An attack-defense link closure analysis method, medium and device

Abstract

The present application relates to the field of air defense decision support, and particularly relates to an attack-defense link closure analysis method, medium and equipment, which integrates multi-dimensional data, carries out closure condition analysis on four core dimensions of time, information, function and efficiency, so that the calculation of reference closure probability comprehensively covers the key influence factors of cross-domain attack-defense link, and improves the comprehensiveness and accuracy of link closure evaluation; when the closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied or not satisfied, the weak links of the weakly corresponding preset dimensions and the link breaking reasons of the unsatisfied dimensions are located, the diagnosis from the result to the root cause is realized, the commander can quickly focus on the link short board, dynamically adjust the subsequent interception strategy, and the closed-loop management and control ability and combat effectiveness of the cross-domain attack-defense link are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of air defense operational decision support, and in particular to a method, medium, and device for closed-loop analysis of offensive and defensive links. Background Technology

[0002] Cross-domain flight equipment is characterized by high speed, strong maneuverability, cross-altitude flight, and small radar cross-section, making its flight trajectory difficult to predict and drastically compressing the early warning and detection window, posing a disruptive challenge to traditional defense systems. Against this backdrop, the rapid closure of the offensive and defensive link becomes the core key to intercepting such equipment.

[0003] The offensive-defense link refers to a series of orderly, closed-loop combat activities from target detection to target destruction, typically including multiple stages such as detection, location, tracking, aiming, engagement, and assessment. Currently, existing offensive-defense link analysis models usually conduct multi-dimensional effectiveness assessments based on the mission link. Although they assess the effectiveness of aircraft mission links from the perspectives of time chain, accuracy chain, and cost-effectiveness chain, their assessment dimensions mainly focus on macro-level performance indicators, lacking independent analysis of intrinsic attributes such as information transmission reliability and combat function implementation capabilities. This results in incomplete coverage of assessment dimensions and an inability to reflect the core contradictions of cross-domain link closure. Furthermore, the assessment results are mostly single numerical effectiveness values, only capable of binary judgments of effective / ineffective, making it difficult to accurately locate weak links and causes of link failures, and failing to provide commanders with fine-grained decision support.

[0004] Therefore, in the context of cross-domain flight equipment, how to comprehensively evaluate the multi-dimensional closed-loop performance of the attack and defense links, and accurately diagnose the weak links and the causes of link failures, has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned technical problems, the present invention provides a method for analyzing the closed-loop attack-defense link, which includes the following steps: S1. Based on the node parameter information of each combat node in the attack and defense link, the combat mission requirements of the attack and defense link, the current situation information and the opponent's countermeasure status, perform closure condition analysis for each preset dimension to obtain the reference closure probability. The preset dimensions include at least the time dimension, information dimension, function dimension and effectiveness dimension, and the reference closure probability includes at least the time closure probability, information closure probability, function closure probability and effectiveness closure probability.

[0006] S2 compares the reference closure probability with the preset closure evaluation criteria to obtain the closure evaluation result corresponding to each preset dimension. The closure evaluation result includes strong satisfaction, weak satisfaction, or non-satisfaction.

[0007] S3, for any preset dimension whose closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied or not satisfied, obtain the abnormal cause corresponding to the current preset dimension according to the intermediate performance parameters and preset judgment rules. The abnormal cause includes weak link or chain break.

[0008] S4 integrates all closed-loop evaluation results and anomaly causes to obtain the target evaluation results of the attack and defense link.

[0009] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing at least one instruction or at least one program, wherein the at least one instruction or at least one program is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the above-described attack-defense link closure analysis method.

[0010] The present invention also provides an electronic device, including a processor and the aforementioned non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.

[0011] This invention has at least the following beneficial effects: By integrating multi-dimensional data and conducting closure condition analysis on the four core dimensions of time, information, function, and effectiveness, the calculation of reference closure probability comprehensively covers the key influencing factors of cross-domain attack and defense links, improving the comprehensiveness and accuracy of link closure assessment; by specifically locating the weak links corresponding to the preset dimensions and the reasons for the chain breakage in the unsatisfied dimensions when the closure assessment result is weakly satisfied or not satisfied, the diagnosis of tracing back to the root cause from the result is realized, which makes it easier for commanders to quickly focus on the link shortcomings and dynamically adjust subsequent interception strategies, thereby improving the closed-loop control capability and combat effectiveness of cross-domain attack and defense links. Attached Figure Description

[0012] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0013] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the closure condition analysis method for the time dimension in an attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the closure condition analysis method for the information dimension in the attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 4This is a flowchart of the closure condition analysis method for the functional dimension in the attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 5 The flowchart shows the closure condition analysis method for the performance dimension in the attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for obtaining closure evaluation results in an attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Figure 7 This is a flowchart of a method for obtaining the cause of anomalies in an attack-defense link closure analysis method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0014] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0015] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this invention are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It is understood that, where appropriate, the terms used to distinguish similar objects can be interchanged so that the invention can also be implemented in other embodiments besides the illustrated or described embodiments. Furthermore, the terms "including," "having," and any variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or server that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products, or devices.

