Security key distribution system, method and chip based on physical random entropy source
By using a secure key distribution system based on physical random entropy sources, and leveraging distributed trusted injection stations and dedicated security chips, the system solves the key initialization problem for massive numbers of terminals, provides an efficient and secure key generation and update mechanism, supports compatibility with quantum key distribution networks, and achieves multiple layers of security against quantum computing.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202610193741.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-02-10
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-08
AI Technical Summary
Existing technologies lack a systematic solution that can embed trust in verifiable physical entities and efficiently and securely pre-set and dynamically update key seeds for a massive number of terminals. Especially when facing the threat of quantum computing, the security of existing technologies relies on mathematical assumptions and is costly to deploy, making it difficult to achieve large-scale, non-interactive key initialization.
A secure key distribution system based on physical random entropy sources is adopted. Entropy material is securely injected from the main entropy pool to the terminal device through distributed trusted injection stations. Combined with hardware isolation design and deterministic synchronization function in a dedicated security chip, an unclonable session key is generated, and compatibility with quantum key distribution networks is supported.
It provides a trusted foundation based on physical entropy sources, enables efficient and secure key initialization, reduces communication overhead, supports key deployment on massive terminals, has multiple security guarantees against quantum computing threats, and is compatible with existing quantum key distribution networks.
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Figure CN122001573A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the fields of cryptography and information security, and in particular to a secure key distribution system, method and chip based on a physical random entropy source. Background Technology
[0002] Currently, the main technological approaches to combat the threat of quantum computing include post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD). The security of PQC relies on mathematically unproven problems, which poses potential risks. While QKD provides information-theoretic security, its deployment heavily relies on dedicated fiber optic links, resulting in high terminal costs and making it difficult to achieve large-scale, non-interactive key initialization.
[0003] Current technologies lack a systematic solution that can embed trust in verifiable physical entities and efficiently and securely pre-configure and dynamically update key seeds (i.e., roots of trust) for a massive number of terminals. How to securely initialize an unclonable and updatable cryptographic foundation on a massive number of devices is a key engineering challenge that current technologies have failed to effectively address. Summary of the Invention
[0004] Based on the technical problems existing in the background technology, this invention proposes a secure key distribution system, method and chip based on physical random entropy source.
[0005] The secure key distribution system based on physical random entropy sources proposed in this invention includes:
[0006] The root physical entropy source is used to generate and provide the main entropy pool; At least one trusted filling station is configured to obtain entropy material from the main entropy pool and securely inject it into the terminal device; Multiple terminal devices, each terminal device having a dedicated security chip, the security memory of which stores a local entropy pool injected and bound to the trusted recharge station; The control center is used to manage terminal identities and communication policies; The two terminal devices communicating are configured to: extract the same entropy data segment from their respective local entropy pools by executing the same deterministic synchronization function based on a shared synchronization seed, and generate the same session key accordingly.
[0007] Furthermore, the trusted filling station is a distributed network of multiple stations.
[0008] Furthermore, the local entropy pool is cryptographically bound to the hardware unique identity information of the dedicated security chip.
[0009] Furthermore, the system also includes a quantum key distribution network; the control center is configured to: obtain a quantum key from the quantum key distribution network, instruct the target terminal device to receive the quantum key, bind it to the chip identity, and then incorporate it as a new part into the local entropy pool.
[0010] Furthermore, the dedicated security chip includes a physical security domain and a general computing domain that are isolated by hardware; the execution of the deterministic synchronization function and the access operation to the local entropy pool are limited to the physical security domain.
[0011] Furthermore, the physical security domain and the general computing domain are connected via a one-way isolation interface, which is configured to allow data to flow only from the physical security domain to the general computing domain.
[0012] Furthermore, the synchronization seed is securely transmitted using a key derived from the local entropy pools preset by both communicating parties.
