Method and system for improving communication security of intelligent electric meter

Abstract

The invention provides a method and a system for improving communication security of an intelligent electric meter. The method comprises the following steps: a peripheral device converts a meter number of a communication target electric meter into a corresponding BCD code; the peripheral equipment embeds an equipment type identification code of the peripheral equipment into a specified position of the BCD code to generate an equipment communication address; the peripheral equipment initiates a communication request to the target ammeter by taking the equipment communication address as a source communication address; after receiving and analyzing the communication request, the target ammeter respectively executes verification items: verifying whether the BCD code in the source communication address corresponds to the own meter number; extracting an equipment type identification code embedded in the source communication address, and checking whether the peripheral equipment has the requested authority or not by querying a pre-configured access control strategy; and if any verification item is not passed, rejecting the communication request. According to the invention, a standard communication address which is associated with the target electric meter and contains own identity information can be dynamically generated for various peripheral devices, and device identification and security access control are realized based on the address.

Description

Methods and systems for improving communication security of smart meters Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power grid communication technology, and in particular to a method and system for improving the communication security of smart meters. Background Technology

[0002] Smart meters typically have a built-in local communication module (such as a power line carrier or low-power wireless module). To facilitate unified management, the local communication module usually converts the meter's 12-digit decimal number into a 6-byte BCD code, and further expands it into an 8-byte standard communication address as its unique identifier.

[0003] In the field operation and maintenance and user interaction scenarios of smart meters, various peripheral devices interact with the local communication module of the smart meter through local communication protocols. These peripheral devices mainly include: a smart handheld terminal (HHU): used to collect meter data locally and upload it to the Advanced Metering System (AMI) via a mobile network; a home display unit (HDU): used by home users to query electricity usage information and perform recharge operations; and a USB dongle: used for meter production testing, customer site network maintenance, and debugging.

[0004] In existing technologies, the aforementioned peripheral devices are typically configured with only a uniform initial communication address at the factory, or even no preset address. When communicating with smart meters, the peripheral devices only know the target meter's number information, lacking a unique source communication address that conforms to communication specifications. This directly leads to the following problems: 1. Lack of identification: The meter's communication module cannot identify the device type of the communication initiator, resulting in the inability to provide differentiated services; 2. Security access vulnerabilities: Any device that knows the meter number can initiate a communication request to the meter, lacking an access control mechanism based on device identity, posing a risk of unauthorized access; 3. Difficult operation and maintenance management: The communication layer cannot effectively distinguish the purpose of the devices, making effective filtering and management difficult. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and system for improving the communication security of smart meters.

[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, the present invention employs the following technical solution: a method for improving the communication security of smart meters, comprising: a peripheral device converting the meter number of the target meter into a corresponding BCD code; the peripheral device embedding its device type identification code and the target meter's device type identification code into designated positions in the BCD code, generating a device communication address and a meter communication address; the peripheral device initiating a communication request to the target meter using the device communication address as the source communication address and the meter communication address as the target communication address; after receiving and parsing the communication request, the target meter performs the following verification items: verifying whether the BCD code in the source communication address matches the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number; extracting the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address and verifying whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permissions by querying a pre-configured access control policy; if any verification item fails, the communication request is rejected.

[0007] Optionally, the peripheral device converts the meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding BCD code, including: the peripheral device converts the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

[0008] Optionally, it also includes: pre-configuring access control policies for each meter; the access control policies record the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code.

[0009] Optionally, the device type identification codes include electricity meters, HHU devices, HDU devices, and USB Dongle devices; the permissions include one or more of the following: allowing reading all data, allowing writing any parameters, allowing reading specified data, and allowing writing specified parameters; the specified data includes one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, electricity meter parameters, and operating status.

[0010] Optionally, it further includes: the peripheral device embeds the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position of the BCD code to generate a meter communication address; the peripheral device uses the meter communication address as the target communication address to initiate a communication request to the target meter.

[0011] Optionally, the peripheral device may embed its device type identification code and the target meter's device type identification code into the position between the third and fourth bytes of the BCD code.