[0016] Example 1 This embodiment provides a method for analyzing the closed loop of attack and defense links, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this attack-defense link closure analysis method includes the following steps: S1. Based on the node parameter information of each combat node in the attack and defense link, the combat mission requirements of the attack and defense link, the current situation information and the opponent's countermeasure status, perform closure condition analysis for each preset dimension to obtain the reference closure probability. The preset dimensions include at least the time dimension, information dimension, function dimension and effectiveness dimension, and the reference closure probability includes at least the time closure probability, information closure probability, function closure probability and effectiveness closure probability.

[0017] The attack-defense link refers to a series of orderly, closed-loop combat activities from target discovery to target destruction, which typically includes multiple stages such as discovery, location, tracking, aiming, engagement, and assessment.

[0018] Combat nodes are core units in the offensive and defensive chain that perform specific combat functions, including detection nodes (such as radar and infrared satellites), targeting nodes (such as command and control centers), and engagement nodes (such as interceptor weapon platforms). Node parameter information consists of core data such as the hardware performance and operational status of each combat node, including data packet length, signal-to-noise ratio, anti-jamming margin, equipment mobility parameters, RCS characteristics, and electronic countermeasures equipment parameters.

[0019] The core operational objectives to be achieved in the offensive and defensive chain are defined as operational mission requirements, including interception time windows, target damage thresholds, and information transmission delay requirements. Dynamic environmental and target status data during the operational process are considered as current situational information, including geographical environmental parameters, electromagnetic interference intensity, target movement status, and battlefield resource allocation. Enemy countermeasures against the offensive and defensive chain, such as interference and evasion, and their intensity (e.g., strong electronic jamming, weak maneuver evasion), are considered as the opponent's countermeasure status, reflecting the adversarial nature of cross-domain operations and used to correct probability calculation results.

[0020] In this embodiment, multiple preset dimensions are set as analytical perspectives for a comprehensive evaluation of link closure, including at least four dimensions: time, information, function, and effectiveness. Furthermore, this can be expanded according to operational requirements, thereby breaking down the complex link closure problem into quantifiable and analyzable sub-problems.

[0021] Specifically, the time dimension focuses on the sequential connection characteristics of each link in the attack and defense chain, with a core assessment of whether the chain can close within the effective time window, adapting to the short early warning window characteristics of cross-domain equipment, and ensuring that the chain's timeliness meets the standards. The information dimension focuses on the information transmission and processing characteristics between each combat node, with a core assessment of whether information can flow accurately and stably between nodes, solving the problems of information transmission being susceptible to interference and data interruption in cross-domain scenarios, and ensuring smooth information flow in the chain. The functional dimension focuses on core combat functions such as detection, interception, and terminal guidance homing, with a core assessment of whether each functional link can achieve its objectives as required, covering the core actions of the chain from detection to engagement, and ensuring the completeness of the chain's functions. The effectiveness dimension focuses on the damage effect of the engagement phase, with a core assessment of whether the preset damage requirements can be achieved after hitting the target, reflecting the ultimate combat value of the chain, and ensuring a closed loop of successful interception and damage achievement.

[0022] Under each preset dimension, the quantitative indicators that the link meets the closure requirements are used as reference closure probabilities to provide a quantifiable basis for subsequent classification and judgment, thus avoiding subjective judgment errors.

[0023] The above approach decomposes the link closure problem into four independent and complementary dimensions: time, information, function, and effectiveness. Each dimension focuses on a core attribute, and an appropriate quantification algorithm is used to output the reference closure probability for each dimension, thereby improving the comprehensiveness and reliability of the evaluation dimensions.

[0024] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 2 As shown, S1 includes the following steps: S111, focusing on the time dimension, calculates the mean and standard deviation of the closure time of the attack and defense link based on the mean and standard deviation of the time of each preset link in the attack and defense link.

[0025] S112, based on the mean of the closing time, the standard deviation of the closing time, and the time window generated by the command and control system, calculate the probability that the closing time of the attack and defense link is less than or equal to the time window, and use it as the time closing probability.

[0026] Among them, the pre-set links are the core combat steps in the attack and defense chain, including the target discovery and identification link, the target location and tracking link, the aiming link, and the engagement link. They cover the entire process from the appearance of the target to the launch of the attack. The time consumption of each pre-set link directly determines the total closing time of the attack and defense chain, so as to ensure that the time analysis focuses on the core process and has no redundancy.

[0027] Based on the characteristics of short warning windows and stringent timing requirements of cross-domain flight equipment, this embodiment quantifies the probability of the attack and defense link completing the entire closed loop within the effective time window by statistically analyzing the time distribution patterns of preset links at each key point in the attack and defense link.

[0028] Specifically, the average time consumed by each preset step in multiple simulations or real-world scenarios is calculated as the corresponding time mean, reflecting the normal time consumption level of that preset step; the dispersion index of the time consumption of each preset step is calculated as the corresponding standard deviation, reflecting the magnitude of the time fluctuation of that preset step. Correspondingly, the larger the standard deviation, the stronger the time uncertainty.

[0029] The sum of the average times of all preset links in the attack-defense link is used as the average closure time of the attack-defense link, reflecting the normal total time for the entire attack-defense link to complete the process. This intuitively reflects the normal level of link timing connection and serves as a benchmark for judging the link's time closure capability. The sum of the standard deviations of all preset links in the attack-defense link is used as the standard deviation of the closure time of the attack-defense link, reflecting the fluctuation risk of the total attack-defense link time and avoiding the one-sidedness caused by judging solely by the average.

