Operation risk analysis and evaluation method for full-balance vertical ship lift

Abstract

The invention discloses a full-balance vertical ship lift operation risk analysis and evaluation method, which comprises the following steps: dividing the operation process of a ship lift into flow class nodes and equipment class nodes, identifying flow operation deviation aiming at the operation steps of the flow class nodes, and identifying equipment operation deviation based on the operation parameters of the equipment class nodes. The credible reasons are analyzed, and the original risk level of each risk scene is determined based on a predefined risk evaluation matrix according to the occurrence possibility of the reasons and the severity of the final consequence; and finally, a risk scene list is output, comprehensive identification and reasonable grading of the ship lift operation risk are realized through a systematic and structured analysis method, and the efficiency and effect of ship lift operation risk management are effectively improved. Semi-quantitative evaluation is carried out on scenes with high risks and above in the risk scene list, risks are quantified, the difference between the risks and tolerable standards is calculated, and the reliability requirement of existing protection measures or the requirement for adding additional protection measures is put forward.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of water conservancy and hydropower technology, and more specifically, to a method for risk analysis and assessment of fully balanced vertical ship lift operation. Background Technology

[0002] Ship lifts, as large-scale and complex electromechanical-hydraulic integrated projects, combine enormous lifting heights, heavy ship-carrying chambers, intricate mechanical transmission and synchronization systems, and sophisticated control systems. During operation, personnel face numerous potential dangers, including mechanical crushing / shearing, falls from heights, electrical injuries, and drowning, posing a severe challenge to life safety. Furthermore, the ship lift's structure and equipment are extremely expensive; any major malfunction or structural damage could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in economic losses and could lead to the disruption of water transport logistics, causing widespread supply chain disruptions and social impacts. In addition, accidents could pollute downstream waterways or trigger secondary disasters. Therefore, systematic risk analysis and assessment are fundamental to ensuring safety, preventing accidents, maintaining navigational capacity, and fulfilling social responsibility, and must be conducted throughout the entire lifecycle of the ship lift, from design and manufacturing to installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and even decommissioning.

[0003] However, risk management of fully balanced vertical ship lifts still faces significant challenges in the current technology. Firstly, due to the numerous mechanisms and complex control processes of this type of equipment, and its non-standardized nature, the optimization, improvement, and upgrade process is relatively slow. Furthermore, the limited number of available engineering examples and insufficient accumulated operational management experience lead to a large number of unidentified potential risks. These hidden risks have become major hazards threatening the safe and stable operation of ship lifts; once triggered, they can easily lead to serious casualties, huge direct and indirect economic losses, and adverse social impacts. Currently, there is a lack of a systematic risk analysis method specifically tailored to the operational characteristics of fully balanced vertical ship lifts, making it difficult to comprehensively and systematically identify various risk factors during operation and form a clear list of risk scenarios. This results in a lack of targeted risk management, and the efficiency and effectiveness need to be improved.

[0004] Secondly, existing technologies lack clear assessment methods for determining whether identified risks are under control. Insufficient or ineffective protective measures can escalate controllable risks into serious safety incidents. Furthermore, current maintenance strategies often adopt a "one-size-fits-all" approach to various protective measures, leading to high operating costs and failing to differentiate and prioritize protective measures crucial for risk control. Currently, there is a lack of a quantitative risk assessment method applicable to fully balanced vertical ship lifts. This makes it difficult to accurately assess the specific risk levels of various scenarios under existing protective measures, identify scenarios that fail to meet risk tolerance requirements, and thus provide a scientific basis for targeted improvements and optimizations of protective measures. This hinders further improvements in the inherent safety level of ship lifts and the achievement of controllable operational risks.

[0005] Therefore, there is an urgent need to propose a risk analysis and assessment method specifically applicable to the operating characteristics of fully balanced vertical ship lifts in order to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings of existing technologies. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this application is to overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies and provide a method for analyzing and assessing the operational risks of a fully balanced vertical ship lift. Through a systematic and structured analysis method, it achieves comprehensive identification and reasonable classification of ship lift operational risks, effectively improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ship lift operational risk management. At the same time, by quantitatively assessing the frequency of risk consequences, it can clarify the risk level of each scenario. For those that do not meet the risk tolerance standard, it can improve the reliability of existing protection measures or add additional protection measures to further improve the intrinsic safety level of the ship lift and achieve the goal of controllable ship lift operational risks.