[0012] Another technical solution provided by the present invention is: a system capable of improving the communication security of smart meters, comprising a peripheral device and a meter; the peripheral device is configured to convert the meter number of the target meter into a corresponding BCD code; and to embed its own device type identification code and the target meter's device type identification code into designated positions in the BCD code, generating a device communication address and a meter communication address; and to initiate a communication request to the target meter using the device communication address as the source communication address and the meter communication address as the target communication address; the meter is configured to receive and parse the communication request, and then perform the following verification items: verify whether the BCD code in the source communication address is consistent with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number; extract the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address, and verify whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permissions by querying a pre-configured access control policy; and, if any verification item fails, reject the communication request.

[0013] Optionally, the peripheral device is specifically configured to convert the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

[0014] Optionally, the electricity meter is specifically configured to have a pre-configured access control policy; the access control policy records the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code; the device type identification codes include electricity meter, HHU device, HDU device, and USB Dongle device; the permissions include one or more of the following: allow reading all data, allow writing any parameter, allow reading specified data, and allow writing specified parameters; the specified data includes one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, electricity meter parameters, and operating status.

[0015] Optionally, the peripheral device is further configured to embed the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position of the BCD code to generate a meter communication address; and to initiate a communication request to the target meter using the meter communication address as the target communication address.

[0016] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: This invention can dynamically generate a standard communication address for various peripheral devices that is associated with the target meter and contains its own identity information, and based on this address, realize device identification and secure access control of the communication initiator at the meter end. This significantly improves the communication security of smart meters. Attached Figure Description

[0017] Figure 1 is an interactive schematic diagram of a method for improving the communication security of smart meters provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 is a system connection schematic diagram for improving the communication security of smart meters provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To explain in detail the technical principles, specific implementable solutions, possible application scenarios, and achievable objectives and effects of the present invention, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is understood that the embodiments described herein and the embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings are only used to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are therefore only examples intended to explain the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention. It should be understood that the present invention can be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein.

[0019] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies and provide a method and system for improving the communication security of smart meters. This method and system enable various peripheral devices, whether lacking an address or possessing only an initial address, to dynamically generate a compliant source communication address based on the target meter number and their own device type identification code. Based on this address, device identification of the communication initiator and communication security filtering can be achieved at the target meter.

[0020] The technical terminology explained in this invention is as follows: Peripheral device refers to any device that needs to communicate and interact with the electricity meter. Examples include the electricity meter, HHU (Smart Handheld Terminal), HDU (Home Display Unit), and USB Dongle (Electricity Meter Maintenance and Adjustment Equipment).

[0021] A device type identifier is used to identify various types of peripheral devices. Each type of peripheral device has a unique corresponding device type identifier. This device type identifier can be an identifier that is commonly agreed upon / defaulted in the field for this type of device, or it can be an identifier specifically designed for this type of device in this invention. Generally, before the device leaves the factory, its device type identifier is pre-embedded in a designated storage area of ​​the device (such as firmware in Flash memory / EEPROM / ROM); of course, it can also be configured in the designated storage area later through application updates.

[0022] The meter number is a unique identification code for an electricity meter, similar to an ID number for each meter, used to uniquely identify each meter. Meter numbers are typically 12 decimal digits, such as 999912345678.

[0023] BCD code, also known as binary decimal, uses 4 binary digits to represent 1 decimal digit (0-9), and 1 byte (8 bits) can store 2 BCD digits.

[0024] Please refer to Figure 1. This embodiment of the invention provides a method to improve the communication security of smart meters.

[0025] The present invention provides a method for improving the communication security of smart meters. The peripheral devices can be any meter other than the target meter, HHU devices, HDU devices, and USB Dongle devices. Of course, they can also be other devices that need to communicate and interact with the target meter.

[0026] As shown in Figure 1, the communication interaction process between the peripheral device and the target meter is as follows: S1: The peripheral device converts the meter number of the target meter into the corresponding BCD code.

[0027] In some specific implementations, peripheral devices can obtain the meter number of the electricity meter as the communication target through various methods such as input, barcode scanning, or radio frequency reading.

[0028] In some specific implementations, the peripheral device converts the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

[0029] For example, after peripheral device A obtains the meter number "999912345678" of the target meter to be communicated with, it converts it into 6-byte BCD code: 0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78.

