Data asset life cycle management system based on block chain

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of block chain security and data asset management, and discloses a data asset life cycle management system based on a block chain. And encryption group parameters and generators are generated and checked through a secure random source, so that the randomness and the anti-attack capability of a bottom-layer password system are ensured. And a secret polynomial is adopted to segment the master key and distribute the master key to each node, so that distributed key management is realized, and the risk of single-point loss is reduced. Attributes are automatically judged during asset registration, the life cycle stage is accurately mapped, and management automation and state tracking are improved. A standardized event message is constructed for each asset state change, and node part signature and threshold aggregation signature are adopted to ensure the consistency and non-tampering property of an audit chain. And the private key share is dynamically updated during node change or period remodeling, so that the risk of long-term key leakage is reduced. After the assets are terminated, all keys are automatically destroyed, only necessary chain records are left, and the residual keys are prevented from being abused.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of blockchain security and data asset management, in particular to a data asset life cycle management system based on a blockchain. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the rapid development of digital economy, various data assets (such as sensor data generated by the Internet of Things, enterprise business processes, scientific research data, etc.) face unprecedented challenges in value creation, circulation and supervision in terms of integrity, traceability and security. On the one hand, traditional centralized systems often have single point of failure and lack of trust, making it difficult to meet the needs of data sharing in a multi-party governance and trustless environment; on the other hand, data life cycle management involves asset registration, use, change, archiving and final destruction, and each stage requires reliable audit and tamper-proof mechanisms.

[0003] In recent years, blockchain technology has been widely used in data trust management in fields such as supply chain, finance, Internet of Things, etc. due to its decentralization, tamper resistance and traceability. At the same time, distributed signature mechanisms such as threshold cryptography can effectively improve the security level of on-chain operations, enabling multi-party collaboration for data signing, authorization and joint evidence. However, in practical scenarios, how to securely and efficiently solidify each life cycle change event of data assets on the blockchain through multi-node joint signature (i.e. threshold signature), while providing dynamic key remolding and asset termination security destruction capabilities, still faces innovative challenges in algorithm design and engineering implementation. Traditional single signature schemes or multi-signature schemes on the blockchain are not sufficient to resist node malfeasance, private key leakage and other threats, and have limited flexibility and auditability.

[0004] Therefore, the present application aims to provide a data asset life cycle management system based on a blockchain, which combines the tamper-proof and traceable features of a blockchain and uses cryptography techniques such as threshold signature to achieve automated management and high security assurance of data assets at various stages such as registration, circulation, change and termination. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application provides a data asset life cycle management system based on a blockchain, which solves the problems mentioned in the background.

[0006] The present application provides the following technical solution: a data asset life cycle management method based on a blockchain, comprising:

[0007] Generating the required integer from a secure random source, performing primality testing to obtain a prime number with preset requirements, and determining the related parameters and generator of the encryption group accordingly, and constructing a hash function;

[0008] Randomly generate a master private key, calculate a master public key, generate a secret polynomial and each node private key share according to the total number of nodes in the system and the threshold value, and distribute the key shares to each node through a secure channel;

[0009] Collect the identification information of all data assets, set the upper limit of the asset life cycle stage, define the judgment conditions and corresponding attributes of each stage, and establish the mapping relationship of the assets in each stage of the life cycle;

[0010] According to the state transition of the data asset, construct an event message four-tuple, concatenate each field into a fixed-length binary string according to the fixed coding length, and calculate the hash value of the message;

[0011] After the authorized node receives the event message, it encrypts and signs the message based on its private key share to form a partial signature;

[0012] Collect and aggregate the effective partial signatures that reach the threshold number, calculate the joint signature using the Lagrange interpolation method, and perform legality verification. If the verification is passed, write the related data to the blockchain and record it synchronously off-chain;

[0013] When the node changes or reaches the preset remodeling condition, reconstruct the key distribution polynomial and securely update the private key share of each node;

[0014] When the asset life cycle reaches the termination condition, perform key destruction operation, and only keep necessary on-chain data and system state information.

[0015] Optionally, the required integer is generated from a secure random source, a primality test is performed to obtain a prime number meeting a preset requirement, and related parameters of an encryption group and a generator are determined based on the prime number, a hash function is constructed, and the construction specifically includes:

[0016] A 256-bit integer is sampled from a secure random source, and a Miller-Rabin primality test is performed until a prime number Q is obtained, wherein Q is an integer in [2 255 ,2 256 -1]; wherein Q is the order of the group, and is a large prime number;

[0017] A positive integer mu is randomly selected, and P = muQ + 1 is calculated; wherein P is the modulus of the group;

[0018] The Miller-Rabin primality test is performed on P; if P is a non-prime number, mu is reselected and P is calculated;

[0019] A u is randomly selected in {2,...,P-2}, and g = u μ mod P is calculated; wherein u is a generator for generating the group; g is the generator; and mod is a modulus operation;

[0020] If g is not equal to 1 or g Qmod P = 1, then reselect u and calculate g;

[0021] For any binary message string m = (m1,..., m L ), take it as a large integer wherein m = (m1,..., m L ) is an input message, a binary sequence with length L; m r is the rth bit of the message m; Int(m) is a decimal integer converted from the binary message m;

[0022] Construct a hash function H(m) = [Int(m) mod (Q-1)] + 1.

[0023] Optionally, the master private key is randomly generated, the master public key is calculated, the secret polynomial and the private key share of each node are generated according to the total number of nodes in the system and the threshold value, and the key share is distributed to each node through a secure channel, and specifically comprising:

[0024] Randomly generate the master private key wherein, represents a random sampling assignment;

[0025] Calculate the master public key Y = g SK mod P;

[0026] Obtain the total number of nodes authorized by the system, denoted as N;

[0027] Randomly assign a unique identifier x j ≠ x j' to node j, j ≠ j'; wherein j = {1,..., N} is the node index; is a remainder system modulo Q;

[0028] Let the threshold value t satisfy 2 ≤ t ≤ N;

[0029] Randomly generate the secret polynomial coefficient: k = 1,..., t-1; wherein a k is the kth coefficient; k is the order of the polynomial;

[0030] Construct the secret polynomial wherein x k is the kth power of the variable x;

[0031] For each node j, calculate the private key share k j = F(x j ) mod Q of node j;

[0032] Distribute k j to node j through a secure channel.

