SECURE INPUT ON A CONTROL COMPARTMENT FOR A DIALYSECATION UNIT

DE502019012404D1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-21FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE DEUTSCHLAND GMBH
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Patent Information

Application Number
DE502019012404
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-09-19
Filing Date
2019-09-12
Publication Date
2024-11-21
Estimated Expiration
2039-09-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Dialysis machines require enhanced safety and flexibility in remote control operations to prevent misuse and unintentional influences, while ensuring the security of protected health information and patient safety.

Method used

A control component with an input interface, output interface, and processor that verifies control commands by detecting activation signals from separate control elements, ensuring confirmation before executing commands on the medical device, and utilizing secure communication connections.

Benefits of technology

This solution enhances flexibility in controlling dialysis machines while meeting stringent safety requirements by securely verifying and confirming control commands, reducing the risk of misuse and ensuring patient safety through dual-channel confirmation and secure data exchange.

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Description

[0001] The invention relates to the secure input of control commands for the purpose of controlling medical devices, in particular dialysis machines, and a related protection concept. The control commands are input to a control component that is provided separately from the device to be controlled.

[0002] Dialysis machines are blood treatment devices in which a patient's fluid is supplied to a fluid treatment component via a fluid line, treated by the fluid treatment component, and returned to the patient via the fluid line, which can be divided into an arterial and a venous branch. Examples of such blood treatment devices include, in particular, hemodialysis machines. One such blood treatment device is the subject of DE 198 49 787 C1, owned by the applicant. Hemodialysis, hemofiltration, and hemodiafiltration processes are generally performed using automatic hemodialysis machines, such as those marketed by the applicant. A plasmapheresis device is used to perform plasmapheresis, a blood treatment process in which the patient's blood is separated into blood plasma and its corpuscular components (cells).The separated blood plasma is purified or replaced with a substitution solution, and the purified blood plasma or substitution solution is returned to the patient. Peritoneal dialysis machines are used to perform peritoneal dialysis, in which a patient's abdominal cavity is filled with a dialysis fluid via a catheter inserted through the abdominal wall. This dialysis fluid has a concentration gradient of blood substances such as electrolytes (e.g., sodium, calcium, and magnesium) compared to the body's own fluids. Toxins present in the body pass from the blood vessels running through the peritoneum into the abdominal cavity through the membrane. After a few hours, the dialysis fluid in the patient's abdominal cavity, now mixed with the toxins excreted from the body, is replaced.Through osmotic processes, water from the patient's blood can pass through the peritoneum into the dialysis fluid, thus dehydrating the patient.

[0003] The dialysis machines mentioned above and currently on the market are generally self-contained, meaning the program flow logic for controlling the machine is located on the machine itself. At least one user interface is provided on the dialysis machine as an input and output unit.

[0004] To increase flexibility, it is desirable that the dialysis machines can also be controlled by remote control devices.

[0005] However, security requirements for medical devices are significantly higher than for other technical devices. Therefore, even with remote control, an appropriate security concept must be implemented to reliably prevent the misuse of protected data (PHI data, protected health data, such as patient-related data) and, on the other hand, unintentional interference with the control of the medical device (e.g., by connecting to the control line) that could potentially endanger the patient.

[0006] The object of the present invention is therefore to provide an improved safety concept for a medical device or a group of these devices, which on the one hand enables increased flexibility in the input of control commands and on the other hand can also meet the increased safety requirements through structural construction measures.

[0007] This object is achieved according to the invention by devices, systems, and methods according to the appended, independent patent claims. Document US 5,792,204 A discloses a method for verifying voice commands for medical devices. This essentially involves determining whether the voice command issued by the user was correctly recognized by the system. If this is the case, the control command is executed after the user has given permission. However, verification using a control element associated with the respective control command is not provided for in this document.

