Data management method, system and device, storage medium and product

Abstract

The invention discloses a data management method, system and device, a storage medium and a product, relates to the technical field of super SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards, constructs an active data security management system running in a super SIM card hardware security environment, can upgrade the super SIM card from a pure storage medium to a credible execution environment, and improves the security of the super SIM card. According to the method, hardware-level protection of the data is realized from creation, refined data life cycle management is also realized, and the risk of data leakage caused by direct reading and writing of a storage medium by an unauthorized application is effectively avoided.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of super SIM card technology, and in particular to a data management method, system, device, storage medium, and product. Background Technology

[0002] The Super SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card provides a large storage capacity. When an application calls the file storage capacity provided by the Super SIM card, the Super SIM card uses its own large storage capacity as a storage medium for the application to use, allowing the application to save, read, and delete files.

[0003] In existing technologies, applications directly use the interfaces provided by the terminal operating system to perform low-level file writing, reading, and deletion operations on the storage area of ​​the Super SIM card, while the Super SIM card itself does not provide any active storage management capabilities.

[0004] Although the current data management process for Super SIM cards is simple, it actually completely externalizes the management responsibility to the terminal operating system, which makes data security highly dependent on the terminal environment and restricts the reliability of Super SIM cards as security hardware. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The embodiments of the present invention aim to provide a data management method, system, device, storage medium and product, which can realize data management based on the hardware security environment of the super SIM card, and effectively eliminate the risk of data leakage caused by unauthorized applications directly reading and writing storage media.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide a data management method, including: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions; the data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; If the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated according to the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the encrypted file; If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, the caller's operation permissions are obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and the control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed. When the operation type is a control operation, the corresponding operation content includes reading and deleting files.

[0007] As an improvement to the above solution, the application interface includes a file save interface, a file read interface, and a file delete interface; The operation type of data operation commands from the file save interface is creation operation; the operation type of data operation commands from the file read interface and the file delete interface is control operation.

[0008] As an improvement to the above solution, the step of receiving data operation instructions from the application interface and verifying the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions includes: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and read the identity information from the caller's ID card. The legitimacy of the identity information is verified using a certificate signature authentication method.

[0009] As an improvement to the above solution, if the verification passes and the operation type is a creation operation, then an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated according to the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path, including: If the verification passes and the operation type is a creation operation, then the original file and initial metadata are obtained from the operation content; the initial metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the original file; A first key is randomly generated, and the original file is symmetrically encrypted using the first key to obtain an encrypted file; Based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners, the first key is asymmetrically encrypted to obtain the second key; The initial metadata is updated based on the second key to obtain the metadata corresponding to the encrypted file; The encrypted file and the metadata are stored in association with the target access path.

[0010] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of asymmetric encryption of the first key based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners to obtain the second key includes: The first key is split into several key fragments; the number of key fragments is the same as the number of all owners in the permission owner list; Obtain the public key corresponding to each owner in the list of operation permission owners, and use the public key to perform asymmetric encryption on each key fragment to obtain encrypted fragments; A second key is obtained from the set of encrypted fragments; the second key can be decrypted using the private key of any owner.

[0011] As an improvement to the above scheme, if the verification passes and the operation type is a control operation, then the caller's operation permissions are obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and a control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed, including: If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, then a list of owners of operation permissions for the encrypted file is obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. Retrieve the identity information from the caller's ID card; Determine whether the identity information matches the list of operation permission holders to obtain the caller's operation permissions; When the operation permission is enabled, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card, and the private key is used to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain the decrypted file; Based on the operation content, control operations are performed on the decrypted file, and the control operation results are returned to the application interface.

[0012] As an improvement to the above scheme, when the operation permission is granted, a private key is obtained from the caller's ID card, and the private key is used to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain a decrypted file, including: When the operation permission is granted, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card. Based on the private key and the metadata associated with the target access path, the first key used for file encryption is restored; The encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted using the first key to obtain the decrypted file.

[0013] As an improvement to the above solution, when the operation involves reading a file, the step of performing a control operation on the decrypted file according to the operation content and returning the control operation result to the application interface includes: The decrypted file is then directly returned to the application interface.

[0014] As an improvement to the above solution, when the operation involves deleting a file, the step of performing a control operation on the decrypted file according to the operation content and returning the control operation result to the application interface includes: The decrypted file is matched against a preset secure deletion policy; the secure deletion policy includes mark deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion. According to the matched security deletion policy, the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file are deleted; The result of the deletion operation is returned to the application interface.

[0015] As an improvement to the above solution, the step of matching the decrypted file with a preset secure deletion policy includes: The decrypted file is divided into blocks to obtain a file block list; Calculate the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and divide the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness. Calculate the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient is matched with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy.

[0016] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of dividing the decrypted file into blocks to obtain a file block list includes: Obtain the second key used for encryption and its decryption difficulty from the metadata; Obtain the total computing power of the Super SIM card and its associated terminal; The block length is calculated based on the length of the second key, the decryption difficulty, and the total computing power; The decrypted file is divided into blocks according to the block length to obtain a file block list.

[0017] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of calculating the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and dividing the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness, includes: Based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file, the block stickiness of each block is calculated; When the stickiness of the segment is not less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the application file segment list; When the stickiness of the segment is less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the user file segment list.

[0018] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of calculating the stickiness of each block based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file includes: Based on the consistency between the first block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file respectively, the block stickiness of the first block is calculated; Select the current block sequentially according to the block order in the file block list; The stickiness of the current block is calculated based on the stickiness of the previous block and the consistency of the current block with the file in the caller and the application template file, respectively.

[0019] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of calculating the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the deletion security level of the caller includes: If the length of the user file block list is 0, then the associated deletion security utility coefficient is set to a preset coefficient; the preset coefficient matches the zero-filling deletion. If the length of the user file block list is not 0, then obtain the storage status of the Super SIM card and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient of the encrypted file is calculated based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, the storage status, and the deletion security level.

[0020] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of matching the associated deletion security utility coefficient with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy includes: When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is not greater than the preset first coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to mark deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than a preset first coefficient threshold and not greater than a preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to zero-filling deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than the preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to overwrite deletion.

[0021] As an improvement to the above scheme, when the secure deletion policy is mark-to-delete, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching secure deletion policy includes: The list of operation permission owners in the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is cleared, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the first flag, so that the encrypted file can be logically deleted by the first flag.

[0022] As an improvement to the above scheme, when the secure deletion policy is zero-padding deletion, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching secure deletion policy includes: The blocks in the user file block list are copied to a contiguous storage location to form a mirrored user file; Iterate through the application file blocks in the application file block list and perform a global deduplication check on each application file block; If there are duplicate blocks in the current application file, record the position of the duplicate block and obtain the first position; If there is no duplicate block of the current application file block, then the current application file block is encrypted and backed up, and the backup position is recorded to obtain the second position; Based on the first and second positions, generate the basis for restoring the application file; The encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file is padded with 0 bytes; Based on the restored image user file and application file, the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is updated, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the second flag.

[0023] As an improvement to the above solution, when the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching secure deletion policy includes: Based on the metadata, the dependent files and their security protection requirements are obtained; Based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements, dynamically calculate the number of overwrite / clear operations; When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is less than a preset threshold, the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file are filled with 0 bytes. When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is not less than the preset threshold, the application file block list is traversed and the storage area of ​​each application file block is filled with 0 bytes in sequence. Based on the number of overwrite clears, the user file block list is iteratively traversed, and in each traversal, the storage area of ​​each user file block is filled with random bytes in sequence; Iterate through the user file block list again, and fill the storage area of ​​each user file block with 0 bytes in turn; Set the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file to 0.

