encrypted private key using the private key from its respective PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the private key for the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair. Finally, each KMS decrypts the encrypted shared key table to obtain the shared key table.

[0153] Step 309: The calling KMS obtains the first session key request sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS obtains the second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier.

[0154] Specifically, the terminals of both parties conducting encrypted communication can apply for a session key from the cryptographic infrastructure system for encrypted communication. That is, the calling terminal can send a first session key request to the calling KMS carrying the session identifier of the encrypted communication session, and at the same time, the called terminal can also send a second session key request to the called KMS carrying the session identifier.

[0155] Step 3010: The calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM.

[0156] After receiving the first session key request, the calling KMS can generate a first random number using the physical noise source built into the cryptographic machine and send the first random number to the calling QKM.

[0157] Step 3011: The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS; and the called QKM sends the basic session key to the called KMS.

[0158] After obtaining the first random number, the calling QKM can generate a second random number using a quantum random number generator. Then, it performs an operation, such as an XOR operation, between the first and second random numbers to obtain the basic session key Kb. This basic session key is then transmitted to the called QKM via a trusted relay and secure distribution through a quantum communication network. Finally, the calling and called QKMs obtain a consistent basic session key, which they then send to the calling KMS and called KMS, respectively.

[0159] Step 3012: The calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a first extended session key to obtain a first extended session key; and the calling KMS and the called KMS negotiate a second extended session key to obtain a second extended session key.

[0160] Specifically, the calling KMS and the called KMS each use a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm key pair, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm certificate, a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm key pair, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master secret. Then, the calling KMS and the called KMS each retrieve the calling KMS's first seed key Ki and the called KMS's second seed key Kr from a preset shared key table. The preset standard can be the commercial cryptographic standard GB / T "0024-2023 SSL VPN Technical Specification," or other standards. In practical applications, the specific standard can be set according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the invention does not impose any limitations on this.

[0161] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the first seed key, and the second seed key to perform operations to obtain the first extended session key. For example, the first seed key is derived from the second seed key, that is, Ki⊕Kr is used as the hash key to perform a cryptographic hash operation HMAC on the session identifier and other information:

[0162] KE=HMAC(Ki⊕Kr,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED)

[0163] Then, the first extended session key Ke-SM is obtained using KE:

[0164] Ke-SM=HMAC(KE⊕pre_master_secret,ClientHello.random||ServerHello.random||"expand secret"||SessionID)

[0165] In the above formula, the parameters are explained in accordance with the commercial cryptographic standard GB / T "0024-2023 SSL VPN Technical Specification". pre_master_secret is the pre-master key, "expand secret" is a custom string, ClientHello.random is a random number generated by the client (caller), and ServerHello.random is a random number generated by the server (callee).

[0166] Furthermore, the calling KMS generates a third random number Ri, and uses the third random number, the PQC signature algorithm signature key pair, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate to generate a first PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS.

[0167] The first PQC extended session key negotiation message is as follows:

[0168] LABEL ||SessionID ||

[0169] In this context, LABEL represents the PQC key negotiation tag as a fixed string, KMS_IP-CALL and KMS_IP-CALLED are the IP addresses of the calling KMS and the called KMS, respectively, Ri is a random number generated by the calling KMS, CertS_PQC_KMS-CALL represents the calling KMS's PQC signing certificate, CertE_PQC_KMS-CALL represents the calling KMS's PQC encryption certificate, and PQC_Sign indicates that the private key PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALL is signed using the calling KMS's PQC signing algorithm.

[0170] After the called KMS obtains the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, it generates a fourth random number Rr, performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, obtains a third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message using the fourth random number, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS.

[0171] The second PQC extended session key negotiation message is as follows:

[0172] LABEL||SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||CertS_PQC_KMS-CALLED||PQC_Encap(Rr,PUB_PQC _KMS-CALL)PQC_Sign(LABEL||SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||Rr,PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALLED)

[0173] Where Rr is a random number generated by the called KMS, CertS_PQC_KMS-CALLED represents the called KMS's PQC signing certificate, PQC_Encap represents the encryption of Rr by using the public key (obtained from the called KMS's PQC encryption certificate CertE_PQC_KMS-CALL) in the called KMS's PQC encryption algorithm, and PQC_Sign represents the signing of the private key PRIV_PQC_KMS-CALLED using the called KMS's PQC signing algorithm.

[0174] After the calling KMS obtains the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, it performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, encrypts the private key in the key pair using the PQC encryption algorithm, and decrypts Rr in the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to obtain the fourth random number Rr.

