Quantum casual transmission method, system and server

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of information security, and discloses a quantum inadvertent transmission method and system and a server. In the invention, a receiver application end receives a first quantum key set and a first selection bit sent by receiver quantum communication equipment; and the receiver application end generates a second selection bit used for selecting the message to be decrypted, determines a third selection bit according to the first selection bit and the second selection bit, and sends the third selection bit to the sender application end, the sender application end selects keys used by messages with different sending sequences from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit, and sends the encrypted messages to the receiver application end in sequence; and the receiver application end performs casual transmission with the sender application end based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit. Through the method, the data output quantity of the QOTD equipment is reduced, the data quantity of the QOT networking security relay is reduced, and the implementation performance of a protocol system is improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security, and in particular to a quantum oblivious transfer method, system and server. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the 1980s, the famous computer scientist and Turing Award winner, Academician Yao Qizhi, proposed the Yao's millionaire problem, which is the beginning of modern secure multi-party computation. The problem is that two millionaires want to compare who has more property without revealing how much property they have. The problem is then generalized to the calculation of any function and multiple participants, known as secure multi-party computation (SMC), that is, for n participants, they want to calculate the overall result of the private input information of the participants without revealing other information about the private input.

[0003] The secure multi-party computation protocol is generally composed of oblivious transfer (OT) and garbled circuit (GC). The oblivious transfer protocol in secure multi-party computation has been considered to rely on the discrete logarithm on the elliptic curve, coding, lattice cryptography and other assumptions for a long time, and cannot be constructed only by relying on one-way function hash function or symmetric encryption. However, recent research shows that in the quantum world, oblivious transfer only needs one-way function to be constructed, and the instantiation of the one-way function in the protocol through the hash function can obtain a naturally quantum-resistant oblivious transfer, which makes the secure multi-party computation using quantum information naturally quantum-resistant. Research on secure multi-party computation / oblivious transfer based on quantum information is not only a topic of cryptography frontier, but also adds a new type of application to the quantum information industry.

[0004] The related QOT protocol currently needs to be completed by the quantum communication device and the host (hereinafter referred to as the host) of the upper secure multi-party computation application program. The inventor finds that at least the following problems exist in the related art: In this implementation, the two hosts need to cooperate to transmit the protocol intermediate data generated in the first stage from the local quantum communication device through the network, and the time consumption of this process greatly affects the performance of QOT. Since the secure multi-party computation application has strict performance requirements for the oblivious transfer function, and the improvement of QOT security requirements will increase the transmission amount of protocol intermediate data. SUMMARY

[0005] The purpose of the embodiments of the present application is to provide a quantum oblivious transfer method, system and server, which reduces the data output of the QOTD device, reduces the data amount of the QOT networking security relay, improves the performance of the protocol system implementation, and meets the functional requirements of the QOT protocol.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the embodiments of the present application provide a quantum involuntary transmission method applied to a receiver application end, comprising: receiving a first quantum key set sent by a receiver quantum communication device, and a first selection bit for selecting a quantum key from the first quantum key set; generating a second selection bit for selecting a message to be decrypted, and determining a third selection bit according to the first selection bit and the second selection bit; sending the third selection bit to a sender application end, so that the sender application end selects an encryption key used for messages in different sending orders from a second quantum key set according to the third selection bit, and sends the encrypted messages in order to the receiver application end; and performing involuntary transmission with the sender application end based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit.

[0007] The embodiments of the present application also provide a quantum involuntary transmission method applied to a sender application end, comprising: receiving a second quantum key set sent by a sender quantum communication device; receiving a third selection bit sent by a receiver application end, and selecting an encryption key used for messages in different sending orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit; and performing involuntary transmission with the receiver application end based on the encrypted messages.

[0008] The embodiments of the present application also provide a quantum involuntary transmission method applied to a receiver quantum communication device, comprising: generating first quantum data, and obtaining a first quantum key set and a first selection bit based on negotiation of a QOT protocol between the receiver quantum communication device and a sender quantum communication device; and sending the first quantum key set and the first selection bit to a receiver application end.

[0009] The embodiments of the present application also provide a quantum involuntary transmission method applied to a sender quantum communication device, comprising: generating second quantum data, and obtaining a second quantum key set based on negotiation of a QOT protocol between the sender quantum communication device and a receiver quantum communication device; and sending the second quantum key set to a sender application end.

[0010] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a quantum unintentional transmission system, comprising: a sending quantum communication device, a sending application terminal, a receiving quantum communication device, and a receiving application terminal; the sending quantum communication device and the receiving quantum communication device are connected by a quantum link formed by optical fiber, and each of the sending quantum communication device, the sending application terminal, the receiving quantum communication device, and the receiving application terminal is connected to each other by a classical link; the sending quantum communication device is used to generate second quantum data, and based on the second quantum data, negotiates the QOT protocol with the receiving quantum communication device to obtain a second quantum key set, and sends the second quantum key set to the sending application terminal; the sending application terminal is used to receive the second quantum key set sent by the sending quantum communication device; receive a third selection bit sent by the receiving application terminal, and select an encryption key for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit; and based on the encrypted message, communicates with the receiving application terminal. The process involves unintentional transmission. The receiving quantum communication device generates first quantum data and, based on this data, negotiates a QOT protocol with the sending quantum communication device to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit. It then sends the first quantum key set and the first selection bit to the receiving application. The receiving application receives the first quantum key set sent by the receiving quantum communication device and a first selection bit for selecting a quantum key from the first quantum key set. It generates a second selection bit for selecting a message to be decrypted and determines a third selection bit based on the first and second selection bits. The third selection bit is sent to the sending application, allowing the sending application to select encryption keys for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit, and then sends the encrypted messages sequentially to the receiving application. Unintentional transmission is also performed between the sending application and the receiving application based on the first and second selection bits.

