Service credential issuance method, service credential use method, service end, service point, and vehicle

Abstract

The application relates to a service voucher issuing method, a service voucher using method, a service end, a service point and a vehicle, and relates to the technical field of cryptography. The method comprises the following steps: sending a first identity authentication request to a security chip of the vehicle; receiving a first zero-knowledge proof returned by the security chip, and determining that the identity authentication of the security chip is passed in the case that the first zero-knowledge proof is established, and sending a second identity authentication request to a terminal device of the vehicle; wherein the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof about sensitive information of the vehicle in response to the second identity authentication request, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the service end; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the service end; in the case that the second zero-knowledge proof is established, it is determined that the identity authentication of the terminal device is passed, and a service voucher is issued to the terminal device. Therefore, hardware-level security binding and selective information disclosure can be realized, and sensitive data leakage can be avoided.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of cryptography technology, and more particularly to the field of cryptographic verification technology, specifically to a service credential issuance method, a service credential usage method, a server, a service point, and a vehicle. Background Technology

[0002] With the popularization of new energy vehicles and the rapid development of urban smart transportation infrastructure, vehicles frequently rely on digital identity authentication and electronic payment tools in public service scenarios such as charging, parking, and road and bridge passage. However, while existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems improve traffic efficiency and convenience, they have exposed a series of serious data security and privacy protection issues, becoming a key bottleneck restricting the in-depth development of smart transportation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore effective ways to ensure vehicle data security. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This application provides a method for issuing service credentials, a method for using service credentials, a server, a service point, and a vehicle, to at least address the technical problem of privacy leakage in vehicle-based digital identity authentication in related technologies. The technical solution of this application is as follows:

[0004] According to a first aspect provided in this application, a service credential issuance method is provided, applied to a server. The method includes: sending a first authentication request to a vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; the server securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, determining that the security chip's authentication is successful, and sending a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device; wherein, in response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof regarding sensitive information about the vehicle, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server; if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, determining that the terminal device's authentication is successful, and issuing a service credential to the terminal device.

[0005] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can achieve hardware-level secure binding and selective information disclosure through phased zero-knowledge proof verification (the first phase verifies the identity of the secure chip hardware, and the second phase verifies the sensitive information of the terminal device). This avoids the transmission or leakage of sensitive data such as vehicle unique identifiers and user attributes in plaintext during communication, thereby ensuring a high degree of privacy protection, tamper resistance, and operational efficiency in the service credential issuance process. At the same time, it provides a cryptographic basis for subsequent violation tracing and effectively prevents the risk of credential abuse and identity forgery.

[0006] In one possible implementation, the method further includes issuing a security chip to the vehicle owner, where a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner applying for the security chip, so that the owner can install the security chip in the vehicle.

[0007] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can establish an unalterable hardware-level identity by binding the verification of the relationship between the person and the vehicle with the chip issuance. This prevents unauthorized vehicles or vehicles with counterfeit license plates from impersonating legitimate identities to apply for certificates, thereby ensuring a strong correlation between the physical entity and the digital identity from the source and providing a reliable hardware security foundation for subsequent privacy protection services.

[0008] In one possible implementation, the first zero-knowledge proof includes a first target value and a first mathematical relationship between the chip key, the first commitment value, and the first target value; the process of determining the validity of the first zero-knowledge proof includes: calculating the first target value based on the first mathematical relationship and the locally pre-stored chip key and the first commitment value; and determining that the first zero-knowledge proof is valid if the calculated first target value is consistent with the first target value included in the first zero-knowledge proof.

[0009] Based on the above technical means, this application can verify the authenticity of hardware identity without exposing sensitive information through cryptographic mathematical relationship verification (reconstructing the first target value based on the locally pre-stored chip key and the first commitment value), thereby preventing the vehicle's unique identifier from being stolen or tampered with during communication, thus establishing a trustworthy hardware security foundation for privacy protection services while ensuring the legitimacy of the chip.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the service credential is signed using the public key corresponding to the private key issued to the terminal device and a target signature algorithm; wherein the target signature algorithm includes the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham+ (BBS+) signature algorithm and the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature algorithm; the signed service credential is then issued to the terminal device, so that the terminal device can verify the signed service credential using the private key to obtain the service credential.

[0011] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can cryptographically sign service credentials using the BBS+ signature algorithm and the CL signature algorithm, which can ensure the integrity and unforgeability of the credentials, prevent sensitive information such as user identity from being leaked or tampered with during the issuance process, thereby achieving efficient local verification on terminal devices while providing a secure credential management mechanism that protects privacy, prevents abuse, and ensures traceability.

[0012] In one possible implementation, the service credential includes service information, or service information and sensitive information; the service information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0013] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can avoid excessive exposure of sensitive data to the verification process by integrating service information (permissions, number of times, validity period) or sensitive information with service information and service credentials, thereby protecting user privacy while ensuring service, and preventing credential forgery or abuse through cryptographic binding (such as BBS + signature).

[0014] According to the second aspect provided in this application, a method for using a service credential is provided, applied to a service point under a server. The method includes: in response to receiving a service credential usage request sent by a terminal device of a vehicle, sending a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof about a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the server securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; sending the third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential information to be verified to the terminal device; wherein, if the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the security chip's authentication is successful; if the security chip's authentication is successful and the service credential information exists, generating a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information; generating a fourth zero-knowledge proof about the unique service credential serial number, and returning the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the unique service credential serial number is updated with each use of the service credential; if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, determining that the unique service credential serial number has been verified, and agreeing to the service credential usage request.

[0015] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can verify the physical authenticity of the security chip through a third zero-knowledge proof, ensuring that the vehicle connected to the terminal device has a legitimate hardware identity and effectively preventing cloned vehicles or counterfeit terminals from accessing service points. Subsequently, it uses a fourth zero-knowledge proof to verify usage permissions based on a dynamically updated unique serial number of the service credential, ensuring that each service use is cryptographically bound to limits on the number of uses and timeliness, preventing credential reuse or overspending, and completely concealing the user's identity and historical behavior. The entire process replaces plaintext transmission with mathematical relationships, ensuring that the service point can complete verification without knowing the vehicle's identification, while retaining traceability capabilities for regulatory agencies on the service side in case of violations. Ultimately, it achieves precise service control and privacy protection with "one-time password" without disclosing any sensitive information.

[0016] In one possible implementation, the service credential information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0017] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can incorporate structured data such as service permissions, total number of uses, remaining valid uses, and validity period into service credential information, thereby preventing the use of credentials beyond their scope, abuse beyond the number of uses, or operation beyond their validity period.

[0018] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: rejecting the service credential usage request if the authentication of the security chip fails or the service credential information does not exist.

[0019] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can immediately reject requests when the security chip authentication fails or the service credential information does not exist. This can effectively block unauthorized device access and the abuse of invalid credentials, and prevent unauthorized access and resource theft of the service system by cloned vehicles, counterfeit terminals, or expired credentials. Thus, a proactive security defense system is built at the operational level to ensure the service reliability and business compliance of the privacy protection service.

