Industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement methods and computer-readable storage media

By embedding a custom physical layer security enhancement IE into the MAC frame of the industrial wireless network, binding the inherent feature vector of the device and comparing the feature vector in real time, and combining it with dynamic session key updates, a two-layer security defense architecture is constructed. This solves the problems of easy identity authentication fraud, lack of physical layer protection and rigid key management in industrial wireless network protocols, and achieves highly secure and real-time network communication.

CN123123898APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17SHENYANG BONCHREE TECHNOLOGY CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611627656.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-10-21
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing industrial wireless network protocols are vulnerable to spoofing attacks in identity authentication, lack security protection at the physical layer, and have rigid key management, failing to meet the high security and real-time requirements of industry.

Method used

By embedding a custom physical layer security enhancement IE into the MAC frame of the industrial wireless network, binding the device's inherent feature vector and comparing the feature vector in real time, and combining it with dynamic session key updates, a two-layer security defense architecture is constructed to achieve hardware-level identity authentication and dynamic key management.

Benefits of technology

It effectively resists forged access and targeted interference, meets the industrial microsecond-level communication latency requirements, reduces the risk of key leakage, and enables progressive security upgrades of the network.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention relates to the technical field of industrial wireless network security. The invention provides a method for enhancing the security of industrial wireless network protocols and a computer-readable storage medium. The method includes: when a source device joins the network, the source device sends an association request frame to the industrial wireless network gateway; the industrial wireless network gateway parses the frame and replies with an association response frame to the source device, completing the security capability negotiation between the two parties; after entering the network access registration phase, the industrial wireless network gateway collects the wireless radio frequency signal of the source device and binds the device's inherent feature vector with the source device's address; during the wireless communication phase between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway, the industrial wireless network gateway receives the industrial wireless network wireless data packets sent by the source device and calculates the feature distance; the feature distance is compared with a preset radio frequency feature verification threshold, and data packets are forwarded or discarded; the dynamic session key is periodically updated. This invention can effectively resist spoofed access attacks.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the technical field of industrial wireless network security, and more specifically, to a method for enhancing the security of industrial wireless network protocols and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Wireless Network for Industrial Automation (Factory Automation) is a national standard for industrial wireless networks independently developed in my country and designed for factory automation scenarios. This protocol boasts advantages such as high reliability, high real-time performance, and strong anti-interference capabilities, and is widely used in critical industrial business scenarios such as production line control in discrete manufacturing, workshop equipment linkage, logistics tracking, and automated processing. With the deepening implementation of the Industrial Internet, the amount of control commands, equipment status, and production data carried by wireless networks in industrial settings continues to increase. Data security during wireless transmission and device access security are gradually becoming core issues that industrial control systems must address.

[0003] Existing industrial wireless network protocols rely primarily on data link layer encryption and simplified device access authentication for their native security mechanisms. These mechanisms have several security vulnerabilities in complex industrial wireless network environments, the main shortcomings of which are as follows:

[0004] (1) The authentication mechanism of upper-layer devices is vulnerable to deception attacks.

[0005] Existing authentication methods rely on MAC addresses and pre-installed keys on devices to verify identity. Attackers can intercept legitimate devices' MAC addresses by listening to wireless signals, and then forge MAC addresses to launch man-in-the-middle attacks and fake gateway / access point attacks, enabling unauthorized devices to access industrial wireless networks and threatening on-site production control security.

[0006] (2) Lack of physical layer security protection, and exposure of wireless radio frequency characteristics.

[0007] Traditional industrial wireless network security solutions only encrypt and protect the message payload, failing to protect the physical layer information of the wireless signal. The radio frequency fingerprint characteristics of the wireless signal, such as its transmitted power spectrum, carrier frequency offset, and phase noise, are exposed. Attackers can use these physical characteristics to track devices, analyze behavior, and launch targeted interference attacks against specific devices.

[0008] (3) The key management mechanism is rigid and there is a long-term risk of leakage.

[0009] Industrial field terminal devices generally have limited computing power and storage resources. Traditional centralized key negotiation schemes have high signaling overhead and cannot meet the real-time constraints of industry. Currently, statically pre-configured keys are commonly used for long-term reuse. Once the keys are leaked, the entire industrial wireless network security barrier will completely fail.

