A power star-ground fusion optimal power safety communication method, device and system

Abstract

The application discloses a power satellite-ground fusion optimal power safety communication method, device and system, and relates to the technical field of power system communication safety. The method comprises the following steps: collecting required data; in the satellite beam coverage range of power satellite-ground communication, quantifying the threat degree of eavesdroppers based on the collected data to obtain a threat value; performing power splitting operation based on the threat value and the collected data to obtain a power allocation result, and then selecting a corresponding safety algorithm scheme in combination with the threshold range where the threat value is located, power business time delay and computing power demand power; constructing and solving a power satellite-ground fusion optimal power allocation model to obtain a power satellite-ground fusion optimal power allocation result applicable under all safety algorithm schemes. The application can realize accurate balanced control of power business safety and transmission performance under the condition of limited satellite power through multi-eavesdropper threat quantification, safety algorithm dynamic adaptation and satellite-ground power optimization.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a power system satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, device, and system, belonging to the field of power system communication security technology. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of new power systems and 5G non-terrestrial network (NTN) technology, the power space-ground converged communication system can achieve seamless integration of "terrestrial" and "space" networks, providing ubiquitous integrated space-air network services for power businesses. This addresses issues such as the transmission of power monitoring data in remote areas and the transmission of power dispatch commands across regions. Power space-ground converged communication (i.e., converged communication between satellites and ground terminals in the power system) needs to transmit three types of core business data: power control commands with high security requirements, metering data with medium security requirements, and environmental monitoring data with low security requirements.

[0003] Current power grid-space-ground converged communication security solutions have the following key issues:

[0004] The threat assessment of multiple eavesdroppers is crude: the satellite beam coverage of power satellite-to-ground communication is wide, and multiple non-cooperative eavesdroppers can easily hide within the beam. However, the existing solution only uses qualitative threat classification for them, without combining the eavesdroppers' actual eavesdropping capabilities, such as signal decoding signal-to-noise ratio and attack frequency to quantify the threat, resulting in a lack of accurate basis for subsequent security strategies.

[0005] Power allocation fails to balance communication and security computing: The satellite power and ground terminal power of power-to-ground communication are constrained by the satellite power. The existing scheme only allocates power for data transmission and does not reserve power separately for security computing to run encryption and authentication algorithms, resulting in insufficient computing power for security algorithms and the squeezing out of communication power.

[0006] Security algorithms are not compatible with threats: Most existing encryption schemes fail to adapt to the threat level, resulting in wasted computing power for monitoring data with low security requirements and the possibility of eavesdropping on control commands with high security requirements due to insufficient algorithm strength. Furthermore, they are not linked to threat levels and power constraints, and cannot dynamically adapt to real-time threat changes in power grid satellite-to-ground communication.

[0007] Based on this, it is necessary to design a power-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, device, and system that quantifies multiple eavesdropper threats, jointly allocates communication and security computing power, and dynamically matches security algorithms to solve the above problems. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to provide a power satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, device and system, which achieves precise balance control of power service security and transmission performance under satellite power constraints by quantifying multiple eavesdropper threats, dynamically adapting security algorithms and optimizing satellite-ground power allocation.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives / to solve the above technical problems, the present invention is implemented using the following technical solution.

[0010] On one hand, the present invention provides a power-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, comprising:

[0011] Collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power for each power satellite-to-ground communication link;

[0012] Within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, the threat level of the eavesdropper is quantified and the threat value is obtained based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters.

[0013] Based on the threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of the ground terminal, a power splitting operation is performed to obtain the power allocation result;

[0014] Based on the power allocation results, and taking into account the threshold range of the threat value, power service latency, and computing power requirements, the corresponding security algorithm scheme is selected.

[0015] A convex optimization objective function is constructed with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users. Then, combined with the constraints of total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power, an optimal power allocation model for power satellite-ground integration is constructed.

[0016] Solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration to obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes.