[0024] As an improvement to the above solution, the application interface also includes a file restoration interface; The data manipulation command from the file recovery interface is a deletion recovery operation.

[0025] As an improvement to the above solution, the data management method further includes: If the verification passes and the operation type is a deletion and recovery operation, then a safe deletion strategy for the target file is obtained based on the operation content; the safe deletion strategy is one of overwrite deletion, zero-filling deletion, and mark deletion. When the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, a restore failure message is generated; When the safe deletion strategy is zero-filling deletion, the target file is restored using a zero-filling compression and restoration algorithm to generate a restored file, and a data operation instruction of operation type creation is generated based on the restored file. When the secure deletion policy is marked for deletion, the metadata corresponding to the target file is updated so that the encrypted file corresponding to the target file can be logically restored.

[0026] Secondly, embodiments of the present invention provide a data management system, including: The authentication module is used to receive data operation instructions from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions; the data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; The file creation module is used to generate an encrypted file and corresponding metadata based on the operation content if the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, and to associate and store the encrypted file and the metadata with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the encrypted file; The file control module is used to obtain the caller's operation permissions based on the metadata associated with the target access path if the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation. When the operation permission is valid, the module decrypts the encrypted file associated with the target access path and executes the control operation corresponding to the operation content. When the operation type is a control operation, the corresponding operation content includes reading and deleting files.

[0027] Thirdly, embodiments of the present invention provide a data management device, including a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the data management method described above.

[0028] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium including a stored computer program, wherein, when the computer program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform the data management method described above.

[0029] Fifthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer program product, the computer program product including a computer program or computer instructions, wherein when the computer program or computer instructions are executed by a processor, the data management method described above is performed.

[0030] Compared with existing technologies, this invention discloses a data management method, system, device, storage medium, and product applied to a Super SIM card. It receives data operation instructions from an application interface and verifies the caller's identity certificate within these instructions. The data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path. If verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated based on the operation content, and the encrypted file and metadata are associated with and stored along with the target access path. The metadata includes a list of owners of the encrypted file's operation permissions. If verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, the caller's operation permissions are obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted, and a control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed. The operation content corresponding to a control operation includes reading and deleting files. Using this invention, data management based on the Super SIM card's hardware security environment can be achieved, effectively preventing the data leakage risk caused by unauthorized applications directly reading and writing to the storage medium. Attached Figure Description

[0031] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a data management method provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a data management system provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a data management device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0032] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0033] In the description and claims, it should be understood that the terms "first," "second," etc., used in the description and claims are only for the purpose of distinguishing the description of the same technical features, and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated, nor necessarily the order of description or chronological order. The terms are interchangeable where appropriate. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature.

[0034] As a hardware entity independent of the terminal operating system and individual applications, the Super SIM card integrates the communication functions and large-capacity storage capabilities of a traditional SIM card, providing a physical foundation for building a trusted data storage environment that does not depend on specific terminal devices or software applications. Even if the terminal device is replaced or the application is uninstalled, the user's sensitive data and digital identity can still be retained in the Super SIM card.

[0035] In existing technologies, Super SIM cards are typically treated as passive, high-capacity storage media. File management responsibilities are entirely handled by the terminal operating system and upper-layer applications. Super SIM cards themselves do not participate in any proactive security strategies, which means that the security boundaries of data stored in Super SIM cards are entirely defined and protected by external systems.

[0036] Once the terminal operating system's permission management is bypassed, or if there are malicious upper-layer applications, the data stored in the Super SIM card is at risk of being directly read, tampered with, or stolen by unauthorized applications, rendering the hardware's security features ineffective.

[0037] Based on the above considerations, this invention provides a data management method applied to a super SIM card. Please refer to... Figure 1 In this embodiment, the data management method is specifically executed through steps S1 to S3: S1. Receive a data operation instruction from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instruction; the data operation instruction includes the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; S2. If the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, then an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated according to the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the encrypted file; S3. If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, then the caller's operation permission is obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. When the operation permission is valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and the control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed. When the operation type is a control operation, the corresponding operation content includes reading and deleting files.

[0038] The application interface is a standardized application programming interface exposed by the Super SIM card to terminal applications. The data format and content of data operation instructions must comply with the fixed terms contract document based on the template.

[0039] A caller identity certificate is a digital certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA) to uniquely identify the caller. The caller identity certificate includes a public key, subject identity information, and the CA's digital signature, enabling cryptographic verification of the caller's identity. The caller refers to either the application or the terminal system itself.

[0040] By verifying the caller's identity certificate, a mandatory identity authentication gateway is established, ensuring that all operation commands entering the security boundary of the Super SIM card have a source identity endorsed by a trusted third party, thus eliminating the possibility of anonymity or identity forgery attacks at the source.

[0041] It should be noted that the Super SIM card itself has a built-in security chip or trusted execution environment isolated from the main application processor. It can independently and securely execute the core security logic of the embodiments of the present invention, including certificate verification, encryption and decryption operations and permission judgment, etc. Through the secure computing capabilities of the Super SIM card, an active security policy execution engine oriented to data storage and management is constructed, coupling computing power and storage management.

[0042] Furthermore, in addition to performing storage operations, the Super SIM card also needs to be able to associate and protect its corresponding metadata. In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the metadata is maintained and managed through the Super SIM card's own file system.

[0043] When the operation type is creation, a write operation is required on the Super SIM card. In this embodiment of the invention, the Super SIM card performs encrypted calculations and encrypted storage of the file, ensuring data confidentiality and preventing direct access by external applications, thereby compromising overall system security. Metadata is also bound during the file creation stage to ensure that the file's access policy is defined by itself throughout its entire lifecycle, and this policy is securely stored in a trusted SIM card environment, preventing arbitrary changes by external systems.

[0044] When the operation type is a control operation, whether reading or deleting a file, the underlying mechanism is a read operation on the Super SIM card. At this point, it's necessary not only to verify the caller's identity at the overall level but also to further determine if the caller has the necessary permissions to access the specific resource. Since a list of permission holders is stored during the operation creation process, the caller's permissions can be directly obtained through metadata. Only when the caller has the required permissions will the encrypted file be decrypted and controlled via the Super SIM card. This process ensures that encrypted data is never exposed to untrusted terminal applications, and the decrypted plaintext is only briefly used within the secure environment of the SIM card, thus eliminating the risk of leakage at the data interface level.

[0045] The above solution constructs a proactive data security management system that runs within the hardware security environment of the Super SIM card. This system upgrades the Super SIM card from a simple storage medium to a trusted execution environment, enabling data to be protected at the hardware level from the moment it is created. Furthermore, it achieves refined data lifecycle management, effectively eliminating the risk of data leakage caused by unauthorized applications directly reading and writing to the storage medium.

[0046] In a preferred embodiment, the application interface includes a file save interface, a file read interface, and a file delete interface; The operation type of data operation commands from the file save interface is creation operation; the operation type of data operation commands from the file read interface and the file delete interface is control operation.

[0047] The file save interface is specifically designed for handling requests to create new files and persist them. Calling this interface indicates a desire to save external data as a new file into the Super SIM card. The file read interface is specifically designed for handling requests to retrieve the contents of an existing file from storage. Calling this interface indicates a desire to read a file that already exists on the Super SIM card. The file delete interface is specifically designed for handling requests to remove an existing file from storage. Calling this interface indicates a desire to delete a file that already exists on the Super SIM card.

[0048] In this embodiment of the invention, based on the essential attributes of data operations, operation types are divided into creation operations and control operations. The essence of creation operations is to introduce new data and create new files, while the essence of control operations is to exert influence on existing data objects.

