Tamper-proof privacy-secure ranging and positioning method and system

Abstract

The present application belongs to the field of information security protection, and particularly relates to a tamper-proof privacy security ranging positioning method and system. The present application first uses an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm to enable each anchor point participating in positioning to securely obtain its own signature information and hash aggregation encrypted key from a positioning server. The anchor point splices the signature and ranging information, encrypts the same using a hash aggregation algorithm, and then sends the same to a user. The user aggregates and decrypts to obtain the aggregated signature information and ranging information of all anchor points, compares the aggregated signature information with the aggregated signature received from the positioning server, and if the two are consistent, the user constructs a ranging positioning calculation matrix using the aggregated ranging information, completes self-position estimation, and if the two are inconsistent, the present positioning is abandoned. The present application effectively prevents tampering of positioning data during positioning, and simultaneously realizes protection of positioning related information of the anchor points and the user participating in positioning.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of positioning and privacy protection, and in particular to a tamper-proof ranging and positioning method and system for privacy and security, which can be used in indoor positioning, IoT positioning and secure positioning service scenarios. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and location-related applications, indoor positioning technology has received widespread attention. Positioning technology based on wireless signal characteristics typically requires mobile terminals to use various transceivers or sensors to collect location-related measurement information and exchange and calculate with a positioning server to obtain positioning services. During this process, the positioning server may collect users' measurement information or estimated location information, thereby inferring or obtaining users' personal information, potentially leading to privacy breaches. Simultaneously, it is crucial to prevent attacks on the positioning server that could result in the leakage of positioning resource information, rendering the server unable to provide effective positioning services. Therefore, ensuring user privacy and the data security of the positioning server during the positioning service process has become one of the key issues driving the large-scale application of location-related services.

[0003] Ranging-based positioning is an important method in indoor positioning technology. Most existing ranging-based positioning solutions utilize pre-positioned anchor points within the positioning scenario. To provide effective positioning services, the anchor points must be deployed at a certain density to ensure that users in any location can interact with a sufficient number of surrounding anchor points to obtain positioning services. In large-scale positioning scenarios, this leads to significant deployment costs. Encouraging users with known locations to act as temporary "mobile pseudo-anchors" to provide collaborative positioning is an effective solution. In such scenarios, it is necessary to consider not only the location privacy of users requesting positioning services but also the location privacy and security of the "mobile pseudo-anchors" providing collaborative positioning. Current solutions generally require the anchor points involved in positioning to communicate with each other to exchange location-related information and ultimately estimate the user's location. Due to the limited transmission distance of wireless signals in indoor environments, this communication between anchor points not only increases the complexity of the positioning solution and communication overhead but also poses privacy and security risks related to the leakage of user or anchor point location information. The technical solution disclosed in patent application number CN202511268836.4 avoids interactive communication between anchor points, and the hash aggregation encryption method used also achieves privacy protection for anchor point information. However, these solutions lack a mechanism for verifying the integrity of location information and cannot achieve authentication of location-related messages. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a ranging and positioning method and system that can protect the privacy of users and anchor point location-related information and provide data integrity verification, so as to realize safe and efficient ranging-based indoor positioning services.

[0005] To this end, the present invention provides a tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method and system, comprising a user, an anchor point, and a positioning server, specifically including the following three stages:

[0006] During the initialization phase, each anchor point generates a public key and a private key for elliptic curve cryptography and sends the public key to the location server. The location server generates the key and signature required for hash aggregation, encrypts them with elliptic curve cryptography, distributes them to each anchor point, and sends the hash aggregation private key and aggregation signature to the user.

[0007] During the encryption phase, each anchor point uses an elliptic curve cryptography decryption algorithm to obtain the public key, private key, and plaintext of the hash aggregation algorithm; determines the ranging and positioning information; after concatenating the ranging and positioning information with the signature, it is encrypted using the hash aggregation algorithm and the ciphertext is sent to the user.

[0008] During the decryption and positioning phase, the user uses a hash aggregation algorithm to decrypt the ranging and positioning information received from each anchor point, extracts the aggregated value of each anchor point's signature, and compares it with the aggregated signature. If the two match, the user uses the aggregated ranging information to construct a ranging and positioning calculation formula to complete their own position estimation. If they do not match, the user discards the ranging information of each anchor point and initiates a new positioning request.

