Smart home security authentication management method and system based on wireless local area network

Abstract

The application provides a wireless local area network-based smart home security authentication management method and system, comprising: constructing a home network security authentication domain; when a new smart home device is accessed, marking the new smart home device as a second smart home device, and obtaining a device authentication state matrix of the home network security authentication domain; generating an authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication state matrix, and sending the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and a first smart home device for collaborative verification; if the authentication challenge vector passes the collaborative verification, updating the keys of all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain according to a preset dynamic key synchronization protocol. Through the construction of the home network security authentication domain, the security parameters such as the device authentication state and the key management are shared in the domain, when any key is updated, other devices are synchronously updated, and there is a correlation and dependence between the keys, thereby blocking the risk transmission path of the single device key leakage leading to the collapse of the whole network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of security authentication, and in particular to a smart home security authentication management method and system based on wireless local area network. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of IoT technology, users can remotely control smart home devices via wireless LAN using smartphones, tablets, and other smart mobile terminals, enabling automated management and control of their home environment.

[0003] However, existing smart home security authentication management lacks unified control over the overall security of the home network. The authentication management of each smart home device and control terminal is relatively independent, lacking an effective coordination mechanism. When a new device joins the home network or the device key changes, security updates and verifications cannot be performed in a timely manner, leaving the home network with many security vulnerabilities and making it difficult to resist new network attack methods. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to provide a smart home security authentication management method and system based on wireless local area network, which solves the problem that the authentication management of smart home devices and control terminals is relatively independent and lacks an effective collaborative mechanism in the prior art.

[0005] Firstly, this application provides a smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network (WLAN), applied to a smart home system. The smart home system includes a control terminal, a gateway, and smart home devices. The control terminal and the gateway are connected via a WLAN, and the smart home devices are connected to the gateway via a wireless communication protocol. The method includes:

[0006] A home network security authentication domain is constructed, and smart home devices that have been connected to the home network security authentication domain are marked as first smart home devices; the home network security authentication domain includes a control terminal, a gateway, and at least two first smart home devices;

[0007] When a new smart home device is connected, the new smart home device is marked as a second smart home device, and the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain is obtained;

[0008] An authentication challenge vector is generated based on the device authentication status matrix, and the authentication challenge vector is sent to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification.

[0009] If the authentication challenge vector passes the collaborative verification, the keys of all smart home devices within the home network security authentication domain are updated according to the preset dynamic key synchronization protocol.

[0010] In one embodiment, constructing a home network security authentication domain specifically includes:

[0011] Generate the root key pair corresponding to the control terminal;

[0012] Based on the root key pair, a domain master key is generated by negotiating with the gateway using a preset elliptic curve algorithm.

[0013] The device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain is determined based on the domain master key; the device authentication status matrix is ​​used to evaluate the authentication association strength between any two devices in the home network security authentication domain.

[0014] In one embodiment, determining the device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain based on the domain master key specifically includes:

[0015] An initial state matrix is ​​generated based on the number of first smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain; the authentication association strength between devices in the initial state matrix is ​​zero.

[0016] The authentication association strength of the initial state matrix is ​​updated based on the access time, communication frequency, and security risks of multiple first smart home devices, and an updated state matrix is ​​obtained.

[0017] The parameters in the updated state matrix are encrypted using the domain master key to generate the device authentication state matrix.

[0018] In one embodiment, generating the authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication state matrix specifically includes:

[0019] Random number challenge factor is generated based on the timestamp of the current time node;

[0020] Extract the public key of the second smart home device, encrypt the public key of the second smart home device with a randomly generated challenge code, and generate an encryption challenge code;

[0021] The domain verification information of the home network security authentication domain is determined by hashing the first hash value, and the first hash value is signed using the private key of the root key pair to generate a domain verification signature; the domain verification information includes the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device;

[0022] The authentication challenge vector is obtained by combining the random number challenge factor, the encryption challenge code, and the domain verification signature.

[0023] In one embodiment, sending the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification specifically includes:

[0024] Select the two first smart home devices with the highest authentication association strength as the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device, respectively.

[0025] The authentication challenge vector is decrypted by the second smart home device to generate a response vector, and the response vector is sent to the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device;

[0026] The response vector is decrypted by the first collaborative authentication device to obtain the unique identifier ID of the second smart home device, and the unique identifier ID is verified to be consistent with the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device.

[0027] The response vector is decrypted by the second collaborative authentication device to obtain the sending time node of the second smart home device, and the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is verified to be within the preset time difference threshold range.

[0028] The gateway decrypts the response vector to obtain the second hash value of the second smart home device, and verifies whether the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value.

[0029] In one embodiment, the step of "if the authentication challenge vector passes collaborative verification" specifically includes:

[0030] If the unique identifier ID matches the device ID pre-written into the second smart home device; and

[0031] If the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is within a preset time difference threshold range; and

[0032] If the second hash value is the same as the first hash value;

[0033] Then the authentication challenge vector is determined to have passed collaborative verification.

[0034] In one embodiment, the dynamic key synchronization protocol satisfies the following formula:

[0035]

[0036] Among them, the For the second smart home device in the The session key at the specified time; For the second smart home device in the The domain master key at that time; The unique identifier ID of the second smart home device; For key synchronization timestamp; the The number of smart home devices already connected within the aforementioned home network security authentication domain; For the first Each connected device The hash value of the session key at that moment.

