Techniques for security algorithm selection in handover from evolved packet system to 5G system

Abstract

A method of wireless communication is provided. The method includes receiving, by a mobility management entity (MME) in a first network, a first message from a base station in the first network indicating initiation of a handover operation for a user equipment from the first network to a second network, receiving, by the MME, a second message from an access and mobility management function (AMF) in the second network requesting security capability information of the user equipment for the second network, sending, by the MME, a third message to the user equipment requesting the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network, receiving, by the MME, a response message from the user equipment including the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network, and sending, by the MME, the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network to the AMF.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This article relates to systems, devices, and technologies used for wireless communication. Background Technology

[0002] Wireless communication technology is driving the world toward an increasingly interconnected and networked society. The rapid growth and technological advancements in wireless communication have led to greater demands for capacity and connectivity. Other factors, such as energy consumption, equipment cost, spectrum efficiency, and latency, are also important for meeting the needs of various communication scenarios. Compared to existing wireless networks, next-generation systems and wireless communication technologies need to support a growing number of users and devices, as well as the ever-expanding mobile society. Summary of the Invention

[0003] Various methods and apparatuses are provided for configuring channel state information reference signals for tracking in wireless communications.

[0004] In one example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving a first message from a base station in a first network by a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network, the first message indicating the initiation of a handover operation for a User Equipment (UE) from the first network to a second network; receiving a second message from an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the second network by the MME, the second message requesting security capability information of the UE for the second network; sending a third message from the MME to the UE, the third message requesting the UE's security capability information for the second network; receiving a response message from the UE including the UE's security capability information for the second network by the MME; and sending the UE's security capability information for the second network to the AMF by the MME.

[0005] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, by an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), a request from a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in a first network to relocate a User Equipment (UE) from the first network to a second network; sending, by the AMF, a message to the MME requesting security capability information of the UE for the second network; and receiving, by the AMF, the security capability information of the UE for the second network from the MME.

[0006] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: a user equipment receiving a message from a mobility management entity (MME) in a first network requesting security capability information for the user equipment regarding a second network; and the user equipment sending a response message to the MME including the security capability information for the user equipment regarding the second network.

[0007] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, by an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in a second network, a first message requesting a User Equipment (UE) to relocate from the first network to the second network from a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in a first network, the first message including a first security context for the first network; generating, by the AMF, a second security context for the second network corresponding to the first security context for the first network, the second security context being generated based on whether the first message includes information about the UE's security capabilities for the second network, and selecting or not selecting a security algorithm for the second network; and sending, by the AMF, a second message to a gNB in ​​the second network, the second message requesting a switch and including a selected security algorithm or security parameters calculated based on candidate algorithms.

[0008] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, by a user equipment, a handover command from a network node in a first network for performing a handover from the first network to a second network, the handover command including security parameters; checking whether the handover command includes a security algorithm selected for the second network or a candidate security algorithm selected for the second network, the security algorithm being configured as a protection signaling message; in response to the check indicating that the handover command includes a candidate security algorithm for the second network, comparing the candidate security algorithm with security capability information of the user equipment; and, based on the comparison result, instructing the user equipment and the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) to support a 256-bit algorithm, selecting a 256-bit algorithm to be used for the second network.

[0009] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: a network node in a second network receiving a handover request from an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in a first network to a second network, the handover request including: 1) security capability information of the user equipment for the second network if security capability information has been provided to the AMF from the Mobility Management Entity (MME), or 2) a container of MACs computed using different keys if security capability information has not yet been provided to the AMF from the MME, wherein the different keys are derived from different candidate algorithms included in a list of algorithms for the user equipment; and the network node receiving a handover completion message from the user equipment.

[0010] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, by an AMF, a registration request including security capability information of a user equipment (UE), the registration request being received after a handover from a first network to a second network; comparing the UE's security capability information with security capabilities in the current security context; updating the current security context using the security capability information included in the registration request if the comparison result indicates that the security capability information differs from the security capabilities in the current security context; and selecting a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages.

[0011] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: a user equipment sending a registration request, including security capability information of the user equipment, to an AMF, the registration request being sent after a handover from a first network to a second network; performing a first Security Context Management (SMC) procedure, the first SMC procedure activating a first security context updated by the AMF based on the security capability information included in the registration request; and performing a second SMC procedure, the second SMC procedure activating a second security context updated by a network node in the second network based on the security capability information included in the registration request.

[0012] In another example aspect, a method for wireless communication is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, by a network node in a second network, a registration request from a user equipment (UE) including security capability information of the UE, the registration request being received after a handover from a first network to the second network; comparing the UE's security capability information with security capabilities in a current security context; updating the current security context using the security capability information included in the registration request if the comparison result indicates that the security capability information differs from the security capabilities in the current security context; and selecting a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages.

[0013] In yet another example aspect, a wireless communication device including a processor is disclosed. The processor is configured to implement the methods described herein.

[0014] In another example, the various techniques described herein can be embodied in processor-executable code and stored on a computer-readable program medium.

[0015] Details of one or more embodiments are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other features will be apparent from the description and drawings, as well as from the claims. Attached Figure Description

[0016] Figure 1 The switch from EPS to 5GS via N26 is shown.

[0017] Figure 2 and Figure 3 Examples of the switching process from EPS to 5GS based on some implementations of the disclosed technology are shown.

[0018] Figure 4 Examples of the registration process performed after a switch from EPS to 5GS are shown, based on some implementations of the disclosed technology.

[0019] Figure 5 An example wireless communication network based on some implementations of the disclosed technology is shown.

[0020] Figure 6 This is a block diagram illustrating examples of wireless communication devices based on some implementations of the disclosed technology.

[0021] Figures 7 to 15 This is an example flowchart of a wireless communication method based on some implementations of the disclosed technology. Detailed Implementation

[0022] The disclosed technology provides implementation methods and examples of security algorithm selection techniques for handover from Evolved Packet Systems to 5G systems.

[0023] To address the potential threat of halved security strength posed by quantum computing, 5G systems (5GS) are being considered for support of 256-bit symmetric algorithms. However, regardless of the algorithms supported by 5GS, the Evolved Packet System (EPS) will only support 128-bit encryption algorithms. This inconsistency in the length of supported cryptographic algorithms could lead to interoperability issues between EPS and 5GS.

[0024] According to relevant specifications (e.g., 3GPP TS 33.501 Clause 8.4), during the handover from EPS to 5GS via N26, if the target AMF does not receive UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME, the target AMF should assume that the UE supports the default set of 5G security algorithms, from which the AMF and gNB select NAS and AS security algorithms. Since the default set of 5G security algorithms only includes cryptographic algorithms NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2, and integrity algorithms 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2, for UEs and 5GSs supporting 256-bit cryptographic algorithms, they can only agree to use 128-bit cryptographic algorithms for NAS and AS security during the handover process. If no algorithm reselection occurs during the registration process after the handover from EPS to 5GS, the 128-bit cryptographic algorithm will continue to be used for data confidentiality and integrity protection, resulting in weaker protection strength.

[0025] Various implementations of the disclosed technology propose a mechanism that enables the UE and 5GS to securely agree on NAS (Non-Access-stratum) and AS (Access-stratum) using a 256-bit cryptographic algorithm during handover or registration processes following a move from EPS to 5GS. While implementations for handover from EPS to 5GS have been discussed, the disclosed technology can be applied to different networks and is not limited to EPS and 5GS.