[0020] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: tracing vehicle violations when the service credential unique serial number is a previously verified service credential unique serial number.

[0021] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can accurately identify the reuse or theft of credentials through a dynamic serial number comparison mechanism (traceability is triggered when the currently verified serial number is found to be duplicated with a previous one). This prevents malicious users from committing service fraud and abusing resources by copying or replaying credential serial numbers, thereby achieving traceability of violations in a completely anonymous verification environment and protecting the privacy rights of legitimate users.

[0022] According to a third aspect provided in this application, a service credential issuance method is provided, applied to a terminal device. The method includes: in response to a second authentication request sent by a server, generating a second zero-knowledge proof about sensitive information of a vehicle, and returning the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; wherein the sensitive information is pre-extracted from the terminal device and submitted to the server; the server sends a first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; the security chip, in response to the first authentication request, generates a first zero-knowledge proof about a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; the server securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server determines that the security chip's authentication is successful and sends a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device.

[0023] Receive service credentials issued by the server; wherein, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server determines that the terminal device's identity verification is successful and issues the service credentials to the terminal device.

[0024] According to the fourth aspect provided in this application, a method for using a service credential is provided, applied to a terminal device. The method includes: sending service credential information to a service point under a server; wherein, in response to receiving a service credential usage request sent by the terminal device of a vehicle, the service point sends a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; in response to the third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the server; the service point sends the third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential information to be verified to the terminal device; the server securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier.

[0025] If the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the identity verification of the security chip is confirmed to be successful; if the identity verification of the security chip is successful and service credential information exists, a unique service credential serial number is generated based on the service credential information.

[0026] Generate a fourth zero-knowledge proof about the unique serial number of the service credential and return the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point; wherein, the unique serial number of the service credential is updated with each use of the service credential;

[0027] Receive service credential usage information sent by the service point; wherein, if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the service point determines that the unique serial number of the service credential has been verified, agrees to the service credential usage request, and sends the service credential usage information to the service point.

[0028] According to the fifth aspect provided in this application, a server is provided, comprising: a sending unit and a determining unit; the sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request to a vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; the server securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; the determining unit is configured to, if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the security chip's authentication is successful, and send a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device; wherein, in response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof regarding sensitive information about the vehicle, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server; the determining unit is further configured to, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the terminal device's authentication is successful, and issue a service credential to the terminal device.

[0029] In one possible implementation, the sending unit is also used to issue a security chip to the vehicle owner, in cases where a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, so that the owner can install the security chip in the vehicle.

[0030] In one possible implementation, the determining unit is specifically used to: calculate a first target value based on a first mathematical relation and a locally pre-stored chip key and a first commitment value; and determine that the first zero-knowledge proof is valid if the calculated first target value is consistent with the first target value included in the first zero-knowledge proof.

[0031] In one possible implementation, the determining unit is specifically used to: sign the service credential using the public key corresponding to the private key issued to the terminal device and the target signature algorithm; wherein the target signature algorithm includes the BBS+ signature algorithm and the CL signature algorithm; and issue the signed service credential to the terminal device so that the terminal device can verify the signed service credential using the private key to obtain the service credential.

[0032] In one possible implementation, the service credential includes service information, or service information and sensitive information; the service information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0033] According to a sixth aspect of this application, a service point is provided, comprising: a sending unit and a determining unit; the sending unit is configured to, in response to receiving a service credential usage request sent by a terminal device of a vehicle, send a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the server securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; the sending unit is further configured to send the third zero-knowledge proof and service credential information to be verified to the terminal device; wherein, if the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the security chip's authentication is successful; if the security chip's authentication is successful and service credential information exists, it generates a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information; it generates a fourth zero-knowledge proof regarding the unique service credential serial number, and returns the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the unique service credential serial number is updated with each use of the service credential; the determining unit is configured to, if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the unique service credential serial number has been verified and agree to the service credential usage request.

[0034] In one possible implementation, the service credential information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0035] In one possible implementation, the service point further includes: a receiving unit; the receiving unit is configured to reject the service credential usage request if the authentication of the security chip fails or the service credential information does not exist.

[0036] In one possible implementation, the service point further includes: a traceability unit; the traceability unit is used to trace violations of a vehicle if the unique serial number of the service credential is a previously verified unique serial number of the service credential.

[0037] According to the seventh aspect provided in this application, a vehicle is provided, including: a terminal device; the terminal device is configured to send a service credential usage request to a service point as described in the sixth aspect.

[0038] According to the eighth aspect provided in this application, an electronic device is provided, comprising: a processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; wherein the processor is configured to execute instructions to implement the method of the first aspect described above and any possible implementation thereof.

[0039] According to the ninth aspect provided in this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided that, when the instructions in the computer-readable storage medium are executed by a processor of an electronic device, enables the electronic device to perform the methods described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0040] According to the tenth aspect provided in this application, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product including computer instructions, which, when executed on an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0041] It should be noted that the technical effects of any of the implementation methods in aspects two through ten can be found in the technical effects of the corresponding implementation methods in aspect one, and will not be repeated here.

[0042] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and do not limit this application. Attached Figure Description

[0043] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application, and do not constitute an undue limitation of this application.

[0044] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a server structure according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0045] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a service credential issuance method according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0046] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for using a service credential according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0047] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a service credential application process according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0048] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating yet another service credential application process according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0049] Figure 6 This is a block diagram illustrating a server according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0050] Figure 7 This is a block diagram illustrating a service point according to an exemplary embodiment;

[0051] Figure 8 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an exemplary embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0052] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions of this application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0053] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., used in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with this application. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of this application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0054] In the embodiments of this application, the words "exemplary," "for example," or "for instance" are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary," "for example," or "for instance" in the embodiments of this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of the words "exemplary," "for example," or "for instance" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0055] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments.

[0056] The service credential issuance method and service credential usage method provided in this application can be applied to the issuance and use of vehicle service credentials, respectively. A vehicle can also be referred to as a vehicle, mobile carrier, electric vehicle (EV), hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV), fuel cell vehicle (FCV), autonomous vehicle, intelligent and connected vehicle (ICV), driverless vehicle, etc.

[0057] In this application, the vehicle can be a sedan, a sport utility vehicle (SUV), a truck, an electric vehicle, a motorcycle, a tricycle, a special vehicle (such as an ambulance, fire truck, police car, etc.), a driverless taxi, an intelligent connected bus, an autonomous logistics vehicle, an electric truck, etc. Furthermore, this method is also applicable to various special-purpose vehicles, such as agricultural vehicles, mining vehicles, forestry vehicles, airport vehicles, and port vehicles. This application does not impose specific limitations in this regard.

