A method and system for locating and reporting lost encrypted anchor points using diagnostic routine control.
By writing an encrypted decoy URL link into the ECU and interacting with it using a standard diagnostic protocol, the problem of being unable to locate a stolen vehicle was solved, achieving concealed vehicle identity and location binding and alarm.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611261810.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-19
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing vehicle anti-theft technologies cannot effectively locate vehicles when the communication module is damaged or blocked after the vehicle is stolen, and lack covert methods of deception, resulting in wasted location opportunities.
The diagnostic routine controls the writing of an encrypted decoy URL link into the ECU's reserved DID storage area. The operator is then induced to access the decoy via standard diagnostic protocol interaction, and the vehicle's identity and location are passively obtained using the decoy server.
When a vehicle is disassembled for repair, its identity and location are proactively linked to the vehicle, enabling concealed location alerts, avoiding the failure of traditional positioning technologies, and improving positioning efficiency.
Smart Images

Figure CN123123382A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle anti-theft technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for detecting and reporting vehicle loss using encrypted anchor points controlled by diagnostic routines. Background Technology
[0002] In the field of vehicle anti-theft and stolen vehicle tracking, existing technologies mainly rely on in-vehicle telematics terminals (T-Boxes) or positioning modules integrated into in-vehicle infotainment systems. These utilize GPS / BeiDou satellite positioning and 4G / 5G cellular networks to report the vehicle's location to a cloud server in real time. However, this centralized architecture, reliant on a single communication link, presents significant security vulnerabilities. Professional car theft gangs often physically damage the T-Box immediately after a vehicle is stolen, such as disconnecting the antenna, cutting off the power supply, or using high-power GPS / cellular signal jammers to interfere with the entire frequency band. Once the T-Box loses connection, conventional anti-theft measures such as remote positioning, trajectory tracking, and electronic fences become ineffective, and subsequent recovery relies solely on external methods such as roadside surveillance, which is extremely inefficient.
[0003] Furthermore, existing anti-theft tracking technologies have too short a time window and lack effective follow-up mechanisms. Some technologies attempt to report the last location the moment it is stolen, or store location data in the electronic control unit (ECU) for later retrieval. However, the former provides limited information value and cannot track the dynamic trajectory of a vehicle after it has lost contact; the latter also relies on the vehicle eventually being found and read by professionals using specific tools, and cannot proactively and in real-time expose the current location of the vehicle or its key components. This makes it almost impossible to effectively track a stolen vehicle once it leaves the initial communication coverage area.
[0004] It is worth noting that existing technologies fail to effectively utilize the inevitable process of vehicle dismantling and repair, and lack covert methods of inducing connection. Once stolen vehicles enter the black market, their ultimate path to monetization is typically dismantling and selling parts. When a repair shop purchases and uses a universal diagnostic tool to power on a used ECU, the ECU objectively and briefly connects to the repair shop's computer's power supply, network, and diagnostic communication links. However, existing technologies fail to transform this inevitable scenario into a covert and reliable opportunity for location exposure. Even if the ECU contains data, there is a lack of methods to induce the mechanic's computer to actively connect to a pre-set tracking server without alerting the operator or relying on special commands, resulting in a significant waste of location opportunities. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This invention addresses the technical problems existing in the prior art by providing an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting method and system that utilizes diagnostic routine control. It solves the technical problem that the original vehicle communication module is damaged or blocked after a vehicle is stolen, resulting in the inability to locate the vehicle. It enables the passive binding of the vehicle's identity and current location and location alarm to be completed by interacting with the standard diagnostic protocol when the vehicle is disassembled for repair.
[0006] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for locating and reporting loss using encrypted anchor points controlled by diagnostic routines is provided, applied to the ECU of a vehicle, the method comprising: S1, in response to a diagnostic routine control request from the vehicle security gateway, the diagnostic routine control request being issued based on the vehicle security gateway detecting that the vehicle meets preset theft mode characteristics; S2, run the stolen-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier (DID) storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a sleep state after the writing is completed. S3, in response to the request from the external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through the standard diagnostic service, the decoy URL link is returned as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link; When the decoy URL is accessed, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0007] Based on the above technical solution, the present invention can also be improved as follows.
