A method, apparatus, user terminal, medium, and product for secure use of documents.

By receiving access verification requests from external auxiliary software and using the software signature ciphertext and public key for authentication and authorization, the problem of external auxiliary software directly leaking confidential documents is solved. This achieves dual verification and fine-grained control, thereby improving the confidentiality and security of documents.

CN123116301APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611353656.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-02
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the fintech field, peripheral auxiliary software can still directly obtain and leak confidential documents even after access control or decryption, and existing technologies cannot effectively prevent document leaks.

Method used

By receiving access verification requests from external auxiliary software, the system uses the software signature ciphertext and public key to determine the authentication result. After successful authentication, the system pushes the software authorization code and encryption service public key. After passing the dual authentication, the external auxiliary software uses encrypted file data to ensure the confidentiality of the file data.

Benefits of technology

It implements a dual verification mechanism for external auxiliary software to prevent file leaks, ensure fine-grained control over file access permissions, and improve confidentiality, security, and the reliability of file processing.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN123116301A_ABST
    Figure CN123116301A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

This invention discloses a method, apparatus, user terminal, medium, and product for secure file use. The method includes: receiving an access verification request from peripheral auxiliary software; determining the authentication result using the software signature ciphertext and the software public key; if the authentication result is successful, pushing a software authorization code to a system notification; sending the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the peripheral auxiliary software, which then displays the software authorization code; receiving the authorization verification result; if the authorization verification result is successful, sending the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key obtained from system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software; the peripheral auxiliary software decrypting and using the original encrypted file data using the service public key; receiving the encrypted file data encrypted with the service public key after use by the peripheral auxiliary software; decrypting, verifying the integrity of, and encrypting the encrypted file data to obtain the target encrypted file; and sending the target encrypted file back to system storage.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of financial technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, user terminal, medium and product for secure use of documents. Background Technology

[0002] Because different user terminals have different hardware, systems, and interface platforms, people often call up various peripheral auxiliary software deployed on the terminal when processing files.

[0003] In the field of financial technology, most files have a high level of confidentiality, such as audit files, log files, and system files. However, the credibility of external auxiliary software varies. Therefore, in order to prevent the files from being leaked when users use different external auxiliary software to process confidential files, file access control or file encryption software is used to encrypt the files.

[0004] However, even with the aforementioned methods, external auxiliary software can still directly retrieve the corresponding files from the system storage and leak them by controlling access permissions or decrypting the files. This can be done by directly copying the files or escalating privileges to bypass directory access control and thus leaking the files. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention provides a method, apparatus, user terminal, medium, and product for secure file use, relating to the field of financial technology. It prevents external auxiliary software from performing abnormal processing on the original file, blocks the problem that external auxiliary software can directly leak the file after controlling permissions or decrypting the file, and improves the confidentiality and security of the original file itself.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for secure file usage, applicable to a security control background service in a user terminal, the method comprising: Receive access verification request from peripheral auxiliary software, and use the software signature ciphertext and software public key in the access verification request to determine the identity verification result of the peripheral auxiliary software. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key. When the identity verification result is successful, the software authorization code is pushed to the system notification, and the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key is sent to the external auxiliary software so that the external auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code; The system receives the authorization verification result and, upon successful authorization verification, sends the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software. This enables the peripheral auxiliary software to decrypt the encryption service public key and then use it to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software. The system receives encrypted usage file data encrypted with the service public key after being used by external auxiliary software. It then decrypts, verifies the integrity of, and re-encrypts the encrypted usage file data in sequence to obtain the target encrypted file, and sends the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

[0007] The file security method provided in this invention determines the identity verification result of the peripheral auxiliary software based on its software identifier and the original compression verification identifier. Only after successful identity verification is a software authorization code generated and sent to the peripheral auxiliary software. This solves the risk of file leakage caused by prematurely issuing authorization codes to the peripheral auxiliary software, allowing it to access different files at any time. It also eliminates the risk of file leakage during subsequent file processing caused by the peripheral auxiliary software using permanent or copied permanent authorization codes, or by circumventing identity verification through forged software identifiers. After issuing the software authorization code, the method checks whether the software authorization codes displayed by two channels determined by the user are consistent. This implements a dual verification mechanism, verifying the identity of the peripheral auxiliary software first and then the authorization, improving the overall reliability of the verification of the peripheral auxiliary software and effectively preventing the peripheral auxiliary software from bypassing single verification through abnormal means, thus preventing file leakage. Meanwhile, since the peripheral auxiliary software obtains encrypted file data through a secure control backend service, it not only ensures that the peripheral auxiliary software cannot directly access files in the system storage after verification, thus achieving fine-grained control over the file access permissions of the peripheral auxiliary software, but also ensures that it cannot directly obtain the original file, but only obtains the file data corresponding to the original file. This prevents the peripheral auxiliary software from performing abnormal processing on the original file, and blocks the problem that the peripheral auxiliary software can directly leak the file after decrypting it through permission control. This improves the confidentiality and security of the original file itself, and also enables the processing of file data by the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0008] Secondly, embodiments of the present invention provide another method for secure file use, applicable to peripheral auxiliary software deployed in a user terminal, the method comprising: After encrypting the software identifier and its original compressed verification identifier using the software private key, the software signature ciphertext is obtained, and an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext is sent to the security control backend service in the user terminal.

[0009] When the security control backend service confirms that the identity verification result is successful, it uses the software public key to encrypt the software authorization code, and uses the software private key to decrypt the encrypted software authorization code, and then obtains and displays the decrypted software authorization code.

[0010] When the security control backend service confirms that the authorization verification result is passed, it receives the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key. After decrypting the encryption service public key, it uses the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data.

[0011] The target file data is encrypted using the service public key to obtain encrypted file data, and then sent to the security control backend service.

[0012] Thirdly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a file security usage device; this device is applicable to a security control background service in a user terminal, and the device includes: The authentication module is used to receive access authentication requests from peripheral auxiliary software and use the software signature ciphertext and software public key in the access authentication request to determine the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key.

[0013] The generation module is used to push the software authorization code to the system notification when the authentication result is successful, and send the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the external auxiliary software so that the external auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0014] The authorization verification module is used to receive the authorization verification result and, when the authorization verification result is successful, send the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software. This allows the peripheral auxiliary software to decrypt the encryption service public key and then use it to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0015] The storage module is used to receive encrypted usage file data encrypted with the service public key after being used by the peripheral auxiliary software, decrypt, verify integrity and encrypt the encrypted usage file data in sequence to obtain the target encrypted file, and then send the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

[0016] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention also provide another file security usage device, which is suitable for peripheral auxiliary software deployed in a user terminal; the device includes: The software signature module is used to encrypt the software identifier and its original compressed verification identifier using the software private key to obtain the software signature ciphertext, and then send an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext to the security control backend service in the user terminal.