[0049] In the above solution, at the management architecture level of the Super SIM card, the creation behavior is isolated from other operations, so that when the system processes new data, it will trigger a process focused on initialization and security establishment; at the same time, the control operation is also isolated to achieve unified management of access permissions to existing data objects, and existing files are processed through the same set of permission verification and security check processes.

[0050] In a preferred implementation, step S1, receiving a data operation instruction from the application interface and verifying the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instruction, includes: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and read the identity information from the caller's ID card. The legitimacy of the identity information is verified using a certificate signature authentication method.

[0051] In some preferred embodiments, the caller's ID card includes an identity information field, which can be directly parsed to read the identity information, which clearly identifies the identity of the certificate holder.

[0052] Certificate signature authentication is a verification process based on public-key cryptography that verifies the authenticity and integrity of a certificate. For example, the public key of the certificate authority that issued the certificate is used to decrypt the digital signature at the end of the certificate to obtain a first digest; simultaneously, the same hash algorithm is used to calculate the body of the certificate to obtain a second digest; finally, the first and second digests are compared. If they match, it proves that the certificate was indeed issued by a trusted certificate authority and has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0053] The above solution utilizes the identity information in the caller's ID card to implement a zero-trust security architecture based on strong identity authentication. This elevates the interaction between the Super SIM card and the external environment from simple, stateless command execution to a trusted session based on verified identity. This allows the Super SIM card to establish a robust identity filtering layer at its security boundary, blocking a large number of anonymous or malicious access requests at the source.

[0054] In a preferred implementation, step S2, if the verification passes and the operation type is a creation operation, then an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated according to the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path; wherein, the metadata includes the operation authorization list of the encrypted file, executed through steps S21 to S25: S21. If the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, then obtain the original file and initial metadata from the operation content; the initial metadata includes a list of operation permission owners of the original file; S22. Randomly generate a first key, and use the first key to perform symmetric encryption on the original file to obtain an encrypted file; S23. Based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners, perform asymmetric encryption on the first key to obtain the second key; S24. Update the initial metadata according to the second key to obtain the metadata corresponding to the encrypted file; S25. The encrypted file and the metadata are associated with the target access path and stored.

[0055] Understandably, data manipulation instructions must comply with the interface specifications, and their operation content must include the necessary information for the corresponding operation type.

[0056] In some preferred embodiments, when the operation type is a creation operation, the operation content includes the original file and initial metadata. The initial metadata includes the file creation time, file modification time, file size, file owner, list of operation permission holders, and security protection requirements.

[0057] It should be noted that the list of permissions holders includes the file owner; security protection requirements are the technical and administrative measures that need to be taken given the sensitivity of the file, such as access or deletion requirements.

[0058] To achieve strong data confidentiality protection, each file is encrypted using a unique and random first key, effectively preventing bulk data leaks. However, if the first key is stored directly in plaintext, any application with access to the Super SIM card can directly manipulate the encrypted files, rendering the security protection ineffective. In this embodiment of the invention, the first key is further encrypted based on a list of authorized users to form a second key. The second key can be decrypted using the authorized user's private key, laying the foundation for subsequent collaborative decryption and access.

[0059] Updating the initial metadata with a second key enables the metadata stored in the Super SIM card to meet the prerequisites for data decryption. After subsequent permission verification, the key information required to decrypt the file can be obtained immediately.

[0060] In some preferred embodiments, the method for updating the initial metadata to obtain the metadata is to concatenate the initial metadata with the second key as the metadata.

[0061] It is worth noting that the initial metadata is data associated with the original file in the file system of the terminal application, which is used for access by the terminal application. However, the metadata in this embodiment of the invention differs from the initial metadata. The metadata is stored in the file system of the Super SIM card and associated with the encrypted file, for access by the Super SIM card itself.

[0062] It should also be noted that the target access path is the logical path given by the application or terminal when calling the Super SIM card. The Super SIM card can find the corresponding physical location in its internal storage space based on the logical path and control the physical location.

[0063] The above scheme constructs a file creation process that utilizes the high efficiency of symmetric encryption to process the original data itself, and then uses the owner's public key for asymmetric encryption, so that the security of the created encrypted file does not depend on the state of the external system.

[0064] In some preferred embodiments, the encrypted file can only be decrypted using the private keys of all owners in the list of owners with access rights. In this case, step S23 includes: performing continuous asymmetric encryption on the first key using the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of owners with access rights to obtain the second key. During decryption, the second key needs to be decrypted layer by layer using the private keys of all owners in the list of owners with access rights.

[0065] Preferably, the second key Represented as: ; in, As the first key, List of users with operation permissions Length, This is the public key corresponding to the i-th owner in the list of operation permission owners.

[0066] In some other preferred embodiments, any owner in the list of operation permission owners can decrypt the encrypted file using their own private key. Therefore, step S23, which involves asymmetric encryption of the first key using the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners to obtain the second key, includes: The first key is split into several key fragments; the number of key fragments is the same as the number of all owners in the permission owner list; Obtain the public key corresponding to each owner in the list of operation permission owners, and use the public key to perform asymmetric encryption on each key fragment to obtain encrypted fragments; A second key is obtained from the set of encrypted fragments; the second key can be decrypted using the private key of any owner.

[0067] By splitting the first key into several key fragments and then distributing the key fragments securely in a targeted manner, each key fragment can only be decrypted by a specific owner, enabling flexible collaborative access control.

[0068] In this embodiment of the invention, each owner has a private key that can decrypt key fragments, and a single key fragment can restore the complete first key, thereby each owner can independently decrypt the second key.

[0069] Understandably, in the fragmentation method, decryption can be performed using the private keys of K (K≤N, where N is the number of owners) owners, and in the preferred embodiment above, K=1. However, in different application scenarios, K can also be set to different values, and the final decryption is based on an agreed encryption / decryption strategy. That is to say, the value of K does not affect the beneficial effects produced by the embodiments of the present invention.

[0070] In a preferred implementation, step S3, if the verification passes and the operation type is a control operation, then based on the metadata associated with the target access path, the caller's operation permissions are obtained. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and the control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed, through steps S31 to S35. S31. If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, then obtain a list of owners of operation permissions for the encrypted file based on the metadata associated with the target access path. S32. Obtain the identity information from the caller's ID card; S33. Determine whether the identity information matches the list of operation permission holders to obtain the caller's operation permissions; S34. When the operation permission is true, obtain the private key from the caller's ID card book, and use the private key to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain the decrypted file; S35. Perform control operations on the decrypted file according to the operation content, and return the control operation results to the application interface.

[0071] It should be noted that the list of owners of operation permissions for encrypted files is directly inherited from the initial metadata and is no different from the specific data content of the list of owners of operation permissions in the initial metadata. Therefore, no distinction is made in the description in this embodiment of the invention.

[0072] The list of authorized users is a whitelist corresponding to the encrypted file. If the user currently accessing the file is on the whitelist, the next control operation can be performed; otherwise, a control failure message is returned to the application interface.

[0073] After successful authorization verification, the encrypted files on the Super SIM card are decrypted, ensuring that only authorized users can access the plaintext content of the files. The decryption process requires the user's private key, binding the decryption to the user's identity and effectively preventing data leakage.

[0074] The above solution provides a sophisticated security control chain that not only enables basic access control but also reshapes the security paradigm of the Super SIM card at the architectural level.

[0075] Further, preferably, in step S34, when the operation permission is granted, a private key is obtained from the caller's ID card, and the private key is used to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain a decrypted file, including: When the operation permission is granted, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card. Based on the private key and the metadata associated with the target access path, the first key used for file encryption is restored; The encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted using the first key to obtain the decrypted file.

[0076] The logic for decrypting encrypted files corresponds to the encryption logic. First, leveraging the security of asymmetric encryption, the second key is restored to the first key using the caller's private key. Once the first key is obtained, the encrypted file can be decrypted using symmetric decryption.