[0017] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the formula for calculating the threat value is:

[0018] , ;

[0019] In the formula, For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link; Representing the The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The probability that the maximum value of the product of the signal-to-noise ratio and the business sensitivity coefficient of a non-cooperative eavesdropper exceeds the threat threshold. For the first A non-cooperative eavesdropper; For the first A group of eavesdroppers on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, and ; For the first The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The signal-to-noise ratio of the first non-cooperative eavesdropper, i.e., the first... The level of threat posed by a non-cooperative eavesdropper; This is the satellite signal decoding threshold, i.e., the threat threshold;

[0020] in, ;

[0021] In the formula, Number of users; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; To distribute power evenly; For satellite beamwidth; Total communication bandwidth; The noise power spectral density;

[0022] in, ;

[0023] In the formula, For rain fading parameters; These are ionospheric decay parameters; These are atmospheric decay parameters; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link;

[0024] in, ;

[0025] In the formula, For communication wavelength; This refers to the distance of the satellite's orbit from the Earth. This refers to the size of the satellite antenna.

[0026] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the power splitting operation includes:

[0027] The satellite's on-board power is divided into unencrypted transmission power, encrypted transmission power, and first-security computing power. The unencrypted transmission power and encrypted transmission power are used to transmit encrypted and unencrypted signals, respectively, and the first-security computing power is used to run a security algorithm. The calculation formula used for this division operation is as follows:

[0028] ;

[0029] ;

[0030] ;

[0031] ;

[0032] In the formula, For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Onboard power of the satellite for each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link;

[0033] when And the utilization rate of ground terminal computing power At that time, a second safe computing power is allocated from the remaining power of the ground terminal to make up for the computing power demand. Power required for computing power

[0034] The formula for calculating the second secure computing power is:

[0035] ;

[0036] In the formula, For the second safest computing power, Let be the synergy coefficient, and .

[0037] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the set consisting of the correspondence between security algorithm schemes and the threshold ranges of threat values ​​is as follows:

[0038] ;

[0039] In the formula, S represents the set of corresponding security algorithm schemes and the threshold range of threat values; All are symmetric key encryption algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to different key lengths, namely 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits; All are secure hash algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to generating fixed-length digests of 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits from the original data of arbitrary length through hash operations;

[0040] The power latency and computing power requirements for each security algorithm scheme are as follows:

[0041] A threat value of 0 indicates no security risk, no power service delay, and low computing power requirements. ;

[0042] The power service delay corresponding to Option 1 is The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0043] The power service delay corresponding to Option 2 is The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0044] The power service delay corresponding to Option 3 is The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0045] in: Delay for power services; This is the time threshold.

[0046] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the power space-ground integrated optimal power allocation model includes: a convex optimization objective function and constraints;

[0047] The mathematical expression for the convex optimization objective function is: ;

[0048] In the formula, Number of users; For the first The total capacity of the unencrypted and encrypted signals of the power satellite-to-ground communication link is the first... Total capacity of the power satellite-to-ground communication links; For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link;

[0049] in, ;

[0050] In the formula, The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Satellite beamwidth for unencrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; The noise power spectral density;

[0051] in, ;

[0052] In the formula, For the first The satellite beamwidth used for encrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; the constraints include: total satellite power constraint, ground terminal power constraint, power service delay constraint, and security algorithm computing power constraint;

[0053] The total power constraint for the satellite is: ;

[0054] The power constraint of the ground terminal is: ;

[0055] In the formula, This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area;

[0056] The power service delay constraint is as follows: ;

[0057] In the formula, For power service delay functions; This is a time threshold;

[0058] The computational power constraint of the security algorithm is: .

[0059] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the method for solving the optimal power allocation model for power satellite-ground integration is as follows:

[0060] Introduce the Lagrange multiplier to construct the Lagrange function;

[0061] By combining the Lagrangian function to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration is obtained.

[0062] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the Lagrange multiplier includes a satellite power constraint factor, a ground power constraint factor, and a time delay constraint factor;

[0063] The expression for the Lagrange function is:

[0064] ;

[0065] In the formula, Represents the Lagrange function; For the first The number of power grid satellite-to-ground communication links; SUM represents the total number of power grid satellite-to-ground communication links. For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; This is the second safest computing power. This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area; This is a time threshold; This is the initial time; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor.

[0066] In conjunction with the first aspect, optionally, the expression for the optimal power allocation result of the power satellite-ground integration is:

[0067] ;

[0068] In the formula, For the first The optimal power allocation result for the power-space-ground integrated communication links; The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor; For satellite beamwidth; The noise power spectral density; For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Constrained residuals of each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The regularization term of the convex optimization objective function corresponding to each power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link;

[0069] in, ; ;

[0070] In the formula, The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link.