[0037] In one embodiment, after updating the keys of all smart home devices within the home network security authentication domain according to a preset dynamic key synchronization protocol, the method further includes:

[0038] When the key version number of the updated key of the smart home device is inconsistent with the pre-stored key version number, a key synchronization request is triggered.

[0039] In response to the key synchronization request, the security authentication management unit of the gateway re-determines the latest domain master key;

[0040] Based on the latest domain master key and the MAC address of the smart home device associated with the gateway, a new session key is determined.

[0041] In one embodiment, it further includes:

[0042] When any smart home device in the home network security authentication domain is attacked, the attacked smart home device is marked as the target smart home device;

[0043] Determine the attack feature vector of the target smart home device, encrypt the attack feature vector, and send it to the gateway;

[0044] The security authentication management unit of the gateway updates the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain and generates a temporary protection key based on the attack feature vector.

[0045] The temporary protection key is synchronized to all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain.

[0046] Secondly, this application provides a smart home security authentication management system based on a wireless local area network, including a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program, the computer program being loaded by the processor and executed as described in any one of the first aspects of the smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network.

[0047] In the smart home security authentication management method and system based on wireless LAN in this embodiment, the construction of a home network security authentication domain enables the sharing of security parameters such as device authentication status and key management within the domain. The constructed home network security authentication domain contains at least two first smart home devices, forcing newly connected second smart home devices to undergo multi-node collaborative verification when connecting, thus resisting the risk of single point of failure when the gateway is attacked. A new key is generated by aggregating the key hash values ​​of all smart home devices through a dynamic key synchronization protocol, ensuring that when the key of any device is updated, other devices are updated synchronously and there is a correlation and dependency between keys, thus blocking the risk transmission path of the entire network being compromised due to the leakage of a single device's key. Attached Figure Description

[0048] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0049] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network, provided for an embodiment of this application.

[0050] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in one embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0051] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the description of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0052] In the description of this invention, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "set," "install," "connect," etc., should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they can refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they can refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms according to the specific circumstances.

[0053] The terms “upper,” “lower,” “left,” “right,” “front,” “back,” “top,” “bottom,” “inner,” and “outer,” etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly used when the product of the invention is in use. They are only for the convenience of description and simplification, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on the present invention.

[0054] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” etc., are used merely to distinguish elements with similar properties, not to indicate or imply relative importance or a specific order.

[0055] The terms “include,” “comprising,” or any other variation thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, which includes not only the elements listed but also other elements not expressly listed.

[0056] The smart home system in this embodiment includes a control terminal, a gateway, and smart home devices. The control terminal includes smart mobile devices such as smartphones and smart tablets, and is responsible for generating root key pairs, negotiating domain master keys, and issuing security policies. The gateway has a built-in security authentication management unit that stores a device authentication status matrix and can coordinate the authentication and key management of smart home devices within the domain. Smart home devices include smart lights, smart door locks, smart air conditioners, and other smart devices. The control terminal and the gateway are connected via a wireless local area network (WLAN), and the smart home devices and the gateway are connected via a wireless communication protocol. The gateway has a built-in security authentication management unit (such as a hardware encryption chip) that supports the WPA3 WLAN protocol and various smart home communication protocols such as Zigbee and BLE Mesh.

[0057] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network, including:

[0058] Step S100: Construct a home network security authentication domain and mark smart home devices that have been connected to the home network security authentication domain as first smart home devices; the home network security authentication domain includes a control terminal, a gateway, and at least two first smart home devices;

[0059] Step S200: When a new smart home device is connected, the new smart home device is marked as a second smart home device, and the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain is obtained;

[0060] Step S300: Generate an authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication status matrix, and send the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification;

[0061] Step S400: If the authentication challenge vector passes the collaborative verification, then update the keys of all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain according to the preset dynamic key synchronization protocol.

[0062] In the smart home security authentication management method based on wireless LAN in this embodiment, the construction of a home network security authentication domain enables the sharing of security parameters such as device authentication status and key management within the domain. The constructed home network security authentication domain contains at least two first smart home devices, forcing newly connected second smart home devices to undergo multi-node collaborative verification when they connect, thus resisting the risk of single-point failure when the gateway is attacked. A new key is generated by aggregating the key hash values ​​of all smart home devices through a dynamic key synchronization protocol, ensuring that when the key of any device is updated, other devices are updated synchronously and there is a correlation and dependency between keys, thus blocking the risk transmission path of the entire network being compromised due to the leakage of a single device's key.

[0063] Step S100: Construct a home network security authentication domain and mark smart home devices that have been connected to the home network security authentication domain as first smart home devices; the home network security authentication domain includes a control terminal, a gateway, and at least two first smart home devices.

[0064] A home network security authentication domain is a logically secure area used to uniformly manage the authentication status and key information of devices within the domain. It can be established by connecting the control terminal, gateway, and at least two smart home devices via a wireless LAN. The first smart home device is one that has passed initial security authentication and has the authority to participate in collaborative verification. It is accessed by completing an initial key negotiation process, which can employ a pre-shared key or a key exchange protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography.

[0065] For example, an initial communication channel can be established between the control terminal and the gateway via a wireless LAN. The gateway, as the central node, can then establish connections with each of the first smart home devices via wireless protocols such as ZigBee and Bluetooth. This ensures that all devices within the domain have pre-completed the sharing of security parameters. Multi-device collaborative management avoids the limitations of traditional single-point gateway authentication and reduces the risk of single-point failure.