[0010] In summary, existing industrial wireless network protocols have weak security mechanisms, lacking hardware-level authentication, dynamic key updates, and standardized secure extension channels. They are unable to resist spoofing, eavesdropping, and targeted interference, failing to meet the high security and real-time requirements of industrial applications. Therefore, we urgently need to propose a novel method for enhancing the security of industrial wireless network protocols. Summary of the Invention

[0011] The present invention aims to solve the following technical problems existing in the prior art or related technologies: (1) Single and vulnerable identity authentication: relying solely on MAC address and static key, it is susceptible to imitation, man-in-the-middle attacks, and fake device access attacks. (2) No physical layer security protection: radio frequency features are exposed, making it easy to locate, analyze, and interfere with, and it lacks hardware-level anti-counterfeiting capabilities. (3) Rigid key management: static keys are used for a long time, resulting in a high risk of leakage, and lack a lightweight and efficient dynamic update mechanism. (4) Lack of protocol carrying: there are no standard extended fields, and security capabilities and parameters cannot be compatiblely transmitted in standard processes. (5) Conflict between security and real-time performance: security mechanisms are independent and fragmented, resulting in high processing overhead and failing to meet the industrial microsecond-level latency requirements.

[0012] Therefore, the primary objective of this invention is to propose a method for enhancing the security of industrial wireless network protocols.

[0013] A second objective of this invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium.

[0014] To achieve the above objectives, the first aspect of the present invention provides a method for enhancing the security of an industrial wireless network protocol. This method is applied to an industrial wireless network composed of a source device and an industrial wireless network gateway. The method includes: Step S1: When the source device powers on and initiates access to the industrial wireless network, it embeds a first custom physical layer security enhancement (PEI) into the frame body of the industrial wireless network MAC frame and sends an association request frame carrying the first custom PEI to the industrial wireless network gateway, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom PEI; Step S2: After the industrial wireless network gateway completes the parsing of the first custom PEI, it replies to the source device with an association response frame carrying a second custom PEI, completing the security capability negotiation between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway; wherein the second custom PEI and the first custom PEI have the same field structure format but different data content; the second custom PEI encapsulates security negotiation configuration parameters; Step S3: After the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway complete the security capability negotiation and enter the network access registration stage, the source device sends an association request frame carrying the first custom PEI into the frame body of the industrial wireless network MAC frame, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom PEI; Step S2: After the industrial wireless network gateway completes the security capability negotiation and enters the network access registration stage, it sends an association request frame carrying the first custom PEI to the source device, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom PEI; Step S3: After the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway complete the security capability negotiation and enter the network access registration stage, it sends an association request frame carrying the first custom PEI to the source device, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom PEI; Step S4: After the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway complete the network access registration and enter the network access registration stage, it sends an association request frame carrying the first custom PEI to the source device, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom PEI; Step S5: After the source device The network gateway collects the wireless radio frequency signals from the source device, extracts the corresponding radio frequency features from the wireless radio frequency signals, constructs a device-specific feature vector, binds the device-specific feature vector to the source device address, and saves the bound information to the local legitimate radio frequency fingerprint database of the industrial wireless network gateway; Step S4: During the wireless communication phase between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway, the industrial wireless network gateway receives the industrial wireless network wireless data packets sent by the source device, extracts the corresponding radio frequency features from the industrial wireless network wireless data packets, generates a real-time feature vector, and calculates the feature distance based on the device-specific feature vector, the real-time feature vector, and the weighted Euclidean distance formula; wherein, the feature distance represents the degree of deviation between the industrial wireless network wireless data packets and those in the legitimate radio frequency fingerprint database; Step S5: The feature distance is compared with a preset radio frequency feature verification threshold, and based on the comparison result, the industrial wireless network wireless data packets are forwarded or discarded; Step S6: The industrial wireless network gateway and the source device periodically update the dynamic session key according to a preset key update cycle.

[0015] In this technical solution, the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE is carried in the MAC frame. The device's inherent feature vector is only constructed and stored during this device network registration phase and is not used as a dynamic update benchmark for subsequent communication verification.

[0016] Preferably, in step S2, the security negotiation configuration parameters include the radio frequency feature verification threshold and the key update period; the radio frequency feature verification threshold is the judgment threshold for physical layer radio frequency feature verification, used to verify whether the radio frequency features of subsequent communication wireless frames are legitimate; the key update period is the time interval parameter for the device to perform key rotation and update.