[0007] The objective of this application is achieved through the following technical solution: Firstly, this application proposes a method for risk analysis and assessment of fully balanced vertical ship lift operations, including: The operation of the ship lift is divided into process nodes and equipment nodes; Process operation deviations are identified based on the operation steps of process nodes, and equipment operation deviations are identified based on the operating parameters of equipment nodes. For the identified deviations, analyze all plausible causes and their ultimate consequences; Based on a predefined risk assessment matrix, the original risk level of each risk scenario is determined according to the probability of occurrence of credible causes and the severity level of the final consequences. The output contains a list of all risk scenarios and their corresponding original risk levels.

[0008] In one possible implementation, process nodes include navigation process, uplink process, downlink process, and suspension process; Equipment nodes include ship-carrying chamber equipment and lock head equipment.

[0009] In one possible implementation, the steps of identifying process operation deviations based on the operation steps of process-type nodes and identifying equipment operation deviations based on the operating parameters of equipment-type nodes include: Deviations in process execution are identified by combining operational steps with a first set of preset guiding words, which include words related to the timing or status of operations. The system identifies equipment operational deviations by combining operating parameters with a second set of preset prompts, which includes words related to the magnitude of the parameter values.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the risk assessment matrix obtains a risk level value by multiplying the probability level value by the severity level value, and then classifies the risk according to the risk level value.

[0011] In one possible implementation, the severity of the final consequences is assessed from at least one of personal injury, economic loss, environmental impact, and reputational impact.

[0012] In one possible implementation, after outputting a list of risk scenarios containing all risk scenarios and their corresponding original risk levels, the method further includes: Select risk scenarios from the risk scenario list whose original risk level reaches a predetermined threshold; Scenarios that cause the same deviation and lead to the same final consequence are grouped together and defined as a risk set; Calculate the frequency of occurrence of the final consequences of the risk set; The frequency of the final consequences is compared with the frequency of the target's tolerable occurrence to determine whether the risk is manageable.

[0013] In one possible implementation, for each scenario within the risk set, the frequency of occurrence of the final consequence in a single scenario. The calculation formula is: ,in Indicates the frequency of the initial event. Let represent the probability of the j-th enabling event. This represents the probability of dangerous failure of the k-th independent protective layer. Let m represent the probability of the m-th conditional correction factor. Indicates the number of enabling events. Indicates the number of independent protective layers. This indicates the number of conditional correction factors.

[0014] In one possible implementation, the frequency of occurrence of the final consequences of the risk set. The sum of the frequencies of the final consequences occurring across all risk scenarios: , This indicates the number of scenarios contained in the current risk set; In one possible implementation, the step of determining whether the risk is manageable includes: Will With tolerable frequency of occurrence To make a comparison, if ≤ If so, the risk is deemed controllable; like If so, it is determined that the reliability of the independent protection layer should be improved or an independent protection layer should be added.

[0015] The main solution and its various further alternatives described above can be freely combined to form multiple solutions, all of which are solutions that can be adopted and are claimed in this application; furthermore, the (non-conflicting alternatives) can also be freely combined with each other and with other alternatives. Those skilled in the art, after understanding the solution of this application, will realize from the prior art and common general knowledge that there are many combinations, all of which are technical solutions to be protected in this application, and will not be exhaustively listed here.

[0016] This application discloses a method for risk analysis and assessment of fully balanced vertical ship lift operations. First, the ship lift's operation process is scientifically divided into process nodes and equipment nodes. Then, operational deviations are identified for the process nodes based on their operational steps, and equipment operational deviations are identified based on the operating parameters of the equipment nodes. Next, for each identified deviation, its credible causes and credible consequences without considering existing protective measures are analyzed. Then, based on a predefined risk assessment matrix, the original risk level of each risk scenario is determined according to the probability of the cause and the severity of the final consequence. Finally, a risk scenario list containing all risk scenarios and their original risk levels is output. Through a systematic and structured analysis method, comprehensive identification and reasonable classification of ship lift operation risks are achieved, effectively improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ship lift operation risk management. Simultaneously, semi-quantitative assessments are conducted on scenarios at high or higher risk levels in the risk scenario list, quantifying the risk and calculating the gap with tolerable standards. Targeted reliability requirements for existing protective measures or the need for additional protective measures are proposed, further improving the inherent safety level of the ship lift and achieving the goal of controllable ship lift operation risks. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of this application and should not be regarded as a limitation of the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the operation risk analysis process for a fully balanced vertical ship lift proposed in an embodiment of this application is shown.