[0026] Figure 1 The switch from EPS to 5GS via N26 is illustrated, and N26 is described in the relevant specifications. The following description is based on Clause 4.11.1.2.2 of TS23.502 and includes only safety-related steps and descriptions.

[0027] As the UE is connected to the EPS, the source MME has the current EPS security context for the UE. The current EPS security context can be a mapped EPS security context generated by the previous mobility of the 5GC, or a native EPS security context generated by the primary authentication under the EPS.

[0028] 1. The source eNB sends a Handover Required message to the source MME, which includes the UE's identifier.

[0029] Note: The source MME checks the UE's security capabilities and access permissions to determine whether a handover to the 5GS can be initiated.

[0030] 2. The source MME selects a target AMF and sends a Forward Relocation Request to the selected target AMF. The source MME includes the UE's EPS security context in this message, which includes K... ASME The parameters include eKSI, UE EPS security capabilities, the selected EPS NAS algorithm identifier, uplink and downlink EPS NAS COUNTs, and {NH, NCC} pairs. If the source MME stores the UE NR security capabilities, it will also forward the UE NR security capabilities to the target AMF.

[0031] 3. The target AMF should construct a mapped 5G security context based on the EPS security context received from the source MME. The target AMF should then construct a mapped 5G security context based on the received K from the EPS security context received from the source MME. ASME The K-mapping derived from the NH value AMF' The key, as described in Clause 8.6.2.

[0032] If the target AMF receives the UE's 5G security capabilities, the target AMF should select the 5G NAS security algorithm with the highest priority from its configured list (which will be used in the target AMF for encryption and integrity protection).

[0033] If the target AMF does not receive UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME, the target AMF should assume the following default set of 5G security algorithms supported by the UE (and set the UE 5G security capabilities in the mapped 5G NAS security context according to this default set):

[0034] a. NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2 for NAS signaling encryption (ciphering), RRC signaling encryption, and UP encryption;

[0035] b. 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 for NAS signaling integrity protection, RRC signaling integrity protection and UP integrity protection.

[0036] Then, the target AMF derives the fully mapped 5G security context. The target AMF derives from the new K... AMF' Deriving the 5G NAS key (i.e., K) NASenc and K NASint The selected 5G NAS security algorithm identifier is used as input in the AMF, as described in Clause A.8. The uplink and downlink 5G NAS COUNTs associated with the derived 5G NAS key are set to the values ​​described in Clause 8.6.2. The K used for the new derivation... AMF' The ngKSI of the key is specified, such as the value being taken from K. ASME The key's eKSI (i.e., included in the received EPS security context) and type are set to indicate the mapped security context. The target AMF stores the EPS NAS security algorithm received from the source MME in the mapped 5G security context. Similar to the N2-Handover defined in Clause 6.9.2.3.3, the target AMF should also set the NCC to zero and use the mapped K AMF 'Key and uplink NAS COUNT value as specified in Appendix A.9 2' 32 -1 is used to further derive the temporary K. gNB .

[0037] The target AMF associates this mapped 5G security context with ngKSI.

[0038] Note: The target AMF uses the mapped K. AMF Instead of using the {NH, NCC} pairs received from the MME to derive the temporary K gNBUsed for initial K gNB The derived uplink NAS COUNT value was set to 2. 32 -1. This value was chosen to avoid the possibility that it might be used to derive the same K again. gNB Any possibility.

[0039] The target AMF creates a NAS container to signal necessary security parameters to the UE. The NAS container includes the NAS MAC, the selected 5G NAS security algorithm, and the derived K... AMF 'Associated ngKSI and with K AMF The NCC value associated with the NH parameter used in the derivation of '. The target AMF calculates the NAS MAC as described in Clause 6.9.2.3.3, where the COUNT parameter is set to its maximum value of 2. 32 -1.

[0040] After creating the NAS container, the target AMF increments the downlink NAS COUNT by one.

[0041] 4. The target AMF requests the target gNB / ng-eNB to establish a bearer by sending a handover request message.

[0042] The target AMF will use the NAS container created in step 3 along with the switch request message containing {NCC=0, NH=derived temporary K}. gNB The new Security Context Indicator (NSCI) and UE security capabilities are sent together to the target gNB / ng-eNB. The target AMF further sets the NCC to one and calculates the NH as specified in Appendix A.10. The target AMF further stores the {NCC=1, NH} pairs.

[0043] 5. The target gNB / ng-eNB selects a 5G AS security algorithm from the list of UE security capabilities.

[0044] The target gNB / ng-eNB calculates the K to be used with the UE by performing the key derivation defined in Appendix A.11 using the {NCC, NH} pair received in the handover request message and the target PCI and its frequency ARFCN-DL. gNB The target gNB / ng-eNB will receive the NCC value from the AMF and compare it with K. gNB Related. Then, the target gNB / ng-eNB is connected via K. gNB Derive the 5G AS key (K) from the selected 5G AS security algorithm identifier. RRCint K RRCenc K UPint and K UPenc) to derive the 5G AS security context, as described in Appendix A.8 for gNB and Appendix A.7 in TS 33.401

[10] .

[0045] The target gNB / ng-eNB sends a Handover Request Ack message to the target AMF. Included in the Handover Request Ack message is the Target to Source Container, which contains the selected 5G AS algorithm, the keySetChangeIndicator, the NCC value from the received {NH, NCC} pair, and the NAS container received from the target AMF. If the target gNB / ng-eNB has already received the NSCI, it sets the keySetChangeIndicator field to true; otherwise, it sets it to false.

[0046] 6. The target AMF sends a forwarding relocation response message to the source MME. The security parameters required from the gNB / ng-eNB obtained in step 5 to the source container are forwarded to the source MME.

[0047] 7. The source MME sends a handover command to the source eNB. The source eNB commands the UE to switch to the target 5G network by sending the handover command. This message includes all security-related parameters obtained from the target AMF in step 6 within the NAS container.

[0048] 8. The UE is transferred from K in the same manner as the AMF in step 3. ASME Derivation of the mapping K AMF' The key. It also derives the 5G NAS key and K corresponding to the AMF and the target gNB / ng-eNB in ​​steps 3 and 5. gNB The UE further sets the selected EPS NAS security algorithm in the 5G security context to the NAS security algorithm used with the source MME. It associates this mapped 5G security context with the ngKSI included in the NAS container. The UE verifies the NAS MAC in the NAS container.

[0049] If NAS MAC authentication fails, the UE aborts the handover process. Furthermore, if the new NAS security context is deduced, the UE discards the new NAS security context and continues to use the existing NAS and AS security contexts.

[0050] Note: Void.

[0051] The mapped 5G security context becomes the current 5G security context.

[0052] 9. The UE sends a Handover Complete message to the target gNB / ng-eNB. In the current 5G security context, this is encrypted and protected for integrity by the AS key.

[0053] 10. The target gNB / ng-eNB uses a Handover Notify message to notify the target AMF.

[0054] If the UE has a native 5G security context established during a previous 5GS access, the UE provides the associated 5G GUTI as an additional GUTI in the Registration Request following the handover procedure. The UE uses the mapped 5G security context to protect subsequent Registration Request messages accessed via 3GPP. The target AMF uses the mapped security context to verify the integrity of the Registration Request message. Upon successful verification, the target AMF sends a Context Request message to the old AMF, including the additional GUTI and an indication that the UE has been verified. Upon receiving the Context Request message with the indication that the UE has been verified, the old AMF skips the integrity check and transfers the native 5G security context to the target AMF. The AMF retrieves the native security context using the 5G GUTI. If the AMF determines that the native security context is to be activated, the AMF performs the NAS SMC procedure.