[0013] A key distribution method based on the system described above includes the following steps: The first terminal generates a synchronization seed; After obtaining authorization, the first terminal securely sends the synchronization seed to the second terminal; The first terminal and the second terminal respectively calculate using the same synchronization function based on the synchronization seed to obtain the same entropy segment locator; The first terminal and the second terminal read the same target entropy data segment from their respective pre-stored local entropy pools according to the locator; The first terminal and the second terminal derive the same session key based on the target entropy segment.
[0014] Furthermore, the calculation of the synchronization function depends on the master synchronization key pre-installed in the dedicated security chip of both terminals and bound to their respective local entropy pools.
[0015] A dedicated security chip for use in the system described above, the chip being integrated on a single silicon substrate, comprising: The physical security domain integrates a hardware identity module, a true random number generator, a secure memory, a secure injection interface, and a synchronization engine. A general-purpose computing domain that integrates a cryptographic coprocessor; A one-way isolation interface connects the physical security domain to the general computing domain and is configured to prevent the general computing domain from accessing key materials in the physical security domain.
[0016] Furthermore, the secure injection interface is configured to: for any key material input from an external source, call the hardware identity module to perform real-time encrypted binding processing, and then store it in the secure memory.
[0017] The advantages of the secure key distribution system, method, and chip based on physical random entropy sources provided by this invention are as follows: (1) Root trust is reliable: the security starting point is based on physical entropy sources, rather than mathematical assumptions, thus fundamentally establishing a trustworthy foundation. (2) High deployment efficiency: through the pre-distribution mechanism, the security and efficiency problem of the "last mile" of initializing massive terminal key materials is solved. (3) High key establishment efficiency: a non-interactive synchronization mechanism is used to generate keys, resulting in low communication overhead and low latency. (4) High security strength: combining physically unclonable, information-theoretically secure entropy materials with algorithms resistant to quantum computing threats provides multiple security guarantees. (5) Strong system compatibility: supports integration with existing quantum key distribution networks and post-quantum cryptography standards, enabling smooth evolution. Attached Figure Description
[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture and trust chain of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a block diagram of the internal hardware logic of a dedicated security chip; Figure 3 This is the flowchart of the core key synchronization generation method; Figure 4 This is a timing diagram of the local entropy pool online update method based on quantum key distribution. Detailed Implementation
[0019] The technical solution of the present invention will now be described in detail through specific embodiments. Many specific details are set forth in the following description to provide a thorough understanding of the invention. However, the present invention can be implemented in many other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art can make similar modifications without departing from the spirit of the invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.
[0020] like Figures 1 to 4 As shown, the secure key distribution system based on physical random entropy sources proposed in this invention includes: The root physical entropy source is used to generate and provide the main entropy pool; At least one trusted filling station is configured to obtain entropy material from the main entropy pool and securely inject it into the terminal device; Multiple terminal devices, each terminal device having a dedicated security chip, the security memory of which stores a local entropy pool injected and bound to the trusted recharge station; The control center is used to manage terminal identities and communication policies; The two terminal devices communicating are configured to: extract the same entropy data segment from their respective local entropy pools by executing the same deterministic synchronization function based on a shared synchronization seed, and generate the same session key accordingly.
[0021] The core of the system in this embodiment lies in the following combination of (a1) to (a4): (a1) Physical root of trust: The system uses a highly reliable physical random source (such as a nationally certified quantum random number generator) as the initial entropy source to generate the main entropy pool.
[0022] (a2) Secure pre-distribution network: Through distributed trusted injection stations, a specific subset of the main entropy pool is securely injected into the terminal's dedicated security chip, forming a local entropy pool that is uniquely bound to the chip hardware.
[0023] (a3) Deterministic synchronization mechanism: Based on a shared, one-time synchronization seed, the two communicating parties independently and deterministically extract the same entropy segment from their respective local entropy pools using the same pre-built synchronization algorithm, thereby deriving a consistent session key.
[0024] (a4) Evolvable architecture: The local entropy pool supports online incremental updates via external secure channels such as quantum key distribution (QKD), while the chip design allows it to work in conjunction with post-quantum cryptography algorithms.