[0030] In one specific implementation, the command and control system dynamically calculates the maximum allowable total time for the "interception failure due to timeout" in the attack-defense link based on the flight speed, remaining flight path, and interceptor weapon response characteristics of the cross-domain flight equipment. This timeframe serves as the time window, or the boundary for determining the time closure probability. Specifically, the command and control system acquires the cross-domain flight equipment's status parameters, interceptor weapon response characteristic parameters, and battlefield environment correction parameters in real time through multi-source data interfaces. The cross-domain flight equipment's status parameters include the real-time flight speed V. target Real-time position coordinates (X) t Y t Z t Remaining flight path L remain And the maneuver correction coefficient α; interceptor weapon response characteristic parameters include weapon deployment location (X w Y w Z w Weapon activation response time t response Weapon flight speed V weapon Effective weapon range R max Terminal guidance correction time t guidance Battlefield environment correction parameters include the atmospheric attenuation coefficient k. atm and electromagnetic interference intensity I emi .

[0031] First, based on the remaining flight path L remain and real-time flight speed V target The ratio of the two values ​​gives the basic remaining flight time t. target_base The base remaining flight time t target_base The product of the maneuver correction factor α and the target's maximum allowable time to reach the interception point / defend the target is the remaining flight time t. target_ermain The greater the mobility, the larger α becomes. In this embodiment, the mobility correction coefficient α ranges from 1.1 to 1.3.

[0032] Based on real-time position coordinates (X) t Y t Z t ), weapon deployment location (X) w Y w Z w ) and weapon flight speed V weapon The weapon's occupancy time was calculated. Weapon activation response time t response Weapon occupation time t weapon_position Terminal guidance correction time t guidance By summing the results, we obtain the total weapon response time t. weapon_total .

[0033] Considering uncertainties such as data transmission delay and decision fluctuations, redundant time is reserved, including the data transmission delay t determined by the intensity of electromagnetic interference. trans and decision redundancy time t decision Then the total redundancy time t redundant =t trans +t decision The data transmission delay for weak electromagnetic interference is 0.1 to 0.3 seconds; for moderate electromagnetic interference it is 0.3 to 0.8 seconds; for strong electromagnetic interference it is 0.8 to 1.5 seconds; and the decision redundancy time is 0.5 to 1 second.

[0034] Following the logic of subtracting redundancy deduction from basic constraints, the maximum allowable closure time is calculated to be T. window =t target_ermain -t weapon_total -t redundant And if T window If T < 0, it indicates that there is no possibility of interception in the current situation, and the system directly outputs "Interception window failed"; if T window If the time is greater than 300 seconds, then use 300 seconds to avoid excessive link redundancy and resource waste.

[0035] It should be noted that the time window calculation process is repeated according to a preset time interval to dynamically adjust the time window based on changes in target position, speed, and battlefield environment, ensuring the real-time performance of the time window. The specific value of the preset time interval can be set by the implementer according to the actual situation; for example, in this embodiment, it can be set to 1 second.

[0036] Furthermore, by using the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution, the probability that the closure time of the attack-defense link is less than or equal to the time window is calculated, and the time closure probability is obtained. This can directly reflect the closure risk of the attack-defense link under the timeliness requirement. Correspondingly, the higher the time closure probability, the stronger the reliability of the attack-defense link closing on time.

[0037] The above transforms the time uncertainty of each preset link into a quantitative indicator of the overall time closure risk of the attack and defense link, which improves the objectivity and scientific nature of the assessment and ensures that the assessment results meet the timeliness requirements of cross-domain scenarios.

[0038] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 3 As shown, the combat nodes include detection nodes, targeting nodes, and engagement nodes. S1 includes the following steps: S121, for the information dimension, based on node parameter information and the opponent's countermeasure status, obtain the information processing function integrity rate of the detection node, the probability of successful information transmission from the detection node to the targeting node, the information processing function integrity rate of the targeting node, the probability of successful information transmission from the targeting node to the combat node, and the information processing function integrity rate of the combat node.

[0039] S122, the product of the information processing function integrity rate of the probe node and the probability of successful information transmission from the probe node to the target node is determined as the first information factor.

[0040] S123, the product of the information processing function integrity rate of the targeting node and the probability of successful information transmission from the targeting node to the combat node is determined as the second information factor.

[0041] S124, the product of the first information factor, the second information factor, and the information processing function integrity rate of the combat node is determined as the information closure probability.

[0042] Based on the characteristics of cross-domain operations, such as "information transmission is susceptible to interference and node functions are susceptible to countermeasures", this embodiment decomposes the information link into node processing and link transmission links. By quantifying the functional integrity of each node and the transmission reliability of each transmission link, the probability of the entire information link closed loop is calculated using a probability multiplication model.