[0055] Note: The AMF determines when to activate the native 5G security context.

[0056] If the switchover fails, the new mapping's 5G security context will not be usable in the future. In this case, the AMF should delete the new mapping's 5G security context.

[0057] When the UE performs a registration request (protected by the mapped 5G security context) after the handover process, if the AMF does not have a native 5G security context available, the AMF should perform primary authentication via SEAF according to the local operator policy.

[0058] Clause 6.4.2.2 provides for the handling of security contexts in the case of multiple active NAS connections within the same PLMN service network.

[0059] The following description is provided based on Clause 8.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501, which discusses the registration process for moving from EPS to 5GS via N26.

[0060] The safety procedures described below apply during the transition from EPS to 5GS.

[0061] When the UE performs an idle mode move from EPS to 5GS, and if the UE has a native non-current 5G context, then the UE makes that native non-current 5G context the current context. The UE discards any mapped 5G security context.

[0062] The UE includes its 5G security capabilities and a mapped 5G GUTI in the registration request message. The UE also includes a 5G GUTI and ngKSI identifying the current 5G security context (if available, e.g., established during early 5G access), and performs integrity protection on the registration request using the selected security algorithm within the current 5G NAS security context, as if it were performed for a 5G NAS message on a 3GPP access network. If the UE does not have a current 5G security context, it sends the registration request message without integrity protection. According to Clause 5.5.1.2.2 of 3GPP 24.501, the registration request includes a TAU request or ATTACH request integrity protected using the EPS NAS security context shared with the source MME, as if it were performed for an LTE NAS message, and then the UE increments its stored uplink EPS NAS COUNT value by one.

[0063] Note: The TAU or ATTACH request attached to the registration request contains the complete TAU or ATTACH request.

[0064] Upon receiving a registration request, the AMF interacts with the MME, identified by the mapped 5G GUTI, to retrieve the UE context. The AMF includes an attached TAU request or ATTACH request in the context request message destined for the MME. The MME verifies the TAU request or ATTACH request using the stored UE security context, and if verification is successful, the MME sends the UE context to the AMF.

[0065] If the AMF obtains a 5G security context identified by the 5G GUTI, the AMF verifies the integrity of the registration request message. If verification is successful, the AMF processes any EPS security parameters received from the source MME in a Context Response message. If verification fails or the 5G UE context is unavailable, the AMF treats the registration request message as unprotected. In this case, the AMF may deduce the mapped 5G security context based on the EPS context received from the source MME, as described in Clause 8.6.2, or initiate a primary authentication process to create a new native 5G security context. If triggered by a home network, the AMF performs primary authentication as described in Clause 6.1.5.

[0066] If the AMF derives the mapped 5G security context from the EPS security context, then the ngKSI associated with the newly derived mapped 5G security context, as well as the uplink and downlink 5G NAS COUNTs, are defined and set as described in Clause 8.6.2. If the registration request contains a TAU request or ATTACH request message, the network uses the uplink EPS NAS COUNTs corresponding to the TAU request or ATTACH request message to retrieve the ngKSI from the EPS security context. ASME Derivation of K AMF '. AMF is used in the NAS SMC process and includes the ngKSI to the UE for the UE to identify the EPS security context used to derive the mapped 5G security context. If the mapped 5G security context is created or the native 5G security context has been changed (e.g., due to a new K... AMF If the 'derivative or NAS algorithm is changed', the AMF activates the resulting 5G security context through the NAS SMC procedure. When the mapped 5G security context is created, the AMF stores the selected EPS NAS security algorithm in the mapped 5G security context and includes it in the NAS Security Mode Command.

[0067] If the AMF wishes to continue using the native 5G security context used by the UE to protect the registration request, the AMF can skip the NAS SMC procedure and send a Registration Accept message that uses the native 5G security context identified by the 5G-GUTI and the ngKSI included in the registration request message for protection.

[0068] If the type value in the ngKSI received in the NAS SMC indicates a mapped security context, the UE uses the value field in the received ngKSI to identify the EPS security context. The UE derives the mapped 5G security context from this EPS security context, as described in Clause 8.6.2. The UE activates the mapped 5G security context to verify the integrity protection of the NAS SMC as if it were performed for a 5G NAS message on a 3GPP access.

[0069] The registration acceptance message is protected by either the new mapped 5G security context (if the mapped 5G security context is activated by the NAS SMC) or the new native 5G security context (if the new native 5G security context is activated by the NAS SMC), as if it were performed for a 5G NAS message on a 3GPP access. Otherwise, the current native 5G security context will be used. If the AMF chooses to use the new K... AMF Key (Mapped K) AMF'Key or native K' AMF Derivation of the initial K (key) gNB The initial K is derived using the start value of the uplink 5G NASCOUNT in the Security Mode Command Complete message and the access type distinguisher set to "3GPP Access". gNB As described in Appendix A.9. If the UE receives an AS SMC message, then the UE receives the new K in the same manner as the AMF. AMF Key derivation of initial K gNB .

[0070] Various embodiments of the disclosed technology provide techniques for selecting secure algorithms during the handover from EPS to 5GS. The proposed embodiments can prevent problems caused by inconsistencies in the lengths of the cryptographic algorithms supported by EPS and 5GS. In the following description, it is assumed that both AMF and gNB / ng-eNB support 256-bit secure algorithms.

[0071] In some implementations, to address the algorithm selection issue during handover, the AMF can send a request message forwarded by the MME to the UE after receiving the UE's 5G security capabilities, requesting the UE's 5G security capabilities and selecting an algorithm. In some implementations, to address the algorithm selection issue during handover, the AMF can provide the UE with information about 256-bit security algorithms supported by the AMF and allow the UE to perform algorithm selection. In some implementations, to address the algorithm selection issue during registration, the AMF can compare the algorithms presented in its configuration list with the UE's 5G security capabilities. If both the AMF and the UE support 256-bit cryptographic algorithms, the AMF can select a 256-bit NAS security algorithm based on its local policy by executing the NAS SMC procedure. The following will refer to... Figures 2-4 This describes various implementations of the disclosed technology.

[0072] Example 1

[0073] If the target AMF does not receive UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME during the handover from EPS to 5GS, the AMF can send a request message forwarded by the MME to the UE to request UE 5G security capabilities. Figure 2 An example of a switchover process from EPS to 5GS based on Embodiment 1 is shown. The following description is provided to explain... Figure 2 Each operation shown.

[0074] 1. The source eNB sends the handover-required message to the source MME, including the UE's identifier.

[0075] 2. The source MME selects a target AMF and sends a forwarding relocation request to the selected target AMF. The source MME includes the UE's EPS security context in this message, which includes K... ASME The parameters include eKSI, UE EPS security capabilities, the selected EPS NAS algorithm identifier, uplink and downlink EPS NAS COUNTs, and {NH, NCC} pairs. If the source MME stores the UE NR security capabilities, it will also forward the UE NR security capabilities to the target AMF.

[0076] 3. The target AMF checks whether it has received the UE's 5G security capabilities.

[0077] If the target AMF does not receive the UE's 5G security capabilities from the source MME, the AMF sends a request message forwarded by the source MME to the UE to request the UE's 5G security capabilities. The UE's identifier should be included in this message.

[0078] If the target AMF receives UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME, steps 4-6 should be skipped.