[0066] In one embodiment, constructing a home network security authentication domain specifically includes:

[0067] Generate the root key pair corresponding to the control terminal;

[0068] The root key pair is an asymmetric key pair generated by the control terminal, containing a private key and a public key. As the initial root of trust in the home network security authentication domain, its core function is to provide the basis for identity authentication in subsequent key negotiations. For example, the control terminal signs messages using the private key, and other devices verify the authenticity of the signature using the public key. The root key pair can be generated using an asymmetric key generation algorithm; for instance, an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm can be used. In one specific embodiment, the control terminal generates the root key pair using the NISTP256 elliptic curve algorithm. The specific steps include selecting elliptic curve parameters, randomly generating a private key, and calculating the corresponding public key using elliptic curve dot product operations. The private key is securely stored by the control terminal, while the public key is distributed to the gateway through a secure channel. By establishing a verifiable initial source of trust, the authenticity of identity in the subsequent key negotiation process is ensured, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks that could tamper with the keys.

[0069] Based on the root key pair, a domain master key is generated by negotiating with the gateway using a preset elliptic curve algorithm.

[0070] Elliptic curve cryptography (ECDH) refers to a key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. This embodiment uses ECDH (Diffie-Hellman) elliptic curve cryptography as the preset algorithm. Its advantage lies in achieving security comparable to traditional algorithms with a shorter key length, making it suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices. The domain master key is the core shared key of the authentication domain, used to derive session keys or signature keys for other devices. Its security directly affects the overall protection strength of the authentication domain. The technical operation can be implemented through the ECDH protocol, specifically including: the control terminal generating a temporary ECDH key pair and sending the temporary public key and the root public key to the gateway; the gateway verifying the control terminal's root public key signature, confirming its legitimacy, and generating its own temporary ECDH public key; both parties calculating the shared key using their respective private keys and the other party's temporary public key, and combining it with the hash value of the root key pair to generate the domain master key. This process ensures that the domain master key negotiation is completed securely without third-party eavesdropping. Even if an attacker intercepts communication data, they cannot deduce the key. Furthermore, the generation of the domain master key, combined with the signature verification of the root key pair, further enhances the key's credibility.

[0071] The device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain is determined based on the domain master key; the device authentication status matrix is ​​used to evaluate the authentication association strength between any two devices in the home network security authentication domain.

[0072] The device authentication status matrix is ​​a structure used to store device authentication statuses such as key version and validity status, and to add a quantitative assessment of the authentication association strength between devices. The authentication association strength reflects the tightness of mutual verification between devices. For example, if device A and device B frequently participate in each other's authentication process, their association strength is high, and they may be preferentially selected as nodes for collaborative verification.

[0073] In one embodiment, determining the device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain based on the domain master key specifically includes:

[0074] An initial state matrix is ​​generated based on the number of first smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain; the authentication association strength between devices in the initial state matrix is ​​zero.

[0075] The initial state matrix is ​​a structured data table recording device states during the initial establishment of the home network security authentication domain. Its dimensions are determined by the number of smart home devices in the domain. This matrix includes device identifiers, initial key hash values, and authentication association strength parameters. The initial association strength value is set to zero to indicate that no dynamic interaction records have been established between devices. The initial state matrix can be generated by the system based on the number N devices in the current domain, constructing an N×N matrix structure. For example, when including three devices—a smart door lock, an air conditioner, and a camera—a 3×3 matrix structure will be generated, with all elements outside the diagonal initialized to zero. This matrix also records basic information such as device access time and key version, serving as a baseline data template for subsequent dynamic updates.

[0076] The authentication association strength of the initial state matrix is ​​updated based on the access time, communication frequency, and security risks of multiple first smart home devices, and an updated state matrix is ​​obtained.

[0077] The access time is the timestamp of the device's first joining the home network security authentication domain, used to assess the device's historical activity. Communication frequency is the statistical value of how often the device interacts with other devices, reflecting the dependencies between them. Security risk is the historical attack history of the device or its current security status assessment, such as the number of key changes or abnormal login attempts. The association strength can be updated through the following steps: First, collect access time, communication frequency statistics, and security risk scores from device logs or monitoring modules. Second, use a weighted calculation method (e.g., access time 30%, communication frequency 50%, security risk 20%) to calculate the association strength of each pair of devices using a weighted summation formula. For example, if devices A and B communicate frequently but pose a security risk, their association strength may be appropriately reduced. Finally, fill the calculation results into the corresponding positions of the initial state matrix to generate an updated state matrix, where the diagonal elements remain zero to avoid redundant calculations. This process allows the home network security authentication domain to reflect the actual interaction status between devices in real time. For example, the association strength of devices that have not communicated for a long time and are of high risk will be lowered, thus reducing their weight in collaborative verification.

[0078] The parameters in the updated state matrix are encrypted using the domain master key to generate the device authentication state matrix;

[0079] The device authentication state matrix is ​​a securely processed state record containing parameters such as encrypted association strength and device identifier. Only authorized smart home devices can access it via decryption using the domain master key. The encryption process includes the following steps: First, extract non-zero association strength values ​​and device metadata such as key hash values ​​from the updated state matrix; second, generate a session encryption key using the domain master key and key derivation functions such as HKDF; next, use a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES256 to encrypt the parameters in blocks, and attach a message authentication code to verify integrity; finally, store the encrypted matrix on the gateway or control terminal and distribute it to trusted devices within the domain through a secure channel. This encryption mechanism ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the state matrix. For example, attackers cannot directly read the association strength parameters after intercepting the encrypted data, and MAC verification can detect data tampering, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks that could alter the association strength values.