[0033] Optionally, the identification information of all data assets is collected, an upper limit of the asset life cycle stage is set, the discrimination conditions and corresponding attributes of each stage are defined, and the mapping relationship of the assets in each stage of the life cycle is established, specifically including:

[0034] Obtain the numbers of all assets and form an asset collection Wherein, M is the total number of managed assets; i is the asset number;

[0035] Pre-set the upper limit of the number of life cycle stages as K;

[0036] Build a life cycle stage collection Wherein, h is the block height;

[0037] Obtain the discrimination predicate P of the qth stage q :Attr→{0,1}, q={0,...,K}; wherein, Attr i,h is the attribute set of asset i at block height h; P q takes the value 1 when and only when Attr satisfies the condition of stage q, and takes the value 0 for the rest of the stages;

[0038] Build a stage mapping function Uniquely determine the life cycle stage number of asset i at block height h;

[0039] If Error and terminate; otherwise, s i,h =C(Attr i,h ); wherein, s i,h is the stage number of asset i at block height h;

[0040] When asset i is registered, read the attribute Attr i,0 , calculate s i,0 =C(Attr i,0 ) according to the above C.

[0041] Optionally, according to the state transition of the data asset, build an event message four-tuple, concatenate each field into a fixed-length binary string according to the fixed encoding length, calculate the hash value of the message, specifically including:

[0042] When s i,h-1 →s i,h , construct e i,h =(i,h,s i,h-1 ,s i,h ); wherein, e i,h is the event four-tuple of asset i at block height h when s i,h-1 transitions to s i,h ;

[0043] Set the length of the field bits: Wherein, is the encoding bit length of the asset number; is the encoding bit length of the block height, fixed at 32 bits; is the encoding bit length of the bit phase number;

[0044] If or , an error is reported and terminated;

[0045] If , an error is reported and terminated;

[0046] If , an error is reported and terminated;

[0047] Splice by bits, get Wherein, m i,h is the i, h, s i,h-1 , s i,h is spliced into a fixed-length binary string according to the respective bit length;

[0048] Calculate the message hash value δ i,h of the event i,h = H(m i,h ).

[0049] Optionally, after receiving the event message by the authorized node, the message is encrypted and signed based on the private key share to form a partial signature, specifically including:

[0050] After node j receives δ i,h , calculate σ j,i,h = k j × δ i,h mod Q; wherein, σ j,i,h is the partial signature of node j to the asset i event at block height h.

[0051] Optionally, the effective partial signature reaching the threshold number is collected and aggregated, the joint signature is calculated by Lagrange interpolation method, and the legality is verified, and after the verification is passed, the related data is written into the block chain, and the off-chain synchronization record is written into the block chain. Specifically, it includes:

[0052] Take any t effective shares to build an index set T = {j1,...,j t}; j k is the number of the kth node participating in aggregation;

[0053] Set the modular inverse inv(z) so that z·inv(z)≡1(modQ); wherein, inv(z) is a function, indicating the inverse element of z under the modulus Q;

[0054] For each jk ∈T, construct Lagrange coefficients

[0055]

[0056] Calculate the aggregated signature

[0057] Obtain the left - hand side of the verification of the joint signature

[0058] Obtain the right - hand side of the verification of the joint signature

[0059] If LHS = RHS, write to the chain; otherwise, reject and record the log (i, h, LHS, RHS);

[0060] Write block h to (m i,h , ∑ i,h ), and record off - chain synchronization (i, h, s i,h , ∑ i,h ).

[0061] Optionally, when there is a node change or a preset reshaping condition is reached, reconstruct the key - distribution polynomial and securely update the private - key shares of each node, specifically including:

[0062] Initialize the counter C e = 0; for each successful chain write, C e := C e + 1;

[0063] Set the reshaping threshold to E T ;

[0064] After monitoring the update of the node list, record the total number of new nodes as N';

[0065] If N'< t, record an error and pause the chain write until the administrator adds nodes or adjusts t;

[0066] Otherwise, if C e ≥ E T , perform the reshaping operation and reset C e := 0;

[0067] Otherwise, continue writing the chain without reshaping;

[0068] The reshaping operation includes steps S701 to S704:

[0069] S701, Randomly generate new coefficients k = {1,..., t - 1} by the key manager;

[0070] S702, Construct a new secret polynomial

[0071] S703, Key administrator securely issues new private key share k' j =G(x) j ()mod Q to node j, and delete all b k With plaintext polynomial data;

[0072] S704, after node j receives the data, it replaces the old share k. j :=k' j .

[0073] Optionally, when the asset's lifecycle reaches the termination condition, a key destruction operation is performed, retaining only necessary on-chain data and system state information, specifically including:

[0074] If asset i reaches s in the high block area h i,h =K, triggering termination;

[0075] The manager executes SK:=0,k j = 0, retain Y;

[0076] Retention (m) i,h ,∑ i,h ) and (i,h,s i,h ,∑ i,h ).

[0077] A system for implementing the blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method includes:

[0078] Parameter initialization module: used for configuring and initializing system group parameters;

[0079] Threshold key management module: used to generate, distribute and dynamically adjust key shares to achieve threshold control and key reshaping;

[0080] Data Asset Lifecycle Management Module: Used for asset registration, lifecycle stage definition and asset status mapping, to achieve full lifecycle status management of assets;

[0081] Event handling module: used for event message construction, standardized encoding, and hash value calculation;

[0082] Distributed signature and verification module: used for distributed partial signatures, aggregated signatures, and signature verification on each node to ensure the authority of the signature;

[0083] Blockchain write and synchronization module: used for on-chain writing with valid signatures and off-chain data synchronization;

[0084] Lifecycle Termination and Key Destruction Module: Used for key destruction and secure closed-loop processing after the data asset lifecycle ends.

[0085] The application has the following beneficial effects:

[0086] 1. The mathematical foundation parameters are generated by a secure random source, and strict primality test and parameter selection are performed to ensure the security cornerstone of the entire cryptographic system. Not only does it eliminate the systematic security risks caused by predictable or improperly constructed parameters, but it also introduces a hash function standardization process that uniformly maps any input message to a secure parameter domain, providing high security and consistency for all subsequent cryptographic operations. Compared to the common practice of arbitrary parameter setting or reusing third-party parameters in existing technologies, this solution improves the independence and attack resistance of system initialization, reduces the risk of known parameter leaks, replay attacks, and dictionary attacks, and provides a solid security foundation for the entire data asset lifecycle management system.

