Distributed cooperative positioning method and system facing non-convex topology and DOS attack

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a distributed cooperative positioning method and system facing non-convex topology and DOS attack, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining a plurality of communicable vehicles closest to a to-be-positioned vehicle, and enabling the plurality of communicable vehicles to be not collinear; obtaining symbolized barycentric coordinates of the to-be-positioned vehicle relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles; when a communication link is normal, iteratively updating the current position information of the to-be-positioned vehicle based on the previous position information of the to-be-positioned vehicle, the symbolized barycentric coordinates and the current position information of the plurality of communicable vehicles; when the communication link is subjected to the DoS attack, position compensation is obtained based on the influence condition of the DoS attack on the communication link; and iteratively updating the current position information of the to-be-positioned vehicle based on the position compensation. According to the embodiment of the invention, reliable position sensing support can be provided for an intelligent motorcade in a high-dynamic and weak communication guarantee environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This specification relates to the field of vehicle cooperative perception and positioning technology in intelligent transportation systems, and in particular, to a distributed cooperative positioning method and system for non-convex topology and DOS attacks. Background Technology

[0002] In the development of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) and cooperative intelligent transportation systems, multi-vehicle communication to share state information for collaborative perception and localization is a core technology for improving the reliability and safety of autonomous driving systems. However, in real-world dynamic road environments, vehicle cooperative localization faces two major challenges: First, network security threats to communication networks, particularly periodic denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which actively block inter-vehicle communication links, causing interruptions, delays, or loss of critical state information transmission, severely damaging the information fusion foundation of the cooperative localization system and potentially leading to localization failures or estimation divergence. Second, the dynamic and complex spatial topology, where vehicles may form arbitrary spatial distributions during travel. Traditional centroid-based localization methods typically require the vehicle to be located to be within the convex hull formed by its neighboring vehicles (especially the leader vehicle acting as an anchor point). This strong assumption is often unsatisfactory in real-world dynamic vehicle platoons, greatly limiting the applicability of the algorithm.

[0003] Currently, mainstream methods for distributed multi-vehicle cooperative localization can be categorized as follows: One category is distributed estimation methods based on filtering theory, such as distributed Kalman filtering and its variants. These methods typically assume stable communication links and known noise characteristics, but lack effective online compensation and recovery mechanisms for sudden or periodic communication interruptions caused by DoS attacks. Another category is localization methods based on graph optimization or multilateral measurement. These perform well in static or slowly changing networks, but in complex scenarios involving dynamic topologies coupled with communication attacks, they suffer from high computational complexity and difficulty in guaranteeing real-time performance.

[0004] In recent years, distributed iterative localization methods based on barycentric coordinates have attracted widespread attention due to their advantages such as low communication volume and no need for a central node. Classical distributed iterative localization algorithms and their improved versions represent the global position of a vehicle as a weighted sum of the positions of several neighbors, requiring only a small number of anchor vehicles with known positions to estimate the position of the entire convoy. However, existing barycentric coordinate-based methods still have significant shortcomings in addressing the two major challenges mentioned above: First, in terms of topology adaptability, most existing methods strictly limit non-anchor vehicles to being located inside the convex hull formed by anchors, or can only handle specific non-convex cases, lacking a universal systematic solution and update mechanism for the symbol coefficients that can handle vehicles located at arbitrary positions outside the convex hull (including edge cases such as connecting lines or specific parallel configurations). Second, in terms of attack robustness, most existing studies assume ideal communication or only consider random packet loss, lacking targeted defense strategies against purposeful, periodic DoS attacks. During an attack, vehicles cannot obtain the latest state of their neighbors, causing iterative updates to stagnate and errors to fail to converge. A few studies have introduced event-triggered or limited memory filtering to deal with attacks, but they have failed to make full use of the temporal correlation of historical vehicle motion data for intelligent prediction and compensation. The recovery speed during the attack interval is slow and the overall positioning continuity is poor.

[0005] Therefore, there is an urgent need for an innovative distributed cooperative positioning method that can solve the problems of complex spatial distribution of vehicles and resistance to DoS attacks, thereby providing reliable location awareness support for intelligent vehicle fleets in highly dynamic and weak communication environments. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of the embodiments in this specification is to provide a distributed cooperative positioning method and system for non-convex topology and DOS attacks, so as to provide reliable location awareness support for intelligent vehicle fleets in highly dynamic and weak communication environments.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, this specification provides a distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and DoS attacks, comprising: Obtain multiple communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located, wherein the multiple communicable vehicles are not collinear; Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles are obtained. When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal, the current position information of the vehicle to be located is iteratively updated based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles. When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack, location compensation is obtained based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link. Based on the location compensation, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles, the current location information of the vehicle to be located is iteratively updated.