[0030] S2: The peripheral device embeds its device type identification code into the designated position of the BCD code to generate a device communication address.

[0031] In some specific implementations, the device type identification code of the peripheral device is pre-stored in the firmware, and the peripheral device can directly read its device type identification code from the firmware.

[0032] In some specific implementations, the device type identification code of the peripheral device can be an identification code that is commonly agreed upon / defaulted to in the field for this type of device, or it can be an identification code specifically formulated for this type of device in this embodiment.

[0033] For example, the device type identification codes corresponding to different peripheral devices are as follows: Electricity meter: 0xFFFE; HHU device (smart handheld terminal): 0xFFFD; HDU device (home display unit): 0xFFFC; USB Dongle device: 0xFFFB.

[0034] In some specific implementations, the peripheral device embeds its device type identifier (DTI) in the middle of the BCD code, specifically between the 3rd and 4th bytes, to form an address structure of "first 3 bytes table number" + "2 bytes device type identifier" + "last 3 bytes table number". This structure has good readability and is easy for programs to process.

[0035] For example, the peripheral device is an HHU device, whose device type identification code is 2 bytes "0xFFFD"; the BCD code is 6 bytes "0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78"; after embedding the device type identification code of the HHU device into the BCD code, we get "0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0xFD, 0xFD, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78"; then each byte is converted into two hexadecimal digits to obtain a device communication address "999912FFFD345678" consisting of 8 bytes of hexadecimal characters.

[0036] In other specific embodiments, the peripheral device will also use the same method to dynamically generate a "target communication address" that specifies the communication target. Specifically, the peripheral device embeds the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position in the BCD code to generate the meter communication address. When the peripheral device initiates a communication request to the target meter, the meter communication address will be used as the target communication address, and the device communication address will be used as the source communication address of the communication initiator. In this embodiment, the communication addresses of the target communication party and the communication initiator will be dynamically generated respectively, which can clearly identify the identity of the communication party and provide technical support for subsequent authentication of both parties and communication security control.

[0037] For example, the device type identification code of the electricity meter is "0xFFFE". After embedding it into the BCD code "0x99,0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78", the resulting electricity meter communication address, i.e. the target communication address, is "999912FFFE345678".

[0038] Here, the device communication address dynamically generated by the peripheral device not only includes the address of the target communication party (target electricity meter) and the device type of the communication initiator, thus serving as a device identification function during the communication process; but also strictly adheres to the relevant electricity meter communication protocols and meets the relevant requirements for electricity meter communication, ensuring the effectiveness of the communication.

[0039] S3: The peripheral device initiates a communication request to the target meter using the device's communication address as the source communication address.

[0040] When a peripheral device needs to communicate with a target meter, it will use its dynamically generated standard communication address, which contains its own device type identification code and the target meter number, as its source communication address to initiate a communication request to the target meter.

[0041] In some specific implementations where the peripheral device also dynamically generates the corresponding target meter's communication address, the peripheral device will use the meter's communication address as the target communication address to better identify the recipient of the communication request.

[0042] S4: After receiving and parsing the communication request, the target meter performs the following verification items respectively: (1) Address verification: By verifying whether the BCD code in the source communication address is consistent with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number, it is determined whether it is the "target meter".

[0043] Specifically, after receiving a communication request, the meter parses the source address in the communication request to obtain the part used to identify the "target meter number", namely the BCD code; then it compares it with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number to determine whether the two are consistent; if they are consistent, the meter determines that it is the "target meter" and processes the communication request; if they are inconsistent, the meter determines that it is not the "target meter" and discards the communication request.

[0044] (2) Permission verification: Extract the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address, and verify whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permission by querying the pre-configured access control policy.

[0045] Specifically, the meter extracts the embedded "device type identification code" by parsing the source address in the communication request; then, by querying the pre-configured access control policy, it determines whether the extracted "device type identification code" has the permissions requested in the communication request; if so, it responds to the request; if not, it determines that the peripheral device that initiated the request does not have the requested permissions and rejects the communication request.

[0046] In this embodiment, if either of the two verification items fails, the communication request is rejected; the meter will only respond to the communication request if both verification items pass.