[0019] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating another method for analyzing operational risks of a fully balanced vertical ship lift is shown.

[0020] Figure 3 The diagram shows the node architecture of the fully balanced vertical ship lift operation process.

[0021] Figure 4 The diagram illustrates the applicable deviation architecture for risk analysis proposed in this application.

[0022] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the risk assessment matrix for ship lift operation is shown.

[0023] Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating the operational risk assessment method for a fully balanced vertical ship lift is provided.

[0024] Figure 7 A schematic diagram illustrating the tolerable baseline for the operational risks of the ship lift is shown.

[0025] Figure 8 A vector diagram of risks in a complex scenario is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0026] The following specific examples illustrate the implementation of this application. Those skilled in the art can easily understand other advantages and effects of this application from the content disclosed in this specification. This application can also be implemented or applied through other different specific embodiments, and various details in this specification can also be modified or changed based on different viewpoints and applications without departing from the spirit of this application. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the following embodiments and features in the embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0027] Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0028] In existing technologies, vertical ship lifts involve numerous equipment components and complex control processes, classifying them as "non-standard" products. Product optimization, improvement, and upgrades are slow, and there are few engineering examples and relatively little operational management experience. This may lead to unidentified risks that could threaten the safe and stable operation of the ship lift, potentially causing serious personnel accidents, significant economic losses, and extremely adverse social impacts. Furthermore, the controllability of risks during ship lift operation has not been clearly assessed, and insufficient protective measures could escalate into a serious safety accident. Moreover, applying the same maintenance strategy to all protective measures would result in enormous operating costs and would prevent the identification of key protective measures that play a crucial role in risk scenarios for focused maintenance.

[0029] Therefore, in order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, this application proposes a method for risk analysis and assessment of fully balanced vertical ship lift operation. This method can not only conduct a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the risks that may exist during the operation of the ship lift, forming a scenario list of all risk elements to guide risk management, making risk management more targeted and improving its efficiency and effectiveness, but also quantitatively assess high-risk and above-level scenarios identified in the risk analysis, clarifying the risk level of each scenario under the existing protection measures configuration, and improving and optimizing the protection measures for scenarios that fail to meet the risk tolerance benchmark, thereby further improving the inherent safety level of the ship lift and ultimately achieving the goal of controllable ship lift operation risks. The following is a detailed description of this method.

[0030] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This paper presents a flowchart illustrating a risk analysis method for the operation of a fully balanced vertical ship lift, as proposed in an embodiment of this application. The risk analysis method includes: The operation of the ship lift is divided into process nodes and equipment nodes; Process operation deviations are identified based on the operation steps of process nodes, and equipment operation deviations are identified based on the operating parameters of equipment nodes. For the identified deviations, analyze all plausible causes and the ultimate consequences without considering existing protective measures; Based on a predefined risk assessment matrix, the original risk level of each risk scenario is determined according to the probability of occurrence of credible causes and the severity of the final consequences. The output contains a list of all risk scenarios and their corresponding original risk levels.

[0031] The operation of a ship lift involves two main elements: process operation and equipment operation. Process operation is controlled by the control system to start and stop various devices to complete the corresponding operation steps. Each process includes multiple operation steps, and most devices also include multiple sub-devices. The various processes and supporting devices involved in the operation of the ship lift are divided into different nodes according to their complexity. When analyzing the risk scenarios of process nodes, devices with a certain function and their sub-devices are considered as a whole to consider their possible abnormalities or failures, and the impact of the abnormality or failure of the device as a whole on the process is analyzed. When analyzing the risk scenarios of equipment nodes, the focus is on the impact of the abnormality or failure of sub-devices on the device as a whole. By reasonably decomposing complex objects, the analysis is ensured to be comprehensive and complete, while avoiding redundancy caused by the recurrence of the same risk scenarios.