[0175] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the third random number, and the fourth random number to calculate the second extended session key Ke_PQC, as follows:

[0176] Ke-PQC=HMAC(Ri⊕Rr,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||"expand pqcsecret")

[0177] "expand pqc secret" is a custom string.

[0178] Step 3013: The calling KMS and the called KMS generate the final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key, respectively.

[0179] Specifically, the calling KMS and the called KMS generate the final target session key (Session-Key) using the basic session key Kb, the first extended session key Ke-SM, and the second extended session key Ke-PQC, as follows:

[0180] Session-Key=HMAC(Kb⊕Ke_SM⊕Ke_PQC,SessionID||KMS_IP-CALL||KMS_IP-CALLED||"session secret")

[0181] "session secret" is a custom string.

[0182] Step 3014: The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can encrypt communication based on the target session key.

[0183] After the calling KMS and the called KMS obtain the target session key, they can send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal respectively through a secure channel.

[0184] After obtaining the target session key, the calling terminal and the called terminal can use the target session key for encrypted communication.

[0185] In this embodiment of the invention, the key exchange mode of classical commercial cryptography and SSL handshake protocol is integrated, as well as the key relay mode of quantum key distribution and the PQC key negotiation mode that combines PQC signature algorithm and PQC encryption algorithm. These multiple technologies are integrated to provide a variety of security superimposed key distribution for cryptographic infrastructure systems, which can provide diversified quantum resistance support for communication between terminals and improve its security.

[0186] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present invention are not limited to the described order of actions, because according to the embodiments of the present invention, some steps can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are preferred embodiments, and the actions involved are not necessarily essential to the embodiments of the present invention.

[0187] This invention discloses a cryptographic infrastructure system, which includes:

[0188] The calling KMS is used to obtain the first session key request sent by the calling terminal.

[0189] The called party's KMS is used to obtain the second session key request sent by the called terminal; the first session key request and the second session key request include a session identifier;

[0190] The calling KMS is also used to generate a random number and send the random number to the calling QKM;

[0191] The calling QKM is used to generate a basic session key based on the random number and send the basic session key to the calling KMS, and to send the basic session key to the called KMS through the called QKM;

[0192] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to perform a first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS perform a second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key.

[0193] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to generate the final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key, respectively;

[0194] The calling KMS and the called KMS are also used to send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal can perform encrypted communication based on the target session key.

[0195] In this embodiment of the invention, the calling KMS is further used for:

[0196] A first random number is generated using a cryptographic machine, and the random number is sent to the calling QKM.

[0197] The calling QKM is also specifically used for:

[0198] Obtain the first random number and generate the second random number;

[0199] The first random number and the second random number are used to perform operations to obtain the basic session key.

[0200] In this embodiment of the invention, the calling KMS and the called KMS are further used for:

[0201] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair, a commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master key;

[0202] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively obtain the first seed key of the calling KMS and the second seed key of the called KMS from a preset shared key table;

[0203] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the first seed key and the second seed key to perform calculations to obtain the first extended session key.

[0204] In this embodiment of the invention, the calling KMS and the called KMS are further used for:

[0205] The calling KMS uses a post-quantum cryptography PQC signature algorithm signature key pair, a PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, a PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and a PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate to generate a first PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS; the first PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a third random number;

[0206] The called KMS obtains the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, obtains the third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS; the second PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a fourth random number.

[0207] The calling KMS obtains the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and obtains the fourth random number from the second PQC extended session key negotiation message;

[0208] The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively use the session identifier, the third random number and the fourth random number to perform calculations to obtain the second extended session key.

[0209] In this embodiment of the invention, the cryptographic infrastructure system further includes a Certificate Authentication System (CAS) and a Cryptographic Management Service Platform (CMSP).

[0210] All KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system are also used to generate commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pairs and PQC signature algorithm signature key pairs respectively through their respective cryptographic machines;

[0211] All KMS are also used to export certificate issuance request files with the signature public key in a preset format, and to issue commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and PQC signature algorithm signature certificates in the CAS using the certificate issuance request files, and to store the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificates and PQC signature algorithm signature certificates in their respective secure media.

[0212] All KMS are also used to generate temporary encryption key pairs for the PQC encryption algorithm through their respective cryptographic machines, and to store the public key in the temporary encryption key pair for the PQC encryption algorithm in their respective secure media.

[0213] The CAS is used to generate PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pairs and commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pairs for all KMS respectively, and to issue PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificates and commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificates. It also generates a first encryption private key and a second encryption private key, and sends the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key to all KMS respectively.

