An anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method and system for multi-node Internet of Things

By collaborating between the key generation center and edge nodes, and combining chameleon hash mapping and Merkle tree commitment structure, efficient search and verifiability of anonymous certificateless search encryption in multi-node IoT are achieved. This solves the problems of high computational overhead and unverifiable search results in existing technologies, and is applicable to industrial IoT, edge computing, and cloud storage.

CN123122867APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17BEIJING ELECTRONICS SCI & TECH INST
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611058349.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-07-16
Publication Date
2026-11-17

Smart Images

  • Figure CN123122867A_ABST
    Figure CN123122867A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

This invention discloses an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method and system for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), relating to the field of IoT information security and privacy protection technology. The method includes: introducing a multi-edge node collaboration mechanism to jointly authenticate data user search requests; generating random mapping values ​​related to keywords using a threshold-based unintentional pseudo-random function; constructing a keyword index and search trapdoor using a chameleon hash mapping to achieve efficient searching of encrypted data; protecting the integrity of the multi-node collaboration process through an aggregated signature mechanism; and verifying search results based on a Merkle tree commitment structure and blockchain notarization technology to ensure the verifiability of results returned by the cloud server. This invention achieves multi-node collaborative search, verifiable search results, and low computational overhead encrypted retrieval while ensuring the anonymity of data owners and users.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) information security and privacy protection technology, and in particular to an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method and system for multi-node IoT. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and edge computing technologies, a large number of terminal devices are continuously generating massive amounts of data in application scenarios such as industrial control, intelligent transportation, and energy management. In order to reduce the pressure on local storage and computing, and to achieve centralized management and sharing of data, more and more systems are outsourcing data storage and processing to cloud servers or cloud-edge collaborative platforms.

[0003] However, existing searchable encryption methods directly employ complex bilinear parallel cryptographic operations without introducing multi-node collaboration mechanisms or efficient trapdoor acceleration structures. This may result in high computational overhead for keyword indexing and trapdoor generation, or make it difficult to verify the search results returned by the cloud server, thereby affecting the search efficiency of resource-constrained IoT terminals and the reliability of the system. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The main objective of this invention is to provide an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT).

[0005] Another objective of this invention is to provide an anonymous, certificateless search encryption device for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT).

[0006] The third objective of this invention is to provide an electronic device.

[0007] The fourth objective of this invention is to provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of the present invention proposes an anonymous certificateless search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), comprising:

[0009] S1, the key generation center generates system public parameters and generates a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines their own secret value to generate the complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes. S2, the data owner randomly generates a symmetric key and encrypts the file set, extracts keywords to construct a keyword message, generates a keyword index based on the chameleon hash mapping, uploads the index and encrypted files to the cloud server, constructs the commitment value of the authentication data structure and registers it to the blockchain; S3: The user constructs a keyword message and collaborates with the edge nodes to perform a threshold-based pseudo-random function operation to obtain a random mapping value, generating a search trapdoor core; the edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoor to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit the search request containing the trapdoor core and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server. S4, the cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information, uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index for equal value matching, retrieves the corresponding ciphertext and generates the authentication data structure member proof, and the user verifies it based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypts the ciphertext after passing the verification.

[0010] Optionally, the key generation center generates system public parameters and generates a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines this with their own secret value to generate the complete private key. Simultaneously, it distributes key shares of a threshold-unintentional pseudo-random function to edge nodes, including: The key generation center inputs security parameters, selects an additive cyclic group and generator, randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the system master public key, randomly selects a chameleon hash secret value and calculates the chameleon hash public key, uses a threshold scheme to divide the chameleon hash secret value into a share set and distributes it to multiple edge nodes, generates an unintentional pseudo-random function master key and uses a threshold scheme to divide it into a share set and distribute it to edge nodes, generates a certificate signing key pair, selects a family of secure hash functions, and publishes the system's public parameters. The user randomly selects a salt value locally and uses a secure hash function to calculate the pseudo-identity. The user also randomly selects a secret value locally and calculates the public key component. The user then sends the complete public key containing the pseudo-identity and the public key component to the key generation center. The key generation center calculates the public key hash point based on the public key information submitted by the user, calculates the user's partial private key using the system master key, generates a certificate using the certificate signing private key on the user's key information, and returns the partial private key and certificate to the user through a secure channel. The user sets the secret value, partial private key, and certificate as the complete private key.

[0011] Optionally, the data owner randomly generates a symmetric key and encrypts the file set, extracts keywords to construct a keyword message, generates a keyword index based on a chameleon hash map, uploads the index and encrypted files to a cloud server, constructs a commitment value for the authentication data structure, and registers it on the blockchain, including: The data owner extracts a set of keywords from the plaintext data, binds its own pseudo-identity and time parameters to each keyword to construct a keyword message, defines an unintentional pseudo-random function input and executes the unintentional pseudo-random function protocol with the collaborating nodes, and each collaborating node calculates the local output with its own unintentional pseudo-random function share and returns it. The data owner aggregates and deblinds the output shares of the unintentional pseudo-random function from multiple collaborating nodes to obtain deterministic random mapping values ​​corresponding to keywords. The chameleon hash auxiliary mapping function is used to calculate the keyword index core and construct index entries. A symmetric file key is generated and the file set is encrypted. All index entries are aggregated into a Merkle tree and the root commitment is calculated. The ciphertext package and the index set are uploaded to the cloud server and the commitment is submitted.

[0012] Optionally, the user constructs a keyword message and collaborates with edge nodes to perform a threshold-based pseudo-random function operation to obtain a random mapping value, generating a search trapdoor core. The edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoor to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit the search request containing the trapdoor core and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server, including: Data users obtain an authorization token issued by the data owner and submit authentication materials containing a pseudo-identity and authorization token to the collaborating node. The collaborating node verifies the data user's certificate, session signature, and authorization token. After successful verification, the data user constructs a keyword message in the same form as the index generation stage for the target keyword and calculates a scalar hash. The data user then executes a threshold-inadvertent pseudo-random function protocol with the collaborating node to obtain a deterministic random mapping value consistent with the indexing stage. The search trapdoor core is calculated using a chameleon hash auxiliary mapping function. The aggregate signature protocol is executed with collaborating nodes to generate aggregate authentication information. The complete trapdoor is then signed without a certificate and an anti-replay tag is generated. The final search trapdoor, containing the trapdoor core, aggregate authentication information, certificate-free signature, and anti-replay tag, is output.