[0032] All risks arise from deviations in a certain stage of the operation from the design intent or operational requirements. It is crucial to fully identify all credible deviations, identify and establish applicable deviation categories for different types of nodes, and use these deviations to guide the screening of risk scenarios. Process-related nodes include multiple operational steps, and the focus is on deviations between the execution of these steps and the design intent or operational requirements. Therefore, these analytical objects are combined with guiding terms such as "executed too early," "executed too late," "executed ahead of schedule," "executed late," "executed excessively," "executed inadequately," "executed too quickly," and "executed too slowly" to form deviation groups applicable to process-related nodes. Equipment-related nodes focus on deviations between the operating parameters of each piece of equipment and the design intent or operational requirements. Therefore, operating parameters are combined with guiding terms such as "too much" and "too little" to form deviation groups applicable to equipment-related nodes.

[0033] The elements of a risk scenario include deviation, a credible cause of the deviation, and the final consequences (i.e., the most severe credible impact) resulting from the continued deterioration of the deviation. A risk assessment matrix applicable to ship lifts is established. The original risk level of each scenario is determined by comprehensively considering the probability level of the cause and the severity level of the consequence in the matrix. Based on this, the residual risk level after considering existing protective measures is determined. For scenarios where the residual risk has not reached the acceptable range, further risk reduction measures are proposed. Thus, the risk analysis is completed and a list of risk scenarios is formed.

[0034] Figure 2This paper presents a flowchart illustrating another method for risk analysis of fully balanced vertical ship lifts. For each identified deviation, the possible causes and consequences are analyzed, and an initial risk rating is given based on a pre-set risk assessment matrix. Next, the effectiveness of existing protective measures is evaluated, and a reduced residual risk rating is given accordingly. The process includes an acceptance threshold; if the residual risk is unacceptable, remedial suggestions are proposed and a reassessment is conducted, leading to iterative optimization. If the risk is acceptable, the process continues to address the next deviation or node. This process repeats until all nodes and deviations have been analyzed, ultimately resulting in a risk scenario list, which serves as the direct output of this analysis method.

[0035] Process-related nodes include the opening process, the uplink process, the downlink process, and the suspension process; Equipment nodes include ship-carrying chamber equipment and lock head equipment.

[0036] Figure 3 This diagram illustrates the node architecture of a fully balanced vertical ship lift. Process nodes, with the lift's operation as the timeline, are subdivided into four typical processes: navigation, upstream, downstream, and shutdown. Each process is further broken down into a series of sequential operational steps (such as preparation, ship entry into the lift, docking / undocking, and start / stop operation), thus transforming the dynamic operation into an analyzable sequence of operations. Equipment nodes, from a spatial and system composition perspective, divide the lift into two main subsystems: the ship-carrying chamber equipment and the lock equipment. The ship-carrying chamber equipment includes key functional systems such as drive, hydraulics, balancing, and locking; the lock equipment encompasses auxiliary facilities such as working doors, sealing frames, movable bridges, and water filling and drainage systems.

[0037] The steps for identifying process operation deviations based on the operation steps of process-type nodes, and the steps for identifying equipment operation deviations based on the operating parameters of equipment-type nodes, include: Deviations in process execution are identified by combining operational steps with a first set of preset guiding words, which include words related to the timing or status of operations. The system identifies equipment operational deviations by combining operating parameters with a second set of preset prompts, which includes words related to the magnitude of the parameter values.

[0038] Identifying deviations in process execution is achieved by systematically combining operational steps within the process with a first set of pre-set guiding words. The core characteristic of this set of guiding words is their close correlation with the timing or state of operations, such as "executed too early," "executed too late," "execution missing," or "execution inadequate." This design is based on the fundamental reliance of process safety on the accuracy of execution timing and state. By pairing each specific step with these temporal and state-related terms, it can forcefully and comprehensively guide analysts to screen for all anomalies that deviate from the design intent in terms of time dimension and state integrity, thereby overcoming the arbitrariness and oversight of traditional experience-based methods.

[0039] To identify equipment operational deviations, the operating parameters of equipment nodes are combined with a second set of preset guiding words. The core of this second set of guiding words is to characterize abnormal parameter values, typically such as "too high," "too low," "too much," or "too little." This aims to accurately capture the quantitative failure modes of equipment hardware performance, because the key to safe equipment operation is that physical parameters (such as water level, pressure, and speed) must be maintained within their rated range.