[0011] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a server, comprising: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the above-described quantum inadvertent transmission method.

[0012] Compared to related technologies, the embodiments of this invention process the intermediate data of the QOT protocol within the sending and receiving quantum communication devices (i.e., QOTD devices). In a network environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement basis and qubits to a relay key set and selection bits. This reduces the amount of relay data, significantly lowers the relay key consumption, improves the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and increases relay efficiency. Furthermore, since the receiving application receives a set of quantum keys but does not know which quantum keys are correct and which are incorrect, by designing a second and third selection bit, the application can select a key based on its selection bit during unintentional transmission, and decrypt messages that it can decrypt based on the selection bit selection, reducing network transmission rounds and computational load. Attached Figure Description

[0013] One or more embodiments are illustrated by way of example with reference numerals in the accompanying drawings. These illustrations do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings are denoted as similar elements. Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings are not to be limited by scale.

[0014] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the connection relationship of a quantum unintentional transmission system provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0015] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a server provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0016] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to a receiving application provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0017] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to the sending application end, provided by another embodiment of the present invention;

[0018] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of a method for unintentional quantum transmission applied to a quantum communication device at the receiving end, provided by another embodiment of the present invention;

[0019] Figure 6 This is a flowchart of a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to a quantum communication device of the sender, provided by another embodiment of the present invention;

[0020] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of a two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method provided in another embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0021] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, those skilled in the art will understand that many technical details are presented in the various embodiments of the present invention to facilitate a better understanding of this application. However, the technical solutions claimed in this application can be implemented even without these technical details and various changes and modifications based on the following embodiments. The division of the various embodiments below is for ease of description and should not constitute any limitation on the specific implementation of the present invention. The various embodiments can be combined with and referenced by each other without contradiction.

[0022] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0023] The current QOT protocol requires both hosts to collaboratively transmit intermediate data generated in the first phase from their local quantum communication devices over a network. This time consumption significantly impacts QOT performance. Furthermore, secure multi-party computation applications have stringent performance requirements for inadvertent transmission capabilities, and the increased security requirements of QOT will increase the amount of intermediate data transmitted. This application provides a quantum inadvertent transmission system, such as… Figure 1 As shown, this quantum unintentional transmission system consists of the following key components: the system includes a sending quantum communication device, a sending application, a receiving quantum communication device, and a receiving application.

[0024] Among them, the sending quantum communication device (1-1) is a quantum unintentional transfer sending hardware device based on discrete variable quantum transmission mode (QOTD-A for short), which is used to execute the quantum information transmission sending end function in the QOT (Quantum Unintentional Transfer) protocol, and is used to generate and provide the qubits and substrate information generated by quantum information transmission, and execute the QOT protocol with 1-2 based on the generated qubits and substrate information to generate a quantum key.

[0025] The receiver quantum communication device (1-2) is a quantum inadvertent transmission receiver hardware device based on discrete variable quantum transmission mode (QOTD-B). It performs the quantum information transmission receiver function in the QOT protocol, which is used to generate qubits and substrate information generated by quantum information transmission, and executes the QOT protocol with 1-1 based on the generated qubits and substrate information to generate quantum keys and selection bits.

[0026] The sending application (2-1) is a software program (QOT-A) that works in collaboration with 2-2 to execute the sending operation in the QOT protocol based on the quantum key provided by 1-1. 2-1 runs on the server.

[0027] The receiver application (2-2) is a software program (QOT-B) that works in conjunction with 2-1 to execute the receiver's operations in the QOT protocol, based on the quantum key and selection bits provided by 1-2. It runs on the server.

[0028] Figure 1 In the diagram, 3 represents a quantum link, which is a channel that uses quantum states as information carriers to transmit information. It is used to provide communication connections between 1-1 and 1-2, and usually appears in the form of bare optical fiber. 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 are all classical links, which are channels that transmit information using classical information transmission methods.

[0029] Specifically, in this example, QOT and QOTD are described as independent components, each used to execute the quantum accidental teleportation method provided in this embodiment (which will be elaborated on in detail later in this document and will not be repeated here). In actual implementation, the two can be implemented as a single unit or equivalently, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Those skilled in the art will readily recognize that the following description is merely exemplary and used to illustrate the principles of the present invention, and does not limit the scope of the invention. Those skilled in the art can make various combinations, modifications, and equivalent substitutions to the above embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

[0030] Based on this, the sending quantum communication device and the receiving quantum communication device are connected by a quantum link formed by optical fiber. Each pair of the sending quantum communication device, the sending application, the receiving quantum communication device, and the receiving application is connected by a classical link. The sending quantum communication device generates second quantum data, negotiates the QOT protocol with the receiving quantum communication device based on the second quantum data to obtain a second quantum key set, and sends the second quantum key set to the sending application. The sending application receives the second quantum key set sent by the sending quantum communication device; receives a third selection bit sent by the receiving application, and selects an encryption key for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit; and inadvertently transmits the encrypted message to the receiving application. The receiving quantum communication device generates first quantum data. Based on the first quantum data, the sending quantum communication device negotiates the QOT protocol to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit; the first quantum key set and the first selection bit are sent to the receiving application; the receiving application receives the first quantum key set sent by the receiving quantum communication device, and the first selection bit is used to select a quantum key from the first quantum key set; a second selection bit is generated for selecting a message to be decrypted, and a third selection bit is determined based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit; the third selection bit is sent to the sending application, so that the sending application can select the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit, and send the encrypted messages sequentially to the receiving application; and an unintentional transmission is performed between the sending application and the first selection bit and the second selection bit.