[0058] like Figure 1 As shown, Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a server-side structure is shown. Server 101 can have subordinate service points 102. Service points 102 can be distributed across different geographical locations to perform specific business operations.

[0059] Optionally, Figure 1 A communication connection can be established between server 101 and service point 102.

[0060] In practical applications, server 101 can establish communication connections with one or more service points 102 to form a distributed service network, enabling server 101 to centrally manage each service point 102 and achieve unified allocation of resources and collaborative processing of tasks.

[0061] In one possible implementation, server 101 can represent the central management system of the traffic management department, and service point 102 can represent the service equipment of the traffic management department or the operating equipment of the service provider. Server 101 can receive, store, and process various requests and data from various service points 102. Each service point 102 can provide corresponding services to the vehicle based on the service credential information issued by server 101.

[0062] For example, service point 102 can be a charging pile, an ETC gantry system, parking service equipment, etc. This application does not impose specific limitations in this regard.

[0063] In one possible implementation, during the service distribution phase Figure 1 The server 101 can send a first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip, and if the first zero-knowledge proof sent by the vehicle's security chip is valid, determine that the security chip's authentication is successful, and send a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device, so that if the second zero-knowledge proof sent by the vehicle's terminal device is valid, determine that the terminal device's authentication is successful, and issue the service credential to the terminal device.

[0064] Furthermore, during the service credential usage phase, the service point 102 under the server 101 can respond to the service credential usage request sent by the vehicle's terminal device by sending a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip, and send the service credential information to be verified and the third zero-knowledge proof returned by the security chip to the terminal device, so that if the fourth zero-knowledge proof returned by the terminal device is valid, the unique serial number of the service credential is verified and the service credential usage request is approved.

[0065] Optionally, Figure 1 The server 101 in the text can be a terminal, a server, or other types of electronic devices. Figure 1 The example shown is merely one example of the device configuration of server 101 and does not constitute a limitation thereof.

[0066] When server 101 is a terminal, the terminal can be a device providing voice and / or data connectivity to a user, a handheld device with wireless connectivity, or other processing devices connected to a wireless modem. The terminal can communicate with one or more core networks via a radio access network (RAN). The terminal can be a mobile terminal, such as a computer with a mobile terminal, or a mobile device built into the server that exchanges voice and / or data with the radio access network, such as a mobile phone, tablet, laptop, netbook, or personal digital assistant (PDA). This application does not impose any limitations on this.

[0067] When server 101 is a server, the server can be a single server or a server cluster consisting of multiple servers. In some embodiments, the server cluster can also be a distributed cluster. This application does not impose any limitations in this regard.

[0068] It should be noted that the structure illustrated in the embodiments of this application does not constitute a limitation on server 101. It may include more or fewer components than illustrated, or combine some components, or split some components, or have different component arrangements. The illustrated components may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of software and hardware.

[0069] For ease of understanding, the following description, in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, details the method for issuing service certificates provided in this application.

[0070] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a service credential issuance method according to an exemplary embodiment, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the method for issuing service vouchers includes the following steps:

[0071] S201. The server sends the first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip.

[0072] Among them, a security chip is a miniature electronic device that integrates an anti-tampering security module.

[0073] Optionally, the security chip can be integrated into the vehicle's on-board unit (OBU) or into the terminal device. This application does not impose specific limitations in this regard.

[0074] In one possible implementation, the server can issue a security chip to the vehicle owner if there is a genuine ownership relationship between the vehicle and the owner applying for the security chip, so that the owner can install the security chip in the vehicle.

[0075] Specifically, vehicle owners can send a request for a security chip, including vehicle-related documents, to the server via their terminal device. The server can verify the vehicle-related documents. If a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the applicant for the security chip, the server embeds a unique identifier (UID) related to the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and an tamper-proof security module into the initial security chip. This tamper-proof security module may have a built-in pseudo-random function (PRF) generator to generate a chip key and a first commitment value, which are then sent to the terminal device and the security chip. The first commitment value satisfies the following first formula:

[0076]

[0077] Q can be used to characterize the first commitment value. h1 can be used to represent unique identifiers. h1 can be used to represent attribute generators. h1 satisfies the bilinear group in the second formula below.

[0078]

[0079] Here, p can be used to represent prime numbers, and p defines that all subsequent calculations (such as exponentiation) are performed in a finite field modulo p. (Group) The order (i.e. the number of elements in the group) is always this prime number p. It can be used to characterize cyclic groups of order p. Can be used for characterization The parameters in. Can be used for characterization The parameters in. Can be used for characterization The parameters in. It can be used to characterize security parameters, for example, 128 bits. Attribute generator. and publicly available parameters , used to construct BBS+ signatures and zero-knowledge proofs. e can be used to represent a bilinear mapping relationship that satisfies... In other words, it is used according to and Given two elements, output one. elements in It can be used to characterize lengths of A string consisting of the number 1. The larger the value, the higher the security of the parameters. The second formula initializes and defines the public, trusted mathematical foundation parameters required in the embodiments of this application. All subsequent security operations can use the initialization parameters defined in the second formula. The Bilinear Group Generator (BGen) is a cryptographic algorithm, and the second formula refers to the algorithm BGen and the input... generate In one possible implementation, when a vehicle owner applies for a service certificate, the owner can provide the server with relevant documents for both the owner and the vehicle for identity verification. Once the server confirms the consistency between the owner and the vehicle based on the relevant documents, it sends a first identity verification request to the vehicle's security chip.

[0080] For example, if the server confirms that the person and vehicle match through the relevant documents of the vehicle owner and the vehicle, it can generate a random number. and send a random number to the security chip Initiate the service credential issuance protocol, which means sending the first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip.

[0081] S202. In response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof about the chip key and the first commitment value.

[0082] The first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier.

[0083] For example, the security chip receives the data sent by the server. Then, random numbers can be generated. And based on random numbers Generate a first zero-knowledge proof regarding the chip key and the first commitment value. The first zero-knowledge proof satisfies the following third formula:

[0084]

[0085] in, It can be used to characterize first zero-knowledge proofs. It can be used to represent a unique identifier. h0 and h1 can be used to represent attribute generators. r can be used to represent mapping parameters generated based on PRF, chip key, and random number. It can be used to characterize PRF, chip key and random number. The first mapping parameter generated. It can be used to characterize the first commitment value, i.e., Q.

[0086] It is understandable that SDL{·} is a cryptographic function used to generate zero-knowledge proofs. In the third formula, its role is to generate the first zero-knowledge proof, demonstrating that the secure chip knows the UID and r, and that these two values ​​correctly constitute the commitment value B. Similarly, the role of SDL{·} in other formulas is similar to its role in the third formula; the roles of SDL{·} in other formulas can be referenced in the third formula. This application will not elaborate further on this point.