[0079] 4. The source MME forwards the request message to the UE.

[0080] 5. Upon receiving the request, the UE provides its 5G security capabilities in the response message.

[0081] 6. The source MME forwards the response message to the target AMF.

[0082] 7. The target AMF constructs a mapped 5G security context based on the EPS security context received from the source MME. The target AMF uses the received K from the EPS security context received from the source MME. ASME The K-mapping derived from the NH value AMF 'Key. The target AMF selects a 5G NAS security algorithm that is in the UE's 5G security capabilities and also has the highest priority from its configuration list (which will be used for encryption and integrity protection in the target AMF). If the UE's 5G security capabilities indicate that the UE supports 256-bit algorithms, the target AMF can select a 256-bit NAS security algorithm based on its local policy.'

[0083] Then, the target AMF derives the fully mapped 5G security context. The target AMF utilizes the selected 5G NAS security algorithm from the new K... AMF 'Deriving the 5G NAS key (i.e., K) NASenc and K NASint K used in the new derivation AMF The ngKSI of the key is defined, such as the value being taken from K. ASMEThe key's eKSI (i.e., included in the received EPS security context) and type are set to indicate the mapped security context. The target AMF stores the EPS NAS security algorithm received from the source MME in the mapped 5G security context. The target AMF also sets the NCC to zero and uses the mapped K... AMF 'Key and uplink NAS COUNT value 2' 32 -1 is used to further derive the temporary K. gNB .

[0084] The target AMF associates this mapped 5G security context with ngKSI.

[0085] The target AMF creates a NAS container to signal necessary security parameters to the UE. The NAS container includes the NAS MAC, the selected 5G NAS security algorithm, and the derived K... AMF 'Associated ngKSI and with K AMF The NCC value associated with the NH parameter used in the derivation of '. The target AMF calculates the NAS MAC, where the COUNT parameter is set to its maximum value of 2. 32 -1.

[0086] After creating the NAS container, the target AMF should increment the downlink NAS COUNT by one.

[0087] 8. The target AMF requests the target gNB / ng-eNB to establish a bearer by sending a handover request message.

[0088] The target AMF will use the NAS container created in step 7 along with the switch request message containing {NCC=0, NH=derived temporary K}. gNB The new Security Context Indicator (NSCI), along with the UE's security capabilities, are sent to the target gNB / ng-eNB. The target AMF further sets the NCC to one and calculates the NH. The target AMF should then store the {NCC=1, NH} pairs.

[0089] 9. The target gNB / ng-eNB selects a 5G AS security algorithm from the list of UE security capabilities. If the UE's 5G security capability indicates that the UE supports a 256-bit algorithm, the target gNB / ng-eNB may select a 256-bit AS security algorithm based on its local policy.

[0090] The target gNB / ng-eNB calculates the K to be used with the UE by performing key derivation using the {NCC, NH} pair received in the handover request message and the target PCI and its frequency ARFCN-DL. gNB The target gNB / ng-eNB will receive the NCC value from the AMF and compare it with K.gNB Related. Then, the target gNB / ng-eNB is connected via K. gNB Derive the 5G AS key (K) from the selected 5G AS security algorithm identifier. RRCint K RRCenc K UPint and K UPenc To derive the 5G AS security context.

[0091] The target gNB / ng-eNB sends a handover request Ack message to the target AMF. Included in the handover request Ack message is the target-to-source container, which contains the selected 5G AS algorithm, keySetChangeIndicator, the NCC value from the received {NH, NCC} pair, and the NAS container received from the target AMF. If the target gNB / ng-eNB has already received the NSCI, it sets the keySetChangeIndicator field to true; otherwise, it sets it to false.

[0092] 10. The target AMF sends a forwarding relocation response message to the source MME. The security parameters required from the gNB / ng-eNB obtained in step 9 to the target to the source container are forwarded to the source MME.

[0093] 11. The source MME sends a handover command to the source eNB. The source eNB commands the UE to switch to the target 5G network by sending the handover command. This message includes all security-related parameters obtained from the target AMF in step 10 within the NAS container.

[0094] 12. The UE receives data from K in the same manner as the AMF did in step 7. ASME Derivation of the mapping K AMF The key. It also derives the 5G NAS key and K corresponding to the AMF and the target gNB / ng-eNB in ​​steps 7 and 9. gNB The UE further sets the selected EPS NAS security algorithm in the 5G security context to the NAS security algorithm used with the source MME. It associates this mapped 5G security context with the ngKSI included in the NAS container. The UE verifies the NAS MAC in the NAS container.

[0095] If NAS MAC authentication fails, the UE aborts the handover process. Furthermore, if the new NAS security context is deduced, the UE discards the new NAS security context and continues to use the existing NAS and AS security contexts.

[0096] The mapped 5G security context becomes the current 5G security context.

[0097] 13. The UE sends a handover completion message to the target gNB / ng-eNB. In the current 5G security context, this is encrypted and protected for integrity by the AS key.

[0098] 14. The target gNB / ng-eNB notifies the target AMF using a handover notification message.

[0099] Example 2-1

[0100] Figure 3 An example of the switchover process from EPS to 5GS based on Embodiment 2-1 is shown. The following description is provided to explain... Figure 3 Each operation shown.

[0101] 1. The source eNB sends the handover-required message to the source MME, including the UE's identifier.

[0102] 2. The source MME selects a target AMF and sends a forwarding relocation request to the selected target AMF. The source MME includes the UE's EPS security context in this message, which includes K... ASME The parameters include eKSI, UE EPS security capabilities, the selected EPS NAS algorithm identifier, uplink and downlink EPS NAS COUNTs, and {NH, NCC} pairs. If the source MME stores the UE NR security capabilities, it will also forward the UE NR security capabilities to the target AMF.

[0103] 3. The target AMF constructs a mapped 5G security context based on the EPS security context received from the source MME. The target AMF uses the received K from the EPS security context received from the source MME. ASME The K-mapping derived from the NH value AMF 'Key'.

[0104] If the target AMF receives the UE's 5G security capabilities, the target AMF selects the 5G NAS security algorithm with the highest priority from its configuration list (which will be used in the target AMF for encryption and integrity protection).

[0105] If the target AMF does not receive UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME, then the UE 5G security capabilities are set in the mapped 5GNAS security context according to this default set:

[0106] a. NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2 for NAS signaling encryption, RRC signaling encryption, and UP encryption;

[0107] b. 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 for NAS signaling integrity protection, RRC signaling integrity protection and UP integrity protection.

[0108] The target AMF does not select any NAS security algorithm. Instead, the target AM selects multiple supported algorithms, including both 128-bit and 256-bit algorithms, and provides a list of algorithms for the UE to choose from. Specifically, the AMF can choose an encryption algorithm from NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2, a 128-bit integrity algorithm from 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2, and all supported 256-bit algorithms. The AMF then derives the 5G NAS key (i.e., K) for each algorithm. NASenc and K NASint ).

[0109] The target AMF creates a NAS container to signal necessary security parameters to the UE. If the AMF has already selected a 5G NAS security algorithm, the NAS container includes the NAS MAC, the selected 5G NAS security algorithm, and the derived K... AMF 'Associated ngKSI and with K AMF The NCC value associated with the NH parameter used in the derivation of '. If the AMF has provided a list of supported algorithms, the NAS container includes NAS MACs calculated using different keys derived from different algorithms, in the same order corresponding to each NAS MAC list, such as (NAS MAC1, NAS MAC2, NASMAC3, ..., Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3, ...). With the derived K AMF 'Associated ngKSI and with K AMF The NCC value associated with the NH parameter used in the derivation of ' is also included in the NAS container.