[0071] Secondly, the present invention provides a power-space-ground integrated optimal power security communication device, comprising:

[0072] The data interaction module is used to collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power of each power satellite-to-ground communication link;

[0073] The multi-eavesdropper threat assessment module is used to quantify the threat level of eavesdroppers and obtain threat values ​​within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters.

[0074] The power allocation module is used to perform power splitting operations based on threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of ground terminals to obtain power allocation results;

[0075] The security algorithm dynamic matching module selects the corresponding security algorithm scheme based on the power allocation results, combined with the threshold range of the threat value, the power service latency, and the power demand of computing power.

[0076] The power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model generation module is used to construct a power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users, combined with constraints on total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power.

[0077] The solution module is used to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, and obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes.

[0078] Thirdly, the present invention provides a power-space-ground integrated optimal power security communication system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0079] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0080] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to perform the method according to any one of the first aspects.

[0081] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects achieved by the present invention are as follows:

[0082] The power satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method provided by this invention achieves accurate threat assessment by quantifying the threat level of eavesdroppers, avoiding the blindness of traditional qualitative classification and providing a precise basis for subsequent power allocation and algorithm selection. It decomposes the satellite's onboard power and combines it with the remaining power of ground terminals to assist in power allocation and supplement computing power, solving the resource mismatch problem in power-constrained scenarios. It balances power constraints and security requirements; selects security algorithm schemes according to threat levels, flexibly matching algorithm strength to avoid wasted computing power and insufficient protection; and solves the optimal power allocation result through a convex optimization objective function, achieving coordinated control of "threat, power, and security algorithm." In practical applications, it can ensure the secure transmission of power services in remote areas, comprehensively balancing the security and performance of power satellite-ground communication. Attached Figure Description

[0083] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the optimal power security communication method for power grid-space integrated communication according to the present invention.

[0084] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture and interaction of a power-space-ground integrated optimal power security communication device according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0085] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0086] Furthermore, if the embodiments of this invention involve descriptions such as "first" or "second," these descriptions are for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying their relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, a feature defined with "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of those features. Additionally, the technical solutions of the various embodiments can be combined with each other, but this must be based on the ability of those skilled in the art to implement them. If the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or impossible to implement, it should be considered that such a combination of technical solutions does not exist and is not within the scope of protection claimed by this invention.

[0087] Example 1

[0088] This invention provides a power grid-satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, comprising the following steps:

[0089] Collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power for each power satellite-to-ground communication link;

[0090] Within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, the threat level of the eavesdropper is quantified and the threat value is obtained based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters.

[0091] Based on the threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of the ground terminal, a power splitting operation is performed to obtain the power allocation result;

[0092] Based on the power allocation results, and taking into account the threshold range of the threat value, power service latency, and computing power requirements, the corresponding security algorithm scheme is selected.

[0093] A convex optimization objective function is constructed with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users. Then, combined with the constraints of total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power, an optimal power allocation model for power satellite-ground integration is constructed.

[0094] Solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration to obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes.

[0095] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the formula for calculating the threat value is as follows:

[0096] , ;

[0097] In the formula, For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link; Representing the The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The probability that the maximum value of the product of the signal-to-noise ratio and the business sensitivity coefficient of a non-cooperative eavesdropper exceeds the threat threshold. For the first A non-cooperative eavesdropper; For the first A group of eavesdroppers on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, and ; For the first The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The signal-to-noise ratio of the first non-cooperative eavesdropper, i.e., the first... The level of threat posed by a non-cooperative eavesdropper; The threshold for satellite signal decoding is the threat threshold; the eavesdropper set and power service sensitivity coefficient of the power satellite-to-ground communication link are both defined based on the actual security level of the power service.

[0098] in, ;

[0099] In the formula, Number of users; For the first The overall channel gain on a power satellite-to-ground communication link consists of large-scale fading and small-scale multipath fading. To distribute power evenly; For satellite beamwidth; Total communication bandwidth; The noise power spectral density;

[0100] in, ;

[0101] In the formula, For rain fading parameters; These are ionospheric decay parameters; These are atmospheric decay parameters; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link;

[0102] in, ;

[0103] In the formula, For communication wavelength; This refers to the distance of the satellite's orbit from the Earth. This refers to the size of the satellite antenna.