[0040] Figure 4 This document illustrates the risk analysis deviation architecture proposed in this application, categorizing potential abnormal states during operation into three main types: process deviations, equipment deviations, and other deviations. Process deviations address timing, sequence, and execution quality issues in ship lift operation. Standardized guiding terms such as "execution too early / too late," "sequence ahead / behind," "execution excessive / inadequate," and "execution too fast / too slow" are used to systematically review the operational standardization of process nodes such as navigation, upstream, downstream, and shutdown, effectively identifying risks of timing errors and action misalignment in process control. Equipment deviations focus on abnormal status parameters of key equipment such as the ship lift chamber and lock head, specifically including deviations from normal states such as "too high" or "too low" core operating parameters like water level, pressure, liquid level, temperature, voltage, and torque. Other deviations, as a supplementary category, cover atypical but significantly impactful internal and external factors such as corrosion / leakage, maintenance inconvenience, power supply anomalies, weather anomalies, ship anomalies, and fire incidents, expanding the boundaries of risk identification and ensuring the comprehensiveness of the analysis scope.

[0041] The risk assessment matrix is ​​obtained by multiplying the probability level value by the severity level value to obtain the risk level value, and then classifying the risk according to the risk level value.

[0042] A risk assessment matrix is ​​determined based on the operational characteristics of the vertical ship lift. This matrix includes two elements: likelihood (L) and severity (S). The likelihood (L) is divided into five levels, described as follows: Level 1 – Extremely unlikely; Level 2 – Very unlikely, possibly conceivable; Level 3 – Low probability, completely unexpected; Level 4 – Possible, but infrequent; Level 5 – Quite likely.

[0043] The severity of the final consequences is assessed based on at least one of the following: personal injury, economic loss, environmental impact, and reputational impact.

[0044] The consequences of the risk assessment matrix are categorized into four types: personal injury, economic loss, environmental impact, and reputational impact. Each category has a severity level (S) of 5: Personal Injury: Level 1 – No injury; Level 2 – Minor injuries to fewer than 3 people; Level 3 – Serious injuries to fewer than 3 people or minor injuries to fewer than 10 people; Level 4 – Deaths to fewer than 3 people, or serious injuries to fewer than 10 people; Level 5 – Deaths to more than 3 people, or serious injuries to more than 10 people. Economic Losses: Level 1 – Less than 100,000 RMB; Level 2 – 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB; Level 3 – 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 RMB; Level 4 – 10,000,000 to 50,000,000 RMB; Level 5 – More than 50,000,000 RMB. Environmental Impact: Level 1 – No pollution; Level 2 – Minor environmental pollution (pollution within the facility); Level 3 – Moderate environmental pollution (moderate pollution within the company); Level 4 – Significant environmental pollution (serious pollution within the company); Level 5 – Major or above environmental pollution (large-scale pollution outside the company). Reputational impact: Level 1 - No more than 1 day of suspension, no damage; Level 2 - More than 1 day but less than 1 week of suspension, affecting the company and surrounding area; Level 3 - More than 1 week but less than 2 weeks of suspension, affecting the region; Level 4 - More than 2 weeks of suspension but less than 1 month of suspension, affecting the industry and province; Level 5 - More than 1 month of suspension, causing significant international and domestic impact. Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the risk assessment matrix for ship lift operation is shown.

[0045] The risk rank (RR) value in the risk assessment matrix is ​​the product of the probability of occurrence and the severity of the consequences, i.e., RR = L × S. Therefore, the risk level is divided into 4 levels: Level I (1≤RR≤6) is low risk, Level II (8≤RR≤12) is medium risk, Level III (15≤RR≤16) is high risk, and Level IV (20≤RR≤25) is extremely high risk.

[0046] After outputting a list of risk scenarios containing all risk scenarios and their corresponding original risk levels, the output also includes: Select risk scenarios from the risk scenario list whose original risk level reaches a predetermined threshold; Scenarios that cause the same deviation and lead to the same final consequence are grouped together and defined as a risk set; Calculate the frequency of occurrence of the final consequences of the risk set; The frequency of the final consequences is compared with the frequency of the target's tolerable occurrence to determine whether the risk is manageable.