[0077] In some preferred embodiments, decrypt the file Represented as: ; in, For the second key, This is the private key obtained from the caller's ID card.

[0078] In the above scheme, the confidentiality of the first key is ensured by decapsulating the second key with the caller's private key. Furthermore, only the private key of the caller who is listed as the owner of the operation permissions can successfully decapsulate the second key, thus strengthening access control.

[0079] In a preferred embodiment, when the operation involves reading a file, step S35, performing a control operation on the decrypted file according to the operation content and returning the control operation result to the application interface, includes: The decrypted file is then directly returned to the application interface.

[0080] For the need to read files, only the encrypted file needs to be decrypted, without performing any other operations. Therefore, after the security check is completed, the decrypted file can be directly returned to the application interface.

[0081] It is worth noting that, in this embodiment of the invention, both security decisions and decryption operations are executed within the Super SIM card. The data only leaves the secure hardware environment built by the Super SIM card during the final decryption file delivery stage, thereby improving the security of data management.

[0082] In another preferred embodiment, when the operation involves deleting a file, step S35 involves performing a control operation on the decrypted file according to the operation content, and returning the control operation result to the application interface, which is then executed through steps S351-S353. S351. Match the decrypted file with a preset secure deletion policy; the secure deletion policy includes mark deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion; S352. According to the matched security deletion policy, delete the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file; S353. Return the result of the deletion operation to the application interface.

[0083] Different types of data have varying sensitivities and values, and their security requirements for destruction also differ. This invention introduces a preset secure deletion strategy for decision-making, weighing security strength and operational performance according to certain rules to provide differentiated data deletion solutions for subsequent execution.

[0084] In some preferred embodiments, marker deletion and zero-filling deletion are reversible deletions, while overwrite deletion is an irreversible deletion.

[0085] Further, preferably, step S351, matching the decrypted file with a preset security deletion policy, is executed through steps S3511-S3514: S3511. Divide the decrypted file into blocks to obtain a file block list; S3512. Calculate the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and divide the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness. S3513. Calculate the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the deletion security level of the caller. S3514. Match the associated deletion security utility coefficient with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy.

[0086] In this embodiment of the invention, the decrypted file is divided into blocks, which transform the file into smaller units that can be analyzed independently. This allows for the analysis of the file's internal structure. Furthermore, by calculating the stickiness of each block, automatic classification and value identification of the block content can be achieved.

[0087] User file chunk lists are highly unique and have low repetition, thus possessing higher value; while application file chunk lists are more generic and have high repetition, thus possessing lower value. In some preferred embodiments, high genericity is indicated when a chunk matches a fixed clause template of a standard contract or when a chunk appears repeatedly.

[0088] If the length of the user file block list of a decrypted file is long, it indicates that the core value and main risk value of this decrypted file are high. Once leaked or not completely deleted, the resulting loss is irreversible and requires a higher level of security attention. In this embodiment of the invention, the level of security attention is reflected as the associated deletion security utility coefficient.

[0089] In the above scheme, the Super SIM card can intelligently select the most economical and effective deletion scheme from mark deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion based on the actual content of the file and external security requirements.

[0090] Furthermore, as a preferred implementation, step S3511 involves dividing the decrypted file into blocks to obtain a file block list, including: Obtain the second key used for encryption and its decryption difficulty from the metadata; Obtain the total computing power of the Super SIM card and its associated terminal; The block length is calculated based on the length of the second key, the decryption difficulty, and the total computing power; The decrypted file is divided into blocks according to the block length to obtain a file block list.

[0091] Decryption difficulty represents the computational complexity required to decrypt the second key, which is determined by the type of asymmetric encryption algorithm used during encryption and the key length.

[0092] The total computing power of the Super SIM card and its associated terminal is a comprehensive indicator of the system's computing capabilities. It encompasses the combined processing power of the Super SIM card's built-in security chip and the central processing unit of the associated terminal device, and represents the upper limit of the system's performance in executing computing tasks.

[0093] Preferably, the total computing power includes terminal computing power, super SIM card computing power, terminal parallel capability, super SIM card parallel capability, and super SIM card hardware decryption computing power.

[0094] In some preferred embodiments, the block length Represented as: ; in, The length of the second key. For terminal computing power, For the computing power of the super SIM card, For terminal parallel capabilities, For the parallel capabilities of the Super SIM card, To reduce the complexity of the decryption algorithm, For the hardware decryption computing power of the Super SIM card, .

[0095] It is understandable that the block length is the result of optimization of the security attributes of the decrypted file and the system performance. From the overall trend, the block length is positively correlated with the decryption difficulty and negatively correlated with the total computing power. The above calculation formula for the block length is only an example. Based on this calculation logic, different block length calculation formulas can be set according to specific application scenarios. The above calculation formula does not affect the beneficial effects produced by the embodiments of the present invention.

[0096] In the above scheme, by dynamically calculating the block length, an optimal balance between analysis accuracy and processing speed can be automatically found when dealing with files of different security levels and terminals with varying processing capabilities, thus maintaining high efficiency and reliability in a wide range of application scenarios.

[0097] In a preferred embodiment, step S3512, calculating the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and dividing the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness, includes: Based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file, the block stickiness of each block is calculated; When the stickiness of the segment is not less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the application file segment list; When the stickiness of the segment is less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the user file segment list.

[0098] It should be noted that the caller file is the application currently invoking this deletion operation, i.e., the caller, the context, or other files in its associated storage space; the application template file is a file provided by the caller application as a standard template or general basis, and its content has high reusability and immutability.

[0099] If the data segment is highly consistent with the file or application template file in the caller, it indicates that the data segment is recurring general data and not unique to the user, and its corresponding security risk level is low.

[0100] In some preferred embodiments, the preset stickiness threshold is 0. When the stickiness of the segment is not less than 0, the segment is added to the application file segment list; when the stickiness of the segment is less than 0, the segment is added to the user file segment list.

[0101] In the above scheme, by analyzing the tendency of each block to be a general component and calculating the block stickiness, the decrypted file is separated into two parts: public resources and core resources, so as to automatically perform risk classification based on data value.

[0102] Further, preferably, the step of calculating the stickiness of each block based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file includes: Based on the consistency between the first block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file respectively, the block stickiness of the first block is calculated; Select the current block sequentially according to the block order in the file block list; The stickiness of the current block is calculated based on the stickiness of the previous block and the consistency of the current block with the file in the caller and the application template file, respectively.

[0103] It should be noted that the block order corresponds to the physical or logical order of the blocks in the original file. Performing the block stickiness calculation according to this order ensures the integrity of the calculation.

[0104] Adjacent chunks are often related in terms of content and semantics. Therefore, the attributes of a chunk are likely to be similar to those of its neighboring chunks. In this embodiment of the invention, the chunk stickiness of the previous chunk is used as the input for calculating the chunk stickiness of the current chunk to achieve smooth processing of the calculation results.

[0105] In some preferred embodiments, the block viscosity of block i Represented as: ; in, This indicates the number of blocks i that are completely identical in the calling file. This indicates the state of the segment i in the application template file (1 for existence, 0 for non-existence).

[0106] In the above scheme, each block is considered in its local sequence environment. The calculated block stickiness can take into account the objective attributes of each block itself, and can also conform to the natural continuity of the data.

[0107] As a preferred implementation, step S3513, calculating the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the caller's deletion security level, includes: If the length of the user file block list is 0, then the associated deletion security utility coefficient is set to a preset coefficient; the preset coefficient matches the zero-filling deletion. If the length of the user file block list is not 0, then obtain the storage status of the Super SIM card and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient of the encrypted file is calculated based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, the storage status, and the deletion security level.