[0214] All KMSs are also used to obtain their respective PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificates, commercial encryption algorithm encryption certificates, first encryption private keys and second encryption private keys, and store them in their respective secure media.

[0215] The CMSP is used to generate an encrypted shared key table and send the encrypted shared key table to all KMSs respectively; the encrypted shared key table includes the seed key corresponding to each KMS;

[0216] All KMSs are also used to obtain the encrypted shared key table and store it in their respective secure media;

[0217] All KMSs are also used to obtain the encrypted shared key table, the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption certificate from their respective secure media, and to decrypt their respective first and second encrypted private keys and their respective encrypted shared key tables to obtain the shared key table.

[0218] In this embodiment of the invention, the CAS is specifically used for:

[0219] The private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the first encryption private key;

[0220] The private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted using the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the second encryption private key.

[0221] In this embodiment of the invention, the CMSP is specifically used for:

[0222] The CMSP generates seed keys for each KMS.

[0223] A shared key table is generated using all the seed keys;

[0224] The shared key table is encrypted to obtain an encrypted shared key table.

[0225] In this embodiment of the invention, all KMS are further used for:

[0226] Each KMS decrypts the first encrypted private key using the private key in its respective commercial cryptographic signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the private key in the commercial cryptographic encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and decrypts the second encrypted private key using the private key in its respective PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair.

[0227] As the system implementation is basically similar to the method implementation, it is described in a relatively simple way. For relevant details, please refer to the description of the method implementation.

[0228] This invention also provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0229] It includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor. When executed by the processor, the computer program implements the various processes of the above-described communication method embodiments based on a cryptographic infrastructure system and achieves the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be described again here.

[0230] This invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the various processes of the above-described communication method embodiments based on a cryptographic infrastructure system and achieves the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be described again here.

[0231] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other.

[0232] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, apparatus, or computer program products. Therefore, embodiments of the present invention can take the form of entirely hardware embodiments, entirely software embodiments, or embodiments combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention can take the form of computer program products implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0233] Embodiments of the present invention are described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, terminal devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing terminal device to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing terminal device, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0234] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing terminal device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0235] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing terminal equipment, causing a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable terminal equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable terminal equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0236] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, those skilled in the art, upon learning the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to these embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments as well as all changes and modifications falling within the scope of the present invention.

[0237] Finally, it should be noted that in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or terminal device that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or terminal device. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or terminal device that includes said element.

[0238] The foregoing has provided a detailed description of a communication method and a cryptographic infrastructure system based on a cryptographic infrastructure system provided by the present invention. Specific examples have been used to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of the present invention. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope based on the ideas of the present invention. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method of communication based on a cryptographic infrastructure system, characterized by, The application is applied to a password infrastructure system, the password infrastructure system comprises a calling key management system (KMS) corresponding to a calling terminal, a calling quantum key manager (QKM) to which the calling KMS belongs, a called KMS corresponding to a called terminal, and a called QKM to which the called KMS belongs; The method comprises: The calling KMS acquires a first session key application sent by the calling terminal, and the called KMS acquires a second session key application sent by the called terminal; the first session key application and the second session key application comprise a session identifier; The calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM; The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number and sends the basic session key to the calling KMS, and the basic session key is sent to the called KMS by the called QKM; The calling KMS and the called KMS perform first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS perform second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key; The calling KMS and the called KMS generate a final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key respectively; The calling KMS and the called KMS send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal respectively, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal perform communication encryption based on the target session key.

2. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The calling KMS generates a random number and sends the random number to the calling QKM, comprising: The calling KMS generates a first random number by a cryptographic machine and sends the first random number to the calling QKM; The calling QKM generates a basic session key based on the random number, comprising: The calling QKM acquires the first random number and generates a second random number; The first random number and the second random number are operated to obtain a basic session key.

3. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 1, characterized by, The calling KMS and the called KMS perform first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, comprising: The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively adopt a commercial secret signature algorithm signature key pair, a commercial secret signature algorithm signature certificate, a commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption key pair and a commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption certificate to perform a handshake protocol according to a preset standard to obtain a pre-master key; The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively acquire a first seed key of the calling KMS and a second seed key of the called KMS from a preset shared key table; The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively adopt the session identifier, the first seed key and the second seed key to perform operation to obtain a first extended session key.

4. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 1, characterized by, The calling KMS and the called KMS perform second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key, comprising: The calling KMS generates a first PQC extended session key negotiation message by using a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) signature algorithm to sign a key pair, a PQC signature algorithm to sign a certificate, a PQC encryption algorithm to encrypt a key pair, and a PQC encryption algorithm to encrypt a certificate, and sends the first PQC extended session key negotiation message to the called KMS; the first PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a third random number; The called KMS acquires the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, acquires the third random number from the first PQC extended session key negotiation message, generates a second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and sends the second PQC extended session key negotiation message to the calling KMS; the second PQC extended session key negotiation message includes a fourth random number; The calling KMS acquires the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, performs signature verification on the second PQC extended session key negotiation message, and acquires the fourth random number from the second PQC extended session key negotiation message; The calling KMS and the called KMS respectively perform operations on the session identifier, the third random number, and the fourth random number to obtain a second extended session key.

5. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 1, characterized by, The cryptographic infrastructure system further includes a certificate authentication system (CAS) and a cryptographic management service platform (CMSP); Before the calling KMS acquires the first session key application sent by the calling terminal and the called KMS acquires the second session key application sent by the called terminal, the cryptographic infrastructure system further includes the following steps: All KMSs in the cryptographic infrastructure system respectively generate a commercial secret signature algorithm signature key pair and a PQC signature algorithm signature key pair through respective corresponding cryptographic machines; All KMSs respectively export a signature public key as a certificate issuance request file in a preset format, use the certificate issuance request file to respectively issue a commercial secret signature algorithm signature certificate and a PQC signature algorithm signature certificate in the CAS, and store the commercial secret signature algorithm signature certificate and the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate in respective secure media; All KMSs respectively generate a PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair through respective corresponding cryptographic machines, and store a public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair in respective secure media; The CAS respectively generates a PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair and a commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption key pair for all KMSs, issues a PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate and a commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption certificate, and generates a first encryption private key and a second encryption private key, and sends the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the first encryption private key, and the second encryption private key to all KMSs; All KMSs respectively acquire the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption certificate, the first encryption private key, and the second encryption private key, and store them in respective secure media; The CMSP generates an encrypted shared key table and sends the encrypted shared key table to all KMSs respectively; the encrypted shared key table includes seed keys corresponding to all KMSs respectively; All KMSs obtain the encrypted shared key table and store the encrypted shared key table in respective secure media; All KMSs obtain the encrypted shared key table, the commercial secret signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC signature algorithm signature certificate, the PQC encryption algorithm encryption certificate and the commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption certificate from the respective secure media respectively, and respectively decrypt the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key, and respectively decrypt the encrypted shared key table, to obtain the shared key table.

6. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 5, characterized by, The first encryption private key and the second encryption private key are generated, including: The private key in the commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted by using the public key in the commercial secret signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the first encryption private key; The private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair is encrypted by using the public key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the second encryption private key.

7. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 5, characterized by, The CMSP generates an encrypted shared key table, including: The CMSP generates seed keys for all KMSs respectively; A shared key table is generated by using all seed keys; The shared key table is encrypted to obtain an encrypted shared key table.

8. The communication method based on a cryptographic infrastructure system according to claim 5, characterized by, All KMSs respectively decrypt the first encryption private key and the second encryption private key, including: All KMSs respectively decrypt the first encryption private key by using the private key in the commercial secret signature algorithm signature key pair to obtain the private key in the commercial secret encryption algorithm encryption key pair, and respectively decrypt the second encryption private key by using the private key in the PQC encryption algorithm temporary encryption key pair to obtain the private key in the PQC encryption algorithm encryption key pair.

9. A cryptographic infrastructure system, characterized by The system includes: A calling KMS, configured to obtain a first session key application sent by a calling terminal; A called KMS, configured to obtain a second session key application sent by a called terminal; the first session key application and the second session key application include a session identifier; The calling KMS is further configured to generate a random number and send the random number to a calling QKM; The calling QKM is configured to generate a basic session key based on the random number, send the basic session key to the calling KMS, and send the basic session key to the called KMS through a called QKM; The calling KMS and the called KMS are further configured to perform first extended session key negotiation to obtain a first extended session key, and the calling KMS and the called KMS perform second extended session key negotiation to obtain a second extended session key; The calling KMS and the called KMS are further configured to generate a final target session key based on the basic session key, the first extended session key and the second extended session key respectively. The calling KMS and the called KMS are further configured to respectively send the target session key to the calling terminal and the called terminal, so that the calling terminal and the called terminal perform communication encryption based on the target session key.

10. An electronic device, comprising: The computer program comprises: A processor, a memory, and a computer program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the communication method based on the cryptographic infrastructure system according to any one of claims 1-8.

11. A computer readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer program is stored on the computer readable storage medium, and when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the communication method based on the cryptographic infrastructure system according to any one of claims 1-8.

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