[0013] Optionally, execute an aggregate signature protocol with collaborating nodes, including: The public keys of the participating collaborative nodes are aggregated to obtain an aggregated public key. The message to be signed is defined to bind the session information and the trapdoor core. Each collaborative node randomly selects a random number and calculates a random number commitment. After the random number is made public, the data user aggregates the aggregated random number and calculates the challenge value. Each collaborative node calculates a partial signature based on the challenge value, its own private key, and the random number. The data user aggregates the partial signatures of each node to obtain the multi-signature result.

[0014] Optionally, the cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the federated authentication information, performs an equivalence match between the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index, retrieves the corresponding ciphertext, and generates a membership certificate for the authentication data structure. The user verifies the certificate based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and upon successful verification, decrypts the ciphertext, including: The cloud server receives the search traps submitted by the data user, and verifies the validity of the data user certificate, the data user trap signature, the collaborative node aggregate signature, and the authorization token and anti-replay tag in sequence. After the verification is successful, the search trap core is used to match and judge the stored keyword index set. When the index core is equal to the search trapdoor core and the time parameters are consistent, the match is considered successful. The ciphertext data corresponding to the successfully matched index entry is added to the result set. The corresponding Merkle leaf node is recalculated and a membership proof relative to the stored Merkle root is generated. The membership proof set and the on-chain root reference are output. Data users obtain commitments from the blockchain based on the on-chain root reference, recalculate the leaf nodes for each retrieval result and perform Merkle membership proof verification. After successful verification, the file symmetric key is derived and the ciphertext is decrypted.

[0015] To achieve the above objectives, a second aspect of the present invention provides an anonymous, certificateless search encryption device for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), comprising: The initialization module is used by the key generation center to generate system public parameters and generate a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines their own secret value to generate the complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes. The encryption module is used by the data owner to randomly generate a symmetric key and encrypt a set of files, extract keywords to construct keyword messages, generate a keyword index based on the Chameleon hash mapping, upload the index and encrypted files to the cloud server, construct the commitment value of the authentication data structure and register it to the blockchain; The search module is used by users to construct keyword messages, and collaborates with edge nodes to perform threshold-based pseudo-random function calculations to obtain random mapping values, generating search trapdoor cores; edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoors to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit search requests containing trapdoor cores and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server; The verification module is used by the cloud server to verify the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information. It uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index to perform equal-value matching, retrieve the corresponding ciphertext, and generate the authentication data structure member proof. Users verify based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypt the ciphertext after passing the verification.

[0016] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0017] To achieve the above objectives, a third aspect of this application provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory; wherein the processor runs a program corresponding to the executable program code stored in the memory, for implementing the anonymous certificateless search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things as described in the first aspect embodiment.

[0018] To achieve the above objectives, a fourth aspect of this application provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the anonymous certificateless search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things as described in the first aspect embodiment.

[0019] The embodiments of the present invention have the following beneficial effects: This invention achieves efficient searching of encrypted data without relying on bilinear pairing operations; it protects the integrity of the multi-node collaboration process through an aggregated signature mechanism, and verifies the search results based on Merkle tree commitment structure and blockchain notarization technology, thus ensuring the verifiability of the results returned by the cloud server and preventing the search results from being tampered with or omitted; while ensuring the anonymity of the data owner and data user, it realizes multi-node collaborative search, verifiable search results, and encrypted retrieval with low computational overhead, making it suitable for application scenarios such as industrial IoT, edge computing, and cloud storage. Attached Figure Description

[0020] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent and readily understood from the following description of the embodiments taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein: Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating an anonymous, certificateless search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT) provided in this embodiment of the invention; Figure 2 An architecture diagram of an anonymous certificateless search encryption system for multi-node Internet of Things provided in this embodiment of the invention; Figure 3 This is a structural diagram of an anonymous certificateless search encryption device for multi-node Internet of Things provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0021] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0022] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0023] The following describes, with reference to the accompanying drawings, an anonymous certificateless search encryption method and apparatus for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT) proposed according to embodiments of the present invention.

[0024] Example 1 This invention provides an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), such as... Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps: S1, the key generation center generates system public parameters and generates a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines their own secret value to generate the complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes.

[0025] To construct a secure, decentralized, and collaborative cryptographic search underlying cryptographic system and avoid key custody risks and single-point key leakage issues, this application completes the standardized generation and configuration of system cryptographic parameter initialization, threshold key distribution, and user certificateless public and private keys and identity certificates.

[0026] In this embodiment, this stage is the foundational preparatory stage for system initialization, key parameter generation, user public and private key derivation, and threshold key share distribution. It is a core foundational step to ensure the secure and reliable operation of the overall protocol, achieve decentralized collaboration among edge nodes, and completely eliminate key escrow vulnerabilities. The core function of this stage is to complete the global cryptographic environment setup, system master key parameter initialization, threshold segmentation and distributed distribution of various cryptographic keys, and to standardize the entire process of anonymous user pseudo-identity generation, user self-derived public and private keys, issuance of uncertified private keys, and binding with legitimate identity certificates.

[0027] In this application embodiment, the application centrally manages system-level keys and public parameters through a key generation center, and combines a decentralized mode in which users generate secret parameters locally, thus completely avoiding the single key escrow risk present in traditional searchable encryption schemes. This provides secure and reliable cryptographic support for the entire process of subsequent index construction, trapdoor generation, ciphertext retrieval, and result verification.

[0028] In this embodiment, the system initialization and cryptographic parameter configuration are standardized, normalized, and highly secure. Specifically, the key generation center pre-inputs industry-standard security parameters. This is used to define the security strength of the overall cryptographic system. In this embodiment, the key generation center is selected as a large prime number. addition cyclic group And accurately identify the addition cycle group Corresponding legal group generator This will establish the basic group parameter system for subsequent elliptic group operations, key negotiation, and hash mapping.

[0029] In this embodiment of the application, the key generation center is derived from a finite integer field. Randomly select the system master private key This master private key is the highest-level key in the system, stored locally only at the key generation center, and is not disclosed to the public or transmitted over the network. The key generation center strictly adheres to group operation rules, using the formula... Calculate the system's global master public key As a publicly available system authentication parameter, it is used for subsequent user partial private key verification, certificate legality verification, and other scenarios.

[0030] In this embodiment of the application, in order to build a chameleon hash mapping system and support accurate and lossless matching of subsequent keyword indexing and search trapdoors, the key generation center randomly selects the chameleon hash secret value. And through cryptographic operation formulas The globally unique chameleon hash public key is calculated. This set of chameleon hash public-private key pairs provides core cryptographic support for keyword privacy mapping, index randomization, and trapdoor consistency matching, ensuring precise equivalence matching between the index and the trapdoor while hiding the plaintext of the keywords.