[0047] Optionally, the execution order of the above two verification items is not specifically restricted. Preferably, (1) address verification is performed first, followed by (2) permission verification.

[0048] In some specific implementations, a "reason for rejection" corresponding to the verification item can be returned to the initiator of the communication request, so that the user can clearly understand the reason for the request failure, thus serving as a prompt. For example, for a communication request that fails the address verification above (1), prompts such as "address mismatch" or "target meter not found" can be returned. For a communication request that fails the permission verification above (2), prompts such as "does not have the relevant permission", "insufficient permission error", "access denied", or "operation permission restricted" can be returned.

[0049] In some specific implementations, the access control policy is pre-configured in the electricity meter. The access control policy records the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code. In this embodiment, the access control policies configured in different electricity meters (even those of the same brand) may differ. The specific configuration is based on various factors, including national / industry standards and laws, the management regulations of the power grid company, the security level design of the electricity meter itself, and the actual business scenario.

[0050] In some specific implementations, the permissions configured in the access control policy include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following: allow reading all data, allow writing any parameter, allow reading specified data, and allow writing specified parameters; the specified data includes, but is not limited to, one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, meter parameters, and operating status.

[0051] The meter parameters include, but are not limited to, identification parameters (model, accuracy class, rated voltage, rated frequency, basic current, etc.), metering parameters, electrical parameters (rated voltage and frequency, current specifications, etc.), and functional parameters (configuration of pulse indicator lights, trip indicator lights, display screen, etc.).

[0052] For example, the pre-configured access control policy of a certain electricity meter is as follows: Electricity meter: Allow reading all data; HHU device: Allow reading all data, restrict writing to specified parameters; specifically, the specified parameters that are restricted from being written include identification parameters, metering parameters, and electrical parameters; HDU device: Allow reading specified data, restrict writing to any parameter; specifically, the specified data that are restricted from being read are "real-time electricity consumption data and historical electricity consumption data"; USB Dongle device: Allow reading all data, allow writing to any parameter.

[0053] Please refer to Figure 2. Another embodiment of the present invention provides a system that can improve the communication security of smart meters, based on the above embodiments.

[0054] As shown in Figure 2, this embodiment provides a system that can improve the communication security of smart meters, including various peripheral devices and meters.

[0055] In this embodiment, the peripheral device is configured to convert the meter number of the target electricity meter into a corresponding BCD code; and to embed its own device type identification code and the target electricity meter's device type identification code into designated positions in the BCD code, generating a device communication address and a meter communication address; and to initiate a communication request to the target electricity meter using the device communication address as the source communication address and the meter communication address as the target communication address; the electricity meter is configured to receive and parse the communication request, and then perform the following verification items: verify whether the BCD code in the source communication address is consistent with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number; extract the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address, and verify whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permissions by querying a pre-configured access control policy; and, if any verification item fails, reject the communication request.

[0056] In some specific embodiments, the peripheral device is specifically configured to convert the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

[0057] In some specific embodiments, the electricity meter is specifically configured to have a pre-configured access control policy; the access control policy records the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code; in some specific embodiments, the device type identification codes include electricity meter, HHU device, HDU device, and USB Dongle device; the permissions include one or more of the following: allow reading all data, allow writing any parameter, allow reading specified data, and allow writing specified parameters; the specified data includes one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, electricity meter parameters, and operating status.

[0058] In some specific embodiments, the peripheral device is further configured to embed the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position of the BCD code to generate a meter communication address; and to initiate a communication request to the target meter using the meter communication address as the target communication address.

[0059] Another embodiment of the present invention provides a specific application scenario based on any of the above embodiments.

[0060] Assuming the target meter number is "999912345678"; 1. Convert the target meter number "999912345678" into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code: 0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78; 2. The firmware of various peripheral devices predefines their device type identification codes: meter: 0xFFFE; HHU device (smart handheld terminal): 0xFFFD; HDU device (home display unit): 0xFFFC; USB Dongle device: 0xFFFB.