[0110] After creating the NAS container, the target AMF should increment the downlink NAS COUNT by one.

[0111] 4. The target AMF requests the target gNB / ng-eNB to establish a bearer by sending a handover request message.

[0112] The target AMF sends the NAS container created in step 3, along with the {NCC=0, NH=derived temporary KgNB} and the new Security Context Indicator (NSCI) from the handover request message to the target gNB / ng-eNB. The UE security capabilities should be included in this message, if they were received from the source MME. Otherwise, a default set of UE 5G security capabilities needs to be included. The target AMF further sets the NCC to one and calculates NH as specified in Appendix A.10. The target AMF further stores the {NCC=1, NH} pairs.

[0113] 5. The target gNB / ng-eNB selects a 5G AS security algorithm from the list of UE security capabilities.

[0114] The target gNB / ng-eNB calculates the K to be used with the UE by performing key derivation using the {NCC, NH} pair received in the handover request message and the target PCI and its frequency ARFCN-DL. gNB The target gNB / ng-eNB will receive the NCC value from the AMF and compare it with K. gNB Related. Then, the target gNB / ng-eNB is connected via K. gNB Derive the 5G AS key (K) from the selected 5G AS security algorithm identifier. RRCint K RRCenc K UPint and K UPenc To derive the 5G AS security context.

[0115] The target gNB / ng-eNB sends a handover request Ack message to the target AMF. Included in the handover request Ack message is the target-to-source container, which contains the selected 5G AS algorithm, keySetChangeIndicator, the NCC value from the received {NH, NCC} pair, and the NAS container received from the target AMF. If the target gNB / ng-eNB has already received the NSCI, it sets the keySetChangeIndicator field to true; otherwise, it sets it to false.

[0116] 6. The target AMF sends a forwarding relocation response message to the source MME. The security parameters required from the gNB / ng-eNB obtained in step 5 to the source container are forwarded to the source MME.

[0117] 7. The source MME sends a handover command to the source eNB. The source eNB commands the UE to switch to the target 5G network by sending a handover command. This message includes all security-related parameters obtained from the NAS container in step 6.

[0118] 8. The UE is transferred from K in the same manner as the AMF in step 7. ASME Derivation of the mapping K AMF 'Key. If the selected 5G NAS security algorithm is received in the NAS container, the UE derives the 5G NAS key and K corresponding to the AMF and the target gNB / ng-eNB in ​​steps 3 and 5. gNB If the UE receives a list of algorithms supported by the AMF in the NAS container, it compares the received algorithms with their security capabilities. If both the UE and the AMF support 256-bit algorithms, the 256-bit algorithm is selected as the NAS security algorithm. After algorithm selection, the UE verifies the NAS MAC corresponding to the selected integrity algorithm. If the verification is successful, the UE derives the 5G NAS key and K using both the NAS and AS algorithms. gNB .

[0119] If NAS MAC authentication fails, the UE aborts the handover process. Furthermore, if the new NAS security context is deduced, the UE discards the new NAS security context and continues to use the existing NAS and AS security contexts.

[0120] 9. The UE sends a handover completion message to the target gNB / ng-eNB. In the current 5G security context, this is encrypted and protected for integrity by the AS key.

[0121] 10. The target gNB / ng-eNB notifies the target AMF using a handover notification message.

[0122] 11. After a successful handover, the UE performs a mobility registration update. The UE sends a registration request message with its registration type set to "Mobility Registration Update". The message includes 5G security features and the mapped 5G GUTI. The selected NAS security algorithm should also be included in this message, if the selected NAS security algorithm was not previously selected by the AMF. UE integrity is protected using the selected security algorithm in the current 5G NAS security context to safeguard the registration request.

[0123] 12. Upon receiving the request message, the AMF should set the NAS security algorithm to the received algorithm (if not previously decided) and derive the 5G NAS key. The AMF then verifies the integrity of the registration request message and completes the normal registration process with the UE.

[0124] Example 2-2

[0125] In Example 2-1, only the 256-bit algorithm used for NAS security is selected during the switching process. This is achieved by adding operation 13 after operation 12, as discussed in Example 2-1. Figure 3 (Not shown in the image), a 256-bit algorithm for AS security can be selected during the mobility registration update process after the handover.

[0126] 13. The GNB / ng-eNB also compares the received UE 5G security capabilities with the security capabilities in the current 5G AS security context. This UE 5G security capability is received from the UE in the registration request in step 11 of Embodiment 2-1. The registration request is sent from the UE to the gNB, and the gNB then performs AMF selection and forwards the message to the AMF. After comparing the received UE 5G security capabilities with the security capabilities in the current 5G AS security context, if they differ, the gNB / ng-eNB updates the current 5G AS security context using the received UE 5G security capabilities and reselects the AS security algorithm. If the UE 5G security capabilities indicate that the UE supports a 256-bit algorithm, the gNB / ng-eNB can select a 256-bit AS security algorithm according to its local policy. The gNB / ng-eNB and the UE then activate the resulting 5G AS security context through the AS SMC procedure.

[0127] Example 3

[0128] Upon receiving the registration request following the handover process, the AMF needs to compare the algorithms presented in its configuration list with those presented in the UE's 5G security capabilities. If both the AMF and the UE support 256-bit cryptographic algorithms, the AMF can select a 256-bit NAS security algorithm based on its local policy by executing the NAS SMC procedure. Figure 4 An example of the registration process performed after the switch from EPS to 5GS, based on Embodiment 3, is shown. The following description is provided to explain... Figure 4 Each operation is shown in the diagram. Although Figure 4 Steps 0 through 8 are shown, with some steps omitted. For example, Figure 4 Steps 5, 6, and 8, shown in dashed lines, are optional and can be omitted.

[0129] 0. The handover from EPS to 5GS via N26 was successfully completed. During the handover process, the AMF did not receive UE 5G security capabilities from the source MME, so the AMF assumed the following default set of 5G security algorithms supported by the UE (and set the UE 5G security capabilities in the mapped 5G NAS security context according to this default set):

[0130] a. NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2 for NAS signaling encryption (ciphering), RRC signaling encryption, and UP encryption;

[0131] b. 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 for NAS signaling integrity protection, RRC signaling integrity protection and UP integrity protection.

[0132] Then, select 5G NAS and AS security algorithm from the list.

[0133] 1. The UE sends a registration request message with its registration type set to "Mobility Registration Update". The message includes 5G security features and the mapped 5G GUTI. UE integrity is protected by the selected security algorithm in the current 5G NAS security context to safeguard the registration request.

[0134] 2. (R)AN selects AMF.

[0135] 3. (R)AN forwards the message to the selected AMF.

[0136] 4. If the AMF obtains the 5G security context identified by the 5G GUTI, the AMF verifies the integrity of the registration request message. If the verification is successful, the AMF should skip step 5.

[0137] 5. If authentication fails or the 5G UE context is unavailable, the AMF will treat the registration request message as unprotected. In this case, the AMF will initiate a primary authentication process to create a new native 5G security context.

[0138] 6. The AMF compares the UE's 5G security capabilities received in the registration request with the security capabilities in the current 5G security context. If they differ, the AMF updates the current 5G security context using the received UE 5G security capabilities and reselects the NAS security algorithm. If the UE's 5G security capabilities indicate that the UE supports a 256-bit algorithm, the AMF can select a 256-bit NAS security algorithm according to its local policy. The AMF then activates the resulting 5G security context through the NAS SMC procedure.