[0031] In this embodiment, to overcome the single-point leakage risk of traditional centralized key architectures and achieve decentralized collaborative computing across multiple edge nodes, thus eliminating single-point key failures or leaks, this application employs a threshold segmentation scheme for distributed processing of the core secret key. The key generation center will use the chameleon hash secret value... Evenly divided into multiple independent sets of secret shares Each secret share is distributed to the corresponding edge node one by one through a secure encrypted channel. The sharding key is held collaboratively by multiple edge nodes, and no single node possesses the complete secret value.

[0032] In this embodiment, the key generation center further generates an unintentional pseudo-random function master key K. This master key is the core key for generating deterministic random mapping values. Similarly, a threshold segmentation scheme is used to divide the complete master key into multiple sets of independent key shares. And distribute it to each edge node. This threshold key distribution mechanism ensures that the system can only complete the computation of the unintentional pseudo-random function when a preset threshold number of edge nodes participate in the computation collaboratively. A single edge node cannot independently generate a valid random mapping value, thereby fundamentally improving the security, randomness, and unforgeability of the random mapping parameters.

[0033] In this embodiment, the key generation center synchronously initializes the user certificate authentication system and generates a dedicated certificate signing key pair. Among them, the private key Public key used for cryptographic signing of user identity certificates Used for verifying the legitimacy of publicly available certificates across the entire network, effectively supporting the confirmation of user identity and trusted authentication across the entire network.

[0034] In this embodiment of the application, to adapt to the cryptographic operation requirements of different stages of the system, the key generation center uniformly initializes multiple families of secure hash functions, covering all scenarios such as identity hashing, message digest, signature challenge, trapdoor labeling, and key derivation, specifically including:

[0035]

[0036] It comprehensively covers the entire process of system identity calculation, message hash digest, signature challenge value generation, trapdoor anti-replay tag generation, and key security derivation, ensuring the standardization and security of cryptographic operations at each stage.

[0037] In this embodiment, after the key generation center completes all parameter initialization and key configuration, it integrates the group parameters, key parameters, and hash function parameters to form complete system common parameters:

[0038] This public parameter will be fully disclosed to the public to complete the global initialization configuration of the system and provide a unified standard of operating parameters for all users, edge nodes and cloud servers across the network.

[0039] In this embodiment, after completing the system's global parameter initialization, the system enters the user pseudo-identity generation and public / private key configuration process. This application employs an anonymous pseudo-identity interaction mechanism throughout, effectively protecting the user's real identity privacy. In this embodiment, the user independently and randomly selects a random salt value on their local device. Combined with their own unique real identity identifier By using a preset secure hash function Perform a hash operation to calculate the user's pseudo identity. All subsequent network protocol interactions, key requests, search requests, and identity authentication processes for the user will use an anonymous pseudo-identity. Participate while keeping your true identity hidden throughout. This avoids the leakage of user identity information and achieves end-to-end identity privacy protection.

[0040] In this embodiment, to overcome the key escrow defects of traditional cryptographic systems and achieve key decentralization and control, this application adopts a certificateless key architecture where users generate their own secret parameters. In this embodiment, users randomly select secret values ​​within a local secure environment. This secret value is held locally by the user and is not uploaded to the key generation center or any third-party node, thus eliminating the risk of key escrow at the source. In this embodiment, the user independently calculates the public key component based on the local secret value using a group operation formula. The pseudo-identity and public key components are combined to form the user's complete and legitimate public key. The user then submits the complete public key to the key generation center for authentication and issuance.

[0041] In this embodiment, after receiving the legitimate public key information submitted by the user, the key generation center uses a preset hash function. The user's identity and public key information are hashed to calculate a unique corresponding public key hash point. In this embodiment, the key generation center uses the system's global master private key, through a formula... Calculate and generate a partial private key for the user that is uniquely bound to the user's pseudo-identity. This ensures that each user's private key is unique and cannot be copied.

[0042] In this embodiment of the application, to effectively resist common network public key substitution attacks and key forgery attacks, and to ensure the legitimacy and authority of user key information, the key generation center uses its own certificate to sign the private key. The system digitally signs the user's pseudo-identity, public key, and partial private key information to generate a legitimate user certificate with legal and authentication validity. This certificate effectively proves the legitimate origin of the user's key, preventing unauthorized access to the system via forged keys.

[0043] In this embodiment of the application, the key generation center transmits a portion of the generated private key through an encrypted secure channel. With legitimate user certificates The key and certificate are distributed to the corresponding user terminals. After receiving the key and certificate, the user integrates them with the locally generated secret value. Private keys issued by the key generation center and official certification This assembles the user's complete certificate-free private key. The private key generation mode achieves two-way key decentralization and control between the key generation center and the user. The key generation center cannot obtain the user's local secret value and cannot recover the user's complete private key, thus avoiding the key escrow defects of traditional cryptographic systems.

[0044] In this embodiment, by building a standardized global cryptographic parameter system, adopting a threshold key sharding distribution mechanism, and combining a certificateless key architecture that combines user local private key self-generation with central certificate issuance, the system initialization deployment achieves user identity anonymization, key authority controllability, and node collaborative trust, laying the foundation for subsequent privacy index construction.

[0045] S2: The data owner randomly generates a symmetric key and encrypts a set of files, extracts keywords to construct a keyword message, generates a keyword index based on a chameleon hash map, uploads the index and encrypted files to a cloud server, constructs a commitment value for the authentication data structure, and registers it on the blockchain.

[0046] To achieve confidential storage of file data, construction of keyword privacy indexes, and verifiable evidence storage of retrieval results, while supporting fine-grained decryption authorization by multiple users, this application sets up an S2 stage to complete the entire preprocessing operation of file encryption, privacy index generation, and blockchain commitment anchoring.

[0047] In this embodiment, the data owner first performs original file encryption and differentiated key encapsulation for multiple authorized users, balancing file storage security with flexible decryption authorization requirements for multiple users. The data owner calls a preset key derivation function, inputting fixed initial parameters. Generate a symmetric file key unique to this group of files using the file's unique identifier (FID). Then, a standard symmetric encryption algorithm is invoked, using the symmetric file key. Perform a global encryption operation on the original plaintext file set F, and output the ciphertext that cannot be directly read. By relying on symmetric encryption mechanisms, the cloud server is isolated from direct access to the plaintext of the original file by third parties, thus ensuring the confidentiality of the original file data from the source.