[0008] Optionally, step S1 includes: S101, receive a preset diagnostic routine control request from the unified diagnostic service protocol of the vehicle security gateway via the controller area network bus. The preset diagnostic routine control request is issued by the vehicle security gateway using backup power after detecting that the vehicle meets the preset theft mode characteristics. S102, the preset diagnostic routine control request carries a decoy URL link string to be written.
[0009] Optionally, the vehicle theft characteristics include at least one of the following: antenna disconnection of the vehicle-mounted telematics terminal, continuous loss of GPS signal, or illegal power outage.
[0010] Optionally, step S2 includes: S201, run the theft-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, encrypt the decoy URL link string, and encode it according to the standard diagnostic data identifier data format; S202, write the encrypted and encoded data into the reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area. The reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area is a diagnostic data identifier area defined by international standards but not used by this ECU for normal function. S203, After the data writing is completed, set the routine status flag of the stolen goods diagnostic routine to the dormant state.
[0011] Optionally, step S2 further includes: A decryption key is randomly generated when the decoy URL link is written, and the decryption key is synchronized to the decoy server through a secure channel independent of the controller LAN bus.
[0012] Optionally, step S3 includes: S301, Receive and respond to the diagnostic service request from the external requester to poll and read the reserved diagnostic data identifier, wherein the diagnostic service request is the data read by identifier service in the UDS protocol; S302, read the written decoy URL link from the reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area, encapsulate the decoy URL link into the data field of the standard UDS diagnostic response message and return it to the external requester without generating a negative response code or abnormal communication behavior, so that the decoy URL link is displayed as standard attribute data on the operation interface of the external requester.
[0013] Optionally, the step of displaying the decoy URL link as a standard attribute data on the requester's interface includes: The decoy URL is displayed as a clickable hyperlink in the user interface of the external requester, and the hyperlink is accompanied by deceptive text labels related to vehicle anti-theft, vehicle after-sales service, or vehicle status inquiry.
[0014] Optionally, the decoy URL link is configured as follows: The domain name of the decoy URL link points to the decoy server and is disguised as a common subdomain; The encrypted tracking token is contained in the path parameters or query string of the decoy URL link. The encrypted tracking token is generated by an encryption algorithm from the vehicle identification code, timestamp, and random number, and is used by the decoy server to decrypt the vehicle to obtain vehicle identity information using a preset decryption key.
[0015] Optionally, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL link to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm, including: The pre-set decoy server passively receives access requests triggered by clicking the decoy URL link, extracts the visitor's public IP address from the access request, and parses the pre-embedded encrypted tracking token from the path parameters or query string of the request URL. The encrypted tracking token is decrypted using a preset decryption key to obtain the vehicle's unique hardware identifier, and a third-party IP geolocation database is called to convert the public IP address into geographic coordinates. The geographic coordinates are associated with the unique hardware identifier to generate structured alarm information containing vehicle identity, current location and access time, and an alarm is sent to the preset associated parties.
[0016] According to a second aspect of the present invention, an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system controlled by diagnostic routines is provided, comprising: The vehicle security gateway is used to send a diagnostic routine control request to the ECU when the vehicle is detected to meet the preset theft mode characteristics. The ECU is configured to respond to the diagnostic routine control request to run the corresponding stolen-specific diagnostic routine, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed; and, in response to a request from an external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through a standard diagnostic service, return the decoy URL link as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link. The decoy server is used to obtain the visitor's public IP address and parse the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL when the decoy URL is accessed, so as to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0017] According to a third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein the processor is configured to implement the steps of the encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting method controlled by diagnostic routines when executing a computer management program stored in the memory.
[0018] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer management class program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the above-described method for locating and reporting lost encrypted anchor points using diagnostic routine control.