[0025] The advantages of this embodiment are: (1) Root trust is reliable: the security starting point is based on physical entropy sources rather than mathematical assumptions, which fundamentally establishes a trustworthy foundation. (2) High deployment efficiency: through the pre-distribution mechanism, the security and efficiency problem of the "last mile" of initializing massive terminal key materials is solved. (3) High key establishment efficiency: the non-interactive synchronization mechanism is used to generate keys, with low communication overhead and low latency. (4) High security strength: the combination of physically unclonable, information-theoretically secure entropy materials and algorithms resistant to quantum computing threats provides multiple security guarantees. (5) Strong system compatibility: it supports integration with existing quantum key distribution networks and post-quantum cryptography standards, and evolves smoothly.
[0026] Example 1: System Architecture; like Figure 1 As shown, the system in this embodiment presents a three-layer structure: Root Entropy Source Layer: Composed of physical random sources with the highest security level, it generates and maintains a large main entropy pool.
[0027] Distribution Management Layer: Consists of a network of authorized and trusted refill stations and a policy control center. The refill stations are responsible for securely injecting entropy materials into the terminal chip under controlled conditions. The control center is responsible for terminal identity management, policy distribution, and coordinating online updates.
[0028] Terminal execution layer: Consists of various devices with embedded dedicated security chips. The chip securely stores a local entropy pool, formed through injection, which serves as the entropy basis for all cryptographic operations performed by the device.
[0029] Example 2: Dedicated security chip; like Figure 2 As shown, the dedicated security chip is the fundamental hardware carrier for system security, employing a robust domain isolation design: Physical security domain: contains all core security modules.
[0030] Static identity module: Based on PUF technology, it generates a unique chip identity identifier and key.
[0031] Dynamic Entropy Source Module: Integrates QRNG to provide fresh random numbers for real-time operations.
[0032] Secure storage area: Used to store the local entropy pool, including the initially injected static area and the dynamically updated area.
[0033] Secure injection interface: Receives entropy material from the filling station or control center, and encrypts and binds it with the chip identity key upon input.
[0034] Synchronous computing engine: It has solidified the core entropy pool synchronization function.
[0035] General computing domain: Contains general cryptographic coprocessors for performing non-core cryptographic operations such as digital signatures and public key encryption / decryption.
[0036] One-way isolation interface: Connects the two domains mentioned above (physical security domain and general computing domain). This interface is strictly limited by hardware policy to allow only the physical security domain to send instructions and data to the general computing domain, and any reverse data reading or control flow is strictly prohibited to ensure that core entropy material is never leaked.
[0037] Example 3: Core Key Synchronization Generation Method; like Figure 3 As shown, assuming terminals A and B need to establish a secure session, the key generation process is as follows: S1 (Trigger): Terminal A uses its dynamic entropy source module to generate a random number as the synchronization seed S for this session.
[0038] S2 (Authorization): A requests communication with B from the policy control center. The control center approves the request after verifying the permissions of both parties.
[0039] S3 (Distribute Seed): A sends seed S to B through a secure channel. The secure channel can be encrypted using a temporary key pre-derived from the local entropy pools of both parties.
[0040] S4 (Synchronous Computation): The synchronous computing engines of chips A and B execute the same entropy pool synchronization function F independently and in parallel.
[0041] A specific implementation of function F is: Locator L = KDF(K_master, S || ID_A || ID_B || Nonce). Here, K_master is the master synchronization key calculated synchronously during the pre-injection phase based on the master entropy pool and terminal identity information, and is bound to the logical view of each chip's local entropy pool; ID_A / B are identity codes; and Nonce is the sequence number. This calculation produces identical output L in both chips.
[0042] S5 (Entropy Segment Extraction): Both parties read the exact same segment of entropy data E from their respective local entropy pools based on the same locator L.