[0104] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the power splitting operation includes:

[0105] The satellite's on-board power is divided into unencrypted transmission power, encrypted transmission power, and first-security computing power. The unencrypted transmission power and encrypted transmission power are used to transmit encrypted and unencrypted signals, respectively, and the first-security computing power is used to run a security algorithm. The calculation formula used for this division operation is as follows:

[0106] ;

[0107] ;

[0108] ;

[0109] ;

[0110] In the formula, For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Onboard power of the satellite for each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link;

[0111] when Furthermore, the utilization rate of ground terminal computing power At that time, a second safe computing power is allocated from the remaining power of the ground terminal to make up for the computing power demand.

[0112] The formula for calculating the second secure computing power is:

[0113] ;

[0114] In the formula, For the second safest computing power, Let be the synergy coefficient, and ; Power required for computing power.

[0115] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the set of correspondences between the security algorithm scheme and the threshold range of the threat value is as follows:

[0116] ;

[0117] In the formula, S represents the set of corresponding security algorithm schemes and the threshold range of threat values; and All of them belong to the category of secure algorithms, among which This is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm; the subscripts correspond to different key lengths: 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. For secure hashing algorithms, the subscripts correspond to generating fixed-length digests of 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits from original data of arbitrary length through hash operations; The power factor is, and ;

[0118] The power latency and computing power requirements for each security algorithm scheme are as follows:

[0119] A threat value of 0 indicates no security risk, no power service delay, and low computing power requirements. ;

[0120] The power service delay corresponding to Option 1 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0121] The power service delay corresponding to Option 2 is The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0122] The power service delay corresponding to Option 3 is The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0123] in: Delay for power services; This is a time threshold; Power required for computing power; The highest level of computing power is required for optimal performance. This is the second safest computing power.

[0124] During the power splitting process, when At that time, the unencrypted transmission power is 0, and the satellite's onboard power is only allocated to encrypted transmission power and first-level security computing power to transmit encrypted signals and run secure algorithm schemes.

[0125] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the power space-ground integrated optimal power allocation model includes: a convex optimization objective function and constraints.

[0126] The mathematical expression for the convex optimization objective function is: ;

[0127] In the formula, Number of users; For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first The total capacity of the unencrypted and encrypted signals of the power satellite-to-ground communication link is the first... Total capacity of the power satellite-to-ground communication links; For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link;

[0128] in, ;

[0129] In the formula, The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Satellite beamwidth for unencrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; The noise power spectral density;

[0130] in, ;

[0131] In the formula, For the first The satellite beamwidth used for encrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; the constraints include: total satellite power constraint, ground terminal power constraint, power service delay constraint, and security algorithm computing power constraint;

[0132] The total power constraint for the satellite is: ;

[0133] In the formula, For the first Onboard power of the satellite for each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link;

[0134] The power constraint of the ground terminal is: ;

[0135] In the formula, This is the second safest computing power. This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area;

[0136] The power service delay constraint is as follows: ;

[0137] In the formula, For the first Threat values ​​on a single power-to-ground communication link; This is a time threshold;

[0138] The computational power constraint of the security algorithm is: ;

[0139] In the formula, Power required for computing power.

[0140] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the method for solving the optimal power allocation model for power-space integration is as follows:

[0141] Introduce the Lagrange multiplier to construct the Lagrange function;

[0142] By combining the Lagrangian function to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration is obtained.

[0143] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the Lagrange multiplier includes a satellite power constraint factor, a ground power constraint factor, and a time delay constraint factor;

[0144] The expression for the Lagrange function is:

[0145] ;

[0146] In the formula, Represents the Lagrange function; For the first The number of power grid satellite-to-ground communication links; SUM represents the total number of power grid satellite-to-ground communication links. For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; This is the second safest computing power. This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area; This is a time threshold; This is the initial time; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor.

[0147] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, the expression for the optimal power allocation result of the power-space-ground integration is as follows:

[0148] ;

[0149] In the formula, For the first The optimal power allocation result for the power-space-ground integrated communication links; The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor; For satellite beamwidth; The noise power spectral density; For the first One power-to-ground communication link; For the first Constrained residuals of each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The regularization term of the convex optimization objective function corresponding to each power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link;

[0150] in, ; ;

[0151] In the formula, The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link.