[0087] 2. The threshold key generation mechanism is adopted in this solution, which reasonably divides the master key into multiple private key shares held by independent nodes, and only when more than a threshold number of nodes are combined can the signature operation be completed. This effectively prevents single-point failure and node collusion attacks, while improving the fault tolerance and distributed security level of the system. By assigning each node a unique digital identity and distributing shares through a secure channel, the uniqueness of node identities and the security of data during transmission are enhanced. Compared to traditional centralized key management methods or single-point signature mechanisms, the security flexibility of key management and system availability are improved, effectively suppressing the global risk caused by single-node leaks, and suitable for complex application scenarios involving multiple organizations and multiple participants.

[0088] 3. The unique identification and state tracking of data assets within the platform are realized, and through the preset upper limit of the number of stages and attribute-driven discrimination conditions, the assets are automatically classified into different lifecycle stages, realizing standardized management from registration, transfer to termination. The lifecycle state of all assets is standardized to a unified number, and combined with automatic mapping of attribute sets, reducing manual participation and ambiguity, enhancing process automation and accuracy. Compared to existing asset management processes that rely mainly on manual registration and discrete event-driven, this method improves the automatic identification, state switching, and tracking capabilities of assets throughout their lifecycle, providing more detailed, compliant process control, and efficient process supervision for complex asset transfer.

[0089] 4. Each asset state change is standardized into an event message quadruple, and fixed-length encoding and strict field validation ensure consistent message format and clear boundaries. Event messages are processed using hash functions, guaranteeing the uniqueness of subsequent signatures and verifications while preventing the leakage of original data on the blockchain, thus strengthening data security and privacy protection. The standardization of message format and data integrity, along with the extremely high granularity of event management, ensures that every asset change possesses a traceable and tamper-proof chain of evidence. Unlike traditional data systems that simply record events, this method establishes an irrefutable chain of evidence for each state change, improving audit reliability and automated monitoring capabilities.

[0090] 5. Authorized nodes use their independently held key shares to partially sign event hashes, forming a distributed, chain-like signature structure. Each node only possesses a key share; a single node cannot independently generate a complete signature, preventing single-point tampering, impersonation, and internal malicious attacks. This mechanism not only protects the overall security of the system's signatures but also achieves decentralized management under multi-party collaboration, ensuring the authenticity and independence of joint signatures. Compared to traditional centralized signature methods, it enhances the system's resistance to internal attacks, decentralized autonomy, and controllable sensitive operations, making it particularly suitable for multi-departmental, cross-institutional asset management environments.

[0091] 6. After collecting a sufficient number of signatures to meet the threshold, a threshold signature aggregation algorithm is used to achieve joint signatures, which are then verified on-chain. The aggregated signature is unique and verifiable, requiring only one signature verification to confirm the consensus result of all nodes, thus improving signature processing efficiency and on-chain write performance. Simultaneously, the aggregation process possesses robust security and a flexible node fault tolerance mechanism, supporting scenarios where some nodes are offline or have failed. Unlike the inefficient node-by-node signature and signature-by-signature verification model in existing technologies, this invention improves the processing speed and security level of large-scale distributed asset changes, enhancing the applicability and scalability of blockchain in high-concurrency, multi-event environments.

[0092] 7. To address security threats posed by dynamic node changes or long-term key use, this solution introduces a periodic or on-demand automatic threshold key refactoring mechanism. When a node changes or the cumulative number of signatures reaches a threshold, a new secret polynomial is automatically generated and the key share of each node is updated, discarding the original key data. Dynamic key updates prevent side-channel attacks and security lag issues caused by long-term exposure of historical keys, ensuring a dynamic balance of security for the system during long-term operation. Compared to most systems relying solely on manual maintenance or static key management, this solution enhances the system's self-healing capabilities and resistance to advanced attacks, making it highly suitable for the long-term operation of critical data assets and high-security regulatory requirements.

[0093] 8. When the data asset life cycle reaches the termination condition, the system automatically destroys the master key and each node private key share, only retains the necessary on-chain information and state evidence, and realizes the complete closed loop of the data asset. This innovatively solves the technical problem that the data asset is completely irreversible after the life cycle ends, prevents the data and its signature from being illegally reused or reconstructed, and guarantees the compliance and non-repudiation of the data throughout the life cycle. Compared with the common asset cancellation in the prior art, which is only logical deletion and the actual key is still available, the present scheme completely destroys the key to realize the real asset destruction and audit termination, and meets the high standard requirements of data security, regulatory compliance and privacy protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0094] Figure 1 The present application is a flowchart. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0095] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0096] Embodiment, refer to Figure 1 A data asset life cycle management method based on a blockchain, comprising:

[0097] Generate the required integer from a secure random source, perform primality test to obtain a prime number with preset requirements, and determine the related parameters and generator of the encryption group according to the prime number, and construct a hash function;

[0098] Randomly generate a master private key, calculate a master public key, generate a secret polynomial and each node private key share according to the total number of nodes and the threshold value in the system, and distribute the key shares to each node through a secure channel;

[0099] Collect the identification information of all data assets, set the upper limit of the asset life cycle stage, define the judgment conditions and corresponding attributes of each stage, and establish the mapping relationship of the assets in each stage of the life cycle;

[0100] According to the state transition of the data asset, construct an event message four-tuple, concatenate each field into a fixed-length binary string according to a fixed coding length, and calculate the hash value of the message;

[0101] After receiving the event message by the authorized node, the message is encrypted and signed based on the private key share of the node to form a partial signature;

[0102] Collect and aggregate the effective part signatures reaching the threshold number, calculate the joint signature in the Lagrange interpolation manner, and perform the legality verification, write the related data into the blockchain after the verification is passed, and record synchronously outside the chain;

[0103] When the node is changed or the preset remodeling condition is reached, the key allocation polynomial is reconstructed, and the private key share of each node is updated safely;

[0104] When the asset life cycle reaches the termination condition, the key destruction operation is performed, and only the necessary on-chain data and system state information are retained.