[0017] The display module is used to receive the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key when the security control backend service confirms that the identity verification result is successful, and to decrypt the encrypted software authorization code with the software private key to obtain and display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0018] The module is used to receive the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service when the authorization verification result is passed. After decrypting the encryption service public key, the module uses the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data and use it.

[0019] The sending module is used to encrypt the target file data using the service public key, obtain the encrypted file data, and send the encrypted file data to the security control backend service.

[0020] Fifthly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a user terminal, the user terminal comprising: At least one processor; and A memory that is communicatively connected to at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by at least one processor, such that the at least one processor is able to perform the file security usage method according to any embodiment of the present invention.

[0021] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the file security usage method of any embodiment of the present invention.

[0022] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the file security usage method of any embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] It should be noted that the aforementioned computer instructions may be stored, in whole or in part, on a computer-readable storage medium. This computer-readable storage medium may be packaged together with the processor of the file security device, or it may be packaged separately from the processor of the file security device; this application does not impose any limitations on this.

[0024] The descriptions of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh aspects in this application can be referred to the detailed description of the first aspect; and the beneficial effects of the descriptions of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh aspects can be referred to the analysis of the beneficial effects of the first aspect, which will not be repeated here.

[0025] In this application, the names of the aforementioned document security devices do not limit the devices or functional modules themselves. In actual implementation, these devices or functional modules may appear under other names. As long as the functions of each device or functional module are similar to those in this application, they fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents.

[0026] These or other aspects of this application will become more readily apparent in the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0027] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0028] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a method for secure file usage provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating another method for secure file usage provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating yet another method for secure file usage provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 A structural diagram of a document security device provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 A structural diagram of another document security usage device provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a user terminal provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0029] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and not intended to limit it. Furthermore, it should be noted that, for ease of description, the accompanying drawings show only the parts relevant to the present invention, and not all of the structures.

[0030] In this article, the term "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent three situations: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone.

[0031] The terms “original” and “target” in the specification and drawings of this application are used to distinguish different objects or to distinguish different treatments of the same object, rather than to describe a specific order of objects.

[0032] Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, used in the description of this application are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the steps or units listed, but may optionally include other steps or units not listed, or may optionally include other steps or units inherent to such process, method, product, or apparatus.

[0033] Before discussing the exemplary embodiments in more detail, it should be noted that some exemplary embodiments are described as processes or methods depicted as flowcharts. Although the flowcharts describe the operations (or steps) as sequential processes, many of these operations can be performed in parallel, concurrently, or simultaneously. Furthermore, the order of the operations can be rearranged. The process can be terminated when its operation is completed, but may also have additional steps not included in the figures. The process can correspond to a method, function, procedure, subroutine, subroutine, etc. Moreover, embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present invention can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0034] It should be noted that in the embodiments of this application, the words "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations, or explanations. Any embodiment or design scheme described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design schemes. Specifically, the use of the words "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0035] In the description of this application, unless otherwise stated, "a plurality of" means two or more.

[0036] Figure 1This is a flowchart illustrating a method for secure file use according to an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is applicable to situations where users need to use peripheral auxiliary software to process confidential files, such as for financial statement auditing, statistical report generation, and data processing. This method can be executed by a file security device, which can be implemented in hardware and / or software and can be configured in a user terminal. In this embodiment, the user terminal is presented as a user terminal, such as a user's computer; an independently running security control background service is deployed in the user terminal; the security control background service can run as a system service or a daemon process, and provides a local inter-process communication interface, operating purely locally without relying on a network connection. (Continue to refer to...) Figure 1 This embodiment specifically includes: S101. Receive the access verification request from the peripheral auxiliary software, and use the software signature ciphertext and software public key in the access verification request to determine the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0037] In this embodiment, the peripheral auxiliary software mainly refers to an auxiliary program that is independent of the core main program and communicates with the core main program through a local inter-process communication interface; in practice, it can be an intelligent agent or artificial intelligence program with different functions. The access verification request is a verification request submitted by the peripheral auxiliary software to the security control backend service for the purpose of access. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the software identifier and its original compressed verification identifier using the software private key; the software private key is the private key in the asymmetric key pair generated by the peripheral auxiliary software itself; the software identifier is the unique identity verification identifier of the peripheral auxiliary software; the original compressed verification identifier is generated by compressing the software identifier using the compression verification method set by the peripheral auxiliary software. The software public key is the public key in the asymmetric key pair generated by the peripheral auxiliary software itself. The authentication result is used to verify whether the identity information of the peripheral auxiliary software is trustworthy.

[0038] Specifically, before the peripheral auxiliary software obtains authorization for this file processing, it first compresses its software identifier according to the set compression and verification method to obtain the original compressed verification identifier. Then, it encapsulates the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier and encrypts them using its private key to obtain the software signature ciphertext. Afterward, it sends an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext to the security control backend service. The security control backend service can then use the peripheral auxiliary software's public key to decrypt the software signature ciphertext to obtain the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier. At this point, the security control backend service can determine the trustworthiness of the peripheral auxiliary software based on the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier, that is, verify its identity, and finally obtain the identity verification result for the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0039] S102. When the authentication result is successful, push the software authorization code to the system notification and send the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the external auxiliary software so that the external auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0040] In this embodiment, the authentication result includes pass and fail. The software authorization code is a unique authorization code generated by the security control backend service, used to authorize peripheral auxiliary software that has passed the authentication result in this file processing. The system notification is an operating system-level message notification on the user terminal.

[0041] Specifically, when the identity verification result for the peripheral auxiliary software is confirmed to be successful, a software authorization code can be randomly generated. Then, on the one hand, the software authorization code is encrypted using the software public key and sent to the peripheral auxiliary software. After receiving the encrypted software authorization code, the peripheral auxiliary software decrypts it using the software private key and displays the software authorization code to the user. On the other hand, the security control background service simultaneously pushes the software authorization code to the system notification. In this way, the user can receive the software authorization code from two channels (system notification and peripheral auxiliary software) at the same time and compare whether the software authorization codes from the two channels are consistent.

[0042] In this embodiment, before each use of different peripheral auxiliary software to process file data with confidentiality requirements, the identity verification result of the peripheral auxiliary software is determined based on the software identifier and the original compression verification identifier. Only after the identity verification result is passed is a software authorization code generated and sent to the peripheral auxiliary software. This solves the risk of file leakage caused by issuing authorization codes to peripheral auxiliary software in advance, which would allow it to access different files at any time. It realizes that the identity of the peripheral auxiliary software is verified before each use of the peripheral auxiliary software to process files, and then a software authorization code is generated for it. This eliminates the risk of file leakage caused by peripheral auxiliary software using permanent authorization codes or copied permanent authorization codes in subsequent file processing, or eliminates the situation of evading identity verification by forging software identifiers.