[0017] Preferably, in steps S1 and S2, both the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE include: Element ID field, Length field, Sec_Capability field, Key_Factor field, and Feature_Params field.

[0018] In this technical solution, the Feature_Params field is used to carry security negotiation configuration parameters related to radio frequency feature verification.

[0019] Preferably, in steps S3 and S4, the radio frequency characteristics include received power and carrier frequency offset; based on the received power and carrier frequency offset, a device-specific feature vector is constructed or a real-time feature vector is generated; the received power is the signal strength of the signal received by the industrial wireless network gateway from the source device; the carrier frequency offset is the carrier frequency offset caused by the source device's hardware crystal oscillator.

[0020] Preferably, in step S3, the expression for the inherent feature vector of the device is:

[0021] ;

[0022] in, The registered reference received power; For the registered reference carrier frequency offset;

[0023] In step S4, the expression for the real-time feature vector is:

[0024] ;

[0025] in, To receive power in real time, For real-time carrier frequency offset;

[0026] In step S4, the weighted Euclidean distance calculation formula is:

[0027] ;

[0028] in, For feature distance, This refers to the weighting adjustment coefficient; the weighting adjustment coefficient It is used to balance the dimensional differences between received power and carrier frequency offset, and can be dynamically adjusted.

[0029] Preferably, in step S5, based on the comparison result, the forwarding or dropping of the industrial wireless network data packet is performed, specifically including: step S51: if the feature distance is less than the radio frequency feature verification threshold, step S52 is executed; otherwise, step S53 is executed; step S52: the source device is determined to be a legitimate device, and the industrial wireless network data packet is forwarded; step S53: the source device is determined to be an illegitimate device, the industrial wireless network data packet is dropped, and a physical layer intrusion alarm is reported to the upper-level industrial wireless network management host.

[0030] Preferably, step S6 specifically includes: Step S61: When the industrial wireless network gateway reaches the preset key update cycle, a random update factor is generated through the industrial wireless network gateway, the random update factor is encrypted, and encapsulated using the same field format as the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE before being sent to the source device; Step S62: The source device decrypts the encrypted random update factor to obtain the random update factor sent by the industrial wireless network gateway; Step S63: Based on the preset master key, the random update factor, and the fixed security salt value, the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway synchronously perform KDF key derivation to generate the latest dynamic session key; Step S64: The source device and the industrial wireless network gateway use the latest dynamic session key to complete the encrypted transmission of subsequent wireless communication between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway.

[0031] Preferably, the KDF key derivation uses the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm;

[0032] The formula for calculating the dynamic session key is as follows:

[0033] ;

[0034] in, For dynamic session keys; For the preset master key, For random update factors; For string concatenation; To fix the safe salt value.

[0035] Preferably, the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway communicate wirelessly in accordance with the GB / T 26790.2 standard.

[0036] The second aspect of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method described in any of the above technical solutions.

[0037] Compared with existing technologies, the industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method and computer-readable storage medium provided by this invention have the following advantages:

[0038] (1) Strong protocol compatibility and support for standardized and smooth upgrades: This invention does not change the main structure of the original industrial wireless network basic frame, but only adds extended information elements to realize secure signaling interaction. Existing standard equipment can selectively be compatible with this extended function to realize the gradual security upgrade of the network.

[0039] (2) Construct a two-layer three-dimensional security defense to effectively resist spoofing access attacks: Construct a dual protection architecture of "physical layer radio frequency fingerprint anti-counterfeiting authentication + link layer dynamic key encryption". Radio frequency fingerprint is determined by the inherent characteristics of hardware circuits. Attackers cannot bypass the verification by simply tampering with the MAC address in software. It can effectively prevent fake device access and man-in-the-middle spoofing attacks.

[0040] (3) Meets the real-time performance indicators of industrial automation: The physical layer radio frequency feature extraction is completed in parallel and in real time by the hardware circuit, without introducing additional delay in the protocol stack software processing flow, which can meet the microsecond-level communication delay constraints of factory automation scenarios.

[0041] (4) Dynamic key mechanism reduces the harm caused by key leakage: Session keys are updated periodically and dynamically, abandoning the long-term reuse mode of static keys. Even if a single session key is leaked, it only affects the communication data of the current period. Attackers cannot use this to control the entire network for a long time, which significantly reduces the security attack surface.