[0048] In this embodiment of the application, in order to adapt to multi-user shared retrieval scenarios and enable different authorized users to independently decrypt ciphertext without interference, for each authorized user with access rights... Corresponding user public key The data owner randomly selects temporary parameters within a finite domain. Calculate temporary public keys based on addition cyclic group operations Based on elliptic group key negotiation logic, the shared secret point between the two parties is calculated. Then call the key hash function. Hash the shared secret point to derive the mask key used for masked encryption. The data owner masks the original file's symmetric key using an XOR operation, and then calculates the masked symmetric key. The temporary public key is combined with the mask key to generate a symmetric key ciphertext that is unique to the user. .

[0049] In this embodiment, the data owner integrates the encrypted file ciphertext C with the key ciphertext set generated for all authorized users to form a complete ciphertext package that can be uploaded to cloud storage. This unifies the ciphertext encapsulation of files and decryption keys.

[0050] After completing the entire file encryption and key encapsulation process, the data owner initiates the complete construction process of a privacy-preserving keyword index, without disclosing any plaintext keyword content to the cloud server throughout the entire process. In this embodiment, the data owner extracts all keywords with search value from the local plaintext file set and summarizes them to form a keyword set. Iterate through each keyword in the set. Perform pre-indexing processing. For a single target keyword w, the data owner will assign their own unique pseudo-identity. Keywords Current time parameter The three elements are concatenated and spliced ​​together to construct a keyword message that uniquely binds the three elements of information. By binding constraints on identity, keywords, and time, it effectively prevents attackers from conducting cross-time and cross-file association analysis and matching attacks using repeated keywords.

[0051] In this embodiment of the application, the data owner invokes a dedicated hash function. Perform scalar transformation operations on the keyword message to obtain finite field scalar parameters. This scalar parameter serves as the basic input variable for subsequent chameleon hash index mapping operations.

[0052] In this embodiment, to generate deterministic random numbers required for index calculation and which cannot be independently cracked by a single edge node, the data owner assembles the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function's exclusive input parameters. ,in A global session identifier is fixed during the index building phase. Subsequently, it collaborates with multiple deployed edge nodes to execute the threshold OPRF secure interaction protocol. The data owner first processes the input parameters. After performing blind masking to eliminate plaintext features of the parameters, the data is distributed to each edge node. Each edge node reads the OPRF key share stored locally. Independently running the pseudo-random function yields a local output fragment. The local segment is then sent back to the data owner's terminal.

[0053] In this embodiment, any single edge node holds only one key share and can only generate partial output fragments. It cannot independently calculate the complete random mapping value, relying on a distributed threshold mechanism to ensure the decentralized security of the random parameter generation process. In this embodiment, the data owner collects all partial output fragments returned by all edge nodes, performs aggregation operations, and removes blinding masking factors to finally obtain a deterministic random mapping value that corresponds one-to-one with the current keyword. Relying on a fixed session identifier throughout the process This ensures that the random mapping values ​​generated during the indexing phase are completely consistent with the random mapping values ​​used in the subsequent S3 search trapdoor calculation phase, providing a unified calculation benchmark for accurate equivalence matching between cloud index and trapdoor.

[0054] In this embodiment of the application, the data owner will use the previously obtained scalar parameters Random mapping value System-wide Chameleon Hash Public Key Substituting the preset chameleon hash mapping function, the core value calculation for the keyword index is performed. The corresponding core calculation formula is as follows: The calculation process incorporates random numbers generated by the threshold OPRF protocol. As a random perturbation term, it can generate completely different index core values ​​for the same keyword in different time rounds and different file scenarios, completely destroying the fixed correspondence between keywords and index values, and effectively resisting keyword guessing attacks and statistical association analysis attacks based on index features.

[0055] In this embodiment of the application, the data owner will index the core. File unique identifier (FID), data owner pseudo-identity Time parameters In addition, custom additional business information meta tags are combined and encapsulated to construct complete and storable index entries. The additional information meta can be used to store extended business parameters such as file category, storage path, and file size.

[0056] In this application embodiment, in order to solve the problems that traditional encrypted retrieval cannot verify the integrity of the results returned by the cloud and that the cloud server may tamper with or omit the search entries, this application simultaneously constructs an authentication data structure based on a Merkle tree and permanently registers the authentication root commitment to the blockchain to achieve tamper-proof evidence storage.

[0057] In this embodiment, the data owner iterates through all generated keyword index entries and independently calculates the Merkle leaf nodes for each index entry. The formula for calculating the leaf nodes is as follows: The index core, file identifier, time, file encrypted hash, and additional metadata are all incorporated into the leaf node hash operation, ensuring that any change to an index entry will directly change the value of the corresponding leaf node. This summarizes the leaf nodes corresponding to all index entries. Following the standard Merkle tree construction rules, hashing is performed layer by layer to aggregate the data, ultimately generating a global root node representing the integrity of the entire index set. .

[0058] In this embodiment, the data owner uses the Merkle global root node as a global commitment value representing the integrity of the entire index. The commitment value is submitted to the blockchain for registration and on-chain verification. Based on the distributed, immutable, and publicly searchable characteristics of blockchain, the commitment value is reliably anchored over a long period. Subsequent user searches can retrieve the original commitment on the chain for verification. In this embodiment, to prove that the commitment value was actively generated by the legitimate data owner, the data owner uses their complete private key. Perform a certificateless signature operation to generate a signature credential. The signature and commitment are uploaded to the blockchain simultaneously to complete the legality confirmation and storage of all indexed data.

[0059] In this embodiment, before completing the indexing and encrypted storage, the data owner can generate a dedicated authorization token based on the different users' business access needs. This authorization token constrains users' search permissions, effective access time, and the range of searchable keywords, achieving refined hierarchical access control. In this embodiment, the authorization token is generated by the data owner using a local private key signature; the specific generation formula is as follows: ,in The field is a customizable access policy parameter, which can be configured with constraints such as the validity period of authorization, the upper limit of a single query, and the allowed file groups for retrieval. When the cloud server receives a user's search request, it can quickly identify the user's access permissions by verifying the authorization token and block illegal search operations that exceed the authorized scope.

[0060] In this embodiment, symmetric file encryption, multi-user key encapsulation, threshold OPRF random mapping, chameleon hash privacy index construction, and Merkle tree blockchain evidence storage mechanism are used to achieve secure ciphertext storage, keyword leakage prevention, index anti-association attack, and traceable verification of search results, laying the foundation for the subsequent generation of search trapdoor cores.