[0105] Firstly, in the system parameter initialization link, the key parameters are generated and verified through a secure random source, ensuring the randomness and anti-prediction of the underlying cryptographic system, solving the problem that existing blockchain systems often follow fixed parameters or are vulnerable to replay attacks. Then, in the threshold key generation and distribution stage, the master key is divided by a secret polynomial and safely distributed, realizing distributed key management, avoiding the single point of failure risk caused by centralized key storage, and being conducive to the decentralized control of signature authority in a multi-party collaborative environment. In the asset registration and mapping step, the life cycle stage is automatically classified by attribute discrimination, eliminating the problems of easy errors in traditional manual registration and fragmented management, improving the degree of automation throughout the process and ensuring the accurate tracking of asset status. In the event construction and hashing, as well as distributed partial signature, joint signature aggregation and verification steps, the standardized message format and multi-node collaborative signature not only improve the consistency and tamper resistance of the audit chain, but also avoid the efficiency bottleneck in the multi-signature strategy. Threshold remodeling and branch processing trigger the counter and dynamically update the private key share, providing a regular "refresh" mechanism for long-running systems, solving the cumulative risk brought by long-term use of keys. The life cycle termination and key destruction step completely deletes the private key through condition triggering, only retaining the necessary on-chain data, avoiding the security risks of residual keys being misused after asset cancellation. The overall architecture is clear and each link is organically connected, not only forming a secure closed loop covering the end-to-end, but also balancing high availability and high security in a distributed environment. Unlike existing technologies that only enhance security or traceability in one link, it realizes "integrated" management of data assets throughout their life cycle.

[0106] The required integer is generated from a secure random source, and primality test is performed to obtain a prime number with preset requirements, and the related parameters and generator of the encryption group are determined accordingly, and the hash function is constructed, which specifically includes:

[0107] A 256-bit integer is sampled from a secure random source, and Miller-Rabin primality test is performed until a prime number Q∈[2 255 ,2 256-1]; wherein, Q is the order of the group, which is a large prime number, used to determine the base of all modular operations; and is a security parameter domain determined for the entire threshold signature system, which guarantees the mathematical security basis of all modular operations and key splitting;

[0108] Randomly select a positive integer μ, and calculate P = μQ + 1; wherein, P is the modulus of the group;

[0109] Perform Miller-Rabin primality test on P; if P is not a prime number, then reselect μ and calculate P;

[0110] Ensure that there is a large cyclic group with order Q, which provides a secure mathematical environment for subsequent group operations and signature aggregation and the like;

[0111] Randomly select y in {2,...,P-2}, and calculate g = u μ mod P; wherein, u is a generator used to generate the group; g is the generator; and mod is the modular operation;

[0112] If g ≠ 1 or g Q mod P = 1, then reselect u and calculate g;

[0113] Select a subgroup generator g, so that the group operation is fully random, and each system initialization is independent and secure, preventing any predictive attacks;

[0114] For any binary message string m = (m1,...,m L ), regard it as a large integer wherein, m = (m1,...,m L ) is the input message, which is a binary sequence with length L; and m r is the rth bit of the message m; and Int(m) is the conversion of the binary message m to a decimal integer.

[0115] Construct a hash function H(m) = [Int(m) mod (Q-1)] + 1;

[0116] Uniformly and standardly map a binary message of any length to a specified number domain as the input of the subsequent threshold signature. By avoiding zero values, the security risks of the signature are effectively avoided.

[0117] The security strength of the underlying cryptographic system is improved through a series of refinement steps in the system parameter initialization link. A secure random source is continuously sampled until a random integer meeting the primality requirement is obtained, and the group parameter and generator used for the entire encryption operation are generated accordingly. This process not only ensures the high randomness of mathematical parameters in each system deployment, avoiding the known weaknesses caused by using fixed or third-party recommended parameters, but also provides an independent and reliable security foundation for all subsequent signature and hash operations. Furthermore, by standardizing the mapping of any binary message, the signature vulnerability caused by zero or boundary values is avoided, ensuring the uniform distribution and unbiasedness of subsequent message hash and signature input. Compared with some existing systems that directly call preset hash functions or reuse public prime numbers, this scheme performs new parameter selection and verification for each deployment instance, significantly enhancing the ability to resist predictive attacks and replay attacks. Not only the security of the group order and generator is concerned, but also the message mapping is systematically integrated into the initialization process, solving the problem of uneven hash input distribution or predictable parameters in existing technologies, and bringing the end-to-end security quality improvement of the entire system initialization process.

[0118] The random master private key is generated, the master public key is calculated, the secret polynomial and the private key share of each node are generated according to the total number of nodes and the threshold value in the system, and the key share is distributed to each node through a secure channel. Specifically, it includes:

[0119] Randomly generate the master private key Wherein, Indicates random sampling assignment, for example Means that SK is randomly selected from {1, 2,..., Q-1} with uniform distribution;

[0120] Calculate the master public key Y=g SK mod P;

[0121] Generate a unique master private key for the entire system and publish the master public key. The master private key is responsible for protecting all signature rights, and the master public key provides a non-repudiable verification method;

[0122] Get the total number of nodes authorized by the system, denoted as N;

[0123] Randomly assign a unique identifier x j ≠x j' , j≠j'; wherein, j={1,...,N} is the node index; The remainder of the module Q;

[0124] Assign a unique and unforgeable digital identity (identifier) to each authorized node to prevent identity conflicts and impersonation between nodes, ensuring the uniqueness and security of key distribution and signature aggregation;

[0125] The threshold value t satisfies 2≤t≤N; represents the minimum number of nodes required to complete joint signature; the smaller t is (such as t=2), the easier the aggregation signature is, and the higher the node failure tolerance is; but a small number of nodes are easy to collude, and the security is lower. The larger t is (close to N), the higher the signature security is; but the requirement for all online nodes is high, and the system availability decreases; t=1 is equivalent to centralized signature, and there is no threshold protection; t=N is full agreement, which is the safest but most likely to cause the whole system to be unavailable due to single node failure. The value is based on: node credibility: the more independent and credible the node is, the smaller t can be; the node is easy to control, and t should be increased; business fault tolerance demand: if the system requires very high availability, t should not be too large; security requirement: when the attack protection requirement is very high, t should be larger; actual number of nodes N: t must satisfy 2≤t≤N. Value suggestion: it is suggested that t is generally taken as That is, the majority node threshold can balance security and fault tolerance; if N=5, it is suggested that t=3; N=7, it is suggested that t=4; if higher security (to prevent node collusion) is required, t can be further increased to two-thirds or more.