[0009] Furthermore, the initialization phase includes the following steps:

[0010] Step 2.1: The user sends a ranging and positioning request to surrounding anchor points. The anchor points that respond to this positioning service are denoted as... ,in ;

[0011] Step 2.2, anchor point v j The private key d is determined by elliptic curve cryptography for j = 1,2,…,M. j and public key Q j , public key Q j Send to the location server;

[0012] Step 2.3: The location server sets the public key (N, H1) according to the Joye-Libert aggregation encryption algorithm, where N is the product of two prime numbers of the same length, and the hash function is... ;from 8 sets of random numbers are randomly selected from the data. and set These serve as the private keys for the hash aggregation algorithms of the M anchor points and the user, respectively; a signature Sig is generated based on the user's ID and the anchor point's ID.j = H2(uid||Anchorid j ), j = 1,2,…,M, where H2 is the hash calculation function; and set the aggregate signature. ;

[0013] Step 2.4: The location server uses elliptic curve cryptography to encrypt the information sent to each anchor point.

[0014] CTAnchor j =ECC.ENC(Q j , sk i1 || sk i2 ||…|| sk i8 || Sig j ), j=1,2,…,M

[0015] Among them, ECC.ENC is an elliptic curve cryptography encryption algorithm, Q... j This is the public key used in the encryption algorithm; || is the concatenation operator; CTAnchor j It is ciphertext;

[0016] Step 2.5 The location server combines the public key (N, H1) of the hash aggregation algorithm with the CTAnchor. j Send to each anchor point v j j = 1,2,…,M;

[0017] Step 2.6 The location server will locate sk i0, i = 1,2,…,8 and Sig sum Send to the user.

[0018] Furthermore, the encryption phase includes the following steps:

[0019] Step 3.1, Anchor point v j The private key d of elliptic curve cryptography is used for j=1,2,…,M. j Decrypting CTAnchor j Extract the eight private keys and signature from the hash aggregation algorithm;

[0020] Step 3.2, anchor point v j, The distance between the device j=1,2,…,M and the user is determined using a ranging method such as wireless signal time of flight or time difference, received signal strength, etc., and then combined with its own position coordinates to obtain 8 information components. , represented as Where (x) j , y j ) is the anchor point v j Coordinate information, D j It is the anchor point v j Distance to users;

[0021] Step 3.3, Anchor point v j , j=1,2,…,M will have information component α ij With Sig j By concatenating the information, the signature information e can be obtained. ij :

[0022]

[0023] Step 3.4, Anchor point v j , Using a hash aggregation algorithm, j=1,2,…,M, e is completed. ij The encryption calculation yields the ciphertext c. ij The calculation formula is as follows:

[0024]

[0025] Step 3.5, Anchor point v j , j=1,2,…,M Translate 8 ciphertexts Send to the user.

[0026] Furthermore, the decryption and location phase includes the following steps:

[0027] Step 4.1: The user aggregates the encrypted information sent from each anchor point, and the calculation formula is as follows:

[0028]

[0029] Step 4.2: The user decrypts the aggregated ciphertext using the following formula:

[0030]

[0031] in ;

[0032] Step 4.3, user extracts e ij In , with Sig sum Compare the two; if they match, it means the received message is not forged or tampered with, the anchor point's identity authentication is completed, and the positioning calculation continues; if they do not match, abandon this positioning.

[0033] Step 4.4, after identity verification, the user retrieves e ij Information components in Specifically:

[0034] ;

[0035] Step 4.5, the user constructs using the extracted information components. and The matrix is ​​calculated using the maximum likelihood estimation formula for ranging and positioning. Calculate and obtain its estimated position .

[0036] At this point, the tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning system is complete.

[0037] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0038] 1. The positioning method proposed in this invention generates a hash aggregation encryption key required for each positioning based on the number of anchor points M by the positioning server, ensuring that the number of anchor points involved in positioning can dynamically change due to different users and their different locations, which conforms to the reality of positioning scenarios.

[0039] 2. The positioning method proposed in this invention effectively protects the privacy of location-related information of anchor points involved in positioning by using hash aggregation encryption. This is beneficial for users who have completed positioning to act as temporary "mobile pseudo-anchor points" to provide positioning-related information to other users around them, thereby assisting in the completion of ranging and positioning.

[0040] 3. The positioning method proposed in this invention adds the signature of each anchor point to the ranging information, which allows users to verify the integrity of the location-related information and ensures the reliability of the positioning results. Attached Figure Description

[0041] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the positioning process of the anti-tampering, privacy-secure ranging and positioning method and system of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a specific application scenario of the anti-tampering, privacy-secure ranging and positioning method and system of the present invention.

[0043] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the specific processing steps of the ranging and positioning privacy protection method of the present invention. Specific implementation methods

[0044] The specific implementation methods of the present invention will now be described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention.