[0080] By generating a root key pair as the initial source of trust, securely negotiating the domain master key based on the elliptic curve algorithm, and constructing a device authentication state matrix that includes authentication association strength assessment, the initial trust of the home network security authentication domain can be anchored to the control terminal, thus mitigating the risk of attacks on the gateway as a single source of trust in traditional solutions. Two-way authentication ensures the security of key negotiation; and dynamic association strength assessment enables the home network security authentication domain to have risk identification and policy adjustment capabilities, such as prioritizing devices with high association strength for collaborative verification or triggering secondary verification for devices with low association strength. This improves the attack robustness and dynamic adaptability of the home network security authentication domain without significantly increasing computational overhead.

[0081] Step S200: When a new smart home device is connected, the new smart home device is marked as a second smart home device, and the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain is obtained.

[0082] A second smart home device is a device that has not yet passed collaborative verification and is to be accessed. It can be obtained by triggering a marking process through a device access request. For example, a second smart home device could be a newly purchased smart camera or sensor.

[0083] New devices can be marked as second smart home devices through a gateway or control terminal. Then, the integrity of the device authentication status matrix can be parsed and verified to provide a reliable data foundation for subsequent collaborative verification. At the same time, it can be ensured that newly connected second smart home devices cannot directly participate in intra-domain communication.

[0084] Step S300: Generate an authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication status matrix, and send the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification.

[0085] The authentication challenge vector is a set of verification data containing parameters such as a random number, a timestamp, and the hash value of the device key within the domain. It can be generated by processing the key hash value using an aggregation algorithm and combining it with other parameters. For example, an asymmetric encryption algorithm can be used to generate a random number, which is then combined with the SHA256 hash function to generate the challenge value.

[0086] A global hash value can be generated by extracting the key hash value from the device authentication status matrix. This hash value, combined with a timestamp, forms a vector and is broadcast to all devices. The consistency of multiple devices is then verified by collecting and comparing their responses. This avoids single-point-of-verification vulnerabilities and enhances the system's defense against man-in-the-middle attacks through a multi-node consensus mechanism.

[0087] In one embodiment, generating the authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication state matrix specifically includes:

[0088] Random number challenge factor is generated based on the timestamp of the current time node;

[0089] The random number challenge factor is an unpredictable value generated by combining a timestamp and a cryptographically secure random number generation algorithm. It is used to prevent replay attacks during the authentication process. The random number challenge factor is obtained by acquiring the current timestamp and ensuring it is synchronized with the network time protocol, while simultaneously using a cryptographically secure random number generator such as CTR_DRBG or Fortuna to generate a random byte string. Finally, the concatenation result of the timestamp and the random byte string is processed using a hash function such as SHA256 to obtain the random number challenge factor.

[0090] Extract the public key of the second smart home device, encrypt the public key of the second smart home device with a randomly generated challenge code, and generate an encryption challenge code;

[0091] The public key of the second smart home device is the public portion of the asymmetric encryption key pre-stored during the registration phase, which can be extracted through the device authentication status matrix or device certificate. The challenge code is an independently generated random number, such as a 128-bit random byte string, which can be generated through the cryptographically secure random number generation interface provided by the operating system. The encrypted challenge code is a data block encrypted with the public key. It can be generated using the AES256 symmetric encryption algorithm with the challenge code as the key, or using the RSAOAEP asymmetric encryption algorithm combined with the challenge code as a padding parameter.

[0092] The domain verification information of the home network security authentication domain is determined by hashing the first hash value, and the first hash value is signed using the private key of the root key pair to generate a domain verification signature; the domain verification information includes the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device;

[0093] The domain verification information consists of structured data containing the device ID and other domain authentication parameters, where the device ID must match the factory-preset unique identifier. The first hash value is a fixed-length digest generated by processing the domain verification information data packet using hash algorithms such as SHA3. The domain verification signature is an electronic credential generated by performing a digital signature algorithm on the first hash value using the root private key; its verification relies on the corresponding root public key.

[0094] Determining the domain verification signature involves constructing a data packet containing the device ID and domain parameters, hashing it, and then generating a signature using the ECDSA algorithm. For example, this process can be specifically as follows: concatenating the device ID and the domain master key version number into a binary stream, calculating the hash value using SHA3256, performing the signature operation using an elliptic curve private key, and finally outputting 64 bytes of signature data.

[0095] The authentication challenge vector is obtained by combining the random number challenge factor, the encryption challenge code, and the domain verification signature.

[0096] The combined authentication challenge vector can be generated by concatenating in a predefined order or using TLV encoding format. For example, the components can be arranged in the order of random number challenge factor, encryption challenge code, and domain verification signature, and a length identifier can be added to each field to finally form a data frame that conforms to the wireless LAN transmission protocol.

[0097] In one embodiment, sending the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification specifically includes:

[0098] Select the two first smart home devices with the highest authentication association strength as the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device, respectively.

[0099] Among them, the authentication association strength is used to characterize the degree of mutual verification between devices recorded in the device authentication status matrix. Its value is calculated by weighting parameters such as access time, communication frequency, and security risk, and can be obtained through the parameter weighting algorithm of the device authentication status matrix.

[0100] The authentication challenge vector is decrypted by the second smart home device to generate a response vector, and the response vector is sent to the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device;

[0101] The response vector is a set of response data from the second smart home device to the authentication challenge vector. It includes the decrypted challenge factor, device identity verification, timestamp, and other parameters required for verification. It can be obtained by the second smart home device using its private key to decrypt the encrypted challenge code in the authentication challenge vector and generate verification parameters.