[0061] S3: The user constructs a keyword message and collaborates with the edge nodes to perform a threshold-based pseudo-random function operation to obtain a random mapping value, generating a search trapdoor core; the edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoor to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit the search request containing the trapdoor core and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server.

[0062] In order to generate legitimate, tamper-proof, and replay-proof search trapdoors while protecting the privacy of keyword retrieval, and to enable secure search request delivery with controllable user authorization and multi-node collaborative authentication, this application sets up an S3 stage to complete the entire process of identity verification, collaborative random value calculation, trapdoor construction, and aggregate signature authentication.

[0063] In this embodiment of the application, before initiating any encrypted search request, a data user must first obtain an authorization token with legal validity and access scope restrictions from the data owner of the corresponding file. Users without a valid authorization token cannot pass the pre-verification of their identity at the edge nodes, directly blocking unauthorized retrieval attempts. In this embodiment, data users submit a complete set of identity authentication materials to the edge node cluster. These materials include their anonymous pseudo-identity, an officially issued user certificate, specific session information for this retrieval, and an authorization token issued by the data owner, which are used by the edge nodes to comprehensively verify the user's access qualifications.

[0064] In this embodiment of the application, the data user assembles the OPRF interaction-specific authentication message. ,in This serves as the unique session identifier for this search. For the user's own fake identity, To create a false identity for the owner of the target file data. For the retrieval time parameter, This provides contextual information for the interaction. The user then retrieves their own complete, certificate-free private key. Perform a certificateless signature operation to generate a session signature used to prove the authenticity and validity of the entity initiating the interaction. .

[0065] In this embodiment, each edge node in the access interaction sequentially performs multi-level verification, verifying the user certificate in turn. The validity of the issuance, the integrity and tamper-proof status of the user session signature, and the access permissions and time constraints corresponding to the authorization token are all verified. Only when all verification items are deemed to pass will the edge node cluster agree to conduct subsequent threshold-based pseudo-random function collaborative calculations with the data user, thus preventing unauthorized users from initiating invalid or illegal search requests from the interaction entry point.

[0066] In this embodiment, after the edge node cluster completes full identity and permission authentication for the data user, it formally enters the threshold random mapping value collaborative calculation process. In this embodiment, the data user strictly replicates the keyword message construction rules uniformly stipulated in the index generation stage, constructing a keyword message with a structure and concatenation order completely consistent with the index side for the target keyword w to be retrieved. To ensure consistency in keyword message input rules, a hash function is then called. Perform a scalar transformation operation on the message to obtain a finite field scalar hash value. A unified scalar input standard ensures that cloud indexes and search traps can achieve accurate equivalence matching.

[0067] In this embodiment, the data user and the edge node cluster again collaboratively execute the threshold-inadvertent pseudo-random function secure interaction protocol, which uses a fixed global session identifier throughout. Based on this unified identifier, a deterministic random mapping value that is completely equivalent to the value in the indexing stage is generated. This ensures that the trapdoor core and the keyword index core are generated based on the same set of random parameters, and that they have cryptographic homology, providing a reliable computational basis for ciphertext field equivalence matching in the cloud.

[0068] In this embodiment of the application, the data user uses the scalar parameters calculated above. Random mapping values ​​generated by threshold collaboration Substituting the system's globally unified chameleon hash public key pk_CH into the standard chameleon hash mapping function, the search trapdoor core specific to this retrieval is calculated. The trapdoor core and the keyword index core generated by the data owner use the exact same mapping formula, and the two have isomorphic mapping characteristics. The cloud server can complete the matching simply by comparing the group element values ​​of the trapdoor core and the storage index core. There is no need to parse the plaintext of the keywords throughout the process, which protects the privacy of the search while achieving lossless and accurate retrieval.

[0069] In this embodiment of the application, in order to avoid insufficient credibility of single-node authentication and prevent attackers from forging fake search traps to deceive cloud servers, this application introduces the MuSig2 two-round aggregate signature protocol, in which multiple edge nodes jointly generate a unified aggregate authentication credential to complete multi-node joint trusted authentication of search requests.

[0070] In this embodiment, the first step of the aggregate signature protocol is multi-node public key aggregation, which involves performing a weighted summation aggregation operation on the public keys of all edge nodes participating in this authentication operation to obtain a unique aggregated public key. This system achieves an integrated aggregation and representation of the identities of multiple edge nodes, simplifying subsequent signature verification logic in the cloud. In this embodiment, the system binds the current retrieval session identifier, the pseudo-identities of both parties, time parameters, and trapdoor core information to assemble a unique message to be signed. This deeply binds the signature content to the current retrieval session, preventing the reuse of signature credentials across sessions.

[0071] In this embodiment, the MuSig2 aggregate signature protocol consists of two complete interactions, the first being a random number commitment phase. In this embodiment, each edge node participating in the signature computation independently selects from a finite field... Randomly select private random parameters Calculate public keys for public random numbers based on group generator P P, combined with the current session identifier, generates an immutable commitment value. It is also made public that the commitment mechanism is used to constrain the subsequent random number values ​​of nodes, thereby preventing nodes from tampering with the random numbers and undermining the legitimacy of the signature.

[0072] In this embodiment of the application, the second round is the formal signature generation stage, in which all edge nodes complete the random number public key generation. After public verification, the data user aggregates the public keys of all nodes' public random numbers and sums them to obtain a globally unified random number. The system combines aggregated random numbers, aggregated public keys, and messages to be signed to calculate a globally unified challenge value. .

[0073] In this embodiment of the application, each edge node combines its own local private key. Private random parameters Weighting coefficients Each local signature fragment is calculated independently of the global challenge value e. All edge nodes send local signature fragments back to the data user, who then modifies all local signature fragments. Summation and aggregation yield the complete global aggregation signature. Aggregate random numbers With global aggregate signature Combined, forming complete edge node aggregated authentication information. .

[0074] In this embodiment, to defend against trapdoor tampering attacks, session replay attacks, and illegal trapdoor forwarding attacks, the data user performs an independent certificateless signature on the entire set of retrieved trapdoor information and generates a unique anti-replay tag. In this embodiment, the data user assembles a complete signed message containing session identifiers, pseudo-identities of both parties, time parameters, the trapdoor core, and edge node aggregated authentication information. Call its own private key Generate user-side identity signature This is used to prove that the search trap was initiated by a legitimate data user. In this embodiment, the data user combines the session identifier, the user's pseudo-identity, and time parameters with the trap's core calculation to obtain a globally unique anti-replay tag. Any changes to the session, keywords, or time will generate different tags, effectively intercepting attackers' behavior of repeatedly submitting search requests after intercepting a trap.