[0031] Servers used to perform quantum accidental teleportation methods, such as Figure 2 As shown, it includes: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to execute the quantum accidental teleportation method provided in the embodiments of this application (which will be described in detail later in this document and will not be repeated here).

[0032] The memory and processor are connected via a bus, which can include any number of interconnecting buses and bridges, connecting various circuits of one or more processors and the memory. The bus can also connect various other circuits, such as peripheral devices, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and therefore will not be described further herein. The bus interface provides an interface between the bus and the transceiver. The transceiver can be a single element or multiple elements, such as multiple receivers and transmitters, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices over a transmission medium. Data processed by the processor is transmitted over the wireless medium via an antenna, which also receives and transmits data to the processor. The processor manages the bus and general processing, and can also provide various functions, including timing, peripheral interface, voltage regulation, power management, and other control functions. The memory can be used to store data used by the processor during operation.

[0033] Through the above-described method described in this application, a quantum inadvertent transmission system and server for executing the quantum inadvertent transmission method are constructed. Based on this system or device, quantum inadvertent transmission methods can be implemented. This method enables the processing of intermediate data of the QOT protocol within the QOTD device. In a network environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement substrate and qubits to the relay key set and selection bits. The amount of relay data is reduced, greatly reducing the relay key consumption, improving the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and increasing relay efficiency.

[0034] In the aforementioned hardware and software operating environment, the two hosts of the current QOT protocol need to collaboratively transmit the intermediate protocol data generated in the first stage from their local quantum communication devices over the network. The time consumed in this process significantly impacts QOT performance. Due to the stringent performance requirements of secure multi-party computation applications for inadvertent transmission functionality, and the increased security requirements of QOT leading to higher transmission volumes of intermediate protocol data, this application provides quantum inadvertent transmission methods, including but not limited to polarization-based discrete variable QOT protocols, time-phase-based discrete variable QOT protocols, continuous variable Gaussian modulation compressed state QOT protocols, continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state QOT protocols, and continuous variable discrete modulation coherent state QOT protocols, supporting inadvertent transmission of any n-choose-k (k < n). To facilitate understanding of the quantum inadvertent transmission method provided in this application, we will use a 2-choose-1 inadvertent transmission as an example, and explain the implementation process of the method in detail with reference to various embodiments.

[0035] Taking a 2-to-1 quantum unintentional transmission method as an example, one embodiment of this application provides a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to the receiving application end, such as... Figure 3 As shown. This method of unintentional quantum teleportation includes the following steps.

[0036] Step 301: The receiving application receives a first set of quantum keys sent by the receiving quantum communication device, and a first selection bit for selecting a quantum key from the first set of quantum keys.

[0037] Step 302: The receiving application generates a second selection bit for selecting the message to be decrypted, and determines a third selection bit based on the first and second selection bits; the third selection bit is sent to the sending application, so that the sending application can select the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit, and send the encrypted messages sequentially to the receiving application.

[0038] Step 303: The receiving application performs an unintentional transmission with the sending application based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit.

[0039] By employing the method described above in this application, the intermediate data processing of the QOT protocol is completed within the sending and receiving quantum communication devices (i.e., QOTD devices). In a network environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement basis and qubits to a relay key set and selection bits. This reduces the amount of relay data, significantly lowers the relay key consumption, improves the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and enhances relay efficiency. Furthermore, since the receiving application receives a set of quantum keys but does not know which quantum keys are correct and which are incorrect, a derandomization method is designed as described in steps 302 and 303. By designing a second and third selection bit, the application can select a key based on its selection bit during unintentional transmission, and decrypt messages that it can decrypt based on the selection bit selection, reducing network transmission rounds and computational load.

[0040] In some embodiments, determining the third selection bit based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit can be implemented as follows: performing an XOR operation on the first selection bit and the second selection bit, and using the XOR result as the third selection bit.

[0041] In some embodiments, this embodiment is a 2-to-1 quantum unintentional transmission method, therefore the first quantum key set includes two quantum keys, wherein both quantum keys are generated by the receiving quantum communication device based on quantum data.

[0042] Taking the two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method as an example, another embodiment of this application provides a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to the sending application, such as... Figure 4 The quantum unintentional transmission method shown includes the following steps.

[0043] Step 401: The sending application receives the second set of quantum keys sent by the sending quantum communication device.

[0044] Step 402: The sending application receives the third selection bit sent by the receiving application, and selects the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit.

[0045] Step 403: The sending application transmits the encrypted message unintentionally to the receiving application.

[0046] Through the above steps, the intermediate data of the QOT protocol is processed within both the sending and receiving quantum communication devices (i.e., QOTD devices). In a networked environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement substrate and qubits to a relay key set. This reduces the amount of relay data, significantly lowers the relay key consumption, improves the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and enhances relay efficiency. The sending application selects a key from the key set using a third selection bit and encrypts and sends messages in the corresponding order, achieving unintended transmission while reducing the computational load on the receiving application.