[0126] Randomly generate secret polynomial coefficients: k=1,...,t-1; wherein, a k is the kth coefficient; k is the order of the polynomial;

[0127] Construct a secret polynomial wherein, x k is the kth power of variable x;

[0128] Randomly generate a high-order secret polynomial, divide the master key into node private key shares, so that only more than threshold t nodes can recover the signature, and any less than t nodes cannot reconstruct the master key;

[0129] For each node j, calculate the private key share k j of node j; j

[0130] Distribute k j to node j through a secure channel;

[0131] For each node, calculate an independent key share according to a unique identifier, and distribute it through a secure channel to prevent key leakage during distribution and ensure that the node independently controls its own signature right.

[0132] ​The distributed key management is realized by randomly generating the master private key and splitting it into several shares, combining the number of system nodes and the preset threshold, and using the secret polynomial mechanism. Each node is assigned a unique identity and the private key share is issued through a secure channel, so that any single node cannot independently recover the master key, effectively eliminating the global risk caused by single key leakage. At the same time, the flexible configuration of the preset threshold improves the system fault tolerance after the node failure or offline under the premise of ensuring the security of joint signature, avoiding the problem that the entire system is unavailable due to individual node anomalies. Compared with the traditional centralized key management, the refined scheme disperses the signature right to multiple independent subjects, ensuring the traceability of the signature operation, and balancing the contradiction between security and availability. Combined with the differentiated needs of security level and availability in business, through the flexible adjustment of threshold value, the comprehensive advantages of resisting node collusion attack and maintaining stable operation in dynamic environment are realized, so as to meet the dual requirements of key management security and high availability in multi-party cooperation environment.

[0133] The identification information of all data assets is collected, the upper limit of the asset life cycle stage is set, the discrimination conditions and corresponding attributes of each stage are defined, and the mapping relationship of the assets in each stage of the life cycle is established, specifically including:

[0134] Get the number of all assets and form an asset collection Where M is the total number of managed assets; i is the asset number; is a unique index for all data assets in the platform, enabling accurate tracking and clear ownership throughout the life cycle;

[0135] The upper limit of the number of life cycle stages is preset to K; the role of K: define the total number of life cycle stages that assets may go through, the stage number set is {0, 1,..., K}, 0 is not activated, 1 ~ K is the intermediate work or transfer stage, and K is terminated. The larger K is, the more life cycle stages can be subdivided, which facilitates more detailed management and review; K is too large, which increases the complexity of the mapping function C and the message encoding length Efficiency and storage. Value basis and recommendations: determined according to the number of key states that assets may have in the actual business scenario; if there are only three states of "not activated → in use → terminated", K can be taken as 2; if more sub-stages need to be tracked (such as "under review", "waiting for approval", "in transfer"), K is increased to 4 ~ 6 accordingly, usually not more than 8 ~ 10, so as not to be too cumbersome in coding and discrimination.

[0136] Build a life cycle stage set Where h is the block height; the life cycle state of the asset is uniformly constrained, providing a common stage number basis for different management processes, permission switching and auditing;

[0137] Get the discrimination predicate P of the qth stage qAttr→ {0,1}, q = {0,...,K}; where, Attr i,h is the attribute set of asset i at block height h; P q = 1 if and only if Attr satisfies the phase q condition, and 0 for the rest of the phases; each type of life cycle state criterion is explicitly defined to achieve attribute-driven automated phase recognition, ensuring that the phase switching standard is unique and transparent;

[0138] Construct a phase mapping function to uniquely determine the life cycle phase number to which asset i at block height h belongs; the attribute set of the asset at any time is one-to-one mapped to the normalized phase number, achieving automatic and unique classification of the life cycle state;

[0139] If , report an error and terminate; otherwise, set s i,h = C(Attr i,h ); where s i,h is the phase number of asset i at block height h;

[0140] When asset i is registered, read the attribute Attr i,0 , calculate s i,0 = C(Attr i,0 ) according to the above C; at the first registration of the asset, the life cycle starting point is automatically identified, providing a standardized starting record for subsequent transition and tracking.

[0141] For asset registration and life cycle phase management, an automatic mapping mechanism driven by attribute set is proposed. By obtaining all asset numbers to establish a unique index, and according to the preset upper limit of the life cycle phase and the discrimination condition, the phase of each asset at any block height is automatically determined and updated in real time, avoiding the problems of manual registration, non-uniform phase division, and phase switching lag in the prior art; at the same time, the phase discrimination condition and the mapping function are standardized, so that the unique phase number can be obtained by inputting the attribute set of the asset in any state, achieving automatic recognition and state archiving throughout the whole process. Compared with the traditional coarse-grained management method of directly recording the state through manual review or basic database fields, the present scheme has the characteristics of high automation and fine management, and can complete phase switching in response to asset attribute changes, providing reliable and verifiable basic data for supervision, auditing and process arrangement, significantly improving the transparency and efficiency of asset circulation process.

[0142] According to the state transition of the data asset, an event message four-tuple is constructed, and each field is spliced into a fixed-length binary string according to a fixed coding length, and the hash value of the message is calculated, which specifically includes:

[0143] When s i,h-1 → s i,h , construct ei,h = (i, h, s i,h-1 , s i,h ) ; wherein e i,h is the event four tuple of asset i at block height h when s i,h-1 transitions to s i,h ; each transition of asset phase is explicitly defined in event tuple, realizing the tamper-proof audit of transition full link;

[0144] Set the bit length of the field: wherein, is the encoding bit length of asset number; is the encoding bit length of block height, fixed at 32 bits; is the encoding bit length of phase number;

[0145] If or , error is reported and terminated;

[0146] If , error is reported and terminated;

[0147] If , error is reported and terminated;

[0148] Fixed-length coding is performed for each field to ensure message format standardization, while boundary check is performed on number / phase / height to prevent data overflow, out-of-bound and format disorder, ensuring data consistency and security on the chain;

[0149] Bit splicing is performed to obtain wherein m i,h is the fixed-length binary string obtained by splicing i, h, s i,h-1 , s i,h according to their respective bit lengths; after standardized coding of all fields, complete fixed-length binary messages are obtained by splicing, providing unique message body for hashing and subsequent signature;

[0150] The message hash value δ i,h of the event is calculated = H (m i,h ); the message is converted into irreversible fixed-length digest through hash function H to prevent direct leakage of the original message, while providing non-forged message input for signature operation.