[0043] S103. Receive the authorization verification result, and when the authorization verification result is successful, send the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data.

[0044] In this embodiment, the authorization verification result includes both pass and fail; the authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software. System storage is the system-level storage area of ​​the user terminal. The original encrypted file data is the file data corresponding to the file to be processed by the peripheral auxiliary software, and the encrypted file data after encryption. The encryption service public key is the public key in the asymmetric encryption key pair generated by the encrypted security control backend service; the service public key is the public key in the asymmetric encryption key pair generated by the security control backend service.

[0045] Specifically, in the previous step, the user can simultaneously receive software authorization codes from two channels (system notification and peripheral auxiliary software) and compare whether the software authorization codes from the two channels are consistent. Therefore, after confirming the consistency, the user provides feedback to the user terminal, and the security control backend service in the user terminal can receive the authorization verification result (i.e., the user's feedback result). Furthermore, when the authorization verification result is confirmed to be successful (i.e., the software authorization codes from the two channels are consistent), the security control backend service first encrypts its generated service public key using the software public key to obtain the encrypted service public key. Simultaneously, it extracts the original encrypted file data of the encrypted file to be processed (all files in the system storage are encrypted in advance by the security control backend service) from the system storage and sends the original encrypted file data and the encrypted service public key to the peripheral auxiliary software. In this way, the peripheral auxiliary software can first decrypt the encrypted service public key using its software private key to obtain the service public key, and then decrypt the original encrypted file data to obtain the decrypted file data for use and processing. Therefore, in this embodiment, the use and processing of file data only involves processing the file data within the file, rather than directly altering the original file in the system storage.

[0046] In this embodiment, in addition to verifying the identity of the peripheral auxiliary software, after issuing the software authorization code, it also checks whether the software authorization codes displayed by two channels determined by the user are consistent. This implements a dual verification mechanism, first verifying the identity of the peripheral auxiliary software and then verifying its authorization, improving the overall credibility of the verification of the peripheral auxiliary software and effectively preventing the peripheral auxiliary software from bypassing single verification through abnormal means and thus causing file leakage. Simultaneously, since the peripheral auxiliary software obtains encrypted file data through a security control backend service, it not only ensures that the peripheral auxiliary software cannot directly access files in the system storage after passing verification, achieving fine-grained control over the file access permissions of the peripheral auxiliary software, but also ensures that it cannot directly obtain the original file, but only obtains the file data corresponding to the original file, preventing abnormal processing of the original file by the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0047] S104. Receive the encrypted usage file data encrypted with the service public key after being used by the peripheral auxiliary software, decrypt, verify the integrity of the encrypted usage file data in sequence, and encrypt it again to obtain the target encrypted file, and then send the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

[0048] The encrypted file data refers to the data obtained after the external auxiliary software uses the original file data. Integrity verification is used to ensure that the data stream, after being read, parsed, and forwarded by the external auxiliary software, has not been lost, tampered with, or corrupted, guaranteeing that the data provided to the security control backend service is consistent with, usable, and undamaged compared to the original file data. The target encrypted file is the file that has been processed by the external auxiliary software and is encrypted.

[0049] Specifically, after the external auxiliary software processes the original file data to obtain the usage file data, it can be encrypted using the service public key to obtain encrypted usage file data, which is then returned to the security control backend service. The security control backend service can decrypt and verify the integrity of the encrypted usage file data. After the integrity verification passes, it is encrypted again to obtain the target encrypted file. In this way, the security control backend service can then send the target encrypted file back to system storage in the same storage area as the original encrypted file.

[0050] In this embodiment, the peripheral auxiliary software can only obtain file data and cannot directly obtain the original file itself. The entire process is handled by a security control background service that retrieves file data from system storage and provides it to the peripheral auxiliary software. This prevents the peripheral auxiliary software from directly leaking the file by controlling permissions or decrypting the file. Furthermore, when the peripheral auxiliary software returns the processed file data, the integrity of the processed file data is verified and it is re-encrypted and stored in the storage location corresponding to the original file. This improves the confidentiality and security of the original file itself and also enables the processing of file data by the peripheral auxiliary software, thus enhancing the user experience.

[0051] The file security method provided in this invention determines the identity verification result of the peripheral auxiliary software based on its software identifier and the original compression verification identifier. Only after successful identity verification is a software authorization code generated and sent to the peripheral auxiliary software. This solves the risk of file leakage caused by prematurely issuing authorization codes to the peripheral auxiliary software, allowing it to access different files at any time. It also eliminates the risk of file leakage during subsequent file processing caused by the peripheral auxiliary software using permanent or copied permanent authorization codes, or by circumventing identity verification through forged software identifiers. After issuing the software authorization code, the method checks whether the software authorization codes displayed by two channels determined by the user are consistent. This implements a dual verification mechanism, verifying the identity of the peripheral auxiliary software first and then the authorization, improving the overall reliability of the verification of the peripheral auxiliary software and effectively preventing the peripheral auxiliary software from bypassing single verification through abnormal means, thus preventing file leakage. Meanwhile, since the peripheral auxiliary software obtains encrypted file data through a secure control backend service, it not only ensures that the peripheral auxiliary software cannot directly access files in the system storage after verification, thus achieving fine-grained control over the file access permissions of the peripheral auxiliary software, but also ensures that it cannot directly obtain the original file, but only obtains the file data corresponding to the original file. This prevents the peripheral auxiliary software from performing abnormal processing on the original file, and blocks the problem that the peripheral auxiliary software can directly leak the file after decrypting it through permission control. This improves the confidentiality and security of the original file itself, and also enables the processing of file data by the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0052] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating another method for secure file use provided by an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment elaborates on the steps and optional steps of determining the authentication result, sending the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, and obtaining the target encrypted file, based on the above embodiments. In this embodiment, the method may further include: S201, Receive access verification request from peripheral auxiliary software.

[0053] Specifically, after preparing the encrypted software signature, the peripheral auxiliary software can send an access verification request carrying the encrypted software signature to the security control backend service.

[0054] S202. Use the software public key to decrypt the software signature ciphertext to obtain the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier.

[0055] Specifically, upon receiving an access verification request, the security control backend service can use the software public key to decrypt the software signature ciphertext, obtaining the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier.

[0056] S203. Use the compression verification method set by the peripheral auxiliary software to perform compression verification processing on the software identifier to obtain the actual compression verification identifier.

