V2N network security improvement-oriented authentication and key negotiation method and system

Abstract

The invention provides a V2N network security improvement-oriented authentication and key negotiation method and system, and the method is cooperatively realized by a vehicle user VU, a vehicle service center VSC and a security detector SV: the VU only uploads a password hash value to avoid plaintext leakage, and the VSC generates and stores a honey word set meeting the minimum editing distance constraint in a registration stage, false alarms caused by input errors are reduced from the source; in the authentication stage, after session key negotiation is completed, a session index and a current IP are sent to the SV, the SV calculates a comprehensive risk score according to whether the index is matched with a registration index and whether the IP is located in a credible geographic set, when the risk score exceeds a preset threshold value, real-time refusal and alarm are carried out, and if not, authentication is allowed to pass. The whole process covers three stages of system parameter initialization, security registration and authentication key agreement, the forward security is guaranteed by utilizing ideal password encryption and temporary key exchange, and the scheme has the advantages of low false alarm rate and dynamic risk self-adaption, and keeps lower calculation and communication overhead at the same time.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of security authentication and key negotiation technology in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), specifically involving an authentication and key negotiation method and system for improving V2N network security. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of intelligent transportation systems, vehicle-to-network (V2N) communication is being used more and more widely. In remote vehicle services, the Vehicle Service Center (VSC) needs to authenticate the vehicle owner to prevent malicious users from unauthorized operation of the vehicle. While traditional password-based authentication methods are simple and easy to implement, they have many serious security vulnerabilities. On the one hand, low-entropy passwords are vulnerable to brute-force and dictionary attacks; attackers can guess user passwords through exhaustive searches or common password combinations. On the other hand, password leaks are frequent, allowing attackers to obtain user credentials through phishing, social engineering, or database breaches, thereby illegally accessing vehicle systems and controlling critical vehicle functions, posing a significant threat to vehicle security.

[0003] In existing solutions, asymmetric password authentication key exchange (aPAKE) technology effectively prevents internal personnel from directly obtaining plaintext passwords by storing only the password authenticator on the server. However, its security still has significant shortcomings: if the password file stored on the server is stolen by external attackers, they can still launch offline dictionary attacks on low-entropy passwords. Honeyword technology, on the other hand, provides leakage detection capabilities by embedding decoy passwords into the authentication system. However, honeyword technology requires clients to transmit plaintext passwords, increasing the risk of internal leakage. To ensure identity authentication security, recent research has combined the aPAKE protocol with honeyword mechanisms to resist password guessing attacks and password leaks. However, most existing solutions use an "index-complete match" method to determine whether a password is a honeyword during honeyword detection, which has limitations in real-world V2N deployment environments. First, existing solutions generally neglect protection against false alarms. Common input errors by legitimate users, due to their high similarity to real passwords, are easily matched by the system to preset honeywords, thus falsely triggering security alerts, causing legitimate services to be interrupted, and severely impacting user experience and system availability.

[0004] Secondly, in the connected vehicle environment, vehicles are highly mobile and geographically variable. When user credentials are stolen, attackers may initiate logins from other locations. Existing solutions cannot effectively distinguish between "legitimate vehicle movement" and "abnormal logins after credential theft," resulting in certain security blind spots.

[0005] In summary, in the V2N network environment, there is an urgent need to develop a new authentication scheme that can ensure the security of the authentication process and meet the needs of real-time communication. This scheme needs to overcome the limitations of existing technologies and achieve the following objectives: (1) provide an effective leakage detection mechanism; (2) introduce an active mechanism to prevent false alarms caused by user input errors and improve availability; (3) have the ability to dynamically identify abnormal login behaviors (such as abnormal geographical location) to deal with risks such as credential theft; (4) maintain lightweight computing and communication characteristics to ensure authentication efficiency. This invention proposes an authentication and key negotiation method and system for improving V2N network security. By satisfying the minimum Levenshtein distance constraint, it effectively prevents false alarms caused by input errors by legitimate vehicle users. Furthermore, by optimizing the verification process through a dynamic risk assessment model of IP address, it solves the problem of detecting abnormal login behaviors caused by legitimate vehicle movement or network switching in the vehicle network environment. Thus, while maintaining vigilance against real attacks, it avoids service interruption for normally driving vehicles and maintains lightweight computing characteristics. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this invention is to propose an authentication and key negotiation method, system, and device for improving V2N network security, aiming to comprehensively address security and availability issues in V2N communication, such as password leakage, false positives for user input, and abnormal login behavior. This invention, based on an asymmetric password authentication mechanism (aPAKE), incorporates honeyword technology and innovatively prevents false positives caused by legitimate user input errors by forcing a minimum Levenshtein distance constraint between the honeyword and the real password. Simultaneously, it introduces a dynamic risk assessment mechanism for vehicle user IP addresses to effectively identify and intercept abnormal geographical login behavior after credential theft. The overall protocol maintains lightweight computational and communication overhead while ensuring forward security, resistance to offline attacks and internal threats, making it suitable for V2N scenarios with comprehensive requirements for high security, high availability, and high efficiency.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0008] An authentication and key negotiation method for improving V2N network security, the method comprising:

[0009] During the registration phase: The Vehicle Service Center (VSC) generates a set of deceptive authentication credentials associated with the real authentication credentials based on the real authentication credentials submitted by the vehicle user (VU) and according to the condition that the real password meets the preset Levenshtein distance constraint; the real authentication credentials and the deceptive authentication credentials are stored together to form an authentication credential library that hides the real entries, and the identification information of the real entries is sent to the security detector (SV).

[0010] During the authentication and key negotiation phase: the vehicle user (VU) and the vehicle service center (VSC) execute a key exchange protocol to negotiate the session key; the vehicle service center (VSC) verifies the type of credential used in this login attempt in parallel based on the authentication credential library; if the verification indicates that a deceptive authentication credential is being used, it is determined to be an attack and terminated; if the verification passes, a subsequent dynamic risk assessment is performed.

[0011] Dynamic risk assessment phase: The current vehicle user IP is collected and assessed by the security detector according to the preset risk model; if the assessment result exceeds the security threshold, it is judged as an abnormal login and access is denied; if it does not exceed the threshold, both parties are allowed to establish a secure channel based on the negotiated session key.

[0012] Preferably, the method further includes an initialization phase, the specific steps of which include:

[0013] Based on the set safety parameters Constructing a prime number Cyclic group and its generators ,in The bit length and the security parameters Match them and define three hash functions. A pseudo-random function ,exist The ideal code of space And for honey word generation algorithms The ranges of the three hash functions are respectively... , It is an integer group. For encryption functions, This is the decryption function.

[0014] Preferably, the registration stage specifically includes the following steps:

[0015] VU Selection As a random obfuscation value, based on the password Generate the first hash value with the random obfuscation value s. and VU private key , Combined with VU private key Calculate and generate VU public key , ;

[0016] VU will parameters Send to VSC via a secure channel, where... It is the vehicle's identification. This is the initial registration IP information;

[0017] After receiving the parameters, VSC calls the honey word generation algorithm. Generate t-1 honey words and obtain a honey word set. Each honey word With real password The minimum Levenshtein distance constraint is satisfied between them to reduce the false alarm rate;

[0018] VSC uses random obfuscation values ​​and honey words. Calculate and generate the corresponding second hash value and VU's private key And based on the private key Calculate the honey public key of VU , ;

[0019] VSC will use the second hash value and the first hash value Store vector , will use the real public key Honey public key Store vector ; for vectors under the same random permutations sum vector A joint shuffling is performed to hide the real entries while maintaining the one-to-one mapping between entries, and based on the shuffled vectors... sum vector Store password file ( This serves as an authentication credential repository; after storage is complete, the VU's identity identifier will be stored. and the actual password storage location and initial registration IP message Send it to SV for storage.

[0020] Preferred, each honey word With real password The Levenshtein distance between them is greater than 3.