[0139] 7. After completing the NAS SMC procedure, the AMF sends a registration acceptance message to the UE. The registration acceptance message is protected by either the new mapped 5G security context (if the mapped 5G security context is activated by NAS SMC) or the new native 5G security context (if the new native 5G security context is activated by NAS SMC).

[0140] 8. The gNB / ng-eNB also compares the received UE 5G security capabilities with the security capabilities in the current 5G AS security context. If they differ, the gNB / ng-eNB uses the received UE 5G security capabilities to update the current 5G AS security context and reselects the AS security algorithm. If the UE 5G security capabilities indicate that the UE supports a 256-bit algorithm, the gNB / ng-eNB can select a 256-bit AS security algorithm according to its local policy. The gNB / ng-eNB and the UE then activate the resulting 5G AS security context through the AS SMC procedure.

[0141] Figure 5 An example of a wireless communication system is shown, comprising a BS 520 (e.g., eNB) and a BS 530 (e.g., gNB) connected to the EPC and 5GC, respectively. One or more user equipments (UEs) 511 and 512 communicate with the BS 520 and BS 530. In some embodiments, uplink transmissions (531, 532) may include uplink control information (UCI), higher-layer signaling (e.g., UE assistance information or UE capabilities), or uplink information. In some embodiments, downlink transmissions (541, 542) may include DCI or higher-layer signaling or downlink information. The UE may be, for example, a smartphone, tablet, mobile computer, machine-to-machine (M2M) device, terminal, mobile device, Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc.

[0142] Figure 6 This is a block diagram illustrating a portion of an apparatus according to some embodiments of the currently disclosed technology. Apparatus 610, such as a network device or base station or wireless device (or UE), may include processor electronics 620, such as a microprocessor, which implements one or more of the technologies presented in this document. Apparatus 610 may include transceiver electronics 630 for transmitting and / or receiving wireless signals via one or more communication interfaces, such as antenna 640. Apparatus 610 may include other communication interfaces for transmitting and receiving data. Apparatus 610 may include one or more memories (not explicitly shown) configured to store information such as data and / or instructions. In some embodiments, processor electronics 620 may include at least a portion of transceiver electronics 630. In some embodiments, at least some of the disclosed technologies, modules, or functions are implemented using apparatus 605.

[0143] Some preferred embodiments may include the following solutions.

[0144] 1. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 7 The method 700 shown includes: receiving 710 a first message from a base station in the first network by a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network, the first message indicating the initiation of a handover operation for a user equipment (UE) from the first network to a second network; receiving 720 a second message from an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the second network by the MME, the second message requesting security capability information of the UE for the second network; sending 730 a third message to the UE by the MME, the third message requesting security capability information of the UE for the second network; receiving 740 a response message from the UE including security capability information of the UE for the second network by the MME; and sending 750 the security capability information of the UE for the second network to the AMF by the MME.

[0145] 2. The method according to Solution 1, wherein the second message includes the identification information of the user equipment.

[0146] 3. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 8 The method 800 shown includes: receiving 810 a request from the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network by the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) for relocating a User Equipment (UE) from the first network to the second network; sending 820 a message to the MME requesting security capability information of the UE for the second network by the AMF; and receiving 830 the security capability information of the UE for the second network from the MME by the AMF.

[0147] 4. The method according to Solution 3 further includes: after receiving the request and before sending the message: the AMF checks whether the AMF has received the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network.

[0148] 5. The method according to Solution 3, wherein the message includes the identification information of the user equipment.

[0149] 6. The method according to Solution 3 further includes, after receiving security capability information, selecting a security algorithm for the second network based on the security capability information, wherein, if the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit algorithm, the security algorithm corresponds to a 256-bit security algorithm.

[0150] 7. The method according to Solution 3 further includes: when the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit algorithm, the AMF sends a handover request message to the network node in the second network, the handover request message causing the base station in the second network to select a 256-bit security algorithm for the second network.

[0151] 8. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 9The method 900 shown includes: receiving a message 910 from a mobility management entity (MME) in a first network requesting security capability information of the user equipment for a second network; and sending a response message 920 from the user equipment to the MME including the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network.

[0152] 9. The method according to Solution 3, wherein the message includes security-related parameters and the method further includes: generating a security context by the user equipment based on the security-related parameters.

[0153] 10. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 10 The method 1000 shown includes: receiving 1010 a first message from a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in a first network requesting the relocation of a User Equipment (UE) from the first network to the second network by an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in a second network, the first message including a first security context for the first network; generating 1020 a second security context for the second network corresponding to the first security context for the first network by the AMF, the second security context being generated based on whether the first message includes security capability information of the UE for the second network to select a security algorithm for the second network or not to select a security algorithm for the second network; and sending 1030 a second message from the AMF to a gNB in ​​the second network requesting a handover and including a selected security algorithm or security parameters calculated based on candidate algorithms.

[0154] 11. The method according to Solution 10 further includes: after receiving the first message and before generating the second security context for the second network: the AMF checks whether the AMF has received the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network.

[0155] 12. The method according to solution 10, wherein, in the case that the first message omits security capability information for the second network, the generation of the second security context includes setting the security capability information in the second security context based on a default set.

[0156] 13. The method according to Solution 10, wherein the default set includes: i) NEA0, 128-NEA1 and 128-NEA2; or ii) 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2.

[0157] 14. The method according to solution 10, wherein, in the case that the first message omits security capability information for the second network, the generation of the second security context includes: generating an algorithm list for the user equipment, the algorithm list including candidate algorithms, the candidate algorithms including at least one 128-bit algorithm and at least one 256-bit algorithm.

[0158] 15. The method according to solution 14, wherein the algorithm list includes candidate algorithms, which include all 256-bit algorithms supported by AMF.

[0159] 16. The method according to solution 14, wherein at least one 128-bit algorithm in the algorithm list comprises: a cryptographic algorithm from NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, and a 128-bit integrity algorithm from 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2.

[0160] 17. The method according to solution 14 further includes: creating a container to be sent to a user device, the container including MACs calculated using different keys derived from different candidate algorithms.

[0161] 18. The method according to solution 10 further includes: receiving a registration request from the user equipment, including a 256-bit algorithm already selected for the second network, by the AMF; and setting a security algorithm by the AMF based on the received request.

[0162] 19. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 11 The method 1100 shown includes: receiving, 1110, a handover command from a network node in a first network for performing a handover from the first network to a second network, the handover command including security parameters; checking, 1120, whether the handover command includes a security algorithm selected for the second network or a candidate security algorithm selected for the second network, the security algorithm being configured to protect signaling messages; in response to the check indicating that the handover command includes a candidate security algorithm for the second network algorithm, comparing the candidate security algorithm with security capability information of the user equipment, 1130; and, based on the comparison result, indicating that the user equipment and the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) support a 256-bit algorithm, selecting, 1140, a 256-bit algorithm to be used for the second network.

[0163] 20. The method according to Solution 19 further includes, after selecting a 256-bit algorithm: performing a verification process of the MAC corresponding to the 256-bit algorithm by the user equipment; and deriving a security key for the second network based on the 256-bit algorithm.

[0164] 21. The method according to solution 19 further includes sending a registration request from the user equipment to the AMF, including a 256-bit algorithm selected for the second network.