[0042] Additional aspects and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the description which follows, or may be learned by practice of the invention. Attached Figure Description

[0043] Figure 1 This diagram illustrates the overall flow of an industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 2 This illustration shows the industrial wireless network MAC frame structure and the physical layer security enhancement IE within the industrial wireless network MAC frame according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 3 This diagram illustrates a process for physical layer feature extraction, comparison, and intrusion detection of an industrial wireless network gateway according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0046] Figure 4 A schematic diagram illustrating the principle of a dynamic session key generation and update algorithm according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0047] To better understand the above-mentioned objects, features, and advantages of the present invention, such as Figures 1 to 4 As shown in the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, the present invention will be further described in detail below. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in these embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0048] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a full understanding of the invention. However, the invention may also be practiced in other ways different from those described herein, and therefore the scope of protection of the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0049] The technical solution of the present invention will be described below with reference to a specific embodiment. This specific embodiment of the industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method is applied to an industrial wireless communication network composed of a source device and an industrial wireless network gateway; the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway communicate wirelessly in accordance with the GB / T 26790.2 standard; the method is specifically implemented through the following steps:

[0050] (1) Step S1: Enter the security negotiation phase (corresponding to the security negotiation phase in Figure 1 and the frame structure in Figure 2). For example... Figure 1 As shown, the source device sends an Association Request frame carrying a security enhancement IE to the destination gateway (i.e., the industrial wireless network gateway). After receiving the frame, the destination gateway returns an Association Response frame carrying a negotiation response to the source device, thus completing the negotiation of security capabilities between the two parties.

[0051] In this specific embodiment, when the source device powers on and initiates access to the industrial wireless network, it sends an association request frame to the industrial wireless network gateway.

[0052] As shown in Figure 2, an industrial wireless network MAC frame consists of three parts: the MAC frame header, the frame body MSDC, and the FCS checksum field. This invention adds a physical layer security enhancement IE within the MSDC field of the MAC frame body. This IE sequentially contains five fields: Element ID, Length, Sec_Capability, Key_Factor, and Feature_Params.

[0053] The Element ID field is set to 0x0F, serving as the IE type identifier; the Length field indicates the total byte length of subsequent fields; the Sec_Capability field carries the security capability bitmap; the Key_Factor field stores the encrypted key update factor; and the Feature_Params field carries the radio frequency configuration parameters. By embedding this custom IE within the MAC frame body, security negotiation-related parameters can be carried within the industrial wireless network protocol framework, enabling security capability interaction.

[0054] In this specific embodiment, a first custom physical layer security enhancement IE is embedded in the frame body of the industrial wireless network MAC frame. This IE sequentially fills in the fields of Element ID, Length, Sec_Capability, Key_Factor, and Feature_Params, informing the industrial wireless network gateway that it supports RF fingerprint authentication and dynamic key update functions. The industrial wireless network gateway receives and parses the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE, then replies with an AssociationResponse frame. Through the same extended IE unit, it sends configuration parameters such as the RF feature verification threshold and key update cycle, completing the security capability negotiation between the two ends. This same extended IE unit is the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE. The second custom physical layer security enhancement IE has the same field structure format as the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE, but carries different data content; the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE encapsulates security negotiation configuration parameters.

[0055] As shown in Table 1, both the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE include: Element ID field, Length field, Sec_Capability field, Key_Factor field, and Feature_Params field.

[0056] Table 1. Field formats of the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE.

[0057]

[0058] (2) Step S2: Enter the fingerprint registration stage (corresponding to the fingerprint registration stage in Figure 1). For example... Figure 1 As shown, the source device sends RF fingerprint sampling data to the destination gateway; the destination gateway (i.e., the industrial wireless network gateway) completes the RF feature extraction, stores the device's inherent feature vector into the local valid RF fingerprint database, and then returns a registration success receipt to the source device.

[0059] In this specific embodiment, the registration process begins after security negotiation is completed. During the initial communication establishment phase, the industrial wireless network gateway continuously collects the wireless radio frequency signals from the source device, extracts the received power and carrier frequency offset, and constructs the device's inherent feature vector. The device's inherent feature vector is bound to the device address and stored in the legitimate radio frequency fingerprint database locally on the industrial wireless network gateway, serving as a basis for subsequent identity verification.