[0047] For step 401, this embodiment implements a two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method, therefore the second quantum key set includes a third quantum key and a fourth quantum key.

[0048] For step 402, selecting the encryption key used for messages with different transmission orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit can be achieved as follows: selecting a quantum key for encrypting messages with the first transmission order from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit; performing an XOR operation between the third selection bit and a preset value to obtain a fourth selection bit; and selecting a quantum key for encrypting messages with the second transmission order from the second quantum key set according to the fourth selection bit.

[0049] Taking the two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method as an example, another embodiment of this application provides a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to a receiver's quantum communication device, such as... Figure 5 The quantum accidental teleportation method shown includes the following steps:

[0050] Step 501: The receiving quantum communication device generates first quantum data, and negotiates the QOT protocol with the sending quantum communication device based on the first quantum data to obtain the first quantum key set and the first selection bit.

[0051] Step 502: The receiving quantum communication device sends the first quantum key set and the first selected bit to the receiving application.

[0052] In this way, the intermediate data of the QOT protocol is processed within the quantum communication devices of the sender and receiver (i.e., QOTD devices). In a network environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement substrate and qubits to the relay quantum key set. The amount of relay data is reduced, which greatly reduces the relay key consumption, improves the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and improves relay efficiency.

[0053] In step 501, the first quantum data includes at least a first qubit and a first measurement substrate. Based on the first quantum data, negotiation of the QOT protocol is performed with the sending quantum communication device to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit. This can be achieved as follows: the receiving quantum communication device receives the second quantum data sent by the sending quantum communication device and generates the first selection bit; the receiving quantum communication device divides the second quantum data into several data sets based on the first selection bit and sends the division method to the sending quantum communication device; the receiving quantum communication device performs sequential error correction processing on the several data sets to obtain several quantum keys, and generates the first quantum key set based on the several quantum keys.

[0054] Taking the two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method as an example, another embodiment of this application provides a quantum unintentional transmission method applied to a quantum communication device at the sending end, such as... Figure 6 The flowchart shown includes the following steps.

[0055] Step 601: The sending quantum communication device generates second quantum data, and negotiates the QOT protocol with the receiving quantum communication device based on the second quantum data to obtain a second quantum key set;

[0056] Step 602: The sending quantum communication device sends the second set of quantum keys to the sending application.

[0057] Through the above steps, the intermediate data of the QOT protocol is processed within both the sending and receiving quantum communication devices (i.e., QOTD devices), thereby generating several quantum keys and ultimately obtaining a quantum key set. In subsequent data relay processes, the relay data is changed from the original measurement basis and qubits to the relay quantum key set. This reduces the amount of relay data, significantly decreasing the relay key consumption, improving the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and increasing relay efficiency.

[0058] Please see Figure 7 , Figure 7This application provides a specific implementation process for a two-choice quantum unintentional transmission method, as another embodiment of the present application. The first part of this specific implementation process, namely "Step 1" to "Step 7" in the figure, corresponds to the QOT protocol negotiation process performed by the sending quantum communication device and the receiving quantum communication device in the above embodiments. For ease of understanding, the following will be combined with... Figure 7 The content shown details the specific implementation of steps 1 to 7 in Part 1.

[0059] like Figure 7 In step 1, the sending quantum communication device (1-1) and the receiving quantum communication device (1-2) use a certain quantum communication method to generate the qubit values ​​and basis values ​​on both sides respectively, denoted as x←{0,1} in step 1-1. n θ←{0,1} n Let 1-2 be denoted as x′←{0,1} n θ′←{0,1} n The qubit value and the basis value are continuously generated during the quantum communication process. Here, x determines the quantum state of the transmitted qubit, and θ determines the chosen measurement basis.

[0060] The above process is the starting point for the physical layer interaction of the QOT protocol. Its core is to generate qubit values ​​and measurement basis values ​​through quantum communication devices 1-1 (QOTD-A) and 1-2 (QOTD-B) respectively, providing raw quantum information for subsequent key negotiation and secure computation. The specific implementation of step 1 is as follows.

[0061] In network scenarios, relay communication requires a continuous supply of quantum resources. A continuous generation mechanism can maximize the coding capabilities of QOTD devices. Therefore, Alice's quantum communication device 1-1 and Bob's quantum communication device 1-2 continuously generate qubits and a measurement substrate through quantum communication processes (such as polarization encoding and time-phase encoding). The qubits in 1-1 are denoted as x←{0,1}. n In 1-2, let x′←{0,1} n The measurement baseline is denoted as θ←{0,1}, where θ is the base of measurement. n In 1-2, it is denoted as θ′←{0,1} n .

[0062] In this context, a qubit is the fundamental unit of quantum information, which can exist in a state of |0>, |1>, or a superposition of both. Here, x and x′ are the classical binary results (0 or 1) of the quantum state after measurement, and their generation process depends on the physical mechanism of the quantum communication device (such as laser polarization state preparation, phase modulation, etc.). x←{0,1} nThis means that 1-1 generates a binary random sequence of length n, where each bit is randomly determined by quantum state measurement, ensuring the randomness and unpredictability of the data, which is the foundation of the security of quantum communication.