[0008] In the following, the invention is described with reference to the solution of the problem according to the device, and thus with reference to the control device. The features, advantages or alternative embodiments mentioned here are also to be transferred to the other claimed subject matter and vice versa. In other words, the method-based claims can also be developed with the features that are described and / or claimed in connection with the control device and vice versa. The corresponding functional features of the method are formed by corresponding material modules, in particular by electronic hardware modules or digital processing units (such as microcontroller modules or microprocessor units), of the system or the product and vice versa. For example, the acquisition of a control command can be carried out by a corresponding input interface, which, for example,can be designed as a button on a (graphical) user interface.

[0009] According to a first aspect, the invention relates to a control component for the secure detection of control commands which serve to control at least one medical device, in particular a dialysis machine, comprising: an input interface for detecting at least one control command; an output interface for outputting a message comprising a request to activate at least one operating element; a processor configured to implement a security algorithm in which the processor itself checks, or instructs the at least one operating element with an additional function to check, whether the activation (e.g. by detecting an activation signal on the operating element) has been detected on the at least one operating element; at least one operating element that is controlled by the processor and, in accordance with its instruction from the processor, checks whether the activation has been detected, and wherein the at least one operating element is configured to send a confirmation signal to the processor upon detection of the activation; wherein the processor of the control component only initiates the application (or execution) of the at least one control command on the medical device if it has received the actuation signal from the at least one control element.

[0010] In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the control command is detected on the control component. Then, for example, it can further be provided that the control command is only sent to the medical device once the confirmation signal has been received.

[0011] In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the input interface and the at least one control element are technically separate components. The aforementioned elements can be implemented as different input channels (e.g., touch and / or hard keys), which can, however, be read by a processor (preferably in the control component). This has the advantage that the input can be confirmed again on another medium (element of the control component). This allows the input to be secured, so to speak, via an additional input channel.

[0012] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the control component is arranged separately from the medical device or provided as a separate device. The control component communicates with the medical device via a secure communication connection. Alternatively, the control component can also be formed on the medical device.

[0013] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the output interface and the input interface are merged into one component. The merged component can be designed, for example, as a user interface—particularly a graphical one.

[0014] In another preferred embodiment of the invention, the message comprises a recapitulation element that reproduces the at least one control command (or the sequence thereof) detected on the input interface. The recapitulation element preferably reproduces the control commands in a different format; e.g., if input acoustically, they can be reproduced textually or visually in the recapitulation element. If, in another example, they were input via a menu selection, they can be reproduced textually, or vice versa. This can improve the confirmation reliability and thus also the quality of the entire method, since errors are often detected during repeated display (particularly with a format change).

[0015] According to a further aspect, the object is achieved by a protection method for operating a control component for the secure detection of control commands for controlling at least one medical device (e.g. dialysis machine), wherein the control component is provided separately from the medical device and communicates with the medical device via a secure communication connection, with the following method steps: Detecting at least one control command; generating a message that includes a request to activate at least one control element; outputting the generated message; checking whether an activation on the at least one control element has been detected and, if so, (locally or internally) preparing the detected at least one control command for application on the medical device.

[0016] According to a preferred embodiment of the invention, the control command is captured as an acoustic input (voice input) and / or as a gesture input (for gesture control) and / or as an input on a user interface. Alternatively, a menu selection can serve as the input. This can increase the flexibility of the input.

[0017] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, it is monitored whether an activation on at least one control element was already detected prior to the message being output. If so, a warning message is output. This provides the technical advantage of automatically detecting when, for example, a control element is no longer functioning properly and is, so to speak, "permanently activated," for example, because a button is stuck.

[0018] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the detection of the at least one control command is not carried out on the control element (but on another component, in particular on a second channel). Alternatively or cumulatively, the activation is not carried out or detected on an input interface on which the at least one control command is detected. This can increase safety by eliminating the need for separate component activation or operation, so that the separate component can serve as a reference or independent confirmation and thus as a control.

[0019] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the at least one control command and / or the message include a timestamp. This allows for a more precise and chronological verification between input and confirmation.