[0019] This invention provides a method, system, electronic device, and storage medium for locating and reporting stolen vehicles using encrypted anchor points controlled by diagnostic routines. By detecting vehicle theft characteristics, a dedicated diagnostic routine for theft is injected, writing an encrypted decoy URL link into the reserved DID storage area of the target ECU, making the target ECU a latent node carrying tracking information. When the target ECU's reserved DID is read by an external requester during subsequent maintenance or inspection, the target ECU returns the decoy URL link as normal diagnostic data, making the link appear in the operator's visual interface, thereby inducing the operator to actively access the link. The decoy server passively receives the access request, obtains the visitor's public IP address, and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the request to identify the vehicle. After associating the two, the system completes the matching and location alarm for the vehicle's current position. This invention shifts the location information output from the original vehicle communication module, which is easily physically damaged or signal-blocked, to the diagnostic equipment and network connection commonly used in the maintenance environment. It utilizes the legitimate data interaction process of standard diagnostic protocols to complete the covert transmission of decoy information, achieving cross-temporal and spatial binding of vehicle identity and location without alerting the operator, thus solving the problem of vehicles being unable to actively report their location after losing contact. Attached Figure Description
[0020] Figure 1 A flowchart of an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting method using diagnostic routine control provided by the present invention; Figure 2 A flowchart of a method for locating and reporting lost encrypted anchor points using diagnostic routine control, provided for one embodiment; Figure 3 This invention provides a schematic diagram of an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system controlled by diagnostic routines. Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a possible electronic device provided by the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a possible computer-readable storage medium provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0021] The specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples. The following examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
[0022] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for locating and reporting lost encrypted anchor points using diagnostic routine control provided by the present invention is shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes steps S1 to S3: S1, in response to a diagnostic routine control request from the vehicle security gateway, the diagnostic routine control request being issued when the vehicle security gateway detects that the vehicle meets preset theft mode characteristics.
[0023] In this step, the vehicle security gateway continuously monitors abnormal vehicle conditions, such as a T-Box antenna open circuit, persistent GPS signal loss, or unauthorized power failure. When a preset theft pattern characteristic is detected, the gateway uses backup power to send a diagnostic routine control request (e.g., the $31 routine control request in the UDS protocol) to the target ECU via the CAN bus to invoke the theft-specific diagnostic routine (also known as the sentinel routine). The target ECU receives this diagnostic routine control request via the CAN bus, which carries a decoy URL link string to be written and a target diagnostic data identifier (DID) number.
[0024] S2, run the theft-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the DID storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the theft-specific diagnostic routine into a deep sleep state after the writing is completed.
[0025] In this step, the target ECU, upon receiving a diagnostic routine control request, runs the corresponding stolen-specific diagnostic routine. For example, this stolen-specific diagnostic routine first encrypts the decoy URL link string and then encodes it according to the standard DID data format. The encryption key is randomly generated by the ECU during writing and pre-synchronized to a preset decoy server via a secure channel independent of the CAN bus. After encoding, the diagnostic routine writes the data to a reserved DID storage area in the target ECU firmware. This reserved DID storage area is an internationally standardized DID region not used by the target ECU for normal function. After writing, the diagnostic routine sets its own routine status flag to a dormant state, ensuring that the stolen-specific diagnostic routine does not respond to new routine control requests until the next ECU power-on reset.
[0026] S3, in response to the request from the external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through the standard diagnostic service, the decoy URL link is returned as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link; When the decoy URL is accessed, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0027] After the stolen vehicle is disassembled, the target ECU ends up in a repair shop. The mechanic uses a general diagnostic tool to perform a standard procedure to read the ECU's identification information. In this step, the diagnostic tool automatically polls a series of standard DIDs and manufacturer-defined DIDs. When it reads a reserved DID containing a decoy URL link, the target ECU recognizes that data has been written to that DID, reads the written decoy URL link string from the reserved DID storage area, encapsulates it into the data field of a standard UDS diagnostic response message, and returns this data to the diagnostic tool. During this process, the ECU does not generate any negative response codes or exhibit any abnormal communication behavior. Upon receiving this data, the diagnostic tool displays the decoy URL link as a standard attribute data in its interface, accompanied by deceptive text labels related to vehicle after-sales service or vehicle status inquiries, enticing the mechanic to click and access it.
[0028] When the mechanic's computer accesses the decoy URL link, the pre-set decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address from the TCP / IP protocol stack of the HTTP request. At the same time, it parses the encrypted tracking token in the URL path, decrypts it with a pre-agreed key to obtain the vehicle's VIN and the time of loss of contact, and then resolves the IP address to a specific geographical location through a geolocation database, binds it with the vehicle's identity information, generates an accurate loss location alarm, and pushes it to the OEM.