[0008] Preferably, obtaining the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, further includes: Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, the original center of gravity coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles are obtained. Based on the positive or negative attribute of each original centroid coordinate, a symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is obtained; The symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with the known symbol combinations. If the match is successful, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained. The original centroid coordinates of each vehicle are normalized to obtain the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles. By combining the symbolic coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located and the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles are obtained.

[0009] Preferably, when the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with a known symbol combination and the match fails, then: If the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 0, then it is determined whether the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to the other communicable vehicles is less than or equal to 1. If so, then the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is vector A1; If not, there exists an original centroid coordinate greater than 1. Based on the relationship between this original centroid coordinate and the other remaining centroid coordinates, the sign coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector A2 or vector A3. If the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 1, and the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to other communicable vehicles is not 0, then based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two communicable vehicles, it is determined whether the parallelogram condition is satisfied. If so, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as vector B1; If not, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector B2 or vector B3 based on the square of the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles.

[0010] Preferably, the iterative update of the current location information of the vehicle to be located based on the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles further includes: The current location information of the vehicle to be located is updated iteratively using the following formula: ; in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. The damping factor, The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. Let r represent the current location information of the communicable vehicles.

[0011] Preferably, obtaining location compensation based on the impact of DoS attacks on the communication link further includes: Based on the historical location information of the vehicle to be located, the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located is obtained. Based on the proportion of the communication link blocked by DoS attacks, a nonlinear adaptive compensation weight is obtained. Based on the compensation weight, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, and the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located, a location compensation is obtained.

[0012] Preferably, obtaining the location compensation based on the compensation weight, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, and the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located further includes: The position compensation is calculated using the following formula: ; in, For location compensation, To compensate for the weight, This refers to the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located.

[0013] Preferably, the iterative update of the current location information of the vehicle to be located based on the location compensation, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles further includes: The current location information of the vehicle to be located is updated iteratively using the following formula: ; in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. The damping factor, The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. This indicates the status of the communication link; if the communication link is blocked by a DoS attack... The value is 0 if the communication link is not blocked by a DoS attack. =1, This represents the current location information between communicable vehicles, where r represents any communicable vehicle. For location compensation.

[0014] On the other hand, embodiments of this specification provide a distributed cooperative localization system for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks, the system comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire the multiple communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located; The determining module is used to obtain the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles. The normal update module is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal. The attack module is used to obtain location compensation based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack. The attack update module is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the position compensation, the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of multiple communicable vehicles.

[0015] In another aspect, embodiments of this specification also provide a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of any of the methods described above.

[0016] In another aspect, embodiments of this specification also provide a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor of a computer device, implements the steps of any of the methods described above.

[0017] As can be seen from the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification above, these embodiments construct a highly robust cooperative localization method suitable for dynamic network topologies and malicious attack environments by introducing signed centroid coordinate modeling, adaptive cluster partitioning and fusion mechanisms, and a DoS attack compensation strategy based on autoregressive prediction. This method possesses strong anti-DoS attack capabilities, high deployment flexibility, and high reliability, providing an efficient, secure, and scalable solution for distributed cooperative localization systems facing complex topological constraints and network security threats.

[0018] To make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this specification more apparent and understandable, preferred embodiments are described below in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0019] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments or prior art of this specification, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this specification. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0020] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topology and DOS attacks provided in an embodiment of this specification is shown. Figure 2 A schematic flowchart illustrating the process of obtaining symbolic centroid coordinates of a vehicle to be located relative to multiple communicable vehicles, as provided in an embodiment of this specification, is shown. Figure 3 This illustration shows a first process diagram provided in an embodiment of the present specification when the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with a known symbol combination, and the matching fails. Figure 4 This illustration shows a second process diagram provided in an embodiment of the present specification when the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with a known symbol combination, and the matching fails. Figure 5A schematic diagram of the process for obtaining position compensation provided in an embodiment of this specification is shown; Figure 6 This specification illustrates a schematic diagram of the directed communication topology of a multi-agent system subjected to DOS, as provided in an embodiment of this specification. Figure 7 The spatial deployment of multi-agent systems provided in the embodiments of this specification under different network topologies is illustrated. Figure 8 This specification illustrates six possible multi-agent non-convex topology deployment regions provided in the embodiments. Figure 9 This specification illustrates multiple solutions for multi-agent spatial deployment provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 10 This specification illustrates the spatial deployment of multi-agent numerical simulations provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 11 This specification illustrates multi-agent localization estimation under convex topology provided by an embodiment of the present specification; Figure 12 This specification illustrates multi-agent localization estimation under non-convex topology provided by an embodiment. Figure 13 This specification shows a schematic diagram of the module structure of a distributed cooperative positioning system for non-convex topology and DOS attacks provided in an embodiment of the present specification. Figure 14 A schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in an embodiment of this specification is shown.