[0021] Preferably, the authentication and key negotiation phase specifically includes the following steps:

[0022] VSC selects a random number As a temporary key, and based on the generator and random numbers Calculate the public key , ;

[0023] VSC uses the first hash value public key Encryption yields ciphertext , ; and ciphertext and VSC's own identity identifier Send to VU;

[0024] VU uses the first hash value Decrypting the ciphertext 'e' yields the public key. , And select a random number. As a temporary key, calculate the public key. , ;

[0025] VU calculates temporary parameters as well as , , ; Calculate session key sk and confirmation information and session key , , , ; and send confirmation information to VSC and public key X;

[0026] After receiving the parameters, VSC generates temporary parameters for each VU. and , , And calculate t session keys. , ,in hour, The value is ;

[0027] VSC verification confirmation information Correctness: If If the session is rejected, the session key is calculated. Obtain the session key set ;

[0028] VSC checks whether the session key SK used by VU belongs to... If it does not belong to the specified index, the session is rejected; otherwise, the corresponding index is determined. and the corresponding index With vehicle user identification identifier Send to SV for authentication:

[0029] like If this indicates that a honey word was used during this login, SV will immediately trigger an alert and terminate the session;

[0030] like This indicates that the correct password was used during this login session and authentication was successful.

[0031] Preferably, the dynamic risk assessment phase specifically includes the following steps:

[0032] VSC collects the current vehicle user IP of VU and records it as IP. cur and will ( Send to SV;

[0033] After receiving the parameters, SV makes a judgment based on the risk scoring model:

[0034]

[0035] in Preset weights; This is an indicator function; it takes the value 1 if the condition is true, and 0 otherwise. A set of trusted vehicle IPs maintained by SV;

[0036] when If the SV determines this is an abnormal login attempt, it will refuse access and trigger a security alarm; otherwise, the SV will return an "allow" signal, and the VSC and VU will establish a secure channel using SK; alarm threshold. The range of values ​​is .

[0037] Preferably, if this login is allowed and the IP address is... cur Originally not in the group In the middle, SV will IP cur Dynamic addition This is to optimize subsequent risk assessments.

[0038] An authentication and key negotiation system for improving V2N network security is provided. The system is implemented using any of the above-mentioned authentication and key negotiation methods for improving V2N network security, including vehicle user (VU), vehicle service center (VSC), and security detector (SV).

[0039] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0040] This invention effectively reduces false alarms caused by erroneous input from legitimate users triggering honeyword detection by introducing a minimum Levenshtein distance constraint. This addresses the long-standing usability issues of traditional honeyword systems and significantly improves the user-friendliness of the authentication process. Secondly, by introducing a dynamic risk assessment mechanism based on vehicle user IPs, this invention further analyzes session behavior after the basic authentication process. This helps identify abnormal login behaviors that may occur due to credential theft, providing additional security protection and enhancing the system's adaptability to complex attack scenarios. Thirdly, the overall architecture of this invention maintains a lightweight nature, with low computational overhead and fewer communication rounds for the vehicle client. While achieving the aforementioned security enhancements, it meets the low latency and high efficiency requirements of the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2N) environment. Attached Figure Description

[0041] Figure 1 This is an overall framework diagram of a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0042] The technical solution of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0043] To address the vulnerabilities of traditional password authentication in Vehicle-to-Network (V2N) communication to offline guessing and internal attacks, and the tendency of existing honeyword schemes to generate false alarms when legitimate users input incorrect information, this invention proposes an authentication and key negotiation method and system for enhancing V2N network security. In the registration, authentication, and key negotiation processes based on aPAKE and honeyword technologies, a dual security enhancement mechanism is constructed: First, by setting a minimum Levenshtein distance constraint between the honeyword and the real password, false alarms caused by honeyword detection triggered by legitimate user input errors are effectively reduced, thereby improving system availability. Second, by introducing a dynamic risk assessment mechanism based on session context features such as vehicle user IP addresses, a Security Authenticator (SV) comprehensively analyzes authentication session behavior to assist in identifying abnormal login behaviors that may occur in scenarios such as credential theft, enhancing the system's defense capabilities against complex attacks. This method enables collaborative detection and timely response to credential leakage and abnormal login behavior. While ensuring forward security, it combines lightweight cryptographic operations and an efficient key negotiation mechanism to effectively resist security threats such as offline guessing, replay attacks, and internal abuse, significantly improving the overall security, reliability, and risk adaptability of the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) authentication system. The complete system architecture is as follows: Figure 1 As shown.

