Safe and reliable P2P network node ID distribution method

Abstract

The invention relates to a safe and reliable P2P network node ID distribution method, and belongs to the technical field of computer networks. According to the method, dual identity authentication is adopted to screen legal nodes, and the legal nodes are divided into common nodes and important nodes. A common node generates a random sequence through a chaos function according to a generation parameter sent by the CA, the random sequence is converted to obtain a node ID, an important node ID is directly distributed by the CA, and finally transmission integrity is ensured through CRC verification. According to the method, forged IP access is blocked through dual authentication, and the risk of privacy disclosure is isolated by centralized management and control of a node IP and ID mapping relation through CA; an unpredictable ID sequence is generated by the chaotic function, various chaotic systems are supported, the ID length is adjustable, and different network environments can be flexibly adapted; security protection is provided from multiple dimensions of public key encryption, CRC verification and CA centralized management and control. Through a strict identity authentication mechanism, chaos randomization and an error detection technology, safe, reliable and privacy-protected node ID distribution is realized, and the P2P network security is remarkably improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of computer network technology, and specifically to a secure and reliable method for allocating P2P network node IDs. Background Technology

[0002] In P2P networks, Node ID is used to uniquely identify each node in the network. It is a core element for network addressing and resource location. Node ID can help nodes build routing tables, optimize path connections between nodes, and improve the robustness and scalability of the network. A secure and reliable Node ID allocation scheme can prevent malicious nodes from forging identities and improve network security.

[0003] However, most traditional structured P2P systems only address Sybil attacks and lack comprehensive security design. Malicious nodes can forge IDs, control network routing, and tamper with or corrupt transmitted content, such as interfering with file-sharing services by seizing specific ID positions. Some solutions rely on complex CA (Certificate Authority) certificate systems or key escrow mechanisms, which increase management costs and pose a risk of key leakage. Furthermore, in most dynamic allocation schemes, the new node identity verification mechanism is simple, making it easy for unauthorized nodes to obtain IDs by forging join requests, thereby gaining access to the network to steal data or launch attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a secure and reliable method for allocating node IDs in a P2P network, aiming to solve the problems of node identity exposure, ID predictability, and ID information tampering in P2P networks. By employing a strict identity authentication mechanism, chaotic randomization technology, and error detection technology, it achieves secure, reliable, and privacy-protected node ID allocation.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this invention provides a secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method, comprising the following steps:

[0006] Step 1: The CA performs dual authentication on the P2P network nodes, verifying both their identity and IP address.

[0007] Step 2: For nodes that have passed identity authentication, dynamically generate node IDs based on the system parameters returned by CA, node ID length N, and initial value;

[0008] Step 3: After receiving the target node ID, the neighboring node performs a CRC check to verify its integrity and validity; only when the check passes can the neighboring node establish a communication connection with the target node.

[0009] Optionally, the execution process of step 1 includes the following steps:

[0010] Step 1.1: The node sends an authentication request to the CA. The authentication request is encrypted with the node's private key and sent to the CA. The CA decrypts the request using the node's public key.

[0011] Step 1.2: The CA authenticates the identity of the nodes applying to join, including checking the certificate validity period, verifying the signature validity, and confirming the IP address ownership;

[0012] Step 1.3: Nodes that pass authentication proceed to the next step; nodes that fail authentication are denied access to the network or are isolated.

[0013] Step 1.4: The CA verifies the node applying to join. If the node is a regular node, proceed to step 1.5; if the node is an important node, proceed to step 1.6.

[0014] Step 1.5: Based on the chaotic function set in the network and the IP address value of the node, CA generates system parameters, node ID length N and initial value, and proceeds to the execution process of Step 2;

[0015] Step 1.6: The CA directly generates a node ID, encrypts the ID value along with other authentication messages using the node's public key, and sends it to the node. The node decrypts the information using its private key to obtain the node ID and proceeds to step 3 for processing.