[0108] The length of the user file block list quantifies the proportion of highly sensitive user data in the decrypted file, while the length of the application file block list quantifies the proportion of low-sensitivity template data in the decrypted file.

[0109] When the length of the user file block list is 0, it indicates that the decrypted file consists entirely of general data and does not contain any core secrets that need to be completely destroyed. In this embodiment of the invention, a fast path is provided to directly set its associated deletion security utility coefficient, which is matched with zero-padding deletion.

[0110] When the length of the user file block list is not 0, it indicates that there is sensitive data in the decrypted file. In this embodiment of the invention, the selection of the deletion strategy is transformed into a multi-objective optimization problem, and decisions are made based on factors such as the block list length, the storage status of the super SIM card, and the deletion security level.

[0111] It should be noted that the storage status value of the Super SIM card, which represents the current usage of the internal storage space, is preferably determined by the remaining space size, the percentage of space used, and the minimum reserved space.

[0112] In some preferred embodiments, the storage state of the Super SIM card Represented as: ; in, The remaining space size Percentage of space used Minimum reserved space.

[0113] It should also be noted that the deletion security level of the caller refers to a parameter explicitly specified by the application that calls the deletion operation, representing its security strength requirements for deleting this file.

[0114] In this embodiment of the invention, the calculation logic of the associated deletion security utility coefficient is as follows: the larger the length of the user file block list and the deletion security level, the larger the calculated coefficient should be, and the more it tends to be a safe overwrite deletion; the larger the length of the application file block list, or when the storage status indicates that the system resources are tight, the calculated coefficient should be suppressed, and the more it tends to be a highly efficient marking or zero-filling deletion.

[0115] In some preferred embodiments, the security utility coefficient for association deletion is expressed as: ; in, This refers to the storage status of the Super SIM card. List of user file chunks Length, The deletion security level for the caller. List of application file chunks The length.

[0116] In the above scheme, path splitting is performed based on the presence or absence of user file chunks. First, purely general files are processed quickly. Then, for decrypted files containing user file chunks, a comprehensive evaluation of the security utility coefficient of associated deletion is performed based on the file's internal attributes, system status, and external security policies. This ensures that the Super SIM card's data deletion strategy can be applied to various complex scenarios.

[0117] As a preferred implementation, step S3514, matching the associated deletion security utility coefficient with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy, includes: When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is not greater than the preset first coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to mark deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than a preset first coefficient threshold and not greater than a preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to zero-filling deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than the preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to overwrite deletion.

[0118] In this embodiment of the invention, the security levels of marker deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion are progressively increased.

[0119] When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is not greater than a preset first coefficient threshold, mark-and-delete is used. This is because the file contains very little sensitive content, the application requires a low level of deletion security, or the system storage pressure is high. In this case, the probability of data being accidentally deleted or needing to be recovered is relatively high, while the risk of data leakage itself is very low.

[0120] When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than the preset first coefficient threshold and not greater than the preset second coefficient threshold, zero-filling deletion is used. This is because the deletion operation has certain security utility requirements. Zero-filling deletion can destroy the original ciphertext by physically overwriting it, preventing simple data recovery and meeting basic security requirements.

[0121] When the security utility coefficient of the associated deletion exceeds a preset second coefficient threshold, overwrite deletion is employed to ensure that the data is completely destroyed. In this scenario, the thoroughness and irrecoverability of the data are the primary objectives, while performance and resource consumption become secondary considerations.

[0122] The above solution precisely matches different strengths of security deletion strategies with the scenario, avoiding the waste or insufficiency of security resources.

[0123] In some preferred embodiments, when the secure deletion policy is mark-to-delete, step S352, deleting the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matched secure deletion policy, includes: The list of operation permission owners in the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is cleared, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the first flag, so that the encrypted file can be logically deleted by the first flag.

[0124] In some preferred embodiments, the metadata corresponding to the encrypted file is represented as follows: ; in, For creation time, To modify the time, For file size, As the file owner, List of users with permissions to perform operations on this item. For the degree of sensitivity, For safety protection requirements, This is the second key.

[0125] When the deletion is marked, the metadata is modified as follows: ; in, This indicates that the current time is being retrieved. This indicates the identity information in the current caller's certificate (to be filled in during the first subsequent read / modification, and empty at this time), and the deletion flag. A value of 1 indicates that the entire file should be deleted.

[0126] It should be noted that in the metadata modification formula corresponding to the above-mentioned mark deletion, the entire list of operation permission owners is not cleared. Instead, the current caller in the list of operation permission owners is deleted, and the file owner information is set to empty, so as to achieve the effect that the current caller cannot access the encrypted file. This implementation method and clearing the list of operation permission owners in the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file can achieve similar technical effects. The choice can be made based on the specific application scenario and does not affect the beneficial effects produced by the embodiments of the present invention.

[0127] In the above scheme, by modifying metadata, the legitimate access path is cut off, so that the encrypted file is logically deleted, while the encrypted file itself is preserved as is, providing data integrity guarantee for the restoration operation.

[0128] In some other preferred embodiments, when the secure deletion policy is zero-padding deletion, step S352, deleting the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matched secure deletion policy, includes: The blocks in the user file block list are copied to a contiguous storage location to form a mirrored user file; Iterate through the application file blocks in the application file block list and perform a global deduplication check on each application file block; If there are duplicate blocks in the current application file, record the position of the duplicate block and obtain the first position; If there is no duplicate block of the current application file block, then the current application file block is encrypted and backed up, and the backup position is recorded to obtain the second position; Based on the first and second positions, generate the basis for restoring the application file; The encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file is padded with 0 bytes; Based on the restored image user file and application file, the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is updated, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the second flag.

[0129] During the zero-filling and deletion process, the list of high-value user file blocks in the decrypted file is organized from a fragmented state into contiguous mirror user files to ensure a complete backup of the unique data in the files. For the application file block list, global deduplication is used to intelligently avoid duplicate backups. For existing blocks, their first position is recorded directly; for blocks that are not completely identical, a backup is created and their second position is recorded to generate the basis for application file restoration.

[0130] In some preferred embodiments, during global deduplication, the Super SIM Card Read-Only Shared Area, the Super SIM Card Read-Only Shared Cloud Area, and the Application Shared Area are searched to determine whether a block is a duplicate block.

[0131] By filling encrypted files with 0 bytes, physical erasure of the storage area corresponding to the encrypted file can be achieved, ensuring that the file cannot be directly recovered through disk scanning, thus meeting basic data security destruction requirements.

[0132] Preferably, when deleting with zeros, the metadata is modified as follows: ; in, This is for mirroring user files.

[0133] The above solution achieves secure deletion at the cost of a single physical overwrite, while providing a basis for file recovery, thus balancing security, efficiency, and resource utilization.

[0134] In some preferred embodiments, when the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, step S352, according to the matched secure deletion policy, deletes the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file, including: Based on the metadata, the dependent files and their security protection requirements are obtained; Based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements, dynamically calculate the number of overwrite / clear operations; When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is less than a preset threshold, the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file are filled with 0 bytes. When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is not less than the preset threshold, the application file block list is traversed and the storage area of ​​each application file block is filled with 0 bytes in sequence. Based on the number of overwrite clears, the user file block list is iteratively traversed, and in each traversal, the storage area of ​​each user file block is filled with random bytes in sequence; Iterate through the user file block list again, and fill the storage area of ​​each user file block with 0 bytes in turn; Set the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file to 0.

[0135] It should be noted that dependent files refer to files that are logically or business-related to the file to be deleted. The status of these files affects the value and sensitivity of the file to be deleted. For each file, strategic requirements are set for the security level it must meet during its creation or subsequent modifications.