[0021] Explanation of symbols in the attached drawings: 100. Acquisition Module; 200. Determine the module; 300. Normal module update; 400, Attack Module; 500, Attack on the update module; 402. Computer equipment; 404, Processor; 406. Memory; 408. Drive mechanism; 410. Input / output module; 412. Input devices; 414. Output devices; 416. Presentation equipment; 418. Graphical User Interface; 420. Network interface; 422. Communication link; 424. Communication bus. Detailed Implementation

[0022] The technical solutions in the embodiments of this specification will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this specification, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this specification, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the embodiments of this specification.

[0023] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. Furthermore, the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure, and application of the relevant data all comply with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards of the relevant countries and regions, have taken necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation access points for users to choose to authorize or refuse.

[0024] To address the aforementioned issues, this specification provides a distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks. Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, as provided in the embodiments of this specification. This specification provides the operational steps described in the embodiments or flowcharts, but based on conventional or non-inventive methods, more or fewer operational steps may be included. The order of steps listed in the embodiments is merely one possible execution order among many and does not represent the only possible execution order. In actual system or device products, the methods shown in the embodiments or accompanying drawings can be executed sequentially or in parallel.

[0025] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the description, claims, and accompanying drawings of the embodiments in this specification are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, apparatus, product, or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or devices.

[0026] Reference Figure 1 This specification discloses a distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks, including: S101: Obtain a plurality of communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located, wherein the plurality of communicable vehicles are not collinear; S102: Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, obtain the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles. S103: When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal, the current position information of the vehicle to be located is iteratively updated based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles. S104: When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack, location compensation is obtained based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link. S105: Based on the location compensation, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles, iteratively update the current location information of the vehicle to be located.

[0027] In the embodiments described in this specification, consider a... A multi-agent system consisting of 100 intelligent vehicles is denoted as . Among them, there are vehicles ( Equipped with high-precision positioning devices (such as RTK-GNSS and laser SLAM systems), these vehicles can obtain their own precise global coordinates. These vehicles are called Leader Agents or anchor nodes, and the set of leaders can be denoted as... .the remaining An intelligent agent that relies on cooperative localization to estimate its own position is called a follower agent. The set of followers is denoted as . Without loss of generality, we can assume... , Arbitrary intelligent agent at discrete time step The two-dimensional position coordinates are The position of the leader agent The location of the following vehicles is known. These are targets that require collaborative estimation.

[0028] For example, suppose each vehicle to be located Instead of communicating with all neighbors, it dynamically selects three suitable communicable vehicles to form a temporary positioning cluster. The core of this process is that each agent maintains a variable communication and ranging interaction radius. The radius is initialized to a small value. At every moment Vehicle to be located First, based on its current ranging radius By combining the ranging information from the vehicle-mounted sensors, a preliminary set of communicable vehicles is determined. The vehicle to be located is then checked within this set to see if a valid communication link can be established (under the assumption of no attack, i.e., ...). The remaining number of vehicles, of which This refers to any vehicle within a valid communication link. If there are fewer than three vehicles, it indicates that the current radius is too small to form a valid positioning geometry. In this case, the vehicles will proceed according to a fixed step size. Increase its interaction radius And reconstruct the set of communicable vehicles based on the new radius. This iterative process continues until the vehicle finds at least three communicably reachable vehicles. Finally, the set of communicably reachable vehicles that meet the conditions is... In the middle, vehicles Select the three closest vehicles, and denote them as follows: The system uses nearby communicable vehicles to calculate the center of gravity coordinates at the current moment. This strategy not only reduces the communication load but also helps improve the accuracy and robustness of geometric positioning by prioritizing the use of nearby communicable vehicles.

[0029] Vehicles obtain distance information from each other using onboard ranging sensors (such as UWB and LiDAR). and At any moment The ranging value is modeled as follows:

[0030] in, For vehicles Location, For vehicles Location, It is independent and identically distributed Gaussian ranging noise. (Vehicle) The range-measuring neighbor set is defined as , This represents the sensor's maximum effective range. The composition of this set forms the basis for subsequent geometric calculations and is typically independent of the communication state.

[0031] Reference Figure 6Vehicles exchange status information (such as position estimation and speed) via a V2V communication network. The system's communication topology uses a Gaussian directed graph. Description, in which the edges Indicates vehicle Successfully received from the vehicle Data packets. When the system faces a periodic denial-of-service (DoS) attack, a sequence is used. Indicates the first The start of the DoS attack This indicates its duration. Therefore, the first... The attack's active period is The dormancy period is Define a binary communication state indicator variable to represent the state of the communication link. :

[0032] vehicle At any moment The effective set of communicating neighbors is: .