[0016] The mechanism by which CA generates node IDs is basically the same as that for ordinary node IDs. The main difference is that the ID length L of important nodes is shorter than the ID length N of ordinary nodes. The network distinguishes node types by the node ID length: IDs of length N identify ordinary nodes, and IDs of length L identify important nodes.

[0017] Optionally, the execution process of step 1.5 includes the following steps:

[0018] Step 1.5.1: System parameters and initial values ​​are determined by the selected chaotic function, ensuring that the sequence generated by the chaotic function satisfies the characteristics of a chaotic sequence. A one-to-one correspondence must be established between the initial values ​​and node IP addresses. Furthermore, based on the high sensitivity of the chaotic function to initial values, a mapping mechanism between the initial values ​​and node IP addresses must be designed. This mapping relationship must satisfy the one-to-one mapping principle and be highly efficient to implement.

[0019] Step 1.5.2: The node ID length N value is set by network requirements;

[0020] Step 1.5.3: Based on the set initial value and node IP address mapping relationship, map the node IP address to the initial value of the chaotic function;

[0021] Step 1.5.4: Encrypt the system parameters, node ID length N, initial value, and other authentication information together with the message using the node's public key and send it to the node. The node decrypts the corresponding information using its own private key.

[0022] Optionally, the node ID generation phase in step 2 includes the following steps:

[0023] Step 2.1: The node decrypts the authentication echo message sent by the CA using its private key to obtain the system parameters, node ID length N, and initial value.

[0024] Step 2.2: Input the system parameters and initial values ​​into the chaotic function set in the network system to obtain the chaotic sequence. The sequence length is N;

[0025] Step 2.3: Convert the chaotic sequence into a node ID. Based on the specific properties of the chaotic sequence, convert the chaotic sequence into a binary sequence. The corresponding binary sequence is the node ID.

[0026] Optionally, the execution process of step 3 includes the following steps:

[0027] Step 3.1: The node performs a CRC check on the generated ID;

[0028] Step 3.2: The node sends its node ID information, which includes a CRC check mechanism, to its neighboring nodes;

[0029] Step 3.3: After receiving the ID, the neighboring node first performs a CRC check; if the CRC check is correct, it establishes a routing table based on the received ID information; if the CRC check is incorrect, it discards the information and reports the abnormal event to the higher layers of the network, and the network notifies the newly joined node to resend the ID information.

[0030] This invention provides a secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method. First, nodes undergo dual authentication. Authenticated nodes are considered legitimate and allowed to join the network; unauthenticated nodes are denied access. For authenticated nodes, a Controller Area Network (CA) categorizes them into ordinary and important nodes. For ordinary nodes, the CA sends node ID generation parameters. Upon receiving system parameters, ID length, and initial values, the node generates a chaotic sequence using a chaotic function, which is then converted into a binary sequence as the node ID. For important nodes, the CA controls the generation of their IDs and sends them directly to the important nodes. Finally, CRC verification ensures transmission integrity. This invention employs dual authentication to block spoofed IP access and defend against Sybil attacks; the IP-ID mapping relationship is centrally managed by the CA, isolating privacy risks; the chaotic function generates unpredictable ID sequences, avoiding reverse pattern derivation; it supports multiple chaotic systems and has adjustable ID lengths to adapt to different network environments; public key encryption ensures information confidentiality; CRC verification ensures transmission reliability; and centralized CA management enhances network controllability. This invention achieves secure, reliable, and privacy-preserving node ID allocation through a strict identity authentication mechanism, chaotic randomization, and error detection technology, significantly improving the network security of P2P networks. Attached Figure Description

[0031] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0032] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0033] The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and intended to explain the invention, and should not be construed as limiting the invention.

[0034] This invention provides a secure and reliable method for allocating node IDs in a P2P network, comprising the following steps:

[0035] Step 1: The CA performs dual authentication on the P2P network nodes, verifying both their identity and IP address.