[0136] The number of overwrite and cleanup operations calculated based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements can reflect the total number of times data should be overwritten in the physical storage area occupied by the files to be deleted. The more overwrite and cleanup operations, the stronger the destruction intensity required to achieve the security goal.

[0137] Further, preferably, the step of dynamically calculating the number of overwrite clearing operations based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements includes: Calculate the necessity of confidential deletion based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements; The number of overwrite removals is calculated based on the confidentiality deletion necessity and the preset maximum number of removals.

[0138] In some preferred embodiments, the necessity of confidential deletion is expressed as: ; For the i-th dependency file , Indicates its file category, Indicates the degree of sensitivity. This indicates safety protection requirements.

[0139] Preferably, the number of times the overwrite is cleared is expressed as: ; in, This is the preset maximum number of times to clear.

[0140] In this embodiment of the invention, for low-sensitivity application file blocks, only a single zero-filling operation is required to meet the security objective, without consuming additional computing power to perform multiple random overwrites; for high-sensitivity user file blocks, multiple overwrites are performed based on the number of overwrite and clear operations, so as to ensure that even by illegal means, it is difficult to detect residual traces of the original data from the storage medium.

[0141] Preferably, the preset threshold for the number of times is 2. That is, when the number of times to clear the overwrite is 1, a clearing operation is performed, and zero-filling overwrite is performed directly on the storage area of ​​the application file block; when the number of times to clear the overwrite is n greater than 1, the storage area of ​​the application file block is iteratively overwritten with n-1 random bytes, and finally zero-filling overwrite is performed once, for a total of n times to clear the overwrite.

[0142] It is important to note that under the secure deletion policy of overwrite deletion, the metadata will also be filled with zeros to ensure that the file entry is completely cleared and to prevent illegal operations such as restoring the file after overwrite deletion.

[0143] In the above scheme, by dynamically calculating the number of overwrites and executing differentiated overwrite strategies for application file blocks and user file blocks, it is ensured that the highest level of security resources are accurately and centrally allocated to the core sensitive data that needs the most protection.

[0144] In a preferred embodiment, in addition to the file save interface, file read interface, and file delete interface, the application interface also includes a file restore interface; The data manipulation command from the file recovery interface is a deletion recovery operation.

[0145] This invention also introduces a dedicated file recovery interface to recover deleted files. The Super SIM card can not only safely delete data, but also safely recover data under certain conditions, which greatly improves the reliability of the Super SIM card.

[0146] Furthermore, the data management method also includes: If the verification passes and the operation type is a deletion and recovery operation, then a safe deletion strategy for the target file is obtained based on the operation content; the safe deletion strategy is one of overwrite deletion, zero-filling deletion, and mark deletion. When the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, a restore failure message is generated; When the safe deletion strategy is zero-filling deletion, the target file is restored using a zero-filling compression and restoration algorithm to generate a restored file, and a data operation instruction of operation type creation is generated based on the restored file. When the secure deletion policy is marked for deletion, the metadata corresponding to the target file is updated so that the encrypted file corresponding to the target file can be logically restored.

[0147] Different safe deletion strategies have different reversibility and reversibility methods, therefore different file recovery solutions are given based on different safe deletion strategies.

[0148] The design goal of overwrite deletion is to ensure the unrecoverability of data through physical destruction. Therefore, on the one hand, logically, file recovery is impossible in the scenario of overwrite deletion; on the other hand, in this embodiment of the invention, metadata is cleared during overwrite deletion, leaving no physical entry point for data recovery.

[0149] Zero-filling deletion essentially involves migrating and then destroying files, and its recoverability depends on metadata and prior backups. Zero-filling compression and restoration algorithms utilize the mirrored user files and application files backed up during deletion as a basis for restoration, reassemble the restored file, and then rewrite this restored file into the Super SIM card to achieve physical restoration.

[0150] Marking a file for deletion does not actually delete it from the storage area; it merely makes it temporarily invisible through logical settings. The target file can be restored to an accessible state by repairing its metadata. Preferably, when the target file is marked for deletion, the logical recovery of the encrypted file is achieved by clearing or setting the deletion flag in the metadata.

[0151] The data management method provided by this invention can construct an active data security management system running within the hardware security environment of a Super SIM card, upgrading the Super SIM card from a simple storage medium to a trusted execution environment. This enables data to be protected at the hardware level from the moment it is created, and also achieves refined data lifecycle management, effectively eliminating the risk of data leakage caused by unauthorized applications directly reading and writing to the storage medium.

[0152] This invention provides a data management system. Please refer to [link / reference]. Figure 2The data management system includes an authentication module 11, a file creation module 12, and a file control module 13, wherein: The authentication module 11 is used to receive data operation instructions from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions; the data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; The file creation module 12 is used to generate an encrypted file and corresponding metadata according to the operation content if the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, and to associate and store the encrypted file and the metadata with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions of the encrypted file; The file control module 13 is used to obtain the caller's operation permissions based on the metadata associated with the target access path if the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation. When the operation permission is valid, the module decrypts the encrypted file associated with the target access path and executes the control operation corresponding to the operation content. The operation content corresponding to the operation type of control operation includes reading and deleting files.

[0153] In a preferred embodiment, the application interface includes a file save interface, a file read interface, and a file delete interface; The operation type of data operation commands from the file save interface is creation operation; the operation type of data operation commands from the file read interface and the file delete interface is control operation.

[0154] In a preferred embodiment, the authentication module 11 is specifically used for: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and read the identity information from the caller's ID card. The legitimacy of the identity information is verified using a certificate signature authentication method.

[0155] In a preferred embodiment, the file creation module 12 includes: The data acquisition unit is used to acquire the original file and initial metadata from the operation content if the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation; the initial metadata includes a list of operation permission owners of the original file; An encrypted file generation unit is used to randomly generate a first key and use the first key to perform symmetric encryption on the original file to obtain an encrypted file. The second key generation unit is used to perform asymmetric encryption on the first key based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners to obtain the second key. Metadata generation unit, used to update the initial metadata according to the second key to obtain the metadata corresponding to the encrypted file; A storage control unit is used to associate and store the encrypted file and the metadata with the target access path.

[0156] Further, preferably, the second key generation unit is specifically used for: The first key is split into several key fragments; the number of key fragments is the same as the number of all owners in the permission owner list; Obtain the public key corresponding to each owner in the list of operation permission owners, and use the public key to perform asymmetric encryption on each key fragment to obtain encrypted fragments; A second key is obtained from the set of encrypted fragments; the second key can be decrypted using the private key of any owner.

[0157] In a preferred embodiment, the file control module 13 includes: The operation permission owner list acquisition unit is used to obtain the operation permission owner list of the encrypted file based on the metadata associated with the target access path if the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation. The identity information acquisition unit is used to acquire the identity information from the caller's ID card. An operation permission determination unit is used to determine whether the identity information matches the list of operation permission owners, and to obtain the caller's operation permission. The file decryption unit is used to obtain a private key from the caller's ID card when the operation permission is enabled, and use the private key to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain a decrypted file. The result return unit is used to perform control operations on the decrypted file according to the operation content, and return the control operation result to the application interface.

[0158] Further, preferably, the file decryption unit is specifically used for: When the operation permission is granted, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card. Based on the private key and the metadata associated with the target access path, the first key used for file encryption is restored; The encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted using the first key to obtain the decrypted file.

[0159] Preferably, when the operation involves reading a file, the result return unit is specifically used for: The decrypted file is then directly returned to the application interface.

[0160] Preferably, when the operation involves deleting a file, the result return unit is specifically used for: The decrypted file is matched against a preset secure deletion policy; the secure deletion policy includes mark deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion. According to the matched security deletion policy, the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file are deleted; The result of the deletion operation is returned to the application interface.