[0045] This invention provides a tamper-proof, privacy-preserving ranging and positioning method and system, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this involves three parties: the user, the anchor point, and the location server.

[0046] This invention provides a tamper-proof, privacy-preserving ranging and positioning method and system, such as... Figure 2 The positioning scenario shown involves user 1, user 2, and anchor points 1, 2, and 3. At a certain positioning moment, anchor points 1, 2, and 3 are within user 1's communication range, while anchor points 2 and 3 are within user 2's communication range. User 1 can use this invention to complete privacy-preserving ranging and positioning. Subsequently, user 1 can act as a "mobile pseudo-anchor point" to collaborate with user 2 in using this invention to complete privacy-preserving ranging and positioning.

[0047] As shown in Figure 3, the specific implementation of this invention includes the following steps:

[0048] Phase 1: Initialization Phase.

[0049] Step S1: The user sends a ranging and positioning request to surrounding anchor points. The anchor points that respond to this positioning service are denoted as... ,in ;

[0050] Step S2, anchor point v j The private key d is determined by elliptic curve cryptography for j = 1,2,…,M. j and public key Q j , public key Q j Send to the location server;

[0051] Step S3: The location server sets the public key (N, H1) according to the Joye-Libert aggregation encryption algorithm, where N is the product of two prime numbers of the same length, and the hash function is... ;from 8 sets of random numbers are randomly selected from the data. and set These serve as the private keys for the hash aggregation algorithms of the M anchor points and the user, respectively; a signature Sig is generated based on the user's ID and the anchor point's ID. j = H2(uid||Anchorid j ), j = 1,2,…,M, where H2 is the hash calculation function; and set the aggregate signature. ;

[0052] Step S4: The location server uses an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm to encrypt the information sent to each anchor point.

[0053] CTAnchor j =ECC.ENC(Q j , sk i1 || sk i2 ||…|| sk i8 || Sig j ), j=1,2,…,M

[0054] Among them, ECC.ENC is an elliptic curve cryptography encryption algorithm, Q... j This is the public key used in the encryption algorithm; || is the concatenation operator; CTAnchor j It is ciphertext;

[0055] Step S5: The location server combines the public key (N, H1) of the hash aggregation algorithm with the CTAnchor. j Send to each anchor point v j j = 1,2,…, M;

[0056] Step S6: The location server will locate sk i0, i = 1,2,…,8 and Sig sum Send to the user.

[0057] Phase 2: Encryption Phase.

[0058] Step S7, anchor point v j The private key d of elliptic curve cryptography is used for j=1,2,…,M. j Decrypting CTAnchor j Extract the eight private keys and signature from the hash aggregation algorithm;

[0059] Step S8, anchor point v j, The distance between the device j=1,2,…,M and the user is determined using a ranging method such as wireless signal time of flight or time difference, received signal strength, etc., and then combined with its own position coordinates to obtain 8 information components. , represented as Where (x) j , y j ) is the anchor point v j Coordinate information, D j It is the anchor point v j Distance to users;

[0060] Step S9, anchor point v j , j=1,2,…,M will have information component α ij With Sig j By concatenating the information, the signature information e can be obtained. ij :

[0061]

[0062] Step S10, anchor point v j , Using a hash aggregation algorithm, j=1,2,…,M, e is completed. ij The encryption calculation yields the ciphertext c. ij The calculation formula is as follows:

[0063]

[0064] Step S11, anchor point v j , j=1,2,…,M Translate 8 ciphertexts Send to the user.

[0065] Phase 3: Decryption and Location Phase.

[0066] Step S12: The user aggregates the encrypted information sent by each anchor point, and the calculation formula is as follows:

[0067]

[0068] Step S13: The user decrypts the aggregated ciphertext using the following formula:

[0069]

[0070] in ;

[0071] Step S14, user extracts e ij In , with Sig sum Compare the two; if they match, it means the received message is not forged or tampered with, the anchor point's identity authentication is completed, and the positioning calculation continues; if they do not match, abandon this positioning.

[0072] Step S15: After identity verification, the user retrieves e ij Information components in Specifically:

[0073] ;

[0074] Step S16, the user constructs using the extracted information components. and The matrix is ​​calculated using the maximum likelihood estimation formula for ranging and positioning. Calculate and obtain its estimated position .

[0075] The above content provides a further detailed description of the present invention in conjunction with the implementation scheme.

[0076] On the other hand, embodiments of the present invention also provide a tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning system, including a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store program instructions, and the processor is used to call the instructions in the memory to execute a tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method as described above.