[0057] In this embodiment, the compression verification method can be hash digest calculation, weighted cumulative checksum, or cyclic redundancy check, etc. The actual compression verification identifier is obtained by the security control backend service processing the software identifier using the same compression verification method as the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0058] Specifically, the security control backend service can directly use the same compression and verification method as the peripheral auxiliary software to perform the same compression and verification operation on the software identifier to obtain the actual compressed verification identifier. For example, if the peripheral auxiliary software uses the hash calculation method to process the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier obtained is the original hash value of the software identifier, then the security control backend service can also use the hash calculation method to process the software identifier to obtain the actual hash value of the software identifier, which is the actual compressed verification identifier.

[0059] S204. Determine the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software based on the original compression verification identifier and the actual compression verification identifier.

[0060] Specifically, the security control backend service can compare the original compression verification identifier with the actual compression verification identifier to determine the authentication result of the external auxiliary software; that is, if the two match, the authentication result is successful, and if the two do not match, the authentication result is unsuccessful.

[0061] In this embodiment, the peripheral auxiliary software performs its own compression and verification operation on its software identifier to obtain the original compressed verification identifier. After obtaining the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the peripheral auxiliary software, the security control backend service compresses the software identifier using the same compression and verification method to obtain the actual compressed verification identifier. Then, the identity verification result is determined based on the consistency of the two. This not only ensures the trustworthiness of the communication between the peripheral auxiliary software and the security control backend service, but also prevents abnormal systems from forging compressed verification identifiers to evade the software identity verification mechanism.

[0062] S205. When the authentication result is successful, push the software authorization code to the system notification and send the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the external auxiliary software so that the external auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0063] Specifically, upon confirming successful identity verification, the security control backend service generates a software authorization code, such as a randomly generated 6- or 8-digit verification code, encrypts it using the software's public key, and sends it to the external auxiliary software. The external auxiliary software receives and decrypts the code, obtaining the software authorization code, and displays it to the user on the software display platform. Simultaneously, the security control backend service pushes the software authorization code to a system notification. Optionally, to ensure consistency, the security control backend service can simultaneously display the software authorization code to the user upon receiving notification that it has been decrypted and obtained, along with the external auxiliary software; that is, when the system notification displays the software authorization code to the user, the external auxiliary software also displays the software authorization code to the user.

[0064] Optionally, if the authentication result is unsuccessful, the security control backend service can directly reject the access request of the external auxiliary software and display the authentication result to the user.

[0065] S206. Receive the authorization verification result, and when the authorization verification result is successful, encrypt the service public key using the software public key to obtain the encrypted service public key.

[0066] In this embodiment, the asymmetric encryption key pair (service public key and service private key) generated by the security control backend service can be generated using RSA-2048 (2048-bit RSA asymmetric encryption algorithm) or ECC P-256 (elliptic curve cryptography algorithm based on P-256 elliptic curve).

[0067] Specifically, the user determines the authorization verification result based on the software license codes displayed through the two channels; that is, if the software license codes displayed through the two channels match, the authorization verification result is successful; if the software license codes displayed through the two channels do not match, the authorization verification result is unsuccessful. Optionally, during the user's confirmation process, the security control backend service can display a confirmation pop-up window for the authorization verification result, allowing the user to select either "Authorization verification result successful" or "Authorization verification result unsuccessful." Therefore, after the user selects an option, the security control backend service receives the authorization verification result. Furthermore, when the authorization verification result is successful, the security control backend service can encrypt the service public key using the software public key to obtain the encrypted service public key.

[0068] S207. Based on the file retrieval request from the peripheral auxiliary software, retrieve the original encrypted file data from the system storage after encrypting the file data of the original file using the service private key.

[0069] The file retrieval request represents the file retrieval request that the peripheral auxiliary software needs to obtain. In other words, it refers to the file that the user needs to process using the peripheral auxiliary software and initiates the retrieval request on the software. In this embodiment, the original file is a confidential document such as a financial statement or statistical report; the file data of the original file is the file data corresponding to these documents.

[0070] Specifically, upon receiving a file retrieval request from the external auxiliary software, the system can retrieve the already encrypted original encrypted file data from the system storage based on the file retrieval request.

[0071] Optionally, in this embodiment, the security control backend service can encrypt all original files in the system storage at the beginning, and also encrypt the file data of the original files to obtain the original encrypted file data.

[0072] In this embodiment, the original encrypted file is obtained from the system storage. After decryption, the original file is extracted in the form of a data stream, and the data stream is encrypted before being transmitted to the external auxiliary software. This eliminates the possibility of directly sending the original file to the external auxiliary software and achieves further encryption protection for the file.

[0073] S208. Send the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key using the software private key, obtain the service public key, and use the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data for use.

[0074] In this embodiment, the method by which the peripheral auxiliary software generates asymmetric key pairs (software private key and software public key) is the same as the optional method for generating asymmetric key pairs by the security control backend service described above.

[0075] Specifically, after obtaining the original encrypted file data, the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key can be sent to the external auxiliary software. In this way, the external auxiliary software can first use its private key to decrypt the service public key, and then use the decrypted service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data for use.

[0076] Optionally, the security control backend service can first send the encryption service public key to the peripheral auxiliary software, and then send the original encrypted file data to the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0077] In this embodiment, encrypting the service public key using the software public key of the peripheral auxiliary software ensures that the service public key is not leaked to other third parties due to abnormal acquisition during the transmission of the encrypted service public key to the peripheral auxiliary software. This also guarantees that even if a third party obtains the original encrypted file data abnormally, they cannot decrypt it. Furthermore, using a dual key pair enhances the confidentiality of the file throughout the entire file processing process.

[0078] S209. Receive encrypted usage file data that has been encrypted using the service public key after being used by peripheral auxiliary software.

[0079] Specifically, after decrypting the original file data, the peripheral auxiliary software can use it for functional processing, such as auditing data in financial statements or compiling statistics from multiple reports. After use or processing, it obtains the usable file data, such as audit data and statistical data. Then, the peripheral auxiliary software uses the service public key to encrypt the usable file data and sends the encrypted usable file data to the security control backend service.

[0080] S210. Use the service private key to decrypt the encrypted file data to obtain the target file data.

[0081] Specifically, the security control backend service can use the service private key to decrypt encrypted file data to obtain the target file data.

[0082] S211. Perform integrity verification on the target file data, and after the integrity verification of the target file data passes, use the service private key to encrypt the target file data and the target file corresponding to the target file data to obtain the target encrypted file.

[0083] In this embodiment, the algorithms used to encrypt the original file and the target file are recommended to be either the RSA-OAEP padding encryption algorithm (an RSA encryption algorithm with optimal asymmetric padding) or ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme).

[0084] Specifically, the security control backend service can perform integrity verification on the target file data to determine whether the target file data is complete. Then, after confirming that the integrity verification is successful, it can use the service private key to re-encrypt the target file data and the target file to obtain the target encrypted file.