[0063] In this context, the substrate is the reference frame for quantum measurement. Different substrates correspond to different measurement methods (e.g., in polarized quantum communication, substrates can be divided into linear and diagonal bases). θ and θ′ represent the measurement substrate sequences chosen by 1-1 and 1-2 respectively, with each element (0 or 1) corresponding to a substrate type. Only when the sender and receiver use the same substrate to measure the quantum state can the obtained qubit values ​​be consistent.

[0064] like Figure 7 In step 2 of this embodiment, 1-1 and 1-2 negotiate to select a portion of the data bits from a segment of qubit values ​​and a base value, perform bit error rate calculation, and check whether this segment of qubit values ​​and a base value is safe and usable. If the bit error rate is greater than a certain threshold, this segment of qubit values ​​and a base value is discarded. If the bit error rate is less than the threshold, the selected portion of the data bits is discarded, and the remaining qubit values ​​and base values ​​are reserved for use in subsequent stages.

[0065] The above process is a crucial step in the QOT protocol to ensure the security of the quantum channel. Its core is to determine the security of the qubits and the substrate data through bit error rate calculation, and then filter valid data accordingly. The specific operational logic is as follows:

[0066] Steps 1-1 and 1-2 negotiate via a classical link, selecting a subset of data bits from the qubit values ​​(x, x′) and basis values ​​(θ, θ′) generated in step 1. The bit error rate (BER) of the qubit values ​​is calculated by comparing the selected data bits. If the BER > a threshold, all qubit values ​​and basis values ​​in this subset are discarded, and step 1 is repeated. If the BER ≤ a threshold, the selected data bits are discarded, and the remaining data is retained for subsequent steps.

[0067] In such Figure 7As shown in step 2, the Bit Error Rate (BER) reflects the probability of errors in data transmission in a quantum channel. Under normal circumstances, quantum channels have inherent noise (such as fiber loss and environmental interference), leading to a small number of bit errors. If the BER increases abnormally, it may be due to eavesdroppers introducing interference by measuring quantum states (such as Eve's intercept-retransmission attack). Real-time monitoring of channel security through BER detection as shown in step 2 is one of the core mechanisms of "eavesdropping detection" in quantum key distribution (QKD). The threshold setting is based on the security model of the quantum communication protocol, essentially balancing the risks of "missed eavesdropping" and "incorrectly discarded normal data." If the threshold is too high, interference introduced by eavesdroppers may be tolerated, leading to insecure key generation; if the threshold is too low, a large amount of normal data may be incorrectly discarded due to environmental noise, reducing protocol efficiency. Performing BER detection on all data would consume significant computational resources and communication bandwidth, and the selected data bits themselves might leak information. Therefore, selecting only a subset of data (e.g., 10%) for testing allows for the statistical inference of the overall data security while reducing resource consumption and the risk of information leakage.

[0068] In step 2, the data selection negotiation process can be as follows: 1-1 and 1-2 randomly select a set of index values ​​{i1,i2,…,i...} through the classic link. m}, where m << n, and x ← {0, 1} generated in step 1. n θ←{0,1} n x′←{0,1} n θ′←{0,1} n The i1 to i m Bit data. The negotiation process must ensure randomness to prevent attackers from predicting the selected location; this is typically achieved through a random number generation algorithm agreed upon by both parties.

[0069] In step 2, the bit error rate can be calculated as follows: for the selected m data bits, compare x{i j} and x′{i j If the number of inconsistent bits is e, then the bit error rate (BER) is calculated as e / m, where (j = 1, 2, 3, ..., m). If the BER is greater than a certain threshold, assuming there are many errors introduced by eavesdropping in the overall data, all n bits of data are discarded to prevent insecure keys from entering subsequent processes. If the BER is less than the threshold, assuming the selected m bits of data are exposed due to detection, these m bits are discarded, and the remaining nm bits of data are considered not to have been obtained by eavesdroppers and can be retained for key negotiation.

[0070] In this way, by detecting the bit error rate, data is ensured to be used only when the channel security requirements are met, eliminating the risk of eavesdropping at the physical layer, which is in line with the "security based on physical principles" characteristic of quantum communication. The design of discarding the detected data bits prevents attackers from inferring the characteristics of the remaining data by analyzing the detected data. Partial detection instead of full detection reduces the amount of data in classical communication and improves the efficiency of protocol execution. When the bit error rate meets the standard, these m bits are discarded and nm bits of data are retained, maximizing the use of the original data generated by quantum communication and achieving the inventive purpose of reducing the amount of data output in the embodiments of this application.

[0071] Please see Figure 7 ,like Figure 7 In step 3, 1-1, obtain x←{0,1} of length 4N. n θ←{0,1} n 1-2 Obtain the x′←{0,1} of length 4N. n θ′←{0,1} n .

[0072] Step 3 in this embodiment is the transition link from the original quantum data to key negotiation in the QOT protocol. Its core is to extend the length of the qubits and base data after screening in step 2 to 4N, providing sufficient data redundancy for subsequent security verification and key extraction. The specific operation is as follows.

[0073] Step 1-1 (QOTD-A) acquires a 4N-length qubit value x and a basis value θ; Step 1-2 (QOTD-B) simultaneously acquires a 4N-length qubit value x′ and a basis value θ′, corresponding one-to-one with the data in Step 1-1. Here, N is the base unit for the target key length. The lengths of the qubit value and the basis value can be set according to specific implementation needs, but must be sufficient for subsequent steps, including sampling and error correction, and ensure that a sufficiently long secure key (e.g., 512 bits) is generated to meet cryptographic strength requirements.