[0165] 22. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 12The method 1200 shown includes: receiving, 1210, a handover request from the first network to the second network from the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the first network by a network node in the second network, the handover request including: 1) security capability information of the user equipment for the second network if the user equipment's security capability information has been provided to the AMF from the Mobility Management Entity (MME), or 2) a container of MACs calculated using different keys if the security capability information has not yet been provided to the AMF from the MME, wherein the different keys are derived from different candidate algorithms included in a list of algorithms for the user equipment; and receiving, 1220, a handover completion message from the user equipment by the network node.

[0166] 23. The method according to solution 22, wherein the algorithm list includes candidate algorithms, including at least one 128-bit algorithm and at least one 256-bit algorithm, the candidate algorithms being configured to protect signaling messages, and wherein, during the handover process, if the user equipment and the AMF support the 256-bit algorithm, the 256-bit algorithm is selected by the user equipment.

[0167] 24. The method according to solution 22, wherein the algorithm list includes candidate algorithms, which include all 256-bit algorithms supported by AMF.

[0168] 25. The method according to solution 22 further includes: receiving security capability information of the user equipment for the second network; comparing the received security capability information with security capabilities in the current security context configured to protect user plane data; updating the current security context using the received security capability information if the comparison result indicates that the received security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context; and selecting a security algorithm for protecting user plane data.

[0169] 26. The method according to solution 25, wherein, when the received security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

[0170] 27. The method according to solution 25 further includes: performing an SMC (Security Mode Control) procedure by a network node in the second network to activate an updated security context.

[0171] 28. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 13The method 1300 shown includes: receiving, by the AMF, a registration request including security capability information of the user equipment 1310 after a handover from a first network to a second network is completed; comparing the security capability information of the user equipment with the security capabilities in the current security context 1320; updating the current security context using the security capability information included in the registration request if the comparison result indicates that the security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context 1330; and selecting, 1340, a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages 1340.

[0172] 29. The method according to solution 28, wherein, when the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

[0173] 30. The method according to solution 28 further includes: the AMF performing an SMC (Safety Mode Control) procedure to activate an updated security context.

[0174] 31. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 14 The method 1400 shown includes: sending a registration request 1410, comprising security capability information of the user equipment, to the AMF after a handover from a first network to a second network is completed; performing a first SMC procedure 1420, which activates a first security context updated by the AMF based on the security capability information included in the registration request; and performing a second SMC procedure 1430, which activates a second security context updated by a network node in the second network based on the security capability information included in the registration request.

[0175] 32. The method according to solution 31, wherein the first security context and the second security context correspond to the NAS (non-access stratum) security context and the AS (access stratum) security context, respectively.

[0176] 33. A method for wireless communication (e.g., such as...) Figure 15 The method 1500 shown includes: receiving, 1510, a registration request including security capability information of the user equipment from a network node in a second network, the registration request being received after a handover from a first network to a second network; comparing the security capability information of the user equipment with security capabilities in the current security context; 1520 updating the current security context using the security capability information included in the registration request if the comparison result indicates that the security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context; and 1540 selecting a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages.

[0177] 34. The method according to solution 33, wherein, when the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

[0178] 35. The method according to solution 33 further includes: performing an SMC (Security Mode Control) procedure by a network node in the second network to activate an updated security context.

[0179] 36. A wireless communication device, comprising a processor configured to implement the method described in any one of the above solutions.

[0180] 37. A computer storage medium having code stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the method described in any one of the above solutions.

[0181] The disclosed and other embodiments, described modules, and functional operations in this document can be implemented in digital electronic circuits, or in computer software, firmware, or hardware, including the structures disclosed in this document and their structural equivalents, or in combinations thereof. The disclosed and other embodiments can be implemented as one or more computer program products, i.e., one or more modules of computer program instructions encoded on a computer-readable medium for execution by or control of the operation of a data processing apparatus. The computer-readable medium can be a machine-readable storage device, a machine-readable storage substrate, a memory device, a combination of substances affecting machine-readable propagating signals, or a combination thereof. "Data processing apparatus" includes all means, devices, and machines for processing data, such as a programmable processor, a computer, or multiple processors or computers. In addition to hardware, the apparatus may also include code that creates an execution environment for the computer program in question, such as code constituting processor firmware, a protocol stack, a database management system, an operating system, or a combination thereof. Propagating signals are artificially generated signals, such as machine-generated electrical, optical, or electromagnetic signals, which are generated to encode information for transmission to a suitable receiver device.

[0182] Computer programs (also known as programs, software, software applications, scripts, or code) can be written in any programming language, including compiled or interpreted languages, and can be deployed in any form, including as standalone programs or as modules, components, subroutines, or other units suitable for use in a computing environment. A computer program does not necessarily correspond to a file in a file system. A program can be stored as part of a file that holds other programs or data (e.g., one or more scripts stored in a markup language document), as a single file dedicated to the program in question, or as multiple coordinating files (e.g., a file storing portions of one or more modules, subroutines, or code). A computer program can be deployed to execute on a single computer or on multiple computers located at one site or distributed across multiple sites and interconnected via a communication network.

[0183] The processes and logic flows described in this document can be executed by one or more programmable processors that execute one or more computer programs to perform functions by manipulating input data and generating outputs. The processes and logic flows can also be executed by dedicated logic circuits, and the devices can be implemented as dedicated logic circuits, such as FPGAs (field-programmable gate arrays) or ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits).

[0184] Processors suitable for executing computer programs include, by way of example, both general-purpose microprocessors and special-purpose microprocessors, as well as any one or more processors in any kind of digital computer. Typically, a processor receives instructions and data from read-only memory or random access memory, or both. The basic components of a computer are a processor for executing instructions and one or more memory devices for storing instructions and data. Typically, a computer will also include, or be operatively coupled to, receiving data from or sending data to one or more mass storage devices (e.g., magnetic disks, magneto-optical disks, or optical disks) for storing data, or both. However, a computer does not need to have such devices. Computer-readable media suitable for storing computer program instructions and data include all forms of non-volatile memory, media, and memory devices, such as semiconductor memory devices like EPROM, EEPROM, and flash memory devices; magnetic disks, such as internal hard disks or removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROMs and DVD-ROMs. The processor and memory may be supplemented by or incorporated into dedicated logic circuitry.

[0185] Although this document contains numerous details, these should not be construed as limiting the scope of the claimed invention or the scope of potentially claimed inventions, but rather as descriptions of features specific to particular embodiments. Certain features described in the context of individual embodiments may also be implemented in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely, various features described in the context of a single embodiment may also be implemented individually or in any suitable sub-combination in multiple embodiments. Furthermore, while the foregoing features may be described as functioning in certain combinations, and even initially claimed in this manner, in some cases one or more features from the claimed combination may be removed from the combination, and the claimed combination may be for sub-combinations or variations thereof. Similarly, although operations are depicted in a specific order in the drawings, this should not be construed as requiring the performance of such operations in the specific order shown or in a sequential sequence, or requiring the performance of all illustrated operations to achieve the desired result.

[0186] Only a few examples and implementations are disclosed. Variations, modifications, and enhancements can be made to the described examples and implementations, as well as other implementations, based on the disclosed content.

Claims

1. A method for wireless communication, comprising: A first message is received by the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network from a base station in the first network, the first message indicating the initiation of a handover operation for a user equipment from the first network to a second network; The MME receives a second message from the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the second network, the second message requesting the user equipment for security capability information of the second network; The MME sends a third message to the user equipment, the third message requesting the user equipment to provide security capability information for the second network; The MME receives a response message from the user equipment including information about the user equipment's security capabilities for the second network; as well as The MME sends the user equipment's security capability information for the second network to the AMF.