[0161] Furthermore, as a preferred embodiment, matching the decrypted file with a preset security deletion policy includes: The decrypted file is divided into blocks to obtain a file block list; Calculate the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and divide the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness. Calculate the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient is matched with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy.

[0162] In a preferred embodiment, the step of dividing the decrypted file into blocks to obtain a file block list includes: Obtain the second key used for encryption and its decryption difficulty from the metadata; Obtain the total computing power of the Super SIM card and its associated terminal; The block length is calculated based on the length of the second key, the decryption difficulty, and the total computing power; The decrypted file is divided into blocks according to the block length to obtain a file block list.

[0163] In a preferred embodiment, calculating the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and dividing the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness, includes: Based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file, the block stickiness of each block is calculated; When the stickiness of the segment is not less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the application file segment list; When the stickiness of the segment is less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the user file segment list.

[0164] Preferably, the step of calculating the stickiness of each block based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file includes: Based on the consistency between the first block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file respectively, the block stickiness of the first block is calculated; Select the current block sequentially according to the block order in the file block list; The stickiness of the current block is calculated based on the stickiness of the previous block and the consistency of the current block with the file in the caller and the application template file, respectively.

[0165] As a preferred implementation, the step of calculating the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file chunk list, the length of the application file chunk list, and the caller's deletion security level includes: If the length of the user file block list is 0, then the associated deletion security utility coefficient is set to a preset coefficient; the preset coefficient matches the zero-filling deletion. If the length of the user file block list is not 0, then obtain the storage status of the Super SIM card and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient of the encrypted file is calculated based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, the storage status, and the deletion security level.

[0166] As a preferred implementation, matching the association deletion security utility coefficient with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy includes: When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is not greater than the preset first coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to mark deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than a preset first coefficient threshold and not greater than a preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to zero-filling deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than the preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to overwrite deletion.

[0167] Preferably, when the secure deletion policy is mark-to-delete, deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matched secure deletion policy includes: The list of operation permission owners in the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is cleared, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the first flag, so that the encrypted file can be logically deleted by the first flag.

[0168] Preferably, when the secure deletion policy is zero-padding deletion, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matched secure deletion policy includes: When the secure deletion policy is zero-filling deletion, the blocks in the user file block list are copied to a contiguous storage location to form a mirrored user file; Iterate through the application file blocks in the application file block list and perform a global deduplication check on each application file block; If there are duplicate blocks in the current application file, record the position of the duplicate block and obtain the first position; If there is no duplicate block of the current application file block, then the current application file block is encrypted and backed up, and the backup position is recorded to obtain the second position; Based on the first and second positions, generate the basis for restoring the application file; The encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file is padded with 0 bytes; Based on the restored image user file and application file, the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is updated, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the second flag.

[0169] Preferably, when the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matched secure deletion policy includes: Based on the metadata, the dependent files and their security protection requirements are obtained; Based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements, dynamically calculate the number of overwrite / clear operations; When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is less than a preset threshold, the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file are filled with 0 bytes. When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is not less than the preset threshold, the application file block list is traversed and the storage area of ​​each application file block is filled with 0 bytes in sequence. Based on the number of overwrite clears, the user file block list is iteratively traversed, and in each traversal, the storage area of ​​each user file block is filled with random bytes in sequence; Iterate through the user file block list again, and fill the storage area of ​​each user file block with 0 bytes in turn; Set the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file to 0.

[0170] In a preferred embodiment, the application interface further includes a file restoration interface; The data manipulation command from the file recovery interface is a deletion recovery operation.

[0171] Furthermore, preferably, the data management system further includes a file restoration module, which is used for: If the verification passes and the operation type is a deletion and recovery operation, then a safe deletion strategy for the target file is obtained based on the operation content; the safe deletion strategy is one of overwrite deletion, zero-filling deletion, and mark deletion. When the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, a restore failure message is generated; When the safe deletion strategy is zero-filling deletion, the target file is restored using a zero-filling compression and restoration algorithm to generate a restored file, and a data operation instruction of operation type creation is generated based on the restored file. When the secure deletion policy is marked for deletion, the metadata corresponding to the target file is updated so that the encrypted file corresponding to the target file can be logically restored.

[0172] The data management system provided by this invention can build an active data security management system running in the hardware security environment of the Super SIM card, upgrading the Super SIM card from a simple storage medium to a trusted execution environment. This enables data to be protected at the hardware level from the moment it is created, and also achieves fine-grained data lifecycle management, effectively eliminating the risk of data leakage caused by unauthorized applications directly reading and writing to the storage medium.

[0173] Please see Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a structural block diagram of a data management device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. The data management device includes a processor 31, a memory 32, and a computer program stored in the memory 32 and executable on the processor 31. When the processor 31 executes the computer program, it implements the steps in the above-described data management method embodiments, such as steps S1 to S3.

[0174] For example, the computer program may be divided into one or more modules / units, which are stored in the memory 32 and executed by the processor 31 to complete the present invention. The one or more modules / units may be a series of computer program instruction segments capable of performing a specific function, which describe the execution process of the computer program in the data management device.

[0175] The data management device may include, but is not limited to, a processor 31 and a memory 32. Those skilled in the art will understand that the schematic diagram is merely an example of a data management device and does not constitute a limitation on the data management device. It may include more or fewer components than illustrated, or combine certain components, or different components. For example, the data management device may also include input / output devices, network access devices, buses, etc.

[0176] The processor 31 can be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The processor 31 is the control center of the data management device, connecting various parts of the entire data management device through various interfaces and lines.

[0177] The memory 32 can be used to store the computer programs and / or modules. The processor 31 implements various functions of the data management device by running or executing the computer programs and / or modules stored in the memory 32 and calling the data stored in the memory 32. The memory 32 may mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area. The program storage area may store the operating system, at least one application program required for a function (such as sound playback function, image playback function, etc.), etc.; the data storage area may store data created according to the use of the mobile phone (such as audio data, phonebook, etc.). In addition, the memory 32 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as hard disk, memory, plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other volatile solid-state storage device.

[0178] If the modules / units integrated into the data management device are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can also be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by the processor 31, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording media, USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, optical disks, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media, etc.

[0179] The above description represents the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various improvements and modifications without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A data management method, characterized in that, The data management method, applied in a Super SIM card, includes: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions; the data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; If the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated according to the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the encrypted file; If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, the caller's operation permissions are obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and the control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed. When the operation type is a control operation, the corresponding operation content includes reading and deleting files.

2. The data management method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The application interfaces include a file save interface, a file read interface, and a file delete interface; The operation type of the data manipulation command from the file saving interface is a creation operation; The data manipulation commands from the file read interface and the file delete interface are both control operations.

3. The data management method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of receiving data operation instructions from the application interface and verifying the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions includes: Receive data operation instructions from the application interface and read the identity information from the caller's ID card. The legitimacy of the identity information is verified using a certificate signature authentication method.

4. The data management method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, If the verification passes and the operation type is a creation operation, then an encrypted file and corresponding metadata are generated based on the operation content, and the encrypted file and the metadata are associated with and stored with the target access path, including: If the verification passes and the operation type is a creation operation, then the original file and initial metadata are obtained from the operation content; the initial metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the original file; A first key is randomly generated, and the original file is symmetrically encrypted using the first key to obtain an encrypted file; Based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners, the first key is asymmetrically encrypted to obtain the second key; The initial metadata is updated based on the second key to obtain the metadata corresponding to the encrypted file; The encrypted file and the metadata are stored in association with the target access path.