[0152] The following describes in detail the optimal power secure communication method for power-space-ground convergence based on multi-eavesdropper threat assessment in an embodiment of the present invention, with reference to a specific implementation method.

[0153] like Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, the present invention provides a technical solution using low-Earth orbit satellites. Taking a frequency band as an example, with a coverage radius of 50km, the following steps are included:

[0154] Step 1, Establish a multi-eavesdropper threat assessment model: This model targets the satellite beam coverage of power grid-to-ground communications (using low-Earth orbit satellites). Taking a frequency band as an example (covering a radius of 50km), the threat value of non-cooperative eavesdroppers within this range is quantified: The first... A collection of eavesdroppers on a power-to-ground communication link Each non-cooperative eavesdropper The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is used to measure the level of threat and can be expressed as: ,in ;

[0155] In the formula, For the first The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The signal-to-noise ratio of the first non-cooperative eavesdropper, i.e., the first... The level of threat posed by a non-cooperative eavesdropper; Number of users; For the first The overall channel gain on a power-to-ground communication link consists of large-scale fading and small-scale multipath fading. To distribute power evenly; For satellite beamwidth; Total communication bandwidth; The noise power spectral density; For rain fading parameters; These are ionospheric decay parameters; These are atmospheric decay parameters; Nakagami is the average multipath fading value for a single satellite-to-ground link.

[0156] Among them, satellite beamwidth , For communication wavelength, The distance of the satellite orbit from the Earth. This refers to the size of the satellite antenna.

[0157] Definition of the first Power service sensitivity coefficient of a power satellite-to-ground communication link The value is assigned according to the actual security requirements of the power business. Since the eavesdroppers are not cooperative, only the eavesdropper with the strongest eavesdropping ability (i.e., the eavesdropper with the highest signal-to-noise ratio) needs to be considered. The threat value is defined as the probability that the product of the eavesdropper's signal-to-noise ratio and the business sensitivity coefficient exceeds the threat threshold. The larger the value, the more severe the security threat faced by the link. The threat value calculation formula is as follows:

[0158] , ;

[0159] in: For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The probability that the maximum value of the product of the signal-to-noise ratio and the business sensitivity coefficient of a non-cooperative eavesdropper exceeds the threat threshold. For the first There are several non-cooperative eavesdroppers. The higher the signal-to-noise ratio of a non-cooperative eavesdropper, the stronger its eavesdropping ability. When calculating the maximum value, the signal-to-noise ratio of the non-cooperative eavesdropper with the strongest eavesdropping ability is used. The calculated threat value represents the threat value of the eavesdropper with the strongest eavesdropping ability. For the first A group of eavesdroppers on a single power-to-ground communication link; This is the satellite signal decoding threshold, also known as the threat threshold.

[0160] The larger the value, the more serious the security threat to the power grid satellite-to-ground link.

[0161] Step 2, Power Satellite-Ground Joint Decomposition: Based on Threat Value Computing power utilization rate of ground power terminals , , for the On-board power of a single power-to-ground communication link The power of the ground terminal is bidirectionally split, and the two types of power jointly support the three major requirements of "unencrypted transmission, encrypted transmission, and secure computing power".

[0162] Satellite on-board power splitting: splitting into the first... Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link , No. Encrypted transmission power of a power satellite-to-ground communication link and the The first secure computing power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link .

[0163] ;

[0164] ;

[0165] ;

[0166] ;

[0167] For power factor, Unencrypted transmission power decreases as the threat level increases, indicating that when the threat is severe, less power is used for low-security service transmissions. Encrypted transmission power increases as the threat level increases, indicating that when the threat is severe, more power is used for high-security service transmissions, and the primary security computing power also increases as the threat level increases.

[0168] Ground terminal power coordination supplementation: when Unable to meet Furthermore, the utilization rate of ground terminal computing power In such cases, the ground terminal continues to supplement the computing power required for the security algorithm; this supplemented power is known as the second security computing power. ;

[0169] ;

[0170] In the formula, Let be the synergy coefficient, and .