[0043] S6 (Key Derivation and Clearance): Both parties input the entropy number E into the standard key derivation function to generate the final session key K_session. Subsequently, all intermediate variables such as S, L, and E are immediately cleared.
[0044] Example 4: Local entropy pool online update method; like Figure 4 As shown, the system supports enhancing the local entropy pool of the terminal using a quantum key distribution network: T1 (Update Triggered): The policy control center sends an update command to the target terminal according to the policy.
[0045] T2 (Quantum Key Distribution Key Request): The control center requests a new quantum key Q_key from the quantum key distribution network.
[0046] T3 (Quantum Key Transfer): The quantum key distribution network securely transmits the Q key to the control center, which then forwards it to the target terminal.
[0047] T4 (Security Injection and Hardware Binding): After receiving Q_key, the security injection interface of the terminal chip immediately calls the static identity module to generate a temporary key to encrypt and protect the integrity of Q_key, binding it to the chip.
[0048] T5 (Entropy Set Integration): The bound ciphertext is stored as a new entropy segment in the dynamic area of the secure storage area. The chip logic updates the internal mapping table so that the new entropy segment can be used by subsequent synchronization processes.
[0049] T6 (Update Confirmation): The terminal sends a confirmation of successful update to the control center.
[0050] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any equivalent substitutions or modifications made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, based on the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A secure key distribution system based on a physical random entropy source, characterized in that, include: The root physical entropy source is used to generate and provide the main entropy pool; At least one trusted filling station is configured to obtain entropy material from the main entropy pool and securely inject it into the terminal device; Multiple terminal devices, each terminal device having a dedicated security chip, the security memory of which stores a local entropy pool injected and bound to the trusted recharge station; The control center is used to manage terminal identities and communication policies; The two terminal devices communicating are configured to: extract the same entropy data segment from their respective local entropy pools by executing the same deterministic synchronization function based on a shared synchronization seed, and generate the same session key accordingly.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein, The trusted filling station consists of multiple sites deployed in a distributed manner.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein, The local entropy pool is cryptographically bound to the hardware unique identity information of the dedicated security chip.
4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system also includes a quantum key distribution network; the control center is configured to: obtain a quantum key from the quantum key distribution network, instruct the target terminal device to receive the quantum key, bind it to the chip identity, and then incorporate it as a new part into the local entropy pool.
5. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dedicated security chip includes a physical security domain and a general computing domain that are isolated by hardware; the execution of the deterministic synchronization function and the access operation to the local entropy pool are limited to the physical security domain.
6. The system according to claim 5, characterized in that, The physical security domain and the general computing domain are connected via a one-way isolation interface configured to allow data to flow only from the physical security domain to the general computing domain.
7. The system according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The synchronization seed is securely transmitted using a key derived from the local entropy pools pre-configured by both communicating parties.
8. A key distribution method based on the system according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, Including the following steps: The first terminal generates a synchronization seed; After obtaining authorization, the first terminal securely sends the synchronization seed to the second terminal; The first terminal and the second terminal respectively calculate using the same synchronization function based on the synchronization seed to obtain the same entropy segment locator; The first terminal and the second terminal read the same target entropy data segment from their respective pre-stored local entropy pools according to the locator; The first terminal and the second terminal derive the same session key based on the target entropy segment.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The calculation of the synchronization function depends on the master synchronization key, which is pre-installed in the dedicated security chip of both terminals and bound to their respective local entropy pools.
10. A dedicated security chip for use in the system according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, The chip is integrated on a single silicon substrate, including: The physical security domain integrates a hardware identity module, a true random number generator, a secure memory, a secure injection interface, and a synchronization engine. A general-purpose computing domain, which integrates a cryptographic coprocessor; A one-way isolation interface connects the physical security domain to the general computing domain and is configured to prevent the general computing domain from accessing key materials in the physical security domain.
11. The dedicated security chip according to claim 10, characterized in that, The secure injection interface is configured to: for any key material input from an external source, call the hardware identity module to perform real-time encrypted binding processing, and then store it in the secure memory.