2. The method according to claim 1, in, The second message includes the identification information of the user equipment.

3. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) receives a request from the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network to relocate the User Equipment from the first network to the second network; The AMF sends a message to the MME requesting information about the user equipment's security capabilities for the second network; as well as The AMF receives the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network from the MME.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising, after receiving the request and before sending the message: The AMF checks whether it has received the user equipment's security capability information for the second network.

5. The method according to claim 3, wherein, The message includes the identification information of the user equipment.

6. The method according to claim 3 further includes, after receiving the security capability information, Based on the security capability information, a security algorithm is selected for the second network. in, When the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit algorithm, the security algorithm corresponds to a 256-bit security algorithm.

7. The method according to claim 3, further comprising: When the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit algorithm, the AMF sends a handover request message to the network nodes in the second network, and the handover request message causes the base station in the second network to select a 256-bit security algorithm for the second network.

8. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The user equipment receives a message from the mobility management entity (MME) in the first network requesting information about the user equipment's security capabilities for the second network; The user equipment sends a response message to the MME, which includes information about the user equipment's security capabilities for the second network.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein, The message includes security-related parameters, and the method further includes: The user equipment generates a security context based on the security-related parameters.

10. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the second network receives a first message from the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the first network requesting the relocation of the User Equipment from the first network to the second network, the first message including a first security context for the first network; The AMF generates a second security context for the second network corresponding to the first security context for the first network. The second security context is generated based on whether the first message includes the user equipment's security capability information for the second network to select a security algorithm for the second network or not to select a security algorithm for the second network. as well as The AMF sends a second message to the gNB in ​​the second network, the second message requesting a switch and including the selected security algorithm or security parameters calculated based on candidate algorithms.

11. The method of claim 10, further comprising, after receiving the first message and before generating the second security context for the second network: The AMF checks whether it has received the user equipment's security capability information for the second network.

12. The method according to claim 10, in, If the first message omits security capability information for the second network, the generation of the second security context includes setting security capability information in the second security context based on a default set.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein, The default set includes: i) NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2; or ii) 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2.

14. The method according to claim 10, in, If the first message omits security capability information for the second network, the generation of the second security context includes: Generate an algorithm list for the user equipment, the algorithm list including candidate algorithms containing at least one 128-bit algorithm and at least one 256-bit algorithm.

15. The method according to claim 14, wherein, The algorithm list includes candidate algorithms containing all 256-bit algorithms supported by the AMF.

16. The method of claim 14, wherein, At least one 128-bit algorithm in the algorithm list includes: a cryptographic algorithm from NEA0, 128-NEA1, and 128-NEA2, and a 128-bit integrity algorithm from 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2.

17. The method of claim 14, further comprising: A container is created to be sent to the user equipment, the container including a MAC calculated using different keys derived from different candidate algorithms.

18. The method of claim 10, further comprising: The AMF receives a registration request from the user equipment, which includes a 256-bit algorithm already selected for the second network; as well as The AMF sets the security algorithm based on the received information.

19. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The user equipment receives a handover command from a network node in the first network for performing a handover from the first network to the second network, the handover command including security parameters; Check whether the switching command includes a security algorithm selected for the second network or a candidate security algorithm selected for the second network, wherein the security algorithm is configured to protect the signaling message; In response to the inspection indicating that the switching command includes a candidate security algorithm for the second network algorithm, the candidate security algorithm is compared with the security capability information of the user equipment; as well as Based on the results of the comparison, the user equipment and access and mobility management function (AMF) are instructed to support a 256-bit algorithm, and a 256-bit algorithm is selected for use in the second network.

20. The method of claim 19, further comprising, after selecting the 256-bit algorithm: The user equipment performs the MAC verification process corresponding to the 256-bit algorithm; and The security key for the second network is derived based on the 256-bit algorithm.

21. The method of claim 19, further comprising: The user equipment sends a registration request to the AMF, including a 256-bit algorithm selected for the second network.

22. A method for wireless communication, comprising: A network node in the second network receives a handover request from the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the first network to the second network. The handover request includes: 1) if the user equipment's security capability information has been provided to the AMF from the Mobility Management Entity (MME), the user equipment's security capability information for the second network; or 2) if the security capability information has not yet been provided to the AMF from the MME, a container of MACs computed using different keys, wherein the different keys are derived from different candidate algorithms included in a list of algorithms for the user equipment. The network node receives the handover completion message from the user equipment.

23. The method according to claim 22, in, The algorithm list includes candidate algorithms comprising at least one 128-bit algorithm and at least one 256-bit algorithm, the candidate algorithms being configured to protect signaling messages, and During the handover process, if the user equipment and AMF support a 256-bit algorithm, the user equipment selects the 256-bit algorithm.

24. The method according to claim 22, wherein, The algorithm list includes candidate algorithms, which include all 256-bit algorithms supported by the AMF.

25. The method of claim 22, further comprising: Receive the security capability information of the user equipment for the second network; Compare the received security capability information with the security capabilities in the current security context configured to protect user plane data; If the comparison result indicates that the received security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context, the current security context is updated using the received security capability information. as well as Select a security algorithm to protect the user plane data.

26. The method of claim 25, wherein, If the received security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

27. The method of claim 25, further comprising: The security mode control (SMC) process is performed by a network node in the second network to activate the updated security context.

28. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The AMF receives a registration request from the user equipment, which includes the security capability information of the user equipment, after a handover from the first network to the second network is completed; The security capability information of the user equipment is compared with the security capabilities in the current security context; If the comparison result indicates that the security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context, the current security context is updated using the security capability information included in the registration request; as well as Select a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages.

29. The method according to claim 28, wherein, When the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

30. The method of claim 28, further comprising: The AMF performs a Security Mode Control (SMC) procedure to activate the updated security context.

31. A method for wireless communication, comprising: The user equipment sends a registration request to the AMF, which includes the security capability information of the user equipment. The registration request is sent after the handover from the first network to the second network is completed. A first SMC procedure is executed, which activates a first security context updated by the AMF based on the security capability information included in the registration request. as well as A second SMC process is executed, which activates a second security context updated by a network node in the second network based on the security capability information included in the registration request.

32. The method according to claim 31, wherein, The first security context and the second security context correspond to the non-access stratum (NAS) security context and the access stratum (AS) security context, respectively.

33. A method for wireless communication, comprising: A network node in the second network receives a registration request from the user equipment, which includes the security capability information of the user equipment. The registration request is received after the handover from the first network to the second network is completed. The security capability information of the user equipment is compared with the security capabilities in the current security context; If the comparison result indicates that the security capability information is different from the security capabilities in the current security context, the current security context is updated using the security capability information included in the registration request; as well as Select a security algorithm for protecting signaling messages.

34. The method according to claim 33, wherein, When the security capability information indicates that the user equipment supports a 256-bit security algorithm, the 256-bit security algorithm is selected as the security algorithm.

35. The method of claim 33, further comprising: The security mode control (SMC) process is performed by a network node in the second network to activate the updated security context.

36. A wireless communication device comprising a processor configured to perform the method of any one of the preceding claims.

37. A computer storage medium having code stored thereon, the code causing the processor to perform the method according to any one of the preceding claims when executed by a processor.

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