[0085] In this embodiment, the security control background service performs integrity verification on the file data obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software to ensure the integrity of the file data returned by it. Then, it uses the service private key to encrypt the file data and the corresponding file again, which can ensure the confidentiality and security of the file before it is sent back to the system storage.

[0086] S212. Transfer the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

[0087] Specifically, the security control backend service can send the encrypted target file back to the system storage.

[0088] Optionally, the whitelist system for peripheral auxiliary software in this embodiment includes: whitelist admission criteria (the software source code has been security-checked and contains no illegal code, it promises to be used only in memory for decryption, not to transmit the complete file externally, and to be cleaned up immediately after information processing); whitelist review process (the developer submits a source code security audit report, the security control backend service operator reviews the code, and the software is added to the whitelist after the review is passed); and whitelist verification (when requesting access, it is verified whether the software is in the whitelist, and the verification method includes the dual verification mentioned above).

[0089] In this embodiment, because the original file is encrypted using the service's private key, it cannot be decrypted even if abnormally obtained. Plaintext is never stored and is only used in memory, thus significantly improving file security. Since access control is precise down to specific peripheral auxiliary software, and the whitelist system ensures that only trusted software can access it, application-level fine-grained control is achieved. The use of a dual-channel authorization confirmation mechanism prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and interface hijacking, thus preventing hijacking during the authorization process. Because the security control backend service does not rely on the network and is not processed in the cloud, there is no risk of cloud data leakage, making it fully usable in offline scenarios. Since the security control backend service can act as an intermediary bridge directly connecting to file requests from all peripheral auxiliary software, it can record all authorization requests and file access behaviors, supporting subsequent security auditing.

[0090] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating another method for secure file usage provided by an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment primarily focuses on peripheral auxiliary software deployed on a user terminal. In this embodiment, the peripheral auxiliary software can be an application that cannot fully grant system target permissions, capable of reading, analyzing, and summarizing data within the file. Specifically, this embodiment includes: S301. After encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key, the software signature ciphertext is obtained, and an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext is sent to the security control background service in the user terminal.

[0091] Specifically, when the peripheral auxiliary software receives a user's instruction to process a file, it can first compress its own software identifier using the set compression and verification method to obtain the original compressed verification identifier; then, it encrypts the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier together using the software private key to obtain the software signature ciphertext, and sends an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext to the security control background service in the user terminal.

[0092] Optionally, to further ensure confidentiality and security during file processing, for personal intelligent assistant applications used by users daily, such as open-source AI agents, users can install and run an internal software module—the secure access plugin. Therefore, the secure access plugin can handle the generation of its own asymmetric key pair, sending access verification requests to the security control backend service, receiving raw encrypted file data from the security control backend service, and decrypting it.

[0093] Furthermore, in this embodiment, for the secure access plugin in a user's daily personal intelligent assistant application, an asymmetric key pair (plugin private key and plugin public key, corresponding to the aforementioned software private key and software public key, used only as a plugin key pair when targeting peripheral auxiliary software of the personal intelligent assistant application) is generated using a 2048-bit RSA asymmetric cryptography algorithm or a P-256 prime field elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. After generating the asymmetric key pair, the plugin private key can be stored in the operating system's keystore and not exposed to the main program of the personal intelligent assistant application or any external program. The public key can register the secure access plugin's plugin identity with the security control background service initially. The secure access plugin internally maintains a key manager responsible for the secure storage, loading, and destruction of keys. The key manager adopts the operating system's secure storage mechanism to ensure that keys cannot be read or exported by other processes.

[0094] For example, when a secure access plugin is included in peripheral auxiliary software (i.e., the peripheral auxiliary software is a personal intelligent assistant application), if the peripheral auxiliary software receives a user's file access instruction, the secure access plugin will first check whether the target file has been encrypted and managed by the security control background service. If so, the secure access plugin will encrypt the software identifier (i.e., the application identifier of the personal intelligent assistant application) and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the plugin's private key, construct an authentication request (i.e., an access verification request), and send it to the security control background service through the local inter-process communication interface.

[0095] S302. When the security control backend service confirms that the identity verification result is successful, it receives the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key, and decrypts the encrypted software authorization code with the software private key to obtain and display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0096] Specifically, after the security control backend service confirms the authentication result, the peripheral auxiliary software can receive the authentication result. Then, when the authentication result is successful, it can receive the software authorization code encrypted using the software public key by the security control backend service. At this point, the peripheral auxiliary software can use its software private key to decrypt the encrypted software authorization code, obtain the decrypted software authorization code, and display it to the user through the software window.

[0097] For example, continuing the above example, for peripheral auxiliary software including a secure access plugin, after the security control backend service receives an access verification request, it uses the plugin's public key to verify the authenticity of the signature and compares the hash value to confirm the authentication result. If the authentication result is successful, the security control backend service generates a software authorization code, encrypts it using the plugin's public key, and returns it to the secure access plugin. Upon receiving the encrypted software authorization code, the secure access plugin decrypts it using its private key to obtain and display the software authorization code.

[0098] Optionally, in this embodiment, since the software license code is displayed to the user through two channels, the example above shows the license verification result selected by the user in the system notification. However, in practice, the secure access plugin can also pop up an license confirmation dialog box to display the software license code to the user and prompt the user to compare it with the software license code displayed in the system notification. After the user confirms that the two software license codes match, they manually click the "Confirm License" button, and only then can the secure access plugin continue with subsequent file acquisition operations.

[0099] S303. Receive the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service when the authorization verification result is passed. After decrypting the encryption service public key, use the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data and use it.

[0100] Specifically, the personal intelligent assistant application proposed in this embodiment can use or process file data by performing operations such as reading, analyzing, and summarizing files.

[0101] Specifically, after the user selects the authorization verification result, the security control backend service and the peripheral auxiliary software simultaneously determine the authorization verification result. When the authorization verification result is successful, the peripheral auxiliary software receives the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service. At this point, the peripheral auxiliary software can first use its software private key to decrypt the encryption service public key to obtain the service public key, and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data.

[0102] For example, after decrypting the encryption service public key, the original encrypted file is decrypted and used using the service public key, including: (a) Use the software private key to decrypt the encryption service public key to obtain the service public key.

[0103] Specifically, the software private key can be used to decrypt the encryption service public key to obtain the service public key.

[0104] (ii) Use the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data in memory to obtain the target original file data.

[0105] Specifically, the decrypted service public key can be used to decrypt the original encrypted file data only in memory to obtain the target original file data.

[0106] (iii) Process the target original file data in memory to obtain the target used file data, and clean up the memory data after processing.

[0107] Specifically, the system processes only the original target file data in memory to obtain the target usable file data, and then cleans up the memory data after processing. The target usable file data can be summary file data resulting from reading, analyzing, and summarizing the original target file data.