[0075] In this embodiment of the application, the data user integrates the session identifier. User fake identity Data owner pseudo-identity Time parameters Trapdoor Core Edge node aggregated authentication information User signature Anti-replay label User public key User's partial private key User Certificate Authorization token All information is assembled to generate a final, legitimate search trap with a standardized format and comprehensive multi-layered authentication. Then, a complete search request carrying the trapdoor core and multi-layered joint authentication information is sent to the cloud server to enter the cloud retrieval and verification process.

[0076] In this embodiment, by using prior permissions and identity authentication, threshold OPRF collaborative computation to ensure the same origin of the trapdoor index, chameleon hash to generate the trapdoor core, and MuSig2 multi-node aggregated signature combined with user certificateless signature and anti-replay tag verification, privacy-preserving trapdoor generation, retrieval request authorization, authentication, anti-forgery and anti-replay attack are achieved, laying the foundation for subsequent decryption of ciphertext.

[0077] S4, the cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information, uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index for equal value matching, retrieves the corresponding ciphertext and generates the authentication data structure member proof, and the user verifies it based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypts the ciphertext after passing the verification.

[0078] To achieve a closed loop of trusted verification of search requests, encrypted privacy matching, verifiable search results, and secure decryption, and to prevent illegal requests, result tampering, and replay attacks, this application sets up an S4 stage to complete the entire process of cloud verification, privacy retrieval, integrity proof, and local decryption by the user.

[0079] In this embodiment of the application, the cloud server receives the complete search trap submitted by the data user. Afterwards, the cloud server will not directly execute the search operation, but will first execute a multi-level legality verification mechanism to verify the legality, authenticity and validity of the search request layer by layer. If any verification step fails, the cloud server will directly reject and terminate the search request, effectively blocking various illegal attacks and invalid requests.

[0080] In this embodiment, the cloud server first performs user certificate validity verification by executing certificate verification calculations according to the system's preset verification rules to satisfy the verification formula. At that time, the system determines that the current data user's identity certificate is legal and valid, confirms that the entity initiating the search request is a legitimate user certified by the system, and prevents the use of forged identities to access the search system.

[0081] In this embodiment, after certificate verification is completed, the cloud server performs a user trapdoor-specific certificateless signature verification operation, strictly adhering to the certificateless signature verification algorithm for verification. When the verification conditions are met... This proves that the core message content of the search trapdoor submitted this time is complete and has not been tampered with, ensuring the integrity of the trapdoor data during the transmission and submission process.

[0082] In this embodiment, to verify the validity of the edge node joint authentication, the cloud server executes a multi-edge node aggregated signature verification process. In this embodiment, the cloud server reconstructs the unique signature message using the following formula: Simultaneously combine the aggregated public key with the signature random parameters to calculate the global challenge value. Finally, the core equation of the aggregate signature is rigorously verified. If the equation holds true, the multi-node joint authentication is deemed legal and valid, confirming that the search trap has undergone compliant authorization and authentication by the edge node cluster and was not generated by the user without authorization.

[0083] In this embodiment, in addition to completing the cryptographic signature verification, the cloud server also simultaneously performs business permission and security protection verification, verifying the authorization tokens issued by the data owner one by one. It confirms that the current user has legitimate search permissions, the authorization period has not expired, and the search scope conforms to preset rules. At the same time, it verifies the global uniqueness of the anti-replay tag and accurately identifies malicious replay requests that are repeatedly initiated. From multiple dimensions such as permissions, timeliness, and attack prevention, it completely eliminates illegal access, expired requests, and network replay attacks.

[0084] In this embodiment, after all verification steps—certificate, signature, authorization, and replay protection—have passed, the cloud server officially initiates the privacy keyword matching operation. In this embodiment, the cloud server traverses all keyword index entries stored locally in persistent storage. Based on the homology and isomorphism between the chameleon hash index and the trapdoor, lossless matching of ciphertext fields is performed, only if the index core... With the core of the trapdoor Keyword matching can be considered successful only when the two keywords are completely equal and the time parameter t of both keywords remains completely consistent.

[0085] In this embodiment, the entire matching operation is completed within the encrypted domain, preventing the cloud server from obtaining any plaintext keyword information and fundamentally ensuring the privacy of keyword retrieval. In this embodiment, the cloud server aggregates all successfully matched valid file data, integrating file identifiers, encrypted file data, time parameters, and metadata information to construct a complete set of search results. .

[0086] In this embodiment, to completely resolve the security vulnerabilities of traditional cloud-based searches, such as service providers tampering with data, omitting search results, and forging search content, this application adds a cloud-based integrity proof generation mechanism. In this embodiment, the cloud server recalculates the corresponding Merkle tree leaf nodes for each successfully matched search result. The unified calculation formula for leaf nodes is as follows: It fully associates the core index, file identifier, time parameters, encrypted hash, and business metadata to ensure the unique correspondence of data.

[0087] In this embodiment, the cloud server generates a corresponding Merkle membership proof π based on each updated leaf node, using the pre-built and on-chain stored Merkle tree root node. It then aggregates the proof data corresponding to all search results to form a complete proof set Π={π}, and simultaneously outputs a blockchain root reference. This provides authoritative credentials to support users in conducting trusted integrity verification locally.

[0088] In this embodiment, after receiving the search result set, Merkle membership proof set, and blockchain root reference information returned by the cloud server, the data user initiates a local verifiable verification process to verify the authenticity of the search results based on the immutability of the blockchain. In this embodiment, the data user verifies the authenticity of the search results based on the root reference. It can accurately retrieve the pre-registered, tamper-proof global commitment value of the data owner from the blockchain nodes. .

[0089] In this embodiment of the application, the data user independently recalculates the leaf node data corresponding to all search results in a local secure environment. The calculation method is as follows: This avoids the risk of data tampering in the cloud. In this embodiment, the data user calls a preset Merkle proof verification algorithm to execute... Integrity verification: If the algorithm returns a result of 1, it proves that the search results are complete, authentic, untampered, and without omissions; if any result fails verification, the data user will directly refuse to receive all search data returned by the cloud in this instance, ensuring the absolute credibility of the search results.