[0036] Step 2: For nodes that have passed identity authentication, dynamically generate node IDs based on the system parameters returned by CA, node ID length N, and initial value;

[0037] Step 3: After receiving the target node ID, the neighboring node performs a CRC check to verify its integrity and validity; only when the check passes can the neighboring node establish a communication connection with the target node.

[0038] Please see Figure 1 The following is a further explanation of the specific implementation process:

[0039] (1) Node authentication phase

[0040] 1. The node sends an authentication request to the CA. This request includes the node's IP address, digital certificate, and timestamp signature. The authentication request is encrypted with the node's private key and sent to the CA. The CA decrypts the request using the node's public key. Public key encryption technology ensures the security of the authentication request information and protects the node's privacy.

[0041] 2. The CA verifies the identity of the nodes applying to join, including checking the certificate validity period, verifying the legality of the signature, and confirming the IP address ownership.

[0042] 3. Nodes that pass authentication proceed to step 4; nodes that fail authentication are handled according to standard P2P network procedures, either by refusing to join the network or by isolating them.

[0043] 4. In a P2P network, nodes are divided into ordinary nodes and important nodes. The CA identifies the nodes that apply to join. If the node is an ordinary node, proceed to step 5; if the node is an important node, proceed to step 6.

[0044] 5. Based on the chaotic function set in the network and the IP address values ​​of the nodes, CA generates system parameters, node ID length N, and initial values. This invention does not impose specific restrictions on the selection of the chaotic function; any function capable of generating chaotic sequence characteristics is acceptable. Given that the Logistic chaotic function is simple in structure, computationally efficient, and possesses typical chaotic characteristics, it is one of the most classic and easily implemented chaotic functions. For ease of explanation, this embodiment uniformly uses the Logistic chaotic function as a typical example.

[0045] 5.1 The system parameters and initial values ​​are determined by the selected chaotic function, ensuring that the sequence generated by the chaotic function is a chaotic sequence. The system parameters of the Logistic chaotic function are... The value is close to 4 ( ), initial value The range of values ​​for is .

[0046] 5.2 The value of N is set by network requirements, and in this invention, N can take any value.

[0047] 5.3 Based on the defined chaotic function, map the node IP address to the initial value of that chaotic function. Different chaotic functions have different initial value sensitivity ranges; therefore, the mapping relationship between node IP address values ​​and initial values ​​is determined by the chaotic function. The design of this mapping function should meet two conditions: simple implementation and each IP value uniquely corresponds to one initial value. For the Logistic chaotic function, since the initial value is between 0 and 1, a simple mapping relationship between IP and initial value is to use the dotted decimal IP address as the fractional part of the initial value, and to distinguish the difference between the fourth bit of the IP address being 10, 100, and 1, add a 1 at the end. Assuming the node IP address is 192.12.10.1, the initial value is 0.192121011; the initial value for IP address 192.12.10.10 is 0.1921210101, and the initial value for IP address 192.12.10.100 is 0.19212101001. The mapping relationship between node IP addresses and initial values ​​is designed to be extremely simple, strictly adhering to the one-to-one correspondence principle between IP addresses and initial values, and all initial values ​​are within a preset range. This scheme has good feasibility. Furthermore, since the range of numeric values ​​that can be added to the end of the IP address covers any integer from 1 to 9 (not limited to 1), the design and implementation complexity of the mapping function is further reduced.

[0048] 5.4 The system parameters, node ID length N, initial value, and other authentication information are encrypted together with the node's public key and sent to the node. The node decrypts the information using its private key. Other nodes and third-party users on the network do not have the node's private key and cannot decipher the information. Public-key cryptography ensures the security of key parameters in node ID generation. Other nodes and third-party users on the network cannot forge node IDs by intercepting CA authentication information. The legitimacy and security of the node ID are guaranteed. Then, the second stage of processing begins.