[0074] Please see Figure 7 ,like Figure 7 In step 4 of the above, in this embodiment, 1-2 makes a commitment to all x′ and θ′, and 1-2 sends... Where r i These are random numbers, and Com(·) is the commitment function. Step 1-1 randomly selects 2N data points for sampling. Step 1-2 sends the sampled x′, θ′, r, and Step 1-1 performs statistical judgment on the sampling. The correctness of the qubits in the sampled data must be no less than a certain threshold. If the sampling passes, the sampled data is discarded, and the protocol continues; otherwise, the protocol terminates, and all data is discarded.

[0075] Step 4 is a crucial step in the QOT protocol to ensure data authenticity. It verifies the legitimacy of the qubit value x′ and the basis value θ′ generated by step 1-2 (QOTD-B) through a cryptographic commitment function and a random sampling mechanism. The specific operational logic includes: commitment generation phase, random sampling, correctness verification, and a decision-making mechanism. In the commitment generation phase, step 1-2 generates commitment values ​​for all 4N bits of data (x′, θ′). Where r i It is a random number, and Com is the commitment function; in the random sampling, 1-1 randomly selects 2N bits from 4N bits, and requires 1-2 to disclose these 2N bits. Next, 1-1 according to the publicly available Recalculate the commitment value, and compare it with the c sent in 1-2. i In comparison, statistical qubit x′ i The correctness of the data is then checked. Finally, if the number of correct bits is greater than or equal to the threshold: discard the sampled 2N bits, and proceed to the next step with the remaining 2N bits; if the number of correct bits is less than the threshold: terminate the protocol and discard all data.

[0076] For step 4, sampling 2N bits (50% of 4N) can be set as needed. In this embodiment, if the overall error rate is p, the number of errors e in the sampled 2N bits follows a binomial distribution B(2N,p). When e exceeds the threshold, it can be inferred with high probability that the overall data is abnormal (such as being tampered with or eavesdropped on). Furthermore, sampling 2N bits (50% of 4N) reduces the amount of data required for classic communication (only 2N bits need to be transmitted). After the sample passes the inspection, the sampled data is discarded to avoid duplicate processing, and the remaining 2N bits of data are just enough to meet the subsequent grouping and error correction requirements.

[0077] In summary, step 4 verifies the authenticity of data during the classical negotiation phase of quantum communication through cryptographic commitment and random sampling. It utilizes the mathematical properties of the commitment function to prevent malicious tampering and balances security and efficiency through statistical sampling.

[0078] Please continue reading. Figure 7 ,like Figure 7 In step 5, 1-1, send all the remaining θ; 1-2, randomly select a b1∈{0,1} and divide all sets into "good" and "bad". And send grouping information I0, I1. 1-1 to group the data.

[0079] Step 5 is a crucial transitional step in the QOT protocol from raw quantum data to key space construction. Its core is to divide the data into two sets: "basis-consistent" and "basis-inconsistent," by comparing the basis values ​​(θ and θ′) of 1-1 and 1-2, providing a logical foundation for subsequent error correction and key generation. This can be implemented in the following way.

[0080] First, 1-1 sends all remaining basis values ​​θ after the sampling in step 4 to 1-2; correspondingly, 1-2 randomly selects a bit b1 ∈ {0,1} as the identifier bit for the block logic. Then, 1-2 divides the data into two sets based on the basis values ​​θ, the first set I... b Represented as In this set, the data bits with a consistent basis have a qubit value x. i With x′ i Consistent; Second set I 1-b Represented as In this set, the data bits with inconsistent basis have a qubit value x. i With x′ i Inconsistent. Finally, in 1-2 seconds, the group index I will be grouped. b and I 1-b Send to 1-1, and both parties complete data grouping based on the same logic.

[0081] In quantum communication, when the sending quantum communication device (1-1) and the receiving quantum communication device (1-2) use the same substrate to measure the quantum state, the obtained qubit value x is... i With x′ i The probability of consistency is relatively high (approximately 50% in the BB84 protocol, after excluding noise); if the basis is different, x i With x′ i The consistency is close to random (50%), therefore, the set I is partitioned by comparing the basis values ​​(θ and θ′) of 1-1 and 1-2. b It can be viewed as a "potential consistent key space", set I 1-b This can be viewed as a "potentially inconsistent key space," providing a target set for subsequent error correction. The randomness of choosing bit b1 ensures the unpredictability of the block logic, preventing attackers from inferring the basis selection patterns of both parties by observing the block results. The randomness of choosing bit b1 can be guaranteed by a true random number generator (such as a quantum random source).

[0082] In this way, by using basis comparison and random grouping mechanisms, the raw data generated by quantum communication is divided into a "consistent key space" and a "dissimilar key space," providing an efficient logical framework for subsequent error correction and key generation. Its design utilizes the physical principle in quantum mechanics that "basis consistency determines bit consistency," and also enhances security through cryptographic randomization.