[0090] In this embodiment, after all the integrity verifications of the search results have passed, the data user confirms that the data returned by the cloud is secure and reliable, and then restores and obtains the file's symmetric key based on the system's preset key derivation rules. Then, the standard decryption algorithm is called to decrypt the ciphertext of the encrypted file, using the decryption formula. The original plaintext file is recovered, and the content of the target search file is finally obtained securely. The single verifiable privacy-preserving keyword search process is then fully executed and terminated.

[0091] In this embodiment, by using cloud-based multi-layer identity and signature legitimacy verification, ciphertext field chameleon hash precise matching, Merkle integrity proof combined with blockchain on-chain evidence verification, and local key derivation decryption mechanism, privacy-secure retrieval, tamper-proof verifiable results, and a secure closed loop throughout the entire process are achieved, effectively improving the security and credibility of ciphertext search.

[0092] Example 2 This invention relates to an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption system for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), such as... Figure 2 As shown, it includes a Key Generation Center (KGC), Data Owners (DU), Data Users (DO), multiple Edge Nodes (ENS), Cloud Servers (CS), and a blockchain network. Details are as follows: The Key Generation Center (KGC) is responsible for system initialization and long-term trust management. It generates globally common parameters. Choose master key And based on the user's fake identity Issuing a portion of the private key to it Because each user will select a random number locally. As a self-selected secret value, KGC cannot obtain the user's complete private key, thus complying with the requirements of a certificateless system. Simultaneously, KGC distributes threshold OPRF key shares to each edge node. This is to support subsequent collaborative trapdoor generation and matching.

[0093] The Data Owner (DO) is typically an end device that generates business data, such as an industrial gateway or controller. Each DO extracts keywords from local data and encrypts the original file using a standard symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES) to obtain ciphertext. The proposed AMN-CLSE scheme is used to generate a corresponding searchable keyword index. Subsequently, DO uploads the encrypted file and index together to the cloud server. The focus of this article is on the certificate-free searchable index and its verifiability design; the underlying file encryption can employ any IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption algorithm.

[0094] Data User (DU / DR): DU refers to an authorized user or upper-layer application that needs to retrieve industrial data by keyword. The DU locally generates a certificateless key pair, which, combined with a partial private key returned by KGC, yields the complete private key. Subsequently, a threshold OPRF protocol was executed with multiple edge nodes to obtain the target Related random values Based on this random value, DU constructs a core value containing the chameleon hash. Anonymous trap DU then uses its private key to perform a Schnorr signature. DU submits the trapdoor to the cloud server, which, upon receiving the search results, performs local verification using the commitments and proofs on the blockchain, and finally decrypts the plaintext using the corresponding file key.

[0095] Edge Nodes (ENs) are deployed close to the industrial terminal and possess strong computing and caching capabilities, but are only considered semi-trusted. Each EN holds a key share of the OPRF master key, assisting the DU in completing trapdoor generation and verification through multi-node collaboration. During trapdoor generation, the EN and DU interact to execute the threshold OPRF protocol, outputting the corresponding random value. Meanwhile, for values ​​related to trapdoors Local signature shares are generated and ultimately aggregated by the system to form a multi-signature. This design ensures the verifiability of collaborative nodes while providing a degree of anonymity and traceability for participating nodes.

[0096] Cloud servers (CS) provide large-scale storage and computing capabilities, and are responsible for long-term storage of encrypted files uploaded by DO. and its searchable index set Upon receiving the trapdoor submitted by DU Then, CS first verifies the user's signature. Aggregate signature with EN This is to ensure the trapdoor's origin is legitimate and has not been tampered with. Subsequently, CS uses a hash containing chameleon hash components... A matching algorithm is performed against the local index to filter out all ciphertext files that meet the conditions. Simultaneously, CS constructs a Merkle proof based on the stored index. This is combined with commitment results on the blockchain to generate retrieval evidence that can be verified by DU. The cloud server in the model is assumed to be "honest but curious," meaning it will execute the protocol but may attempt to analyze the data content.

[0097] Blockchain and Smart Contract (BC) platforms utilize blockchain and its smart contracts as an immutable auditing and verification layer for the system. DO periodically calculates the Merkle root for its own index set. and the commitment value The DO is signed and recorded on the blockchain, thus recording the index status and timestamp. The smart contract is responsible for storing these commitments and (optionally) retrieving related logs. During the verification phase of the retrieval results, both CS and DU can query the corresponding commitment information on the blockchain and use Merkle proofs. Check if the returned index and file identifier match This ensures consistency, thereby guaranteeing the correctness, integrity, and traceability of results even when the cloud server or some EN nodes are not entirely trustworthy.

[0098] Example 3 This invention provides an anonymous, certificate-free search encryption device 10 for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), such as... Figure 3 As shown, the device includes: Initialization module 100 is used by the key generation center to generate system public parameters and generate a partial private key bound to the pseudo identity for the user. The user combines his own secret value to generate a complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes. Encryption module 200 is used by the data owner to randomly generate a symmetric key and encrypt a set of files, extract keywords to construct keyword messages, generate a keyword index based on the chameleon hash mapping, upload the index and encrypted files to the cloud server, construct the commitment value of the authentication data structure and register it to the blockchain; The search module 300 is used by users to construct keyword messages, collaborate with edge nodes to perform threshold-based pseudo-random function calculations to obtain random mapping values, and generate search trapdoor cores; edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoors to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit search requests containing trapdoor cores and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server. The verification module 400 is used by the cloud server to verify the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information. It uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index to perform equal-value matching, retrieve the corresponding ciphertext and generate the authentication data structure member proof. The user verifies based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypts the ciphertext after passing the verification.

[0099] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0100] Example 4 To implement the methods of the above embodiments, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor; wherein the processor reads executable program code stored in the memory to run a program corresponding to the executable program code, so as to implement the various steps of the methods described above.

[0101] Example 5 To implement the above embodiments, this application also proposes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the foregoing embodiments.

[0102] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0103] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., refer to specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in connection with that embodiment or example, which are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of different embodiments or examples.

[0104] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature. In the description of this invention, "a plurality of" means at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise explicitly specified.