[0047] Quantitative risk assessments are conducted on scenarios with an original risk level of high risk or above selected from the risk scenario list. The same deviation in the risk scenario list may be caused by different reasons. Therefore, scenarios that cause the same deviation and lead to the same consequences are integrated into a scenario group, which is defined as a risk set.

[0048] The severity of consequences in the risk assessment matrix is ​​introduced by the occurrence frequency, thereby determining the tolerable benchmark for the risk of ship lift operation. The final consequences caused by each risk set have a corresponding tolerable occurrence frequency as a risk control target, so as to judge whether the existing protection measures for the current risk set can control the risk to a tolerable level.

[0049] The occurrence frequency of a single scenario consequence is calculated by comprehensively considering the frequency of the initial event, the probability of applicable enabling conditions, the failure probability of independent protection layers, and the probability of applicable condition correction factors. Then, the occurrence frequencies of consequences of all credible scenarios in the same scenario group are summed to obtain the occurrence frequency of consequences of the risk set corresponding to that scenario group. If this frequency is lower than the tolerable frequency, the risk is under control; otherwise, further measures should be taken, including reducing the failure probability of existing independent protection layers or adding additional independent protection layers, to make up for the current gap in risk reduction capabilities, thereby achieving a state of risk control.

[0050] Figure 6 This paper presents a flowchart of the risk assessment method for fully balanced vertical ship lifts. It integrates multiple independent scenarios that cause the same deviation and lead to the same consequences into a single assessment unit. For each risk set, a detailed frequency calculation is performed. The steps include determining the initial event and its frequency, identifying enabling conditions and their probabilities, assessing the failure probability of independent protection layers, and considering condition correction factors to comprehensively determine the frequency of the final consequence. A quantitative risk decision-making and closed-loop feedback mechanism is established. The calculated frequency of the final consequence is compared with a preset "tolerable risk frequency" benchmark to determine whether the risk is acceptable. If the risk is unacceptable, a "propose rectification suggestions" step is triggered. This involves strengthening protective measures or reducing the initial risk and then reassessing, forming an iterative optimization cycle until all risks are reduced to an acceptable level. Finally, the process outputs a "risk level summary" and a "list of independent protection layers and their risk reduction capabilities."

[0051] In one possible embodiment, firstly, the operation of the ship lift involves two main elements: process operation and equipment operation. A process operation includes multiple operational steps executed according to preset logic, while the operation of a piece of equipment requires the coordination and cooperation of multiple sub-devices. The various processes and supporting equipment involved in the operation of the ship lift are divided into different nodes according to their complexity. When analyzing risk scenarios for process-type nodes, a piece of equipment and its sub-devices are considered as a whole to consider potential anomalies or malfunctions, and the impact of the overall equipment anomaly or malfunction on the process is analyzed. When analyzing risk scenarios for equipment-type nodes, the focus is on the impact of sub-device anomalies or malfunctions on the overall equipment.

[0052] Second, identify applicable deviations at each node. For ship lifts, applicable deviations are mainly categorized into process-related, equipment-related, and other. Process-related nodes include multiple operational steps, focusing on deviations between the execution of these steps and the design intent or operational requirements. Equipment-related nodes focus on deviations between the operating parameters of each piece of equipment and the design intent or operational requirements. Therefore, operating parameters are combined with guiding terms such as "too much" or "too little" to form deviation groups applicable to equipment-related nodes. Other deviations are used to supplement guidance for scenarios not covered by the above deviations.

[0053] Third, analyze all credible causes of each deviation, which may include design flaws, human error, equipment failure, functional failure, management loopholes, environmental factors, etc., and give the probability level of occurrence based on the risk assessment matrix.

[0054] Fourth, analyze the final consequences of each deviation (without considering existing protective measures). Typical consequences of ship lift operation include flooding of the factory and ship grounding. The impacts include operational fluctuations, personnel safety risks, economic losses caused by equipment damage, environmental risks caused by media leakage, and the adverse effects of the above events on the company's image. Based on the risk assessment matrix, give the severity level of the consequences.

[0055] Fifth, based on the risk assessment matrix, and taking into account the probability of the cause occurring and the severity of the consequences, an original risk rating is given for each risk scenario.

[0056] Sixth, identify existing protective measures and determine whether they are preventative measures (i.e., reducing the likelihood of risk) or mitigation measures (i.e., reducing the severity of consequences). Based on the risk assessment matrix, determine the residual risk level after considering the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of consequences after taking into account existing protective measures. If the risk is unacceptable, make recommendations for rectification.