[0043] Information processing function availability rate is the probability that a single node (detection / aiming / engagement node) will operate normally in an adversary countermeasure environment (e.g., data decoding, feature extraction, command generation). The value ranges from 0 to 1, and it is used to quantify a node's ability to resist countermeasures, avoiding the bias caused by relying solely on a binary "normal / faulty" judgment. The specific method for obtaining this information is as follows: Obtain the node parameter information of the hardware of the detection / aiming / engagement node, such as data packet length, modulation method, signal-to-noise ratio, anti-jamming margin, and node survival probability. The equipment status monitoring system outputs this information in real time, using electronic reconnaissance equipment to obtain the type (e.g., strong electronic interference, weak electromagnetic suppression) and intensity level of the adversary's countermeasures. Establish a mapping relationship between the countermeasure state and the countermeasure correction coefficient; for example, strong countermeasures correspond to a correction coefficient of 0.7, and weak countermeasures correspond to a correction coefficient of 0.9. Then, based on the node hardware parameters, consult the equipment performance manual to obtain the basic function availability rate of each combat node in an environment without countermeasures. Multiply the basic function availability rate by the correction coefficient corresponding to the adversary's countermeasure state to obtain the information processing function availability rate of each combat node in the actual environment.

[0044] The probability of successful information transmission is the probability that information is accurately and completely transmitted without loss between two nodes (detection → aiming, aiming → engagement). It ranges from 0 to 1 and is used to quantify the anti-interference capability of information transmission in cross-domain scenarios. Specifically, it is obtained by calculating the probability of successful information transmission from the detection node to the aiming node using an information transmission model, based on parameters such as the distance between the detection node and the aiming node, the reliability of the transmission protocol, the signal-to-noise ratio, and the anti-interference margin. For example, P... S→T=(1-BER)×PSR, where BER is the bit error rate and PSR is the probability of successful data packet reception. Using the same model, based on parameters such as the distance between the aiming node and the engagement node, the reliability of the transmission protocol, the signal-to-noise ratio, and the anti-interference margin, the probability of successful information transmission from the aiming node to the engagement node is calculated through the information transmission model.

[0045] The first information factor integrates the overall reliability of the information link's initial processing and the first segment of transmission, reflecting the closed-loop quality of information from detection to targeting; the second information factor integrates the overall reliability of the information link's intermediate processing and the second segment of transmission, reflecting the closed-loop quality of information from targeting to engagement; and the information closure probability directly reflects the reliability of the entire closed-loop process of the information link: "acquisition-transmission-processing-retransmission-execution".

[0046] The above-mentioned method decomposes the information link into three levels of nodes (detection, targeting, and engagement) and two transmission links, and integrates the performance indicators of the scattered information links into a unified information closure probability. This enables information closure analysis to cover the entire information flow process and accurately reflect the anti-interference and anti-countermeasure capabilities of the information link in cross-domain scenarios.

[0047] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 4 As shown, S1 includes the following steps: S131, focusing on the functional dimension, obtains the probability of detection, the probability of interception, and the probability of terminal guidance homing based on node parameter information, current situation information, and the opponent's countermeasure status.

[0048] S132 determines the functional closure probability by multiplying the detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability.

[0049] This includes acquiring node parameter information such as detection range, resolution, and anti-jamming margin from the equipment management system; node parameter information such as maximum overload, range, and flight speed of the interceptor weapon; and node parameter information such as guidance accuracy and target recognition algorithm efficiency of the terminal guidance system. The system also acquires real-time target status (such as flight altitude, speed, and maneuvering overload) and battlefield environment information (such as geographical obscuration coefficient and atmospheric attenuation coefficient) through a multi-sensor fusion system.

[0050] Based on the characteristics of cross-domain flight equipment—"high maneuverability, high stealth, and intense confrontation"—this embodiment focuses on three types of combat functions in the offensive-defense link: detection, interception, and terminal guidance homing. The functional closure of the offensive-defense link requires the sequential achievement of three key functions: "target detection → successful interception → terminal guidance hit." Failure of any one function results in the breakdown of the entire functional chain. Therefore, by quantifying the probability of achieving each type of combat function, and then integrating the dispersed functional indicators into a unified functional closure probability based on probability multiplication, this accurately reflects the collaborative achievement capability of combat functions in cross-domain scenarios.

[0051] In one specific embodiment, those skilled in the art will know that any calculation method for the probability of detection, the probability of interception, and the probability of terminal guidance homing in the prior art falls within the protection scope of the present invention, and will not be elaborated further here.

[0052] The above-mentioned approach focuses on three types of combat functions: detection, interception, and terminal guidance homing. It accurately covers the core functions of the cross-domain attack and defense link, making the function analysis more targeted and fully adapting to the highly dynamic and highly adversarial characteristics of cross-domain scenarios. This makes the function probability calculation more in line with actual combat conditions.

[0053] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 5 As shown, S1 includes the following steps: S141, regarding the effectiveness dimension, obtains the single-shot damage probability based on the equipment parameter information in the node parameter information of the combat nodes contained in the combat nodes, and the strike target information in the current situation information.

[0054] S142, based on the single-shot damage probability and the preset number of independent shots, calculates the cumulative damage probability as the effectiveness closure probability.

[0055] Among them, the equipment parameter information of the engagement node consists of the core performance parameters of the interceptor weapons carried by the engagement node, such as warhead type (fragmentation / kinetic energy), explosive charge, blast radius, critical accuracy (CEP), and damage radius. These are the core hardware basis for calculating the single-shot damage probability and directly determine the weapon's basic damage capability. The target information consists of damage characteristic parameters related to the target in the current situation information, such as the target's structural strength, location of vital parts, damage resistance level (e.g., hard target / soft target), and armor thickness. This information is adapted to the damage resistance characteristics of different types of cross-domain targets to ensure that the damage probability calculation is consistent with the actual target.