[0029] Understandably, given the deficiencies in the background technology, this invention proposes an encrypted anchor point location and reporting method utilizing diagnostic routine control. By detecting vehicle theft characteristics, a sentinel routine injection response is triggered, writing an encrypted decoy URL link into the reserved DID storage area of the target ECU, making the target ECU a latent node carrying tracking information. When the target ECU's reserved DID is read by an external requester during subsequent maintenance or inspection, the target ECU returns the decoy URL link as normal diagnostic data, making the link appear in the operator's visual interface, thereby inducing the operator to actively access the link. The decoy server passively receives the HTTP request generated by this access, obtains the visitor's public IP address from it, and simultaneously parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the request to identify the vehicle's identity. After associating the two, the current vehicle location is matched and a location alarm is generated. This invention shifts the location information output from the original vehicle communication module, which is easily physically damaged or signal-blocked, to the diagnostic equipment and network connection commonly used in the maintenance environment. It utilizes the legitimate data interaction process of standard diagnostic protocols to complete the covert transmission of decoy information, achieving cross-temporal and spatial binding of vehicle identity and location without alerting the operator, thus solving the problem of vehicles being unable to actively report their location after losing contact.
[0030] Based on the above technical solutions, the embodiments of the present invention can be further improved as follows.
[0031] In one possible embodiment, combining Figure 2 The implementation scenario shown, step S1, includes sub-steps S101~S102: S101, receive a preset diagnostic routine control request (such as $31 routine control request) from the Unified Diagnostic Service (UDS) protocol of the vehicle security gateway via the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. The preset diagnostic routine control request is issued by the vehicle security gateway using backup power after detecting that the vehicle meets the preset theft mode characteristics. S102, the diagnostic routine control request carries a decoy URL link string to be written and a target DID number.
[0032] It is understood that in this embodiment, the preset theft mode characteristics include at least one of the following: antenna disconnection of the vehicle telematics terminal T-Box, continuous loss of GPS signal, or illegal power failure. The vehicle security gateway continuously monitors the above-mentioned abnormal vehicle status. When the preset theft mode characteristics are detected, it indicates that the vehicle may have been stolen and the original vehicle communication module is about to fail or has already failed, at which point the theft response process is triggered.
[0033] Upon detecting signs of theft, the vehicle security gateway immediately activates its backup power supply to ensure continued operation even if the vehicle's main power is cut off. At this point, the gateway uses the backup power to send a UDS-compliant Diagnostic Service Request 31 (Routine Control) via the CAN bus to a pre-designated, high-value, and frequently disassembled target ECU (such as the Body Control Module, Electric Power Steering (EPS), or Airbag Controller System (SRS)). This request invokes a diagnostic routine specifically designed for theft scenarios, also known as a sentinel routine. This routine has a theft-specific ID and its function is not to perform mechanical actions, but rather to execute a data write operation to the target ECU's internal memory.
[0034] In one possible implementation, combined with Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, step S2 includes sub-steps S201~S203: S201, run the theft-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, encrypt the decoy URL link string, and encode it according to the standard DID data format.
[0035] In this step, after the target ECU runs the stolen goods diagnostic routine, it first preprocesses the decoy URL link string. The decoy URL link is configured as follows: The domain name of the decoy URL link points to the decoy server and is disguised as a common subdomain; The path parameters or query string of the decoy URL link contain an encrypted tracking token. The encrypted tracking token is generated by an encryption algorithm from the vehicle identification code, timestamp, and random number. It is used by a preset decoy server to decrypt the vehicle to obtain the vehicle identity information using a preset decryption key.
[0036] Understandably, the decoy URL link string originally existed in plaintext in the parameters of the diagnostic routine control request, in the format http: / / [our default domain name] / [encrypted tracking token], for example, "http: / / diag-assist.com / token=abc123xyz".
[0037] The stolen goods diagnostic routine first calls the ECU's built-in encryption engine, using a randomly generated symmetric key (such as the SM4 algorithm) to encrypt the sensitive portion (encrypted tracking token) of the decoy URL link string. Then, the entire link string is encoded according to the standard DID data format. For example, the encoding process includes converting the string to an ASCII byte sequence, padding or truncating it according to the DID data length and format requirements defined in the ISO 14229 standard, and ensuring the data conforms to the write specifications of the reserved DID storage area in the ECU firmware.