[0020] In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the request to activate at least one (specific) control element from a group of control elements is generated dynamically according to a preconfigured scheme that is stored in a memory. The scheme can be stored consistently for all control commands to be confirmed. Alternatively, it can also be different for each control command or for a group of control commands. The scheme can therefore also differ from control command to control command. The scheme can, for example, indicate in which form and / or when a control element is to be activated: For example, it can be configured so that a first control element and then a second control element must be activated first. If a control element is, for example, a button on a GUI, then a single or double click can be required.These scheme settings are configured in a preparatory phase of the protection procedure.

[0021] In another preferred embodiment of the invention, the request to activate at least one control element is a request to activate multiple control elements in a defined sequence or for simultaneous activation. This can increase safety by requiring not just one activation action, but several in a predefined order. Thus, both the sequence must be observed and the control element must be operated correctly. This provides twofold protection.

[0022] In another preferred embodiment of the invention, the protection method is implemented in a protected memory area of ​​the control component.

[0023] According to a further aspect, the above object is further achieved by a computer program for a medical device and / or a control component that can be loaded into an internal memory of a processor and comprises software routines with which the steps of the method according to the above method claims are executed when the software routines are executed on the processor. The protection method and / or the security algorithm can thus be executed completely automatically, computer-implemented, and in particular without user interaction.

[0024] According to a further aspect, the above object is further achieved by a control system for the secure detection of control commands on a control component designed to control at least one medical device (e.g., a dialysis machine). The system is designed with: the at least one medical device; the control component; at least one operating element; wherein the control component is arranged separately from the medical device and communicates with the medical device via a secure communication connection and is thus designed as a distributed system, wherein a control command is detected on the control component or on the medical device and a message is generated which comprises a request to activate the at least one control element; and wherein the generated message is output on the control component or on the medical device; and wherein a check is carried out on or with the aid of the at least one control element to determine whether an activation has been detected and, if so, (and thus the detected at least one control command is deemed to be confirmed): causing the detected at least one control command to be applied to the medical device.

[0025] The protection method can comprise multiple sections that are executed on different computer-based entities. Thus, a first section of the protection method can be executed on the control component and a second section on the medical device and / or on a separate instance. It is also possible for all process steps of the protection system to be executed on the control component. Alternatively, it is possible for some process steps, in particular the input of at least one control command and / or the evaluation, to be performed entirely by the medical device.

[0026] The terms used in the registration are defined in more detail below.

[0027] The control component is an electronic terminal device with a processor or microprocessor that executes a security algorithm to protect an input (e.g., a control command as user input from a user) for controlling the medical device. The control component can be configured directly or indirectly with a user interface. "Indirect" in this context means that the user interface can also be configured on an external device (e.g., a mobile device) that exchanges data with the control device via a corresponding network connection (e.g., Wi-Fi) or interface. The control component also has a data connection with the medical device. This connection is preferably secured. The control component can be configured as a mobile device or as a tablet, smartphone, or mobile terminal device. In one variant, the control component can be configured as a server.The control component can be designed for the (central) control of a plurality of medical devices.

[0028] The control component is controlled, for example, by a processor. The software implemented in the processor controls, in particular, the control elements of the control component. According to the invention, the security algorithm modifies this software to assign additional functionality to all or selected control elements. For this purpose, a control element is determined according to a preconfigurable scheme, on which a user action must be performed to confirm the entered and summarized control command. This can be done, for example, by flipping a switch or clicking a button on a user interface, or by pressing or actuating a key, e.g., the volume up and down buttons on a tablet or smartphone.As soon as the intended activation of the control element has been detected, the control element sends a confirmation signal to the processor, which then marks the respective control command as confirmed and initiates the execution of the control command on the medical device. This can sometimes be done by sending the control command to the medical device.

[0029] A secure communication connection is provided between the control component and the medical device to be controlled. The inputs recorded as control commands on the control component are later used to control the medical device and therefore require additional security. This is achieved by requiring each input to be confirmed via a different control element on the control component. The control element to be actuated is selected according to a predefined scheme implemented using a security algorithm. The security algorithm is implemented in the processor of the control component and can be stored in a (preferably) secure memory area. The secure communication connection can thus preferably be designed for bidirectional data exchange.