[0056] Based on the characteristics of cross-domain flight equipment—"strong resistance to damage but low success rate of single interception"—this embodiment focuses on the ultimate operational value of the offensive-defense link, namely, achieving the damage target. By quantifying the damage capability of a single weapon and combining the cumulative effect of multiple rounds of firing, the effectiveness closure probability of the link is calculated, accurately reflecting whether the offensive-defense link can achieve the preset damage operational objective.

[0057] Specifically, the cumulative damage probability P u =1-(1-P k ) n , where P k denoted as the single-shot damage probability, and n is the preset number of independent shots.

[0058] The above-mentioned method, by combining equipment parameters at the engagement node with target information to calculate the single-shot damage probability, enables the damage capability assessment to be consistent with the actual weapon performance and the target's damage resistance characteristics, providing accurate data support for the decision on the number of weapons to be fired and improving the efficiency of combat resource utilization.

[0059] S2 compares the reference closure probability with the preset closure evaluation criteria to obtain the closure evaluation result corresponding to each preset dimension. The closure evaluation result includes strong satisfaction, weak satisfaction, or non-satisfaction.

[0060] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 6 As shown, the preset closure evaluation criteria include a first preset threshold and a second preset threshold corresponding to each preset dimension, wherein the first preset threshold corresponding to each preset dimension is greater than the second preset threshold. S2 includes the following steps: S21, for any preset dimension, if the reference closure probability of the current preset dimension is greater than or equal to the first preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be strongly satisfied.

[0061] S22, if the reference closure probability is greater than or equal to the second preset threshold and less than the first preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be weakly satisfied.

[0062] S23, if the reference closure probability is less than the second preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be unsatisfactory.

[0063] Cross-domain operations have different reliability requirements for link closure in different dimensions. First and second preset thresholds are set for the four preset dimensions of time, information, function and effectiveness. By comparing the reference closure probability of each preset dimension with the corresponding threshold, the continuous probability value is transformed into a discrete graded conclusion of "strong satisfaction / weak satisfaction / non-satisfaction", which makes it easier for commanders to quickly grasp the risk level of each dimension and improve decision-making efficiency.

[0064] The specific values ​​of the first and second preset thresholds can be set by the implementer according to the actual situation.

[0065] In one specific implementation, the first preset threshold for the time dimension is 95%, and the second preset threshold is 50%. The first preset threshold for the information dimension, the functional dimension, and the performance dimension is 80%, and the second preset threshold is 50%.

[0066] This involves obtaining information based on operational mission requirements, specifically defining the threat level (high / medium / low) of the interception target, the importance of the protected target (e.g., core facilities / ordinary areas), operational rules (e.g., whether multiple interceptions are allowed), and the minimum acceptable operational success rate. Higher thresholds are assigned to high-threat and important targets. The maximum achievable reliability for each preset dimension is obtained through equipment testing and simulation experiments. Specifically, in the time dimension, the minimum standard deviation of time fluctuations at each stage is tested to calculate the feasibility of "closure time ≤ time window with a 95% probability"; in the information dimension, the maximum reliable probability of information transmission is tested under strong electromagnetic interference; and in the functional / effectiveness dimension, the extreme probabilities of detection, interception, and destruction are obtained through live-fire exercises and simulations. The correlation between the closure probability and operational results for each dimension in historical interception exercises and real-world cases is collected. For example, the interception success rate is calculated when the "time closure probability ≥ 95%"; the operational intervention success rate is calculated when the "information closure probability ≥ 80%".

[0067] Based on the above data, a correlation curve between dimensional closure probability and operational success rate is plotted (e.g., for the time dimension, the probability ranges from 80% to 99%, corresponding to an interception success rate of 50% to 95%). Then, based on the minimum acceptable operational success rate required by the operational mission, the corresponding dimensional closure probability is derived in reverse. Specifically, for the time dimension: if an interception success rate ≥ 90% is required, the corresponding time closure probability extracted from the correlation curve is 95%, which is set as the first preset threshold; for the information / function / effectiveness dimension: if a success rate ≥ 85% after operational intervention is required, the corresponding closure probability is 80%, which is set as the first preset threshold.

[0068] The second preset threshold is set as the critical value of intervention cost-effectiveness. For example, statistical data shows that when the probability of dimensional closure is less than 50%, the cost of combat intervention (such as additional weapons and resources) is far higher than the intervention effect (success rate improvement of less than 10%). Therefore, 50% is set as the second preset threshold.

[0069] In one specific implementation, the weak satisfaction interval can be further divided into two sub-intervals, "medium satisfaction" and "low satisfaction," based on the urgency of the combat mission and resource availability, to achieve more refined decision support. Correspondingly, 75% can be set as the intermediate threshold for the time dimension, and 65% can be set as the intermediate threshold for the information dimension, functional dimension, and effectiveness dimension.

[0070] The above-mentioned approach, through differentiated thresholds and unified judgment logic, transforms the reference closure probabilities of each preset dimension into decision-making hierarchical conclusions, thus meeting the needs of rapid decision-making in cross-domain operations.