[0087] The following fourth formula can be satisfied. It can be used to characterize the first mathematical relation. Fourth formula:

[0088]

[0089] in, It can be used to characterize PRF, chip key and random number. The generated second mapping parameters. Substituting into the first mathematical relation yields the first objective value. ,Right now PRF K The (·) function can be a mapping relationship related to the chip key K, used to generate the mapping parameters corresponding to random numbers.

[0090] S203, The security chip returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server.

[0091] For example, the security chip can return a first zero-knowledge proof to the server. The security chip can also return random numbers to the server. and the first target value .

[0092] S204. If the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server determines that the security chip's authentication is successful and sends a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device.

[0093] The terminal device can be a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to a user, a handheld device with wireless connectivity, or other processing device connected to a wireless modem. The terminal device can communicate with one or more core networks via a wireless access network. The terminal device can be a mobile terminal, such as a computer with a mobile terminal, or a vehicle-mounted terminal built into a vehicle, exchanging voice and / or data with the wireless access network, such as a mobile phone, tablet computer, laptop computer, netbook, or personal digital assistant. This application does not impose any limitations on this.

[0094] In one possible implementation, the server can verify the first zero-knowledge proof, and if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the security chip's authentication is successful (i.e., the UID sent by the server and the preset calculation rules exist), and send a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device.

[0095] Specifically, the server can determine the first mapping parameters based on the chip key and the fourth formula. And based on the first mapping parameter The first commitment value Q and the first mathematical relationship First, determine the first objective value. Then, if the calculated first objective value is consistent with the first objective value included in the first zero-knowledge proof, determine that the first zero-knowledge proof is valid.

[0096] For example, the server can send ( , This means sending a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal equipment.

[0097] S205. In response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof about sensitive information about the vehicle.

[0098] Sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server. Sensitive information may include vehicle owner identity information, travel records, etc.

[0099] In one possible implementation, the second zero-knowledge proof can satisfy the following fifth formula:

[0100]

[0101] in, It can be used to characterize proofs of second zero knowledge. It can be used to characterize terminal devices from the integer field Select a random number. It can be used to characterize sensitive information, that is . As a second mathematical relation, C can be used to characterize information based on sensitive information. The generated second commitment value, It can be used to characterize the product of attribute commitments. Attribute values ​​that can be used to represent sensitive information. h0, h i+1 It can be used to characterize attribute generators. It can be used to characterize the third mathematical relation.

[0102] S206. The terminal device returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server.

[0103] For example, the terminal device can return a second zero-knowledge proof to the server. The security chip can also return random numbers to the server. And the second commitment value C.

[0104] S207. If the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server determines that the terminal device's identity verification is successful and issues the service credential to the terminal device.

[0105] The service credential includes service information, or service information and sensitive information. The service information includes service permissions, total service attempts, remaining valid attempts, and service validity period. In one possible implementation, the server can perform a second zero-knowledge proof, and if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the terminal device's identity verification is successful and issue a service credential to the terminal device.

[0106] Specifically, the server can base its decisions on sensitive information and random numbers. Attribute generator h0, the second mathematical relation, and the generation of the second target value. And based on random numbers... Attribute generator A third mathematical relation generates a third objective value. The server can determine that the second zero-knowledge proof is valid if the second objective value is consistent with the second objective value included in the second zero-knowledge proof, and the third objective value is consistent with the third objective value included in the second zero-knowledge proof.

[0107] Furthermore, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server can use the public key corresponding to the private key issued to the terminal device and the target signature algorithm to sign the service credential, and then issue the signed service credential to the terminal device, so that the terminal device can use the private key to verify the signed service credential and obtain the service credential.

[0108] The target signature algorithms include the BBS signature algorithm and the CL signature algorithm. Private key sk=x. Public key , All are attribute generators.

[0109] In one embodiment, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server can merge service information and sensitive information to obtain a service credential, and then call the BBS+ signature algorithm to sign the service credential to obtain the corresponding digital credential. The digital credential satisfies the following sixth formula:

[0110]

[0111] in, It can be used to represent service credentials. It can be used to represent signature parameters, used for subsequent sequence number calculation, e. sk can be used to represent the private key, sk=x. It can be used to characterize sensitive information. It can be used to represent service information. s can be used to represent random numbers. and The sum of A. A can be used to characterize signature parameters, and A satisfies the following seventh formula:

[0112]

[0113] in, It can characterize cyclic groups The parameters in. , It can be used to represent attribute generators. It is a random number. It can be used to characterize the first target value. It can be used to characterize the second objective value. It can be used to characterize the commitment term of the attribute product. Attribute values ​​that can be used to represent service information. x can be used to represent the signing private key. It can be used to characterize signature parameters.

[0114] Furthermore, after obtaining the digital credentials, the server will... Send to the terminal device. The terminal device, upon verifying the validity of Formula 8, processes the service credential. Store it. Eighth Formula:

[0115]

[0116] Here, w can be used to represent the public key. It can characterize cyclic groups The parameters in. It can characterize cyclic groups The parameters in. , It can be used to represent attribute generators. It is a random number. It can be used to characterize the first target value. It can be used to characterize the second objective value. It can be used to characterize the commitment term of the attribute product. Attribute values ​​that can be used to represent service information. x can be used to represent the signing private key. It can be used to characterize signature parameters. It can be used to characterize the first mapping parameter. It can be used to characterize the first commitment value. = That is, the sum of sensitive information and service information.

[0117] In another embodiment, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the server can invoke the BBS+ signature algorithm to sign the service credential containing service information, obtaining the corresponding digital credential. Then, after obtaining the digital credential, the server sends the digital credential and its corresponding information to the terminal device. The terminal device verifies the digital credential and its corresponding information based on the method corresponding to the eighth formula, and stores the digital credential and its corresponding information after successful verification.

[0118] It is understandable that when the service credential only includes service information, the specific implementation of the server determining that the terminal device's identity verification is successful and issuing the service credential to the terminal device when the second zero-knowledge proof is valid is similar to the implementation of the server determining that the terminal device's identity verification is successful and issuing the service credential to the terminal device when the service credential includes service information. This will not be elaborated further here.

[0119] In one possible implementation, after the server issues the service credential to the terminal device, it can record the information of this service credential issuance for subsequent violation tracing.

[0120] For example, the server can Record this information as a traceability parameter, including the vehicle owner's identity information, contact information, certificate issuing authority, and issuing address.

[0121] Based on the above technical solution, this application can achieve hardware-level secure binding and selective information disclosure through phased zero-knowledge proof verification (the first phase verifies the identity of the secure chip hardware, and the second phase verifies the sensitive information of the terminal device). This avoids the transmission or leakage of sensitive data such as vehicle unique identifiers and user attributes in plaintext during communication, thereby ensuring a high degree of privacy protection, tamper resistance, and operational efficiency in the service credential issuance process. At the same time, it provides a cryptographic basis for subsequent violation tracing and effectively prevents the risk of credential abuse and identity forgery.

[0122] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for using service credentials according to an exemplary embodiment, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the method for issuing service vouchers includes the following steps:

[0123] S301. The terminal device sends a service credential usage request to the service point.