[0102] The response vector is decrypted by the first collaborative authentication device to obtain the unique identifier ID of the second smart home device, and the unique identifier ID is verified to be consistent with the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device.

[0103] The unique identifier (ID) of the second smart home device is an immutable and unique identifier pre-installed at the factory. It is stored in the device's hardware security module or encrypted storage area and can be generated through pre-installed processes or write operations within the security module during device manufacturing. When a second smart home device is connected, its corresponding device ID must be provided in advance, along with its MAC address or UUID. Upon receiving this information, the gateway will bind the device ID to the MAC address or UUID.

[0104] The response vector is decrypted by the second collaborative authentication device to obtain the sending time node of the second smart home device, and the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is verified to be within the preset time difference threshold range.

[0105] Among them, the sending time node of the second smart home device is the timestamp generated when the second smart home device processes and generates the response vector after receiving the authentication challenge vector; the current time node refers to the timestamp corresponding to the current time; the time difference threshold is the allowed time deviation range, which is used to detect whether the response is generated in real time, and can be determined by system configuration parameters or dynamic adjustment algorithms, such as 5 seconds, 10 seconds or other time nodes.

[0106] The gateway is used to decrypt the response vector to obtain the second hash value of the second smart home device, and to verify whether the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value.

[0107] The second hash value is a hash value of a portion of the response vector content or a re-signature hash of the domain verification information by the second smart home device. It can be generated by calculating specific fields of the response vector or the verification signature using a hash algorithm.

[0108] The two smart home devices with the highest authentication association strength are selected as verification nodes. This is achieved by extracting the authentication association strength values ​​of all smart home devices from the device authentication status matrix and sorting them numerically, thus ensuring the core position of the verification nodes in the authentication domain. If devices with the same association strength exist, further filtering is performed based on device type priority or access time, which effectively reduces the risk of misjudgment.

[0109] The second smart home device uses its private key to decrypt the encrypted challenge code in the authentication challenge vector and verify the timeliness of the random number challenge factor. It then generates a response vector containing parameters such as the decrypted device ID, public key verification result, current timestamp, and domain verification signature re-signing. This response vector is then transmitted to the designated device via encryption. This verifies the second smart home device's control over the private key and simultaneously reduces the possibility of an attacker breaching a single verification step.

[0110] The first collaborative authentication device uses the domain master key or pre-shared key to decrypt the response vector, extracts the unique identifier ID, and compares it with the device ID of the second smart home device pre-recorded in the device authentication status matrix. If they match, the verification is successful; otherwise, it is marked as identity forgery, thus directly associating the physical entity of the device with its digital identity and preventing cloned or forged devices from masquerading as legitimate entities.

[0111] The second collaborative authentication device decrypts the response vector to obtain the sending time node. By calculating the difference between this time and the current system time, it determines whether it is less than a preset threshold. This effectively prevents replay attacks and ensures the timeliness of the response.

[0112] The gateway uses the domain master key to decrypt the response vector, extracts the second hash value, and compares it with the previously generated first hash value. If they match, it proves that the response has not been tampered with and is associated with the domain verification information; otherwise, authentication is rejected. This operation ensures the integrity and legitimacy of the response data, forming a multi-node cross-verification mechanism in conjunction with the gateway's central node role.

[0113] Step S400: If the authentication challenge vector passes the collaborative verification, then update the keys of all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain according to the preset dynamic key synchronization protocol.

[0114] Dynamic key synchronization protocols are mechanisms that generate new keys and ensure synchronization by aggregating the key hash values ​​of all devices on the network. This is achieved through threshold cryptography or blockchain consensus mechanisms to establish key association. For example, the Shamir secret sharing scheme can be used. The key hash value is a fixed-length digest of the device's current key after processing it using a hash function such as SHA3, and can be generated through local key storage on the device.

[0115] The gateway can collect the current key hash values ​​of all devices, aggregate them through a hash chain to generate a global seed, and then generate a new master key based on the AESKW algorithm and distribute it to each device. This operation can effectively block the transmission path of key leakage risks, ensuring that the leakage of a key on one device cannot deduce the keys of other devices.

[0116] By constructing an authentication domain encompassing multiple devices to achieve shared security parameters, forcing new devices to undergo multi-node collaborative verification to ensure access security, and employing a dynamic key synchronization protocol to ensure the correlation of key updates across the entire network, the system's ability to defend against new types of network attacks can be enhanced. Through multi-device collaborative authentication and a network-wide key association mechanism, the overall security and attack robustness of the smart home network are achieved without significantly increasing computational overhead.

[0117] In one embodiment, the step of "if the authentication challenge vector passes collaborative verification" specifically includes: if the unique identifier ID is consistent with the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device; and if the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is within a preset time difference threshold range; and if the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value; then it is determined that the authentication challenge vector passes collaborative verification.

[0118] For example, this can be achieved as follows: First, device identity consistency verification is performed to confirm that the requester has a legitimate device identity. Then, time validity verification is performed to rule out the possibility of delayed or duplicate transmission of the response vector. Finally, data integrity verification is performed to ensure that the response data has not been tampered with or forged. The system determines that the authentication challenge vector has passed the collaborative verification only when all three verification conditions are met simultaneously. If any verification condition fails, the authentication failure handling process is triggered. This verification mechanism, by forcing all conditions to take effect in parallel, can effectively resist complex attacks such as hybrid attacks combining identity forgery and replay attacks. At the same time, the layered verification logic significantly increases the technical complexity and resource investment required for attackers to breach the protection system.