[0171] To avoid the interference between unencrypted and encrypted signals, orthogonal multiple access (OMA) technology is used. The spectrum is divided into multiple non-overlapping subcarriers, each of which is orthogonal and can be independently allocated to different users to achieve parallel data transmission. Signals from different users can overlap on the spectrum without interference, providing high spectrum utilization and anti-interference capabilities.

[0172] Total bandwidth The signals are evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals, with a bandwidth of [missing value] for each signal type. , Let be the number of users. The capacities of the two types of signals are expressed as follows:

[0173] Unencrypted signal: ;

[0174] Encrypted signal: ;

[0175] ;

[0176] in: The capacity of the unencrypted signal; For the first The overall channel gain on a power-to-ground communication link consists of large-scale fading and small-scale multipath fading. This refers to the satellite beamwidth used for unencrypted signal transmission; The capacity of the encrypted signal; For satellite beamwidth used in encrypted signal transmission; The total capacity of the unencrypted and encrypted signals is the number of the first (i.e., the number of the second) signals. The total capacity of the power satellite-to-ground communication links.

[0177] Step 3, Dynamic matching of security algorithms: based on threat values Power service delay (assuming a time threshold of 1) The system dynamically selects a combination of authentication and encryption algorithms to achieve a linkage between "threats, computing power, and latency," based on the required computing power, the first security computing power, and the second security computing power. For power factor, ; It is a collection of safe algorithm schemes.

[0178] ;

[0179] In the formula, S represents the set of corresponding security algorithm schemes and the threshold range of threat values; All are symmetric key encryption algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to different key lengths, namely 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits; All are secure hash algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to generating fixed-length digests of 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits from the original data of arbitrary length through hash operations; The power factor is, and ;

[0180] The power latency and computing power requirements for each security algorithm scheme are as follows:

[0181] A threat value of 0 indicates no security risk, no power service delay, and low computing power requirements. ;

[0182] The power service delay corresponding to Option 1 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0183] The power service delay corresponding to Option 2 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0184] The power service delay corresponding to Option 3 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ;

[0185] in: Delay for power services; This is the time threshold.

[0186] Step 4, Optimal Power Solution: With the objective of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users, and considering constraints such as total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service delay, and security algorithm computing power, the optimal power allocation result for power satellite-ground fusion is derived using convex optimization theory.

[0187] Convex optimization objective function: ;

[0188] Constraints:

[0189] 1. Total satellite power constraint: ;

[0190] 2. Ground terminal power constraints: ;

[0191] 3. Power service delay constraints: ;

[0192] 4. Computational power constraints for security algorithms: ;

[0193] Introducing the Lagrange multiplier (Satellite power constraint factor) (Ground power constraint factor) The (delay constraint factor) is used to measure the degree of constraint on total power and to construct the Lagrangian function. :

[0194] ;

[0195] The first Lagrange function is obtained by deriving the Lagrange function. Optimal power allocation results for power-space-ground integrated communication links The aforementioned optimal power allocation result for satellite-ground integration achieves optimal allocation of total power (i.e., the combined power of the satellite and the ground terminal), and this allocation result is applicable under different security algorithms. When the total power is sufficient... , The power allocation result for space-ground integration is relatively small, and can be appropriately increased when total power is tight. , By increasing the power of a single link, the power of the link is limited, thus achieving overall power balance.

[0196] The optimal power allocation result for the power satellite-ground integration is as follows:

[0197] ;

[0198] in, , ;

[0199] For the first The constraint residual term of each link is used to measure the degree of deviation from the optimal constraint state, and can be optimized by adjusting the power factor; The regularization term for the convex optimization objective function; For the first Average multipath fading value of a single power satellite-to-ground communication link; The power factor.

[0200] No. Constraint residuals of a single link Regularization term of convex optimization objective function Both are determined by the threat value and the power factor, ensuring that the optimal power allocation result of the power satellite-ground integration is dynamically adjusted according to the threat, and establishing the correlation between the optimal power and the security threat value.

[0201] Example 2

[0202] Based on the same inventive concept as Embodiment 1, this embodiment of the invention provides a power grid-space-ground integrated optimal power security communication device, comprising:

[0203] The data interaction module is used to collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power of each power satellite-to-ground communication link;

[0204] The multi-eavesdropper threat assessment module is used to quantify the threat level of eavesdroppers and obtain threat values ​​within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters.