[0124] In one possible implementation, when a car owner needs services from a service point under the server, the car owner can send a service credential usage request to the service point through a terminal device.

[0125] For example, in a vehicle charging scenario, after the car owner inserts the charging gun into the vehicle, they can select the desired service (e.g., fast charging for 1 hour) and determine the target charging station (e.g., by scanning the charging station's QR code or entering its number) through a terminal device application or the "Service Credential Selection Information" interface displayed on the charging station. Then, the terminal device can send a random number to the charging station based on the information selected by the car owner. This is a service credential usage request to initiate the service verification protocol.

[0126] Alternatively, in a parking scenario, after driving their vehicle into the parking lot entrance, drivers can select the desired parking service type (e.g., 2-hour temporary parking, nighttime special offer parking, etc.) through a terminal device application (such as a parking lot app or in-car navigation system) or the "Service Voucher Selection Information" interface displayed at the entrance, and bind the target parking space or area (e.g., scanning the parking space QR code, entering the parking space number, or selecting a zone). Subsequently, based on the information selected by the driver, the terminal device sends a random number to the parking lot management system. This is a service credential usage request to initiate the service verification protocol.

[0127] S302. Upon receiving a service credential usage request from the vehicle's terminal device, the service point sends a third-party authentication request to the vehicle's security chip.

[0128] For example, when a service point receives a service credential usage request from a terminal device, i.e., a random number... Subsequently, in response to a service credential usage request, a random number can be sent to the vehicle's security chip. and random numbers Initiate the credential verification protocol.

[0129] S303, In response to a third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof about the chip key and the first commitment value.

[0130] In this process, the server securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance. The first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier. The chip key and the first commitment value are described above and will not be repeated here. The third zero-knowledge proof satisfies the following ninth formula:

[0131]

[0132] in, It can be used to characterize third zero-knowledge proofs. It can be used to represent a unique identifier. h0 and h1 can be used to represent attribute generators. r can be used to represent mapping parameters generated based on PRF, chip key, and random number. It can be used to characterize PRF, chip key and random number. The generated second mapping parameters. It can be used to characterize the first commitment value, i.e., Q. It can satisfy the following tenth formula. It can be used to characterize the first mathematical relation.

[0133] Formula 10:

[0134]

[0135] in, It can be used to characterize PRF, chip key and random number. The generated second mapping parameters. Substituting into the first mathematical relation yields the fourth objective value. ,Right now .

[0136] For example, the security chip may determine a random number seed in response to a third-party authentication request. (That is to say, by concatenating (||) two random numbers from different sources) A new random number n is obtained, and a second mapping parameter is generated based on the PRF, the random number seed n, and the chip key. Furthermore, the security chip can be based on the second mapping parameter First commitment value Q, attribute generator And the first mathematical relation generates the fourth objective value. The "||" symbol is used to represent a "concatenation" or "join" operation.

[0137] S304, the security chip returns a third zero-knowledge proof to the service point.

[0138] For example, a security chip can return a third-party zero-knowledge proof to the service point. The security chip can also return random numbers to the service point. Fourth target value .

[0139] S305. The service point sends the third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential to be verified information to the terminal device.

[0140] The information to be verified for the service credential may include the credential issuance time, validity period, vehicle type, and service permissions.

[0141] For example, a service point can return a third-party zero-knowledge proof to another service point. The security chip can also return random numbers to the service point. Fourth target value and the service credential information to be verified. v .

[0142] S306. If the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the authentication of the security chip is successful.

[0143] It is understandable that the method by which terminal devices verify the third zero-knowledge proof can refer to the method by which the server verifies the first zero-knowledge proof. This will not be elaborated upon further here.

[0144] In one possible implementation, the terminal device verifies the validity of a third zero-knowledge proof to determine whether intermediate information has been tampered with, thus cryptographically ensuring that the proof was generated by the secure chip and has not been maliciously altered. Because the mathematical binding property of zero-knowledge proofs requires the prover to possess information strongly associated with the credential data, any modification to intermediate information or simulation attack will lead to verification failure. This allows for dual verification of the secure chip's identity and data integrity without exposing the key.

[0145] S307. When the terminal device has successfully authenticated the security chip and has service credential information, it generates a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information.

[0146] In one possible implementation, the terminal device can determine whether the service credential to be verified exists in the stored service credentials, and if the security chip's authentication is successful and the service credential information exists, generate a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information. The unique service credential serial number satisfies the following eleventh formula:

[0147]

[0148] Where u can be used to represent a unique sequence of service credentials. It can be used to characterize public parameters. f can be used to characterize signature parameters. The `CredType` parameter can be used to represent the validity period of a service credential. `CredType` represents the type of service credential, with different types corresponding to different service permissions. `J` represents the number of times a service credential has been used, with a value ranging from (0 to N-1). `N` represents the total number of times a service credential has been used. (·) can be used to characterize collision-resistant hash functions. In the eleventh formula (·) can be used to represent strings that have practical meaning. ||CredType is converted into a random hash value that can be used in cryptographic computation summaries. It can be used to represent integer fields. ||CredType is a string obtained by concatenating the validity date T of the service credential with the service credential type CredType. The unique serial number of the service credential is updated with each use of the service credential.

[0149] Understandably, on the surface, f, J, ( ||CredType) appears to be a different type of data, but in cryptography, f, J, ( The parameters (||CredType) are ultimately converted and defined in the mathematical space, thus allowing for addition. Additionally, || can be used to represent concatenation, that is, joining different strings together. The same applies to other parameters involved in other formulas in this application; further details are omitted for brevity.

[0150] S308. The terminal device generates a fourth zero-knowledge proof about the unique serial number of the service credential and returns the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point.

[0151] For example, the fourth zero-knowledge proof satisfies the following twelfth formula:

[0152]

[0153]

[0154]

[0155] in, For from integer field The random number determined in the middle, that is . It can be a random number Generated, . Based on s, , The generated s can be used to represent random numbers. and The sum of. It can be used to characterize sensitive information. It can be used to represent random numbers and The sum of. It can be used to characterize public parameters. f can be used to characterize signature parameters. The `CredType` parameter can be used to represent the validity period of a service credential. `CredType` represents the type of service credential, with different types corresponding to different service permissions. `J` represents the number of times a service credential has been used, with a value ranging from (0 to N-1). `N` represents the total number of times a service credential has been used. It can be used to characterize collision-resistant hash functions. . It can be used to represent integer fields. It can be based on A and Generated, . It can be based on e, b Generated, , d can be based on b, , Generated by h0 . It can be used to characterize auxiliary values ​​for proof. . It is the conjunction symbol in logical operations, used to represent the relationship of "and" or "and".