[0044] The proposed authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security specifically includes the following stages:

[0045] During the initialization phase, parameters are set. Three hash functions are defined as security parameters. Pseudo-random function is selected. Ideal Code And for honey word generation algorithms ;

[0046] During the registration phase, vehicle user VU selects s ​​as a random obfuscation value based on the password. Generate a hash value with random obfuscation value s and vehicle private key Combined with private key Calculate and generate public key Initial IP information registration Finally, the parameters It is sent to the Vehicle Service Center (VSC) through a secure channel. It is the vehicle's identification identifier; VSC uses a honeyword generation algorithm to generate t-1 honeywords, requiring each honeyword to satisfy the minimum Levenshtein distance with the real password to reduce the false alarm rate, and uses a random obfuscation value s and honeywords to generate the VU's private key. and Calculate the public key of the vehicle user ,Will and Store vector , will use the real public key Honey public key Store vector These two vectors are jointly shuffled under the same random permutation to hide the real entries while maintaining a one-to-one mapping relationship, and the password file is stored. ), and identify the vehicle user (VU). and the actual password storage location and initial registration IP message Send to the security detector (SV); the SV stores the received data. and And save;

[0047] During the authentication and key negotiation phase, VSC selects a random number. As a temporary key, and to compute the public key Y, where Y is generated by the generator and random numbers Calculated; using hash value Encryption yields ciphertext and ciphertext and one's own identity identifier Send to vehicle user VU; vehicle user VU uses hash value Decrypting the ciphertext e yields Y, and vehicle user VU selects... As a temporary key, calculate the public key X and the session key sk, and send an acknowledgment message to the VSC. And the temporary public key X; VSC calculates t session keys. VSC then obtains t sets of session keys. VSC check If the check passes, select its corresponding index. With vehicle user identification identifier Send to SV; if If this indicates that a honey keyword was used during this login, SV will immediately trigger an alert and terminate the session; if This indicates that the correct password was used during the login and authentication was successful. After successful protocol authentication, the system initiates a risk analysis based on the context of this session to identify potential abnormal login behavior (such as login from a different location after password theft). VSC collects the current vehicle user's IP address (denoted as IP). cur ), and ( The parameters are sent to the SV; after receiving the parameters, the SV makes a judgment based on the risk scoring model. ,in Preset weights; This is an indicator function; it takes the value 1 if the condition is true, and 0 otherwise. A set of trusted vehicle IPs maintained for SV. When If the SV determines that this is an abnormal login attempt, it will refuse access and trigger a security alarm; otherwise, the SV will return an "allow" signal, and the VSC and the vehicle user VU will establish a secure channel using SK. Alarm threshold value range ;SV can transmit IP cur Dynamic addition This is to optimize subsequent risk assessments.

[0048] In a preferred embodiment, parameters are set during the initialization phase. As a safety parameter; It is a level cyclic group, in which It is a prime number. for The generator; define three hash functions. And a pseudo-random function The ranges of the hash functions are as follows: , It is the group of integers; defined in The ideal code of space ,in For encryption functions, Let be the decryption function; This is a keyword generation algorithm.

[0049] In a preferred embodiment, during the registration phase, the vehicle user (VU) selects... As a random confounding value, calculate Get hash value and the vehicle user's private key Calculate the vehicle user's public key Vehicle users will provide parameters It is sent to the Vehicle Service Center (VSC) through a secure passage. The initial registration IP information for the vehicle is received; after receiving it, the VSC calls the Gen keyword generation algorithm to generate t-1 sets of honey words. Next, each is required to With real password The Levenshtein distance between them is greater than 3, and for each Calculation with confusion value s Obtain the corresponding private key for vehicle V Calculate the public key for the honey ,Will and Store vector , will use the real public key Honey public key Store vector These two vectors are jointly shuffled under the same random permutation to hide the true entries while maintaining a one-to-one mapping, and the parameters are stored in file[ ] After storage is complete, VSC will index the real password corresponding to vehicle V. Identity identifier and initial registration IP message Send to the security detector (SV); SV obtains from VSC ( , Then store it.