[0038] S202, the encrypted and encoded data is written to the reserved DID storage area, which is a diagnostic data identifier area defined by international standards but not used by this ECU for normal function.
[0039] In this step, the stolen goods diagnostic routine writes the encoded decoy URL link data to the storage area corresponding to the target DID number specified in the diagnostic routine control request. This reserved DID storage area is located in the non-volatile memory (such as Flash or EEPROM) of the ECU firmware. Its DID number is selected from the manufacturer-defined DID range (e.g., 0xF100~0xF1FF) reserved in the ISO 14229 standard, and this DID is not used by the ECU for any function (such as reading sensor values, calibration parameters, etc.) under normal vehicle operating conditions. The write operation is completed through the ECU's underlying memory write interface, ensuring data persistence. After the write is complete, the contents of this DID storage area contain the encrypted decoy URL link string, which can be accessed normally by subsequent diagnostic reading services.
[0040] In this embodiment, a decryption key is randomly generated for the encrypted decoy URL link. This decryption key is synchronized to a pre-built decoy server via a secure channel independent of the CAN bus (e.g., via an in-vehicle security gateway through a 4G / 5G network or Bluetooth short-range communication), ensuring that the decryption key is not transmitted on the CAN bus to prevent interception. This decryption key is used by the decoy server in subsequent steps to decrypt the encrypted tracking token and obtain original identity information such as the vehicle VIN and time of loss of contact. The key generation and synchronization process is executed in parallel with data writing, ensuring that the key has been securely delivered to the decoy server when the writing is completed.
[0041] S203, after the data writing is completed, the routine status flag of the stolen goods diagnostic routine is set to sleep state, so that the stolen goods diagnostic routine will not respond to new routine control requests before the next power-on reset.
[0042] In this step, after successfully writing data, the stolen diagnostic routine immediately sets a dedicated flag bit inside the ECU (e.g., the routine status register stored in RAM) to a dormant state. This flag bit is checked by the entry function of the stolen diagnostic routine: when the ECU receives another control request for the $31 diagnostic routine with the same routine ID, the entry function first checks the flag bit; if it is in a dormant state, it directly returns a negative response code, refusing to perform any write operation and not generating any log records. This flag bit is only cleared and restored to the ready state during the next power-on reset of the ECU (i.e., after the ECU has been completely powered off and then powered on again). This design ensures that the stolen diagnostic routine is permanently disabled after a single write (until the ECU restarts), avoiding the exposure risk that may be caused by repeated writes, and also reducing the possibility of data being overwritten by malicious multiple calls.
[0043] In one possible implementation, combined with Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, step S3 includes sub-steps S301~S302: S301, Receive and respond to the diagnostic service request from the external requester to poll and read the reserved diagnostic data identifier, wherein the diagnostic service request is the data read service by identifier in the UDS protocol.
[0044] Understandably, after a stolen vehicle is disassembled, a used ECU, injected with a diagnostic program specifically designed for stolen goods, ends up in a repair shop. The mechanic uses a universal diagnostic tool to connect to this used ECU. To read vehicle information and diagnose faults, they will inevitably perform a standard procedure: reading the ECU identification information. The external diagnostic tool will automatically poll a series of standard and manufacturer-defined DIDs to obtain information such as the VIN code, part number, and software version.
[0045] In this step, when the external diagnostic device polls for the reserved DID via the $22 ReadDataByIdentifier service in the UDS protocol, this ECU receives and responds to the diagnostic service request sent by the external requester to read the reserved DID. This diagnostic service request is the $22 ReadDataByIdentifier service in the UDS protocol, specifically service number 22. In this step, the ECU recognizes that the reserved DID has been written with data.
[0046] S302, read the written decoy URL link from the reserved DID storage area, encapsulate the decoy URL link into the data field of the standard UDS diagnostic response message and return it to the external requester without generating a negative response code or abnormal communication behavior, so that the decoy URL link is displayed as standard attribute data on the operation interface of the external requester.
[0047] Understandably, when an external diagnostic tool reads the reserved DID written by the stolen diagnostic routine, this ECU will return the contents of the corresponding DID storage area, i.e., the complete encrypted decoy URL link string, as a completely legitimate data response to the external diagnostic tool.