[0033] In the embodiments of this specification, to make the cooperative localization algorithm applicable to any vehicle deployment (including convex and non-convex topologies, such as...) Figure 7 As shown, Figure 7 (a) shows a convex topology. Figure 7 (b) shows a non-convex topology. This invention extends the traditional centroid coordinate system by introducing a sign coefficient for the vehicle to be located. As a follower agent, it selects the three most accessible communicable vehicles to the vehicle to be located as reference points. These three communicable vehicles are not collinear and are denoted as [reference points]. Define the vehicle to be located. The symbolic centroid coordinates relative to these three communicable vehicles are a set of parameters. .in: It is based on the geometric weights of the directional area ratio, i.e., the centroid coordinates. , These are introduced sign coefficients used to characterize points. The triangle formed relative to the reference point The spatial regions they occupy. They satisfy the following core relationship:

[0034] Formula (3) shows that even if the vehicle to be located Located outside the triangle, its position can still be expressed as a signed weighted sum of the positions of the three reference points. Formula (4) is the normalization condition, which is adjusted by... The symbol allows Under the premise of non-negativity, its weighted sum is adjusted to 1 by sign adjustment, thus breaking the restriction that the vehicle to be located must be inside the triangle.

[0035] In the embodiments described in this specification, reference is made to Figure 2 The step of obtaining the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, further includes: S201: Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, obtain the original center of gravity coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles. S202: Based on the positive or negative attribute of each of the original centroid coordinates, combine them to obtain the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located; S203: Match the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located with the known symbol combination, and obtain the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located if the match is successful; S204: Normalize each of the original centroid coordinates to obtain the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles. S205: By combining the symbolic coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located and the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles are obtained.

[0036] First, there are three relative distances between the vehicle to be located and the three communicable vehicles, and three relative distances between any two of the communicable vehicles, for a total of six relative distances. Based on these six relative distances... Calculate the directed areas of the four key triangles, such as Figure 7 As shown in (a). For any three points The triangle they form Directed area It can be calculated using the Cayley-Menger determinant:

[0037] To obtain a signed area value, the sign needs to be determined based on the order of the points. It is generally agreed that the sign is determined by the order of the points. When the direction is counterclockwise, the directed area is positive. Calculate the four directed areas: refer to the area of ​​the triangle. Area of ​​the sub-triangle: , , Then, the traditional (signed) area weight ratio, also known as the original barycentric coordinates, is calculated:

[0038] When the vehicle to be located lie in Inside, there is And all values ​​are non-negative. When the vehicle to be located is located When external, such as Figure 7 As shown in (b), the sum is not equal to 1 and some values ​​are negative. In this case, it is necessary to make a judgment according to the following steps.

[0039] To uniquely determine the sign coefficient from the distance measurement A systematic process for determining the sign coefficient is proposed. This process is based on vehicle... With its three selected neighbors Six Euclidean distance measurements between For input. First, the original centroid coordinates are calculated according to formulas (5) and (6). The signs and values ​​of these original center-of-gravity coordinates directly reflect the location of the vehicle. Relative to a reference triangle formed by communicable vehicles The approximate location.

[0040] The core of the judgment process lies in analysis. The symbols are combinations. There are six specific symbol combination patterns, each corresponding to the vehicle to be located. Located in one of the six outer sub-regions of the triangle (such as Figure 8 (As shown). For example, when At that time, it indicates the vehicle to be located. Located near the edge The outer region, the corresponding combination of sign coefficients should be set to Similarly, the other five symbol combinations also each correspond to a pre-defined, unique one. The values ​​and their corresponding relationships are as follows: Subarea 1: If ,but ; Sub-area 2: If ,but ; Subarea 3: If ,but ; Subarea 4: If ,but ; Subarea 5: If ,but ; Sub-area 6: If ,but ; If the calculated symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located matches one of the six known symbol combinations mentioned above, the symbol coefficient vector can be directly determined, and the subsequent normalization step can be initiated. If the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located does not belong to the above conventional pattern, it indicates that the vehicle to be located... It falls under one of the two special cases of multiple geometric solutions, requiring further discrimination based on distance information.

[0041] Reference Figure 3 and Figure 4 If the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with a known symbol combination and the match fails, then: S301: If the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 0, then determine whether the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to the other communicable vehicles is less than or equal to 1. S3011: If so, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is vector A1; S3012: If not, there exists an original centroid coordinate greater than 1. Based on the relationship between the original centroid coordinate and other remaining centroid coordinates, the sign coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector A2 or vector A3. S302: If the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 1, and the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to other communicable vehicles is not 0, then based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two communicable vehicles, it is determined whether the parallelogram condition is satisfied. S3021: If so, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as vector B1; S3022: If not, then based on the square of the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector B2 or vector B3.