[0205] The power allocation module is used to perform power splitting operations based on threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of ground terminals to obtain power allocation results;

[0206] The security algorithm dynamic matching module selects the corresponding security algorithm scheme based on the power allocation results, combined with the threshold range of the threat value, the power service latency, and the power demand of computing power.

[0207] The power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model generation module is used to construct a power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users, combined with constraints on total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power.

[0208] The solution module is used to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, and obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes.

[0209] The data interaction module establishes communication connections with the multi-eavesdropper threat assessment module and the power joint allocation module, respectively, and transmits the collected data to the corresponding modules. The multi-eavesdropper threat assessment module also establishes communication connections with the power joint allocation module and the security algorithm dynamic matching module, respectively, calculates the threat value based on the collected data, and transmits it to the power joint allocation module and the security algorithm dynamic matching module. The power joint allocation module establishes a communication connection with the security algorithm dynamic matching module, performs a power splitting operation based on the received threat value, adjusts the beamwidth, and transmits the power splitting result to the security algorithm dynamic matching module.

[0210] The rest are the same as in Example 1.

[0211] Example 3

[0212] This invention provides a power-space-ground integrated optimal power security communication system, including a storage medium and a processor;

[0213] The storage medium is used to store instructions;

[0214] The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the method according to any one of Embodiment 1.

[0215] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0216] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0217] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0218] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0219] The embodiments of the present invention have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above. The specific embodiments described above are merely illustrative and not restrictive. Those skilled in the art can make many other forms under the guidance of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the claims. All of these forms are within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A power-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method, characterized in that, include: Collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power for each power satellite-to-ground communication link; Within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, the threat level of the eavesdropper is quantified and the threat value is obtained based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters. Based on the threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of the ground terminal, a power splitting operation is performed to obtain the power allocation result; Based on the power allocation results, and taking into account the threshold range of the threat value, power service latency, and computing power requirements, the corresponding security algorithm scheme is selected. A convex optimization objective function is constructed with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users. Then, combined with the constraints of total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power, an optimal power allocation model for power satellite-ground integration is constructed. Solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration to obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes; The formula for calculating the threat value is: ， ； In the formula, For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link; Representing the The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The probability that the maximum value of the product of the signal-to-noise ratio and the business sensitivity coefficient of a non-cooperative eavesdropper exceeds the threat threshold; For the first A group of eavesdroppers on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, and ; For the first The first power satellite-to-ground communication link The signal-to-noise ratio of the first non-cooperative eavesdropper, i.e., the first... The level of threat posed by a non-cooperative eavesdropper; This is the satellite signal decoding threshold, i.e., the threat threshold; in, ; In the formula, Number of users; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; To distribute power evenly; For satellite beamwidth; Total communication bandwidth; The noise power spectral density; in, ; In the formula, For rain fading parameters; These are ionospheric decay parameters; These are atmospheric decay parameters; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link; in, ; In the formula, For communication wavelength; This refers to the distance of the satellite's orbit from the Earth. This refers to the size of the satellite antenna; The power splitting operation includes: The satellite's on-board power is divided into unencrypted transmission power, encrypted transmission power, and first-security computing power. The unencrypted transmission power and encrypted transmission power are used to transmit encrypted and unencrypted signals, respectively, and the first-security computing power is used to run a security algorithm. The calculation formula used for this division operation is as follows: ； ； ； ； In the formula, For the first Onboard power of the satellite for each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link; when Furthermore, the utilization rate of ground terminal computing power At that time, a second safe computing power is allocated from the remaining power of the ground terminal to make up for the computing power demand. Power required for computing power; The formula for calculating the second secure computing power is: ； In the formula, For the second safest computing power, Let be the synergy coefficient, and .

2. The power grid-satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The set consisting of the correspondence between security algorithm schemes and the threshold ranges of threat values ​​is as follows: ； In the formula, S represents the set of corresponding security algorithm schemes and the threshold range of threat values; All are symmetric key encryption algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to different key lengths, namely 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits; All are secure hash algorithms, and the subscripts correspond to generating fixed-length digests of 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits from the original data of arbitrary length through hash operations; The power latency and computing power requirements for each security algorithm scheme are as follows: A threat value of 0 indicates no security risk, no power service delay, and low computing power requirements. ; The power service delay corresponding to Option 1 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ; The power service delay corresponding to Option 2 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ; The power service delay corresponding to Option 3 is: The corresponding computing power requirement is: ; in: Delay for electricity services; This is the time threshold.