[0156] In one possible implementation, the process of the terminal device generating the fourth zero-knowledge proof can be an interactive process, as follows:

[0157] Terminal devices randomly generate random numbers And generate multiple commitment values, including a third commitment value. Fourth commitment value Fifth commitment value The sixth commitment value The seventh commitment value The terminal device can commit tuples ( , , , Send it to the service point.

[0158] The service point receives the promised value ( , , , After that, send a random number n to the terminal device.a .

[0159] When the terminal device receives a random number n a Then, calculate the challenge value. And, based on the challenge value, calculate multiple response values, including: the first response value. Second response value Third response value Fourth response value Fifth response value The sixth response value The seventh response value Eighth response value Ninth response value Furthermore, the terminal device can generate a fourth zero-knowledge proof. This refers to different manifestations of the twelfth formula. Terminal devices can... Send to the service point.

[0160] in, For from integer field The random number determined in the middle. It can be a random number Generated, . Based on s, , The generated s can be used to represent random numbers. and The sum of. It can be used to characterize sensitive information. It can be used to represent random numbers and The sum of and f can be used to characterize signature parameters. The `CredType` parameter can be used to represent the validity period of a service credential. `CredType` represents the type of service credential, with different types corresponding to different service permissions. `J` represents the number of times a service credential has been used, with a value ranging from (0 to N-1). `N` represents the total number of times a service credential has been used. It can be used to characterize collision-resistant hash functions. . It can be based on A and Generated, . It can be based on e, b Generated, , d can be based on b, , Generated by h0 . It can be used to characterize auxiliary values ​​for proof. .

[0161] S309. If the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the service point confirms that the unique serial number of the service credential has been verified and agrees to the request to use the service credential.

[0162] In one embodiment, the service point can receive a fourth zero-knowledge proof sent by the terminal device and upload the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the server. The server can verify the fourth zero-knowledge proof and send the verification result to the service point. If the verification result indicates that the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the service point can determine that the unique serial number of the service credential has been verified and agree to the service credential usage request. Alternatively, if the verification result indicates that the fourth zero-knowledge proof is invalid, the service point can send a verification failure message to the terminal device.

[0163] In another implementation, the service point can send a request to the server to obtain relevant information corresponding to the vehicle's unique identifier, and verify the fourth zero-knowledge proof based on this information. If the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the service point can determine that the service credential's unique serial number verification is successful and agree to the service credential usage request. Alternatively, if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is invalid, the service point can send a verification failure message to the terminal device.

[0164] In another implementation, the service point can store information related to the vehicle's unique identifier. The service point can verify the fourth zero-knowledge proof based on this information. If the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the service point can determine that the unique serial number of the service credential has been verified and approve the service credential usage request. Alternatively, if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is invalid, the service point can send a verification failure message to the terminal device.

[0165] For example, referring to the example in S308, the way the service point or server verifies the fourth zero-knowledge proof satisfies the following formula thirteen:

[0166]

[0167]

[0168] in, For from integer field The random number determined in the middle. It can be a random number Generated, . Based on s, , The generated s can be used to represent random numbers. and The sum of. It can be used to characterize sensitive information. It can be used to represent random numbers and The sum of and f can be used to characterize signature parameters. The `CredType` parameter can be used to represent the validity period of a service credential. `CredType` represents the type of service credential, with different types corresponding to different service permissions. `J` represents the number of times a service credential has been used, with a value ranging from (0 to N-1). `N` represents the total number of times a service credential has been used. It can be used to characterize collision-resistant hash functions. . It can be based on A and Generated, . It can be based on e, b Generated, , d can be based on b, , Generated by h0 . It can be used to characterize auxiliary values ​​for proof. .

[0169] In one possible implementation, if the server or service point determines that the unique serial number of the service credential is the same as a previously verified unique serial number, the vehicle is traced for violations. The violation tracing process is explained below with the server as the executing entity.

[0170] Specifically, the server can obtain the first challenge value corresponding to the unique serial number of the service credential used twice. Second challenge value and the first challenge value The corresponding first number of uses , Service voucher validity date T, First verification record value First challenge value The corresponding first number of uses , Service voucher validity date T, First verification record value .

[0171] Therefore, the first challenge value The corresponding first number of uses , Service voucher validity date T, First verification record value and the first challenge value The corresponding first number of uses , Service voucher validity date T, First verification record value Substitute these values ​​into the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth formulas below to parse out the violator's cid and signature parameter f.

[0172] Fourteenth Formula:

[0173]

[0174] Formula Fifteen:

[0175]

[0176] Sixteenth Formula:

[0177]

[0178] in, It can be used to characterize and verify recorded values. It can be used to characterize signature parameters. It can be used to represent the number of times a service credential has been used. It can be used to characterize challenge values. It can be used to characterize a collision-resistant hash function. T can be used to characterize the validity date of a service credential.

[0179] ( f) is the user information uniquely associated with the service credential issuance phase. Subsequently, the server can base its decisions on (f). f) Retrieve records ( f) Identify the specific service credentials and the identity of the offending user. Upon confirming the violation, the server updates the revocation list. The server rejects all service credential verification requests associated with the CID, but retains the validity of the underlying UID to ensure that other legitimate credentials are not affected. Upon detecting a violation, the server sends a revocation command to the relevant service point to block service to the offending vehicle. Simultaneously, it conducts an in-depth investigation based on service point verification records and the hardware binding characteristics of the security chip to trace the source of the violation, such as security chip theft or signature forgery, and holds the violators accountable according to regulations. In addition, the server simultaneously initiates an internal investigation and legal action against the vehicle or owner involved, ensuring privacy while tracing the violation.

[0180] Based on the above technical solution, this application can verify the physical authenticity of the security chip through a third zero-knowledge proof, ensuring that the vehicle connected to the terminal device has a legitimate hardware identity and effectively preventing cloned vehicles or counterfeit terminals from accessing the service point. Subsequently, it uses a fourth zero-knowledge proof to verify usage rights based on the dynamically updated unique serial number of the service credential, ensuring that each service use is cryptographically bound to limits on the number of uses and timeliness, preventing credential reuse or overspending, and completely hiding the user's identity and historical behavior. The entire process replaces plaintext transmission with mathematical relationships, ensuring that the service point can complete the verification without knowing the vehicle identification, while retaining the traceability capability for regulatory agencies on the service side after violations. Ultimately, it achieves precise service control and privacy protection with "one-time password" without disclosing any sensitive information.

[0181] In some embodiments, such as Figure 4 As shown, Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a service credential application process provided in this application. Figure 4 The service credential application process includes: security chip distribution, vehicle information backup, service credential issuance, service credential usage, service credential verification, and anomaly reporting.

[0182] In some embodiments, such as Figure 5 As shown, Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of another service credential application process provided in this application. Figure 5 The service credential application process includes:

[0183] During the security chip distribution phase, vehicle owners can submit their vehicle registration documents. The security chip issuer writes a unique identifier for each chip and distributes them to vehicle owners.