[0042] The first special case is the vehicle to be located. Located on the line connecting two communicating vehicles, such as Figure 9 As shown in (a). For example, when At that time, it indicates the vehicle to be located. Located through and On a straight line. In this case, first set .for and The determination depends on and The numerical value. The specific decision rule is as follows: If and Then it is vector A1. ;like and Then it is vector A2. ;like and Then it is vector A3. .

[0043] The second special case is the parallelogram configuration that may produce multiple solutions, such as... Figure 9 As shown in (b), the judgment condition is that both conditions must be met simultaneously. and To eliminate ambiguity and obtain a unique solution, additional geometric constraints need to be introduced for judgment. First, it is checked whether an exact parallelogram is formed, i.e., whether the distance equation is satisfied simultaneously. , and the relationship between the squares of the diagonals of a parallelogram If all conditions are met, then the decision point is... and Construct a parallelogram and determine the sign coefficient as vector B1. .

[0044] If the above parallelogram conditions are not met, then it is necessary to determine the distance. and Further decisions should be made based on the size relationship: If Then it is set as vector B2. ;like Then it is set as vector B3. .

[0045] Determining a unique sign coefficient vector through any of the above methods Next, the original coordinates need to be normalized to obtain the final geometric weights. And ensure that it meets the normalization condition of formula (4). The specific calculation method is as follows: For ,make Calculated from this satisfy And by substituting and verifying, we can see that Established.

[0046] Through the aforementioned distance-based judgment and calculation process, the vehicle to be located can be determined. For any three non-collinear communicable vehicles, under any topology (including cases inside and outside the convex hull), a unique and definitive set of valid symbolic barycenter coordinates can be calculated: This set of symbolic barycentric coordinates transforms the complex spatial relationships between vehicles into an algebraic form that can be used for iterative calculations, and is the core and foundation for subsequent robust distributed cooperative localization.

[0047] Before constructing a complete algorithm to resist DoS attacks, this specification first proposes a distributed location algorithm under normal communication conditions. This algorithm, by combining an adaptive neighbor selection strategy with a symbolic barycentric coordinate system, successfully solves the problem of traditional methods failing in non-convex topologies and lays the core framework for subsequent anti-attack algorithms.

[0048] In the above process, after successfully selecting three communicable vehicles After that, the vehicle to be located Perform symbolic barycentric coordinate calculation and position update. First, the agent obtains precise relative distance measurements to the three communicable vehicles using ranging sensors. and the distance between communicable vehicles This distance information can be obtained through direct measurement or by exchanging information between communicable vehicles. Then, the sign coefficient determination algorithm is invoked. Inputting the six distance values ​​mentioned above, the algorithm will output a vector of sign coefficients. and normalized geometric weights This set of parameters The vehicle to be located was uniquely coded. Relative to the spatial relationship of its temporary cluster, and applicable to arbitrary deployment. Based on the calculated symbolic centroid coordinates, the vehicle to be located... Update the current location information of the vehicle to be located. The update formula is as follows:

[0049] in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. Damping factor ( This is used to control the step size of state updates, ensuring the smoothness and stability of the iteration process and preventing estimation oscillations. The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. Let r represent the current location information of any communicable vehicle. is a leader ( ),but For its known true location ;like If they are other followers, then For the current location information of the follower .

[0050] It not only includes the area-based proportional relationships in traditional centroid coordinates ( ), and also through sign coefficients Reflects the vehicle to be located Geometric facts located inside or outside the triangle formed by the cluster, the algebraic sum of all weights satisfying The physical meaning of this formula is that the vehicle to be located uses its local geometric relationship with three reference communicable vehicles in real time to iteratively correct its position estimate to converge to the true value.

[0051] This algorithm combines dynamic communicable vehicle selection with symbolic centroid coordinates, achieving effective support for cooperative localization of convex or non-convex platoons while ensuring distributed computing and communication efficiency.

[0052] The algorithms described above assume they function well under ideal communication conditions, but when the system suffers periodic DoS attacks, the communication links between vehicles can be blocked. This results in the vehicle to be located being unable to receive the latest status information from communicable vehicles, thus rendering the update formula based on real-time information exchange ineffective. To address this, this specification's embodiments introduce a compensation mechanism based on autoregressive prediction, building upon the foregoing, to design a robust localization algorithm capable of withstanding DoS attacks.

[0053] The core idea of ​​this mechanism is to compensate for the lack of updates caused by the inability to obtain neighbor information by utilizing the continuity of the vehicle's own motion state during communication interruptions and predicting its current position using historical estimation data. Specifically, each follower agent... Maintain a length of Sliding window buffer Used to store its own past The estimated values ​​at each time point provide a basis for time series forecasting.

[0054] Specifically, refer to Figure 5 This specification's embodiments include an attack strength adaptive compensation term, that is, based on the impact of a DoS attack on the communication link, the location compensation further includes: S401: Based on the historical location information of the vehicle to be located, predict the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located; S402: Based on the proportion of the communication link blocked by DoS attacks, obtain nonlinear adaptive compensation weights; S403: Based on the compensation weight, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, and the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located, a location compensation is obtained.