[0108] For example, continuing the above example, for peripheral auxiliary software including a secure access plugin, when the authorization verification result is successful, the secure access plugin can request the security control background service to send the original encrypted file data through the inter-process communication interface. After the secure access plugin receives the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key sent by the security control background service, it can use its private key to decrypt the encryption service public key, and then use the decrypted service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data to obtain the original file. The entire decryption process is completed in the system's memory space; the decrypted plaintext file data exists only in memory and is not written to disk or any persistent storage.

[0109] Further, the specific process in practice for this embodiment is as follows: The secure access plugin allocates a protected area in memory (e.g., using a memory locking system call mechanism to lock memory pages to prevent them from being swapped out to disk by the operating system). Within this area, it performs the decryption operation on the original encrypted file (which can actually be obtained from system storage by the security control background service and provided to the secure access plugin; however, if it's not an external auxiliary software containing the secure access plugin, the file data needs to be provided directly). The secure access plugin provides the decrypted file content to the corresponding processing module of the external auxiliary software as a memory data stream. The processing module of the external auxiliary software reads the file content from the memory data stream for analysis and processing, but cannot persist this memory data stream to disk. After the processing module of the external auxiliary software finishes reading the file content, the secure access plugin immediately overwrites and clears the plaintext data in memory (using zero or random data), and then releases the memory. Throughout the entire process, the plaintext content of the file never leaves the system memory, ensuring file security.

[0110] S304. Use the service public key to encrypt the target file data to obtain encrypted file data, and send the encrypted file data to the security control backend service.

[0111] Specifically, after the peripheral auxiliary software finishes processing the file data, it can use the service public key to encrypt the target file data, obtain encrypted file data, and send the encrypted file data to the security control backend service.

[0112] For example, following the above example, for peripheral auxiliary software including a secure access plugin, the secure access plugin can use the service public key to encrypt the target file data and the decrypted file content, obtain encrypted file data, and send it back to the security control backend service through the inter-process communication interface.

[0113] Optionally, to further enhance the monitoring of transmissions by peripheral auxiliary software, a transmission audit module (limited to the security access plugin in personal intelligent assistant applications used daily by users) can be embedded in the security access plugin. Therefore, the transmission audit module can scan and audit the transmission content of any outbound communication request initiated by the peripheral auxiliary software in real time; if it detects data containing complete file content or violating transmission policies, it will automatically intercept the request and alert the user. For example, the transmission audit module embedded in the security access plugin monitors all network communications originating from the peripheral auxiliary software in real time. Specifically, the security access plugin registers an interceptor at the network communication layer of the peripheral auxiliary software, ensuring that all outbound requests are checked by the transmission audit module before reaching the network layer. The transmission audit module employs a multi-layered detection strategy: First, it checks the data volume threshold. If the data volume of a single communication exceeds a preset threshold (e.g., more than 10 kilobytes), deep content analysis is triggered. Second, it uses content fingerprint matching to compare the communication data with the hash fingerprints of recently decrypted file content. If the matching degree exceeds the threshold, it is determined that the file content has been transmitted. Finally, it uses semantic analysis and a lightweight text classification model to determine whether the communication content contains specific information from the original file (e.g., large quotations of the original text, complete data tables, etc.). For processing results that are allowed to be sent out (e.g., file summaries, analysis conclusions, recommendations), the transmission audit module marks them as "audited and approved" and allows them to proceed. For communications containing original file content or violating the policy, the transmission audit module automatically intercepts the request, records the violation log, and sends an alert notification to the user. The user can choose to manually approve the transmission, modify the content and resend it, or cancel the transmission. In addition, the secure access plugin also supports custom transmission policies. Users can configure which content types are allowed to be sent out (e.g., text summaries, chart descriptions), which are prohibited from being sent out (e.g., original files, binary data, personally identifiable information), and which require manual user confirmation.

[0114] Optionally, the secure access plugin maintains a detailed audit log, recording all operations related to secure file access. The log includes: the time of the file access request, the target file identifier, the requesting application and software identifier, the authorization verification result, the time and duration of file decryption, the type and result summary of the AI ​​processing, the audit result of outbound communication (passed or blocked), and the detailed reason for blocking. The audit log is digitally signed using the plugin's private key and stored in a local encrypted database to prevent tampering. Users can view the audit log at any time to understand all file access and processing behaviors of the AI ​​assistant.

[0115] Optionally, the secure access plugin can be integrated into peripheral auxiliary software via a plugin mechanism, such as being distributed as a standalone package (e.g., a manager package, a wheel-style package, or the native plugin format of the peripheral auxiliary software). Users can install it through the plugin management interface or command-line tool of the peripheral auxiliary software. After the secure access plugin is installed, the peripheral auxiliary software will automatically load the secure access plugin upon startup.

[0116] In this embodiment, by installing a secure access plugin in the user's peripheral auxiliary software, it is possible to ensure that the core functions of the peripheral auxiliary software are not affected and the user experience remains unchanged, while ensuring that all sensitive file operations are under the secure control of the plugin.

[0117] In summary, this embodiment utilizes a secure access plugin to implement an independent security control layer for local files by the peripheral auxiliary software. Through the encrypted storage mechanism of the secure control background service, the plaintext of sensitive files is not exposed to the peripheral auxiliary software; the software must obtain authorization and verification from the secure access plugin to access the file content. This security control layer, independent of operating system permissions, provides users with more granular file access control capabilities. The secure access plugin's security mechanism seamlessly integrates security functions such as key management, file decryption, and transmission auditing into the workflow of the peripheral auxiliary software. Users only need to install the secure access plugin; no modification to the peripheral auxiliary software's source code or complex configuration is required to obtain comprehensive file security protection. Memory-level file processing ensures the security of file content. Files are only decrypted and used in memory, not written to disk, and are immediately cleaned up after use. Even if the peripheral auxiliary software itself has security vulnerabilities or is maliciously exploited, attackers cannot recover the plaintext content of the file from the disk. The transmission auditing mechanism effectively prevents external leakage of file content. Through a multi-layered detection strategy of data volume detection, content fingerprint matching, and semantic analysis, the secure access plugin can accurately identify and intercept communication requests containing the original file content, ensuring that only the content digest of the processing result is allowed to be sent externally. Complete audit logs support the traceability of security incidents. All file access, decryption, processing, and outgoing operations are recorded in detail, allowing users to understand all file operations performed by the external auxiliary software at any time. This solution has broad applicability. Although using external auxiliary software as a specific implementation example, the plug-in design allows this solution to be adapted to any external auxiliary software that supports plug-in mechanisms, providing excellent scalability.