[0184] During the certificate issuance phase, the vehicle owner applies for a service certificate from the traffic management department. The traffic management department verifies the security chip information. The security chip returns authentication information to the traffic management department. The traffic management department then issues the service certificate to the vehicle owner.

[0185] During the credential usage phase, each time the service is used, the vehicle owner initiates a service request to the service center. The service center verifies the service credential corresponding to the security chip. The security chip returns the verification result. The service center sends the service record to the regulatory agency and provides service to the vehicle owner's vehicle.

[0186] During the violation tracing phase, regulatory agencies analyze service records. If violations are found, they are reported to the traffic management department. The traffic management department then sends a blacklist to the service point and notifies the vehicle owner of the penalty decision.

[0187] in, Figure 5The issuer, traffic management department, and regulatory agency of the security chip can be different management agencies on the server side. Vehicle owners can interact with the server through their terminal devices. This application does not impose specific restrictions in this regard.

[0188] The foregoing primarily describes the solutions provided by the embodiments of this application from a methodological perspective. To achieve the aforementioned functions, the server, service point, or electronic device includes corresponding hardware structures and / or software modules for executing each function. Those skilled in the art should readily recognize that, based on the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein, this application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0189] This application embodiment can, based on the above method, exemplarily divide a server, service point, or electronic device into functional modules. For example, the server, service point, or electronic device may include various functional modules corresponding to each functional division, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. It should be noted that the module division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division; in actual implementation, there may be other division methods.

[0190] Figure 6 This is a block diagram illustrating a server according to an exemplary embodiment. (Refer to...) Figure 6 The server includes a sending unit 601 and a determining unit 602.

[0191] In one possible implementation, the sending unit 601 is configured to send a first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; the server securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; the determining unit 602 is configured to, if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the security chip's authentication is successful, and send a second authentication request to the vehicle's terminal device; wherein, in response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof regarding sensitive information about the vehicle, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server; the determining unit 602 is further configured to, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the terminal device's authentication is successful, and issue a service credential to the terminal device.

[0192] Based on the above technical solution, this application can achieve hardware-level secure binding and selective information disclosure through phased zero-knowledge proof verification (the first phase verifies the identity of the secure chip hardware, and the second phase verifies the sensitive information of the terminal device). This avoids the transmission or leakage of sensitive data such as vehicle unique identifiers and user attributes in plaintext during communication, thereby ensuring a high degree of privacy protection, tamper resistance, and operational efficiency in the service credential issuance process. At the same time, it provides a cryptographic basis for subsequent violation tracing and effectively prevents the risk of credential abuse and identity forgery.

[0193] In one possible implementation, the sending unit 601 is also used to issue a security chip to the vehicle owner, in the case where there is a real ownership relationship between the vehicle and the vehicle owner who applied for the security chip, so that the vehicle owner can install the security chip in the vehicle.

[0194] In one possible implementation, the determining unit 602 is specifically used to: calculate a first target value based on a first mathematical relation and a locally pre-stored chip key and a first commitment value; and determine that the first zero-knowledge proof is valid if the calculated first target value is consistent with the first target value included in the first zero-knowledge proof.

[0195] In one possible implementation, the determining unit 602 is specifically used to: sign the service credential using the public key corresponding to the private key issued to the terminal device and the target signature algorithm; wherein the target signature algorithm includes the BBS+ signature algorithm and the CL signature algorithm; and issue the signed service credential to the terminal device so that the terminal device can verify the signed service credential using the private key to obtain the service credential.

[0196] In one possible implementation, the service credential includes service information, or service information and sensitive information; the service information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0197] Figure 7 This is a block diagram illustrating a service point according to an exemplary embodiment. (Refer to...) Figure 7 The service point includes: a sending unit 701, a determining unit 702, a receiving unit 703, and a tracing unit 704.

[0198] In one possible implementation, the sending unit 701 is configured to send a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip in response to receiving a service credential usage request from the vehicle's terminal device; wherein, in response to the third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof regarding the chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the server securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; the sending unit 701 is further configured to send the third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential information to be verified to the terminal device; wherein, if the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the security chip's authentication is successful; if the security chip's authentication is successful and the service credential information exists, it generates a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information; it generates a fourth zero-knowledge proof regarding the unique service credential serial number, and returns the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the unique service credential serial number is updated with each use of the service credential; and the determining unit 702 is configured to determine that the unique service credential serial number has been verified successfully if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, and agree to the service credential usage request.

[0199] Based on the aforementioned technical means, this application can verify the physical authenticity of the security chip through a third-degree zero-knowledge proof, ensuring that the vehicle connected to the terminal device has a legitimate hardware identity and effectively preventing cloned vehicles or counterfeit terminals from accessing service points. Subsequently, it uses a fourth-degree zero-knowledge proof to verify usage permissions based on a dynamically updated unique serial number of the service credential, ensuring that each service use is cryptographically bound to limits on the number of uses and timeliness, preventing credential reuse or overspending, and completely concealing the user's identity and historical behavior. The entire process replaces plaintext transmission with mathematical relationships, ensuring that the service point can complete verification without knowing the vehicle's identification, while retaining traceability capabilities for regulatory agencies on the service side in case of violations. Ultimately, it achieves precise service control and privacy protection with "one-time password" without disclosing any sensitive information.

[0200] In one possible implementation, the service credential information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

[0201] In one possible implementation, the receiving unit 703 is configured to reject the service credential usage request if the security chip fails to authenticate or does not have service credential information.

[0202] In one possible implementation, the tracing unit 704 is used to trace violations of a vehicle if the unique serial number of the service credential is a previously verified unique serial number of the service credential.

[0203] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0204] Figure 8 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 8 As shown, the electronic device includes, but is not limited to, a processor 801 and a memory 802.

[0205] The memory 802 described above is used to store the executable instructions of the processor 801. It is understood that the processor 801 is configured to execute instructions to implement the service credential issuance method and the service credential usage method in the above embodiments.

[0206] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 8 The electronic device structure shown does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device; the electronic device may include, but is not limited to, other electronic devices. Figure 8 This may indicate more or fewer components, or combinations of certain components, or different component arrangements.

[0207] The processor 801 is the control center of the electronic device. It connects various parts of the electronic device via various interfaces and lines. By running or executing software programs and / or modules stored in the memory 802, and by calling data stored in the memory 802, it performs various functions and processes data, thereby providing overall monitoring of the electronic device. The processor 801 may include one or more processing units. Optionally, the processor 801 may integrate an application processor and a modem processor. The application processor mainly handles the operating system, user interface, and applications, while the modem processor mainly handles wireless communication. It is understood that the modem processor may not be integrated into the processor 801.

[0208] The memory 802 can be used to store software programs and various data. The memory 802 may primarily include a program storage area and a data storage area. The program storage area may store the operating system, application programs required by at least one functional module (such as a determination unit, processing unit, etc.), etc. Furthermore, the memory 802 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other volatile solid-state storage device.