[0060] (3) Step S3: Enter the identity authentication phase (corresponding to the identity authentication phase in Figure 1, and the discrimination process in Figure 3). For example... Figure 1 As shown, the source device sends a service packet carrying radio frequency feature sampling information to the destination gateway (i.e., the industrial wireless network gateway); the destination gateway extracts the real-time radio frequency features, performs feature comparison and intrusion judgment, and returns the authentication pass or rejection result to the source device, thereby deciding whether to forward or discard the service packet.

[0061] After negotiation and registration are completed, periodic industrial data transmission begins. Each time the industrial wireless network gateway receives an industrial wireless network data packet, it synchronously executes the process shown in Figure 3: Upon starting the process, the industrial wireless network gateway receives the industrial wireless network data packet and performs hardware demodulation on the message; subsequently, it extracts the real-time feature vector corresponding to the current message. Read the inherent feature vectors pre-registered by the device from the local fingerprint database. ; Calculate the weighted Euclidean distance between two eigenvectors .

[0062] Determine the weighted Euclidean distance Is the data packet less than the radio frequency feature verification threshold (Threshold)? If the result is yes, the device is considered legitimate, and the data packet is forwarded; if the result is no, it is considered an unauthorized spoofing device, the data packet is discarded, and an intrusion alarm is triggered. The process ends after data packet processing is complete.

[0063] The hardware performs parallel demodulation of service packets and extracts the current signal radio frequency characteristics in real time to generate real-time feature vectors. ; Retrieve pre-stored registration features from the database Substituting into the weighted Euclidean distance formula:

[0064] ;

[0065] In the formula, This is the feature distance value. It represents the degree of deviation between the current signal and a legally registered fingerprint; the smaller the value, the more similar they are. and The received signal power (RSSI) component. The power value is measured in real time. is the reference power value recorded during registration. and are both carrier frequency offset (CFO) components. Fcur is the frequency offset value extracted in real time, and Fref is the reference frequency offset value recorded during registration (the inherent characteristic of the hardware crystal oscillator). is a weight adjustment coefficient; the weight adjustment coefficient is used to balance the influence of different physical dimensions of power and frequency offset, and can dynamically adjust the weights of the two in the decision according to the on-site electromagnetic environment.

[0066] Compare the calculated distance with the preset threshold Threshold. If <Threshold, the source device is determined to be legal, and the industrial control message is forwarded to the upper layer; if ≥Threshold, it is determined as an illegal device with MAC spoofing, the gateway directly discards the data packet and reports a physical layer intrusion alarm to the host computer.

[0067] (4) Step S4: Enter the dynamic session key update phase (corresponding to the dynamic session key update phase in Figure 1 and the key process in Figure 4). As shown Figure 1 , the source device sends key interaction signaling to the destination gateway (i.e., the industrial wireless network gateway); the gateway completes the generation and update of the session key, then sends an update completion notification to the source device, and both parties synchronously enable the new session key.

[0068] As shown Figure 4 , when the gateway (i.e., the industrial wireless network gateway) reaches the key update period, it first generates a random factor, encapsulates it into an industrial wireless network interaction frame and sends it to the source device; the source device decrypts it with its own private key to obtain the key update factor. Subsequently, the gateway and the source device synchronously perform KDF key derivation operation to generate a dynamic session key consistent for both parties. The encrypted transmission of industrial messages is completed by using this session key. After that, the gateway judges whether the key update period is reached again: if the judgment is yes, a new random factor is regenerated to start a new round of key update process; if the judgment is no, the current session key is continuously used to encrypt and transmit industrial messages.

[0069] The industrial wireless network gateway generates a random update factor according to the preset key update period , encrypts it with the public key of the source device, fills it into the Key_Factor field of the extended IE (the extended IE has the same field format as the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE), and sends it along with a common interaction frame. The source device obtains the plaintext by decrypting with the local private key Using the master key and dynamic factor as input, a fixed-length message authentication code is calculated using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm, which serves as the communication session key. The source device and the industrial wireless network gateway synchronously perform KDF key derivation to generate the latest dynamic session key. The source device and the industrial wireless network gateway then use this latest dynamic session key to complete the encrypted transmission of subsequent wireless communication between them. The formula for calculating the dynamic session key is:

[0070] ;

[0071] in, For dynamic session keys; The pre-set master key is a fixed master key that is pre-set by the system and uniformly stored by the gateway and the source device;

[0072] This is the random update factor, which is the random key update factor periodically issued by the gateway; For string concatenation; A fixed security salt value is used to constrain the uniqueness of key derivation.