[0057] Seventh, after completing the above work, a list of risk scenarios for the operation of the ship lift will be generated. Scenarios with an original risk level of high risk or above will be selected for quantitative risk assessment. The same deviation in the risk scenario list may be caused by different reasons. Therefore, scenarios that cause the same deviation and lead to the same consequences will be integrated into a scenario group. This scenario group is defined as a risk set. The name of the risk set comes from the deviation corresponding to the risk analysis stage.

[0058] Eighth, based on the risk assessment matrix and the risk management objectives of the hydropower industry, determine the risk tolerance benchmark applicable to ship lifts, and determine that the tolerable frequency of occurrence for the consequence level of personnel deaths (i.e., Level 4 – fewer than 3 deaths or fewer than 10 serious injuries) should not exceed 1×10. -5 Once per year.

[0059] Ninth, select a risk set and determine the tolerable baseline for the frequency of occurrence of the corresponding final consequences. This indicates that the initial events and their frequencies for all scenarios included in the risk set are determined. The frequency of the initial events is represented by... This indicates that the unit is "times / year". Figure 7 A schematic diagram illustrating the tolerable baseline for the operational risks of the ship lift is shown.

[0060] Tenth, determine whether there are any enabling events in the risk set as the initial event develops. If so, determine their probability values. This indicates the need to determine the available protective layers for the current scenario. Typical protective layers for ship lifts include interlocking condition control functions, parameter anomaly or equipment failure alarm functions, emergency stop functions, mechanical protection such as overflow valves or explosion-proof valves, fire detection and fire suppression systems. A protective layer must simultaneously possess effectiveness, independence, and auditability to serve as an independent protective layer and achieve the necessary risk reduction for the scenario. A reasonable probability of hazardous failure must be determined. express.

[0061] Eleventh, determine the applicable condition correction factors for the current scenario, such as the requirement for an ignition source in case of a fire or explosion accident, and the requirement for personnel to be exposed to a hazardous environment in case of casualties, and determine the probability values ​​of these correction factors. express.

[0062] Twelfth, for each scenario with concentrated risk, the frequency of occurrence of the final consequences of a single scenario. The calculation formula is: ,in Indicates the frequency of the initial event. Let represent the probability of the j-th enabling event. This represents the probability of dangerous failure of the k-th independent protective layer. Let m represent the probability of the m-th conditional correction factor. Indicates the number of enabling events. Indicates the number of independent protective layers. Indicates the number of conditional correction factors. If no applicable... or If so, then delete it from the formula.

[0063] Thirteenth, integrate the contributions of all scenarios in the current risk set to the occurrence of its consequences, and combine this with a composite risk vector model to comprehensively calculate the frequency of occurrence of the consequences of this risk set. This indicates the frequency of the final consequences occurring in the risk set. The sum of the frequencies of the final consequences occurring across all risk scenarios: , This indicates the number of scenarios contained in the current risk set; The steps to determine whether a risk is manageable include: Will With tolerable frequency of occurrence To make a comparison, if ≤ If so, the risk is deemed controllable; like If so, it is determined that the reliability of the independent protection layer should be improved or an independent protection layer should be added.

[0064] Fourteenth, will and To make a comparison, if ≤ Under the current independent protection layer configuration, the risk set already meets the tolerable benchmark, and the risk is under control; if If the risk remains uncontrollable under the current independent protection layer configuration, then rectification is necessary to improve the reliability of the existing independent protection layer or add an additional independent protection layer in order to control the risk level within a tolerable baseline range.

[0065] Fifteenth, after completing the above work, a semi-quantitative assessment result of the risk level of relevant scenarios with an original risk level of high risk or above will be compiled, and an independent protection layer and its risk reduction capability list will be formed to provide a reference for daily operation and maintenance.

[0066] Figure 8The diagram illustrates a composite scenario risk vector. Multiple initial events (such as initial event 1, initial event 2, etc.) may converge into a critical risk point under the action of their respective protective measures (such as protective measures 1 and 2). Subsequently, the development path of the risk scenario will be constrained and guided by a series of subsequent protective measures (such as protective measures 3 and 4) and condition judgments. Some paths may terminate prematurely due to effective protection, while others may break through the barriers and eventually evolve into specific consequences that cause damage to different objectives (such as consequence impact 1, consequence impact 2, etc.).