[0151] In terms of event message construction and hash processing, by uniformly defining event quadruples, key fields such as asset identification, block height, original stage and new stage are spliced into fixed-length binary messages with fixed coding length, strict boundary check is implemented and hash calculation is performed on the spliced results. This process ensures that each state transition can generate a message body with consistent and unique format, solving the problems of existing log record diversification, poor readability, easy tampering or difficult automatic parsing; at the same time, the unified fixed-length coding and hash value output make the data written on the chain not only easy to store and optimize, but also support fast indexing and batch verification. Compared with traditional text-based or diversified format event recording methods, this scheme not only realizes the standardization and irreversible encryption of event messages in technology, but also provides an efficient and reliable retrieval and verification mechanism in audit and supervision, improving the consistency management and security traceability of the entire system for asset transition events.

[0152] After the authorized node receives the event message, the message is encrypted and signed based on the private key share of the node to form a partial signature, specifically including:

[0153] Node j receives δ i,h Then, σ j,i,h =k j ×δ i,h mod Q; wherein, σ j,i,h is the partial signature of node j for asset i at block height h event;

[0154] Each node uses its own private key share to partially sign the event hash to form a chain-like, distributed digital signature fragment; it not only ensures that a single node cannot tamper with or forge a joint signature, but also facilitates subsequent aggregation.

[0155] In terms of partial signature generation, after each authorized node receives the standardized event message after hash processing, the message is encrypted and signed with the private key share. This measure ensures that a single node cannot tamper with or generate a complete signature on its own, solving the security risks of centralized signature or single key management leading to the invalidation of the entire signature right when a node is compromised; at the same time, the generation and storage process of distributed signature fragments forms a chain-like protection, effectively blocking the risk of signature forgery caused by internal attacks or private key leakage on nodes. Unlike existing multi-signature mechanisms, the partial signature of this scheme not only has the same legal effect, but also has higher anti-tampering and anti-fraud capabilities due to its reliance on the joint participation of multiple parties, providing more reliable trust assurance for asset management scenarios involving multiple organizations or departments.

[0156] The collection and aggregation of a threshold number of valid partial signatures, the calculation of a joint signature using Lagrange interpolation, and the legality verification, after which the relevant data is written to the blockchain and recorded synchronously off-chain, specifically including:

[0157] For any t valid shares, construct an index set T = {j1,..., j t};j k The kth node number participating in aggregation; from all nodes, a signature subset consisting of any t is selected to prevent single point failure or node offline from causing business interruption, improve fault tolerance and flexibility;

[0158] Set the modular inverse inv(z) so that z·inv(z)≡1(mod Q); wherein, inv(z) is a function, indicating the inverse element of z under the module Q;

[0159] For each j k ∈T, construct Lagrange coefficient

[0160]

[0161] For each node participating in aggregation, calculate the unique interpolation coefficient according to the identifier and node number, to ensure the correctness and uniqueness of signature aggregation;

[0162] Calculate the aggregated signature Linearly combine the partial signatures of each node and the Lagrange coefficients to generate a unique and valid aggregated threshold signature, so that only the aggregated signature is needed to verify the uniqueness;

[0163] Get the verification left side of the joint signature

[0164] Get the verification right side of the joint signature

[0165] If LHS = RHS, write the chain; otherwise, reject and record the log(i, h, LHS, RHS);

[0166] By verifying the consistency of the aggregated signature, public key and message hash, the non-repudiation and tamper-proof ability of multi-node joint signature are ensured. If the verification fails, it is automatically rejected and the log is recorded to ensure the safety and traceability of the whole process;

[0167] Block h is written (m i,h ,∑ i,h ), and (i, h, s i,h ,∑ i,h ) is recorded outside the chain. The aggregated signature and key messages are written to the blockchain to form an irreversible historical record, and the key index is saved off-chain to realize the whole process traceability and independent audit of asset life cycle events.

[0168] In the signature aggregation and verification link, by collecting part of the signature reaching the preset threshold, and using interpolation algorithm to generate a unique joint signature, one-time legality verification is carried out, which solves the low efficiency problem of traditional multi-signature mode which needs to verify each signature one by one; At the same time, due to the fixed length of the aggregated signature, the storage and calculation overhead is reduced when writing on the blockchain. The consistency check of joint signature, public key and message hash in the verification step ensures that the system will not lose signature right or be forged due to node failure in long-term operation, and the aggregation mechanism itself allows part of the nodes to be offline or replaced, which improves the fault tolerance of dynamic changes of nodes. Compared with existing multi-signature technology, this scheme considers both efficiency and security, optimizes the performance of blockchain writing, and at the same time maintains the core advantages of distributed trust.

[0169] When the node changes or reaches the preset remodeling condition, the key distribution polynomial is reconstructed, and the private key share of each node is safely updated, which specifically includes:

[0170] Initialize the counter C e = 0; C e := C e + 1; track the number of times of successful chain writing for each signature, which is used to automatically trigger the threshold key remodeling mechanism, improve long-term security and attack resistance;

[0171] Set the remodeling threshold E T ; E T Function: when the cumulative chain writing event counter C e reaches the threshold E T , trigger threshold remodeling, that is, generate a new secret polynomial and distribute new private key shares to replace the keys of signature participants regularly to prevent long-term key accumulation risks. E T small → remodeling frequently → high security (key update is more timely), but increases network burden and management overhead; E T large → remodeling period long → reduce system overhead, but long-term use of keys is vulnerable to unknown risks (such as side channel, guessing attack). Value basis and suggestion: refer to the event occurrence rate of the system and the demand for security; if the asset event (chain writing) is hundreds of times a day, E T = 1000 (remodeling once a day or several days); for scenarios with extremely high security requirements, E T can be set to tens or hundreds of times; for performance-sensitive scenarios, E T can be set to several thousand to tens of thousands, which balances the operation and maintenance cost and security evaluation.