[0071] S3, for any preset dimension whose closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied or not satisfied, obtain the abnormal cause corresponding to the current preset dimension according to the intermediate performance parameters and preset judgment rules. The abnormal cause includes weak link or chain break.

[0072] Among them, based on the graded conclusion of weak satisfaction / non-satisfaction, the specific problems that lead to insufficient dimensional closure capability, that is, the weak links or the reasons for the broken links, are further located. This allows us to trace back to the root cause of the problem from the probability results, transforming the abstract probability failure into a specific and operable optimization object, and providing precise targets for combat intervention and link optimization.

[0073] In one specific implementation, such as Figure 7 As shown, the intermediate performance parameters include time variance, time mean, information processing function integrity rate, information successful transmission probability, detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability. The preset judgment rules include preset integrity rate threshold, preset transmission probability threshold, and combat function probability threshold. S3 includes the following steps: S31. For the time dimension where the closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied, calculate the time variance of each preset step, and determine the preset step with the largest time variance as the weak step in the time dimension.

[0074] S32, for time dimensions where the closure evaluation result is not met, the preset link with the largest time average is determined as the cause of the time dimension break.

[0075] S33. For information dimensions where the closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied, the node with the lowest information processing function integrity rate and the transmission link with the lowest probability of successful information transmission are identified as weak links in the information dimension. Among them, the transmission links include the link from the detection node to the aiming node and the link from the aiming node to the engagement node.

[0076] S34. For information dimensions where the closure evaluation result is not met, the node with the lowest information processing function integrity rate, the node with the information processing function integrity rate lower than the preset integrity rate threshold, the transmission link with the lowest probability of successful information transmission, and the transmission link with the probability of successful information transmission lower than the preset transmission probability threshold are identified as the causes of the information dimension's chain break.

[0077] S35 identifies the operational function corresponding to the lowest probability among the detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability as the weak link in the functional dimension for functional dimensions that are weakly satisfied by the closed evaluation results. The operational function includes the detection function, interception function, and terminal guidance homing function.

[0078] S36, for functional dimensions whose closure assessment results are not met, the operational function corresponding to the lowest probability among the detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability, as well as the probability below the operational function probability threshold, is identified as the cause of the functional dimension's break.

[0079] S37, for effectiveness dimensions where the closure assessment result is weakly satisfied, the engagement phase is identified as the weak link in the effectiveness dimension.

[0080] S38, for effectiveness dimensions where the closure assessment result is not met, the engagement phase is identified as the cause of the break in the effectiveness dimension.

[0081] The specific values ​​of the preset integrity rate threshold, preset transmission probability threshold, and combat function probability threshold can be set by the implementer according to the actual situation. For example, in this embodiment, the preset integrity rate threshold, preset transmission probability threshold, and combat function probability threshold are all set to 0.6.

[0082] S4 integrates all closed-loop evaluation results and anomaly causes to obtain the target evaluation results of the attack and defense link.

[0083] Specifically, based on the preset template, the closed evaluation results corresponding to each preset dimension, as well as the abnormal reasons for each preset dimension where the closed evaluation results are weakly satisfied or not satisfied, are integrated into a structured report to obtain the target evaluation results of the attack and defense link. This can be further output to the human-computer interaction interface of the command and control system for commanders to review or as input to the automatic decision-making system for dynamically adjusting subsequent interception strategies.

[0084] In one specific implementation, the target assessment results are output to the command and control system, wherein the command and control system adjusts the resource allocation, timing arrangement or combat mode of the subsequent attack and defense links in a targeted manner based on the assessment results.

[0085] Specifically, if the closure assessment result corresponding to the time dimension is weakly satisfied or unsatisfied, and the anomaly is due to an excessively large time variance or excessively long time mean in a certain preset link (such as target localization and tracking), the assessment link can provide feedback on adjustment instructions such as adjusting the time window, optimizing the link sequence, switching fast response nodes, and parallelizing link processing. Adjusting the time window refers to dynamically correcting the time window generated by the command and control system based on the current situation. For example, if the detected target maneuverability is enhanced, the time window can be appropriately shortened to force rapid link closure; if the target's flight speed is reduced, the time window can be appropriately widened to allow for more precise aiming. Optimizing the link sequence means starting the preparatory work for the link with the largest time mean in advance. For example, if the aiming link takes the longest, aiming resources can be pre-allocated before the target enters the detection range, shortening the subsequent actual aiming time. Switching fast response nodes means that if a node's processing speed is too slow, it can be switched to a faster-responding backup node (such as switching from a phased array radar to an infrared tracking system). Parallelizing link processing means changing the originally serial links (such as target identification and localization) to parallel processing to reduce the total closure time.