[0118] Figure 4 This invention provides a structural diagram of a file security usage device according to an embodiment of the invention; the device is suitable for security control background services in user terminals; such as... Figure 4 As shown, the device includes: The authentication module 401 is used to receive the access authentication request from the peripheral auxiliary software, and use the software signature ciphertext and the software public key in the access authentication request to determine the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key.

[0119] The generation module 402 is used to push the software authorization code to the system notification when the authentication result is successful, and send the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the peripheral auxiliary software so that the peripheral auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code.

[0120] The authorization verification module 403 is used to receive the authorization verification result and, when the authorization verification result is successful, send the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software.

[0121] Storage module 404 is used to receive encrypted usage file data encrypted with the service public key after being used by peripheral auxiliary software, decrypt, verify integrity and encrypt the encrypted usage file data in sequence to obtain the target encrypted file, and then send the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

[0122] Based on the above embodiments, the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software is determined by using the software signature ciphertext and the software public key in the access verification request. The authentication module 401 is specifically used for: The software signature ciphertext is decrypted using the software public key to obtain the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier; the software identifier is compressed and verified using the compression and verification method set by the peripheral auxiliary software to obtain the actual compressed verification identifier; the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software is determined based on the original compressed verification identifier and the actual compressed verification identifier.

[0123] Based on the above embodiments, before sending the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, the authorization verification module 403 is further configured to: The service public key is encrypted using the software public key to obtain the encrypted service public key; based on the file retrieval request from the peripheral auxiliary software, the original encrypted file data, which is encrypted using the service private key, is retrieved from the system storage.

[0124] Based on the above embodiments, the authorization verification module 403 is specifically used for: Send the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can use the software private key to decrypt the encryption service public key, obtain the service public key, and use the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data for use.

[0125] Based on the above embodiments, the encrypted file is decrypted, its integrity is verified, and then encrypted again in sequence to obtain the target encrypted file. The storage module 404 is specifically used for: The encrypted file data is decrypted using the service private key to obtain the target file data. The integrity of the target file data is verified, and after the integrity verification of the target file data is passed, the target file data and the target file corresponding to the target file data are encrypted using the service private key to obtain the target encrypted file.

[0126] Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of another file security usage device provided in an embodiment of the present invention; the device is suitable for peripheral auxiliary software deployed in a user terminal; such as... Figure 5 As shown, the device includes: The software signature module 501 is used to encrypt the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key to obtain the software signature ciphertext, and send an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext to the security control background service in the user terminal. The display module 502 is used to receive the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key when the security control backend service determines that the identity verification result is successful, and to decrypt the encrypted software authorization code with the software private key to obtain and display the decrypted software authorization code. Module 503 is used to receive the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service when the authorization verification result is passed. After decrypting the encryption service public key, the original encrypted file data is decrypted and used. The sending module 504 is used to encrypt the target file data using the service public key, obtain the encrypted file data, and send the encrypted file data to the security control backend service.

[0127] Based on the above embodiments, after decrypting the encryption service public key, the original encrypted file is decrypted and used using the service public key. Module 503 is specifically used for: The software private key is used to decrypt the encryption service public key to obtain the service public key; the service public key is used to decrypt the original encrypted file data in memory to obtain the target original file data; the target original file data is processed in memory to obtain the target file data, and the memory data is cleaned up after processing is completed.

[0128] The file security usage device provided in this embodiment of the invention can execute the file security usage method provided in this embodiment of the invention, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of executing the method.

[0129] It is worth noting that in the embodiments of the document security usage device described above, the various units and modules included are only divided according to functional logic, but are not limited to the above division, as long as the corresponding functions can be achieved; in addition, the specific names of each functional unit are only for easy differentiation and are not used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0130] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a user terminal provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 6 A block diagram is shown of an exemplary user terminal 11 suitable for implementing embodiments of the present invention. Figure 6 The user terminal 11 shown is merely an example and should not impose any limitations on the functionality and scope of use of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0131] like Figure 6 As shown, user terminal 11 is presented in the form of a general-purpose computing user terminal. The components of user terminal 11 may include, but are not limited to: one or more processors or processing units 16, system memory 28, and bus 18 connecting different system components (including system memory 28 and processing unit 16).

[0132] Bus 18 represents one or more of several bus architectures, including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, a graphics acceleration port, a processor, or a local bus using any of the various bus architectures. For example, these architectures include, but are not limited to, the Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, the Micro Channel Architecture (MAC) bus, the Enhanced ISA bus, the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and the Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus.

[0133] User terminal 11 typically includes a variety of computer system readable media. These media can be any available media that can be accessed by user terminal 11, including volatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media.

[0134] System memory 28 may include computer system readable media in the form of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 30 and / or cache memory 32. User terminal 11 may further include other removable / non-removable, volatile / non-volatile computer system storage media. By way of example only, storage system 34 may be used to read and write non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media (… Figure 6 Not shown; usually referred to as a "hard drive"). Although Figure 6As not shown, disk drives for reading and writing to removable non-volatile disks (e.g., "floppy disks") and optical disc drives for reading and writing to removable non-volatile optical discs (e.g., CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs, or other optical media) may be provided. In these cases, each drive may be connected to bus 18 via one or more data media interfaces. System memory 28 may include at least one program product having a set (e.g., at least one) of program modules configured to perform the functions of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0135] A program / utility 40 having a set (at least one) of program modules 42 may be stored, for example, in system memory 28. Such program modules 42 include, but are not limited to, an operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data. Each or some combination of these examples may include an implementation of a network environment. Program modules 42 typically perform the functions and / or methods described in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0136] User terminal 11 can also communicate with one or more external devices 14 (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, display 24, etc.), and with one or more devices that enable the user to interact with the user terminal 11, and / or with any device that enables the user terminal 11 to communicate with one or more other computing devices (e.g., network card, modem, etc.). This communication can be performed through input / output (I / O) interface 22. Furthermore, user terminal 11 can also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), and / or public networks, such as the Internet) through network adapter 20. Figure 6 As shown, network adapter 20 communicates with other modules of user terminal 11 via bus 18. It should be understood that, although... Figure 6 As not shown, other hardware and / or software modules can be used in conjunction with user terminal 11, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives, and data backup storage systems.

[0137] The processing unit 16 executes various functional applications and page displays by running programs stored in the system memory 28, such as implementing the file security usage method provided in this embodiment. Of course, those skilled in the art will understand that the processor can also implement the technical solutions of the file security usage method provided in any embodiment of this invention.

[0138] This invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements, for example, the file security usage method provided in this invention.