[0061] 3. When various peripheral devices communicate with the target meter, their device communication addresses are dynamically generated: (1) When meter B communicates with the target meter, “0xFFFE” is embedded into the BCD code of the target meter “0x99, 0x99,0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78”, resulting in “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0x34, 0x56,0x78”, generating a device communication address of 999912FFFE345678 composed of 8 bytes of hexadecimal characters.

[0062] (2) When the HHU device (smart handheld terminal) communicates with the target meter, it embeds “0xFFFD” into the BCD code “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78” of the target meter to obtain “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0xFD, 0xFD, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78”, and generates a device communication address 999912FFFD345678 consisting of 8 bytes of hexadecimal characters.

[0063] (3) When the HDU device (home display unit) communicates with the target electricity meter, it embeds “0xFFFC” into the BCD code “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78” of the target electricity meter to obtain “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78”, and generates a device communication address 999912FFFC345678 consisting of 8 bytes of hexadecimal characters.

[0064] (3) When the USB Dongle device communicates with the target electricity meter, it embeds “0xFFFB” into the BCD code “0x99,0x99, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78” of the target electricity meter to obtain “0x99, 0x99, 0x12, 0xFB, 0xFB, 0x34,0x56, 0x78”, and generates a device communication address of 999912FFFB345678 consisting of 8 bytes of hexadecimal characters.

[0065] 4. When an HHU device (smart handheld terminal) wants to read the meter data of the target meter, it dynamically generates its device communication address "999912FFFD345678" and generates the target communication address "999912FFFE345678" in the same way. Then, it sends a communication request to the target communication address "999912FFFE345678" using the device communication address "999912FFFD345678" as the source communication address. 5. After receiving the above communication request, the target meter performs address verification and permission verification respectively: (1) Address verification: Extract the meter number part "999912…345678" from the source address and compare it with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number. If they match, then (2) Permission verification is performed. If they do not match, then the "address mismatch" prompt message is returned to the HHU device (smart handheld terminal).

[0066] (2) The device type identification code "FFFE" embedded in the source address is extracted to identify the device type of the communication initiator as HHU device (smart handheld terminal); the pre-configured access control policy is queried according to the extracted device type identification code to determine whether the HHU device (smart handheld terminal) has the permission to "read meter data" requested in the communication request; if so, the target meter performs the corresponding operation and returns the requested meter data to the HHU device (smart handheld terminal); if not, the prompt message "does not have the corresponding permission" is returned.

[0067] If the target meter receives a communication request carrying a "write parameter" instruction, the target meter identifies the initiator of the communication request as an HDU device (home display unit) based on the source address in the communication request. During the (2) permission verification process, the target meter queries the access control policy based on its device type identification code and finds that the peripheral device of this type does not have the permission to "write parameters". The target meter will directly reject the communication request, thereby ensuring the system security of the target meter.

[0068] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above technical solutions can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the methods described above. After being executed by a processor, the program can also achieve the beneficial effects of the corresponding methods.

[0069] The storage medium can be a disk, optical disc, read-only memory (ROM), or random access memory (RAM), etc.

[0070] In summary, the method and system for improving the communication security of smart meters provided by the present invention have at least the following beneficial effects: 1. Dynamic identity assignment: A standardized and unique device communication address is dynamically generated for peripheral devices without a fixed address, thus solving their identity identification problem.

[0071] 2. Precise Device Identification: By parsing the device communication address, the target meter, as the communication receiver, can accurately identify the device type (HHU, HDU, etc.) of the communication request initiator, laying the foundation for subsequent differentiated data processing.

[0072] 3. Enhanced security mechanism: Implements two-level security filtering: Level 1 filters access requests not related to this table number; Level 2 performs fine-grained access control based on device type. This effectively prevents unauthorized access and unauthorized operations.

[0073] 4. Backward compatibility: The dynamically generated 8-byte address format is completely consistent with the existing meter address length, without the need to modify the underlying communication protocol, which is highly compatible and easy to deploy in existing systems.

[0074] Although preferred embodiments of the invention have been described, those skilled in the art, upon understanding the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to the embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to cover the preferred embodiments and all equivalent modifications falling within the scope of protection defined by the claims and their equivalents. Clearly, those skilled in the art can make various alterations and variations to the invention without departing from its spirit and scope. If such modifications and variations fall within the scope of protection defined by the claims and their equivalents, the invention also intends to include them.