[0055] use An autoregressive model is used to model the evolution of the position estimation of the vehicle to be located. The horizontal axis is used as the model. For example (vertical axis) (The processing method is the same), and the model form is: ,in These are the AR model coefficients. At each time step, the vehicle to be located utilizes cached historical data to solve an optimization problem with L1 regularization. Update AR coefficients online, among which This is the regularization parameter. L1 regularization helps to obtain sparse solutions and improves the robustness of the model in dynamically changing environments. The estimated coefficients are then used... It can predict the coordinates at the current moment: Similarly, the predicted position vector is obtained. .

[0056] Furthermore, the vehicle to be located is first defined. At any moment Attack Influence Factor It indicates the vehicle to be located. The proportion of all ranging neighbors whose communication links are blocked by attacks is used to quantify the degree of interference with their communication.

[0057] Based on this, a nonlinear adaptive compensation weight is designed. ,in It is the upper limit coefficient of the compensation weight. This is the sensitivity adjustment coefficient. This function ensures that the compensation mechanism has little impact when the attack is mild, but a significant effect when the attack is severe. Finally, the autoregressive prediction compensation term... Defined as: It reflects the deviation between the predicted location information based on historical trends and the current estimated location (i.e., the previous location information of the vehicle to be located at the previous moment), and is weighted according to the real-time attack intensity.

[0058] in, For location compensation, To compensate for the weight, This refers to the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located.

[0059] By combining the aforementioned adaptive positioning framework with the autoregressive prediction compensation mechanism, a complete anti-DoS attack distributed cooperative positioning algorithm is obtained from the embodiments of this specification.

[0060] At each time step Each follower intelligent agent The following processes are executed in parallel: First, communication state perception and compensation calculation are performed, that is, the communication state with all ranging neighbors is perceived. Calculate the attack impact factor and adaptive compensation weights And calculate predicted location information based on historical cache and AR model. and compensation items Next, robust adaptive communication-enabled vehicle selection is performed, the key to which is constructing a candidate set of communication-enabled vehicles. At that time, both distance and communication conditions must be met simultaneously: The same search strategy is employed: "increase the radius if there are fewer than three available communicable vehicles," until three communicable vehicles with normal communication links are found. It is worth noting that even if an attack causes a complete communication breakdown and no three available communicable vehicles can be found, the algorithm will not stall.

[0061] Then, using the relative distances to the three selected communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinate parameters are calculated using the aforementioned method. and Finally, a robust location update of the vehicle to be located, integrating compensation terms, is performed to fully implement the current location information.

[0062] in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. The damping factor, The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. This indicates the status of the communication link; if the communication link is blocked by a DoS attack... The value is 0 if the communication link is not blocked by a DoS attack. =1, This represents the current location information between communicable vehicles, where r represents any communicable vehicle. For location compensation.

[0063] A communication status indicator variable was explicitly added to the summation term. This means that even a certain communicable vehicle It is selected to join the cluster, but if its communication link is attacked and blocked during the update process ( If the communication vehicle's contribution is zero, the missing information will be compensated by the location compensation term. To compensate. After the update is complete, the vehicle to be located will add the new estimate to the historical cache. If the current communication link has not been blocked by an attack, the new estimate will be broadcast and then proceed to the next time step.

[0064] This algorithm simultaneously handles geometric non-convexity and communication-level DoS attacks, achieving dual fault tolerance. Under severe attacks, it can degrade from a "relying on real-time neighbor collaboration" mode to a "relying on its own historical prediction" mode, maintaining basic system functionality and quickly restoring collaboration accuracy during attack intervals.

[0065] To fully verify the effectiveness, robustness, and practicality of the distributed multi-agent cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and denial-of-service attacks proposed in this invention, numerical simulations were conducted. All experiments were performed in scenarios closely related to the subject of this invention, covering complex environments coupled with non-convex topology deployments and periodic DoS attacks, such as... Figure 10 As shown.

[0066] 1. Simulation environment and scene configuration: Simulation platform: A multi-agent cooperative localization simulation environment is built using MATLAB / Simulink, including custom topology, motion model, communication protocol and attack injection.

[0067] Scenario Design: Construct a simulation system containing 8 intelligent agents, including 3 leader agents (capable of autonomous localization) and 5 follower agents (requiring collaborative localization estimation). The agents move in a two-dimensional plane, with trajectories including straight lines, curves, and random disturbances to simulate dynamic behavior in real traffic.