[0030] The medical device may be an electronic device that provides medical functions. In particular, it may be a dialysis machine or other blood treatment device. The medical device has a processor, e.g., a digital circuit that performs control tasks.

[0031] The control command is used to control the medical device and is executed and implemented locally on the device. It can be, for example, a single command (activate / deactivate a pump) or a sequence of commands (e.g., replace an extracorporeal blood treatment module). The control command is provided in a format that can be implemented by the medical device's processor.

[0032] The security algorithm is fully computer-implemented and runs automatically without user interaction. The security algorithm is used to modify the control elements of the control component (e.g., the "loudspeaker louder" button is assigned a different or additional function to detect whether or not an activation or actuation by the user has occurred). The button or control element thus becomes a test element for confirming an already entered control command by activating a key or a configurable switching element or component on the control component. The security algorithm can be implemented in the processor of the control component and / or in the processor of the dialysis machine. In advance, certain configurations can be made and stored by the user in a configuration phase, such as the scheme for activating the control elements.It is possible to specify which control elements (switches, buttons, keys, etc.) must be activated for confirmation and by which actions (single or repeated clicks, presses, toggles, turns, etc.). To increase security, it can be configured so that not just one confirmation element (e.g., the speaker button) must be activated, but rather several confirmation elements in a configurable order.

[0033] The confirmation signal is an electronic signal and can be binary (assuming the state 0 or 1 to indicate a successful or failed confirmation of the control element) or a sequence of bits (encoded). The confirmation signal is sent from the respective control element to the processor of the respective device (control component or medical device).

[0034] The message is electronic and comprises at least one digital data set. The message contains at least one request to activate the at least one control element. The message is addressed to the user and is output on the output unit (e.g., GUI). The message can, for example, include the textual or voice-based instruction: "Please now operate the control element of device XY at position xyz in the manner described." A visual instruction can also be output indicating the location of the control element and / or a simulated representation of how it is to be activated. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the message includes a recapitulation element. This can, for example, be a data field to repeatedly display the control command recorded on the input interface to the user as a voice- or text-based recapitulation for confirmation.Additionally, a confirmation field can be provided for the user to confirm or revoke their control command. After a revocation, the protection procedure is interrupted. After confirmation, it continues. It is also conceivable for the confirmation signal to be emitted by the operator via voice input.

[0035] The check (whether the intended control element has been activated in the intended manner) is preferably performed continuously and / or repeatedly as soon as the first input is possible, and then event-based, e.g., as soon as an activation is detected or as soon as a message is received. This ensures that the functionality of the respective control element can be monitored. If a confirmation signal is detected on the control element before the request to activate it, it can be assumed that it is faulty (button stuck), and a corresponding warning can be issued.

[0036] The protection method and / or the security algorithm can be provided as a computer program, in particular as a microprocessor program.

[0037] A further solution to the problem thus consists in a computer program product which is loaded or loadable into a memory of a computer or an electronic or medical device with a computer program for carrying out the protection method described in more detail above when the computer program is executed on the computer or the electronic or medical device.

[0038] Another solution to the problem involves a computer program for carrying out all steps of the method described in more detail above, if the computer program is executed on a computer, an electronic device, or a medical device. It is also possible for the computer program to be stored on a medium readable by the computer or the electronic or medical device.

[0039] In the following detailed description of the figures, non-limiting embodiments with their features and further advantages are discussed with reference to the drawing. Short description of the characters

[0040] Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of a dialysis machine for which control commands are to be recorded in a secure manner on a separately provided control component according to an advantageous embodiment of the invention. Fig. 2 is an alternative implementation of the embodiment shown in Fig. 1 is shown. Fig. 3 is an exemplary flowchart of method steps of a protection method according to an advantageous embodiment of the invention. Fig. 4 shows an exemplary interaction diagram with a data exchange of signals and messages between the control component and a dialysis machine. Fig. 5shows an alternative exemplary interaction diagram with a data exchange between the control component and a dialysis machine according to a variant of the invention. Fig. 6 shows one to the in Fig. 1 shown alternative embodiment, in which the evaluation logic is implemented on the dialysis machine. Detailed description of embodiments based on the figures