[0086] If the closed-loop evaluation result corresponding to the information dimension is weakly satisfied or unsatisfied, and the cause of the anomaly is a low information processing function integrity rate of a certain node or a low probability of successful information transmission in a certain transmission link, then the evaluation link can provide feedback on adjustment instructions such as switching communication modes, activating relay nodes, adjusting data compression ratio, node redundancy backup, and dynamically adjusting transmission priority. Switching communication modes refers to switching to a communication frequency band or modulation method with stronger anti-interference capabilities, or activating frequency hopping or spread spectrum technologies, for links with low transmission probability. Activating relay nodes means that if the direct transmission link is severely affected by electromagnetic interference, relay nodes such as UAVs and satellites can be introduced to construct multi-hop transmission paths. Adjusting data compression ratio means increasing the data compression ratio and reducing the length of transmitted data packets, thereby reducing the bit error rate and transmission delay, while ensuring that critical information is not lost. Node redundancy backup means that if the information processing function integrity rate of a certain node is lower than a preset threshold, the hot backup unit of that node can be activated, or the node can be switched to a functional node of the same type. Dynamically adjusting transmission priority means allocating higher transmission priority to critical information (such as target indication data) according to the urgency of the combat mission, ensuring its priority passage.

[0087] If the closed-loop evaluation result corresponding to the functional dimension is weakly satisfied or unsatisfied, and the anomaly is due to an excessively low probability of detection, interception, or terminal guidance homing, the evaluation process can provide adjustment instructions for detection, interception, and terminal guidance functions. Detection function adjustment refers to switching detection methods (e.g., from radar detection to infrared / electro-optical combined detection), increasing detection nodes (multi-base radar coordination), or adjusting detection parameters (e.g., reducing scanning interval or increasing transmission power) if the detection probability is low. Interception function adjustment refers to changing the interceptor weapon type (e.g., from fragmentation warhead to kinetic energy interceptor) if the interception probability is low, adjusting the interceptor trajectory (e.g., using head-on interception instead of tail-chase), or increasing the number of interceptor missiles (salvo firing). Terminal guidance function adjustment refers to switching the terminal guidance method (e.g., from radar terminal guidance to infrared imaging guidance) if the terminal guidance homing probability is low, optimizing the guidance algorithm (e.g., introducing a maneuvering target prediction model), or enabling the wide-beam search mode of the terminal guidance radar.

[0088] If the closed-loop assessment result corresponding to the effectiveness dimension is weakly satisfied or unsatisfied, and the cause of the anomaly is related to a low single-shot damage probability, the assessment stage can provide adjustment instructions such as increasing the number of independent shots, changing the warhead type, adjusting the aiming point, and multi-missile coordinated damage. Increasing the number of independent shots means increasing the number of shots to improve the cumulative damage probability based on the cumulative damage probability formula. Changing the warhead type means switching to a more effective warhead (e.g., from fragmentation to continuous rod or kinetic energy penetrator) or adjusting the fuse detonation method (e.g., delayed detonation to penetrate vital parts) based on the target's damage resistance characteristics. Adjusting the aiming point means optimizing the aiming point based on the distribution of vital parts of the target (e.g., aiming at the engine compartment instead of the fuselage center) to increase the probability of a single shot hitting a vital part. Multi-missile coordinated damage refers to using multiple missiles to reach the target simultaneously, enhancing the damage effect through spatiotemporal coordination (e.g., forming a fragmentation curtain or superimposed shock waves).

[0089] The above-mentioned approach integrates multi-dimensional data and conducts closure condition analysis on the four core dimensions of time, information, function, and effectiveness. This ensures that the calculation of reference closure probability comprehensively covers the key influencing factors of the cross-domain attack and defense link, improving the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the link closure assessment. By specifically locating the weak links in the corresponding preset dimensions and the reasons for the link breakage in the unmet dimensions when the closure assessment result is weakly satisfied or unsatisfied, the approach enables a diagnosis that traces back to the root cause from the result. This allows commanders to quickly focus on the link's shortcomings and dynamically adjust subsequent interception strategies, thereby improving the closed-loop control capability and operational effectiveness of the cross-domain attack and defense link.

[0090] Example 2 Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, which can be disposed in an electronic device to store at least one instruction or at least one program related to implementing a method in the method embodiment. The at least one instruction or at least one program is loaded and executed by the processor to implement the attack and defense link closure analysis method provided in the above embodiment.

[0091] Example 3 Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides an electronic device, which includes a processor and the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of Embodiment 2 of the present invention.

[0092] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention in any way. Although the present invention has been disclosed above with reference to preferred embodiments, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Any person skilled in the art can make some modifications or alterations to the above-disclosed technical content to create equivalent embodiments without departing from the scope of the present invention. Any simple modifications, equivalent changes and alterations made to the above embodiments based on the technical essence of the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention shall still fall within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for analyzing the closed loop of attack and defense, characterized in that, The attack-defense link closure analysis method includes the following steps: S1. Based on the node parameter information of each combat node in the attack and defense link, the combat mission requirements of the attack and defense link, the current situation information and the opponent's countermeasure status, perform closure condition analysis for each preset dimension to obtain the reference closure probability. The preset dimensions include at least the time dimension, information dimension, function dimension and effectiveness dimension, and the reference closure probability includes at least the time closure probability, information closure probability, function closure probability and effectiveness closure probability. S2, compare the reference closure probability with the preset closure evaluation criteria to obtain the closure evaluation result corresponding to each preset dimension, wherein the closure evaluation result includes strong satisfaction, weak satisfaction or non-satisfaction; S3, for any preset dimension whose closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied or not satisfied, obtain the abnormal cause corresponding to the current preset dimension according to the intermediate performance parameters corresponding to the current preset dimension and the preset judgment rules, wherein the abnormal cause includes weak link or chain break cause. S4. Based on all the closed evaluation results and the causes of anomalies, the target evaluation results of the attack and defense link are integrated to obtain the target evaluation results of the attack and defense link.

2. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S1 includes the following steps: S111, for the time dimension, the mean time and standard deviation of the closure time of the attack and defense link are calculated based on the mean time and standard deviation of each preset link in the attack and defense link, wherein the preset links include the target discovery and identification link, the target location and tracking link, the aiming link and the engagement link; S112, based on the mean of the closure time, the standard deviation of the closure time, and the time window generated by the command and control system, calculate the probability that the closure time of the attack and defense link is less than or equal to the time window, and use it as the time closure probability.

3. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The combat nodes include detection nodes, aiming nodes, and engagement nodes. S1 includes the following steps: S121, for the information dimension, based on the node parameter information and the opponent's countermeasure status, obtain the information processing function integrity rate of the detection node, the probability of successful information transmission from the detection node to the aiming node, the information processing function integrity rate of the aiming node, the probability of successful information transmission from the aiming node to the combat node, and the information processing function integrity rate of the combat node. S122, the product of the information processing function integrity rate of the detection node and the probability of successful information transmission from the detection node to the aiming node is determined as the first information factor; S123, the product of the information processing function integrity rate of the aiming node and the probability of successful information transmission from the aiming node to the combat node is determined as the second information factor; S124, the product of the first information factor, the second information factor, and the information processing function integrity rate of the combat node is determined as the information closure probability.

4. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S1 includes the following steps: S131, for the aforementioned functional dimension, based on the node parameter information, the current situation information, and the opponent's countermeasure status, obtain the detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability; S132, the product of the detection probability, the interception probability and the terminal guidance homing probability is determined as the functional closure probability.

5. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S1 includes the following steps: S141, for the effectiveness dimension, based on the equipment parameter information in the node parameter information of the combat node included in the combat node, and the strike target information in the current situation information, the single-shot damage probability is obtained. S142, based on the single-shot damage probability and the preset number of independent shots, the cumulative damage probability is calculated and used as the effectiveness closure probability.

6. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset closure evaluation criteria include a first preset threshold and a second preset threshold corresponding to each preset dimension, wherein the first preset threshold corresponding to each preset dimension is greater than the second preset threshold. S2 includes the following steps: S21, for any preset dimension, if the reference closure probability of the current preset dimension is greater than or equal to the first preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be strongly satisfied. S22, if the reference closure probability is greater than or equal to the second preset threshold and less than the first preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be weakly satisfied; S23, if the reference closure probability is less than the second preset threshold, then the closure evaluation result of the current preset dimension is determined to be unsatisfactory.

7. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The first preset threshold corresponding to the time dimension is 95%, and the second preset threshold is 50%. The first preset threshold for the information dimension, the function dimension, and the efficiency dimension is 80%, and the second preset threshold is 50%.

8. The attack-defense link closure analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The intermediate performance parameters include time variance, time mean, information processing function integrity rate, information successful transmission probability, detection probability, interception probability, and terminal guidance homing probability. The preset judgment rules include preset integrity rate threshold, preset transmission probability threshold, and combat function probability threshold. S3 includes the following steps: S31, For the time dimension where the closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied, calculate the time variance of each preset step, and determine the preset step with the largest time variance as the weak step of the time dimension. S32, for the time dimension where the closure evaluation result is not met, the preset link with the largest time average is determined as the cause of the chain break in the time dimension; S33, for information dimensions whose closure evaluation results are weakly satisfied, the node with the lowest information processing function integrity rate and the transmission link with the lowest probability of successful information transmission are identified as the weak links of the information dimension. The transmission link includes the link from the detection node to the aiming node and the link from the aiming node to the engagement node. S34. For information dimensions where the closure evaluation result is not met, the node with the lowest information processing function integrity rate, the node with the information processing function integrity rate lower than the preset integrity rate threshold, the transmission link with the lowest probability of successful information transmission, and the transmission link with the probability of successful information transmission lower than the preset transmission probability threshold are identified as the cause of the broken chain in the information dimension. S35, for functional dimensions whose closure evaluation results are weakly satisfied, the operational function corresponding to the smallest probability among the detection probability, the interception probability, and the terminal guidance homing probability is identified as the weak link of the functional dimension, wherein the operational function includes the detection function, the interception function, and the terminal guidance homing function. S36, for functional dimensions whose closure evaluation results are not satisfied, the operational function corresponding to the smallest probability among the detection probability, the interception probability and the terminal guidance homing probability, and the probability below the operational function probability threshold, is determined as the cause of the break in the functional dimension. S37, for the effectiveness dimension whose closure evaluation result is weakly satisfied, the engagement phase is identified as the weak phase of the effectiveness dimension; S38, for a performance dimension whose closure assessment result is not met, the engagement phase is identified as the cause of the break in the performance dimension.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction or at least one program segment, characterized in that, The at least one instruction or the at least one program segment is loaded and executed by the processor to implement the attack and defense link closure analysis method as described in any one of claims 1-8.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that, Includes a processor and the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium as described in claim 9.

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