[0119] Device identity consistency verification ensures the requester possesses a legitimate device identity; time validity verification prevents response vector delays or reuse; and data integrity verification ensures response data remains tamper-proof. This multi-dimensional cross-verification system achieves the technical effect of constructing a three-dimensional authentication protection structure and significantly improving the system's resistance to attacks. By forcing all verification dimensions to take effect simultaneously, it not only compensates for potential security vulnerabilities in single verification mechanisms but also, through a multi-condition joint judgment mechanism, requires attackers to simultaneously breach multiple independent protection layers to forge authentication. This achieves high-confidence secure authentication capabilities in smart home network environments.

[0120] In one embodiment, the dynamic key synchronization protocol satisfies the following formula:

[0121]

[0122] Among them, the For the second smart home device in the The session key at the specified time; For the second smart home device in the The domain master key at that time; The unique identifier ID of the second smart home device; For key synchronization timestamp; the The number of smart home devices already connected within the aforementioned home network security authentication domain; For the first Each connected device The hash value of the session key at that moment.

[0123] The dynamic key synchronization protocol ensures that all devices on the network complete key updates within the same time window through timestamp synchronization. It achieves a strong correlation between the new key and the key status of all devices through hash value collection and global aggregation calculation. Furthermore, it enhances the dynamism and reverse engineering of key generation by combining the domain master key and timestamp through key derivation functions. Finally, it ensures the security of key updates through encrypted channel distribution and timestamp verification. This achieves the technical effects of improving global consistency, attack robustness, and dynamic update efficiency in key management. This solution ensures that any device key change triggers a network-wide update through a multi-parameter aggregation mechanism. Combined with time synchronization and key derivation functions, it achieves the security feature of "one key, one change, network-wide linkage." Simultaneously, it maintains basic network functions through single-point-of-failure resistance design, significantly reducing the impact of key leakage or device offline on the overall network.

[0124] In one embodiment, after updating the keys of all smart home devices within the home network security authentication domain according to a preset dynamic key synchronization protocol, the method further includes:

[0125] When the key version number of the updated key of the smart home device is inconsistent with the pre-stored key version number, a key synchronization request is triggered.

[0126] The key version number is an identifier used to identify the key generation or update sequence. It is usually stored locally on the device as an incrementing integer or a timestamp. Its core function is to track the key lifecycle and ensure version synchronization between devices. This identifier can be automatically updated through device firmware upgrades or key update processes. For example, the initial version V1 is incremented to V2, V3, etc. after each update.

[0127] Triggering a key synchronization request is achieved by the device actively comparing the locally stored key version number with the new key version number. If a version number mismatch is detected (e.g., the device is still using V2 locally while the new key is V3), the device will generate a request message containing its own identifier, current version number, and request type, and send it to the gateway via the wireless LAN. This operation can be implemented through a mechanism that performs periodic checks or executes immediately after the key update is completed.

[0128] In response to the key synchronization request, the security authentication management unit of the gateway re-determines the latest domain master key;

[0129] The security authentication management unit is the core module of the gateway responsible for key management, including key storage, version tracking, and protocol execution logic. Its functions include verifying request legitimacy and retrieving or generating the domain master key. The domain master key, as the foundational key for intra-domain key negotiation, is typically stored in the gateway's security element and dynamically updated according to preset policies.

[0130] The process of re-establishing the domain master key includes: first, verifying the legitimacy of the request source, such as authenticating the request signature through a device certificate or existing key; second, retrieving the currently valid domain master key from secure storage. If the current domain master key has expired or needs to be updated, a new domain master key is generated through a key negotiation protocol and broadcast to devices within the domain. This process ensures the trusted processing of key synchronization requests and prevents malicious requests from tampering with the key state.

[0131] Based on the latest domain master key and the MAC address of the smart home device associated with the gateway, a new session key is determined;

[0132] The MAC address is a unique hardware identifier for the device's network interface, embedded in the device by the manufacturer and used for physical layer communication identification. In this scheme, it serves as an input parameter for key derivation, forming a necessary condition for session key generation together with the domain master key.

[0133] The new session key is determined through a key derivation function. Specifically, the latest domain master key is concatenated with the target device's MAC address, and a timestamp or random number is used as a salt to generate a device-specific session key using algorithms such as HKDF. The generated session key is distributed to the corresponding device through an encrypted channel, and its key version number is updated synchronously. This operation ensures a strong association between the session key and the device's hardware identity, preventing the key from being reused or forged by other devices.

[0134] When a device experiences a key version mismatch due to network interruption, partial failure, or unexpected restart, it can proactively trigger a repair process to ensure the eventual consistency of key versions across the entire network. At the same time, by binding hardware identifiers with dynamic keys, the uniqueness and anti-cloning capabilities of session keys are enhanced, thereby improving the system's adaptability, fault tolerance, and communication security in dynamic network environments.

[0135] In one embodiment, it further includes:

[0136] When any smart home device in the home network security authentication domain is attacked, the attacked smart home device is marked as the target smart home device;

[0137] Network attacks are malicious acts targeting devices or networks, including but not limited to DDoS attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, credential theft, and abnormal traffic injection. Detection mechanisms can be implemented through the device's built-in security module or the gateway's traffic analysis engine. For example, detection methods include intrusion detection systems, traffic pattern analysis, or abnormal logs reported by the device. The target smart home device is the one confirmed to have been attacked; its status will be marked as "under attack" or "in isolation," triggering subsequent protection processes. This marking can be achieved by updating the status field in the device authentication status matrix.