[0041] The invention is described in more detail below using exemplary embodiments in conjunction with the figures. The following description of the exemplary embodiments refers to a dialysis machine DG as an example of a medical device. In the preferred embodiment of the invention, both a control component SB and a dialysis machine DG are designed with a processor MC. To keep the description as clear as possible, the same reference numerals are used for these, even though the processor is located in different components. However, the description clearly indicates which processor is involved in each case.

[0042] Fig. 1shows a dialysis machine DG as an example of a medical device that is to be controlled by a control component SB. The user makes inputs with control commands sb on the control component SB. For this purpose, the control component SB can be designed with an input interface ES. Alternatively, it is also possible to use the input interface ES, as in Fig. 1indicated by dashed lines, to be implemented externally and outside of the control component SB, e.g. as a graphical user interface GUI that exchanges data with the control component SB. The control commands sb recorded on the input interface are passed on to the local processor MC (in this case on the control component SB), which causes a message n to be generated, which is output on an output interface AS. The message n contains a request to activate a control element BE and can, if necessary, include further information and data fields for notification. The control element BE indicated in the request is monitored. In particular, it is checked whether activation has occurred. If so, a confirmation signal b is transmitted to the processor MC of the control component SB.The processor of the control component SB is now able to decide whether or not the control element has been operated and activated as intended by the security algorithm. If so (confirmation signal b received), it can make local preparations so that the control command sb can be implemented and executed on the dialysis machine DG. To do this, it can, in particular, initiate the sending of the control command sb to the dialysis machine DG via a secure data connection. After the control command sb is received on the dialysis machine DG, the command can be executed there.

[0043] In this embodiment, the protection process is implemented entirely on the control component SB. The user thus controls the dialysis machine remotely from the control component SB.

[0044] An alternative variant is in Fig. 2shown. Here, for example, a four-eyes principle for controlling the dialysis machine DG can be implemented. A first user operates the control component SB and a second user operates the dialysis machine DG. A control command sb is entered by the first user on the control component SB, e.g. on a user interface GUI, and forwarded to the processor MC, which in response generates the message n and sends it to the dialysis machine DG via the secure data connection. The processor MC of the dialysis machine DG forwards the received message n to the local output interface AS for output (to the second user). The message n contains the request to activate a control element BE, which is now arranged on the dialysis machine DG so that it can be operated by the second user or even by the same user.The control element BE is controlled by the processor MC according to the security algorithm in such a way that when activated correctly (e.g. when an activation signal is detected) it sends the confirmation signal b to the processor MC of the dialysis machine DG.

[0045] In another variant, the control command sb is input on the control component SB, and the message n is also output on the control component SB, but the input is confirmed on the dialysis machine DG (e.g., via a dedicated confirmation switch). Message n can also be configured as a voice message for output on the control component SB (e.g., a loud voice playback of the user input or control command with a request for confirmation).

[0046] In a first variant, the confirmation signal b (from the dialysis machine DG) is forwarded to the control component SB, which in response transmits the (confirmed) control command sb to the processor MC of the dialysis machine DG.

[0047] In a second variant, the control component SB not only sends the locally generated message n (or, in an alternative embodiment of the invention, also on the dialysis machine DG) to the dialysis machine DG for the purpose of confirmation, but also the detected control command sb. In this case, the confirmation signal b from the dialysis machine DG does not need to be sent to the control component SB, since the dialysis machine already knows the control command sb and can execute it directly. If no confirmation signal was detected, the existing but unconfirmed control command sb is deleted and not executed.