[0049] 6. The CA directly generates a node ID, encrypts this ID value along with other authentication messages using the node's public key, and sends it to the node. The node decrypts this information using its private key to obtain the node ID and proceeds to the third stage of processing. The CA's node ID generation process is the same as that of ordinary nodes, the only difference being that the ID length L of important nodes is less than the ID length N of ordinary nodes in step 5. By explicitly distinguishing between ordinary nodes and important nodes using the ID length parameter, automatic classification is achieved.

[0050] (2) Node ID generation stage

[0051] 1. The node uses its private key to decrypt the authentication echo message sent by the CA, and obtains the system parameters, node ID length N, and initial value from it.

[0052] 2. Input the system parameters and initial values ​​into the chaotic function set in the network system to obtain the chaotic sequence. The sequence length is N. The chaotic sequence of the Logistic chaotic function is generated by the following formula.

[0053]

[0054] 3. Convert the chaotic sequence into node IDs. Different chaotic functions produce chaotic sequences with different value ranges. Based on the properties of the specific chaotic sequence, convert it into a binary sequence, which is the node ID. Let the sequence... Here, the node ID is used. The transformation process from a chaotic sequence to a node ID sequence for the Logistic chaotic function is as follows:

[0055]

[0056] (3) Communication establishment phase

[0057] 1. The node performs a CRC check operation on the ID. This invention does not impose any special restrictions on the selection of the CRC check algorithm. Common algorithms such as CRC-16 can be used to complete the check process.

[0058] 2. Nodes send node identification information containing CRC check mechanism to neighboring nodes through the communication link to ensure the integrity and reliability of ID information during transmission.

[0059] 3. After receiving the ID, the neighboring node first performs a CRC check.

[0060] 3.1 If the CRC check is correct, it means that the information has not been tampered with by a third party or that a transmission error has occurred. A routing table is then established based on the received ID information.

[0061] 3.2 If the CRC check is incorrect, it indicates that the information has been tampered with by a third party or that an error occurred during transmission. The information should be discarded and the abnormal event should be reported to the higher layers of the network. The network should then notify the newly joined node to resend the ID information.

[0062] In summary, the method of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0063] 1. Strict dual authentication mechanism

[0064] This invention employs a dual authentication mechanism. Building upon the traditional P2P network node authentication framework (based on digital certificates and timestamp signature technology), it introduces IP attribution authentication. By bidirectionally verifying node identity and IP authenticity, it effectively blocks malicious access attempts using spoofed IPs. This mechanism can systematically resist Sybil attacks, prevent unauthorized nodes from injecting into the network, and significantly improve network topology security.

[0065] 2. Comprehensive privacy protection design

[0066] The mapping relationship between node IPs and IDs is centrally managed by the CA (Certificate Authority), which is the only entity that possesses this mapping, effectively isolating the risk of IP exposure. Combined with the unpredictable ID sequences generated by chaotic functions, a dual randomization mechanism is formed, ensuring both the privacy of identity identifiers and preventing the reverse derivation of ID patterns.

[0067] 3. Highly flexible scalability

[0068] This invention does not impose specific restrictions on the selection of chaotic functions; besides the Logistic chaotic function, it can be adapted to any other chaotic system that conforms to the characteristics of a chaotic sequence. It supports the generation of ID sequences of arbitrary length and can be dynamically adjusted according to different network sizes and security requirements. Furthermore, the mapping relationship between node IPs and initial values ​​is designed to be simple and efficient, ensuring good engineering feasibility.

[0069] 4. Multi-dimensional security enhancement

[0070] This invention strengthens network system security from three dimensions: information encryption protection, transmission verification guarantee, and centralized access control. The specific measures are as follows: public key encryption technology is used to ensure the confidentiality of communication between CA and nodes, preventing the risk of information interception; the integrity of ID transmission is ensured through CRC verification mechanism, reducing the risk of information being tampered with or lost during transmission; and CA is implemented to centrally manage the allocation of important node IDs, improving the controllability of network topology and its resistance to attacks.