Claims

1. A tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method, characterized in that: Includes users, anchor points, and location servers, specifically: During the initialization phase, each anchor point generates a public and private key for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and sends the public key to the location server. The location server generates the public and private keys and signature required for the hash aggregation algorithm, and generates ciphertext using Elliptic Curve Cryptography before sending it to each anchor point. The location server then sends the aggregated private key and aggregated signature of the hash aggregation algorithm to the user. During the encryption phase, the anchor point uses an elliptic curve cryptography decryption algorithm to obtain the public key, private key, and plaintext of the hash aggregation algorithm; determines the ranging and positioning information; after concatenating the ranging and positioning information with the signature, it is encrypted using the hash aggregation algorithm, and the ciphertext is sent to the user. During the decryption and positioning phase, the user uses a hash aggregation algorithm to decrypt the ranging and positioning information received from each anchor point, extracts the aggregated value of each anchor point's signature, and compares it with the aggregated signature. If the two match, the user uses the aggregated ranging information to construct a ranging and positioning calculation formula to complete their own position estimation. If they do not match, the user discards the ranging information of each anchor point and initiates a new positioning request.

2. The tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The initialization phase specifically includes the following steps: Step 2.1: The user sends a ranging and positioning request to surrounding anchor points, and the anchor points responding to this positioning service are denoted as... ,in ; Step 2.2, the anchor point v j The private key d is determined by elliptic curve cryptography for j = 1,2,…,M. j and public key Q j , public key Q j Send to the location server; Step 2.3: The positioning server sets a public key (N, H1) according to the Joye-Libert aggregation encryption algorithm, where N is the product of two prime numbers of the same length, and the hash function is... ;from 8 sets of random numbers are randomly selected from the data. and set The private keys for the hash aggregation algorithms of the M anchor points and the user are used respectively; a signature Sig is generated based on the user's ID and the anchor point's ID. j = H2(uid||Anchorid j ), j = 1,2,…, M, where H2 is the hash calculation function; and set the aggregate signature. ; Step 2.4: The positioning server uses an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm to encrypt the information sent to each anchor point. CTAnchor j =ECC.ENC(Q j , sk i1 || sk i2 ||…|| sk i8 || Sig j ), j=1,2,…,M Among them, ECC.ENC is an elliptic curve cryptography encryption algorithm, Q... j This is the public key used in the encryption algorithm; || is the concatenation operator; CTAnchor j It is ciphertext; Step 2.5 The server will use the public key (N, H1) of the hash aggregation algorithm and CTAnchor j Send to each anchor point v j j = 1,2,…,M; Step 2.6 The server will sk i0, i = 1,2,…,8 and Sig sum Send to the user.

3. The tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The encryption phase specifically includes the following steps: Step 3.1, the anchor point v j The private key d of elliptic curve cryptography is used for j=1,2,…,M. j Decrypting CTAnchor j Extract the eight private keys and signature from the hash aggregation algorithm; Step 3.2, the anchor point v j, The distance between the device j=1,2,…,M and the user is determined using a ranging method such as wireless signal time of flight or time difference, received signal strength, etc., and then combined with its own position coordinates to obtain 8 information components. , represented as Where (x) j , y j ) is the anchor point v j Coordinate information, D j The anchor point v j Distance to the user; Step 3.3, the anchor point v j j=1,2,…,M will be the information component α ij With Sig j By concatenating the information, the signature information e can be obtained. ij : Step 3.4, the anchor point v j Using a hash aggregation algorithm, j=1,2,…,M, e is completed. ij The encryption calculation yields the ciphertext c. ij The calculation formula is as follows: Step 3.5, the anchor point v j j=1,2,…,M (8 ciphertexts) Send to the user.

4. The tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The decryption and location phase specifically includes the following steps: Step 4.1: The user aggregates the encrypted information sent by each anchor point, and the calculation formula is as follows: Step 4.2, the user decrypts the aggregated ciphertext using the following formula: in ; Step 4.3, the user extracts e ij In , with Sig sum Compare the two; if they match, it means the received message is not forged or tampered with, the anchor point's identity authentication is completed, and the positioning calculation continues; if they do not match, abandon this positioning. Step 4.4, after signature authentication, the user extracts e ij Information components in Specifically: ； Step 4.5, the user constructs using the extracted information components. and The matrix is ​​calculated using the maximum likelihood estimation formula for ranging and positioning. Calculate and obtain its estimated position .

5. A tamper-proof and privacy-secure ranging and positioning system, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory, the memory being used to store program instructions and data, and the processor being used to call the instructions stored in the memory to execute a tamper-proof, privacy-secure ranging and positioning method as described in any one of claims 1-4.

Images