[0048] Furthermore, the decoy URL link's prefix includes misleading prompt text related to vehicle anti-theft, vehicle after-sales service, or vehicle status inquiry. This misleading prompt text is returned along with the decoy URL link so that the external diagnostic device displays it as a clickable hyperlink. In this embodiment, the domain name of the decoy URL link points to a pre-built decoy server, and this domain name is disguised as a common subdomain, such as diag-assist.com, making it resemble a legitimate automotive diagnostic assistance website to reduce the operator's vigilance.
[0049] In practice, after receiving the data corresponding to the DID, the diagnostic software, according to its preset interface layout, displays the encrypted decoy URL link string as a standard ECU attribute on the ECU details page or similar interface. This link text is displayed directly as a clickable hyperlink, accompanied by misleading prompts such as "Anti-theft online matching entry: http: / / diag-assist.com / token=abc123xyz". When faced with an anti-theft online matching prompt, the mechanic, in an attempt to resolve a potential anti-theft lockout issue with the ECU, will click or access this link.
[0050] This embodiment returns the decoy URL link as standard UDS diagnostic response data, displaying it directly in the interface of a general diagnostic tool as legitimate ECU attribute information. The entire process does not trigger any negative response codes or abnormal logs, requiring no modification to the diagnostic protocol or addition of special instructions, and is not dependent on any specific diagnostic device model. This achieves dual transparency and camouflage for both the diagnostic tool and the repairman. This embodiment achieves seamless transmission of decoy information from within the ECU to the operator's visual interface with extremely high concealment and compatibility, creating a reliable prerequisite for inducing clicks and subsequent passive positioning.
[0051] In one possible implementation, the OEM pre-sets a web server corresponding to the domain name contained in the encrypted decoy URL link string as bait. This decoy server does not perform any active scanning, but only passively listens for and records all HTTP / HTTPS access requests.
[0052] When the repairman's computer accesses the decoy URL link, the decoy server directly extracts the visitor's public IP address from the TCP / IP protocol stack, and at the same time parses the pre-embedded encrypted tracking token from the path parameters or query string of the request URL.
[0053] The decoy server uses a pre-set decryption key to decrypt the encrypted tracking token. Since the key has been synchronized to the decoy server in advance via a secure channel, the decoy server can correctly decrypt the encrypted tracking token (e.g., token=abc123xyz), obtaining the vehicle's unique hardware identifier (VIN) and original identity information such as a timestamp and / or the time the vehicle went missing. Subsequently, the decoy server calls a third-party IP geolocation database to convert the public IP address into approximate geographical coordinates (e.g., including longitude and latitude).
[0054] By associating the geographic coordinates with the unique hardware identifier, structured alarm information containing vehicle identity (VIN), current location (geographic coordinates), and access time (HTTP request timestamp) is obtained, so as to immediately generate an accurate loss and location alarm and send an alarm to the preset associated parties (such as the OEM's back-end monitoring center and the mobile app bound to the vehicle owner), thus completing the cross-temporal and spatial binding and location loss reporting from vehicle identity to current location.
[0055] Throughout the process, the decoy server can also return a normal status code and a simulated vehicle diagnostic report page to further confuse visitors and prevent them from noticing anything unusual.
[0056] This embodiment uses a decoy server that passively listens to HTTP requests to obtain the visitor's public IP address without actively sending any probe messages. At the same time, it uses the decryption result of the encrypted tracking token in the decoy URL link to identify the vehicle's identity, instantly binding the two together and generating an alarm message. This achieves a precise cross-temporal and spatial match between the stolen vehicle's identity and its current location, and achieves extremely high concealment and security. It also solves the problem that traditional active positioning technology completely fails after the communication module is damaged.
[0057] Figure 3 This invention provides a structural diagram of an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system controlled by diagnostic routines, as shown in the embodiment of the invention. Figure 3 As shown, an encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system using diagnostic routine control includes an onboard security gateway, an ECU, and a decoy server, wherein: The vehicle security gateway is used to send a diagnostic routine control request to the ECU when the vehicle is detected to meet the preset theft mode characteristics. The ECU is configured to respond to the diagnostic routine control request to run the corresponding stolen-specific diagnostic routine, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed; and, in response to a request from an external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through a standard diagnostic service, return the decoy URL link as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link. The decoy server is used to obtain the visitor's public IP address and parse the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL when the decoy URL is accessed, so as to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0058] It is understood that the encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system using diagnostic routine control provided by the present invention corresponds to the encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting method using diagnostic routine control provided in the foregoing embodiments. The relevant technical features of the encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting system using diagnostic routine control can be referred to the relevant technical features of the encrypted anchor point location and loss reporting method using diagnostic routine control, and will not be repeated here.