[0139] The computer storage medium of this invention can be any combination of one or more computer-readable media. A computer-readable medium can be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium. A computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. In this document, a computer-readable storage medium can be any tangible medium that contains or stores a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0140] Computer-readable signal media may include data signals propagated in baseband or as part of a carrier wave, carrying computer-readable program code. Such propagated data signals may take various forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination thereof. Computer-readable signal media may also be any computer-readable medium other than computer-readable storage media, capable of sending, propagating, or transmitting programs for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0141] Program code contained on a computer-readable medium may be transmitted using any suitable medium, including but not limited to: wireless, wire, optical fiber, RF, etc., or any suitable combination thereof.

[0142] This invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the file security usage method provided in any embodiment of this invention.

[0143] Computer program code for performing the operations of this invention can be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof. Programming languages ​​include object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, and C++, as well as conventional procedural programming languages—such as the "C" language or similar programming languages. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In cases involving remote computers, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or it can be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0144] Those skilled in the art will understand that the modules or steps of the present invention described above can be implemented using general-purpose computing devices. They can be centralized on a single computing device or distributed across a network of multiple computing devices. Optionally, they can be implemented using computer-executable program code, thereby allowing them to be stored in a storage device for execution by a computing device, or they can be fabricated as separate integrated circuit modules, or multiple modules or steps can be fabricated as a single integrated circuit module. Thus, the present invention is not limited to any particular combination of hardware and software.

[0145] Furthermore, the acquisition, storage, use, and processing of data in the technical solution of this invention all comply with the relevant provisions of national laws and regulations.

[0146] Note that the above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and the technical principles employed. Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described herein, and various obvious changes, readjustments, and substitutions can be made without departing from the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, although the present invention has been described in detail through the above embodiments, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and may include many other equivalent embodiments without departing from the concept of the present invention, the scope of which is determined by the scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for secure use of files, characterized in that, The method is applicable to a security control backend service in a user terminal, and the method includes: The system receives an access verification request from peripheral auxiliary software and uses the software signature ciphertext and software public key in the access verification request to determine the identity verification result of the peripheral auxiliary software. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key. When the authentication result is successful, the software authorization code is pushed to the system notification, and the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key is sent to the peripheral auxiliary software so that the peripheral auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code; The system receives the authorization verification result and, when the authorization verification result is successful, sends the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software. This enables the peripheral auxiliary software to decrypt the encryption service public key and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software. The system receives encrypted usage file data encrypted using the service public key after the peripheral auxiliary software has used it, and sequentially decrypts, verifies the integrity of, and encrypts the encrypted usage file data to obtain the target encrypted file, and then sends the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software using the software signature ciphertext and the software public key in the access verification request includes: The software signature ciphertext is decrypted using the software public key to obtain the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier; The software identifier is compressed and verified using the compression and verification method set by the peripheral auxiliary software to obtain the actual compressed and verified identifier. The authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software is determined based on the original compression verification identifier and the actual compression verification identifier.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before sending the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, the process also includes: The service public key is encrypted using the software public key to obtain the encrypted service public key; Based on the file retrieval request from the peripheral auxiliary software, the original encrypted file data, which has been encrypted using the service private key, is retrieved from the system storage.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Sending the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key obtained from system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data, including: The original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key are sent to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key using the software private key to obtain the service public key, and use the service public key to decrypt the original encrypted file data for use.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process of sequentially decrypting, verifying integrity, and encrypting the encrypted file to obtain the target encrypted file includes: The encrypted file data is decrypted using the service private key to obtain the target file data. The integrity of the target file data is verified, and after the integrity verification of the target file data is passed, the target file data and the target file corresponding to the target file data are encrypted using the service private key to obtain the target encrypted file.

6. A method for secure use of files, characterized in that, The method is applicable to peripheral auxiliary software deployed in a user terminal, and the method includes: After encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key, the software signature ciphertext is obtained, and an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext is sent to the security control background service in the user terminal. When the security control backend service confirms that the identity verification result is successful, it receives a software authorization code encrypted with the software public key, and decrypts the encrypted software authorization code with the software private key to obtain and display the decrypted software authorization code. The system receives the original encrypted file data and encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service when the authorization verification result is passed. After decrypting the encryption service public key, the system uses the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The target file data is encrypted using the service public key to obtain encrypted file data, and then the encrypted file data is sent to the security control backend service.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of decrypting the encryption service public key and then using the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file includes: The software private key is used to decrypt the encryption service public key to obtain the service public key; The original encrypted file data is decrypted in memory using the service public key to obtain the target original file data; The target original file data is processed in memory to obtain the target used file data, and the memory data is cleaned up after processing is completed.

8. A document security device, characterized in that, The device is suitable for a security control backend service in a user terminal, and the device includes: An authentication module is used to receive an access authentication request from peripheral auxiliary software and use the software signature ciphertext and software public key in the access authentication request to determine the authentication result of the peripheral auxiliary software. The software signature ciphertext is obtained by the peripheral auxiliary software encrypting the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key. The generation module is used to push the software authorization code to the system notification when the authentication result is successful, and send the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key to the peripheral auxiliary software so that the peripheral auxiliary software can display the decrypted software authorization code; The authorization verification module is used to receive the authorization verification result and, when the authorization verification result is successful, send the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key obtained from the system storage to the peripheral auxiliary software, so that the peripheral auxiliary software can decrypt the encryption service public key and then use the service public key to decrypt and use the original encrypted file data. The authorization verification result is determined by the user comparing the software authorization code in the system notification with the software authorization code displayed by the peripheral auxiliary software. The storage module is used to receive encrypted usage file data encrypted with the service public key after the peripheral auxiliary software has used it, decrypt, verify the integrity of the encrypted usage file data and encrypt it in sequence to obtain the target encrypted file, and then send the target encrypted file back to the system storage.

9. A document security device, characterized in that, The device is suitable for peripheral auxiliary software deployed in a user terminal, and the device includes: The software signature module is used to encrypt the software identifier and the original compressed verification identifier of the software identifier using the software private key to obtain the software signature ciphertext, and then send an access verification request carrying the software signature ciphertext to the security control background service in the user terminal. The display module is used to receive the software authorization code encrypted with the software public key when the security control backend service determines that the identity verification result is successful, and to decrypt the encrypted software authorization code with the software private key to obtain and display the decrypted software authorization code. The module is used to receive the original encrypted file data and the encryption service public key sent by the security control backend service when the authorization verification result is passed, and to decrypt the original encrypted file data using the service public key after decrypting the encryption service public key; The sending module is used to encrypt the target file data using the service public key to obtain encrypted file data, and then send the encrypted file data to the security control backend service.

10. A user terminal, characterized in that, include: One or more processors; Memory, used to store one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the file security usage method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, or implement the file security usage method as described in any one of claims 6 to 7.

11. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the file security usage method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, or the file security usage method as described in claim 6 or 7.

12. A computer program product, characterized in that, It includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the file security usage method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, or implements the file security usage method as described in claim 6 or 7.