5. The data management method as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The step of performing asymmetric encryption on the first key based on the public keys corresponding to all owners in the list of operation permission owners to obtain the second key includes: The first key is split into several key fragments; the number of key fragments is the same as the number of all owners in the permission owner list; Obtain the public key corresponding to each owner in the list of operation permission owners, and use the public key to perform asymmetric encryption on each key fragment to obtain encrypted fragments; A second key is obtained from the set of encrypted fragments; the second key can be decrypted using the private key of any owner.

6. The data management method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, If the verification passes and the operation type is a control operation, then based on the metadata associated with the target access path, the caller's operation permissions are obtained. When the operation permissions are valid, the encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted and a control operation corresponding to the operation content is executed, including: If the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation, then a list of owners of operation permissions for the encrypted file is obtained based on the metadata associated with the target access path. Retrieve the identity information from the caller's ID card; Determine whether the identity information matches the list of operation permission holders to obtain the caller's operation permissions; When the operation permission is enabled, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card, and the private key is used to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain the decrypted file; Based on the operation content, control operations are performed on the decrypted file, and the control operation results are returned to the application interface.

7. A data management method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, When the operation permission is granted, a private key is obtained from the caller's ID card, and the private key is used to decrypt the encrypted file associated with the target access path to obtain a decrypted file, including: When the operation permission is granted, the private key is obtained from the caller's ID card. Based on the private key and the metadata associated with the target access path, the first key used for file encryption is restored; The encrypted file associated with the target access path is decrypted using the first key to obtain the decrypted file.

8. The data management method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, When the operation involves reading a file, the step of performing control operations on the decrypted file according to the operation content and returning the control operation result to the application interface includes: The decrypted file is then directly returned to the application interface.

9. A data management method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, When the operation involves deleting a file, the process of performing control operations on the decrypted file according to the operation content and returning the control operation result to the application interface includes: The decrypted file is matched against a preset secure deletion policy; the secure deletion policy includes mark deletion, zero-filling deletion, and overwrite deletion. According to the matched security deletion policy, the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file are deleted; The result of the deletion operation is returned to the application interface.

10. A data management method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, The step of matching the decrypted file with a preset secure deletion policy includes: The decrypted file is divided into blocks to obtain a file block list; Calculate the stickiness of each block in the file block list, and divide the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the stickiness. Calculate the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient is matched with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy.

11. The data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The process of dividing the decrypted file into blocks to obtain a file block list includes: Obtain the second key used for encryption and its decryption difficulty from the metadata; Obtain the total computing power of the Super SIM card and its associated terminal; The block length is calculated based on the length of the second key, the decryption difficulty, and the total computing power; The decrypted file is divided into blocks according to the block length to obtain a file block list.

12. The data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The calculation of the block stickiness of each block in the file block list, and the division of the file block list into a user file block list and an application file block list based on the block stickiness, includes: Based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file, the block stickiness of each block is calculated; When the stickiness of the segment is not less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the application file segment list; When the stickiness of the segment is less than a preset stickiness threshold, the segment is added to the user file segment list.

13. The data management method as described in claim 12, characterized in that, The step of calculating the stickiness of each block based on the consistency between each block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file includes: Based on the consistency between the first block in the file block list and the files in the caller and the application template file respectively, the block stickiness of the first block is calculated; Select the current block sequentially according to the block order in the file block list; The stickiness of the current block is calculated based on the stickiness of the previous block and the consistency of the current block with the file in the caller and the application template file, respectively.

14. The data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The step of calculating the associated deletion security utility coefficient based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, and the caller's deletion security level includes: If the length of the user file block list is 0, then the associated deletion security utility coefficient is set to a preset coefficient; the preset coefficient matches the zero-filling deletion. If the length of the user file block list is not 0, then obtain the storage status of the Super SIM card and the deletion security level of the caller; The associated deletion security utility coefficient of the encrypted file is calculated based on the length of the user file block list, the length of the application file block list, the storage status, and the deletion security level.

15. A data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The step of matching the associated deletion security utility coefficient with a preset coefficient range to obtain a secure deletion strategy includes: When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is not greater than the preset first coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to mark deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than a preset first coefficient threshold and not greater than a preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to zero-filling deletion; When the associated deletion security utility coefficient is greater than the preset second coefficient threshold, the security deletion strategy is set to overwrite deletion.

16. A data management method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, When the security deletion policy is mark-to-delete, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching security deletion policy includes: The list of operation permission owners in the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is cleared, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the first flag, so that the encrypted file can be logically deleted by the first flag.

17. A data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, When the security deletion policy is zero-padding deletion, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching security deletion policy includes: The blocks in the user file block list are copied to a contiguous storage location to form a mirrored user file; Iterate through the application file blocks in the application file block list and perform a global deduplication check on each application file block; If there are duplicate blocks in the current application file, record the position of the duplicate block and obtain the first position; If there is no duplicate block of the current application file block, then the current application file block is encrypted and backed up, and the backup position is recorded to obtain the second position; Based on the first and second positions, generate the basis for restoring the application file; The encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file is padded with 0 bytes; Based on the restored image user file and application file, the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file is updated, and the deletion flag in the metadata is set to the second flag.

18. A data management method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, When the security deletion policy is overwrite deletion, the step of deleting the metadata and encrypted files corresponding to the decrypted file according to the matching security deletion policy includes: Based on the metadata, the dependent files and their security protection requirements are obtained; Based on the dependent files and their security protection requirements, dynamically calculate the number of overwrite / clear operations; When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is less than a preset threshold, the metadata and encrypted file corresponding to the decrypted file are filled with 0 bytes. When the number of times the overwrite is cleared is not less than the preset threshold, the application file block list is traversed and the storage area of ​​each application file block is filled with 0 bytes in sequence. Based on the number of overwrite clears, the user file block list is iteratively traversed, and in each traversal, the storage area of ​​each user file block is filled with random bytes in sequence; Iterate through the user file block list again, and fill the storage area of ​​each user file block with 0 bytes in turn; Set the metadata corresponding to the decrypted file to 0.

19. A data management method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The application interface also includes a file recovery interface; The data manipulation command from the file recovery interface is a deletion recovery operation.

20. A data management method as described in claim 19, characterized in that, The data management method also includes: If the verification passes and the operation type is a deletion and recovery operation, then a safe deletion strategy for the target file is obtained based on the operation content; the safe deletion strategy is one of overwrite deletion, zero-filling deletion, and mark deletion. When the secure deletion policy is overwrite deletion, a restore failure message is generated; When the safe deletion strategy is zero-filling deletion, the target file is restored using a zero-filling compression and restoration algorithm to generate a restored file, and a data operation instruction of operation type creation is generated based on the restored file. When the secure deletion policy is marked for deletion, the metadata corresponding to the target file is updated so that the encrypted file corresponding to the target file can be logically restored.

21. A data management system, characterized in that, The data management system, used in the Super SIM card, includes: The authentication module is used to receive data operation instructions from the application interface and verify the caller's identity certificate in the data operation instructions; the data operation instructions include the caller's identity certificate, operation type, operation content, and target access path; The file creation module is used to generate an encrypted file and corresponding metadata based on the operation content if the verification is successful and the operation type is a creation operation, and to associate and store the encrypted file and the metadata with the target access path; the metadata includes a list of owners of the operation permissions for the encrypted file; The file control module is used to obtain the caller's operation permissions based on the metadata associated with the target access path if the verification is successful and the operation type is a control operation. When the operation permission is valid, the module decrypts the encrypted file associated with the target access path and executes the control operation corresponding to the operation content. When the operation type is a control operation, the corresponding operation content includes reading and deleting files.

22. A data management device, characterized in that, It includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the computer program, implements the data management method as described in any one of claims 1 to 20.

23. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein, when the computer program is executed, it controls the device on which the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform the data management method as described in any one of claims 1 to 20.

24. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product includes a computer program or computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, perform the data management method as described in any one of claims 1 to 20.

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