[0050] In a preferred embodiment, during the authentication and key negotiation phase, the VSC selects... As a temporary key, calculate As a public key, for The generator of the public key Encryption yields ciphertext The calculated ciphertext and their own identity markers Send together to vehicle user (VU); vehicle user (VU) selects As a temporary key, calculate Use the hash value as the public key. For ciphertext Decryption Then, a session key is generated for calculating the session key. Required temporary parameters as well as ,but Calculate confirmation information and session key and the public key X and confirmation information Send to VSC; after receiving the parameters from the vehicle user VU, VSC generates temporary parameters for each vehicle V. and And calculate t session keys And confirm the information. Then verify its correctness, that is, if If the session is rejected, the session key is calculated. Then VSC will obtain the session key set. Next, VSC checks whether the session key SK used by the vehicle user (VU) belongs to... If it does not belong to the specified index, the session is rejected; otherwise, VSC determines the corresponding index. , corresponding index With vehicle user identification identifier Send to SV for authentication; if If this indicates that a honey keyword was used during this login, SV will immediately trigger an alert and terminate the session; if This indicates that the correct password was used during the login and authentication was successful. After successful protocol authentication, the system initiates a risk analysis based on the context of this session to identify potential abnormal login behavior (such as login from a different location after password theft). VSC collects the current vehicle user's IP address (denoted as IP). cur ), and ( The parameters are sent to the SV; after receiving the parameters, the SV makes a judgment based on the risk scoring model. ,in Preset weights; This is an indicator function; it takes the value 1 if the condition is true, and 0 otherwise. A set of trusted vehicle IPs maintained for SV. When If the SV determines that this is an abnormal login attempt, it will refuse access and trigger a security alarm; otherwise, the SV will return an "allow" signal, and the VSC and the vehicle user VU will establish a secure channel using SK. Alarm threshold value range ;SV can transmit IP cur Dynamic addition This is to optimize subsequent risk assessments.

[0051] The system proposed in this invention allows vehicle users and servers to securely establish session keys based on aPAKE and honeyword technology. By introducing a minimum Levenshtein distance constraint during honeyword generation and authentication, false alarms caused by honeyword detection triggered by erroneous password input by legitimate users are effectively suppressed, thereby improving the availability and stability of the authentication process. At the same time, the Security Authenticator (SV) performs a comprehensive risk assessment on session context features such as the vehicle user's IP address to identify abnormal login behavior and potential password leakage events in real time, further enhancing the system's security protection capabilities and overall operational efficiency in complex network environments.

[0052] This invention can be widely applied to scenarios such as V2N communication, intelligent transportation, and vehicle-road cooperation, providing reliable and efficient identity authentication and key negotiation services for vehicle users, vehicle service centers, and operators.

[0053] In summary, this invention achieves its safety objectives through the following innovative design:

[0054] 1. Use ideal cryptography (IC*) to encrypt transmission for authentication purposes;

[0055] 2. A minimum Levenshtein distance constraint mechanism is introduced, which forces that the edit distance between each honey word and the user's real password is not less than a set threshold, thereby effectively preventing legitimate users from triggering false alarms due to input errors and significantly improving system availability;

[0056] 3. Establish a dynamic risk assessment mechanism, in which the security authenticator performs secondary analysis on the authentication session based on context information such as the vehicle user's IP address, thereby enabling the identification and interception of abnormal login behavior and enhancing the defense capabilities against security threats such as credential theft.

[0057] 3. Optimize the key negotiation process to adapt to the V2N environment's requirements for low latency and lightweight computing.

[0058] It should be understood that any parts not described in detail in this specification belong to the prior art.

[0059] It should be understood that the above description of the preferred embodiments is quite detailed, but it should not be considered as a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention. Those skilled in the art, under the guidance of this invention, can make substitutions or modifications without departing from the scope of protection of the claims of this invention, and all such substitutions or modifications fall within the scope of protection of this invention. The scope of protection of this invention should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. An authentication and key negotiation method for improving V2N network security, characterized in that, The method includes: During the registration phase: The Vehicle Service Center (VSC) generates a set of deceptive authentication credentials associated with the real authentication credentials based on the real authentication credentials submitted by the vehicle user (VU) and according to the condition that the real password meets the preset Levenshtein distance constraint; the real authentication credentials and the deceptive authentication credentials are stored together to form an authentication credential library that hides the real entries, and the identification information of the real entries is sent to the security detector (SV). During the authentication and key negotiation phase: the vehicle user (VU) and the vehicle service center (VSC) execute a key exchange protocol to negotiate the session key; the vehicle service center (VSC) verifies the type of credential used in this login attempt in parallel based on the authentication credential library; if the verification indicates that a deceptive authentication credential is being used, it is determined to be an attack and terminated; if the verification passes, a subsequent dynamic risk assessment is performed. Dynamic risk assessment phase: The current vehicle user IP is collected and assessed by the security detector according to the preset risk model; if the assessment result exceeds the security threshold, it is judged as an abnormal login and access is denied; if it does not exceed the threshold, both parties are allowed to establish a secure channel based on the negotiated session key.

2. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method also includes an initialization phase, the specific steps of which include: Based on the set safety parameters Constructing a prime number Cyclic group and its generators ,in The bit length and the security parameters Match them and define three hash functions. A pseudo-random function ,exist The ideal code of space And for honey word generation algorithms The ranges of the three hash functions are respectively... , It is an integer group. For encryption functions, This is the decryption function.

3. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 2, characterized in that, The registration phase specifically includes the following steps: VU Selection As a random obfuscation value, based on the password Generate the first hash value with the random obfuscation value s. and VU private key , Combined with VU private key Calculate and generate VU public key , ; VU will parameters Send to VSC via a secure channel, where... It is the vehicle's identification. This is the initial registration IP information; After receiving the parameters, VSC calls the honey word generation algorithm. Generate t-1 honey words and obtain a honey word set. Each honey word With real password The minimum Levenshtein distance constraint is satisfied between them to reduce the false alarm rate; VSC uses random obfuscation values ​​and honey words. Calculate and generate the corresponding second hash value and VU's private key , And based on the private key Calculate the honey public key of VU , ; VSC will use the second hash value and the first hash value Store vector , will use the real public key Honey public key Store vector ; for vectors under the same random permutations sum vector A joint shuffling is performed to hide the real entries while maintaining the one-to-one mapping between entries, and based on the shuffled vectors... sum vector Store password file ( This serves as an authentication credential repository; after storage is complete, the VU's identity identifier will be stored. and the actual password storage location and initial registration IP message Send it to SV for storage.

4. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 3, characterized in that, Each honey word With real password The Levenshtein distance between them is greater than 3.

5. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 3, characterized in that, The authentication and key negotiation phase specifically includes the following steps: VSC selects a random number As a temporary key, and based on the generator and random numbers Calculate the public key , ; VSC uses the first hash value public key Encryption yields ciphertext , ; and ciphertext and VSC's own identity identifier Send to VU; VU uses the first hash value Decrypting the ciphertext 'e' yields the public key. , And select a random number. As a temporary key, calculate the public key. , ; VU calculates temporary parameters as well as , , ; Calculate session key sk and confirmation information and session key , , , ; and send confirmation information to VSC and public key X; After receiving the parameters, VSC generates temporary parameters for each VU. and , , And calculate t session keys. , ,in hour, The value is ; VSC verification confirmation information Correctness: If If the session is rejected, the session key is calculated. Obtain the session key set ; VSC checks whether the session key SK used by VU belongs to... If it does not belong to the specified index, the session is rejected; otherwise, the corresponding index is determined. and the corresponding index With vehicle user identification identifier Send to SV for authentication: like If this indicates that a honey word was used during this login, SV will immediately trigger an alert and terminate the session; like This indicates that the correct password was used during this login session and authentication was successful.

6. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 5, characterized in that, The dynamic risk assessment phase specifically includes the following steps: VSC collects the current vehicle user IP of VU and records it as IP. cur and will ( Send to SV; After receiving the parameters, SV makes a judgment based on the risk scoring model: in Preset weights; This is an indicator function; it takes the value 1 if the condition is true, and 0 otherwise. A set of trusted vehicle IPs maintained by SV; when If the SV determines this is an abnormal login attempt, it will refuse access and trigger a security alarm; otherwise, the SV will return an "allow" signal, and the VSC and VU will establish a secure channel using SK; alarm threshold. The range of values ​​is .

7. The authentication and key negotiation method for enhancing V2N network security according to claim 6, characterized in that, If this login is allowed and the IP address is valid... cur Originally not in the group In the middle, SV will IP cur Dynamic addition This is to optimize subsequent risk assessments.

8. An authentication and key negotiation system for improving V2N network security, characterized in that, The system is implemented using the authentication and key negotiation method for improving V2N network security as described in any one of claims 1-7, including vehicle user (VU), vehicle service center (VSC), and security detector (SV).

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