[0172] After monitoring the node list update, the total number of new nodes is recorded as N';

[0173] Detect the current number of active nodes in real time to prevent joint signature invalidation due to node loss; ensure that only when the threshold number of nodes is met can the business continue, and eliminate security risks;

[0174] If N' < t, record the error, suspend the write chain until the administrator supplements the nodes or adjusts t;

[0175] Otherwise, if C e ≥ E T , perform the reshaping operation and reset C e : = 0;

[0176] Otherwise, continue the write chain without reshaping;

[0177] The scenarios of not meeting the node number and meeting the reshaping condition are handled respectively by suspension, reshaping or normal process, and automatic and no manual intervention is guaranteed to ensure continuous and stable operation of the system;

[0178] The reshaping operation includes steps S701 to S704:

[0179] S701, the key manager randomly generates a new coefficient k = {1,..., t-1};

[0180] S702, construct a new secret polynomial

[0181] S703, the key manager securely issues a new private key share k' j = G(x j ) mod Q to node j, and deletes all b k and plaintext polynomial data;

[0182] S704, node j receives and replaces the old share k j : = k' j ;

[0183] Periodically or on demand, automatically reset the private key shares of all nodes (unchanging master key), eliminate the security risks caused by the leakage of historical key shares, and discard the old key in time.

[0184] In terms of threshold remodeling and branch processing, the number of write events on the chain is tracked by a counter and compared with a preset remodeling threshold to automatically trigger key share reconstruction. This design not only solves the security risks that the long-term use of keys may be stolen by side-channel or cumulative attacks, but also does not rely on manual intervention, achieving self-renewal and self-repairing ability in long-term system operation; for the scenario of node addition or replacement, by dynamically monitoring the node list and adjusting the remodeling pace, the risk of interrupting the write chain due to the signature threshold not meeting the requirements caused by node loss is avoided. Compared with the existing method of manually replacing or not replacing the key, the present scheme realizes automatic balancing of remodeling frequency and system overhead according to the actual business event frequency and system security requirements, and takes into account the best practice of security and performance overhead, providing robust security life cycle management for continuously running key business systems.

[0185] When the asset life cycle reaches the termination condition, the key destruction operation is performed, and only necessary on-chain data and system state information are retained, specifically including:

[0186] If the asset i reaches s i,h = K, termination is triggered; automatic detection of whether the asset life cycle has reached the termination stage triggers subsequent key destruction and audit archiving operations;

[0187] The manager performs SK: = 0, k j : = 0, Y is retained; the master key and all node private key shares are completely destroyed, completely cutting off the subsequent signature and permission chain of the asset, ensuring that the data is irreversible and unrecoverable after termination;

[0188] (m i,h , ∑ i,h ) and (i, h, s i,h , ∑ i,h ) are retained; all life cycle events and signed on-chain and off-chain evidence are retained to achieve audit closed loop and regulatory compliance requirements.

[0189] In the life cycle termination and key destruction link, through continuous monitoring of the asset life cycle stage, once the termination condition is reached, the key destruction process is triggered, and the master key and all node private key shares are completely removed, only retaining necessary event records and system state information on the chain. This process solves the limitations of existing technologies that often only do logical deletion or retain keys, making it impossible to restore the signature ability of the asset after the life cycle ends, preventing the risk of subsequent misuse or secondary attacks; at the same time, the retained on-chain records provide complete closed-loop historical data for supervision and audit, meeting compliance and evidence requirements. In design, both complete destruction and audit storage are considered, compared with the traditional method of relying only on logical deletion or simple archiving, the credibility and compliance of data asset life cycle security management are improved.

[0190] The embodiment also provides a system of a blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method, comprising:

[0191] A parameter initialization module: used for configuration and initialization of system group parameters;

[0192] A threshold key management module: used for generating, distributing and dynamically adjusting key shares, realizing threshold control and key remodeling;

[0193] A data asset lifecycle management module: used for asset registration, lifecycle stage definition and asset state mapping, realizing state management of the whole lifecycle of the asset;

[0194] An event processing module: used for event message construction, standardized coding and hash value calculation;

[0195] A distributed signature and verification module: used for distributed partial signature, aggregated signature and signature verification of each node, guaranteeing signature authority;

[0196] A blockchain writing and synchronization module: used for writing on the chain and off-chain data synchronization of effective signature;

[0197] A lifecycle termination and key destruction module: used for key destruction and safe closed loop processing after termination of the lifecycle of the data asset.

[0198] It should be noted that, in this document, the relationship terms such as first and second are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply that there is any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "contain" or any other variant thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that the process, method, article or equipment including a series of elements not only includes those elements, but also includes other elements not explicitly listed or inherent to such process, method, article or equipment.

[0199] The above only describes the preferred embodiments of the present application, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, without departing from the technical principles of the present application, a number of improvements and refinements can be made, and these improvements and refinements should also be considered as the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method, characterized in that, include: The required integers are generated from a secure random source, and primality tests are performed to obtain the required prime numbers. Based on this, the relevant parameters and generators of the cryptographic group are determined, and a hash function is constructed. A master private key is randomly generated, a master public key is calculated, a secret polynomial and a private key share for each node are generated based on the total number of nodes and the threshold value in the system, and the key share is distributed to each node through a secure channel; Collect identification information of all data assets, set upper limits for asset lifecycle stages, define the discrimination conditions and corresponding attributes for each stage, and establish the mapping relationship between assets at each stage within their lifecycle. Based on the state changes of data assets, an event message quadruple is constructed, and each field is concatenated into a fixed-length binary string with a fixed encoding length to calculate the hash value of the message; After receiving the event message, the authorized node encrypts and signs the message based on its own private key share to form a partial signature; Collect and aggregate valid partial signatures that reach the threshold, calculate the joint signature using Lagrange interpolation, and verify its legality. Once verified, write the relevant data into the blockchain and record it synchronously off-chain. When a node changes or a preset reshaping condition is met, the key allocation polynomial is reconstructed to securely update the private key share of each node. When the asset's lifecycle reaches the termination conditions, a key destruction operation is performed, retaining only the necessary on-chain data and system state information. 2.The blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method of claim 1, wherein, The process of generating the required integer from a secure random source, performing primality checks to obtain a preset prime number, determining the relevant parameters and generators of the cryptographic group based on this, and constructing a hash function specifically includes: Sample a 256-bit integer from a secure random source, perform a Miller-Rabin primality test until a prime number Q ∈ [2 255 ,2 256 -1] is obtained; wherein Q is the order of the group, and is a large prime number; Randomly select a positive integer μ, and calculate P = μQ + 1; where P is the modulus of the group; Perform the Miller-Rabin primality test on P; if P is not a prime number, then reselect μ and recalculate P. Select u randomly in {2,...,P-2}, compute g = u μ mod P; where u is a generator for generating a group; g is a generator; mod is a modulus operation; if g≠1 or g Q mod P = 1, then select a new u and compute g; For any binary message string m = (m1,..., m L ), consider the large integer where m = (m1,..., m L ) is the input message, a binary sequence of length L; m r is the rth bit of the message m; Int(m) is the decimal integer conversion of the binary message m of length L; Construct a hash function H(m) = [Int(m)mod(Q-1)] + 1. 3.The blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method of claim 2, wherein, The process of randomly generating a master private key, calculating a master public key, generating a secret polynomial and a private key share for each node based on the total number of nodes and a threshold value in the system, and distributing the key shares to each node through a secure channel specifically includes: Randomly generate a master private key wherein, denotes a random sample assignment; Compute master public key Y = g SK mod P; The total number of nodes that have obtained system authorization is denoted as N; Randomly assign a unique identity to node j where j = {1,..., N} is the node index; is a residue system modulo Q; Assume the threshold value t satisfies 2 ≤ t ≤ N; Randomly generate secret polynomial coefficients: where a k is the kth coefficient; k is the degree of the polynomial; Constructing a secret polynomial where x k is the kth power of the variable x; For each node j, compute the private key share k j of node j as j F(x mod Q; Through the secure channel, k j is issued to node j.