[0075] It should be noted that any reference signs placed between parentheses in the claims should not be construed as limiting the claims. The word "comprising" does not exclude the presence of components or steps not listed in the claims. The word "a" or "an" preceding a component does not exclude the presence of a plurality of such components. The invention can be implemented by means of hardware comprising several different components and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In a unit claim enumerating several means, several of these means may be embodied by the same item of hardware.

[0076] In this invention, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of indicated technical features. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of this invention, "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified. The term "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone.

[0077] In this invention, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "installation," "connection," "linking," and "fixing," etc., should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral part; they can refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they can refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; they can refer to the internal communication of two components or the interaction between two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this invention according to the specific circumstances.

[0078] In this specification, the use of terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., refers to a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example, which is included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. The illustrative expressions of the above terms in this specification should not be construed as necessarily referring to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of different embodiments or examples.

[0079] The above description is merely an embodiment of the present invention and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent modifications made based on the content of the present invention specification and drawings, or direct or indirect applications in related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for improving the communication security of smart meters, characterized in that, include: The peripheral equipment converts the meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding BCD code; The peripheral device embeds its device type identification code into a designated location in the BCD code to generate a device communication address. The peripheral device initiates a communication request to the target meter using the device communication address as the source communication address. After receiving and parsing the communication request, the target meter performs the following verification items: verifying whether the BCD code in the source communication address matches the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number; extracting the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address and verifying whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permissions by querying the pre-configured access control policy; if any verification item fails, the communication request is rejected.

2. The method for improving communication security of smart meters as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The peripheral device converts the meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding BCD code, including: the peripheral device converts the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

3. The method for improving the communication security of smart meters as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Each electricity meter is pre-configured with its own access control policy. The access control policy records the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code.

4. The method for improving the communication security of smart meters as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The device type identification codes include electricity meters, HHU devices, HDU devices, and USB Dongle devices; the permissions include one or more of the following: allow reading all data, allow writing any parameters, allow reading specified data, and allow writing specified parameters; the specified data includes one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, electricity meter parameters, and operating status.

5. The method for improving communication security of smart meters as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The peripheral device embeds the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position in the BCD code to generate a meter communication address; the peripheral device uses the meter communication address as the target communication address to initiate a communication request to the target meter.

6. The method for improving communication security of smart meters as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The peripheral devices embed their device type identification codes and the target meter's device type identification codes into the position between the third and fourth bytes of the BCD code.

7. A system capable of improving the communication security of smart meters, characterized in that, Peripheral devices and electricity meters; the peripheral devices are configured to convert the meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding BCD code; The device type identification code and the target meter's device type identification code are embedded into designated positions in the BCD code to generate a device communication address and a meter communication address; a communication request is initiated to the target meter using the device communication address as the source communication address and the meter communication address as the target communication address; the meter is configured to receive and parse the communication request, and then perform the following verification items: verify whether the BCD code in the source communication address is consistent with the BCD code corresponding to its own meter number; extract the device type identification code embedded in the source communication address, and verify whether the corresponding peripheral device has the requested permissions by querying the pre-configured access control policy; and if any verification item fails, the communication request is rejected.

8. The system for improving the communication security of smart meters as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The peripheral device is specifically configured to convert the 12-bit decimal meter number of the target electricity meter into the corresponding 6-byte BCD code.

9. The system for improving the communication security of smart meters as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The electricity meter is specifically configured with a pre-configured access control policy; the access control policy records the permissions corresponding to each device type identification code; the device type identification codes include electricity meter, HHU device, HDU device, and USB Dongle device; the permissions include one or more of the following: allow reading all data, allow writing any parameter, allow reading specified data, and allow writing specified parameters; the specified data includes one or more of the following: real-time electricity consumption data, historical electricity consumption data, electricity meter parameters, and operating status.

10. The system for improving the communication security of smart meters as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The peripheral device is further configured to embed the device type identification code of the target meter into a designated position of the BCD code to generate a meter communication address; and to initiate a communication request to the target meter using the meter communication address as the target communication address.

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