[0083] Please continue reading. Figure 7 ,exist Figure 7In step 6, 1-1 and 1-2 perform error correction on the grouped data according to a certain error correction method, resulting in one set of completely identical qubits and another set of inconsistent qubits. The above process is a key step in the QOT protocol to eliminate the influence of quantum channel noise and generate a consistent key. Its core is to perform error correction on the "good" set (baseline consistent data) after grouping in step 5, ensuring that both parties obtain a completely identical set of qubits, while retaining the "bad" set (baseline inconsistent data) as the basis for the inconsistent key.

[0084] Specifically, step 6 involves the set I with consistent basis in step 5. b Error correction is performed on the data bits within (due to the inconsistent basis of set I). 1-b (Naturally, there are many inconsistencies, so no error correction is needed); through a collaborative error correction algorithm, the 1-1 qubit value x is made... i x′ with 1-2 i In set I b The data is completely consistent. Through the above process, a set of completely consistent qubits is obtained. By precisely correcting the errors in the basis-consistent data, errors caused by quantum channel noise are eliminated, generating a set of completely consistent qubits, providing a reliable foundation for subsequent key generation.

[0085] 1-1 (sender) and 1-2 (receiver) perform a privacy amplification algorithm on the two sets of qubits (consistent and inconsistent sets) after error correction in step 6. By compressing the data length (from the original quantum data length to the target length), they eliminate residual information that an eavesdropper might possess, ensuring the information-theoretic security of the final key (even if an attacker has partial data, they cannot deduce the key). Then, 1-1 outputs X of the target length (e.g., 512 bits, i.e., the aforementioned length N). b and X 1-b (The compression results corresponding to the two sets of qubits) are used to generate a key set, and outputs 1-2 are of the same length X′. b and X′ 1-b And select bit b1 (b1 is the block identifier randomly selected in step 5, used for subsequent key selection). Where X b =X′ b And X 1-b ≠X′ 1-b This ensures that the compressed key X of the "base consensus set" is b Both are exactly the same.

[0086] Steps 1 to 7 above pertain to the processing of intermediate data in the QOT protocol within the QOTD device. This process generates a secure key from a quantum state, providing fundamental resources for upper-layer software protocols (such as unintended transmissions). In a real-world networking environment, the relay data is changed from the original measurement substrate and qubits to a relay key set and selection bits. This reduces the amount of relay data, significantly lowers relay key consumption, improves the utilization rate of QKD network key resources, and enhances relay efficiency.

[0087] Please continue reading. Figure 7 , Figure 7 The second part of the specific implementation process of the quantum unintentional transmission method shown in the figure, namely steps 8 to 9, corresponds to the process of unintentional transmission between the sending and receiving application ends. For ease of understanding, the following will combine... Figure 7 The content shown details the specific implementation of steps 8 to 9 in Part 1.

[0088] Please see Figure 7 ,pass Figure 7 Step 8 in the text explains how to determine the third selection bit based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit, and how to do so through... Figure 7 Step 9 in the document explains how two application endpoints can transmit data inadvertently based on quantum keys and selected bits.

[0089] In step 7, 2-2 (the receiving application, i.e., QOT-B) obtains X′0, X′1, and b1 from 1-2 (QOTD-B), and selects v2∈{0,1} to calculate... And send b to 2-1 (the sending application, i.e., QOT-A). 2-1 obtains X0 and X1 from 1-1 (QOTD-A). and,

[0090] Specifically, step 2-2 obtains X′0, X′1, and b1 from step 1-2. X′0 and X′1 are the quantum key pairs after privacy amplification in step 7 (short keys compressed from basis-consistent and basis-inconsistent sets, which are core security resources for quantum communication). b1 is an identifier bit randomly generated by the quantum layer in step 5 for grouping (marking which key group is "basis-consistent" for subsequent matching). Step 2-2 locally generates a selection bit b2, where b2 ∈ {0, 1}; this is achieved through an XOR operation. The first selection bit b1 and the second selection bit b2 are combined to obtain the third selection bit b, which is then sent to 2-1 (i.e., QOT-A). The X0 and X1 obtained by 2-1 from its own underlying quantum channel module (1-1) satisfy the conditions of QOT-B. That is, the base consensus key is exactly the same for both parties.

[0091] Step 8 ensures that QOT-A and QOT-B receive a perfectly matched key pair, guaranteeing that during subsequent unintentional transmissions, both parties maintain consistent keys where necessary and different keys where necessary, thus strengthening security at the hardware level. The third selection bit derandomizes the data, allowing the receiving application to choose the target quantum key to decrypt its desired message.

[0092] Please continue reading. Figure 7 ,like Figure 7 In step 9, 2-1, messages m0 and m1 are calculated as follows: Then M0 and M1 are sent sequentially to 2-2. 2-2 receives M0 and M1 and calculates the required message.

[0093] Specifically, after steps 1 to 8 in the preceding text completed the quantum layer key generation and inter-device synchronization (such as the key and selection bit interaction of QOT-A / B), step 9 focuses on the application layer using quantum keys to complete "inadvertent transmission". The following will be divided into "derivation of the conventional process" and "scenario-based explanation combining roles (QOT-A and QOT-B)".

[0094] Typically, step 9 of quantum unintentional transmission involves the application layer completing the unintentional transmission based on the keys (such as X0 and X1) synchronized with the quantum layer and the selection bits. Specifically, steps 2-1 and 2-2 select the target quantum key from the pre-shared quantum key set based on the selection bits, and encrypt the message corresponding to the quantum key based on the selected quantum key.