[0073] Both ends generate a consistent session key for subsequent encrypted transmission of industrial messages. At each preset key update cycle, the industrial wireless network gateway issues a new random factor to refresh the session key, avoiding the risk of leakage caused by long-term reuse of static keys.

[0074] In this specific embodiment, to overcome the shortcomings of existing industrial wireless network protocol security schemes, such as easy identity forgery, lack of physical layer protection, and fixed key mechanisms, this embodiment provides a method for enhancing the security of industrial wireless network protocols. Specifically, by introducing physical layer radio frequency fingerprint feature authentication and a dynamic session key periodic update mechanism into the standard protocol process, a two-layer linkage security protection system of "physical layer and data link layer" is constructed, which improves the anti-attack capability of industrial wireless networks while maintaining compatibility with the original industrial wireless network standard framework.

[0075] In this specific embodiment, the solution only adds an extended IE unit without changing the original industrial wireless network MAC frame header and FCS check field, thus achieving backward compatibility; the radio frequency feature acquisition is processed in parallel by hardware, which introduces almost no additional communication latency, meets the microsecond-level real-time requirements of factory automation, and is suitable for industrial scenarios such as intelligent manufacturing production lines and automated logistics in workshops.

[0076] Based on the above specific embodiments, the inventive points of this invention are summarized as follows: (1) Custom physical layer security enhancement IE extension unit is defined in the standard industrial wireless network MAC frame. Under the premise of not modifying the original industrial wireless network basic frame structure and being compatible with GB / T 26790.2 standard, an information element IE is added as a security signaling carrier; security capability negotiation, radio frequency feature parameter distribution, and dynamic key factor transmission are completed in the device association request / response interaction stage. Solving the bottleneck that the physical layer security mechanism cannot be embedded in the standard protocol is the basic support innovation of the overall solution. (2) Construct a hardware-level auxiliary identity authentication mechanism based on radio frequency fingerprint. The unique feature vector of the device is constructed by using the inherent physical layer radio frequency features (received power, carrier frequency offset) of the wireless transceiver chip; a weighted Euclidean distance discrimination algorithm is designed to complete feature comparison in real time in the data packet reception stage. Unlike the software tamperable MAC authentication, hardware fingerprint anti-counterfeiting is realized, resisting fake device access and man-in-the-middle spoofing attacks from the source. (3) Relying on the extended IE to carry the encryption random factor, the dynamic session key of the link layer is synchronously updated. In the associated process and periodic interaction, the encrypted key update factor is transmitted; the two communicating parties derive the session key synchronously through KDF based on the master key, random factor and fixed protocol salt value, supporting periodic update / one-time key. There is no need for complex centralized key negotiation, which is suitable for industrial terminal resource-constrained scenarios and reduces the security threat caused by static key leakage. (4) An integrated two-layer collaborative security architecture of "protocol extension channel + physical layer fingerprint authentication + dynamic session encryption" is proposed. Physical layer identity anti-counterfeiting and link layer data encryption are linked and integrated through a unified extension protocol channel to form a complete security closed loop of "access identity verification and transmission data encryption"; physical layer feature extraction is executed in parallel by hardware to ensure the real-time performance of industrial communication and achieve a balance of compatibility, security and real-time performance.

[0077] In summary, this invention sequentially completes security negotiation, fingerprint registration, real-time identity authentication, and dynamic key update, thereby enabling secure device access and industrial wireless communication.