Claims

1. An anonymous, certificate-free search encryption method for multi-node Internet of Things (IoT), characterized in that, include: S1, the key generation center generates system public parameters and generates a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines their own secret value to generate the complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes. S2, the data owner randomly generates a symmetric key and encrypts the file set, extracts keywords to construct a keyword message, generates a keyword index based on the chameleon hash mapping, uploads the index and encrypted files to the cloud server, constructs the commitment value of the authentication data structure and registers it to the blockchain; S3: The user constructs a keyword message and collaborates with the edge nodes to perform a threshold-based pseudo-random function operation to obtain a random mapping value, generating a search trapdoor core; the edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoor to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit the search request containing the trapdoor core and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server. S4, the cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information, uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index for equal value matching, retrieves the corresponding ciphertext and generates the authentication data structure member proof, and the user verifies it based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypts the ciphertext after passing the verification.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The key generation center generates common system parameters and generates partial private keys bound to pseudo-identities for users. Users combine their own secret values ​​to generate complete private keys. Simultaneously, it distributes key shares of threshold-inadvertent pseudo-random functions to edge nodes, including: The key generation center inputs security parameters, selects an additive cyclic group and generator, randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the system master public key, randomly selects a chameleon hash secret value and calculates the chameleon hash public key, uses a threshold scheme to divide the chameleon hash secret value into a share set and distributes it to multiple edge nodes, generates an unintentional pseudo-random function master key and uses a threshold scheme to divide it into a share set and distribute it to edge nodes, generates a certificate signing key pair, selects a family of secure hash functions, and publishes the system's public parameters. The user randomly selects a salt value locally and uses a secure hash function to calculate the pseudo-identity. The user also randomly selects a secret value locally and calculates the public key component. The user then sends the complete public key containing the pseudo-identity and the public key component to the key generation center. The key generation center calculates the public key hash point based on the public key information submitted by the user, calculates the user's partial private key using the system master key, generates a certificate using the certificate signing private key on the user's key information, and returns the partial private key and certificate to the user through a secure channel. The user sets the secret value, partial private key, and certificate as the complete private key.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data owner randomly generates a symmetric key and encrypts a set of files, extracts keywords to construct a keyword message, generates a keyword index based on a chameleon hash map, uploads the index and encrypted files to a cloud server, constructs a commitment value for the authentication data structure, and registers it on the blockchain, including: The data owner extracts a set of keywords from the plaintext data, binds its own pseudo-identity and time parameters to each keyword to construct a keyword message, defines an unintentional pseudo-random function input and executes the unintentional pseudo-random function protocol with the collaborating nodes, and each collaborating node calculates the local output with its own unintentional pseudo-random function share and returns it. The data owner aggregates and deblinds the output shares of the unintentional pseudo-random function from multiple collaborating nodes to obtain deterministic random mapping values ​​corresponding to keywords. The chameleon hash auxiliary mapping function is used to calculate the keyword index core and construct index entries. A symmetric file key is generated and the file set is encrypted. All index entries are aggregated into a Merkle tree and the root commitment is calculated. The ciphertext package and the index set are uploaded to the cloud server and the commitment is submitted.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The user constructs a keyword message, collaborates with edge nodes to perform a threshold-based pseudo-random function operation to obtain a random mapping value, and generates a search trapdoor core. The edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoor to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit a search request containing the trapdoor core and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server, including: Data users obtain an authorization token issued by the data owner and submit authentication materials containing a pseudo-identity and authorization token to the collaborating node. The collaborating node verifies the data user's certificate, session signature, and authorization token. After successful verification, the data user constructs a keyword message in the same form as the index generation stage for the target keyword and calculates a scalar hash. The data user then executes a threshold-inadvertent pseudo-random function protocol with the collaborating node to obtain a deterministic random mapping value consistent with the indexing stage. The search trapdoor core is calculated using a chameleon hash auxiliary mapping function. The aggregate signature protocol is executed with collaborating nodes to generate aggregate authentication information. The complete trapdoor is then signed without a certificate and an anti-replay tag is generated. The final search trapdoor, containing the trapdoor core, aggregate authentication information, certificate-free signature, and anti-replay tag, is output.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The execution of the aggregate signature protocol with the collaborating nodes includes: The public keys of the participating collaborative nodes are aggregated to obtain an aggregated public key. The message to be signed is defined to bind the session information and the trapdoor core. Each collaborative node randomly selects a random number and calculates a random number commitment. After the random number is made public, the data user aggregates the aggregated random number and calculates the challenge value. Each collaborative node calculates a partial signature based on the challenge value, its own private key, and the random number. The data user aggregates the partial signatures of each node to obtain the multi-signature result.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information, performs an equivalence match between the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index, retrieves the corresponding ciphertext, and generates an authentication data structure member proof. The user verifies the ciphertext based on the commitment value in the blockchain. Upon successful verification, the ciphertext is decrypted, including: The cloud server receives the search traps submitted by the data user, and verifies the validity of the data user certificate, the data user trap signature, the collaborative node aggregate signature, and the authorization token and anti-replay tag in sequence. After the verification is successful, the search trap core is used to match and judge the stored keyword index set. When the index core is equal to the search trapdoor core and the time parameters are consistent, the match is considered successful. The ciphertext data corresponding to the successfully matched index entry is added to the result set. The corresponding Merkle leaf node is recalculated and a membership proof relative to the stored Merkle root is generated. The membership proof set and the on-chain root reference are output. Data users obtain commitments from the blockchain based on the on-chain root reference, recalculate the leaf nodes for each retrieval result and perform Merkle membership proof verification. After successful verification, the file symmetric key is derived and the ciphertext is decrypted.

7. An anonymous, certificate-free search encryption device for multi-node Internet of Things, characterized in that, include: The initialization module is used by the key generation center to generate system public parameters and generate a partial private key bound to the pseudo-identity for the user. The user combines their own secret value to generate the complete private key, and at the same time distributes the key share of the threshold unintentional pseudo-random function to the edge nodes. The encryption module is used by the data owner to randomly generate a symmetric key and encrypt a collection of files, extract keywords to construct keyword messages, generate a keyword index based on a chameleon hash map, upload the index and encrypted files to a cloud server, construct a commitment value for the authentication data structure and register it on the blockchain; The search module is used by users to construct keyword messages, and collaborates with edge nodes to perform threshold-based pseudo-random function calculations to obtain random mapping values, generating search trapdoor cores; edge nodes perform joint authentication on the search trapdoors to generate aggregated authentication information, and submit search requests containing trapdoor cores and aggregated authentication information to the cloud server; The verification module is used by the cloud server to verify the legitimacy of the search trapdoor and the joint authentication information. It uses the core of the search trapdoor and the stored keyword index to perform equal-value matching, retrieve the corresponding ciphertext and generate the authentication data structure member proof. Users verify based on the commitment value in the blockchain, and decrypt the ciphertext after passing the verification.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, Including processor and memory; The processor reads executable program code stored in the memory to run a program corresponding to the executable program code, so as to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.