[0209] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium including instructions is also provided, such as a memory 802 including instructions, which can be executed by a processor 801 of an electronic device to implement the methods in the above embodiments.

[0210] In actual implementation, Figure 6 The sending unit 601, the determining unit 602, and Figure 7 The functions of the sending unit 701, determining unit 702, receiving unit 703, and tracing unit 704 can all be derived from... Figure 8 The processor 801 calls the computer program stored in the memory 802 to implement the process. The specific execution process can be found in the method section of the previous embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0211] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, such as a read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage device. In an exemplary embodiment, this application also provides a computer program product including one or more instructions, which can be executed by a processor 801 of an electronic device to perform the methods in the above embodiments.

[0212] It should be noted that when one or more instructions in the computer-readable storage medium or computer program product are executed by the processor of an electronic device, they implement the various processes of the above method embodiments and achieve the same technical effect as the above method. To avoid repetition, they will not be described again here.

[0213] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, only the division of the above functional modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0214] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another apparatus, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0215] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. A component shown as a unit can be one or more physical units; that is, it can be located in one place or distributed in multiple different locations. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0216] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0217] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, essentially, or the parts that contribute to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solutions, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a device (which may be a microcontroller, chip, etc.) or processor to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0218] This application provides a computer program product containing instructions. When the computer program product is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the service credential issuance method and the service credential usage method described in the above method embodiments.

[0219] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the service credential issuance method and the service credential usage method in the method flow shown in the above method embodiments.

[0220] The computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory, a read-only memory, an erasable programmable read-only memory, a register, a hard disk, an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory, an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof, or any other form of computer-readable storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to a processor, enabling the processor to read information from and write information to the storage medium. Of course, the storage medium can also be a component of the processor. The processor and the storage medium can reside in an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). In embodiments of this application, the computer-readable storage medium can be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0221] Since the server, service point, computer-readable storage medium, and computer program product in the embodiments of this application can be applied to the above methods, the technical effects they can achieve can also be referred to the above method embodiments. The embodiments of this application will not be repeated here.

[0222] The above are merely specific embodiments of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for issuing service vouchers, characterized in that, Applied to the server side, the method includes: A first authentication request is sent to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; if a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, the server generates the chip key and the first commitment value, and securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the vehicle's terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, the authentication of the security chip is determined to be successful, and a second authentication request is sent to the terminal device; wherein, in response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof regarding sensitive information about the vehicle, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server; If the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, the authentication of the terminal device is determined to be successful, and the service credential is issued to the terminal device.

2. The service voucher issuance method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: If a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, the security chip is issued to the owner so that the owner can install the security chip in the vehicle.

3. The service voucher issuance method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first zero-knowledge proof includes a first target value and a first mathematical relationship between the chip key, the first commitment value, and the first target value; The process of determining the validity of the first zero-knowledge proof includes: The first target value is calculated based on the first mathematical relationship, the locally pre-stored chip key, and the first commitment value. If the calculated first target value is consistent with the first target value included in the first zero-knowledge proof, the first zero-knowledge proof is determined to be valid.

4. The service voucher issuance method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of issuing the service certificate to the terminal device includes: The service credential is signed using the public key corresponding to the private key issued to the terminal device and the target signature algorithm; wherein, the target signature algorithm includes the BBS+ signature algorithm and the CL signature algorithm; The signed service credential is issued to the terminal device, so that the terminal device can use the private key to verify the signed service credential and obtain the service credential.

5. The service voucher issuance method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The service credential may include service information, or the service information and the sensitive information. The service information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

6. A method for using a service credential, characterized in that, The method is applied to service points under the server and includes: In response to a service credential usage request received from a vehicle's terminal device, a third authentication request is sent to the vehicle's security chip. The security chip, in response to the third authentication request, generates a third zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the service point. If a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, the server generates the chip key and the first commitment value, and securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance. The first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier. The third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential information to be verified are sent to the terminal device; wherein, if the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the security chip's authentication is successful; if the security chip's authentication is successful and the service credential information exists, a unique service credential serial number is generated based on the service credential information; a fourth zero-knowledge proof about the unique service credential serial number is generated, and the fourth zero-knowledge proof is returned to the service point; the unique service credential serial number is updated with each use of the service credential. If the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, the unique serial number of the service credential is verified and the request to use the service credential is approved.

7. The method for using service credentials according to claim 6, characterized in that, The service credential information includes service permissions, total number of service attempts, remaining valid service attempts, and service validity period.

8. The method for using service credentials according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the security chip fails to authenticate or does not provide service credential information, the request to use the service credential will be rejected.

9. The method for using service credentials according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the unique serial number of the service credential is the same as a previously verified unique serial number of the service credential, the vehicle will be traced for violations.

10. A server-side component, characterized in that: The server includes: a sending unit and a determining unit; The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the first authentication request, the security chip generates a first zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the first zero-knowledge proof to the server; the server, assuming a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, generates the chip key and the first commitment value, and securely distributes the chip key and the first commitment value to the vehicle's terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; The determining unit is configured to, if the first zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the authentication of the security chip is successful, and send a second authentication request to the terminal device; wherein, in response to the second authentication request, the terminal device generates a second zero-knowledge proof about sensitive information of the vehicle, and returns the second zero-knowledge proof to the server; the sensitive information is extracted from the terminal device in advance and submitted to the server. The determining unit is further configured to, if the second zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the authentication of the terminal device is successful and issue the service credential to the terminal device.

11. A service point, characterized in that, The server as described in claim 10 is provided with the service point; the service point includes: a sending unit and a determining unit; The sending unit is configured to, in response to a service credential usage request received from a terminal device of the vehicle, send a third authentication request to the vehicle's security chip; wherein, in response to the third authentication request, the security chip generates a third zero-knowledge proof regarding a chip key and a first commitment value, and returns the third zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the server, assuming a genuine ownership relationship exists between the vehicle and the owner who applied for the security chip, generates the chip key and the first commitment value, and securely distributes both the chip key and the first commitment value to the terminal device and the security chip in advance; the first commitment value is determined based on the vehicle's unique identifier; The sending unit is further configured to send the third zero-knowledge proof and the service credential information to be verified to the terminal device; wherein, if the third zero-knowledge proof is valid, the terminal device determines that the security chip's authentication is successful; if the security chip's authentication is successful and the service credential information exists, the terminal device generates a unique service credential serial number based on the service credential information; generates a fourth zero-knowledge proof about the unique service credential serial number, and returns the fourth zero-knowledge proof to the service point; the unique service credential serial number is updated with each use of the service credential. The determining unit is configured to, if the fourth zero-knowledge proof is valid, determine that the unique serial number of the service credential has been verified and agree to the service credential usage request.

12. A vehicle, characterized in that, The vehicle includes terminal equipment; The terminal device is used to receive the service credential sent by the server as described in claim 10. The terminal device is also used to send a service credential usage request to the service point as described in claim 11.

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