[0138] When identifying target smart home devices, the system first uses an attack detection mechanism to identify abnormal behaviors such as unusually high-frequency communication and unauthorized key requests, triggering attack alarms. Then, it locates the specific attacked device based on the attack source IP, device identifier, or communication characteristics, confirming it as the target smart home device. After identifying the target smart home device, its status field in the device authentication status matrix is ​​updated to "Attacked," and its authentication association strength is reduced to a preset minimum value, restricting its access to collaborative verification. Attacked devices can be isolated in real time to prevent lateral spread of attacks. For example, if a device is infected with malware attempting to launch an internal attack, its low association strength after being marked will prevent it from affecting other devices through collaborative verification.

[0139] Determine the attack feature vector of the target smart home device, encrypt the attack feature vector, and send it to the gateway;

[0140] The attack feature vector is a structured set of parameters describing attack behavior, including attack type, attack time, source IP address, abnormal traffic characteristics, and device response logs. Its generation can be achieved through feature extraction and vector construction. For example, attack type identifiers include "0x01" for DDoS and "0x02" for man-in-the-middle attack. Encrypted transmission involves encrypting the vector using a domain master key or temporary session key and attaching a message authentication code.

[0141] When determining the attack signature vector, attack-related parameters are first extracted from the target device and network logs, including attack type identifiers, attack duration, packet rate, abnormal port access records, and abnormal CPU / memory usage values. Secondly, these parameters are combined into an attack signature vector according to a predefined format. Finally, the encrypted vector is sent through a secure channel to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the transmission process. For example, even if an attacker intercepts the data packet, they cannot directly read critical information such as the attack type or source IP, preventing attackers from misleading protection strategies by tampering with the signature vector.

[0142] The security authentication management unit of the gateway updates the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain and generates a temporary protection key based on the attack feature vector.

[0143] The device authentication status matrix is ​​a dynamic data structure that records the authentication status and association strength of each device. Its updates can be achieved by adjusting parameters after parsing the attack feature vector. For example, adjustments can be made by marking the target device as "isolated" or reducing the association strength of other affected devices. The temporary protection key is a short-term key generated to counter the current attack. Its generation can be achieved by combining attack feature parameters and the domain master key through a key derivation function.

[0144] When generating a temporary protection key, the MAC address of the attack signature vector is first decrypted and verified to ensure data integrity. Secondly, the device authentication state matrix is ​​dynamically adjusted based on the attack type and target device information, such as setting the target device's association strength to the lowest value or triggering secondary authentication for other devices. Finally, a temporary protection key is generated through a key derivation function, and its validity period is typically short, such as 24 hours. For example, a key generated for a DDoS attack might include traffic filtering rules, while a key generated for a man-in-the-middle attack might enhance two-way authentication strength, thus specifically defending against similar attacks.

[0145] The temporary protection key is synchronized to all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain.

[0146] When synchronizing temporary protection keys, the temporary protection key is first packaged with metadata such as effective time and validity period and encrypted using the domain master key; then, the encrypted key package is distributed through a secure channel; finally, each device verifies the MAC address, updates its local key, and adjusts its communication policy. For example, enabling traffic rate limiting rules against DDoS attacks on all devices simultaneously can effectively block the spread of attacks, while the short-term validity of the temporary key reduces the risk of long-term key exposure.

[0147] By real-time tagging of attacked devices to isolate threats, extracting and encrypting attack signature vectors to ensure trusted information transmission, dynamically updating the authentication status matrix to adjust device permissions, and generating and synchronizing temporary protection keys for targeted defense, the technical effects of building proactive defense and rapid response capabilities can be achieved. Through a three-stage mechanism of attack detection, signature analysis, and dynamic protection, the goals of rapidly isolating threats, adjusting protection strategies, and maintaining continuous secure communication of core devices are achieved, significantly improving the self-healing capabilities and resilience against attacks of smart home networks.

[0148] In summary, the smart home security authentication management method based on wireless LAN in this embodiment achieves the following: Firstly, by constructing a home network security authentication domain, security parameters such as device authentication status and key management are shared within the domain. The constructed home network security authentication domain includes at least two first smart home devices, forcing newly connected second smart home devices to undergo multi-node collaborative verification upon connection. This mitigates the risk of single-point failure when the gateway is attacked. A dynamic key synchronization protocol aggregates the key hash values ​​of all smart home devices to generate a new key, ensuring that when any device updates its key, other devices update synchronously, and that keys are correlated and dependent, thus blocking the risk transmission path of a single device's key leakage leading to network-wide compromise. Secondly, by real-time marking of attacked devices to isolate threats, extracting and encrypting attack feature vectors to ensure reliable information transmission, dynamically updating the authentication status matrix to adjust device permissions, and generating and synchronizing temporary protection keys to implement targeted defense, the method achieves the technical effect of constructing proactive defense and rapid response capabilities.

[0149] Based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, this embodiment also provides a smart home security authentication management system based on a wireless local area network, including a processor and a memory; wherein, the memory stores a computer program, which is used by the processor to load and execute the smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network as described above.

[0150] like Figure 2 As shown, based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, this embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions for loading and executing by a processor the above-described smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network.

[0151] The embodiments of the mobile terminal and computer-readable storage medium provided in this application include all the technical features of the embodiments of the above control method. The extended and explanatory content of the specification is basically the same as that of the embodiments of the above method, and will not be repeated here.

[0152] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, it causes the computer to perform the methods described in the various possible implementations above.