[0095] In this embodiment, 2-1 uses selected bits to determine the quantum key X. b and Then encrypt the corresponding m0 and m1, and output the encrypted messages M0 and M1 to 2-2. Among them, For the XOR operation, in step 9, the quantum key X b and As a quantum-secure key (generated by a quantum channel and possessing information-theoretic security), it is used to encrypt messages, ensuring that the receiver can decrypt the message using the quantum key. The third selection bit is XORed with the preset value, and 1 is an optional preset value.

[0096] Here is a selection of the corresponding values ​​for the first selection bit b1, the second selection bit b2, and the third selection bit b, as shown in Table 1 below.

[0097]

[0098] In this embodiment, step 9 combines the quantum key with an XOR operation to transfer the quantum key X of the quantum layer. b and This translates into an unobtrusive transmission capability at the application layer, achieving "message privacy protection based on physical principles." Its design utilizes both the unconditional security of quantum keys and the cryptographic properties of XOR operations to ensure selection privacy, thus achieving the invention's objective of "reducing data output and improving protocol performance."

[0099] Those skilled in the art will understand that the above embodiments are specific examples of implementing the present invention, and in practical applications, various changes in form and detail may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for unintentional quantum teleportation, characterized in that, Applied to the receiving application, the method includes: Receive a first set of quantum keys sent by a receiving quantum communication device, and a first selection bit for selecting a quantum key from the first set of quantum keys; A second selection bit is generated for selecting the message to be decrypted, and a third selection bit is determined based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit; the third selection bit is sent to the sending application, so that the sending application can select the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit, and send the encrypted messages sequentially to the receiving application. Based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit, the data is transmitted unintentionally to the sending application.

2. The quantum unintentional transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the third selection bit based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit includes: Perform an XOR operation between the first selection bit and the second selection bit, and use the XOR result as the third selection bit.

3. The quantum unintentional transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first quantum key set includes a first quantum key and a second quantum key; wherein, The first quantum key and the second quantum key are generated by the receiver's quantum communication device based on quantum data.

4. A method for unintentional quantum teleportation, characterized in that, Applied to the sending application, the method includes: Receive the second set of quantum keys sent by the sender's quantum communication device; Receive the third selection bit sent by the receiving application, and select the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit; The encrypted message is transmitted unintentionally to the receiving application.

5. The quantum unintentional transmission method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The encryption key used to select messages with different transmission orders from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit includes: A quantum key for encrypting the message in the first transmission order is selected from the second quantum key set according to the third selection bit; The third selection bit is XORed with a preset value to obtain the fourth selection bit; a quantum key for encrypting the second transmission sequence message is selected from the second quantum key set based on the fourth selection bit.

6. A method for unintentional quantum teleportation, characterized in that, Applications in receiver-side quantum communication devices include: Generate first quantum data, and based on the first quantum data, perform QOT protocol negotiation with the sending quantum communication device to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit; The first quantum key set and the first selected bit are sent to the receiving application.

7. The quantum unintentional transmission method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The first quantum data includes at least a first qubit and a first measurement substrate; Based on the first quantum data, the QOT protocol is negotiated with the sending quantum communication device to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit, including: Receive the second quantum data sent by the sending quantum communication device and generate the first selection bit; Based on the first selected bit, several data sets are obtained by dividing the second quantum data, and the division method is sent to the sending quantum communication device. The plurality of data sets are sequentially error-corrected to obtain a plurality of quantum keys, and the first quantum key set is generated based on the plurality of quantum keys.

8. A method for unintentional quantum teleportation, characterized in that, Applications in quantum communication devices for the transmitter include: Generate second quantum data, and based on the second quantum data, perform QOT protocol negotiation with the receiving quantum communication device to obtain a second quantum key set; The second set of quantum keys is sent to the sending application.

9. A quantum unintentional transmission system, characterized in that, include: The sending quantum communication device, the sending application, the receiving quantum communication device, and the receiving application; The sending quantum communication device and the receiving quantum communication device are connected by a quantum link formed by optical fiber, and the sending quantum communication device, the sending application terminal, the receiving quantum communication device and the receiving application terminal are connected to each other by classical links; The sending quantum communication device is used to generate second quantum data, and based on the second quantum data, to perform QOT protocol negotiation with the receiving quantum communication device to obtain a second quantum key set, and to send the second quantum key set to the sending application terminal; The sending application is used to receive a second set of quantum keys sent by the sending quantum communication device; receive a third selection bit sent by the receiving application, and select an encryption key for messages with different sending orders from the second set of quantum keys based on the third selection bit; and inadvertently transmit the encrypted message to the receiving application. The receiving quantum communication device is used to generate first quantum data, and based on the first quantum data, to perform QOT protocol negotiation with the sending quantum communication device to obtain a first quantum key set and a first selection bit; and to send the first quantum key set and the first selection bit to the receiving application. The receiving application is used to receive the first set of quantum keys sent by the receiving quantum communication device, and the first selection bit for selecting a quantum key from the first set of quantum keys; A second selection bit is generated for selecting the message to be decrypted, and a third selection bit is determined based on the first selection bit and the second selection bit; the third selection bit is sent to the sending application, so that the sending application can select the encryption key used for messages with different sending orders from the second quantum key set based on the third selection bit, and send the encrypted messages sequentially to the receiving application; and an unintentional transmission is performed between the sending application and the first selection bit and the second selection bit.

10. A server, characterized in that, include: At least one processor; as well as, A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the quantum accidental transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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