[0067] Compared with the prior art, the embodiments of this application have the following beneficial effects: First, by introducing node segmentation and deviation guidance words, the complex ship lift system is structurally decomposed, ensuring that the risk analysis can cover all processes and equipment, and identify potential hazards and accident scenarios without omission.

[0068] Secondly, by establishing a logically clear risk scenario chain and risk assessment matrix, it is possible to accurately distinguish between high, medium and low risk levels, enabling risk management resources to be used in a targeted manner, prioritizing the handling of high-risk scenarios, and significantly improving management efficiency and effectiveness.

[0069] Third, by using a semi-quantitative risk assessment method, the frequency of the final consequences is compared with the tolerable benchmark, which clarifies whether the risk is under control and provides objective and quantitative data support for safety decisions.

[0070] Fourth, by forming an independent protection layer and its risk reduction capability list, it is possible to distinguish between critical and routine maintenance objects, and implement a strategy of key maintenance for high-risk components and routine maintenance for low-risk components, thereby significantly reducing costs and increasing efficiency while ensuring safety.

[0071] In summary, this application discloses a method for analyzing and assessing the operational risks of a fully balanced vertical ship lift. Through a systematic and structured analysis method, it achieves comprehensive identification and reasonable classification of ship lift operational risks, effectively improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ship lift operational risk management. For scenarios in the risk scenario list that are at or above the high-risk level, a semi-quantitative assessment is conducted to quantify the risks and calculate the gap between the risks and the tolerable standards, and to propose reliability requirements for existing protection measures or the need for additional protection measures.

[0072] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit this application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for full-balance vertical ship lift operation risk analysis and assessment, characterized in that, The method comprises: dividing the operation process of the ship lift into process nodes and equipment nodes; identifying process operation deviations based on the operation steps of the process nodes and identifying equipment operation deviations based on the operation parameters of the equipment nodes; analyzing all credible causes and final consequences for the identified deviations; determining the original risk level of each risk scenario based on a predefined risk evaluation matrix according to the occurrence probability of the credible causes and the severity level of the final consequences; outputting a risk scenario list containing all risk scenarios and corresponding original risk levels.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The process nodes include navigation process, uplink process, downlink process and shutdown process. The equipment nodes include the ship chamber equipment and the lock head equipment.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The steps of identifying process operation deviations based on the operation steps of the process nodes and identifying equipment operation deviations based on the operation parameters of the equipment nodes comprise: identifying the process operation deviations by combining the operation steps with a first set of preset guide words, the first set of preset guide words including words related to operation timing or state; identifying the equipment operation deviations by combining the operation parameters with a second set of preset guide words, the second set of preset guide words including words related to parameter value size.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The risk evaluation matrix multiplies the numerical value of the occurrence probability level with the numerical value of the severity level to obtain a risk level value, and classifies the risk according to the risk level value.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The severity level of the final consequences is evaluated from at least one of the aspects of personnel injury, economic loss, environmental impact and reputation impact.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, After outputting the risk scenario list containing all risk scenarios and corresponding original risk levels, the method further comprises: filtering out risk scenarios with original risk levels reaching a predetermined threshold from the risk scenario list; integrating scenarios causing the same deviation and leading to the same final consequence, defined as a risk set; calculating the final consequence frequency of the risk set ; comparing the frequency of occurrence of the final consequences with a target tolerable frequency of occurrence to determine whether the risk is controllable.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein, Single scenario final consequence occurrence frequency for each scenario in the risk set The formula is: , where represents the initial event occurrence frequency, represents the probability of the jth enabling event, represents the dangerous failure probability of the kth independent protection layer, represents the probability of the mth conditional modifier, represents the number of enabling events, represents the number of independent protection layers, represents the number of conditional modifiers.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein, Final consequence occurrence frequency of the risk set Sum of final consequence occurrence frequencies of all scenarios in the risk set: , represents the number of scenarios contained in the current risk set.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein, The step of determining whether the risk is controllable comprises: Will tolerance frequency In contrast, if ≤ , the risk is considered controllable; If then it is determined to improve the reliability of the independent protective layer or to increase the independent protective layer.

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