[0048] Fig. 3shows the sequence in one exemplary embodiment. After the start of the method, the control command sb is detected in step S1, preferably on the input interface ES. In step S2, the message n is generated. In step S3, the generated message n is output, preferably on the output interface AS. In step S4, a check is made as to whether the control element BE has been activated as intended (according to the request). For this purpose, it is checked or monitored whether a confirmation signal b has been detected on the control element BE and transmitted to the processor MC. In step S5, the control command is prepared for local execution on the dialysis machine DG in step S6.

[0049] In order to keep the safety requirements for the control component SB as low as possible, it is preferably provided that as many steps as possible, in particular the evaluation, take place on the dialysis machine DG itself. It is therefore helpful if a first or second control element BE1 is formed on the dialysis machine, as described above in connection with Fig. 2 explained. Therefore, the control component SB is preferably designed "only" for data input and output, while the evaluation logic, which checks whether the control element has been activated or not, is performed on the dialysis machine itself. This makes it easier to comply with safety standards.

[0050] Fig. 4 is an interaction diagram between the dialysis machine DG and the control component SB. In the Fig. 4In the variant shown, all steps of the protection procedure are executed on the control component SB. Only after a successful confirmation has been detected on the control component SB, the control command sb is sent to the dialysis machine DG for execution there. Otherwise, the

[0051] The control command is not implemented and may need to be entered repeatedly. The interactions in Fig. 4 correspond to the structural design of the protection system described above with reference to Fig. 1 has been described.

[0052] In Fig. 5 is a variant of the Fig. 4 described process, which corresponds to the structural design described above with reference to Fig. 2The protection system is designed here as a distributed system and the protection procedure is executed in a distributed manner. A first section is executed on the dialysis machine DG and a second section is executed on the control component SB. As in Fig. 5As shown, the detection S1 and the generation of the message n are carried out in step S2 on the control component SB. The message n is transmitted to the dialysis machine DG. This preferably also takes place via the secure data channel. In response, the message n is then output in step S3 and the activation of the control element BE is checked in step S4. If a confirmation signal b was detected and the test has thus determined a successful test result, the confirmation signal b can, in one variant, be transmitted to the control component SB, which, in response, sends the control command sb to the dialysis machine DG in step S5 so that the dialysis machine DG can execute it locally in step 6.

[0053] In Fig. 6 is a variant of the Fig. 1shown embodiment of the invention, in which the evaluation logic and the security algorithm are at least partially implemented on the dialysis machine DG. The input control command sb is transmitted to the dialysis machine. The processor MC of the dialysis machine DG then converts the detected control command sb into the message (speech or text) and sends this to the output interface AS of the control component SB. When the control element BE on the control component SB is activated, the confirmation signal b is sent back to the dialysis machine DG. The previously transmitted control command sb is thus considered confirmed. In other words, the control command sb is only implemented when the confirmation signal b has been received on the dialysis machine DG.

[0054] By additionally checking whether a control element has been operated in a preconfigured manner to confirm the detected control command, inputs and control commands on external devices can also be further secured with appropriate hardware components. One advantage is that new hardware components do not need to be provided on the end device (e.g., in the form of new, additional control elements); instead, existing control elements can be used and only need to be modified by the processor to control them.

[0055] Finally, it should be noted that the description of the invention and the exemplary embodiments are not to be understood as restrictive with regard to a specific physical realization of the invention. All features explained and shown in connection with individual embodiments of the invention can be provided in different combinations in the subject matter according to the invention in order to simultaneously realize their advantageous effects. It is therefore, for example, also within the scope of the invention to require not only the activation of one control element BE, but the activation of several control elements in a predefined sequence (e.g. first loudspeaker button quiet and then loudspeaker button louder). For a person skilled in the art, it is particularly obvious that the invention is not only applicable to dialysis machines (e.g.for a hemodialysis machine or a peritoneal dialysis machine), but also for other medical devices that must be controlled in a secure manner via a remote control component SB.

[0056] Furthermore, the components of the medical device DG and the control component SB, such as the user interface GUI, etc., can be implemented distributed across several physical products.

[0057] The scope of the present invention is given by the claims and is not limited by the features explained in the description or shown in the figures.