4. The data asset lifecycle management method based on blockchain according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process involves collecting the identification information of all data assets, setting an upper limit for the asset lifecycle stages, defining the discrimination conditions and corresponding attributes for each stage, and establishing a mapping relationship between the assets at each stage within their lifecycle. Specifically, this includes: Obtain the asset IDs of all assets and assemble them into an asset collection. Where M represents the total number of assets under management; i represents the asset number. The maximum number of lifecycle stages is preset to K; Construct a collection of lifecycle phases Where h is the block height; acquiring a discriminant predicate P of the qth stage q :Attr→{0,1}, q={0,...,K}; where, Attr i,h is the attribute set of asset i at block height h; P q takes the value 1 when and only when Attr satisfies the stage q condition, and takes the value 0 for the rest of the stages Construction phase mapping function The unique identifier determines the lifecycle stage number of asset i at block height h; like Report an error and terminate; otherwise, s i,h =C(Attr) i,h ); where s i,h This is the stage number of asset i at block height h; The asset i reads the attribute Attr at registration i,0 , compute s as above C i,0 = C(Attr i,0 ).

5. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The process of constructing an event message quadruple based on the state changes of data assets, concatenating each field into a fixed-length binary string according to a fixed encoding length, and calculating the hash value of the message specifically includes: When s i,h-1 → s i,h , construct e i,h = ( i , h, s i,h-1 , s i,h ) ; where e i,h is an event four tuple for asset i at block height h when s i,h-1 transitions to s i,h . Set the field bit length: l h =32, Among them, l i The length of the encoded bits for the asset number; h The encoding bit length for the block height is fixed at 32 bits; s The length of the encoded bits for the bit stage number; like or Then an error will be reported and the process will terminate; like Then an error will be reported and the process will terminate; like Then an error will be reported and the process will terminate; By concatenating the bits, we obtain... Where, m i,h To make i,h,s i,h-1 ,s i,h Concatenate the individual bits into a fixed-length binary string; calculating a message hash value δ of the event i,h = H(m i,h ).

6. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method according to claim 5, characterized in that, After receiving the event message, the authorized node encrypts and signs the message based on its own private key share to form a partial signature, specifically including: Node j receives δ i,h Then, compute σ j,i,h = k j × δ i,h mod Q; where σ j,i,h is the partial signature of node j on asset i at block height h event.

7. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of collecting and aggregating a threshold number of valid partial signatures, calculating a joint signature using Lagrange interpolation, and verifying its legitimacy, involves writing the relevant data into the blockchain and simultaneously recording it off-chain. Specifically, this includes: Take any t valid shares, construct the index set T = {j1,..., j t};j k kth node participating in the aggregation Let the modular inverse inv(z) be such that z·inv(z)≡1(modQ); where inv(z) is a function representing the inverse of z modulo Q; For each j k ∈T, construct the Lagrange coefficients Calculate aggregate signature Obtain the verification left-hand side of the joint signature Obtain the verification right side of the joint signature If LHS = RHS, write to the chain; otherwise, reject and record the log (i, h, LHS, RHS); Block h write (m i,h ,∑ i,h ), out-of-chain synchronization record (i,h,s i,h ,∑ i,h ).

8. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method according to claim 7, characterized in that, When a node changes or reaches a preset reshaping condition, reconstruct the key distribution polynomial and securely update the private key shares of each node, specifically including: Initialize counter C e = 0; C e := C e + 1; The remolding threshold is set as E T ; After monitoring the update of the node list, the total number of new nodes is denoted as N'; If N' < t, record an error and pause writing to the chain until the administrator replenishes the nodes or adjusts t; Otherwise, if C e ≥ E T , perform a reshaping operation and reset C e : = 0; Otherwise, continue writing to the chain without reshaping; The reshaping operation includes steps S701 to S704: S701, The key manager randomly generates new coefficients. S702, Constructing a New Secret Polynomial S703, the key manager securely issues a new private key share k' j = G(x j ) mod Q to node j and deletes all b k with the plaintext polynomial data; S704, node j receives and replaces old share k j : = k' j .

9. A blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method according to claim 8, characterized in that, When the asset life cycle reaches the termination condition, perform the key destruction operation, and only retain the necessary on-chain data and system status information, specifically including: If in the block high zone h asset i reaches s i,h = K, trigger termination; Manager performs SK: = 0, k j : = 0, reserve Y; Survival (m i,h ,∑ i,h ) with (i,h,s i,h ,∑ i,h ).

10. A system employing the blockchain-based data asset lifecycle management method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, Include: Parameter initialization module: used for the configuration and initialization of system group parameters; Threshold key management module: used for generating, distributing, and dynamically adjusting key shares to achieve threshold control and key reshaping; Data asset life cycle management module: used for asset registration, life cycle stage definition, and asset status mapping to achieve the status management of the entire asset life cycle; Event processing module: used for event message construction, standardized encoding, and hash value calculation; Distributed signature and verification module: used for distributed partial signatures, aggregated signatures, and signature verification of each node to ensure the authority of signatures; Blockchain writing and synchronization module: used for on-chain writing of valid signatures and off-chain data synchronization; Life cycle termination and key destruction module: used for key destruction and secure closed-loop processing after the termination of the data asset life cycle.

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