[0153] This application also provides a chip, including a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program from the memory, so that a device with the chip installed performs the methods described in the various possible implementations above.

[0154] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0155] In this application, the same or similar terms, concepts, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions are generally described in detail only when they appear for the first time. When they appear again, they are generally not repeated for the sake of brevity. When understanding the technical solutions and other contents of this application, the same or similar terms, concepts, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions that are not described in detail later can be referred to their previous relevant detailed descriptions.

[0156] In this application, the descriptions of the various embodiments have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0157] The technical features of the present application can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of the present application.

[0158] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms. Of course, they can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in the above-mentioned storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a terminal device to execute the methods of each embodiment of this application. The above are only preferred embodiments of this application and do not limit the patent scope of this application. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the content of this application's specification and drawings, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of this application.

[0159] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other.

[0160] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network, characterized in that, The method is applied to a smart home system, which includes a control terminal, a gateway, and smart home devices. The control terminal and the gateway are connected via a wireless local area network (WLAN), and the smart home devices and the gateway are connected via a wireless communication protocol. A home network security authentication domain is constructed, and smart home devices that have been connected to the home network security authentication domain are marked as first smart home devices; the home network security authentication domain includes a control terminal, a gateway, and at least two first smart home devices; When a new smart home device is connected, the new smart home device is marked as a second smart home device, and the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain is obtained; An authentication challenge vector is generated based on the device authentication status matrix, and the authentication challenge vector is sent to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification. If the authentication challenge vector passes the collaborative verification, then the keys of all smart home devices within the home network security authentication domain are updated according to the preset dynamic key synchronization protocol; The construction of the home network security authentication domain specifically includes: Generate the root key pair corresponding to the control terminal; Based on the root key pair, a domain master key is generated by negotiating with the gateway using a preset elliptic curve algorithm. The device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain is determined based on the domain master key; the device authentication status matrix is ​​used to evaluate the authentication association strength between any two devices in the home network security authentication domain. The step of determining the device authentication status matrix corresponding to the home network security authentication domain based on the domain master key specifically includes: An initial state matrix is ​​generated based on the number of first smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain; the authentication association strength between devices in the initial state matrix is ​​zero. The authentication association strength of the initial state matrix is ​​updated based on the access time, communication frequency, and security risks of multiple first smart home devices, and an updated state matrix is ​​obtained. The parameters in the updated state matrix are encrypted using the domain master key to generate the device authentication state matrix; The generation of the authentication challenge vector based on the device authentication status matrix specifically includes: Random number challenge factor is generated based on the timestamp of the current time node; Extract the public key of the second smart home device, encrypt the public key of the second smart home device with a randomly generated challenge code, and generate an encryption challenge code; The domain verification information of the home network security authentication domain is determined by hashing the first hash value, and the first hash value is signed using the private key of the root key pair to generate a domain verification signature; the domain verification information includes the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device; The authentication challenge vector is obtained by combining the random number challenge factor, the encryption challenge code, and the domain verification signature.

2. The smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending the authentication challenge vector to the second smart home device and the first smart home device for collaborative verification specifically includes: Select the two first smart home devices with the highest authentication association strength as the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device, respectively. The authentication challenge vector is decrypted by the second smart home device to generate a response vector, and the response vector is sent to the first collaborative authentication device and the second collaborative authentication device; The response vector is decrypted by the first collaborative authentication device to obtain the unique identifier ID of the second smart home device, and the unique identifier ID is verified to be consistent with the device ID pre-written by the second smart home device. The response vector is decrypted by the second collaborative authentication device to obtain the sending time node of the second smart home device, and the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is verified to be within the preset time difference threshold range. The gateway decrypts the response vector to obtain the second hash value of the second smart home device, and verifies whether the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value.

3. The smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network according to claim 2, characterized in that, If the authentication challenge vector passes collaborative verification, the specific steps include: If the unique identifier ID matches the device ID pre-written into the second smart home device; and If the time difference between the sending time node and the current time node is within a preset time difference threshold range; and If the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; Then the authentication challenge vector is determined to have passed collaborative verification.

4. The smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The dynamic key synchronization protocol satisfies the following formula: Among them, the For the second smart home device in the The session key at the specified time; For the second smart home device in the The domain master key at that time; The unique identifier ID of the second smart home device; For key synchronization timestamp; the The number of smart home devices already connected within the aforementioned home network security authentication domain; For the first Each connected device The hash value of the session key at that moment.

5. The smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network according to claim 4, characterized in that, After updating the keys of all smart home devices within the home network security authentication domain according to the preset dynamic key synchronization protocol, the method further includes: When the key version number of the updated key of the smart home device is inconsistent with the pre-stored key version number, a key synchronization request is triggered. In response to the key synchronization request, the security authentication management unit of the gateway re-determines the latest domain master key; Based on the latest domain master key and the MAC address of the smart home device associated with the gateway, a new session key is determined.

6. The smart home security authentication management method based on wireless local area network according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: When any smart home device in the home network security authentication domain is attacked, the attacked smart home device is marked as the target smart home device; Determine the attack feature vector of the target smart home device, encrypt the attack feature vector, and send it to the gateway; The security authentication management unit of the gateway updates the device authentication status matrix of the home network security authentication domain and generates a temporary protection key based on the attack feature vector. The temporary protection key is synchronized to all smart home devices in the home network security authentication domain.

7. A smart home security authentication management system based on wireless local area network, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program for being loaded by the processor and executed as described in any one of claims 1-6, the smart home security authentication management method based on a wireless local area network.

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