Claims

1. Control component (SB) for the secure acquisition of control commands for controlling at least one medical device (DG), in particular a dialysis device, with: - an input interface (ES) for capturing at least one control command (sb); - an output interface (AS) for outputting a message (n) which comprises a request to activate at least one operating element (BE); - a processor (MC) which is designed to implement a security algorithm in that the processor (MC) instructs the at least one operating element (BE) with an additional function for checking whether its activation has been detected; - at least one operating element (BE) which is controlled by the processor (MC) and consequently checks whether the activation has been detected, and wherein the at least one operating element (BE) is configured to send a confirmation signal (b) to the processor (MC) when the activation is detected; wherein the processor (MC) initiates the application of the at least one control command (sb) to the medical device (DG) only when it has received the confirmation signal (b) from the at least one operating element (BE).

2. Control component (SB) according to claim 1, in which the input interface (ES) and the at least one operating element (BE) are separate components.

3. Control component (SB) according to at least one of the preceding claims, wherein the control component (SB) is arranged separately from the medical device (DG) and communicates with the medical device (DG) via a secure communication link.

4. Control component (SB) according to at least one of the preceding claims, in which the output interface (AS) is fused with the input interface (ES) in one component.

5. Control component (SB) according to at least one of the preceding claims, wherein the message (n) comprises a recapitulation element reproducing the control commands (sb) detected on the input interface (ES).

6. Protection method for operating a control component (SB) for the secure acquisition of control commands (sb) for controlling at least one medical device (DG), in particular a dialysis device, the control component (SB) being arranged separately from the medical device (DG) and communicating with the medical device (DG) via a secure communication link, having the following method steps: - Detection (S1) of at least one control command (sb); - Generating (S2) a message (n), which comprises a request to activate at least one operating element (BE); - Output (S3) of the message (n); - Checking (S4) whether an activation has been detected on at least one operating element (BE) and if so: - Preparing (S5) the captured at least one control command (sb) for execution (S6) on the medical device (DG).

7. Protection method according to the preceding method claim, in which the at least one control command (sb) is detected as an acoustic input and / or as an input on a user interface.

8. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, wherein the checking (S4) is performed by detecting whether a confirmation signal (b) has been received.

9. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, in which it is monitored whether an activation on the at least one operating element (BE) has already been detected at a time before the message (n) is output and, if the answer is affirmative, a warning is output.

10. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, in which the detection of the at least one control command (sb) is not carried out on the operating element (BE) and / or in which the activation is not detected on the input interface (ES) on which the at least one control command (sb) is detected.

11. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, in which the at least one control command (sb) and / or the message (n) comprise a time stamp.

12. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, in which the request to activate at least one operating element (BE) from a group of operating elements is generated dynamically according to a preconfigured scheme which is stored in a memory.

13. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, in which the request for activation of at least one operating element (BE) is a request for activation of a plurality of operating elements (BE) in a defined sequence or for simultaneous activation.

14. Protection method according to at least one of the preceding method claims, which is implemented in a protected memory area of the control component (SB).

15. Computer program for a medical device (DG) and / or a control component (SB), which can be loaded into an internal memory of a processor (MC) and comprises software routines with which the steps of the method according to the preceding method claims are carried out when the software routines are executed on the processor (MC).

16. Control system for the secure acquisition of control commands (sb) on a control component (SB) which is designed to control at least one medical device (DG), in particular a dialysis device, having: - at least one medical device (DG); - the control component (SB); - at least one operating element (BE); wherein the control component (SB) is arranged separately from the medical device (DG) and communicates with the medical device (DG) via a secure communication link, and wherein a control command (sb) is detected on the control component (SB) or on the medical device (DG) and a message (n) is generated which comprises a request to activate the at least one operating element (BE); and whereby the generated message (n) is output on the control component (SB) or on the medical device (DG); and whereby a check is carried out on the at least one operating element (BE) to determine whether an activation has been detected and, if so; Confirmation of the captured at least one control command (sb) to initiate an application of the same on the medical device (DG).