[0059] Please see Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an embodiment of the electronic device provided in this invention. For example... Figure 4 As shown, this embodiment of the invention provides an electronic device 400, including a memory 410, a processor 420, and a computer program 411 stored in the memory 410 and executable on the processor 420. When the processor 420 executes the computer program 411, it performs the following steps: S1, in response to a diagnostic routine control request from the vehicle security gateway, the diagnostic routine control request being issued based on the vehicle security gateway detecting that the vehicle meets preset theft mode characteristics; S2, run the stolen-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed. S3, in response to the request from the external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through the standard diagnostic service, the decoy URL link is returned as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link; When the decoy URL is accessed, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0060] Please see Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an embodiment of a computer-readable storage medium provided by the present invention. (See diagram below.) Figure 5 As shown, this embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium 500 on which a computer program 411 is stored. When the computer program 411 is executed by a processor, it performs the following steps: S1, in response to a diagnostic routine control request from the vehicle security gateway, the diagnostic routine control request being issued based on the vehicle security gateway detecting that the vehicle meets preset theft mode characteristics; S2, run the stolen-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed. S3, in response to the request from the external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through the standard diagnostic service, the decoy URL link is returned as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link; When the decoy URL is accessed, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
[0061] This invention provides a method, system, and storage medium for locating and reporting stolen vehicles using encrypted anchor points controlled by diagnostic routines. Upon detecting signs of vehicle theft, the system uses diagnostic routines to write an encrypted decoy URL link into the reserved DID storage area of the target ECU, making the ECU a latent tracking node. When the ECU is read by a general diagnostic tool at a repair shop, the decoy URL is returned as legitimate standard diagnostic data and displayed as a clickable hyperlink, inducing the operator to actively access it. The decoy server passively receives the access request, obtains the visitor's public IP address from the HTTP protocol, decrypts the encrypted token in the URL to obtain vehicle identity information, and associates the two to complete location matching and alarm.
[0062] The present invention has the following main advantages: First, a rear-end positioning channel was created that is completely independent of the original vehicle T-Box and cellular network. It is only activated after the vehicle is dismantled and sold as stolen goods, thus fundamentally avoiding traditional counter-reconnaissance methods such as removing the antenna and signal jamming. Secondly, it utilizes the data format of the standard UDS diagnostic protocol to achieve double transparency camouflage, which does not generate any abnormal signals for diagnostic instruments and repairmen, and is compatible with all general diagnostic equipment. Third, it adopts a purely passive listening architecture. The decoy server does not send any probe messages, making it extremely difficult for security software to detect. Once the target accesses it, the vehicle's identity can be instantly and accurately bound to its current location, solving the fundamental problem that the vehicle cannot actively report its location after losing contact.
[0063] It should be noted that the descriptions of each embodiment in the above embodiments have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.
[0064] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0065] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.
[0066] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.
[0067] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.
[0068] Although preferred embodiments of the invention have been described, those skilled in the art, upon learning the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to these embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including both the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications falling within the scope of the invention.
[0069] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Therefore, if these modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this invention and their equivalents, this invention also intends to include these modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A cryptographic anchor point positioning misreporting method controlled by a diagnostic routine, applied to an ECU of a vehicle, characterized by, include: S1, in response to a diagnostic routine control request from the vehicle security gateway, the diagnostic routine control request being issued based on the vehicle security gateway detecting that the vehicle meets preset theft mode characteristics; S2, run the stolen-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed. S3, in response to the request from the external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through the standard diagnostic service, the decoy URL link is returned as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link; When the decoy URL is accessed, the preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
2. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled by a diagnostic routine according to claim 1, wherein, Step S1 includes: S101, receive a preset diagnostic routine control request from the unified diagnostic service protocol of the vehicle security gateway via the controller area network bus. The preset diagnostic routine control request is issued by the vehicle security gateway using backup power after detecting that the vehicle meets the preset theft mode characteristics. S102, the preset diagnostic routine control request carries a decoy URL link string to be written.
3. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled by a diagnostic routine according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The characteristics of the vehicle theft include at least one of the following: antenna disconnection of the vehicle-mounted telematics terminal, continuous loss of GPS signal, or illegal power outage.
4. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method using a diagnostic routine control of claim 2, wherein, Step S2 includes: S201, run the theft-specific diagnostic routine corresponding to the diagnostic routine control request, encrypt the decoy URL link string, and encode it according to the standard diagnostic data identifier data format; S202, write the encrypted and encoded data into the reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area. The reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area is a diagnostic data identifier area defined by international standards but not used by this ECU for normal function. S203, After the data writing is completed, set the routine status flag of the stolen goods diagnostic routine to the dormant state.
5. The cryptographic anchor point location mislaying method using diagnostic routine control according to claim 4, wherein, Step S2 also includes: A decryption key is randomly generated when the decoy URL link is written, and the decryption key is synchronized to the decoy server through a secure channel independent of the controller LAN bus.
6. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled with a diagnostic routine of claim 5, wherein, Step S3 includes: S301, Receive and respond to the diagnostic service request from the external requester to poll and read the reserved diagnostic data identifier, wherein the diagnostic service request is the data read by identifier service in the UDS protocol; S302, read the written decoy URL link from the reserved diagnostic data identifier storage area, encapsulate the decoy URL link into the data field of the standard UDS diagnostic response message and return it to the external requester without generating a negative response code or abnormal communication behavior, so that the decoy URL link is displayed as standard attribute data on the operation interface of the external requester.
7. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled with a diagnostic routine of claim 6, wherein, The step of displaying the bait URL as a standard attribute data on the requester's interface includes: The decoy URL is displayed as a clickable hyperlink in the user interface of the external requester, and the hyperlink is accompanied by deceptive text labels related to vehicle anti-theft, vehicle after-sales service, or vehicle status inquiry.
8. The cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled with a diagnostic routine of claim 7, wherein, The decoy URL is configured as follows: The domain name of the decoy URL link points to the decoy server and is disguised as a common subdomain; The encrypted tracking token is contained in the path parameters or query string of the decoy URL link. The encrypted tracking token is generated by an encryption algorithm from the vehicle identification code, timestamp, and random number, and is used by the decoy server to decrypt the vehicle to obtain vehicle identity information using a preset decryption key.
9. A cryptographic anchor point location misreporting method controlled with a diagnostic routine according to claim 7 or 8, characterized in that, The preset decoy server obtains the visitor's public IP address and parses the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL link to determine the vehicle's identity and current location, and generates a location loss alarm, including: The pre-set decoy server passively receives access requests triggered by clicking the decoy URL link, extracts the visitor's public IP address from the access request, and parses the pre-embedded encrypted tracking token from the path parameters or query string of the request URL. The encrypted tracking token is decrypted using a preset decryption key to obtain the vehicle's unique hardware identifier, and a third-party IP geolocation database is called to convert the public IP address into geographic coordinates. The geographic coordinates are associated with the unique hardware identifier to generate structured alarm information containing vehicle identity, current location and access time, and an alarm is sent to the preset associated parties.
10. An encryption anchor point location reporting system controlled with a diagnostic routine, characterized by include: The vehicle security gateway is used to send a diagnostic routine control request to the ECU when the vehicle is detected to meet the characteristics of a preset theft mode. The ECU is configured to respond to the diagnostic routine control request to run the corresponding stolen-specific diagnostic routine, write the encrypted decoy URL link into the diagnostic data identifier storage area reserved in its own firmware, and put the stolen-specific diagnostic routine into a dormant state after the writing is completed; and, in response to a request from an external requester to read the reserved diagnostic data identifier through a standard diagnostic service, return the decoy URL link as legitimate data to induce the operator to access the decoy URL link. The decoy server is used to obtain the visitor's public IP address and parse the encrypted tracking token contained in the decoy URL when the decoy URL is accessed, so as to determine the vehicle's identity and current location and generate a location loss alarm.