3. The power grid-satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The power grid-space integrated optimal power allocation model includes: a convex optimization objective function and constraints; The mathematical expression for the convex optimization objective function is: ; In the formula, Number of users; For the first The total capacity of the unencrypted and encrypted signals of the power satellite-to-ground communication link is the first... Total capacity of the power satellite-to-ground communication links; For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link; in, ; In the formula, The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Satellite beamwidth used for unencrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; The noise power spectral density; in, ; In the formula, For the first Satellite beamwidth used for encrypted signal transmission on a power-to-ground communication link; The constraints include: total satellite power constraint, ground terminal power constraint, power service latency constraint, and security algorithm computing power constraint; The total power constraint for the satellite is: ; The power constraint of the ground terminal is: ; In the formula, This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area; The power service delay constraint is as follows: ; In the formula, For power service delay function; This is a time threshold; The computational power constraint of the security algorithm is: .

4. The power grid-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method for solving the optimal power allocation model for power satellite-ground integration is as follows: Introduce the Lagrange multiplier to construct the Lagrange function; By combining the Lagrangian function to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration is obtained.

5. The power grid-satellite-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The Lagrange multiplier includes the satellite power constraint factor, the ground power constraint factor, and the time delay constraint factor; The expression for the Lagrange function is: ； In the formula, Represents the Lagrange function; SUM is the total number of power satellite-to-ground communication links; For the first The capacity of unencrypted signals on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The capacity of the encrypted signal for a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first Unencrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Encrypted transmission power of the power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first The first secure computing power of a power-to-ground communication link; This is the second safest computing power. This represents the sum of the remaining power of all ground terminals within the beam's coverage area; This is a time threshold; This is the initial time; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor.

6. The power grid-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The expression for the optimal power allocation result of the power satellite-ground integration is as follows: ； In the formula, For the first The optimal power allocation result for the power-space-ground integrated communication links; The total communication bandwidth is evenly distributed between unencrypted and encrypted signals. For each type of signal bandwidth; This refers to the satellite power constraint factor. Ground power constraint factor; This is the time delay constraint factor; For satellite beamwidth; The noise power spectral density; For the first Constrained residuals of each power-to-ground communication link; For the first Overall channel gain on a single power-to-ground communication link; For the first The regularization term of the convex optimization objective function corresponding to each power satellite-to-ground communication link; For the first Average multipath fading value on a single power-to-ground satellite communication link; in, ; ; In the formula, The power factor is, and ; For the first Threat value of a single power-to-ground communication link.

7. A power-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication device, characterized in that, The apparatus employing the power grid-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication method according to any one of claims 1-6 comprises: The data interaction module is used to collect the power service sensitivity coefficient, eavesdropper real-time signal-to-noise ratio, channel fading parameters, satellite on-board power, and ground terminal remaining power of each power satellite-to-ground communication link; The multi-eavesdropper threat assessment module is used to quantify the threat level of eavesdroppers and obtain threat values ​​within the satellite beam coverage area of ​​power satellite-to-ground communication, based on the power service sensitivity coefficient of each power satellite-to-ground communication link, the real-time signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper, and the channel fading parameters. The power allocation module is used to perform power splitting operations based on threat value, satellite onboard power, and remaining power of ground terminals to obtain power allocation results; The security algorithm dynamic matching module selects the corresponding security algorithm scheme based on the power allocation results, combined with the threshold range of the threat value, the power service latency, and the power demand of computing power. The power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model generation module is used to construct a power grid-space-ground fusion optimal power allocation model with the goal of maximizing the total communication capacity of all power users, combined with constraints on total satellite power, ground terminal power, power service latency, and security algorithm computing power. The solution module is used to solve the optimal power allocation model for power-space-ground integration, and obtain the optimal power allocation result for power-space-ground integration that is applicable to all security algorithm schemes.

8. A power-space-ground integrated optimal power secure communication system, characterized in that, Including storage media and processor; The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to perform the method according to any one of claims 1-6.

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