[0078] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method applied to an industrial wireless network composed of a source end device and an industrial wireless network gateway, characterized in that, The method includes: Step S1: When the source device powers on and initiates access to the industrial wireless network, it embeds a first custom physical layer security enhancement IE into the frame body of the industrial wireless network MAC frame and sends an association request frame carrying the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE to the industrial wireless network gateway, so that the industrial wireless network gateway can receive and parse the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE. Step S2: After the industrial wireless network gateway completes the parsing of the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE, it replies to the source device with an associated response frame carrying the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE, thus completing the security capability negotiation between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway. The second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE have the same field structure format but different data content. The second custom physical layer security enhancement IE encapsulates security negotiation configuration parameters. Step S3: After the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway complete the security capability negotiation and enter the network access registration stage, the industrial wireless network gateway collects the wireless radio frequency signal of the source device, extracts the corresponding radio frequency features from the wireless radio frequency signal, constructs the device inherent feature vector, binds the device inherent feature vector with the address of the source device, and saves the bound information to the local legitimate radio frequency fingerprint database of the industrial wireless network gateway. Step S4: During the wireless communication phase between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway, the industrial wireless network gateway receives the industrial wireless network data packets sent by the source device, extracts the corresponding radio frequency features from the industrial wireless network data packets, generates a real-time feature vector, and calculates the feature distance based on the device's inherent feature vector, the real-time feature vector, and the weighted Euclidean distance formula; wherein, the feature distance represents the degree of deviation between the industrial wireless network data packets and those in the legitimate radio frequency fingerprint database; Step S5: Compare the feature distance with a preset radio frequency feature verification threshold, and based on the comparison result, perform forwarding or dropping of wireless data packets in the industrial wireless network; Step S6: The industrial wireless network gateway and the source device periodically update the dynamic session key according to the preset key update cycle.

2. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method of claim 1, wherein, In step S2, the security negotiation configuration parameters include the radio frequency feature verification threshold and the key update cycle; The radio frequency feature verification threshold is the judgment threshold for physical layer radio frequency feature verification, used to verify whether the radio frequency features of subsequent communication wireless frames are legitimate. The key update cycle is the time interval parameter at which the device performs key rotation updates.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: In steps S1 and S2, both the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and the first custom physical layer security enhancement IE include: Element ID field, Length field, Sec_Capability field, Key_Factor field, and Feature_Params field.

4. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In steps S3 and S4, the radio frequency characteristics include received power and carrier frequency offset; based on the received power and carrier frequency offset, a device-specific feature vector is constructed or a real-time feature vector is generated; The received power is the signal strength of the signal received by the industrial wireless network gateway from the source device. The carrier frequency offset is the carrier frequency offset caused by the source device's hardware crystal oscillator.

5. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to claim 4, characterized in that, In step S3, the expression for the inherent feature vector of the device is: ; in, The registered reference received power; For the registered reference carrier frequency offset; In step S4, the expression for the real-time feature vector is: ; in, To receive power in real time, For real-time carrier frequency offset; In step S4, the weighted Euclidean distance calculation formula is: ; in, For feature distance, This refers to the weighting adjustment coefficient; the weighting adjustment coefficient It is used to balance the dimensional differences between received power and carrier frequency offset, and can be dynamically adjusted.

6. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, based on the comparison result, the forwarding or dropping of wireless data packets in the industrial wireless network is performed, specifically including: Step S51: If the feature distance is less than the radio frequency feature verification threshold, proceed to step S52; otherwise, proceed to step S53. Step S52: Determine that the source device is a legitimate device, and forward the wireless data packets of the industrial wireless network; Step S53: Determine that the source device is an illegal device, discard the wireless data packets of the industrial wireless network, and report a physical layer intrusion alarm to the upper-level industrial wireless network management host.

7. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S6 specifically includes: Step S61: When the industrial wireless network gateway reaches the preset key update cycle, a random update factor is generated through the industrial wireless network gateway, the random update factor is encrypted, and it is encapsulated in the same field format as the second custom physical layer security enhancement IE and then sent to the source device. Step S62: Decrypt the encrypted random update factor through the source device to obtain the random update factor issued by the industrial wireless network gateway; Step S63: Based on the preset master key, random update factor and fixed security salt value, KDF key derivation is performed synchronously between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway to generate the latest dynamic session key; Step S64: The source device and the industrial wireless network gateway use the latest dynamic session key to complete the encrypted transmission of subsequent wireless communication between the source device and the industrial wireless network gateway.

8. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The KDF key derivation uses the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm; The formula for calculating the dynamic session key is as follows: ; in, For dynamic session keys; For the preset master key, For random update factors; For string concatenation; To fix the safety salt value.

9. The industrial wireless network protocol security enhancement method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that, The source device and the industrial wireless network gateway communicate wirelessly in accordance with the GB / T 26790.2 standard.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.