[0068] Topology and Communication Setup: A non-convex deployment scenario was intentionally designed, placing some follower agents outside the convex hull formed by the leader, or even within edge connections or parallelogram configurations, to comprehensively test the algorithm's topology adaptability. A distance-dependent communication model was used between vehicles, with an adjustable communication radius. Periodic DoS attacks were injected, with an attack cycle of [missing information]. Attack duration Random variations simulate the uncertainty of attacks in a real-world environment; during the active attack period, communication links between designated vehicles are completely blocked. A damping factor is set. Adaptive radius step size Autoregressive model order Historical cache length .

[0069] Positioning error used: That is, the Euclidean distance between the vehicle's actual position and its estimated position is used for evaluation; Simulation results show that: Figure 11 and Figure 12As shown, the system remains stable under periodic DoS attacks, with the error growth not exceeding 0.3 m during the attack and recovering rapidly after the attack ends. In non-convex topologies, even if the vehicle is located outside the convex hull or in a geometrically degenerate configuration, the algorithm can still correctly calculate the symbolic centroid coordinates, achieving continuous positioning without any positioning failures.

[0070] This application provides users with access to relevant big data analysis (such as personal biometrics, identity data, consumption data, asset data, electronic terminal operation data, etc.), allowing users to choose to agree to or reject automated decision results; if the user chooses to reject, the process will proceed to the expert decision-making process.

[0071] Based on the aforementioned distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks, this specification also provides a corresponding distributed cooperative localization system for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks. The system may include a system (including a distributed system), software (application), modules, components, servers, clients, etc., using the method described in this specification, combined with necessary hardware implementation devices. Based on the same innovative concept, the devices in one or more embodiments provided in this specification are as described in the following embodiments. Since the implementation schemes and methods for solving the problem by the devices are similar, the implementation of specific devices in this specification can refer to the implementation of the aforementioned method, and repeated details will not be repeated. As used below, the terms "unit" or "module" can refer to a combination of software and / or hardware that implements a predetermined function. Although the devices described in the following embodiments are preferably implemented in software, hardware implementation, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and contemplated.

[0072] Specifically, Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of one embodiment of a distributed cooperative localization system for non-convex topology and DOS attacks provided in this specification. (Refer to...) Figure 13 As shown in the embodiments of this specification, a distributed cooperative positioning system for non-convex topology and DOS attacks includes: an acquisition module 100, a determination module 200, a normal update module 300, an attack module 400, and an attack update module 500.

[0073] The acquisition module 100 is used to acquire the multiple communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located; The determining module 200 is used to obtain the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles. The normal update module 300 is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal. The attack module 400 is used to obtain location compensation based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack. The attack update module 500 is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the position compensation, the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of multiple communicable vehicles.

[0074] Reference Figure 14 As shown, based on the distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topology and DOS attacks described above, one embodiment of this specification also provides a computer device 402, wherein the above method runs on the computer device 402. The computer device 402 may include one or more processors 404, such as one or more central processing units (CPUs) or graphics processing units (GPUs), each processing unit may implement one or more hardware threads. The computer device 402 may also include any memory 406 for storing any kind of information such as code, settings, data, etc. In one specific embodiment, a computer program on the memory 406 and executable on the processor 404, when run by the processor 404, can execute instructions according to the above method. Non-limitingly, for example, the memory 406 may include any type of RAM, any type of ROM, flash memory device, hard disk, optical disk, etc. More generally, any memory can use any technology to store information. Further, any memory can provide volatile or non-volatile retention of information. Further, any memory can represent a fixed or removable component of the computer device 402. In one scenario, when processor 404 executes associated instructions stored in any memory or combination of memories, computer device 402 can perform any operation of the associated instructions. Computer device 402 also includes one or more drive mechanisms 408 for interacting with any memory, such as hard disk drive mechanisms, optical disk drive mechanisms, etc.

[0075] Computer device 402 may also include an input / output module 410 (I / O) for receiving various inputs (via input device 412) and providing various outputs (via output device 414). A specific output mechanism may include a presentation device 416 and an associated graphical user interface 418 (GUI). In other embodiments, the input / output module 410 (I / O), input device 412, and output device 414 may be omitted, and the device may function solely as a computer device within a network. Computer device 402 may also include one or more network interfaces 420 for exchanging data with other devices via one or more communication links 422. One or more communication buses 424 couple the components described above together.

[0076] Communication link 422 can be implemented in any way, such as via a local area network, a wide area network (e.g., the Internet), a point-to-point connection, or any combination thereof. Communication link 422 may include any combination of hardwired links, wireless links, routers, gateway functions, name servers, etc., governed by any protocol or combination of protocols.

[0077] Corresponding to Figures 1-5 In addition to the methods described above, embodiments of this specification also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, performs the steps of the methods described above.

[0078] This specification also provides computer-readable instructions, wherein when a processor executes the instructions, the program therein causes the processor to perform the following... Figures 1 to 5 The method shown.

[0079] This specification also provides a computer program product, which, when executed by the processor of a computer device, performs the following... Figures 1 to 5 The method shown.