[0071] The aforementioned technical features together constitute a secure and reliable node identity management system, significantly improving the overall security of P2P networks.

[0072] The above description discloses only one preferred embodiment of the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention. Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes of the above embodiments can be implemented, and equivalent changes made in accordance with the claims of the present invention are still within the scope of the invention.

Claims

1. A secure and reliable method for allocating node IDs in a P2P network, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: The CA performs dual authentication on the P2P network nodes, verifying both their identity and IP address. Step 2: For nodes that have passed identity authentication, dynamically generate node IDs based on the system parameters returned by CA, node ID length N, and initial value; Step 3: After receiving the target node ID, the neighboring node performs a CRC check to verify its integrity and validity; only when the check passes can the neighboring node establish a communication connection with the target node.

2. The secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The execution process of step 1 includes the following steps: Step 1.1: The node sends an authentication request to the CA. The authentication request is encrypted with the node's private key and sent to the CA. The CA decrypts the request using the node's public key. Step 1.2: The CA verifies the identity of the node applying to join, including checking the certificate validity period, verifying the signature validity, and confirming the IP address ownership; Step 1.3: Nodes that pass authentication proceed to the next step; nodes that fail authentication are denied access to the network or are isolated. Step 1.4: The CA verifies the node applying to join. If the node is a regular node, proceed to step 1.5; if the node is an important node, proceed to step 1.

6. Step 1.5: Based on the chaotic function set in the network and the IP address value of the node, CA generates system parameters, node ID length N and initial value, and proceeds to the execution process of Step 2; Step 1.6: The CA directly generates a node ID, encrypts the ID value along with other authentication messages using the node's public key, and sends it to the node. The node decrypts the information using its private key to obtain the node ID and proceeds to step 3 for processing. The mechanism by which CA generates node IDs is basically the same as the mechanism for generating ordinary node IDs. The length of the ID is L, where L < N. IDs of length N identify ordinary nodes, and IDs of length L identify important nodes.

3. The secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The execution process of step 1.5 includes the following steps: Step 1.5.1: The system parameters and initial values ​​are determined by the selected chaotic function, and it is ensured that the sequence generated by the chaotic function satisfies the characteristics of a chaotic sequence, wherein the initial value and the node IP address satisfy a one-to-one mapping relationship; Step 1.5.2: The node ID length N value is set by network requirements; Step 1.5.3: Based on the set initial value and node IP address mapping relationship, map the node IP address to the initial value of the chaotic function; Step 1.5.4: Encrypt the system parameters, node ID length N, initial value, and other authentication information together with the node's public key and send them to the node. The node decrypts the corresponding information using its own private key.

4. The secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The node ID generation phase in step 2 includes the following steps: Step 2.1: The node uses its private key to decrypt the authentication echo message sent by the CA, and obtains the system parameters, node ID length N, and initial value from it; Step 2.2: Input the system parameters and initial values ​​into the chaotic function set in the network system to obtain the chaotic sequence. The sequence length is N; Step 2.3: Convert the chaotic sequence into a node ID. Based on the specific properties of the chaotic sequence, convert the chaotic sequence into a binary sequence. The corresponding binary sequence is the node ID.

5. The secure and reliable P2P network node ID allocation method as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The execution process of step 3 includes the following steps: Step 3.1: The node performs a CRC check on the generated ID; Step 3.2: The node sends its node ID information, which includes a CRC check mechanism, to its neighboring nodes; Step 3.3: After receiving the ID, the neighboring node first performs a CRC check; if the CRC check is correct, it builds a routing table based on the received ID information. If the CRC check is incorrect, the information is discarded and the abnormal event is reported to the higher layers of the network. The network then notifies the newly joined node to resend the ID information.

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