[0080] The computer program product described in this specification is a software product that mainly implements the methods described in this specification through a computer program.

[0081] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of this specification, the sequence number of each process does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this specification.

[0082] It should also be understood that, in the embodiments of this specification, the term "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone. Furthermore, in the embodiments of this specification, the character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0083] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed in this specification can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of the embodiments in this specification.

[0084] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0085] In the several embodiments provided in this specification, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the couplings or direct couplings or communication connections shown or discussed may be indirect couplings or communication connections through some interfaces, devices, or units, or they may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms of connection.

[0086] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the embodiments described in this specification, depending on actual needs.

[0087] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this specification can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0088] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this specification, in essence, or the parts that contribute to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solutions, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this specification. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0089] This specification uses specific embodiments to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the embodiments. The above description of the embodiments is only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and core ideas of the embodiments in this specification. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope based on the ideas of the embodiments in this specification. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation on the embodiments in this specification.

Claims

1. A distributed cooperative localization method for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks, characterized in that, include: Obtain multiple communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located, wherein the multiple communicable vehicles are not collinear; Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles are obtained. When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal, the current position information of the vehicle to be located is iteratively updated based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles. When the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack, location compensation is obtained based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link. Based on the location compensation, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles, the current location information of the vehicle to be located is iteratively updated.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of obtaining the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, further includes: Based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles, the original center of gravity coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles are obtained. Based on the positive or negative attribute of each original centroid coordinate, a symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is obtained; The symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with the known symbol combinations. If the match is successful, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained. The original centroid coordinates of each vehicle are normalized to obtain the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles. By combining the symbolic coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located and the geometric weight of the vehicle to be located relative to each of the communicable vehicles, the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles are obtained.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, If the symbol combination corresponding to the vehicle to be located is matched with a known symbol combination and the match fails, then: If the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 0, then it is determined whether the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to the other communicable vehicles is less than or equal to 1. If so, then the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is vector A1; If not, there exists an original centroid coordinate greater than 1. Based on the relationship between this original centroid coordinate and the other remaining centroid coordinates, the sign coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector A2 or vector A3. If the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to a certain communicable vehicle is 1, and the absolute value of the original center of gravity coordinate of the vehicle to be located relative to other communicable vehicles is not 0, then based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two communicable vehicles, it is determined whether the parallelogram condition is satisfied. If so, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as vector B1; If not, the symbol coefficient vector of the vehicle to be located is obtained as either vector B2 or vector B3 based on the square of the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The iterative update of the current location information of the vehicle to be located based on the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles further includes: The current location information of the vehicle to be located is updated iteratively using the following formula: ； in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. The damping factor, The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. Let r represent the current location information of the communicable vehicles.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The location compensation based on the impact of DoS attacks on communication links further includes: Based on the historical location information of the vehicle to be located, the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located is obtained. Based on the proportion of the communication link blocked by DoS attacks, a nonlinear adaptive compensation weight is obtained. Based on the compensation weight, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, and the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located, a location compensation is obtained.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of obtaining position compensation based on the compensation weight, the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, and the predicted position information of the vehicle to be located further includes: The position compensation is calculated using the following formula: ； in, For position compensation, To compensate for the weight, This refers to the predicted location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The iterative update of the current location information of the vehicle to be located, based on the location compensation, the previous location information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current location information of the multiple communicable vehicles, further includes: The current location information of the vehicle to be located is updated iteratively using the following formula: ； in, This refers to the current location information of the vehicle to be located. This refers to the previous location information of the vehicle to be located. The damping factor, The symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to any communicable vehicle. This indicates the status of the communication link; if the communication link is blocked by a DoS attack... The value is 0 if the communication link is not blocked by a DoS attack. =1, This represents the current location information between communicable vehicles, where r represents any communicable vehicle. For location compensation.

8. A distributed cooperative localization system for non-convex topologies and DOS attacks, characterized in that, The system includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire the multiple communicable vehicles that are closest to the vehicle to be located; The determining module is used to obtain the symbolic centroid coordinates of the vehicle to be located relative to the plurality of communicable vehicles based on the relative distance between the vehicle to be located and each of the communicable vehicles, and the relative distance between any two of the communicable vehicles. The normal update module is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of the multiple communicable vehicles when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and the multiple communicable vehicles is normal. The attack module is used to obtain location compensation based on the impact of the DoS attack on the communication link when the communication link between the vehicle to be located and at least one of the communicable vehicles is subjected to a DoS attack. The attack update module is used to iteratively update the current position information of the vehicle to be located based on the position compensation, the previous position information of the vehicle to be located, the symbolic centroid coordinates, and the current position information of multiple communicable vehicles.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, characterized in that, When the computer program is run by the processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is run by the processor of the computer device, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

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